Gt Brit. Foreign Office

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919–1939

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DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

1919–1939

First Series, Volume XVIII

Greece and Turkey
September 3, 1922–July 24, 1923

PREFACE

THIS volume continues the documentation of Volume XVII. Chapter I deals with the Chanak crisis of September–October 1922, with the events leading to the Armistice of Mudania (October 11, 1922), and with the negotiations for the convening of a Peace Conference, which opened at Lausanne on November 20. The proceedings of the first phase of that Conference (November 20, 1922 to February 5, 1923) provide the subject of Chapter II. Negotiations from the break-down of the Conference until its resumption on April 23, 1923 are dealt with in Chapter III. Chapter IV covers the second phase of the Conference which led to the signature on July 24, 1923 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, of various other instruments and of subsidiary documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement,[1] all of which replaced the abortive Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920. Included in this volume are three Appendices. Two of these—a Memorandum by Mr. H. G. Nicolson on the Freedom of the Straits, and a War Office Memorandum of October 19, 1922, discussing revisions of the Treaty of Sèvres—have been included because of their intrinsic interest and because they supplement and elucidate the documentation in Chapter I. The third Appendix giving the French texts of the Allied Draft Treaty of January 31, 1923 and of the Turkish Counter-proposals of March 8, 1923 has been included for the convenience of readers who may wish to follow closely the intricate negotiations of the second phase of the Lausanne Conference (Chapter IV). In this Appendix the texts have been so arranged that the reader can see at a glance what the Allies proposed, and what the Turks wished to omit, amend, or add. For three months this Allied Draft Treaty and the Turkish Counter-proposals were the subject of continuous haggling against a background of recurrent crises, the final treaty emerging only very slowly after much redrafting, many compromises, and last moment concessions. As the documentation in Chapter IV clearly shows, matters of principle were discussed in terms of economic, financial, and administrative detail. Much of this detail is tedious. As Sir H. Rumbold commented to Lord Curzon (he was complaining of Press comments on the futility and procrastination of the Conference): 'To the public bulk of questions at issue for which solutions have been found only by patient debate are probably uninteresting and may often appear unimportant but agreement by discussion however slow is the only procedure possible to-day.' (See No. 547.) This tedium is relieved, however, by Lord Curzon's and Sir H. Rumbold's lively and lucid telegrams to London which form the principal documentation of

[1] For these, see Treaty Series No. 16 (1923). *Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other Instruments, signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, together with Agreements between Greece and Turkey signed on January 30, 1923, and Subsidiary Documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Settlement. (With Map.)* Cmd. 1929, H.M.S.O., 1923.

this volume. These telegrams not only summarize the lengthy proceedings of the formal meetings of the commissions of the Conference but also describe important negotiations which went on outside the Conference room. They reveal, moreover, the thoughts and plans of these two negotiators. Finally, they elucidate the minutes of the formal conferences.

For the first phase of the Conference the English version of the minutes will be found in Cmd. 1814 (1923) and the French version in a publication of the French Foreign Ministry (see No. 209, note 1). For the second phase of the Conference, which was conducted entirely in French without an interpreter, there is no English version of the minutes of any of its three committees. As Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, writing from Lausanne, explained in a private letter of April 24, 1922 to Mr. G. W. Rendel of the Foreign Office: 'We have arranged with the French Delegation and with M. Massigli, the Secretary General, that a French, British and probably Italian secretary will be present at every meeting of each of these three committees. These secretaries will as soon as possible draw up a *procès verbal* which will be sent round to all the Delegations for approval and, in accordance with the rules of the Conference, if any amendments should be desired they must be notified to the Secretary General within forty-eight hours. Thus it is hoped that within ninety-six hours a "texte définitif" will be available which will be forwarded to Paris for urgent printing. In practice I hope that the French will do most of the work in connection with drawing up the *procès-verbaux*. The *procès-verbaux* of the present Conference will not form verbatim reports of the orations delivered but will summarise these. Sir H. Rumbold, Mr. Grew (the United States observer) and M. Otchiai (the Japanese delegate) all speak French, so we do not propose to send you an English version of the *procès-verbaux* as the questions under discussion are mostly highly technical.' Minuting this letter, Mr. Rendel commented: 'Presumably it will not be necessary to translate the *procès-verbaux* unless and until it is decided to publish a second blue book on the resumed conference.' No second blue book, however, was published and no translation of the *procès-verbaux* was made. Hence for a full account of the proceedings of the formal conferences at Lausanne between April 24 and July 24, 1923, recourse must be had to the official French record (see No. 477, note 4) to which references are made in the footnotes to Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams summarizing the proceedings of the Conference.

When in September 1922 the Greek army in Asia Minor collapsed, British policy had to be adjusted hastily to meet the new situation. Any chance of the Turkish Nationalists' accepting the relatively moderate revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, for which Lord Curzon had striven in the previous eighteen months (see Volume XVII), had suddenly disappeared. What is more, the whole British military position in the Near East seemed to be seriously threatened, particularly as no effective help was likely to be rendered by the French and Italians, whose policies, in default of determined British countermeasures, had been chiefly responsible for the Greek collapse. To this new situation the British Government, although much divided in counsel and

uncertain of parliamentary and popular support, responded with some firmness, threatening to mobilize the strength of the Empire to defend what were considered to be vital British interests. In making this threat, which they showed signs of carrying out, they could still count upon considerable Greek military support. Before the Asia Minor disaster, the Greeks had built up in Thrace an army Corps of four divisions. Subsequently the Greek Northern Army groups, having extricated themselves from Asia Minor, had joined these Thracian forces, which by the end of January 1923 amounted to two army corps each of three divisions. There is little doubt that the presence of these troops, which in the months following the Greek Revolution of September 1922 (see Nos. 85 and 86) were to be reorganized into a respectable fighting force, made possible the British stand at Chanak and the stout rearguard action that Lord Curzon fought at the long drawn out Conference of Lausanne.

On the Chanak crisis the documents here published give a detailed account of the military situation, of the negotiations with the French and the Italians, and the day to day governmental decisions. They do not, however, tell the whole story. They must necessarily be supplemented by a study of the War Office and Admiralty records, of private papers, and of the French, Greek and Turkish documents, which have not yet been published in any quantity. The same holds good of other crises—the first Greek threat to Constantinople in December 1922–January 1923 (see Nos. 287, 299, 302, 307, 316, 317, 319, 350), the second threat in May 1923 (see Nos. 505, 508, 517, 518, 520, 521, 522, 525, 526, 530, 546, 551, 552, 553, 554, 556, 558, 562), and the Turkish intransigence in July 1923 combined with the Greek proposal to make a separate peace (see Nos. 645, 655, 657, 658, 669, 672, 674, 677, 680). In July 1923 an outbreak of hostilities was perhaps even more likely than in September–October 1922 when the Nationalist forces were pressing on the perimeter of the British base at Chanak. So far as one can see, the Turkish pressure on Chanak, which was subsequently transferred to Ismid (see No. 112), was merely a means to gain hoped-for concessions for which there was no intention to fight; whereas in July 1923, the Kemalists, it would seem, were determined to fight if further concessions were not forthcoming.

It was during July 1923 that the Allies made their final steps in a halting retreat which had been going on for many months. During the first phase of the Conference, Lord Curzon, receiving little support from his French and Italian colleagues, had made, according to his own reckoning, well over sixty concessions, many relatively trivial but a number of some substance. (Memorandum of December 27, 1922, E 2/1/44.) True, in the political commission, over which he himself had presided, he had secured, at the price of these concessions, a régime for the Straits which satisfied essentially British *desiderata* (see Nos. 225, 251, 255, 256, 260, 266, 268, 281, 283, 284, 286, 360, 370), and the exclusion from the peace negotiations of the problem of Mosul which was to be left to separate Anglo-Turkish negotiations, failing which the dispute was to be referred to the League of Nations (see Nos. 228, 257, 273, 305, 322, 325, 334, 340, 344, 345, 370). As he himself explained in

a telegram to his government: 'His Majesty's Government will recognize that in the end the result they so much feared viz: that the break, if it occurred, would take place upon issues for which I was responsible or in which Great Britain was principally concerned, was successfully escaped. All the points for which I had fought had been secured and the methods pursued in the first commission had been triumphantly vindicated. It was upon matters of greater importance to the French and Italians than to ourselves that the rupture took place; and there, with a loyalty in marked contrast to that which I had met with at the hands of M. Poincaré and the French, I stood by my colleagues to the end; choosing to return without a Treaty sooner than sacrifice the cause of allied unity to which I had pledged my faith. Furthermore, when during the conversations of the last few days at Lausanne, Ismet Pasha more than once intimated to me that it was with Great Britain that he would like to conclude a separate Treaty, inasmuch as we were the one Power whose friendship he desired, I resisted any such appeal on the ground that I was at Lausanne to conclude an allied and not an individual peace. Had France adopted a similar attitude instead of deserting us at a critical juncture the result might have been very different' (see No. 370).

In the economic and financial commissions, over which his two colleagues, M. Barrère and Signor Garroni, had presided, much less agreement had been reached, and, as will be seen from the Turkish Counter-proposals of March 8 (Appendix III), it was precisely to the economic and financial sections of the Treaty that the Kemalists took the greatest exception. On these matters, at least, Lord Curzon hoped he would receive some support from the French, whose financial stake in Turkey was considerable, and even from the Italians, who had dreams of securing concessions under the continuance of an economic régime resembling the pre-war Capitulations. Here, however, he was to be disappointed. The French and Italians were inclined to yield on almost every issue; and, during the second phase of the Conference, Sir H. Rumbold at Lausanne and Lord Curzon himself in London, found themselves defending the French bondholders with a greater tenacity than the French Government displayed on their behalf. Only at the last moment, when almost every conceivable concession had been made, did the French stand firm on what were really trivialities, and, in doing so, they seriously jeopardized the armistice, fondly hoping that if hostilities broke out the British and the Greeks would fight their battles for them. Not until Curzon let it be known that the British Government would not stand for this, did the French make the final concessions which enabled the Peace Settlement to be signed.

While the documentation printed in this volume and its predecessors provides a wealth of material for the study of British policy in the Near East during the years 1919 to 1923, it may be some time before historians can see this period in its true perspective. Looked at in one way, the story of these eventful years is one of continuous triumph of French over British diplomacy. Looked at in another way, the story is typical of the complete failure of

France, by disregarding certain prerequisites of the Entente, to maintain the Anglo-French unity considered by many to be so essential to the repose and security of Europe. Looked at in yet another way, British policy in the Near East was, despite its apparent weakness and the controversy that accompanied it, a masterly day to day adjustment to political realities both at home and abroad.

Lord Curzon's own comment on the Conference of Lausanne is not without interest. Replying privately to Mr. Ben Tillett, M.P., who had sent to him a letter from one of his correspondents criticising the Lausanne settlement, he stated: '. . . His criticism of the Foreign Office seems to be that the interests of British traders were sacrificed at Lausanne and that not only they but British industry in general are now suffering from the consequences. Given the circumstances this charge is both unjust and unfounded. It is hardly necessary to add anything to what he says of the present mentality of the Turks and it is that mentality with which we had to contend at Lausanne. The Turks are passing through a period of intoxicated nationalism. Their attitude towards all foreigners is one of mixed arrogance and suspicion. Their admitted policy is to achieve and consolidate a position of self-sufficiency and complete independence, political and economic, of the rest of the world. They have begun by freeing themselves from the Greeks and Armenians, who have been their merchants and middlemen in the past, and incidentally, they are just beginning to discover the disastrous consequence of this idiotic policy. They are also determined as far as possible to substitute Turks for all other foreigners engaged in trade or industry in Turkey, partly in pursuance of the policy to which I have referred above and partly in order to find occupations for their own people. The fact that their own people are incapable of replacing the foreign element does not worry them at all for the moment. They will find out their mistake before long.

'It was this mentality and this policy that confronted us in the negotiations at Lausanne where the Turks had the further advantage that in their state of frenzied nationalism they were always in the last resort cheerfully prepared to face a rupture and to have recourse to hostilities. I ran this risk when I broke up the conference at the end of the first phase. Had the other Allies stood by me I should then have won. In the second phase of the negotiations, at which I was not present, compromises were reached on all the points at issue but not without the point of rupture being almost reached on several occasions. Admittedly the treaty which finally resulted was not what we could have wished. But we had to restore peace in the Near East and to withdraw our troops, and we were not prepared to exact our conditions by force of arms. Had I come back with a renewal of hostilities in my hand the first to demand my expulsion from office would have been the labour party.

'As for the present position of British trade and traders, I agree that it is profoundly unsatisfactory. The Turks will have to pay the price for their obstinacy and folly and in the meantime foreign interests of all sorts will suffer. I need not tell you that we do all we can by protests to protect British interests. But we cannot prevent the Turkish National Assembly

from enacting oppressive laws and regulations any more than we can force them to buy British products and avail themselves of British industry. Their so-called sovereign rights have become a sort of shibboleth to them and appeals to justice, reason or even self-interest are for the moment unavailing.

'But I do not therefore despair of the future of British trade in Turkey. When the madness is over past sanity will return and the clouds will lift. In my own opinion British trade already stands higher and will then have a better chance than that of any other country. I have written to you quite frankly; but of course this letter is not for publication.'

I have to thank the Foreign Office Librarian, Mr. C. J. Child, O.B.E., and his successor, Mr. B. Cheeseman, O.B.E., Librarian of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and their staffs for their unfailing assistance. I have had unrestricted access to all papers in the Foreign Office archives. I have to express my gratitude to the staff of the Public Record Office for their patience and co-operation. Finally, I have to thank Miss Janet Cooper, M.A., Ph.D., and Mrs. Roberta Warman, B.A., for their invaluable help in the preparation of this volume.

DOUGLAS DAKIN

September, 1970

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

B.F.S.P.	*British and Foreign State Papers* (London).
Cmd.	Command Paper (London).
Cmd. 1814	Turkey No. 1 (1923). *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922–1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace* (London, 1923).
Degras	*Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras, 3 vols. (London, 1951 ff.), vol. i.
D.D.I.(i)/(ii)	*I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Settima Serie: 1922–35*, Volumes I and II (Rome, 1953, 1955).
Frangulis	A. F. Frangulis, *La Grèce et La Crise Mondiale*, vol. ii (Paris, 1926).
F.R.U.S.	*Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington).
H.C. Deb. 5s.	*Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, 5th Series*, House of Commons (London).
H.L. Deb. 5s.	*Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, 5th Series*, House of Lords (London).
Recueil (1)	*Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du Proche-Orient (1922–1923). Recueil des Actes de la Conférence, Première Série*, vols. i, ii, iii, and iv (Paris, 1923).
Recueil (2)	*Conférence de Lausanne sur les affaires du Proche-Orient, (1922–1923). Recueil des Actes de la Conférence, Deuxième Série*, vols. i and ii (Paris, 1923).

An asterisk following the file number of a document indicates that the text has been taken from Confidential Print.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

CHAPTER I

Correspondence and Memoranda, September 3–November 20, 1922

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
1	MR. C. H. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 368	Sept. 3	Refers to Vol. XVII, No. 756, and reports that Greek Govt. is prepared, if H.M.G. so wish, to inform the French Govt. of the Greek request to H.M.G. to arrange an armistice on the basis of the evacuation of Asia Minor.	1
2	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 347	Sept. 3	Requests advice as to steps to be taken to secure suspension of hostilities pending early meeting of a peace conference.	2
3	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 374	Sept. 4	Reports information from the French High Commissioner that Nationalists had decided to launch offensive in view of (i) Greek proclamation of autonomous district in Asia Minor, (ii) Mr. Lloyd George's speech of Aug. 4 (see Vol. XVII, No. 727).	2
4	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 275 TO MR. H. W. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 238	Sept. 4	Instructs to urge French and Italian Govts. to instruct their High Commissioners at Constantinople to invite Angora Govt. to send military representatives to the frontier of the neutral zone to meet Allied military commanders with a view to the immediate conclusion of an armistice.	3
5	TO MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 191	Sept. 4	Informs that contents of No. 4 has been communicated to Greek Chargé d'Affaires, to whom it was pointed out that Greek Govt. should not imagine that situation is worse than it is.	5
6	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 378	Sept. 4	Expresses view that, since Kemalists identify H.M.G. with the Greeks, it is advisable that Greek Govt. should be urged to ask Kemalists for an armistice themselves.	5
7	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 381	Sept. 5	Reports agreement with views of his French and Italian colleagues that Allies should (i) land detachments in Smyrna to protect colonies and prevent excesses, (ii) recommend to Greek Govt. to ask for armistice and intimate to Angora Govt. that armistice had in view immediate and orderly evacuation of Asia Minor, (iii) wait a few days before inviting Turks to [Allied] conference.	7

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
8 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 379	Sept. 5	Reports that on being informed of substance of Nos. 4 and 5, M.F.A. expressed his thanks to H.M.G. Adds that he had encouraged Greek Govt. to show strength and to work for best possible terms.	9
9 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 456	Sept. 5	Refers to No. 4, and communicates French Govt.'s reply to effect that intervention of Allied Commanders would be offer of mediation which would run risk of rejection, but the French Govt. are ready to instruct their High Commissioner at Constantinople to concert with his Allied colleagues to secure an immediate armistice.	10
10 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 384	Sept. 6	Refers to No. 11, n. 3, and expresses view that question of armistice should be related only to that of evacuation of Asia Minor; adds that should Mustapha Kemal make other demands, and should H.M.G. in consequence decide to give material assistance to the Greeks, such assistance should take the form of military equipment and supplies.	10
11 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 390	Sept. 7	Refers to No. 4, and reports that, in view of gravity of the military situation, he prevailed upon his colleagues to instruct dragomans to put armistice proposal to Hamid Bey, Nationalist representative, the following morning.	12
12 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 279 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 244	Sept. 7	Instructs to invite French and Italian Govts. to concur in draft invitation to the League of Nations. *Note 4.* Draft of invitation to the League of Nations to make recommendations (for incorporation in treaties) for the protection of minorities in Greece and Turkey.	13
13 MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 266	Sept. 7	Refers to No. 4, and reports that M.F.A. is inclined to the French view (see No. 9). Requests to be instructed whether to press Italian Govt. on the fixing of a date for the Venice Conference and on the despatch of commissions to enquire into atrocities.	14
14 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 360	Sept. 7	Refers to No. 11, and approves action therein reported; states H.M.G.'s view that date and nature of conference must depend on course of events in Anatolia.	14
15 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 270	Sept. 8	Refers to No. 12, and reports that M.F.A. had stated (i) that instructions had been sent to Italian Ambassadors in Paris and London to propose that Venice Conference should be held towards the end of September, (ii) that Fathi Bey had intimated that Turks would be ready to go to Venice.	15
16 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 399	Sept. 8	Refers to No. 14, and reports that Allied Generals in Constantinople point out that armistice entails establishing a line behind which Greek troops in Thrace must retire.	16

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
17 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 403	Sept. 8	Points out the necessity of embarkation of the Greek army and of giving effective support to Greece.	16
18 To Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 209	Sept. 9	Instructs to represent to the Greek Govt. the criminal folly of any such action as destroying Brusa.	17
19 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 403	Sept. 9	Reports that, with the approval of his colleagues, the French High Commissioner has informed Hamid Bey that request for armistice (see No. 11) emanated officially from the Greek Govt. and that object was the immediate evacuation of Anatolia.	18
20 To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 371	Sept. 10	Refers to No. 16, and informs that, since Greek threat to Constantinople and possibility of Greek support for Allied troops are important factors in negotiations with Kemalists, H.M.G. object to Allied Generals' proposal for fixing a line behind which Greek Army must retire.	18
21 To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 374	Sept. 11	Informs that H.M.G., while not contemplating holding Chanak, are prepared, even though French and Italian Govts. refuse, to send reinforcements and to employ British fleet to hold Gallipoli and Constantinople. Adds that General Harington is authorized to abandon Ismid lines rather than incur defeat.	19
22 To Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 267	Sept. 11	Refers to No. 15, and informs that H.M.G. have sent reply to Italian Govt. stating that three Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have recommended that it would be impolitic to invite the Angora Govt. to a conference at this stage; instructs to urge Italian Govt. to agree to proposed reference of minorities question to the League of Nations (see No. 12).	20
23 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 410	Sept. 13	Comments on No. 21 and points out that (i) Allies at Constantinople intend to maintain neutral zone opposite Constantinople and Gallipoli, (ii) any withdrawal from Chanak or neutral zone in Ismid would have deplorable effect on Allied prestige, (iii) emphatic announcement of Allied intention to hold Constantinople and Gallipoli may inspire Kemalists to threaten Allied forces in Chanak and Ismid, (iv) Allies cannot hold Constantinople and ensure freedom of the Straits unless they hold territory opposite Constantinople and Gallipoli or unless they can obtain complete demilitarization of existing neutral zones. *Note 4.* General Harington's comments on No. 21.	21
24 Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 276	Sept. 13	Refers to Nos. 12 and 22, and reports that Italian Govt., while reiterating view that early conference at Venice is desirable, is ready to associate itself with invitation to the League of Nations on condition French Govt. also consents to do so.	22

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
25	To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 301 To Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 270	Sept. 13	Instructs to inform French and Italian Govts. that Admiral Brock has asked Mustapha Kemal to confirm in writing his statement to Sir H. Lamb that he considered himself at war with Great Britain.	23
26	To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 385	Sept. 13	Informs of H.M.G.'s view that Allied troops should not, except in case of military risk, withdraw from Chanak and Ismid, since the holding of these positions may constitute useful pawn in Allies' negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.	24
27	Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 418	Sept. 15	Reports view of the Allied High Commissioners that their govts. must face prospect of war with Kemalists unless conference is summoned without delay and that those govts. should, before the conference assembles, reach agreement on extent of concessions to be made to the Kemalists.	25
28	Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 417	Sept. 15	Reports that Constantinople Govt. consider that Allies should declare immediately that a conference will be held at Venice. *Note 2.* Reports of the destruction of Smyrna.	26
29	To Mr. Millington-Drake Bucharest Tel. No. 79	Sept. 15	Instructs to enquire whether Roumanian Govt. are prepared to place without delay a division at disposal of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople.	27
30	Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 421	Sept. 16	Reports that he informed Greek High Commissioner that Greek troops would be fully justified in repelling attacks by Turkish bands but should not pursue these bands into neutral zone.	28
31	Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 466	Sept. 16	Reports receipt of note in which M. Poincaré objects to proposal (see No. 12) that League of Nations should be invited to draft stipulations for inclusion in treaty.	28
32	To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. unnumbered	Sept. 16	Informs of (i) Cabinet decision to send reinforcements to General Harington, (ii) approaches to Dominion, Roumanian, and Yugo-Slav Govts., (iii) intention to propose to M. Poincaré early convening of a conference.	29
33	Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 424	Sept. 17	Expresses view that any Greek attack on Constantinople would be best way to bring about a catastrophe.	31
34	Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 455	Sept. 18	Expresses view that Greek army, provided Greece is treated as an ally and supplied with funds and materials, would be the cheapest weapon to oppose return of the Turks to Europe and the Straits.	31
35	Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 469	Sept. 19	Reports that he protested that withdrawal of French troops from Chanak was way to encourage Kemalists and to provoke war; adds that M. Poincaré, while agreeing to an immediate conference, stated that Angora	32

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		representatives were unlikely to attend unless it was understood in advance that their territorial demands would be granted.	
36 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 432	Sept. 20	Reports that High Commissioners' joint communication respecting neutral zone was handed to Hamid Bey on afternoon of Sept. 18. *Note 2.* Text of joint communication.	34
37 MR. LONDON Geneva Tel. No. 3	Sept. 20	Transmits tel. from Lord Balfour stating that Lord Curzon's presence at Geneva would be invaluable in view of conflict between views of Dominions' representatives and those of the European Allies.	35
38 MR. HODGSON Moscow Tel. No. 201	Sept. 20	Reports Russian view that Turks should gain footing in Europe or control the Dardanelles. *Note 4.* Russian tel. of Sept. 12 expressing views on the régime for the Straits.	36
39 SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 119	Sept. 20	Transmits message from the Roumanian Prime Minister to Mr. Lloyd George stating that Roumania is unable to participate in common action at Constantinople until actually in receipt of munitions of war.	37
40 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. unnumbered	Sept. 20	Informs that H.M.G. proposes to authorize Lord Balfour, provided Lord Curzon agrees, to join appeal to League of Nations to offer good offices to belligerents.	38
41 MEETING OF BRITISH AND FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES 11 a.m.	Sept. 20	Lord Curzon, having given an outline of Anglo-French negotiations since the March conversations (see Vol. XVII, Chap. IV), protests against French Govt.'s decision to withdraw their contingent from Chanak: exposition by M. Poincaré of the French point of view: Lord Curzon appeals for allied unity and points out that a conference would be futile if Allied firmness were lacking.	38
42 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES 4 p.m.	Sept. 20	Lord Curzon's statement that, if French Govt. persisted in their views, he would have to explain to H.M.G. that, as so far as Asia was concerned, the *Entente* had ceased to exist and Great Britain might be compelled to take independent action: discussion of the views of Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset concerning the defence of the Straits and Gallipoli: agreement to hold a conference: discussion as to its scope and form.	50
43 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 312	Sept. 21	Transmits text of War Office telegram instructing General Harington to hold Chanak and to withdraw, if necessary, from Ismid and even Constantinople and authorizing him to give through the High Commissioner any warning he considers necessary to Mustapha.	62

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44 To Mr. London Geneva Tel. No. 45	Sept. 21	Transmits message from P.M. to Lord Balfour authorizing to support resolution (see No. 37) of the League of Nations.	63
45 To Mr. London Geneva Tel. No. 48	Sept. 21	Informs Lord Balfour that he should express surprise at cynicism of Turkish request made through Persian delegate at League Assembly for appointment of neutral committee of enquiry into atrocities in Thrace and Asia Minor in view of failure of Kemalists to agree to commissions already proposed.	64
46 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 449	Sept. 22	Reports that General Harington repeated to Hamid Bey his determination to defend the neutral line.	64
47 Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 474	Sept. 22	Transmits from Lord Curzon for communication to the Cabinet, telegram from Sir H. Rumbold, stressing the need of obtaining from the French and Italian Govts. categorical statements on the defence of Constantinople.	65
48 Meeting of British, French, and Italian Representatives 2 p.m.	Sept. 22	Further discussion (see No. 42) of scope, form, and place of proposed conference: Lord Curzon reiterates H.M.G.'s view of necessity of defending the Straits and Gallipoli and of avoiding excessive concessions to Kemalists as incentive to attend conference: suspension of meeting and resumption after exchange of private explanations: discussion of Lord Curzon's draft of invitation to Angora Govt. to attend conference (Annex). *Annex.* Text of Lord Curzon's draft.	66
49 To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 320	Sept. 23	Transmits to Lord Curzon Cabinet instructions: (i) in the event of failure to secure agreement of French and Italian Govts. to a revised draft (see No. 48, Annex and No. 51, n. 7), to communicate note separately and directly to the Angora Govt., (ii) if proposed note is to be sent jointly to press for assent of Serbia and Roumania and to protest should French and Italian Govts. insist on their exclusion.	85
50 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 450	Sept. 23	Calls attention to difficulties and dangers of executing Admiral Brock's orders to remove craft of every description from Bosphorous and requests that he and General Harington be given full latitude to deal with the situation.	86
51 Meeting of British, French, and Italian Representatives 5 p.m.	Sept. 23	M. Poincaré's objection to despatch of Serbian and Roumanian troops to Constantinople: discussion and amendment of British draft note (see No. 48, Annex): Lord Curzon agrees to the Maritza frontier and concession of Adrianople to the Kemalists but not to the mention of the National Pact: decision to communicate copies of the note to the Serbian and Roumanian Govts.	88

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52 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. unnumbered	Sept. 23	Transmits Lord Curzon's comments for the Cabinet on execution of instructions in No. 49.	96
53 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 474	Sept. 23	Reports that, in reply to Greek Govt.'s offer to put all their resources at disposal of H.M.G., he stated that H.M.G. desires peaceful solution of Near Eastern question.	97
54 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 478	Sept. 24	Reports that in reply to representations (see No. 52, n. 9) M. Poincaré states that French Govt. are ready to associate themselves with measures strictly destined to ensure order in Constantinople.	98
55 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 480	Sept. 25	Reports that he informed Greek P.M. that (i) Greece must bow to decree of the Powers, (ii) questions of loan and recognition of King Constantine were not likely to be decided before the peace conference.	98
56 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 482	Sept. 26	Reports that he urged Greek P.M. to withdraw warships from Constantinople. *Note 3.* Tel. reporting that orders have been given for all Greek warships (except two torpedo boat destroyers) to leave Constantinople.	99
57 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 481	Sept. 26	Reports that M. Poincaré, while ready to instruct General Pellé and Admiral Dumesnil to obtain withdrawal of Turkish troops, wishes to emphasize that maintenance of Allied troops on Asiatic shore endangers European peace.	100
58 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 482	Sept. 26	Refers to No. 57, and suggests that, to avoid hostilities arising from irresponsible action of Turkish regular or irregular troops, General Harington and Mustapha Kemal should agree to withdraw their troops from neutral zone. *Note 3.* P.M.'s comments on this suggestion.	100
59 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 465	Sept. 26	Reports that Admiral Brock is instructing Senior Naval Officer at Dardannelles to detain Greek transports bound for the Marmora.	101
60 TO SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 290	Sept. 26	Informs him that statement by U.S.A. Govt. of belief in the disinterestedness of H.M.G.'s action in the Near East would have great effect on Turkey and on Europe.	102
61 MR. GREGORY Foreign Office	Sept. 26	Record of conversation with M. Berzine who requested an answer to M. Karakhan's tel. of Sept. 12 (see No. 38, n. 4) and who stated that his govt. could see no reason why they should not be invited to take part in a conference on the Near East.	102
62 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 466	Sept. 27	Reports that General Harington communicated to the Allied High Commissioners Mustapha Kemal's reply to demand that Turkish cavalry should withdraw from neutral zone (see No. 57, n. 2): Mustapha	104

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		Kemal denied knowledge of the neutral zone, complained of presence of Greek warships at Constantinople, and accused British artillery of firing on Nationalist troops.	
63 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 467	Sept. 27	Reports that Greek warships, at Admiral Brock's request, have left Constantinople and that Nationalist and Constantinople Govts. have been informed of this.	105
64 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 468	Sept. 27	Reports French High Commissioner as saying that in reply to his enquiry the French Govt. had informed him that M. Franklin-Bouillon (see No. 51, n. 9) had no authority to offer any additional concessions to Mustapha Kemal.	105
65 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 470	Sept. 27	Reports that in reply to protest from Hamid Bey he stated that (i) British reinforcements at Chanak had no hostile intention, (ii) Greek warships had left Constantinople, (iii) in return for advantages to be gained from Allied intervention Angora Govt. must undertake not to enter neutral zone or cross Straits or Sea of Marmora, (iv) Angora Govt. should promptly accept invitation (see No. 51, n. 10) to conference.	106
66 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 2946	Sept. 27	Instructs him, in reply to M. Poincaré's note of Sept. 21 (see No. 48, n. 15), to draw attention to the French Ambassador's note of July 28. *Encl.* French note of July 28 stating that the three govts. should resist any attack on zone held by Allied Powers.	107
67 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 129	Sept. 28	Reports M.F.A.'s statement that Yugoslav Govt. when considering request to furnish detachments (see No. 29, n. 3) desire to know whether H.M.G. will accord credit, as it is likely that French Govt., taking umbrage, will cut off financial facilities.	108
68 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 480	Sept. 28	Reports (i) concentration of Turkish forces in neutral zone, (ii) French High Commissioner's promise to send message to Mustapha Kemal asking him to withdraw troops, (iii) Mustapha Kemal's request to Admiral Dumesnil that British troops should withdraw from Chanak, (iv) Admiral Brock's orders that Turkish craft should be cleared from Asiatic shore of Dardanelles.	109
69 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 441	Sept. 28	Communicates Cabinet's decisions on General Harington's proposals: (i) independent meeting with Mustapha Kemal is inconsistent with Paris agreement, but H.M.G. favour immediate meeting at Mudania, (ii) proposal to fix line to which Greek army should retire, if adopted by generals at Mudania, should be referred to Allied Govts., (iii) proposal to permit Kemalists to cross the Marmora if Greeks	110

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		will not withdraw is contrary to Paris terms and would entail withdrawal of embargo on Greek ships.	
70 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 442	Sept. 28	Instructs to inform Angora representative that if Mustapha Kemal does not withdraw from neutral zone Greek warships will be allowed to enter the Marmora and Dardanelles. Adds that H.M.G.'s view is that neutrality does not require compulsory withdrawal of Greek ships already in Marmora.	111
71 SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 124	Sept. 28	Reports M.F.A.'s statement that Roumanian Govt. would be ready to furnish supplies and permit use of Constantza as a base provided H.M.G. guaranteed Roumania against all consequences of such action.	112
72 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 515	Sept. 29	Transmits Military Attaché's report on Greek Army.	112
73 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 447	Sept. 29	Transmits H.M.G.'s view that Greek troops should not retire (see No. 59) before Mudania meeting: Paris Note (see No. 52) did not contemplate this withdrawal.	114
74 To Sir H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 448	Sept. 29	Instructs to represent to French and Italian High Commissioners that Paris Note (see No. 52) expressly denies to Kemalists the passage of the Marmora up to and during the peace conference.	114
75 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 292	Sept. 29	Informs that Count Sforza's claim to responsibility for the Paris Note (see No. 52) is without foundation.	115
76 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 330 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 293	Sept. 30	Informs of H.M.G.'s view that Greek retirement in Thrace, contemplated in Allied Note of Sept. 23 to Angora (see No. 51, n. 10 and No. 52), should not take place before Mustapha Kemal accepts invitation to peace conference.	115
77 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 487	Sept. 30	Refers to No. 69, and expresses agreement with the views contained therein.	116
78 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 332	Sept. 30	Transmits text of War Office tel. of Sept. 29 to General Harington instructing him to notify local Turkish Commander that unless his troops are withdrawn from around Chanak by time to be fixed by General Harington they will be fired upon.	117
79 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 490	Sept. 30	Expresses agreement with General Harington that it would be inopportune to act immediately on instructions in No. 78. *Note 1.* General Harington's reply to instructions in No. 78.	118
80 To MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 277	Oct. 1	States that it is very desirable that Greek Govt. should send a representative to Mudania meeting which will begin on October 3.	119

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81 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tels. Nos. 455 and 456	Oct. 1	Instructs that Mudania meeting should: (i) fix line in Thrace behind which Greeks are to retire, (ii) require Kemal to accept Paris terms, (iii) refer to High Commissioners all questions of a political nature; question of provisional administration of Eastern Thrace must be settled by Allied Govts. on the advice of High Commissioners, who should at once draw up a scheme; adds that it is extremely undesirable that General Harington should agree to any stopping of British reinforcements to the Turkish theatre.	120
82 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 336	Oct. 1	Instructs to request M. Poincaré to send French High Commissioner instructions similar to No. 81.	123
83 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tels. Nos. 498 and 499	Oct. 1	Reports protest made to Hamid Bey at Nationalists' silence on Mudania meeting and continued presence of their troops in neutral zone, and Hamid's reply that Ismet Pasha would come to Mudania on Oct. 3 and that all movement towards Constantinople was to stop.	124
84 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 497	Oct. 1	Reports conversation with M. Poincaré who read him telegrams, including one from Yussuf Kemal practically accepting proposal for conference, and one from General Pellé recording Hamid Bey's account of his interview with Sir H. Rumbold (see No. 83): M. Poincaré expressed hope that nothing would be done to endanger peaceful solution of difficulties.	125
85 MR. LINDLEY Athens No. 556	Oct. 1	Reports, and comments on, revolution which began on Sept. 26 and which resulted in the overthrow of M. Gounaris's Govt., the departure of King Constantine and the setting up of a Revolutionary Committee represented by Colonel Gonatas, Colonel Plastiras and Capt. Phocas.	127
86 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 533	Oct. 2	Reports conversation with Col. Plastiras who asked about future of Thrace; he replied that it would be madness for Greece to act in isolation, but that a strong army might be required in Thrace to keep order and prevent massacres.	131
87 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 504	Oct. 2	Reports that he informed French High Commissioner that: (i) since Angora Note of Sept. 29 (see No. 84) did not constitute acceptance of conference, Generals at Mudania could not proceed with arrangements for evacuation of Thrace, and (ii) he could not agree to any modification of Maritza frontier.	133
88 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 506	Oct. 3	Refers to No. 81, and expresses view that Generals at Mudania must be able to settle question of Kemalist administration of Eastern Thrace, and of maintenance of Allied commissions there.	134

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89 To Mr. Lindley Athens No. 687	Oct. 3	Reports conversation with M. Venizelos, who refused to consider withdrawal of Greek army from Eastern Thrace before peace conference.	135
90 To Lord Hardinge Paris No. 3010	Oct. 3	Reports conversation with French Ambassador in which he asked that French Govt. should consider following possibilities: (i) refusal of Kemal to respect neutral zones, (ii) refusal of Greeks to retire, (iii) Kemalist advance into Europe.	138
91 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 512	Oct. 5	Reports difficult situation at Mudania due to interference of M. Franklin-Bouillon, and Nationalist refusal to accept foreign interference in Eastern Thrace, which they consider already theirs. *Note 1.* General Harington's tel. No. 2616 of Oct. 4 listing four main difficulties.	139
92 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 516	Oct. 5	Transmits summary of Angora's reply to Allied Note of Sept. 23 (see No. 52, n. 3) accepting invitation to conference and proposing (i) that conference meet at Smyrna on Oct. 20, (ii) that Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia be invited.	141
93 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 514	Oct. 5	Proposes that, since Greek civil administration cannot remain in Eastern Thrace after its evacuation by Greek army, Kemalists should take over administration; Allies should maintain commissions and gendarmerie officers in the area.	142
94 To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 470	Oct. 5	Reports that M. Venizelos now states that he has urged Greek Govt. to agree to immediate evacuation of Eastern Thrace (cf. No. 89), provided territory is placed under Allied control.	143
95 To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 472	Oct. 6	Instructs that General Harington is not to return to Mudania until H.M.G. have received his telegrams and Sir H. Rumbold's opinion on the situation; requests a copy of document handed to Kemalists by Allied Generals.	144
96 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 523	Oct. 6	Reports that (i) because of Kemalist demand for immediate possession of Eastern Thrace, which French general alone is authorized to accept, Allied Generals have returned to Constantinople for instructions, (ii) General Harington and Admiral Brock consider Greeks should leave Eastern Thrace at once, and be replaced by Allied troops.	144
97 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 524	Oct. 6	Refers to No. 96, and reports that at meeting of High Commissioners and Generals, French and Italian High Commissioners argued in favour of yielding to Turks to avoid war.	146
98 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 526	Oct. 6	Transmits text of convention which Allied Generals were prepared to sign at Mudania (see Nos. 95 and 96).	147

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99 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 527	Oct. 6	Refers to No. 95, and comments on four Turkish demands (see No. 91, n. 1) for (i) possession of Karagatch, (ii) unlimited gendarmerie in Eastern Thrace, (iii) withdrawal of Allied missions in Eastern Thrace, (iv) right to continue hostilities until ratification of convention: adds that Turks also made impossible demands for (i) Greek withdrawal to 100 kilos from Adrianople, (ii) possession of Eastern Thrace before peace treaty.	149
100 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 473	Oct. 6	Informs that H.M.G. take so grave a view of situation (see Nos. 96 and 97) that Lord Curzon is going to Paris for talks with M. Poincaré, and instructs that, pending result of these talks, General Harington should not return to Mudania.	150
101 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 529	Oct. 6	Transmits text of declaration, which he has instructed General Harington to make to Ismet Pasha should Mudania Conference break down, stating that Allies have gone to limit of concessions and forbearance, and responsibility for any resumption of hostilities will fall on Angora Govt.	151
102 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 530	Oct. 6	Expresses view that Nationalist attempt to obtain, before peace conference, document conceding nearly all their territorial demands, has been foiled.	151
103 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 532	Oct. 6	Reports that he informed M. Franklin-Bouillon, who wanted to hold out to Turks prospect of concessions, that he could not prejudge decisions of H.M.G.; adds that M. Franklin-Bouillon has telegraphed to Ismet Pasha asking that reassembling of conference be delayed to enable Paris and London decisions to arrive.	152
104 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 533	Oct. 6	Expresses view (i) that conference should be held in Italian town, if possible by Oct. 30, (ii) that H.M.G. should not object to participation of Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine, (iii) that Straits régime might form subject of entirely separate negotiations.	152
105 MR. LINDLEY Athens No. 564	Oct. 6	Reports further on the events of the Greek revolution (see No. 85), especially on the departure of King Constantine.	153
106 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES 11 p.m.	Oct. 6	Lord Curzon's summary of events since last Paris meeting; breakdown of Mudania Conference over Turkish demand for immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace; M. Poincaré unaware of this and of other three points (see No. 91, n. 1); French and Italians refuse to fight under any circumstances.	155
107 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES 9 a.m.	Oct. 7	Further discussion of the evacuation of Thrace; production of a draft Allied formula; question of length of time to be allowed for evacuation, Generals Charpy	165

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		and Mombelli reported to have agreed to fifteen days, whereas Lord Curzon considered thirty the minimum.	
108 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES 2 p.m.	Oct. 7	Further discussion of time to be allowed for evacuation of Thrace; formula agreed; discussion of peace conference (i) place, (ii) date, (iii) participants, (iv) status of Allied delegates. *Note 5.* Final English text of Allied formula for evacuation of Thrace.	171
109 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 369	Oct. 7	Transmits message from Prime Minister for Lord Curzon accepting formula (see No. 108, n. 5) on following conditions: (i) any agreement must be conditional upon Turks respecting neutral zones, (ii) numbers of Kemalist gendarmerie admitted to Thrace before peace treaty must be strictly limited, (iii) Allies shall not withdraw from Eastern Thrace in less than thirty days unless provision has been made for maintenance of order and protection of minorities.	176
110 LORD CURZON Paris Tel. unnumbered	Oct. 7	Message for the Prime Minister: refers to No. 109 and states that all points raised therein have been covered in conversations, and that he is writing to M. Poincaré to this effect.	177
111 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 480	Oct. 7	Instructs that, in view of No. 110, he may authorize General Harington to resume negotiations at Mudania on basis of Paris formula (No. 108, n. 5), provided H.M.G.'s reservations and conditions are accepted and embodied in final convention.	178
112 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 32	Oct. 8	Transmits letter from General Harington who requests speedy reply from Cabinet, since during postponement of conference Turks have entered neutral zone, and informs that he is issuing an ultimatum to Ismet.	178
113 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 547	Oct. 8	Refers to No. 111, n. 1. and No. 111, and reports difference between French and British instructions over (i) definition of neutral zones, (ii) method of fixing limit to Turkish gendarmerie in Thrace; requests immediate instructions for General Harington as to how Cabinet wishes him to interpret conditions.	179
114 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 483	Oct. 9	Refers to No. 113, and replies that (i) definition of neutral zones is a matter which can be left to General Harington's discretion, and (ii) it does not matter whether limitation of gendarmerie is proposed by Generals, or by Turks and accepted by Generals.	180
115 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 548	Oct. 9	Transmits message sent to C.-in-C. Mediterranean, pointing out that clearing Bosphorus will cause panic and great inconvenience, and should be preceded by	181

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		summons to Turks to withdraw; adds that, in his view, Bosphorus should only be cleared in last resort.	
116 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 376 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 325	Oct. 10	Informs that H.M.G. propose to reply to Soviet telegram that there is no truth in accusation that British navy is blockading Dardanelles, and enquires whether French/Italian Govt. will send similar reply.	182
117 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 549	Oct. 10	Reports that Allied Generals are authorized to accept slight modifications in draft convention which has been handed to Turks, but if Turks do not accept neutral zones General Harington will deliver an ultimatum to them to leave zones, and Admiral Brock will clear Bosphorus.	183
118 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 550	Oct. 10	Refers to No. 117, and reports discussion of (i) six points in convention which Ismet had referred to Angora (Karagatch, limitation of gendarmerie, area of neutral zones, 45 day time-limit, civilian hostages, prisoners of war), and (ii) Kemalist penetration of neutral zones, which led to decision to issue ultimatum (see No. 117).	184
119 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 554	Oct. 11	Reports signing of Mudania Convention by Allies and Turks and points out urgency of Greek adherence, Greek delegates having been unable to sign in the absence of instructions from their govt.	186
120 To MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 309	Oct. 11	Refers to No. 119, and instructs to inform Greek Govt. that Mudania agreement contains maximum possible safeguards for Greek interests, and that H.M.G. trust Greek Govt. will at once authorize signature and arrange evacuation.	187
121 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. unnumbered	Oct. 12	Instructs to consult M. Poincaré on the date, place and participants of peace conference; expresses view that it should be held at Lausanne early in November, that Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Bulgaria should take part only in Straits discussion, that each Ally should appoint two plenipotentiaries, and that Great Powers should each provide a chairman for different subject.	188
122 SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Oct. 12	Record of a conversation with M. Venizelos who (i) expressed alarm at reported provisions of Mudania agreement for complete transfer of Eastern Thrace to Turks within 45 days, and (ii) refusal to intervene in internal affairs of Greece, even to forestall further insurrection.	191
123 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 381	Oct. 13	Expresses surprise that M. Poincaré, while insisting that conference meet in first week in November, should await M. Franklin-Bouillon's return before deciding on site of conference; states that Smyrna is wholly	194

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		unacceptable, and desirability of any Turkish site doubtful.	
124 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 578	Oct. 13	Transmits text of declaration to be made by Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople to Allied High Commissioners, making a final appeal in favour of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace, but stating that the Greek Government nevertheless adheres to the Mudania Convention.	196
125 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 570	Oct. 15	Expresses view that matter of Karagatch and Western Thrace should be cleared up as soon as possible by statement by Greek Govt. or M. Venizelos that Greece is not prepared to concede 1914 frontier.	196
126 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 574	Oct. 16	Reports view of High Commissioners that League of Nations should act as liaison between Greek and Turkish authorities to ensure orderly evacuation and examine exchange of populations in Eastern Thrace.	197
127 LORD CURZON Foreign Office	Oct. 18	Letter to M. Poincaré stating that he (i) accepts M. Poincaré's suggestions for a separate Straits agreement and for the procedure for the admission of Russia, (ii) considers Straits should be treated by main conference at Lausanne, (iii) would prefer not to have a Swiss president for conference, (iv) cannot agree that if Dominions and India are included Tunis and Morocco must be too, (v) suggests Nov. 13 as opening date of conference.	198
128 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 590	Oct. 19	Expresses hope that, in view of impatience and suspicions of Turks and fears of Christian population, Allied Govts. will soon be able to notify date and place of conference.	201
129 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 595	Oct. 20	States that Mudania Convention does permit introduction of Turkish gendarmerie to Thrace within 14 days of midnight Oct. 14/15, and that this must be left to discretion of Allied authorities on the spot; adds that he is sending British Consular Officer to Adrianople.	202
130 LORD CURZON Foreign Office	Oct. 20	Letter to M. Poincaré giving views on (i) presidency of conference, (ii) *de jure* position of Georgian Govt., (iii) representation of Dominions and India and of Egypt and the Hedjaz, and transmitting draft invitations to the conference, including one to the United States Govt.	203
131 LORD HARDINGE Paris No. 2473	Oct. 22	Reports that M. Poincaré informed him that he was considering appointment of MM. Leygues and Bompard as French delegates to conference; he had never seriously thought of M. Franklin-Bouillon.	206
132 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 391	Oct. 23	States that, since new govt. has not yet been formed, it would be inaccurate to refer to any intention of theirs to ask for postponement of conference.	207

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133	To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 519	Oct. 25	Reports that, due to acrimonious spirit of French reply, proposal for preliminary meeting of experts has been abandoned, but H.M.G. will try to arrange that at conference new proposals are agreed by Allies before being made to Turks.	208
134	To Sir A. Geddes Washington Tel. No. 312 To Sir C. Eliot Tokyo Tel. No. 113 To Sir H. Dering Bucharest Tel. No. 91 To Sir A. Young Belgrade Tel. No. 76 To Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 333 To Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 521	Oct. 26	Instructs to present, in consort with French and Italian colleagues, text of invitation to Lausanne Conference to govt. to which they are accredited. *Note 2.* Last paragraph of invitation to the United States.	208
135	Lord Curzon Foreign Office	Oct. 26	Letter to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, stating (i) that H.M.G. cannot announce a uniform time-limit for the replacement of Greek by Turkish authority in Eastern Thrace, but that dates before which Turks will not reach areas are widely published, (ii) that evacuation is proceeding with only minor incidents.	209
136	Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 630	Oct. 27	Reports that Nationalists are apparently less eager for immediate conference, since by end of November, having taken over Eastern Thrace and perhaps paralysed Constantinople Govt., they will be in a stronger position. *Note 2.* General Harington's tel. No. 2875 of Oct. 30, reporting on Turkish military organizations in Eastern Thrace.	210
137	Mr. Russell Berne Tel. No. 28	Oct. 27	Reports presentation of conference invitation to Swiss M.F.A., who assured Allied Govts. of all possible assistance; M.F.A. added that Swiss Govt. would, if pressed, agree to conference being opened by President of the Confederation.	210
138	Mr. Peters Moscow Tel. No. 228	Oct. 27	Reports presentation of conference invitation to M. Chicherin, who asked (i) on what principle were Powers selected to discuss Treaty? (ii) what part would Russian representative have in decisions on Straits? (iii) were Ukraine and Georgia invited? (iv) was conference likely to be delayed by British election?	211
139	To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 399	Oct. 30	Instructs to ask French and Italian Govts. whether they will (i) join in intimation to Angora that interference in Allied institu-	212

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To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 345		tions will not be permitted, (ii) insist on insertion in treaty of clause recognizing validity of financial acts of Constantinople Govt.	
140 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 635	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 139, n. 2, and reports that Allied High Commissioners have ordered Ottoman Bank to sell enough of the gold sequestered in 1919 to provide £500,000 paper to meet payments due that day.	213
141 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 637	Oct. 31	Reports that he informed Hamid Bey, who delivered Notes accepting invitation to conference on Nov. 13, but stating that Angora might not take part if Constantinople Govt. were invited, that he could not accept view that Constantinople Govt. had been superseded.	213
142 To SIR A. GEDDES Washington Tel. No. 322	Oct. 31	Expresses surprise at statement reported to be included in forthcoming speech by Secretary of State, that U.S. could not appropriately attend Lausanne Conference, since American Ambassador has just presented his govt.'s acceptance of invitation to send observers to conference *Note 5.* Sir A. Geddes's tel. No. 435, reporting words of speech as delivered.	214
143 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 400	Oct. 31	Refers to No. 138 and instructs to enquire whether M. Poincaré agrees with Lord Curzon's proposed reply to M. Chicherin's first three questions.	215
144 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople No. 957	Oct. 31	Reports anxiety of Allied High Commissioners at Kemalist attitude to foreigners and foreign enterprise, and anxiety of official classes in Constantinople at extremist doctrines of Refet Pasha.	216
145 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 346	Nov. 1	Instructs to see M. Mussolini and express trust that new Italian Govt., the keynote of whose policy is loyal co-operation between Allies, will not pursue policy of former govt. in embarking on separate negotiations with Angora.	218
146 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 533	Nov. 2	Refers to No. 141, n. 1, and authorizes to concert with French and Italian colleagues in replying to Hamid Bey's notes by (i) acknowledging Angora's acceptance of invitation to conference, (ii) observing that Allies have followed procedure adopted at London Conference (see Vol. XV, Chap. II), and Angora and Constantinople Govts. must arrange for despatch of single delegation to Lausanne.	219
147 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 534	Nov. 2	Refers to No. 146, and warns not to include in joint reply French argument that Mudania Convention precluded Allies from insisting on separate representation of Constantinople Govt.	220
148 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 345	Nov. 3	Reports that he spoke in the sense of No. 145 to Signor Mussolini who replied that such separate action would be in	220

NO. AND NAME		DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			contradiction to his policy, and added that he thought it desirable that Allies should decide on policy before Lausanne Conference; comments that Signor Mussolini is anxious to work with H.M.G.	
149	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 646	Nov. 3	States that in requesting a joint Allied protest against establishment of Turkish recruiting offices in Thrace, French Govt. was acting under a misapprehension, since there is no evidence of open Nationalist recruiting bureaux in Thrace.	222
150	MR. LINDLEY Athens No. 635	Nov. 3	Reports further on events of Greek revolution and on plans, against which he and his colleagues have protested, to try members of M. Gounaris's Govt. and other political prisoners by special military tribunal.	223
151	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 652	Nov. 4	Reports that he informed Grand Vizier, who had asked, in view of Angora decision that Constantinople form of govt. and office of sultan had ceased to exist (i) whether his govt. should resign, and (ii) whether they should send a delegation to Lausanne, that he could not advise him on these matters.	226
152	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 352	Nov. 4	Refers to No. 148, and to Sir H. Rumbold's tel. No. 648 (see No. 145, n. 5), and instructs to urge M.F.A. to take immediate steps to stop Signor Maissa's departure for Angora.	227
153	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 406 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 353	Nov. 4	Instructs to suggest to French and Italian Govts. that Allied attitude to Kemalist claim to install civil administration and gendarmerie in Gallipoli, Chanak, Constantinople, and Ismid should be that Turkish civil administration in these areas, with or without gendarmerie which may be admitted as a concession, must be subject to the Allied military authorities.	227
154	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 657	Nov. 5	Expresses view that Lausanne Conference should meet before end of month, and that Angora should be notified at once that, because of impending election in England and recent change of govt. in Italy, meeting of conference will be adjourned for ten days.	229
155	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 658	Nov. 5	Reports resignation of Constantinople Govt. and assumption of administration by Refet Pasha as representative of Angora Govt.; adds that Sultan has not abdicated and has no intention of deserting his post.	229
156	TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 409 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 354	Nov. 6	Instructs to ask M. Poincaré and Signor Mussolini to agree to joint notification to govts. invited to Lausanne, postponing conference until end of month in view of (i) situation in Constantinople and France, (ii) Signor Mussolini's reported desire for	230

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		postponement, (iii) impending British election, (iv) necessity for preliminary exchange of views among Allies.	
157 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 665	Nov. 6	Reports unity of Allied High Commissioners who have informed Hamid Bey that any administration in Constantinople must be subject to Allied surveillance. *Note 1.* Sir H. Rumbold's tel. No. 660 summarizing Angora Note asking Allies to evacuate Constantinople.	232
158 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 668	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 157, and requests authority to declare state of siege in Constantinople in view of measures already taken by Nationalist administration and danger that further arbitrary measures will follow.	233
159 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 673	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 155, and reports interview with Sultan who insisted on illegality of Angora Govt. and declared his intention not to abdicate, adds that he informed Sultan that promise given in 1920 to protect his person still held.	235
160 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 414 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 357	Nov. 7	Instructs to ask M. Poincaré and Signor Mussolini whether H.M.G. may expect the support of the French and Italian Govts. for the action of the High Commissioners in Constantinople (see No. 158); stresses great importance of Allied unity in this matter.	236
161 MR. ERSKINE Sofia Tel. No. 67	Nov. 7	Transmits summary of Bulgarian reply to conference invitation, which asks that Bulgaria may be heard in regard to Greco-Turkish frontier, and an outlet to the Aegean sea, as well as the Straits.	237
162 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 570	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 160, and transmits M. Poincaré's reply that he has authorized proclamation of state of siege in Constantinople if necessary; adds that M. Poincaré stated that he considered any delay in meeting of conference most dangerous.	238
163 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 571	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 139, and reports that French Govt. (i) agree with H.M.G. on necessity for clause in peace treaty recognizing acts of Constantinople Govt., (ii) consider that the three govts. would be justified in renewing High Commissioners' protest, but cannot guarantee execution of engagements of Constantinople Govt.	239
164 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 572	Nov. 7	Refers to No. 162, and transmits summary of note from M. Poincaré (i) insisting on maintenance of Nov. 13 as opening date of conference, (ii) recommending signature of preliminaries of peace as soon as possible.	240
165 SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 149	Nov. 8	Reports attitude of Roumanian Govt. to be adopted at Lausanne Conference, on (i) Straits, (ii) Capitulations, (iii) Eastern	242

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Thrace, (iv) Western Thrace, (v) General Eastern question.	
166 To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 417	Nov. 8	Refers to No. 164, and expresses view that in view of Angora's demands, a preliminary inter-allied meeting is indispensable if Allies are to maintain a united front; adds that suggestion for preliminary treaty of peace would not meet the difficulties involved.	243
167 Sir A. Young Belgrade Tel. No. 148	Nov. 8	Reports conversation with M. Nincic who gave him his views on (i) Western Thrace and Bulgarian outlet to sea, (ii) Eastern Thrace, (iii) the Straits, and (iv) capitulations.	244
168 Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 577	Nov. 8	Reports that M. Poincaré insists that conference be held on Nov. 13, since General Pellé reports t at Sir H. Rumbold's informing Ismet Pasha of proposal for adjournment has had worst effect, and adds that proclamation of state of siege might now precipitate conflict.	245
169 To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 419	Nov. 9	Instructs to make communication to M. Poincaré in accordance with No. 166, in spite of No. 168, since there must be time to reach an inter-Allied agreement before conference; adds that he has informed all powers invited of postponement of conference to Nov. 20.	246
170 To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 421	Nov. 10	States that M. Poincaré's suggestion for an opening of conference on Nov. 13, followed by a week's adjournment is quite impracticable, and that he must know where Allies mean to stand before conference opens.	247
171 Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 363	Nov. 10	Refers to No. 139, and transmits summary of Italian Govt.'s reply that they have no objection to co-operating with Allies to obtain clause in peace treaty recognizing validity of Constantinople Govt.'s acts, but they do not consider it prudent to give any guarantee to interested parties.	248
172 To Mr. Peters Moscow Tel. No. 257	Nov. 10	Transmits reply of Allied Govts. to Russian observations on invitation to Lausanne Conference: (i) govts. invited are those not in a state of peace with Turkey, (ii) Soviet delegates will participate in discussions and decisions on Straits, (iii) Soviet delegation may include delegates of Ukraine and Georgia.	248
173 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 693	Nov. 10	Reports that matter of Sultan's safety, about which he is uneasy, was brought before meeting of Allied High Commissioners and Generals; Italian General appeared to be unwilling to share responsibility for Sultan's protection.	249
174 Sir H. Rumbold Constantinople Tel. No. 694	Nov. 11	Reports that Allied Generals consider it very undesirable to proclaim state of siege in Constantinople unless considerable	250

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		reinforcements are sent; comments that he himself considers that only proclamation of state of siege will prevent worsening of situation in Constantinople, and that Allies should certainly not fix date for evacuation of town.	
175 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 425	Nov. 11	Expresses opinion that best solution to problem of preliminary meeting, which is absolutely necessary, would be for M. Poincaré to come to London, since he fears that otherwise M. Poincaré will so arrange conversations as to throw responsibility on him should conference have to be postponed again.	251
176 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 364	Nov. 11	Refers to No. 166, n. 5, and reports that (i) Italian Govt. consider it would be better to evacuate Constantinople than to risk expulsion, but that a firm line should be taken in all other respects, (ii) Signor Mussolini is most anxious for preliminary discussion, but cannot leave Rome before Nov. 16.	252
177 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 560	Nov. 11	Refers to No. 174, and states that H.M.G. think fullest advantage should be taken of authority to declare state of siege, on which Allies are agreed; certain risks must be taken, and Kemalists are unlikely to force issue during conference.	252
178 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 588	Nov. 11	Reports conversation with French President, M. Poincaré, and Count Sforza in which (i) he insisted that there must be preliminary agreement between three Allies, and that British representatives could not be at Lausanne by Nov. 13, (ii) M. Poincaré proposed a discussion in Paris on Nov. 18.	253
179 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 589	Nov. 11	Reports that in conversation reported in No. 178, French President and M. Poincaré rejected Italian proposal for evacuation of Constantinople if it was threatened by Turks during conference (see No. 176).	255
180 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 382	Nov. 11	Refers to No. 177, and informs that H.M.G. have replied to Italian proposal for postponement of conference and evacuation of Constantinople in this sense, and trust that Italian Govt. will not withdraw authority to proclaim state of siege in Constantinople, where only a united Allied front can save the situation.	256
181 To LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 428	Nov. 12	Instructs to make immediate representations to M. Poincaré urging him to come to London for conversations before Lausanne Conference, rather than seeing Lord Curzon in Paris on his way to Lausanne.	258
182 SIR G. GRAHAME Brussels Tel. No. 96	Nov. 12	Reports that he and his French and Italian colleagues have made communication to Belgian M.F.A. to the effect that	260

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		two Belgian representatives would be summoned to Lausanne to take part in discussions of financial and economic questions of interest to Belgium.	
183 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 700	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 177, and gives fuller account of meeting reported in No. 174 as a result of which Allied High Commissioners decided it would not, after all, be advisable to declare a state of siege in Constantinople.	260
184 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 701	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 177 and No. 183, and reports meeting at which Allied High Commissioners and Generals decided that they could not afford to precipitate matters by declaring state of siege. *Note 4.* Smyrna tel. reporting reign of terror in town. *Note 5.* General Harington's tel. No. 2978 of Nov. 12 accepting full responsibility for fact that state of siege was not ordered.	262
185 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 369	Nov. 12	Reports that Signor Mussolini, to whom he communicated H.M.G.'s reply to proposal to evacuate Constantinople (see No. 180), said that there was no question of withdrawing authority to proclaim state of siege, and proposal for evacuation did not signify weakening of Italy's attitude.	263
186 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 371	Nov. 12	Refers to No. 170, and reports that (i) Italian Govt. will not authorize French Ambassador to speak for them at preliminary meeting, (ii) Signor Mussolini was anxious for thorough discussion of problems, but could not leave Rome before Nov. 18.	264
187 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 372	Nov. 13	Refers to No. 181, and stresses importance of Italy's being invited to preliminary meeting if her support at peace conference is wanted.	265
188 LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 593	Nov. 13	Refers to No. 181, and reports conversation with M. Poincaré who (i) stated that he could see no reason why he and Lord Curzon should not reach an agreement on all important questions before conference, (ii) proposed that he and Lord Curzon should meet in Paris and both go on to meet Signor Mussolini, perhaps at Geneva.	265
189 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 430	Nov. 13	Instructs to inform M. Poincaré that (i) in reply to Armenian note he is admitting possibility of hearing Armenian representatives at Lausanne on question of minorities, (ii) as regards Georgian Govt. his view has not changed.	268
190 TO LORD HARDINGE Paris Tel. No. 431	Nov. 13	Refers to No. 188, and informs that he proposes (i) to communicate to M. Poincaré a list of points on which H.M.G. consider agreement essential, and (ii) if M. Poincaré	269

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			agrees on these points, to go to Paris for conversations on Nov. 18, before proceeding, with M. Poincaré, to meet Signor Mussolini at Lausanne on Nov. 19.	
191	To Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 393	Nov. 14	Refers to No. 187, and states that he is most anxious to consult Signor Mussolini and to pay all due respect to him; adds that if Signor Mussolini would realize this, things would be much easier.	271
192	To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 433	Nov. 14	Informs that he is sending, for M. Poincaré, points on which he considers it essential or desirable that agreement be reached before conference, and hopes to come to Paris himself on 17 (see No. 190): adds that M. Poincaré is mistaken in thinking the Mudania convention prevents the Allies sending reinforcements to Constantinople.	272
193	To Sir R. Graham Rome Tels. Nos. 394 and 395	Nov. 14	Communicates list of points communicated to French Govt. (see No. 192): A (essential) (i) Western Thrace, (ii) Frontier of Western Thrace, (iii) Freedom of Straits, (iv) Capitulations, (v) Islands in Aegean, (vi) Frontiers of Syria and Irak, (vii) Mandated territories, (viii) Graves, (ix) Indemnities, (x) Mudania Convention, (xi) Constantinople; B (most desirable) (i) Minorities, (ii) Turkish military forces, (iii) Financial Clauses, (iv) Economic Clauses.	273
194	Sir E. Crowe Foreign Office	Nov. 14	Records that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, who had communicated message that Marquis della Torretta was coming to London for conversations with Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré, was informed that these conversations were not to take place.	274
195	Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 599	Nov. 15	Reports that M. Poincaré sees no grounds for serious divergence on any of Lord Curzon's points (see No. 193), and is determined that there shall be complete accord at Lausanne.	275
196	Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 600	Nov. 15	Communicates comments of the Quai d'Orsay upon Lord Curzon's memorandum (see No. 193).	276
197	To Lord Hardinge Paris Tel. No. 437	Nov. 16	Informs that in view of extremely serious situation in Constantinople he is bringing General Burnett Stuart with him to Paris; instructs to arrange conversation on Saturday morning to discuss this situation. *Note 2.* War Office Memorandum of Nov. 17 on Constantinople.	279
198	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 714	Nov. 16	Reports on situation in Constantinople and expresses view that if *modus vivendi* can be reached situation will drag on until conference has time to discuss it, and possibly fix date for evacuation.	280

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199	To Lord Hardinge Paris No. 3426	Nov. 16	Instructs to make communication to French Govt. trusting that they will join H.M.G. in inviting Egypt to send representatives to Lausanne to take part in discussion of matters relating to Egypt.	281
200	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 719	Nov. 17	Reports departure of Sultan, who emphasizes that he has not abdicated, for Malta aboard H.M.S. *Malaya*.	283
201	Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 388	Nov. 17	Reports conversation with Signor Mussolini who agreed in principle with all points in Lord Curzon's memorandum (No. 193), and stated that only hope of stability for world lay in closest co-operation between Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium.	284
202	Mr. Rendel Foreign Office	Nov. 17	Memorandum on the situation as regards refugees in Greece.	285
203	Mr. Lindley Athens No. 658	Nov. 18	Reports further on the trial of the ex-ministers (see No. 150) and his efforts to ensure that they would not be executed.	287
204	Meeting of British, French, and Italian Representatives 3 p.m.	Nov. 18	Discussion between Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré of (i) military situation in Constantinople, (ii) points raised in Lord Curzon's memo. (No. 193).	292
205	To Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 358	Nov. 19	Informs of drastic action taken in informing Greek Minister in London that if ex-Ministers are executed H.M.G. will be compelled to break off diplomatic relations with Greece.	308
206	Meeting of British, French, and Italian Representatives 7.30 p.m.	Nov. 19	Discussion between Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré, and Signor Mussolini of military situation in Constantinople and other points raised in Lord Curzon's memo. (No. 193).	308
207	Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 2	Nov. 20	Reports meeting of Allied delegates and experts, M. Poincaré, and Signor Mussolini at which Italians raised questions of Dodecanese and mandates, and procedure of main conference was discussed.	317
208	Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 689	Nov. 20	Refers to No. 205 and expresses view that no civil govt. could be formed as long as threat stands; present govt. will resign unless friction with H.M.G. is removed; further reports that Revolutionary Committee will not give written assurances that prisoners will not be executed.	318

CHAPTER II

Correspondence and Memoranda relating to the Conference of Lausanne, November 20, 1922–February 5, 1923

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
209	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 6	Nov. 20	Reports opening meeting of conference, at which spirit of Turkish delegation foreshadowed trouble at every turn.	320
210	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 5	Nov. 20	States that he would prefer not to suggest to French Govt. that command in Turkey be conferred on Marshal Foch.	321
211	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 9	Nov. 21	Reports first business meeting of conference at which three commissions were set up to deal with: (i) territorial and military questions, (ii) régime for foreigners and minorities in Turkey, (iii) financial and economic questions.	321
212	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 12	Nov. 21	Reports second meeting of conference at which Turks tried to re-open procedural questions settled in the morning (see No. 211).	322
213	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 13	Nov. 22	Reports conversation with Signor Mussolini, who was particularly concerned over Dodecanese and mandates and clearly anxious that Italy, having practically lost Tripartite Agreement, has nothing to show as eastern reward for her victory.	323
214	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 732	Nov. 22	Reports that Allied Generals have failed to reach agreement with Refet Pasha on jurisdiction of Allied police over Greeks and Russians; adds that Refet Pasha objected to presence in Constantinople of Greek High Commissioner.	324
215	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 19	Nov. 23	Reports that at first meeting of frontier commission Allies showed united front against Turkish demands for pre-war frontier in Thrace and plebiscite in Western Thrace.	325
216	TO MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 365	Nov. 23	Instructs not to exchange further notes with Greek Govt. on question of ex-Ministers, since H.M.G.'s views and intentions have been made quite clear to Greek Minister in London (see No. 205).	326
217	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 23	Nov. 23	Reports further meeting of Frontier Commission at which sub-committee to consider demilitarized zone in Thrace was set up.	327
218	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 24	Nov. 23	Reports meeting to discuss situation in Constantinople with Ismet Pasha, who promised to telegraph to Angora asking that instructions be sent to pursue more conciliatory policy.	327

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219 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 12	Nov. 24	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Refers to No. 214 and No. 218, and requests to clear up as soon as possible question of tribunals to try Turkish subjects arrested by Allies.	328
220 Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 693	Nov. 24	Refers to No. 216, and reports that he has communicated it to M.F.A. who doubted very much whether revolutionary committee would commute any death sentences, particularly as French Govt. had shown complete reserve regarding prisoners.	329
221 Mr. Lindley Athens Tel. No. 695	Nov. 25	Refers to No. 220, and reports receipt of note from M.F.A. announcing the resigna- of the govt. and enclosing revolutionary committee's reply to notes about the trial of the ex-Ministers.	330
222 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 31	Nov. 25	Reports meeting of first committee to discuss report of Sub-Committee on demilitarized zones in Eastern Thrace and a free outlet to the Aegean for Bulgaria.	331
223 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 735	Nov. 25	Reports that compromise has been reached on police question which gives Hellenes and Russians Allied police protection without including them in list of Allies.	332
224 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 16	Nov. 25	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs that General Harington should, in view of Allied unity demonstrated at Lausanne, take firm stand in Constantinople.	333
225 Sir M. Hankey Cabinet Office	Nov. 25	Letter to Sir E. Crowe enclosing draft telegram to Lord Curzon on Freedom of Straits, which resulted from C.I.D. meeting. *Encl.*: Draft telegram instructing Lord Curzon to accept French memo. of Nov. 18, as modified by Marshal Foch's proposals for demilitarization of Straits.	334
226 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 17	Nov. 26	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Summarizes progress of conference, reporting meeting of first commission to discuss Thrace and the Aegean Islands, and decision to set up sub-committee to examine question of Thrace.	336
227 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 19	Nov. 26	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Refers to No. 224, and informs that he has spoken again to Ismet who has promised to telegraph to Refet Pasha's successor enjoining friendly attitude in Constantinople; adds that if this has no effect, he will send telegram from President of Conference to Angora.	337
228 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 41	Nov. 27	Reports conversation, of a hopeful character, with Ismet Pasha, on questions of Mosul, oil, Straits, capitulations, and role of League of Nations.	338

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
229 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 701	Nov. 27	Suggests that he be authorized to receive from ex-Ministers written undertakings not to take part again in Greek political life, as this seems to be only way of saving situation.	339
230 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 702	Nov. 27	Refers to No. 229, and reports that he has failed to move Col. Plastiras from position that sentences of court martial must be carried out.	340
231 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 2	Nov. 28	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs to ask Signor Mussolini that instructions be sent to Italian delegation to join in proposed reply to Russian demand to be admitted to whole proceedings of conference.	341
232 TO MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. No. 4	Nov. 28	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Refers to No. 229, and authorizes to obtain whichever undertaking (see No. 216) is most likely to save ex-Ministers. *Note 3.* Mr. Lindley's tel. No. 704 of Nov. 28 reporting executions, and his unnumbered despatch of Dec. 8 commenting on trial and executions.	341
233 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 742	Nov. 28	Refers to No. 227, and expresses opinion that situation in Constantinople is now easier: suggests that any representations made at Angora take account of distinction between Allied military and Turkish civil control.	344
234 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 47	Nov. 28	Asks to have immediate opinion of Committee of Imperial Defence on question of guarantee of neutrality and inviolability of Eastern Thrace, for which Turks will probably ask when Straits are discussed.	344
235 MR. LINDLEY Athens Tel. unnumbered	Nov. 28	Reports that Mr. Talbot, who arrived after execution of ex-Ministers, is concentrating on saving Prince Andrew, whose position has become much more dangerous.	346
236 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 49	Nov. 28	Reports first meetings of Commission on Financial and Economic Questions, and expresses anxiety about M. Barrère's conduct of business.	346
237 TO MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 5	Nov. 29	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Reports that, on his urging, M. Venizelos telegraphed to Athens that Europe would be shocked by execution of ex-Ministers, and his own position at Lausanne would be extremely difficult.	347
238 SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 391	Nov. 29	Refers to No. 231, and informs that Italian delegates have been instructed to accept reply to Russians, although Signor Mussolini still thinks it would have been better to admit full participation of Russians.	348
239 TO MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 8	Nov. 29	Authorizes to offer King and Queen refuge in legation if necessary, and adds that he is asking Admiralty to send man-of-war in case of necessity to take them off.	348

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
240	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. unnumbered	Nov. 30	Reports that Mr. Talbot has obtained promise that Prince Andrew will not be executed, and informs of arrangements made for him to leave the country.	349
241	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 55	Nov. 30	Reports meeting of territorial commission to receive and discuss report of sub-committee on demilitarization of Aegean Islands and North Dodecanese.	350
242	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 59	Nov. 30	States that he is inclined to favour statements in Parliament rather than laying of papers on events in Greece, since so much of H.M.G.'s case is contained in minutes or conversations.	351
243	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 60	Dec. 1	Expresses astonishment at report that he encouraged Greeks to continue their advance in Asia Minor, and states that all his efforts were directed to inducing them to withdraw.	351
244	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 62	Dec. 1	Reports progress of conference, meetings of experts to discuss (i) oil and (ii) Straits; adds that Italians are giving great trouble behind the scenes and expresses view that they may be trying to reach a private agreement with Turks.	352
245	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 39	Dec. 1	Refers to No. 234, and transmits view of Committee of Imperial Defence that H.M.G. should not give an individual guarantee of perpetual neutrality and inviolability of Turkish territory, and should not go beyond their obligations under the League of Nations Covenant.	353
246	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 63	Dec. 1	Transmits message for Secretary of State for Colonies and President of Board of Trade giving an account of informal conversations between British and Turkish experts on question of oil in Irak, which is complicated by Italian demand for participation in its exploitation.	354
247	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 65	Dec. 2	Reports meeting of first commission at which sub-committee was appointed to draw up convention for exchange of Greek and Turkish populations.	356
248	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 679	Dec. 2	Reports on events which led up to execution of ex-Ministers, and effect on situation of M. Venizelos's silence, scarcely veiled approval of French military mission, and news of Mr. Talbot's departure for Athens.	356
249	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 724	Dec. 3	Transmits particulars of allegations made at trial of ex-Ministers, that Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George supported M. Gounaris.	358
250	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 67	Dec. 3	Reports first meeting of second commission, on Capitulations, at which three sub-commissions were set up; adds that, due to Turks' intransigent attitude, there does not seem to be much hope of a reasonable compromise at this stage.	360

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251	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 68	Dec. 3	Requests considered opinion on alternative plan for Straits, which British naval and military experts are anxious to propose if Turks reject French plan (see No. 225).	361
252	TO MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 27	Dec. 4	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs to do utmost to prevent expulsion or arrest of Patriarch, and, if he is arrested, to insist on his release.	362
253	Sir E. CROWE Foreign Office	Dec. 4	Record of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, who was told that Signor Mussolini must have been under a complete misapprehension in thinking that he had reached any agreement on mandates with Lord Curzon at Lausanne (see Nos. 206, 207, and 213).	362
254	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 695	Dec. 4	Reports a private meeting between himself and Mr. Talbot and members of the Greek Govt. and revolutionary committee, at which the latter promised that no more prisoners would be executed.	366
255	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 74	Dec. 5	Reports first meeting of Commission on Straits, at which Turkish delegation formulated no plan, but M. Chicherin put forward extreme case on behalf of Turkey as well as Russia.	368
256	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 50	Dec. 5	Transmits message from P.M. referring to No. 251 and stating that (i) Committee of Imperial Defence are unable to recommend endorsement of Straits proposal made by naval and military experts at Lausanne, (ii) Cabinet may have to consider question of whether it is more important to obtain demilitarization, or free passage of warships.	370
257	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 80	Dec. 6	Reports conversation with Riza Nur Bey, Turkish delegate, who said Turks would meet H.M.G. on every point, provided they got Mosul; suggests it might be possible to give Turks Kurdish part of Mosul vilayet.	370
258	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 82	Dec. 6	Transmits message for C.I.G.S. from General Stuart referring to No. 256, and requesting fresh instructions, since views of General Staff have changed considerably.	372
259	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 757	Dec. 6	Communicates his views on situation in Constantinople, and states that Allies will not be able to resist Turkish claims unless they are prepared to use force, from which French and Italian High Commissions shrink.	372
260	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 83	Dec. 6	Reports meeting of first commission to discuss Straits question, at which he replied at length to Russian proposals (see No. 255).	374
261	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 53	Dec. 7	Transmits message from P.M. asking (i) whether it would be possible to arrive, through Ismet Pasha, at an understanding	375

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		that Turks will cease their aggressive attitude at Constantinople, and (ii) whether he (Lord Curzon) would advise that General Harington be instructed to do his best to maintain position without provoking conflict?	
262 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 89	Dec. 7	Message for the P.M. reporting a conversation with Signor Mussolini on London Conference, reparations, and Allied debts; expresses view that P.M. will find him easy of approach, though startlingly ignorant of external affairs.	376
263 SIR C. HURST Foreign Office	Dec. 7	Memorandum answering questions (i) how far was Greek Govt.'s action in sentencing ex-Ministers to death unconstitutional? (ii) how far was it illegal? (iii) had H.M.G. any *locus standi* in appealing to Greek constitution?	377
264 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 93	Dec. 8	Refers to No. 261, and informs that he proposes to send joint telegram from three Presidents of Conference to Mustapha Kemal, and does not favour sending fresh instructions to General Harington until reply has been received.	379
265 TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 60	Dec. 8	Informs that No. 257 has been considered by Cabinet committee who, while supporting attitude taken to Riza Nur Bey's arguments, agreed that compromise suggested in No. 257, of ceding Kurdish areas to Turkey, would not be acceptable solution.	380
266 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 92	Dec. 8	Reports meetings of first commission to discuss Straits, at which Turks replied to Allied proposals, and he replied to Turkish case; Russians did not depart from their original views.	381
267 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 94	Dec. 9	Message for P.M. and Cabinet: protests against attempts to throw blame for late govt.'s Greek policy upon him, and expresses willingness to take any step which P.M. may advise to make truth known.	382
268 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 98	Dec. 10	Reports (i) Turks have been obstructive and insolent at meetings of sub-committees on capitulations and debts, (ii) telegram has been sent to Mustapha Kemal by three Presidents (see No. 264); expresses hope that he can come to terms with Ismet Pasha on Straits.	383
269 TO MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 35	Dec. 10	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs that if there is danger of action by Refet Pasha against Greek High Commission it should be made branch of Spanish legation.	384
270 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 101	Dec. 10	Transmits message for Mr. Vansittart from Sir W. Tyrrell informing that he had, in September, proved that Lord Curzon's	384

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		note to M. Gounaris had been circulated to the Cabinet.	
271 To LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 70	Dec. 11	Transmits message from Sir W. Tyrrell to Mr. Vansittart, replying to No. 270.	385
272 To MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 387	Dec. 11	Approves Mr. Bentinck's proposal to have no direct contact with any Cabinet Minister, and informs that his position is that of Chargé d'Affaires.	386
273 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 106	Dec. 12	Reports that (i) conversation with Ismet Pasha about Mosul was friendly but unfruitful, (ii) Turks had displayed a more conciliatory attitude in sub-committees, and (iii) M. Barrère intended to warn Ismet Pasha that unless Turks showed a disposition to agree on essential points soon, there would be no use in going on.	386
274 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 110	Dec. 13	Reports discussion of question of minorities, in which Turks refused to allow that there was any problem which required to be dealt with other than by expulsion of Christians and by ordinary Turkish law.	387
275 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 113	Dec. 13	Reports that in second discussion of minorities, at which Turkish attitude remained very unsatisfactory, he warned Ismet Pasha that critical moment had arrived and conference must advance or separate.	388
276 To MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 38	Dec. 13	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs to address to Refet Pasha, when other High Commissioners are instructed, a communication similar to that addressed by Presidents of Conference to Ismet Pasha, requesting that application of Turkish law to foreign companies be suspended. *Note 2.* Note from Presidents of Conference to Ismet Pasha.	389
277 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 118	Dec. 14	Requests instructions as to whether he should acquiesce in abandonment of military clauses in treaty, of which French experts had already told Ismet Pasha.	389
278 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 120	Dec. 14	Reports that Ismet Pasha's reply to his speech of Dec. 13 (see No. 275) was much more conciliatory towards minorities, and included announcement that Turkey was ready to join League of Nations on conclusion of peace.	391
279 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 125	Dec. 16	Informs H.M.G. that he is drawing up preliminary treaty for presentation to Turks, adds that, if this is signed, final treaty will be drawn up in January.	392
280 MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 727	Dec. 16	Reports a conversation with M. Zaïmis, who believed that, if the Powers would support him, he could induce the Revolutionary Government to hand over to him.	393

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281	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 131	Dec. 18	Reports that at meeting to discuss scheme for Straits, which had already been examined by experts, Russians and Turks produced counter schemes of their own.	396
282	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 134	Dec. 18	Expresses hope that General Harington's proposal to retire when preliminary treaty has been signed will not be entertained.	396
283	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 138	Dec. 19	Reports further meeting to discuss Straits, at which he replied to Turks and Russians rejecting counter schemes.	398
284	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 140	Dec. 20	Reports that at final meeting to discuss Straits, Ismet Pasha accepted Allied proposals, but reiterated Turkish views on points of special importance to them.	399
285	TO MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 459	Dec. 21	Instructs to inform French Govt. that H.M.G. propose to enforce, from Jan. 1, prohibition against export of war material to Greece and Turkey.	400
286	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 146	Dec. 22	Reports that Turkish delegation are still difficult and obstructive, both on questions of Straits and on other points such as Minorities, Capitulations, and Patriarchate.	400
287	MR. NICOLSON Lausanne	Dec. 23	Record of a conversation with M. Venizelos who stated, unofficially, that there was a point beyond which Greece could not go in making concessions.	401
288	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 784	Dec. 24	Summarizes Refet Pasha's language to himself and General Harington, stating that Angora wished for a clear-cut peace, and mistrusted Great Britain.	404
289	TO MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 10 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 6	Dec. 24	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Informs that, as Persian Govt. has torn up Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, H.M.G. are absolved from promise made in 1920, on which Persians base their claim to be heard by conference.	405
290	MR. FORBES ADAM Lausanne	Dec. 24	Memorandum for Lord Curzon on outstanding points for discussion in Minorities Sub-Commission.	406
291	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 100	Dec. 25	Addressed to Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Reports information that Turkish army is prepared for rupture of conference, and asks whether situation is such as to necessitate recall of C.-in-C. from Malta.	412
292	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 153	Dec. 26	States that Ismet Pasha's information for Angora (see No. 291) is untrue, and expresses opinion that rupture will not occur immediately, if it occurs at all.	413
293	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 154	Dec. 26	Reports conversation with Ismet Pasha, with whom he failed to come to any agreement, and whom he told of his plan for preliminary treaty (see No. 279).	415
294	TO ISMET PASHA Lausanne	Dec. 26	Letter from Lord Curzon stating that the Sub-Committee on Minorities had an un-	416

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		doubted right to hear representatives of Bulgarians and Armenians.	
295 To Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. unnumbered	Dec. 27	Transmits message from P.M. expressing view that before crisis comes French must be asked whether they will join in opposing Turks by force; if they will not, British will withdraw altogether.	417
296 To Major Marshall Jeddah Tel. No. 2	Dec. 27	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Informs of steps he is taking to protect Arab interests, particularly in Hedjaz Railway, Haramein Wakf, and loot from Prophet's Tomb at Medina.	417
297 To Mr. Phipps Paris Tel. No. 11	Dec. 28	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). States that, as M. Barrère has instructions to make Anglo-French unity clear to Turks, there is no need to trouble President of Council to repeat them.	418
298 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 160	Dec. 28	Reports meeting of second commission to receive report of Sub-Committee on Capitulations, which had broken down on subject of judicial capitulations.	419
299 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 762	Dec. 28	Expresses view that Greeks might yet attempt to take Constantinople.	420
300 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 793	Dec. 28	Refers to No. 291, and reports that all information shows serious military measures to be in preparation; expresses view that Turkish leaders are using army as means of pressure during negotiations.	422
301 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 794	Dec. 29	Reports receipt of three Turkish notes concerning regulations for men-of-war entering Turkish ports, particularly Smyrna.	423
302 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 796	Dec. 29	Reports that he has told representative of Grand National Assembly that Greek military preparations in Thrace were doubtless being made against possible breakdown of conference, and that Turkish attitude at Lausanne was encouraging Greeks.	424
303 To Mr. Bentinck Athens No. 904	Dec. 29	Transmits, in reply to No. 280, a record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador on the question of the recognition of the King of Greece.	424
304 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 167	Dec. 30	Expresses opinion that French hope to do a private deal with Turks on financial matters, hence proposal, which he and Italian delegate have dissuaded, to send General Pellé to Angora; adds that he is much concerned by publicity given to recall of the ships from Malta.	425
305 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 168	Dec. 30	Message for Colonial Office requesting that Mr. Bullard be sent out to take part in discussions on Irak frontiers.	426
	1923		
306 Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 173	Jan. 4	Requests views of Treasury and Colonial Office on Turkish proposal that detached territories should either take over Turkish	427

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		liability for damage within their borders since Aug. 1, 1914, or also be liable for their share of all debt up to armistice.	
307 MR. NICOLSON Lausanne	Jan. 4	Record of a conversation with M. Venizelos who stated that he would never advise his govt. to take military action against Turks without concurrence of French and British Govts., but agreed that, if more Greeks were expelled from Turkey, public opinion might drive Greek Govt. into a dangerous line of policy.	428
308 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 7	Jan. 5	Addressed to Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Transmits text of official denial of Turkish charges that British have infringed Mudania Convention.	429
309 To LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 118	Jan. 5	Transmits text of W.O. telegram to General Harington informing him that there is no intention to change his instructions if there is a breakdown at Lausanne.	430
310 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 177	Jan. 5	Informs of plans to bring matters at Lausanne to a head within reasonable time, and present draft treaty to Turks.	431
311 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 181	Jan. 6	Reports meeting of Commission for Capitulations, at which Ismet Pasha expounded Turkish plan to refuse concessions at Lausanne and make separate treaties with individual powers later on.	431
312 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 7	Jan. 7	Reports that failure of reparations conference at Paris has led Turks to consider Allied front broken, and has given rise to greater optimism as to outcome of Lausanne Conference.	432
313 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 9	Jan. 8	Reports conversation about Lausanne Conference with Hassan Bey, to whom he made it clear that Allied front in respect of Turkey would not be affected by breakdown of reparations conference.	433
314 To LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 123	Jan. 8	Informs of W.O. instructions to General Harington which were in force on Dec. 25, 1922.	434
315 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 188	Jan. 9	Reports meeting of first commission to take report of Sub-Committee on Minorities, which had arrived at solution of many problems.	435
316 To LORD CREWE Paris No. 139	Jan. 9	Requests to inform French Govt. that Mr. Bentinck has been assured that Greek Govt. have no aggressive designs, and no intention of acting alone.	436
317 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 14	Jan. 10	Reports that, in view of reports from Constantinople of warlike preparations by Greeks on Maritza, he and his Allied colleagues have decided to renew warning to Greek Govt.	437
318 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 192	Jan. 10	Reports meeting of first commission to receive report of sub-committee on exchange of prisoners and populations; adds	437

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		that he hopes to bring matters to a head during the week.	
319 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 15	Jan. 11	Refers to No. 317, and reports that in view of M.F.A.'s statement to French Minister that Turks might make situation so impossible that Greeks would have to attack, he and French Minister feel it is necessary to make clear to Greeks that warning is meant by their govts.	439
320 To LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 129	Jan. 11	Refers to No. 306, and states that, although Treasury and Colonial Office regard proposed concession as unjustifiable in principle, they are anxious not to reject a concession likely to facilitate peace if liability involved is inconsiderable.	439
321 MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 17	Jan. 11	Reports further on the situation in Greece, which is still tranquil.	440
322 To LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 131	Jan. 12	Transmits message from Sir J. Shuckburgh to Mr. Forbes Adam stating that Secretary of State for Colonies is very favourable to suggestion that Iraq frontier question be settled by reference to League of Nations.	442
323 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 198	Jan. 12	Reports that matters are still going slowly and he is finding it difficult to induce his colleagues to make an advance.	443
324 To MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 49	Jan. 12	Informs that recognition by H.M.G. of both Greek Govt. and king should be coupled with confirmation of both by popular election, rather than with formation of govt. under any particular man.	444
325 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 202	Jan. 13	Transmits message for P.M. requesting repudiation of story that Mr. Rickett had seen him and Lord Long about Mosul question, that he (Lord Curzon) was to be replaced, and that conference might be transferred to London.	445
326 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 204	Jan. 13	Reports meeting of Commission to hear report of Sub-Committee on Ottoman Debt. &c., and requests that H.M.G. express their disappointment at tardy progress of conference.	446
327 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 210	Jan. 15	Reports (i) that French delegation now seem to oppose plan for draft treaty, (ii) that he and Mr. Child have, in conversation with Ismet Pasha, insisted on a provisional judicial system for period before reform of Turkish law is completed.	448
328 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople No. 31	Jan. 15	Reports that situation in Constantinople has improved since appointment of Dr. Adnan Bey to succeed Refet Pasha as representative of Grand National Assembly.	449
329 MR. NICOLSON Lausanne	Jan. 15	Record of a conversation with M. Venizelos who stated that Greece was only taking ordinary precautions for	450

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		defence in Thrace, and expressed a desire for a separate peace with Turkey if a general peace could not be concluded.	
330 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 211	Jan. 16	Reports that, owing to French tactics, plan for presenting draft treaty to Turks has been so delayed that final treaty will now be ready for presentation instead.	452
331 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 25	Jan. 18	Reports that he has expressed surprise at Turkish allegations that Allies have violated Mudania Convention, and denied reports on which they are based.	453
332 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 29	Jan. 18	Refers to No. 331, and states that he is unable to support French High Commissioner's proposal that, to avoid dangerous incidents, Greeks be asked to withdraw from west bank of Maritza.	454
333 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 29	Jan. 19	Refers to No. 317, and expresses hope that he will not be instructed to take any further action (cf. No. 332).	455
334 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 215	Jan. 19	Informs (i) that he proposes to refer dispute over Mosul to the League of Nations, (ii) that an Allied committee is sitting to draw up a judicial scheme to safeguard interests of foreigners in Turkey.	456
335 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 220	Jan. 20	Reports that he has sent a strong reply to memo. from Ismet Pasha accusing Greeks of outrages on Moslems and of violations of Mudania Convention.	458
336 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 221	Jan. 21	Reports that on his return from Paris, M. Bompard brought proposals from M. Poincaré to concede almost every point to Turks.	458
337 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 34	Jan. 22	Refers to No. 333, and states that he has told French Minister that he must await instructions before suggesting that both Greeks and Turks retire from Maritza. *Note 2.* General Harington's tel. No. 3488 of Jan. 22 on situation in Thrace.	460
338 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 222	Jan. 22	Reports (i) that M. Bompard has replaced M. Barrère, who is ill, as chief French delegate, (ii) that M. Bompard and Marquis Garroni want to present treaty to Turks in such a way as to offer opportunity for further concessions.	461
339 TO MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 72	Jan. 23	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Refers to No. 333, and instructs to ask General Harington immediately for full report on situation in Thrace. *Note 2.* General Harington's reply, in his tel. No. 3492 of Jan. 25.	462
340 LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 224	Jan. 23	Reports meeting of commission at which Turks rejected any arbitration on Mosul question, and he announced intention of referring matter to League of Nations under Article 11 of Covenant.	463

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341	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 226	Jan. 24	Message for P.M. stating that there is no fear of a crisis arising so suddenly that Cabinet has no time to determine H.M.G.'s policy.	465
342	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 229	Jan. 24	Reports procedure, agreed with Sir E. Drummond, for bringing Mosul case before Council of League of Nations under Article 11 of Covenant, and emphasizes need for immediate action.	466
343	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 231	Jan. 24	Informs of timetable for ending conference which he has proposed and Marquis Garroni and M. Bompard accepted, and of arrangement for presenting treaty to Turks in simultaneous meeting of three commissions.	466
344	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 41	Jan. 25	Reports that Angora Govt. have appealed to France over Mosul and asked for reply before Jan. 27; expresses view that this date was fixed in connection with discussions on Russian treaty of alliance, and that Angora means to use both her army and Russia as means of pressure.	470
345	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 149	Jan. 27	Transmits message from Lord Balfour asking whether, in raising question of Irak frontier at Council of League, there is any objection to his referring to Turkish obduracy in other matters.	471
346	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 240	Jan. 27	Reports meetings of commissions to receive reports of sub-committees on exchanges of prisoners of war and of populations, war graves, judicial and economic régimes, nationalities, and antiquities. *Note 5.* Lord Curzon's tel. No. 249 of Jan. 30 reporting signature of agreements for exchange of prisoners of war and populations.	471
347	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 241	Jan. 27	Reports meeting of commission to take reports of sub-committees: (i) sanitary, (ii) economic, (iii) commercial régime, (iv) financial, on all of which matters Turks raised reservations, protests, refusals or appeals.	473
348	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 43	Jan. 28	Expresses support for General Harington's proposal to retire from Constantinople to Gallipoli if and when Lausanne negotiations are broken off.	473
349	LORD CREWE Paris No. 213	Jan. 28	Reports a conversation with M. Poincaré to whom he indicated that, should the Lausanne negotiations break down, H.M.G. would probably remind the French Govt. of the Declaration signed in London in 1915.	475
350	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 50	Jan. 29	Reports (i) that Mr. Spender has been promised Greeks will not attack Turks without Allies' sanction, (ii) that extreme depression exists at idea of Lausanne Conference ending without a decision.	478

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351	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 57	Jan. 29	Asks whether, in event of British withdrawal to Gallipoli (see No. 348), Lord Curzon would approve his staying in Constantinople if French and Italian High Commissioners remain.	478
352	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 59	Jan. 29	Transmits substance of telegram from Col. Mougin, read to him by French High Commissioner, reporting Reouf Bey's reception of telegram from President of the Council to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.	479
353	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 246	Jan. 30	Transmits message for P.M. and War Office expressing hope that no action will be taken on No. 348 which was written on an imperfect appreciation of events at Lausanne.	480
354	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 47	Jan. 30	Transmits report, borne out by communiqué in semi-official newspaper, that Grand National Assembly has decided war must be avoided at all costs.	480
355	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 155	Jan. 30	Transmits text of telegram which Cabinet, after discussion of Nos. 348 and 353, propose to send to General Harington giving instructions for withdrawal from Constantinople to Gallipoli if necessary.	481
356	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 251	Jan. 31	Expresses hope that H.M.G. will support him in resisting weakness of his French and Italian colleagues, who have completely abandoned agreement made for ending of conference (see No. 343).	482
357	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 252	Jan. 31	Reports meeting of commissions to present treaty to Turks, at which Ismet Pasha asked for eight days to consider treaty, and he agreed to delay his departure for four days.	484
358	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 253	Feb. 1	Submits that British Ambassador in Paris should be instructed to make formal representation to President of the Council on gravity of implications of (i) his telegram to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, (ii) his Note of Jan. 30 (No. 349, n. 5) repudiating agreement of November 1915.	487
359	TO LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 164	Feb. 1	Refers to No. 355, and transmits message from P.M. that Cabinet have agreed not to send telegram to General Harington for the present.	490
360	LORD CURZON Lausanne Tel. No. 256	Feb. 2	Reports (i) meeting of commission to discuss Straits Convention, which Russians refused to sign, and (ii) conversation with Ismet Pasha who stated that, provided he got additional assurances and concessions, he could guarantee ratification of Treaty by Angora.	490
361	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 132	Feb. 2	Refers to No. 356, and expresses view that as situation has been altered by French démenti, he should merely reply to Note of Jan. 30 (No. 349, n. 5).	492

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362	To Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 24	Feb. 2	From Lord Curzon (Lausanne). Instructs to make representations to President of the Council, as instructed in No. 356, in view of Mr. Henderson's tel. No. 64. *Note 3.* Mr. Henderson's tel. No. 64 reporting that French High Commissioner had informed Adnan Bey that French would discuss modifications of Treaty, which was not an ultimatum.	492
363	Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 259	Feb. 2	Informs of concessions, to be made in financial clauses of treaty, on which Allied delegations have agreed.	494
364	To Lord Curzon Lausanne Tel. No. 169	Feb. 2	Informs that French Counsellor of Embassy has made verbal communication from President of the Council asking what answer H.M.G. will give to possible Turkish request for Allied withdrawal from Constantinople if conference breaks down.	495
365	Sir R. Graham Rome No. 121	Feb. 2	Reports a conversation with Senator Contarini, whom he reminded of the Declaration of 1915, and who replied that Italy would not sign a separate peace with Turkey, and referred to the loyal support which, he said, the Italian delegation was giving Lord Curzon.	495
366	Lord Curzon Lausanne No. 118	Feb. 2	Gives an account of various offers of a commercial outlet to the Aegean made to and rejected by the Bulgarian delegation, and expresses view that demand for such outlet is inspired by political and territorial rather than commercial considerations.	497
367	Mr. Ryan Lausanne	Feb. 3	Minute on a letter from M. Venizelos on the exclusion of members of the Greek army from the amnesty to be declared.	499
368	Lord Crewe Paris No. 280	Feb. 3	Transmits copy of communication of Feb. 3, made to M. Poincaré in accordance with No. 362, n. 7, No. 368, and No. 362, protesting against his note of Jan. 30 to the Angora Govt.	501
369	Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 141	Feb. 4	Reports M. Poincaré's comments on No. 368.	502
370	Lord Curzon Paris Tel. unnumbered	Feb. 5	Reports concluding phases of Lausanne proceedings, at which Turks finally refused to sign treaty; points out that rupture has finally occurred on financial and judicial questions, not on questions covered by his own commission, or in which Great Britain has particular interests.	504

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371	MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK Lausanne Tel. unnumbered	Feb. 6	Reports on events in Lausanne after departure of British delegation.	508
372	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 61	Feb. 6	Reports that Turkish demand for withdrawal from Smyrna of all foreign warships over 1,000 tons has been confirmed, and Turkish authorities at Smyrna have stated that arrival of H.M.S. *Curaçoa* will be resisted.	509
373	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Feb. 6	Record of a conversation with the French Ambassador who was unable to explain the discrepancies and contradictions between M. Poincaré's statement that the Turks were now ready to sign the treaty they had rejected, and the list of articles to be signed, embodying further Allied concessions, left at the F.O. by M. de Montille, but who stated that if H.M.G. refused to sign they would place themselves in position of wrecking Treaty.	510
374	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 63	Feb. 7	Requests instructions as to whether, in view of risk of incident as a result of extremist action in Anatolia, British warship should leave Smyrna if French and Italian warships do so.	514
375	SIR E. CROWE Foreign Office	Feb. 7	Record of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador who (i) stated that Signor Mussolini was disturbed at dissatisfaction with Italy's attitude at Lausanne expressed in the English press, (ii) brought up the subject of a new agreement to replace the Tripartite Agreement, and (iii) stated that Italian Govt. felt drawn more closely to Britain than to France over Ruhr.	515
376	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 66	Feb. 8	Informs (i) that French admiral will associate himself in declaration to Turkish authorities that Allies cannot recognize restrictions on movement of their warships, (ii) that Allied High Commissioners are addressing a further written communication to Adnan Bey on the subject.	517
377	MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 68	Feb. 8	Refers to No. 374, n. 1, and reports a conversation with Adnan Bey, who was told that if Angora returned a conciliatory reply to joint Note (see No. 376) he (Mr. Henderson) would recommend to H.M.G. that second cruiser be withdrawn from Smyrna.	518
378	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 93	Feb. 8	Comments on statements made to press by Colonel Plastiras on his return from his brief visit to Lausanne to consult M.	519

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			Venizelos; observes that latter would appear to have exercised a moderating influence.	
379	To Sir A. Geddes Washington Tel. No. 55	Feb. 9	Expresses gratitude of H.M.G. for American offer of mediation, but states that best assistance U.S. Govt. can proffer is to tell Turks that they will have no American sympathy or aid until Treaty is signed.	521
380	To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 31	Feb. 9	Instructs on line to be adopted towards Ismet Pasha, who is to pass through Constantinople.	522
381	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 71	Feb. 9	Transmits joint appreciation of uncertain situation in Constantinople by Admiral Brock, General Harington, and himself, and expresses view that advantage might be taken of Ismet Pasha's passing through Constantinople to force a decision.	523
382	To Lord Crewe Paris No. 473	Feb. 9	Replies to M. Poincaré's Note of Feb. 4 that H.M.G. are unable to accept his explanations of his representations to Angora as satisfactory.	524
383	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 73	Feb. 10	Refers to No. 377, and expresses view that since Reouf Bey has returned a fairly conciliatory answer to Allied Note, British warships might now be withdrawn from Smyrna.	532
384	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 75	Feb. 11	Refers to No. 383, and states that in view of Reouf Bey's verbal message to Col. Mougin, which was in form of ultimatum, he and French High Commissioner cannot recommend to their govts. any greater measure of compromise than that outlined in No. 383.	533
385	Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 167	Feb. 11	Reports conversation with President of the Council who stated that (i) the reply to Turkish demand for withdrawal of ships from Smyrna must be in the negative, but war must be avoided if possible, (ii) he had never thought of making a separate peace with Turks.	533
386	Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 168	Feb. 11	Expresses hope that presentation of reply to M. Poincaré's Note of Feb. 4 may be suspended in view of critical situation in Smyrna.	534
387	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 79	Feb. 12	Reports that Mustapha Kemal Pasha has gone to Smyrna to confer with Fevzi Pasha, leader of military party.	535
388	To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 33	Feb. 12	Refers to No. 381, and deprecates course of action suggested therein; instructs to follow line of policy given in No. 380.	535
389	To Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 64	Feb. 12	Refers to No. 386, and expresses view that M. Poincaré's attitude to Smyrna crisis is unlikely to be unfavourably affected by reply (No. 382) to Note of Feb. 4.	536
390	Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 80	Feb. 12	Refers to No. 383, and expresses opinion that H.M.G. could now afford to withdraw all except one of her warships from Smyrna,	536

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		in which case Adnan Bey would recommend Angora to increase tonnage stipulated in regulations.	
391 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tels. Nos. 34 and 35	Feb. 12	Transmits draft text of Note on situation in Smyrna, and validity of Mudros and Mudania armistices, which, he is suggesting to M. Poincaré, Allied High Commissioners should despatch to Adnan Bey.	537
392 Mr. Bentinck Athens No. 103	Feb. 12	Comments on report by Col. Hoare Nairne (not printed) on the state of the Greek army in Thrace, and the character of General Pangalos.	539
393 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 82	Feb. 13	Refers to No. 388, and earnestly begs that ships may be withdrawn from Smyrna, particularly as this would encourage rather timid party which favours good relations with Great Britain.	541
394 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 36	Feb. 13	Informs that he sees no reason to offer Ismet Pasha any further concession on economic clauses at the moment.	541
395 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 84	Feb. 13	Expresses view (i) that Reouf Bey's 'ultimatum' to Col. Mougin (see No. 384) was in no way official, (ii) that Turks are looking for an excuse, which text transmitted in No. 391 would afford, to get out of Smyrna affair without losing too much face.	542
396 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 85	Feb. 14	Reports increasing tendency in Constantinople to favour immediate signature of peace, and strong reaction, led by Reouf and Fethi Beys, against extremists at Angora.	543
397 Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 32	Feb. 14	Transmits text of Turkish counter-draft of declaration on judicial safeguards for foreigners, as amended by Signor Montagna. *Note 3.* Text of declaration.	543
398 To Lord Crewe Paris No. 527	Feb. 14	Replies to M. Poincaré's Note of January 30 (No. 349, n. 5).	544
399 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tels. Nos. 86 and 87	Feb. 15	Reports that, Italian High Commissioner having received his instructions, joint Note is being addressed to Adnan Bey on lines of No. 391.	549
400 Lord Crewe Paris Tel. No. 190	Feb. 15	Refers to No. 382, and reports that he has read it to M. Poincaré.	549
401 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 67	Feb. 17	Reports British officer has been informed by members of Cabinet (i) that they have no intention of acting independently of England, (ii) that if Allies could not ensure peace, they would be free to re-take Eastern Thrace.	551
402 Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 90	Feb. 17	Reports conversation with Ismet Pasha to whom he gave message in No. 380, and stated that only advice he could give him was to sign treaty he had rejected at Lausanne.	552

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
403 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 206	Feb. 17	Informs that he has, in accordance with his instructions, given President of the Council a copy of No. 398 after reading it to him.	553
404 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 96	Feb. 19	Reports on various telegrams read to him by French High Commissioner, from one of which it appeared that French Govt. was prepared to agree to Turkish request to reserve whole economic section of treaty for further discussion.	554
405 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 97	Feb. 20	Refers to No. 404, and informs that he proposes to make it clear to Adnan Bey that H.M.G. are in no way committed to Montagna draft of Judicial Declaration, which Ismet Pasha has told French Ambassador he would accept.	556
406 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 46	Feb. 20	Expresses opinion that re-discussion of Treaty should take place at Constantinople, and be confined to (i) Turco-Greek reparations, (ii) Judicial Declaration, (iii) economic clauses, and instructs to broach matter to French and Italian colleagues.	557
407 TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 81 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 54	Feb. 20	Refers to No. 406, and instructs to convey its substance to French and Italian Govts.	559
408 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 100	Feb. 21	Transmits General Harington's comments on report from Greek Legation in London of Turkish military activities in Eastern Thrace.	560
409 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 104	Feb. 22	Refers to No. 406, which he has discussed with his colleagues, and reports that French High Commissioner personally favours proposal, but Italian High Commissioner has instructions on entirely different lines.	561
410 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 105	Feb. 22	Refers to No. 409, and expresses opinion that chance of limiting further discussion to points enumerated in No. 406 is small.	562
411 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 106	Feb. 22	Reports discussion with Admiral Brock and General Harington who asked (i) How long H.M.G. intended to maintain troops in Constantinople? (ii) What rupture with Nationalists would mean? (iii) What French and Italians were likely to do in the event of hostilities?	562
412 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 54	Feb. 23	Transmits information that Sherif Bey has informed Signor Arlotta that it would be more advantageous for Turkey to resume discussions at Constantinople than at Lausanne.	564
413 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 57	Feb. 24	Instructs to inform Adnan Bey that withdrawal from Smyrna of warships is a sign of conciliation and friendliness, but not an	564

NO. AND NAME		DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
			indication of abandonment of principle affirmed by their original despatch to that place.	
414	SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 43	Feb. 24	Refers to No. 407, and transmits substance of Italian reply, agreeing in principle that discussion should be confined to three points mentioned in No. 406, but considering that discussions should be held at Lausanne rather than Constantinople.	565
415	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 115	Feb. 25	Refers to No. 413, and reports that Adnan Bey expressed utmost satisfaction at information that ships were to be withdrawn from Smyrna.	567
416	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 118	Feb. 25	Refers to No. 409, and suggests that, if necessary, Allies might offer to substitute for economic clauses of treaty short chapter laying down principles on which subsequent negotiations should be based.	567
417	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 59	Feb. 26	Refers to No. 414, and instructs to inform Italian Govt. more fully of his views on (i) Turco-Greek reparations, (ii) judicial formula, (iii) economic clauses.	568
418	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 120	Feb. 26	Transmits his comments on Allied, Turkish, and Montagna formulas of Judicial Declaration.	570
419	LORD CREWE Paris No. 482	Feb. 26	Transmits M. Poincaré's answer to No. 398.	571
420	TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 61	Feb. 27	Informs that French Govt. share views of H.M.G. regarding both judicial formula and economic clauses.	572
421	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 125	Feb. 28	Reports that he has informed Adnan Bey that British delegation was not bound by any concessions made after final meeting in Lord Curzon's room on Feb. 4; expresses view that Angora Govt. are making the most of misunderstanding which has arisen over this to get H.M.G. to come into line with French on concessions.	572
422	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 131	Mar. 2	Expresses opinion that Greek Govt. should find other forms of reprisal for Turkish expulsion of Pontine Greeks than refusing to continue with exchange of prisoners.	574
423	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 68	Mar. 3	Refers to No. 418, and asks views on (i) proposal to relegate economic clauses to separate agreement to be signed with treaty, (ii) French and Italian preference for Lausanne for resumed conference.	575
424	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 141	Mar. 4	Refers to No. 423, and expresses view (i) that resumed conference of a minimum number of diplomatists and experts should meet at Lausanne, (ii) economic clauses must either be discussed in detail or replaced by shorter chapter as proposed in No. 416.	576

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
425	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 144	Mar. 6	Requests that, in view of statements in French press, he be authorized to say that H.M.G., while unable to agree to reservation of economic clauses or to Montagna formula, do not exclude possibility of further discussion on points left outstanding at Lausanne.	577
426	LORD CURZON Foreign Office	Mar. 6	Memo. to Greek Legation stating that H.M.G. cannot accept their offer to place Greek fleet under orders of Allied admirals in the Sea of Marmora.	578
427	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 146	Mar. 7	Transmits official communiqué of Grand National Assembly stating that draft treaty is unacceptable, but govt. has authority to continue peace negotiations.	579
428	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 148	Mar. 7	Reports that he and his Allied colleagues have protested to Adnan Bey about treatment of Pontine Greeks, but expresses view that there are serious objections to linking this with question of prisoners, and some action should be taken at Athens.	579
429	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 72	Mar. 8	Refers to No. 425, and authorizes to make communication to Adnan Bey; expresses opinion, however, that it would be better to wait until joint Allied communication can be made to Angora.	580
430	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople No. 151	Mar. 9	Reports on difficulties likely to arise from Turkish Govt.'s view that foreign companies must comply with Turkish law of 1914 by Mar. 18.	581
431	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 154	Mar. 10	Transmits summary of covering letter, signed by Ismet Pasha, to Turkish counter-draft of treaty.	582
432	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 85	Mar. 10	Reports that he has spoken in sense of Nos. 422 and 428 to head of political bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated that exchange of prisoners would be resumed if this would facilitate task of High Commissioners at Constantinople, but if expulsions of Pontine Greeks continued, Moslems would have to be expelled from Greece to make room for refugees.	587
433	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 157	Mar. 11	Comments on Turkish counter-draft of treaty, and expresses view that Allies might express their readiness to confer further with Turks on points raised in it.	588
434	LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 282	Mar. 11	Informs of plan put forward by M. de Peretti that French and British concessionaires should try to reach a settlement direct with Turkish Govt.	589
435	TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 115 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 67	Mar. 12	Instructs to invite French and Italian Govts. to send experts to London to discuss Turkish Note.	589

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
436 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 87	Mar. 12	States that Turkish insistence on an indemnity, which Greece cannot in any case pay, will merely revive danger of desperate move by Greeks.	590
437 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 76	Mar. 12	Requests views on French proposal for separate agreements between concessionaires and Turkish Govt. (see No. 434).	590
438 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 162	Mar. 12	Refers to No. 432, and expresses hope that, now that Turks have stopped departure of Greeks from Black Sea ports, Greek Govt. will be able to resume exchange of prisoners.	592
439 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 77	Mar. 12	Enquires whether any British nationals have been given permission to negotiate or are negotiating with Turks, as Quai d'Orsay claims.	593
440 To THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR London	Mar. 12	Informs that, subject to certain reservations, H.M.G. are prepared to accede to Franco-Italian agreement to take place of Tripartite Agreement.	593
441 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 170	Mar. 14	Refers to No. 437, and expresses view that French proposal would involve great delay; suggests that reply to Angora be so worded as to enable Allies to fall back on plan suggested in No. 416.	595
442 To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 125 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 72	Mar. 15	Instructs to inform French and Italian Govts. of H.M.G.'s proposal that first meeting of Allied experts should take place in London on March 21.	596
443 MR. KENNARD Rome Tel. No. 54	Mar. 15	Transmits Signor Mussolini's views that there was no alternative but to make peace on best terms possible, but Italian Govt. would be intransigent as regards Castellorizo.	596
444 SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 178	Mar. 16	Expresses opinion that, although presence of Greek army in Western Thrace has contributed to Turkish anxiety for peace, any forward movement of that army is to be deprecated.	597
445 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 94	Mar. 16	Reports that he knows of no intimation that Serbia has rejected Greek overtures, in fact Serbian Minister favours acceptance but is still awaiting views of his govt.	597
446 SIR A. YOUNG Belgrade Tel. No. 41	Mar 17	Reports that attitude of Serbian Govt. to Greek overtures has been reserved, and that, as regards guarantee against Bulgaria, Serbia avoids going further than standpoint that she will tolerate no infraction of treaty of Neuilly; expresses view that it is highly unlikely Serbia would conduct secret negotiations with Turkey. *Note 5.* Sofia tel. No. 19 of Mar. 24 reporting evidence of marked rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria.	598

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
447	MR. PHIPPS Paris No. 695	Mar. 19	Transmits a further Note (not printed) from M. Poincaré on the validity of the pact of Sept. 5, 1914.	599
448	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 99	Mar. 21	Expresses view that Greeks cannot wait indefinitely for peace, and may prefer to risk rush on Constantinople to waiting for Turkish attack; adds that nervousness at possible Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement is increasing.	599
449	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 190	Mar. 21	Reports that, Angora having refused High Commissioner's request (see No. 430), he is advising British companies to register under Turkish law of 1914.	600
450	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 191	Mar. 21	Refers to No. 449, and expresses view that, since Turks are tending to try and enforce other laws also on foreigners, it is very important for Allies to protect themselves against retroactive measures against their subjects.	601
451	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES 3.30 p.m.	Mar. 21	Opening discussion and appointment of three committees for (i) general questions, (ii) financial questions, (iii) economic questions. *Note 15.* M. Bompard's explanation of proposal for separate negotiations by concessionaires.	602
452	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 223	Mar. 22	Transmits a 'Notice' (not printed) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs summarizing attitude of Greek Govt. to expulsion of Pontine Greeks (see No. 437); informs that exchange of prisoners has been resumed.	612
453	MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Mar. 23	Record of a conversation with M. Venizelos who was prepared to meet Turkish delegation on small technical points of counter-draft, but stated that, as regards indemnity, Greek Govt. would go to war rather than give up counter-claim against Turkey.	613
454	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 195	Mar. 24	Reports that he informed Adnan Bey (i) that any delay in negotiations since Lausanne Conference had been Turkish, (ii) that any Greek military preparations in Western Thrace were no doubt due to rumours of Turkish preparations in Eastern Thrace.	615
455	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES	Mar. 26	Report of the General Committee (see No. 451).	616
456	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES	Mar. 26	Report of the Economic Committee (see No. 451).	633
457	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES	Mar. 26	Report of the Financial Committee (see No. 451).	643

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
458	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES 4.45 p.m.	Mar. 27	Discussion of (i) reports of general, economic, and financial committees, (ii) reply to be made to Ismet Pasha's Note (No. 431), (iii) place of meeting for reassembled conference.	650
459	To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 95	Mar. 28	Instructs to communicate to Adnan Bey text of Allied reply to Ismet Pasha's Note (No. 431), as soon as other Allied High Commissioners are similarly instructed.	666
460	To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 96	Mar. 28	Transmits text of Allied reply to Ismet Pasha's Note (No. 431).	666
461	To SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 97	Mar. 28	Informs of plans for separate negotiations between concessionaires and Turkish Govt., preferably at Constantinople.	669
462	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 215	Apr. 2	Transmits information regarding alleged desire of Serbia for understanding or agreement with Turkey. *Note 3.* Belgrade despatch No. 133 of April 5 stating that Sir H. Young can find no hint of such a policy.	670
463	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 114	Apr. 3	Expresses view that reports that M.F.A. has gone to explain to M. Venizelos that Greece must renew war are improbable; adds that report of Allies' decision that question of Greek indemnity is to be left for negotiations between Greece and Turkey has caused greatest disappointment.	671
464	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 269	Apr. 5	Discusses the possibility of a republican coup in Greece, and expresses view that this is unlikely.	672
465	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 225	Apr. 8	Reports that he informed Adnan Bey, who delivered reply to No. 460, that (i) some Turkish modifications in the territorial clauses appeared to involve substantial changes, (ii) Allies as a whole were not bound by anything which passed after Lord Curzon left Lausanne.	675
466	SIR H. RUMBOLD Constantinople Tel. No. 226	Apr. 8	Transmits slightly condensed translation of Turkish reply to No. 460.	675
467	To MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 164	Apr. 9	Instructs to communicate to French Govt. view that invitations to resumed conference should be confined to inviting Powers, Japan, Greece, and Turkey, and possibly also Roumania and Yugoslavia.	677
468	MR. PHIPPS Paris Tel. No. 385	Apr. 11	Reports pessimism of French press at news of Grand National Assembly's granting concession to American Admiral Chester.	679
469	To LORD CURZON Tours Tel. No. 1	Apr. 11	Informs of opinion of Sir H. Rumbold and Sir A. Geddes that U.S. Govt. should be invited to resumed conference, and suggests that Mr. Phipps be instructed to inform M. Poincaré, who shares generally views expressed in No. 467, that H.M.G. wish to reconsider their views on invitation to U.S. Govt.	680

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
470 To Mr. Phipps Paris Tel. No. 169 To Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 89	Apr. 12	Instructs to inform French and Italian Govts. of Lord Curzon's view that Turkish reply to Allied Note (see No. 466) is sufficiently satisfactory to justify resumption of negotiations on Apr. 23 without further correspondence.	681
471 To Mr. Phipps Paris Tel. No. 170 To Sir R. Graham Rome Tel. No. 90	Apr. 12	Refers to No. 468, and further instructs to ask French and Italian Govts. to instruct their High Commissioners to concert as soon as possible in a Note to Turkish Govt. asking them to negotiate with concessionaires at Constantinople.	682
472 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 134	Apr. 12	Reports most categorical denial by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkish allegations of deportation of all Turkish males from Western Thrace.	682
473 Mr. Phipps Paris Tel. unnumbered	Apr. 12	Transmits message from Lord Curzon stating, in reply to No. 467, that he adheres to his original view that neither U.S. nor Belgium need be invited to conference.	683
474 Mr. Bentinck Athens No. 314	Apr. 19	Reports on political situation in Greece and unlikelihood of a return to civilian govt.	684
475 Mr. Bentinck Athens No. 316	Apr. 19	Reports further on M.F.A.'s visit to France, where he conferred with M. Venizelos and M. Poincaré, to Belgrade, and to Salonica where he conferred with Col. Plastiras, Gen. Pangalos, and Capt. Hadjikyriakos, who afterwards made warlike speeches.	685
476 To Sir A. Geddes Washington Tel. No. 140 To Mr. Henderson Constantinople Tel. No. 134	Apr. 20	Informs of decision that Secretary General should notify U.S. Govt. of resumption of negotiations at Lausanne.	686

CHAPTER IV

Correspondence and Memoranda relating to the Conference of Lausanne, April 23–July 24, 1923

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
477 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 3	Apr. 23	Describes opening of conference, and adoption by French and Italian plenipotentiaries of his proposal to adopt division of work adopted at London Conference (see No. 451).	688
478 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 6	Apr. 24	Reports meetings of first and second committees to discuss (i) Turkish demand for thalweg of Maritza as boundary in Thrace, and for ratification of Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, (ii) clauses relating to debt.	690

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
479 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 7	Apr. 25	Reports meetings of the third committee to discuss articles 71 to 78, and of the first committee to discuss articles 15 (Castellorizo), 16 (Ada Kala), 19, 20, and 21–5.	691
480 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 10	Apr. 26	Refers to No. 477, and requests authority, when territorial clauses have been reduced to questions of Maritza frontier and Castellorizo, to bargain thalweg of Maritza in return for Castellorizo.	694
481 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 12	Apr. 26	Records a conversation with Ismet Pasha, who raised questions of (i) evacuation of Constantinople, (ii) reparations; expresses view that Ismet Pasha is very uneasy at having either to go home without a treaty or give way on certain questions.	695
482 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 13	Apr. 27	Reports that, at meeting of third committee, reparations question was brought into prominence prematurely; requests instructions as to his attitude *vis-à-vis* Allies on this question.	696
483 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 14	Apr. 27	Refers to No. 482, and reports discussion of articles 80–90; comments that this discussion showed some indication of Turkish desire to reach an agreement.	697
484 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne No. 9	Apr. 27	Transmits information that Angora envoy in Moscow allegedly stated that Angora Govt. would request presence of Soviet delegation at Lausanne; adds, however, that Turks appear to have taken no steps to secure this.	699
485 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 15	Apr. 27	Reports that American delegate does not claim right to participate in actual negotiations, but simply to take a more active part in discussions.	699
486 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 16	Apr. 27	Reports meeting of the first committee to discuss articles 26 (abolition of capitulations) and 16, and Turkish addition to Thracian frontiers convention.	700
487 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 17	Apr. 28	Reports discussion, in third committee, of articles 91–115.	702
488 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 22	May 1	Reports meeting of the first committee to consider chapters 1 and 3 of the draft convention on the régime for foreigners.	703
489 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 23	May 1	Reports that American delegate has been authorized to commence negotiations for a treaty of commerce and amity with the Turks.	707
490 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 25	May 2	Reports meeting of second committee (i) to receive the experts' report on articles 17–19 and 45–9, and (ii) to discuss articles 53–6 on the Ottoman Public Debt.	708
491 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 27	May 2	Reports that General Pellé's instructions, to raise question of reparations, are directly contrary to his own, and that both	709

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos are demanding discussion of question as soon as possible.	
492 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 28	May 3	Refers to No. 491, and states that he infers from General Pellé's telegrams that French and Italian Govts. recognize that reparations question is one between H.M.G. and Allies, not between Allies and Turks.	710
493 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 29	May 3	Reports discussion, at meeting of third committee, of articles 116 and 117, and of articles 10–17 of the convention respecting the régime for foreigners.	711
494 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 11	May 3	Authorizes to agree to cession of Merkels Islands to Turkey, and suggests this might be done in return for exemption from military service of inhabitants of Tenedos and Imbros.	712
495 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 30	May 3	Reports that General Pellé's démarche regarding Turkish concentrations on Syrian frontier has produced great effect on Turkish delegation.	713
496 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 31	May 4	Reports meeting of first committee, to discuss question of declaration regarding the administration of justice in Turkey, at which Ismet Pasha refused to consider Allied draft declaration.	714
497 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 32	May 4	Reports discussion of amnesty declaration in meeting of first committee.	717
498 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 33	May 4	Reports a private conversation with Ismet Pasha regarding the question of the judicial declaration, in the course of which he again made it clear that H.M.G. had not agreed to the Montagna formula.	718
499 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 158	May 5	Transmits substance of Greek Govt.'s reply to his representations concerning reports of the training in Mitylene of bands to instigate rising against Mustapha Kemal in Asia Minor.	720
500 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 35	May 5	Reviews work of conference to date.	721
501 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 36	May 5	States that he has not encouraged Signor Montagna in his proposal to bargain thalweg of Maritza and Merkels Islands for Castellorizo.	724
502 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 273	May 6	Reports that Turkish position, both internal and external, is weakening, and peace seems essential for her.	725
503 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 38	May 7	Reports discussion, in third committee, of articles 73, 75, 77, and 78, and of articles 1–4 of the commercial convention.	727
504 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 39	May 7	Reports discussion, in third committee, of question of currency in which bondholders of Ottoman debt were to be paid.	728

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
505	MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 160	May 8	Transmits information that M. Venizelos is to be instructed that if situation is not cleared without delay, Greece will be forced to bring matters to a head by declaring armistice at an end.	729
506	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 43	May 8	Reports a conversation with Ismet Pasha about judicial declaration; comments that Ismet Pasha has clearly committed himself in Grand National Assemby to the Montagna formula.	729
507	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 44	May 8	Reports discussion in first committee of (i) report of sub-committee on proposed Turkish addition to Thracian Frontiers Convention, (ii) articles 152–60 of treaty.	730
508	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 45	May 9	Reports conversation with M. Venizelos who stated (i) that Greek Govt. contemplated an ultimatum to Turkey to stop seizure of Greek safes in Smyrna banks, expulsion of Greeks from Asia Minor, etc., (ii) that in present atmosphere he could not take up reparations question direct with Ismet.	733
509	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 46	May 9	Reports consideration, in third committee, of report of financial experts on the remainder of the debt clauses (i.e. articles 45 to 56).	734
510	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 49	May 10	Reports discussion, in third committee, of articles 5–11 of draft commercial convention.	736
511	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 51	May 11	Reports meeting of first committee to discuss article 159 and the first two of the three additional articles proposed by Turks after 159 dealing with Wakf property.	737
512	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 52	May 12	Reviews work of conference to date and expresses view that battle royal over big question may begin any time after middle of next week.	741
513	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 56	May 14	Reports a conversation with M. Venizelos who proposes, if necessary, to give Turks Karagatch in return for their dropping their demand for an indemnity from Greece.	743
514	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 57	May 14	Reports that on question of reparations he and his Allied colleagues have reached a deadlock which can only be solved by their govts. since General Pellé's and Signor Montagna's instructions to re-open question are directly contrary to his own.	744
515	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 59	May 14	Reports meeting of second committee at which agreement was reached on the sanitary clauses (articles 129–33).	745
516	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 61	May 15	Reports conversation with Ismet Pasha about Greco-Turkish reparations; expresses view that situation as between Greece and Turkey will be dangerous until this question is out of the way.	747

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAG
517 To Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 21	May 15	Refers to No. 513, and (i) approves M. Venizelos's proposal to cede Karagatch to Turks if all other means of reaching a settlement fail, and (ii) instructs to speak to M. Venizelos about Greek troop movements in Western Thrace which have alarmed Allied Generals at Constantinople.	749
518 To Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 77	May 15	Refers to No. 517, (i) requests information concerning reported troop movements, and (ii) instructs to renew warning to Greek Govt. against resumption of hostilities.	750
519 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 62	May 15	Reports discussion, in third committee, of articles 78–107 of the treaty and articles 12–20 of the commercial convention.	751
520 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 173	May 16	Refers to No. 518, and informs that head of Political Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to whom he made communication, was painfully surprised by it, but stated that if Turks gave way on indemnities there would be no war, and in any case Greek army would not advance against govt.'s orders.	752
521 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 65	May 17	Refers to No. 517, and informs of conversation with M. Venizelos and M. Alexandris who (i) gave formal assurance that Greek Govt. would not resume hostilities without giving notice to Allies, (ii) stated that question of Greco-Turkish reparations must be settled 'within a reasonable time'.	754
522 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 175	May 17	Reports further conversation with head of Political Bureau (see No. 520), who had no reason to believe govt. would not follow M. Venizelos's wishes (see No. 521); expresses view that if there is further delay situation will become most grave.	756
523 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 67	May 17	Reports discussion in first committee of articles 3, 16, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 144 of the treaty, additional article to Thracian Frontiers Convention, and articles 15 and 24 of the convention concerning the régime for foreigners (foreign institutions).	757
524 Sir H. Rumbold Lausanne Tel. No. 69	May 18	Refers to No. 521, and reports conversations about Greco-Turkish reparations question both with Ismet Pasha, who stated that if Greece made a 'practical proposal' he would consider it, and with M. Venizelos who was still without authority to propose cession of Karagatch to Turkey (see No. 513).	760
525 Mr. Bentinck Athens Tel. No. 176	May 18	Refers to No. 522, and reports M. Politis's further statement that Greece had nothing to fear from resumption of hostilities and only desire not to act contrary to wishes of powers restrained her.	761

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
526 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 178	May 18	Transmits views of chief of Naval Staff, Chief of General Staff, and head of Second Bureau of General Staff on chances of war between Greece and Turkey.	761
527 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 74	May 18	Reports that Greek Govt. has now given authority for offer of Karagatch to Turks, and General Pellé is to suggest this solution of reparations question to Ismet Pasha.	762
528 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 179	May 18	Reports that Italian Chargé d'Affaires has had telegram from Signor Montagna hinting at Allied pressure on Greeks to yield to Turkish demand for reparation; comments that this would be unjust and would provoke new revolution in Greece.	763
529 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 299	May 18	Requests views of H.M.G. as to whether (A) commissions of Allied Generals are based on military considerations, or (B) Allied forces are responsible for whole city; informs of plans of action in event of resumption of hostilities.	764
530 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 184	May 19	Reports statement by Greek Prime Minister threatening to withdraw delegate from Lausanne if Powers yielded to Turkish demand for indemnity and expressing hope that if Turkey provoked war Allies would not stand in way.	766
531 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 185	May 19	Refers to No. 529, and repeats conviction that Greece will not do anything to bring her into conflict with Allies; expresses hope that in event of war Allies will not close Dardanelles, about which Greeks are most anxious.	766
532 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 78	May 19	Reports meeting of second committee to discuss (i) report of sub-committee on sanitary clauses, (ii) Section 3 of Financial Clauses (articles 65–70).	767
533 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 81	May 19	Reports meeting of first committee to discuss articles 19 (Cyprus), 26, 35 and three articles proposed by Turks (Wakf property, foreign institutions) of the main treaty, and the Amnesty declaration.	769
534 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 82	May 19	Informs that he proposes the next week to try to induce Turks to drop demand for Castellorizo and Ada Kola in return for Merkels Islands and possibly thalweg of Maritza.	773
535 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 85	May 20	Reports (i) that General Pellé has regrettably put cession of Karagatch to Ismet Pasha as Allied proposal, (ii) that fact that French and Italian Govts. have not yet agreed to drop question of reparations from Turkey is increasingly awkward.	774
536 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 29	May 21	Informs of French proposal, now withdrawn, for use of gold transferred from Germany and Austria to Allies to satisfy claims against Turkey, and suggests that, as H.M.G. can see no other solution, this proposal be discussed by Allied experts.	775

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
537 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 90	May 22	Reports discussion of reparation problem among Allied delegates; suggests Treasury bills for £846,000 bought from construction firms when Turkish ships were requisitioned, be contributed to reparations pool.	776
538 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 91	May 22	Reports that Serbian Minister, asked by Ismet Pasha whether Serbia would remain neutral in event of resumption of hostilities, strongly advised Ismet Pasha not to risk any further adventures.	777
539 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 195	May 22	Reports that Prime Minister has assured French Minister, who has made his *démarche*, of Greece's pacific intentions, adding that Greek Govt. would agree to slight rectification of frontier.	778
540 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 93	May 22	Reports M. Venizelos's proposal that preliminaries of peace between Greece and Turkey be signed as soon as reparations question is settled.	778
541 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 95	May 24	Refers to No. 540, discusses M. Venizelos's proposal, and expresses favourable view of it on the whole.	779
542 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 31	May 24	Refers to No. 537 and No. 537, n. 4, and informs that, if reparations question can thereby be settled, H.M.G. would contribute treasury bills to reparations pool.	780
543 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 96	May 24	Reports that all real progress of conference as a whole has been suspended for nearly a week because of (i) reparations question, and (ii) non-arrival of French economic expert.	781
544 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 309	May 24	Transmits information that Refet Pasha's military organization in Thrace is a failure and troops may be sent back to Anatolia; comments that now is the time to take a firm line with Turks.	782
545 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 97	May 24	Requests that, as it is reparations question which now blocks way, H.M.G. will take strong action at Paris and Rome to have French and Italian delegates instructed to drop demand for reparation from Turks.	783
546 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 98	May 24	Reports that Greek representatives will leave if indemnity question is not settled by Saturday, and expresses view that this is not bluff and failure of Allies to agree about their reparations claim before Saturday might have disastrous effect on Turco-Greek situation and on conference.	784
547 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 99	May 24	Expresses concern at criticism of conference in British press, and requests that press section of Foreign Office do what they can to counteract this.	785
548 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 8	May 25	States that he has informed M. Venizelos that there is no truth in report that 7,000 Turkish troops had crossed to Eastern Thrace.	786

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549 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 103	May 25	Informs that he is fairly confident Ismet Pasha can be forced to accept Karagatch solution to Turco-Greek reparations problem, but only when Allies are united in deciding to drop all reparations claims on Turkey.	787
550 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 35	May 25	Addressed to Constantinople. Informs of situation regarding Turco-Greek reparations question, which Allied delegates agree must be settled without delay.	787
551 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 34	May 25	Instructs to ask M. Venizelos whether H.M.G. are right in relying on his and Greek Prime Minister's statements that Greece will not resume hostilities without notice to Allies, or act contrary to wishes of Powers.	788
552 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 204	May 25	Reports Greek Prime Minister (i) stated that Greece would agree to postponement of indemnity discussion to enable Ismet Pasha to hear from Angora, (ii) denied reports of movement of fleet to Dardanelles, (iii) stated that Serbia had given Greece favourable assurances about her attitude in case of war.	789
553 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 205	May 25	Reports chief of revolution's statement that if delegates were withdrawn from Lausanne cabinet would not feel bound to act in accordance with their recommendations; comments that number of people who believe in peaceful solution declines every day.	789
554 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 36	May 25	Requests views on situation which would arise in event of breakdown which might occur over (i) Turkish reparations, (ii) concessions, (iii) régime for foreigners, (iv) Greek reparations (with consequent danger of resumption of Greco-Turkish hostilities).	790
555 TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 238 TO SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 153	May 25	Instructs to act immediately to have French and Italian delegates authorized to inform Ismet Pasha that Allies will not claim reparations from Turkey.	792
556 TO MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 87	May 25	Refers to No. 555, and instructs to take urgent action to ensure that utmost latitude is given to M. Venizelos not to leave Lausanne while there is chance of settlement of Greek reparations question.	792
557 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 108	May 25	Reports conversation between Allied delegates and M. Venizelos, who agreed not to leave Lausanne on May 26, even if reparations question were not solved that day.	793
558 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 109	May 25	Refers to No. 551, and reports that he has acted on instructions, and M. Venizelos has repeated assurance that Greece will not go to war without previous notice to Allies.	794

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559 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 110	May 26	Reports that he has told Ismet, who stated that he had not yet had an answer from Angora regarding cession of Karagatch, that question must be settled without further loss of time.	795
560 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 313	May 26	Reports that French High Commissioner has been instructed that, in the event of Greco-Turkish hostilities, French troops and nationals are to be evacuated as soon as possible. *Note 2.* General Harington's tel. No. 3931 to the War Office informing of action agreed on in event of hostilities.	796
561 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 113	May 26	Reports meeting of first committee to discuss articles 3, 20, 25, 27, 154, 155, and first and third additional articles after 159 of main treaty, and articles 1, 4, 5, 20, and 25 of Convention Concerning Régime for Foreigners.	797
562 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 209	May 26	Refers to No. 539, and reports that French Minister is authorized to deliver to Greek Govt. message similar to that in No. 518, although he has hitherto not done so.	801
563 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 114	May 26	Reports settlement of Greco-Turkish reparations question on basis of (i) Greek recognition in principle that she should pay indemnity to Turkey, (ii) cession of Karagatch, (iii) mutual restitution of prizes of war taken since Mudros Armistice.	802
564 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 115	May 26	Reports more fully on meeting between heads of Allied delegations, Ismet Pasha, and M. Venizelos, at which Greco-Turkish reparations question was solved.	802
565 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 118	May 26	Refers to No. 554, and gives views on concessions and régime for foreigners, both Turkish and Greek reparation questions being settled, and on question of currency in which interest on pre-war Turkish loans is to be paid.	804
566 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 119	May 26	Expresses view that, in unlikely event of resumption of Greco-Turkish hostilities British should (*a*) remain neutral, (*b*) stay in Constantinople, (*c*) refuse passage of Dardanelles to Greek fleet; adds that best plan in Constantinople would be to confine occupation to zone between Golden Horn and Bosphorus.	807
567 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 121	May 27	Requests instructions regarding discussion of Allied evacuation of Constantinople and Straits; expresses view that evacuation could, as Turks propose, begin as soon as Angora ratifies treaty.	810
568 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 128	May 28	Reports meeting of second committee at which General Pellé announced Allied decision to waive claim to reparations from Turkey, as proposed in February (see No. 370).	811

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569 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 129	May 29	Reports that, at private meeting with Allied delegates, Ismet Pasha agreed to drop demands for Ada-Kaleh and Castellorizo, and Allies agreed to thalweg of Maritza as frontier in Thrace, and to cession of Rabbit Islands.	812
570 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 130	May 29	Refers to No. 569, and informs of timetable, made at private meeting with Ismet, for discussion of outstanding questions; requests views on solution of question of Judicial Declaration foreshadowed in No. 565.	812
571 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 131	May 29	Reports discussion of draft Judicial Declaration at meeting between Allied delegates and Ismet Pasha who insisted that this problem must be solved before remaining questions were discussed.	813
572 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 132	May 30	Reports that he means to ask M. Venizelos, who wants to sound Ismet Pasha on the possibility of Greece signing preliminaries of peace with Turkey (see No. 540), to hold his hand.	814
573 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 133	May 30	Refers to No. 571, and requests instructions as to whether he should accept new draft of Judicial Declaration which, although it falls far short of Allied draft, is a considerable advance on Montagna formula.	815
574 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 213	May 30	Refers to No. 572, and expresses view (i) that resignation of M. Venizelos or M.F.A. would play into hands of extremists who are not altogether pleased with settlement of reparations question, (ii) that unless preliminary peace at least is signed there is danger of serious crisis.	817
575 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 135	May 31	Transmits terms of new drafts of article 2 of main treaty and additional article in Thracian Frontiers Convention, necessitated by cession of Karagatch.	817
576 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 327	May 31	Transmits substance of explanations made to Angora by Ismet Pasha for exceeding his instructions in reaching settlement of Greek reparations question; comments that Ismet Pasha's position is likely to be very difficult if he cannot show compensating advantages for this surrender.	818
577 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 136	May 31	Reports discussion, at meeting of third committee, of articles 73, 78, 82 (*c*), 87, 89, and 93 of main treaty, the fiscal clauses of the Etablissement Convention, and articles 2, 9, 14, 17, and 18 of the Commercial Convention.	819
578 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 142	June 1	Expresses opinion that, in view of possible delay in French ratification of treaty, evacuation should begin on Turkish ratification, on condition (i) that Greek and Turkish ratification should re-establish	821

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		peace between two Powers, (ii) that provisions of Convention for Régime for Foreigners and Commercial Convention should come into force in Turkey on Turkish ratification.	
579 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 222	June 2	Expresses view that Turkish warships should not be allowed through Dardanelles to protect Aegean coast from Greek hands since this might lead to incidents with Greek destroyers and give hot-heads in Greece a pretext for hostilities.	823
580 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 146	June 2	Requests instructions on question of exchange options, on which deadlock has now been reached, since Allied delegates cannot agree to vary loan contracts to detriment of bondholders, and Turkish Govt. refuse to pay in sterling.	824
581 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 147	June 2	Reviews progress of conference: settlement of territorial questions (see No. 569), Judicial Declaration (see No. 573); adds that question of debt coupons is proving difficult, and two details of Greek reparations settlement are still outstanding.	825
582 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 151	June 2	Refers to No. 581, and informs that French Govt. are prepared to accept draft Judicial Declaration (see No. 573) if H.M.G. and Italian Govt. agree.	828
583 MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	June 2	Letter to M. Venizelos summarizing correspondence between H.M.G. and Italian Govt. regarding Dodecanese, and stating that H.M.G. would welcome Italo-Greek discussions on this subject.	829
584 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 152	June 3	Reports that he has asked M. Venizelos, who does not think C. in C. and head of navy can bring off coup in Greece, to speak to Ismet Pasha about Turkish claim to reimbursement for requisitions and right of Greek inhabitants to stay at Karagatch.	830
585 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 155	June 4	Expresses hope that dangerous and unpractical French proposal that evacuation should start on ratification by Turkey and end on ratification by three other Powers will be dropped.	831
586 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 157	June 4	Reports private meeting between Ismet Pasha and Allied delegates to discuss question of concessions.	832
587 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 62	June 5	Refers to No. 578, and expresses readiness to agree to evacuation on ratification of treaty by Angora provided protocol is signed with treaty, under which certain parts of treaty become operative at once: (i) peace between Greece and Turkey, (ii) régime for foreigners and Commercial Convention, and possibly also Irak frontier clause.	836

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588 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 63	June 5	Expresses view that, in spite of their earlier refusal (see No. 360), Russians should again be invited to sign Straits Convention.	836
589 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 64	June 5	Authorizes, if necessary, to drop article 156 which binds Turks to accede to Arms Traffic Convention.	837
590 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 159	June 5	Reports discussion, in first committee, of articles 3 (1), 3 (2), 16, 20, 35, 152, 153, and 159 *bis* of the main treaty, article 20 of the Etablissement Convention, the Judicial Declaration, and the report of the experts on the Amnesty Declaration.	838
591 To MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 103	June 6	Informs of proposals for evacuation and for coming into force of peace between Greece and Turkey on ratification by those Powers (see No. 588).	842
592 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 166	June 6	Informs of plan to present Ismet Pasha with draft texts on both debt and concessions questions, in which Allied delegates will be prepared to make concessions authorized by their govts.	842
593 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 452	June 7	Comments on reports of private conversations with Colonel Plastiras and with M. Lambrakis, editor of 'Eleftheron Vinia' on the situation in Greece and possibility of a coup by C.-in-C.	843
594 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 73	June 8	Refers to No. 580, and informs that Treasury approve attitude taken on debt coupons question and would assent to compromise suggested if liberty of action of bondholders is in no way curtailed.	845
595 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 173	June 9	Refers to No. 594, and informs (i) that French and Italian instructions conform entirely to his, and (ii) that Turks are using every means to obtain concessions on debt coupons question.	846
596 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 175	June 9	Requests instructions as to course he should adopt towards article 159 of treaty (accession to certain clauses of Belgium, Portugal, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), and informs of plan for separate protocol giving these states, or at least first two, right to accede to certain clauses of treaty.	847
597 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 176	June 10	Reports private meeting between Allied delegates and Ismet Pasha to discuss question of Ottoman debt at which he made declaration in sense of instructions in No. 594.	848
598 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 177	June 11	Reports discussion of debt question between Ismet Pasha and Allied financial experts.	849
599 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 178	June 11	Refers to No. 598, and requests instructions as to attitude to be assumed if Turks break on debt question; expresses view that in last resort Allies should accept best settlement Ismet Pasha will accept.	850

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600	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 180	June 11	Informs of instructions sent to French delegate on (i) concessions, (ii) evacuation, (iii) invitation to Russians to sign Straits Convention; instructions on last two points agree with his own (see Nos. 588 and 589).	851
601	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 181	June 11	Refers to No. 600, and enquires whether H.M.G. would accept six weeks as period for evacuation.	852
602	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 184	June 12	Refers to No. 599, and reports further meeting with Turkish delegates on debt question, at which General Pellé connected settlement of debt question with evacuation; expresses view that, as Turks may risk break on this question, Allies might drop demand for declaration to bondholders.	852
603	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 183	June 12	Refers to No. 601, and suggests that problem of French proposal, for Turkish demobilization to proceed concurrently with evacuation, be taken up with French Govt., since Turks will not accept it.	854
604	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 188	June 12	Informs that at next meeting of first commission to consider additional article to Thracian Frontiers Convention, which Bulgarian delegates now say they will not sign, he proposes to point out that new article and convention were both accepted by Bulgarian delegate when originally discussed.	855
605	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 189	June 12	Reports private meeting between Ismet Pasha and Allied delegates on concession question, at which he pointed out to Ismet necessity of some provision for recognition of certain principles in negotiations being incorporated in Treaty.	856
606	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 80	June 13	Informs of views of H.M.G. on (i) evacuation, (ii) debt, (iii) concessions, and (iv) Mosul.	858
607	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 190	June 13	Refers to No. 604, and reports that Bulgarian delegate has now explained that Bulgaria is willing to sign all articles of Thracian Frontiers Convention, except new transit article.	859
608	SIR H. DERING Bucharest Tel. No. 80	June 13	Reports that Djevad Bey has asked M.F.A. whether Roumania would intervene on debt questions, and what would be Roumanian attitude to resumption of hostilities.	860
609	TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne No. 96	June 13	Transmits copies of two telegrams from General Harington to War Office, regarding evacuation of Constantinople.	860
610	MR. BENTINCK Athens No. 463	June 13	Refers to No. 593, and comments on further conversation between Mr. Atchley and Chief of the Revolution, who appeared to wish to hand over to a regular govt.	861

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
611 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 191	June 14	Describes position of conference on questions of (i) debt, (ii) concessions, (iii) evacuation, and states that Allied delegates propose to treat them as a whole and insist on their being settled together.	863
612 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 192	June 14	Transmits summary of a Note from M. Venizelos asking for support of Allies for signature of preliminary peace between Greece and Turkey.	865
613 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 193	June 14	Refers to No. 612, and comments that advantages of separate negotiations now appear smaller and disadvantages greater than three weeks before (see No. 541).	866
614 TO MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 60	June 14	From Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne). Informs that he is unable to press Ismet Pasha for assurances concerning payment of termettu and other taxes by foreigners.	866
615 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 195	June 14	Refers to No. 606 and No. 611, and reports conversations on debt question with General Pellé, who had received very uncompromising instructions from his govt., and with Ismet Pasha who was very obstinate.	868
616 TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 257	June 15	Refers to No. 585, and instructs to point out to French Govt. that proposal for Turkish demobilization concurrently with evacuation would arouse suspicion and resentment, and H.M.G. trust French Govt. will modify General Pellé's instructions on this point.	871
617 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 196	June 16	Reports that deadlock on debt question is complete and he has recommended to his colleagues that if they failed to find acceptable formula in next 24 hours they should ask for instructions whether to propose compromise or summon Turks to agree to their proposals; requests that French be strongly urged to accept jurists' formula. *Note 2.* Jurists' formula for declaration to be made by Turkish delegation regarding public debt.	871
618 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 199	June 16	Expresses view that best method of dealing with problem of paying concessionary companies out of reparations pool will be to allow companies' claims to rank *pari passu* with individual claims.	874
619 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 200 and 201	June 17	Refers to No. 617, and reports conversation with Ismet Pasha, from whom he derived impression that jurists' formula with two alterations would be acceptable; states conviction that Allies must now stick to principle of formula.	875
620 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 202	June 18	States that he has informed Ismet Pasha that new conditions for acceptance of jurists' formula on debt were diametrically opposed to his instructions; adds that he	876

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		learns French Govt. are opposed to further concessions.	
621 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 203, 204, and 205	June 18	Reports preparation, after long discussion between Allied delegates, of new formula on debt, which was rejected by Ismet Pasha.	876
622 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 207 and 208	June 19	Refers to Nos. 612 and 613, and informs that M. Venizelos has explained to Ismet Pasha that he is not pressing his request to expedite re-establishment of state of peace between Greece and Turkey as Allies do not foresee prolonged delay in concluding general peace.	879
623 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 209	June 19	Refers to No. 603, and reports that French Govt. have dropped demand for Turkish demobilization *pari passu* with evacuation, and agree to period of six weeks for evacuation.	880
624 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 212	June 20	Analyses situation with regard to debt question, French attitude to which has not changed, and suggests (i) vigorous effort to make Ismet accept jurists' formula, (ii) discussions between French bondholders and Turkish Govt., (iii) dropping declaration, but placing on record Allied right to protect bondholders.	880
625 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 600	June 20	Refers to No. 606, and transmits brief summary of French Note giving views on concessions, debt, and evacuation.	882
626 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 215	June 21	Appeals to Lord Curzon to help conference in deadlock over debt, pointing out that key to the situation is now in Paris.	883
627 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 95	June 22	Refers to Nos. 621 and 624, and instructs to leave debt question aside for time being and deal with Concessions and any other outstanding questions.	884
628 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 216	June 23	Informs that he has communicated instructions in No. 627 to his colleagues who have agreed to meet Ismet to review outstanding questions.	885
629 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 217	June 23	Reports private conversation with Ismet Pasha about debt and progress of concessionaires' negotiations.	886
630 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 218	June 23	Refers to No. 629, and reports that, in reply to Ismet's protest against evacuation of Turkish war material in Allied custody, he asked about guns recently seized on board 'Urmid'.	887
631 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 219	June 23	Reports meeting of third committee at which agreement was reached on several minor points.	888
632 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 220	June 23	Refers to No. 628, and reports meeting with Ismet Pasha and discussion of evacuation, Syria, Irak Frontier, adhesion of Belgium, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, civil list property, articles 70, 72 and 72 *bis*, concessions.	890

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
633 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 363	June 24	Transmits appreciation of general situation, commenting that Turkish fortunes are declining, but there is a danger of Turks withdrawing into Anatolia rather than sign peace compromising their independence.	894
634 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 221	June 25	Comments on meeting with Ismet Pasha (see No. 632), and expresses view that since Turks connect debt, evacuation, and concessions, Allies should either settle debt and concessions by bargain or present Turks with ultimatum on these questions.	896
635 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 223	June 26	Reports discussion in first committee of article 2 and additional article to Thracian Frontiers Convention, Syrian Frontier and Angora Agreement, Irak Frontier, article 152, Arms Traffic Convention, Prize Court decisions, Accession of Belgium, Portugal, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.	898
636 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 225	June 26	Reports conversation with Ismet Pasha who gave undertaking that if debt question were solved he would settle concessions in satisfactory manner.	901
637 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 226	June 26	Reports meeting of financial committee to confirm agreement reached by experts on minor points.	902
638 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 99	June 28	Refers to No. 636, and expresses view (i) that all depends on French decision on debt question, (ii) that H.M.G. must insist on settlement of concessions concurrently with debt question.	903
639 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 232	June 28	Reports decision to present Ismet Pasha with Allies' last word on debt, concessions, and evacuation, first verbally then, if necessary, as *mise en demeure*.	903
640 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 233	June 28	Refers to No. 639, and states that H.M.G. must choose between (i) following French in one of two courses, either of which would probably lead to rupture, and (ii) getting French to agree to evacuation on ratification by Angora even if declaration to bondholders is dropped; expresses hope that H.M.G. and French Govt. will agree on common policy.	905
641 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 234	June 29	Refers to Nos. 638, 639, and 640, and expresses view that H.M.G. should strongly urge French Govt. to modify their views on debt question, British interest in which does not seem great enough to justify rupture.	906
642 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 236	June 29	Refers to No. 636, and reports that he has told Ismet (i) that delay on debt question was entirely due to Turkish Govt., (ii) that Allies must insist on a solution of both debt and concessions questions.	907

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
643 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 239	June 30	Expresses view that arguments against plan for signature of preliminary peace between Greece and Turkey are as strong as ever, but responsibility for discouraging them is increasing; suggests instead partial demobilization in Western Thrace.	907
644 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 240	June 30	Transmits substance of French delegate's instructions on debt, which authorize him to agree to absence of declaration on certain conditions.	909
645 TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 281	July 2	Instructs to invite careful attention of French Govt. to proposals in No. 639, and enquire whether, if French Govt. propose to adhere to their own proposals, they have weighed all possible consequences.	910
646 MR. BENTINCK Athens Tel. No. 257	July 2	Refers to No. 643, and expresses view (i) that Greece dare not demobilize without peace, (ii) that if H.M.G. is to beg Greek Govt. not to make peace their position will be humiliating.	911
647 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 242 and 243	July 3	Reports that Italian delegate has been instructed not to take part in drawing up agreement for distribution of funds available for reparation; expresses view that agreement should be made at Lausanne if possible.	912
648 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 244	July 3	Transmits summary of Note addressed by Ismet Pasha to Allied delegates requesting that conference discuss debt, evacuation, and concessions at single meeting.	914
649 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 245	July 3	Refers to No. 648, and reports that he has, in conversation with Ismet Pasha, protested vehemently against his action in sending Note which is a tissue of misrepresentations.	915
650 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 246	July 3	Reports meeting at which certain subsidiary outstanding points in second and third committees were cleared off.	915
651 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 247	July 3	Reports conversation with Roumanian and Serbian delegates who expressed hope that Allies would not take any action which might lead to rupture, since Ismet Pasha had stated rupture would mean resumption of hostilities.	919
652 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 640	July 3	Communicates summary of French reply to No. 645, which states that Sir H. Rumbold's three points in No. 639 are in agreement with instructions sent through French Ambassador (see No. 644).	920
653 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 249	July 4	Refers to No. 652, and expresses view (i) that conditions French attach to abandonment of declaration would lead to rupture, (ii) that one chance of avoiding rupture is to follow course recommended in No. 639.	921
654 MR. HENDERSON Constantinople Tel. No. 377	July 4	Refers to No. 645, and expresses view that if treaty with reservations is signed continued occupation of Straits would be	923

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
		almost as effective as occupation of Constantinople, easier to manage, and more likely to produce amicable solution.	
655 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 251	July 5	Refers to No. 653, and expresses earnest hope that H.M.G. and French Govt. will reach speedy agreement and send identic instructions on debt question not later than the end of the week.	923
656 TO LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 284	July 5	Instructs to make communication to French Govt. asking them to reconsider debt question and instruct General Pellé to accept omission of declaration without postponement of evacuation, and at the same time to submit to Turks protocol and declaration on concessions.	924
657 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 252	July 5	Reports a conversation with M. Venizelos who agreed not to approach Ismet Pasha with plan for protocol providing for release of Greek prisoners and coming into force of exchange of populations agreement until July 8, by which time Allies hoped to have final instructions and be able to meet Ismet Pasha.	926
658 LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 655	July 6	Refers to No. 656, and reports M. Poincaré's reception of *aide memoire* based upon it; expresses view that French Govt.'s reply is generally satisfactory.	927
659 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 254	July 7	Refers to No. 656, and informs that, as French have now agreed to H.M.G.'s proposals (see No. 658), private meeting with Ismet Pasha will be held that afternoon.	928
660 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 256	July 7	Reports private meeting between Allied and Turkish delegates to discuss debt, evacuation, and concessions.	929
661 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 258	July 8	Requests instructions on Turkish demand for naval evacuation, suggesting that number of ships might be limited by declaration or protocol, and ships in excess of this number withdrawn.	934
662 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 261	July 9	Expresses strong dislike of M. Peretti's suggestion that Allies might delay making declaration on debt until after conclusion of peace.	934
663 TO SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 112	July 9	Refers to No. 661, and instructs that right of free access to Straits cannot be jeopardized by fixing of a maximum number of ships.	935
664 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 269	July 10	Refers to No. 663, and requests authorization to press for unlimited right of passage until Straits Convention comes into force, but to use discretion as regards right of sojourn in Turkish waters.	936
665 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 7	July 10	Addressed to Rome. Requests to press Italian Govt. to send Italian delegation authority to negotiate inter-Allied agreement on reparations.	937

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
666 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 268	July 10	Transmits full report of private meeting between Ismet Pasha and Allied delegates on July 8 to discuss draft evacuation protocol and other outstanding questions.	937
667 To LORD CREWE Paris Tel. No. 287 To SIR R. GRAHAM Rome Tel. No. 206 To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 122	July 11	Informs that he has agreed to M. Poincaré's proposal that treaty be signed on behalf of France, Italy, and Great Britain only by three representatives now at Lausanne.	944
668 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 273	July 12	Reports further private meeting between Allied delegates and Ismet Pasha, at which Turks played for delay.	945
669 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 274	July 12	Reports that, at private meeting (see No. 668), Ismet Pasha expressed uncompromising views on naval evacuation; asks whether, in last resort, H.M.G. would agree to leave no ships in Turkish waters provided unlimited right of passage were secured.	946
670 To MR. HOWE Belgrade Tel. No. 58	July 12	Instructs to bring pressure on Serbian Govt. to sign treaty.	947
671 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 276	July 12	Reports that he informed American observer, who stated that if H.M.G. maintained their position as regards Turkish Petroleum Company's concession, he would make a protest, that he (Sir H. Rumbold) entirely declined to drop the case.	948
672 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 278	July 13	Reports further private meeting between Allied delegates and Ismet Pasha at which some minor points were settled, but which broke up over naval evacuation and concessions.	949
673 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 279	July 13	Informs that, at final meeting of his committee, he will ask Ismet Pasha to confirm assurances that Mudania Convention would remain in force until end of evacuation, and that measures would be taken to prevent incidents.	951
674 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 284	July 14	Refers to No. 672, and requests observations of H.M.G. on concessions which might have to be made over naval evacuation and right of passage through Straits in order to avoid rupture, for which these questions do not provide strong grounds.	952
675 SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 286	July 15	Informs that he and Allied colleagues are sending Note to Ismet Pasha proposing meeting of experts followed by further private meeting, if Ismet Pasha can take definite decisions on outstanding points.	954

NO. AND NAME		DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
676	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 288	July 16	States that he assumes British Chargé d'Affaires will be instructed to join in urging Yugoslav Govt. to sign treaty, and adds that Yugoslav delegates attended all meetings of committees.	954
677	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 292 and 294	July 17	Reports discussion and settlement of concessions question at private meeting between Ismet Pasha and Allied delegates.	955
678	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tels. Nos. 293 and 296	July 17	Reports final meeting of first, second, and third committees to record final agreements reached at private meetings.	960
679	To SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 131	July 18	Expresses apprehensions lest jettisoning of case of Turkish Petroleum Company should prejudice position in negotiations on Mosul, and instructs to insist on putting Company back in concessions protocol.	967
680	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 297	July 19	Refers to No. 679, and states that only alternative course would have been rupture of conference and that re-opening of matter would not secure a more favourable settlement.	967
681	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 299	July 20	Reports that Italians are anxious to secure exclusion of concessionary companies from inter-Allied reparations agreement, and requests authority to agree that companies shall not receive more than 1½, or if necessary, 1 million pounds.	970
682	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 300	July 20	Transmits substance of Soviet Note stating that their representative at Rome will sign Straits Convention at Constantinople before Aug. 14.	971
683	SIR H. RUMBOLD Lausanne Tel. No. 308	July 24	Reports signature of peace treaty and seventeen other instruments.	972
APPENDIX I	MR. NICOLSON Foreign Office	Nov. 15, 1922	Memo. by Mr. Nicolson respecting the Freedom of the Straits.	974
APPENDIX II	GENERAL STAFF War Office	Oct. 19, 1922	Memo. by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey.	984
APPENDIX III		Jan. 31, 1923 Mar. 8, 1923	Allied Draft Treaty of Jan. 31, 1923, and Turkish Counter-proposals of Mar. 8, 1923.	990

CHAPTER I

Correspondence and Memoranda September 3–November 20, 1922

No. 1

Mr. Bentinck[1] *(Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received September 4, 9 a.m.)
No. 368 Telegraphic [E 8792/27/44]

ATHENS, *September 3, 1922, 9 p.m.*

My telegram No. 360.[2]

In spite of precautions and official denial, news of Greek request to His Majesty's Government has leaked out and I gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs[3] that French Minister had let it be known through Belgian Minister that he thought request should not have been made to His Majesty's Government alone. Minister for Foreign Affairs denied to Belgian Minister that there had been any request for mediation. His Excellency explained to me that request made to His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice on basis which had been discussed since March is not yet a request for mediation between belligerents.

I raised the point with Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, to avoid irritating French, it might not be wise to let them know exactly what Greek government had asked of His Majesty's Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would do this if asked point blank by French Minister.

Although he had no official information as to respective attitudes of British and French governments he had learnt from Greek representatives abroad that His Majesty's Government had wished armistice to precede evacuation whereas French had held opposite view. He feared it might embarrass His Majesty's Government and perhaps weaken their hands vis-à-vis French if he told latter that Greeks had given way on this point. His Majesty's Government might prefer to take initiative themselves. If, however, you should wish Greek government to tell French government of request rather than that His Majesty's Government should do this Minister for Foreign Affairs would do so at once.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 360.

[1] Mr. C. H. Bentinck, Counsellor of the British Embassy in Athens since November 1, 1920, acted as Chargé d'Affaires from July 25 to September 17, 1922.
[2] Vol. XVII, No. 756.
[3] M. Baltatzis.

No. 2

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold[1]
(Constantinople)
No. 347 Telegraphic [E 8770/27/44][2]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 3, 1922, 6.35 p.m.*

Complete evacuation of Asia Minor was one of terms proposed at Paris Conference,[3] and would be first subject to be discussed at impending conference at Venice.[4] It is now accepted as military necessity by Greek government, who desire immediate armistice on that understanding.[5] His Majesty's Government are naturally anxious to terminate disastrous warfare and to avoid further shedding of blood, and will gladly take any steps in conjunction with their allies to secure these objects. But they also have to consider political conditions under which evacuation will take place and protection of Christian populations. Your advice is requested as to steps to be taken to communicate this offer to Turks and to secure suspension of hostilities pending early meeting of conference. You are at liberty to consult your colleagues, if you consider it desirable before replying.

Repeated to Paris No. 274 (by bag).

Repeated to Rome No. 237 and Athens No. 185.

[1] Sir Horace Rumbold, H.M. Ambassador at Constantinople with the title of British High Commissioner.

[2] Lord Curzon, who was at Montacute, drafted this telegram. In a preface to the draft communicated to Sir W. Tyrrell (Assistant Under-Secretary of State) and Mr. Lindsay (Principal Assistant Secretary), and dated 9.30 a.m. September 3, he wrote: 'I was pulled out of bed at 3 this morning to receive Mr. Lindsay's telegram about Greek representation. I suggest we send following telegram to Rumbold (deferring any reply to Greeks until we have heard from him unless it be to tell them that we are taking immediate steps to ascertain best manner in which their proposal can be entertained).' Having written the draft, he added: 'As soon as we hear from Rumbold we can then make definite proposal either to (a) expedite Venice [Conference] or (b) substitute something else for it. It is also well to bear in mind the Assembly of L[eague] of N[ations] is in session at Geneva and may conceivably be of use. This is written in great haste to catch train and can be shown to Sir E. Grigg [Private Secretary to the Prime Minister] if he asks for information.'

[3] See Vol. XVII, No. 570.

[4] See ibid., No. 737.

[5] See ibid., No. 755.

No. 3

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 4, 9 a.m.)
No. 374 Telegraphic [E 8781/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 4, 1922, 12.5 a.m.*

French High Commissioner[1] informed me today[2] that his reports from Angora indicate that Nationalists had hesitated for some time before launching their offensive.

[1] General Pellé.

[2] September 3.

They had decided to do so as a result of proclamation by Greeks of an autonomous district in Asia Minor[3] coupled with Mr. Lloyd George's speech[4] which they considered foreshadowed a revision of Paris proposals in a sense unfavourable to Turkey. Nationalists had therefore decided to settle matters by force of arms.

Repeated to Athens No. 106.

[3] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 685 and 710.

[4] Of August 4. (See *The Times*, August 5, p. 8. See also Vol. XVII, No. 727.)

No. 4

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge[1] *(Paris) and Mr. Kennard*[2] *(Rome)*

No. 275[3] *Telegraphic [E 8766/27/44]*[4]

Very Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 4, 1922, 5 p.m.*

My telegram No. 344 to Constantinople (of September 2nd: Greek request for an armistice).[5]

[1] Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris from November 27, 1920.

[2] Mr. H. W. Kennard, Counsellor of Embassy at Rome from November 19, 1919, acted as Chargé d'Affaires from August 25 to September 8, 1922.

[3] No. 275 to Paris, No. 238 to Rome.

[4] The draft of this telegram was one of four draft telegrams submitted to Lord Curzon, who was at Montacute. At 10.5 a.m. Lord Curzon telegraphed to Mr. Lindsay a message for the Prime Minister, saying that he approved of the draft provided a passage about Eastern Thrace 'likely at this stage to cause delay' were omitted. The passage ran: 'They the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople should also, if possible, avoid discussion of Eastern Thrace but agree in the last resort to withdrawal of Greek forces to frontier agreed upon at Paris in March last and to the reduction of the Greek forces there.' At 12.50 p.m. the Foreign Office received from Sir E. Grigg the following telephone message, which was telegraphed to Lord Curzon: 'The Prime Minister makes the following suggestions, on which he would like Lord Curzon's views: (1) That we should communicate immediately with the Greek Government to this effect: that, if they are really unable in the present military situation to check the Turkish Army on the frontier of the Smyrna Zone during the Conference, they should ask for an immediate Armistice on the basis of the evacuation of Asia Minor. In that case we would support their request, and ask the other Allied Governments to support it, and also send Allied Military Representatives to assist in fixing the terms of the Armistice. (2) In that event, to communicate to the French and Italian Governments our advice to the Greeks, and, if the Greeks demand an Armistice, that we should support the demand and instruct the High Commissioners at Constantinople to arrange for the evacuation of Asia Minor under the supervision of Allied Officers in accordance with the scheme already worked out. (3) Suggest to the French and Italian Governments that the League of Nations be invited to advise immediately on permanent arrangements for the protection of minorities in Asia Minor. We might inform the Constantinople and Angora Governments that we would give facilities for a Turkish Loan on the London market if they accept this reference to the League of Nations, and undertake to apply the measures of protection for minorities which the League proposes. (4) Instruct the Allied Naval Commanders at Smyrna to concert measures for the temporary protection of refugees

His Majesty's Government propose that the three High Commissioners should invite Angora government at once to send competent military representatives to the frontier of the neutral zone to meet allied Commander-in-Chief[6] and his French and Italian colleagues and competent Greek military representatives with a view to the immediate conclusion of an armistice. The allied military representatives should, if possible, secure that immediate

arriving in Smyrna from the interior, if they see any danger in Smyrna itself. (5) Ask the American Near East Relief Association to undertake supply arrangements for the refugees. Message ends.' Mr. Lindsay added the following comments: '(1) and (2) are anticipated in drafts submitted to you already. (3) The first part seems sound, the second inadmissible. (4) Action practically taken already. (5) No objection.' Lord Curzon replied by telegraph at 4.45 p.m.: '(1) and (2) of his points have been provided for. (3) Reference to League of Nations already suggested by me is quite sound. Offer of loan to Turks might be held in reserve and could be hinted at by Rumbold to induce favourable attitude of Angora but should not be made before we have proposals of League. (4) and (5) quite sound. Repeat to Chequers.' Mr. Lindsay, in a report sent to Lord Curzon by messenger at 6 p.m., stated: 'On receiving your telegram we called up Sir E. Grigg and suggested acting in accordance with your telegram. The Prime Minister's reply was that he adhered to his view as suggested in No. 1 of his observations. His grounds were these roughly: he has in his mind the German action in Nov[ember] 1918 when they got into a panic and agreed to an armistice more humiliating than was necessary; he was hardly convinced that the Greeks were as badly beaten as they made out; he was anxious to avoid all responsibility of advising them to make an armistice in these circumstances; and therefore adhered to the view that the Greeks should address Angora direct, in wh[ich] case we would support them.

'A conversation then took place between Sir E. Grigg and Sir W. Tyrrell by telephone. The latter urged strongly your point of view: he said that after all the Greeks were the best judges of their own powers of resistance and referred to the Smyrna and Athens telegrams and to evidence we [had] received from the W[ar] O[ffice]. He reminded him of Bentinck's tel[egram] [see No. 6, n. 1, below], saying explicitly that Greece would get worse terms by applying direct to Angora: he showed that the French had already heard of the Greek démarche and were suspicious; he argued that it was an original mistake of the Greeks to have approached us alone and that every moment's delay now in bringing the French and Italians in was against the Greek interest. He pointed out that the G[reek] Ch[argé] d' Aff[aires]'s [M. Rizo-Rangabé] written communication absolved us from any responsibility for advice but put on us some responsibility if we delayed action.

'On these representations the P[rime] M[inister] agreed to an immediate attempt to bring the French and Italians in for asking an armistice but he has indicated that the Greeks must be told that they must meanwhile put up the best fight they can against the Turks and that on their ability to prevent a collapse depends the terms they will get.

'On this, feeling that we must proceed at once, we have gone as far as we have dared. We have despatched Draft A, as amended by you.... We have *not* felt able to send Draft D (instructing Rumbold to act immediately and alone in requesting Angora to grant an armistice)....

'This action is a kind of compromise and I hope you will approve it. I assure you that it has been rather hard work for us, when telegrams from you take 4 hours and the telephone to Hindhead occasionally stops working.

'I am seeing Rizo-Rangabé this evening to give him the message referred to above. It does not amount to much. It will also be sent as a telegram to Athens. [See No. 5, below.]

'This is written in great haste to catch the messenger who leaves for Yeovil at 6 o'clock.'

Lord Curzon annotated (September 4) Mr. Lindsay's report as follows: 'I quite appreciate the difficulty and am content with the solution.'

[5] Not printed (see, however, Vol. XVII, No. 756).

[6] Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington.

evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops takes place by stages and under supervision of allied officers.

Full discretion in the negotiation should be left to the allied representatives.

Official Greek reports point to urgent necessity of immediate armistice in order to avoid further bloodshed and possible massacre of Christians as well as danger to foreign colonies in Smyrna.

You should urge government to which you are accredited to send immediate instructions in the above sense to their High Commissioners and military representatives at Constantinople.

Repeated to Athens No. 186 and Constantinople No. 348.

No. 5

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 191 Telegraphic [E 8919/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 4, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Greek Chargé d'Affaires[1] was informed today of my telegram to Paris No. 275.[2] It was pointed out to him that Greek government should be careful not to imagine that the situation is worse than perhaps it is and how important it is that they should not now throw away any cards that they can retain and that may be invaluable in later negotiations.[3]

[1] M. Rizo-Rangabé.
[2] No. 4.
[3] For M. Rizo-Rangabé's account, see Frangulis, pp. 432–3.

No. 6

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 378 Telegraphic [E 8878/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 4, 1922, 9.45 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 362.[1]

Armistice is certainly desirable. If it can be obtained on condition of evacuation of Asia Minor only to which Greek government have already made up their minds so much the better. I cannot however share opinion of Chargé d'Affaires at Athens that His Majesty's Government will be able to obtain better terms for Greeks than they could themselves.

[1] Of September 3; this stated: 'Greeks have asked His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice and obviously His Majesty's Government will be able to obtain better terms for them than they would themselves obtain by direct request to Kemal.'

In the minds of Kemalists[2] His Majesty's Government are completely identified with Greeks. This impression was enormously strengthened by Prime Minister's speech.[3] If His Majesty's Government now put themselves forward to ask for armistice Kemalists will be still further confirmed in this impression and will see in our action admission of bankruptcy not only of Greek cause but of policy of His Majesty's Government.

Our purely moral influence with Kemalists is nil. Any idea that they will give Greeks better terms in order to court the favour of His Majesty's Government must be dismissed. They still fear us to some extent knowing that if we chose at any moment to exercise our own force we could place greater difficulties in their way than we have hitherto done. We should place no reliance on their willingness to accommodate us. We should do everything to (?keep) alive their fear that even if they dispose of Greeks they will still have to reckon with us.

Dangers foreshadowed in my telegram No. 373[4] should be borne steadily in mind. If Greeks themselves ask for armistice and Kemalists are disposed to grant it they will almost certainly demand unconditional evacuation of Eastern Thrace as well as Asia Minor, which is tantamount to imposing National Pact[5] on Greeks. If however His Majesty's Government put forward request Kemalists will probably either refuse our intervention, saying that it is for Greeks themselves to demand an armistice, or else seize the opportunity of endeavouring to commit His Majesty's Government themselves to acceptance of Pact.[6]

I feel that we should keep our hands as free as possible even at the expense of advising Greeks to seek armistice in the usual military fashion by arrangement between military commanders. This would not prevent us from doing what we can alone, or jointly with our allies, to reduce danger of chaos in evacuated area, e.g. by offering our good offices to both sides to see that evacuation (?once) agreed on was carried out in orderly fashion.[7]

Repeated to Athens No. 108.

[2] Turkish Nationalists; Mustafa Kemal Pasha was President of the Grand National Assembly at Angora.

[3] See No. 3, n. 4.

[4] Of September 3, not printed.

[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 13, n. 6.

[6] In a further telegram, No. 379 of September 4, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'Events are moving so rapidly that in my opinion His Majesty's Government would do well to study immediately possibility of comprehensive balance as between themselves and Kemalists. Collapse of Greeks may place us in situation in which only alternatives for His Majesty's Government would be complete surrender to Kemalists backed by French or strong independent action. I have in mind possibility of such action as occupying Gallipoli Peninsula.'

[7] Commenting on this telegram, Mr. Bentinck stated (in Athens telegram No. 380 of September 5): 'I have no knowledge here of Kemalist attitude and mind but it strikes me that if after His Majesty's Government have abstained for nearly two years from giving Greeks any material aid Kemal is not convinced of our neutrality, but still identifies His Majesty's Government with Greek government and army, nothing we can do now will convince him to the contrary. So far as he is concerned we might just as well give Greeks effective assistance and gather what profit we can.... If Greeks were to concentrate in Thrace they could not easily be dislodged. They may conceivably even yet form a front in Smyrna zone.

'I still think His Majesty's Government would obtain better terms for Greeks than Greeks could by themselves. If His Majesty's Government have no influence with Kemal they have strong potential influence in compelling French to exert pressure. (?French) and Kemal could not force Greece to evacuate any part of Thrace if His Majesty's Government objected while active approval of His Majesty's Government might probably still enable Greeks to enter Constantinople which would facilitate defence of Thrace. French realize this even if Kemal does not yet.'

No. 7

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 5, 8 p.m.)
No. 381 Telegraphic [E 8890/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 5, 1922, 3.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 380.[1]

I have acquainted my colleagues with substance of last paragraph of Sir H. Lamb's[2] telegram No. 60[3] and have discussed with them question of Smyrna, an armistice, and Venice conference.

Smyrna.

[1] Of September 4. This referred to Lord Curzon's telegram No. 347 (No. 2) and stated:

'I am purposely refraining from consulting my colleagues as to communication of Greek offer to Turks because in first place:

'Offer would be at once passed on to nationalist agent by my French colleague and tend to still further weaken Greek position. This would be unfair to Greeks. Secondly, because French high commissioner would almost certainly take line that events must run their course and that it is for Greek commander-in-chief to ask for an armistice. I am clear that French would subordinate intervention with us to secure suspension of hostilities, to acceptance of Kemalist conditions which would include evacuation of Eastern Thrace. I shall, however, with especial reference to last paragraph of Smyrna telegram No. 60 [see n. 3] and without mentioning Greek offer, immediately endeavour to ascertain views of my colleagues regarding steps to be taken to avoid massacres at all events in Smyrna district and will telegraph again.

'Question of allied intervention to secure suspension of hostilities would seem to be matter for direct arrangement with Paris and Rome, as, were I to raise it here, my colleagues would certainly refer to their respective governments. I think allied intervention might take the form of a notification to Kemalists that allied governments will take Smyrna under their protection until evacuation of Greek army and of such civilians as wish to go has been completed.

'You will have gathered that Greek debacle cannot but prejudice Paris proposals and that situation has completely changed. The French here are even doubting whether there is any basis for a preliminary conference of Venice.'

[2] Sir Harry Lamb, British Consul-General at Smyrna from March 19, 1921.

[3] Of September 3; this ran: 'Greek General Staff admit that there is no possibility of army offering further resistance.

'Fully 2,000 refugees have already arrived by Smyrna–Aidin Railway alone.

'Seven vessels are now loading stores and ammunition at railway pier and aviation camp is being evacuated.

'Town [of Smyrna] is in state of acute alarm, but no disorder has yet occurred. The danger period will be that between order for evacuation and establishment of Turkish authority; if Greek civil administration and police be withdrawn or collapse there should be some authority based on Allied force to bridge over interval.'

My colleagues fully appreciate the considerations advanced by Sir H. Lamb but they are firmly opposed to any action which would bring allied forces into conflict with Kemalist forces. They consider detachments should if necessary be landed from ships to protect our respective colonies in Smyrna town. The mere presence of these detachments on land would inspire confidence and prevent excesses. Should, however, excesses occur, French High Commissioner considers detachments should put a stop to them in the interests of humanity. Detachments might occupy various points in Smyrna and eventually hand these over to regular Kemalist officials. My colleagues do not see how we have any practical means of preventing disorders and excesses outside limits of Smyrna.

My French colleague has given great latitude to French Admiral as regards measures for protecting French subjects. I am in agreement with foregoing.

Armistice.

French High Commissioner has now heard of Greek request to His Majesty's Government to bring about an armistice.[4] I pointed out to my colleague that speedy conclusion of an armistice would tend to prevent disorders and excesses always attending a disorderly retreat and a hot pursuit. Both my colleagues agreed that allied governments might very properly intervene to secure a suspension of hostilities and an armistice. French High Commissioner considers proper course to be for allied governments to recommend to Greek government to ask for an armistice and to inform Greek government simultaneously that they will use their good offices with Kemalists to back this request. Allied governments would intimate to Angora that suspension of hostilities and conclusion of an armistice had in view the immediate and orderly evacuation of Asia Minor by Greeks. I am in agreement with my colleagues about this.

Venice conference.

French High Commissioner has now got instructions but Italian High Commissioner is still without them. The latter states that his government propose that High Commissioners should fix date of conference. We are all three agreed that it would be wiser to wait a few days before inviting Turks to attend conference so as to allow time for present excitement to subside.

According to French High Commissioner, Turks are quite carried away by their victories and they even talk of recovering Western Thrace as far as Seres. We think an immediate invitation to a conference would be construed by Turks as a panic invitation and would play straight into the hands of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. We consider proper moment for issuing an invitation to conference would be when or if there is a stabilization on front, in lieu of on conclusion of an armistice.

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 755, n. 2.

No. 8

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 379 Telegraphic [E 8922/27/44]

ATHENS, *September 5, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 191,[1] your telegram No. 275[2] to Paris.

I read both telegrams in paraphrase to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency took notes and asked me to thank you.

I then made personal comments to the effect that many people had thought that Greek government had been unduly alarmed but that this morning's news was better (see my telegram No. 377).[3] If armistice were to be arranged for Greek government, obviously they would get better terms if they showed that they had some kick left. I reminded His Excellency that as far as I knew Greeks were numerically superior to Turks. Even though the idea of eventual evacuation had undermined their morale, situation appeared to have distinctly improved. I suggested that he should instruct Greek chargé d'affaires to explain this to you.

Military attaché had already on Sunday and Monday with my approval endeavoured to encourage minister of war and general staff to help themselves and it is possible that this may have had some influence on present appointments.

Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that there appeared still to be great confusion at the front and that massacres had already commenced. He feared that retreating Greek soldier[s] had also been guilty.

Minister for Foreign Affairs does not appear to be recuperating quite as quickly as some of younger officials.

[1] No. 5. [2] No. 4.

[3] Of September 5. This reported the reappointment of General Pallis and Colonel Sariyannis as Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of General Staff in Asia Minor, the appointment of General Dousmanis as Chief of the General Staff of the whole Greek army, and the replacement of General Hadgianestis by Lieutenant-General Tricoupis in the Asia Minor Command. Mr. Bentinck went on to say: 'Appointment of these officers seems to indicate determination by Greek Government to face situation and as far as possible to retrieve it.' General Harington reported on the situation, in his telegram No. 2190 of September 5 to the War Office, as follows: 'Most that can be hoped for by Greek Army is to stand at Alashehr and prevent debacle while arrangements are in progress for armistice and evacuation of Anatolia. I have just received Foreign Office wire 275 [No. 4] proposing to entrust settlement of terms of armistice with belligerents to Allied Generals. No doubt Nationalist terms will be severe. I have seen Hamid's proposed terms to Angora forwarded to you under my 2191 [not printed]. While it is all important that armistice be effected and bloodshed saved and that our best be done to protect minorities, it must be realized that complete surrender to Nationalists may be course favoured by my colleagues while my object will be naturally to get best terms I can in conformity with policy of British Government in this theatre, and others affected by it, and in fairness to Greeks who have in a measure, by reason of disloyalty of allies and Constantinople Government in arming Kemalists, been forced into present situation.'

No. 9

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 6, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 456 Telegraphic [E 8900/27/44]

PARIS, *September 5, 1922, 11.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 275.[1]

Armistice proposal.

I have received following reply from president of the council.

French government agree with His Majesty's Government upon advantage of an immediate armistice between Greek and Nationalist armies. They are determined to use their utmost efforts to persuade both sides to put an end to any further effusion of blood.

Intervention of British Commander-in-Chief and his allied colleagues would be an offer of mediation which would risk rejection and which allied powers have neither intention nor the means to impose.

But French government are ready to instruct their High Commissioner at Constantinople to concert with his allied colleagues with a view to conveying through most appropriate channels to chiefs of the two armies how urgent it is from a humanitarian point of view to conclude an immediate armistice.

It should be well understood that allied powers will not co-operate to arrange and supervise total evacuation of Greeks from Anatolia unless on the one hand these troops are not transferred to Thrace and on the other hand unless Greek forces now to the east of line Enos-Midia retire to west, without this retirement pre-judging in any way question of frontier to be laid down in peace treaty.

[1] No. 4.

No. 10

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 6, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 384 Telegraphic [E 8991/27/44]

Very urgent ATHENS, *September 6, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 383.[1]

I venture to submit following considerations as situation strikes us at this end.

1. Greeks have asked His Majesty's Government to arrange armistice for them on basis of evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek army which according to official statements here was then no longer prepared to defend it. Thrace is quite another matter (see my telegram No. 346)[2] and was not mentioned in Greek request. Discretionary powers granted to allied generals, it seems to me, should not therefore include anything but evacuation of Asia Minor.

[1] See No. 11, n. 3, below. [2] Of August 31, not printed.

2. Until reliable information is received as to morale of army (see my telegram No. 381)[3] it is too early to assert definitely that it is not now in a position to defend some portion of Asia Minor and this is still more the case as far as Thrace is concerned (see my telegram No. 380).[4]

3. In my opinion question of armistice which is immediate is connected with evacuation of Asia Minor only whilst objects of eventual conference are to arrange the other matters to which Sir H. Rumbold refers.

4. If as Sir H. Rumbold and I have anticipated (see my telegram No. 358)[5] Kemal should demand as condition of armistice all that he could obtain from most favourable peace, we appear to be left with a choice between:

(*a*) Surrender to Kemal and French (see last paragraph Constantinople telegram No. 379)[6] or

(*b*) Immediately giving Greeks material aid which France and Italy have been giving to Kemalists.

5. If Kemal should make exorbitant demands he has still to show his power to take anything more than Asia Minor. Without command of the sea he surely cannot do so if Greek 3rd Army Corps is transferred to Thrace.

6. If His Majesty's Government are prepared to take strong and independent line would their hands not be strengthened rather than weakened by exorbitant demands on the part of Kemal?

7. If His Majesty's Government are considering giving any form of material assistance to Greeks, see Lord Granville's telegram No. 298 of June 3rd, 1921,[7] but military attaché thinks most immediate needs would probably be aeroplanes, transport, guns, rifles, ammunition and supplies. Tanks would have great moral effect but military attaché doubts whether Greeks would be able to manage them without expert aid. The fifteen new aeroplanes ordered by Greek government from Armstrong are hardly expected to arrive before another month.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[3] Of September 5. This stated: 'We can only have really reliable information as to the condition of the *moral* of the army when reports are received from Minister of War and officers accompanying him to Smyrna.'

[4] See No. 6, n. 7.

[5] Of September 2. This ran: 'In connection with possible request for armistice I venture to submit following for consideration:

'1. If Kemal should grant armistice doubtless he would demand evacuation of troops from Asia Minor to a locality named by him.

'2. Evacuation at least of Eastern Thrace.'

[6] See No. 6, n. 6.

[7] Vol. XVII, No. 207.

No. 11

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 390 Telegraphic [E 8981/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 7, 1922, 2.30 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 275 to Paris.[1]

In view of Smyrna telegram No. 63[2] to you which reveals gravity of military situation and of serious information subsequently received by General Harington from his military representative with Greek forces I decided after consultation with General Harington to propose to my colleagues that we should act without further delay on your above-mentioned telegram to Paris.

I accordingly saw my colleagues this evening with General Harington and read them Smyrna telegram No. 63. I pointed out that we should incur grave responsibility if we did not at once endeavour to bring about an armistice. I said that we must waive all the considerations set forth in my telegrams Nos. 383, 387 and 388.[3]

Italian High Commissioner warmly supported me and we had little difficulty in getting French High Commissioner to come into line. We have therefore instructed our dragomans to see Nationalist representative[4] first thing tomorrow morning and put to him proposal for armistice as contained in first sentence of second paragraph of your telegram No. 275 to Paris beginning 'His Majesty's Government' and ending 'armistice'.

French High Commissioner read us reply[5] of his government to your telegram No. 275 to Paris. The allied High Commissioners and General Harington consider this reply reasonable. I also proposed that we should give allied generals instructions that their intervention was to be confined to securing

[1] No. 4.

[2] Of September 5. This ran: 'Present situation is as follows:— Eudemish, Alashehr, Tireh and Sokia have all been evacuated; Turkish cavalry are believed to be at Salihli and irregulars to have taken possession of Aidin Railway, Eudemish and Tireh branch lines as far as Tchatas junction. Greeks are rapidly evacuating all possible material, and civil administration is believed to be on the point of leaving. Greek post office is closed and National Bank of Greece closing. Refugees are pouring in and scarcity of bread already felt. Town very agitated, but no actual disorders yet.'

[3] In these three telegrams (dated September 6) Sir H. Rumbold transmitted his views on the proposals contained in Lord Curzon's telegram No. 275 to Paris (No. 4). Telegram No. 388 ran as follows: 'We all [the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople] consider that in their present state of exultation Kemalists will either decline intervention of allied generals in negotiations for an armistice thus inflicting a rebuff on allied governments which would make subsequent intervention on their part very difficult or if they accept allied intervention it will be with a view to getting allied endorsement of proposals affecting Eastern Thrace, the Straits etc. Both of my colleagues are of opinion that Kemalists will not confine their demands to immediate evacuation of Asia Minor but will raise all other questions as well.'

[4] Hamid Bey.

[5] See No. 9.

evacuation of Anatolia but that they were not to discuss questions of Eastern Thrace, Straits, etc.

Repeated to Athens No. 116.[6]

[6] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon (in telegram No. 203 to Athens, of September 7) instructed Mr. Bentinck as follows: 'You may inform Greek government of action taken by three High Commissioners as reported in the third paragraph.'

No. 12

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham[1] (Rome)

No. 279[2] Telegraphic: by bag [E 9010/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 7, 1922, 2.30 p.m.*

In view of new situation created by Greek reverse in Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government consider that the task of the Allies in mediating between Greece and Turkey and making peace themselves with the latter would be much facilitated if the League of Nations were at once invited by the Allied governments to consider, by whatever machinery seems most appropriate to the League, the best method of protecting the minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor.[3] The League should be invited to consult the Greeks and Turks and to make recommendations to the Allies for eventual incorporation in the new treaty with Turkey and in the minority treaty with Greece.

My immediately following telegram[4] contains a draft invitation to the

[1] Sir Ronald Graham, H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Rome, from November 25, 1921.

[2] No. 279 to Paris, No. 244 to Rome.

[3] For the decision to approach the League of Nations, see No. 4, n. 4.

[4] No. 280 to Paris, No. 245 to Rome, of September 7. This ran: 'The governments of France, Great Britain and Italy invite the Council of the League of Nations at once to consider, by whatever machinery seems most appropriate to them, the best method of protecting the minorities in Thessaly, Western Thrace, Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor, and, after consulting the Greeks and Turks, to make recommendations to the three allied governments for incorporation in a treaty between the allies and Turkey and in a minority treaty between the allies and Greece.

'The three allies suggest that the resolutions agreed upon by them at the Paris conference in March last regarding minorities [see Vol. XVII, No. 562, Annex 2] form a suitable basis for the League of Nations' examination. These resolutions generally comprise:

(a) Guarantees based on an examination of Turkish legislation and the relevant provisions of the different treaties drafted since the armistice of November 1918.

(b) Special League of Nations Commissioners, under the general control of the High Commissioner of the League at Constantinople, to make periodic visits to certain specified zones, namely, Smyrna, Pontus, the eastern and south-eastern vilayets and Cilicia, and in Europe, in Thrace and Thessaly, and in concert with the local authorities to take the necessary measures for protecting the minorities in conformity with the guarantees to be worked out under (a). The Commissioners to report directly to the Council and also submit their reports to the annual assembly of the League, in order to enable latter to ensure faithful execution of provision for which the League will have given its guarantee.

League in which you should at once invite the concurrence of the government to which you are accredited.

Repeated to Athens No. 195, Constantinople No. 356 and Geneva No. 26.

(c) Special protection and adequate representation of the different religious and ethnic elements of Adrianople and Smyrna.

(d) Turkey to be recommended to employ allied officers for the organisation, command and instruction of gendarmerie, such officers to be at the service of Turkey according to the pre-war usages.'

No. 13

Mr. Kennard (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 7, 7.15 p.m.)
No. 266 Telegraphic [E 8993/27/44]

Very urgent ROME, *September 7, 1922, 3 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 238.[1]

Minister for Foreign Affairs,[2] who has only just returned to Rome, agrees that every effort should be made to secure immediate armistice and evacuation and has sent instructions to Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to agree to any unanimous decision as to the best means of attaining these ends. He is inclined to French view[3] that intervention of allied commander-in-chiefs might lead to rejection which would be serious blow to our prestige. He is further consulting Italian High Commissioner as to other French conditions.

He further considers moment is hardly opportune for fixing date of Venice conference and suggests that final result of Turkish offensive should be awaited.

He also expressed view that it was now somewhat inadvisable to send commission to enquire into atrocities.[4] I should be glad to learn whether I should still press Italian government on these two points.

Sent to Constantinople.

[1] No. 4. [2] Count Sforza. [3] See No. 9. [4] See Vol. XVII, No. 731.

No. 14

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold
(Constantinople)
No. 360 Telegraphic [E 8981/27/44]

Most urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 7, 1922, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 390[1] (of September 6th. [*sic*][2] Armistice).

I entirely approve your action.

[1] No. 11.

[2] This telegram was not despatched until 2.30 a.m. on September 7.

Instructions to be given to allied generals should, as you propose, make it quite clear that allied intervention is to be confined to securing evacuation of Anatolia, and that other questions are matters for future conference and not for an armistice.

In our view, invitations to Venice conference should not now be sent. When any future conference should be called and its nature must now depend on course of events in Anatolia.

Please inform General Harington.

Repeated to Paris No. 282 (By Bag), Rome No. 248 and Athens No. 199.

No. 15

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 270 Telegraphic [E 9095/27/44]

ROME, *September 8, 1922, 9.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 244[1]

I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening directly after my arrival[2] and communicated proposal to him. I also told him that, in your view, invitations to Venice Conference should not now recommence.

His Excellency read proposal carefully, and said that he was not opposed in principle to referring matter to League of Nations. But he had to-day instructed Italian Ambassadors at Paris and London to submit proposal that Venice Conference should be [held] towards end of month with a view to establishing peace. Underlying idea was that, if Turks and Greeks came to agreement between themselves, they might do so to prejudice our Allied interests, and it was preferable that Allies should keep some control over negotiations. He thought that proposed reference to League of Nations might be tacked on to Venice Conference, which might take place about (? 25th September). His Excellency added that he had seen Fathi Bey[3] this morning, and without actually communicating proposal to him had ascertained that, in his opinion, Turks would be ready to come to Venice.

He had found Fathi Bey with rather exalted ideas, and latter had said that, in view of Turkish victory, Turks had now the right of marching on Constantinople. His Excellency had replied that Turks had better be very careful. Greeks had found Allies united in opposing their intention to march on Constantinople, and Turks would find equally united opposition on the part of Allies should they attempt to do so.

I said that principal idea of His Majesty's Government at this juncture was to secure and maintain perfect united action amongst the Allies. His Excellency entirely agreed that this was essential. I also pointed out that,

[1] No. 12. [2] See No. 4, n. 2.

[3] Minister of the Interior in the Angora Government. During July and August he had been on a mission to Paris and London.

while views of His Majesty's Government and Italian Government on Turco-Greek conflict might not have been identical, a too strong Turkey with exaggerated pretensions would be just as dangerous to Italian interests as to ours. His Excellency fully concurred.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

No. 16

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 399 Telegraphic [E 9080/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 8, 1922, 9.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 360.[1]

Allied Generals pointed out armistice conditions will inevitably comprise clause regarding line behind which Greek troops in Thrace must retire. Apart from Turkish demand this is necessary to ensure safety of Constantinople against Greek attack.

Generals have suggested three lines (a) Ganos-Istranja (b) Enos-Midia (c) Maritza.

Instructions contained in your above mentioned telegram coupled with your telegram No. 283 to Paris[2] would preclude discussion of this point during armistice negotiations. I recognise however that it cannot be left undecided and undertook to refer it to Your Lordship.

General Officer Commanding considers line (a) as sufficient for the purpose indicated.

Repeated to Athens No. 124.

[1] No. 14.

[2] Of September 7. This ran: 'Please inform government to which you are accredited of substance of third paragraph of Constantinople telegram No. 390 [No. 11] and of my telegram No. 360 of September 7th [No. 14]. You should add that question of acting as French government suggest in Paris telegram No. 456 [No. 9] does not now arise.'

No. 17

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 403 Telegraphic [E 9080/27/44]

ATHENS, *September 8, 1922, 11 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

I have had in mind vital importance of Greek army's southern group rallying at least so far as to cover and to effect its own embarkation; for on

[1] Of September 8, not printed. In this telegram Mr. Bentinck had stated that M. Kalogeropoulos was not a happy choice for the premiership. (The Greek Government had resigned on the evening of September 7. M. Kalogeropoulos failed to form a Cabinet. On September 11, a ministry was formed under M. Triandafilakos, former Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople.)

its escape depends K(? emal)'s power to force terms which would, I suppose, be even more troublesome to His Majesty's Government than to Greece. For this reason military attaché and I have tried to hearten Greek government officials (see my telegram No. 379)[2] and I have urged on you grant of some kind of material support even if only credits (my telegram No. 348[3] and my telegram No. 384).[4] Mere news of this would put new heart into troops and country even if actual supplies were too late.

For military embarkation Greece requires every available ship: hence need of our aid in transporting and providing for refugees (my telegram No. 399).[5]

The quicker and more effective our support the greater will be our influence with Greek nation and it may exercise calming influence on internal situation. Effect on our prestige both in Greece and outside will be tenfold if promise is made and action taken before any internal movement begins.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[2] No. 8.
[3] Of August 31, not printed.
[4] No. 10.
[5] Of September 8, not printed.

No. 18

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 209 Telegraphic [E 9073/27/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 9, 1922, 5 p.m.*

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 398,[1] (repeated to you No. 123 of 8th September).

You should, either with or even without your allied colleagues, follow up steps taken on my telegram No. 192 (of September 6th)[2] with strongest possible representations to Greek government on criminal folly of any such action as destroying Brusa.[3]

Repeated to Paris No. 290 (By Bag), Rome No. 261 and Constantinople No. 372.

[1] This stated: 'There is reason to fear lest Brussa, on its evacuation by Greek troops, may suffer the same fate as Eskishehr and Ushak. French High Commissioner read to-day despatch from French consular agent there, declaring it to be, in fact, intention of Greeks to burn Brussa.'

[2] This ran: 'Nabi Bey has informed French Government that Greek troops in retreat are indulging in atrocities of every kind.

'French Government suggest that you, in concert with French and Italian colleagues, should call attention of Greek Government to these reports, and suggest despatch of orders with a view to prevention of such acts, which must lead to reprisals on part of Kemalists.

'Italian Ambassador alluded on 4th September to similar reports.

'You should act accordingly.

'Have you any corroborative evidence?'

[3] In his telegram No. 418 of September 10, Mr. Bentinck reported: 'I told Secretary-General to-day that I had now received instructions from you with which my two colleagues authorise me to associate themselves.

'French Minister had also already acted yesterday.

'Secretary-General replied that everything possible was being done in the desired sense.'

No. 19

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 9, 9.40 p.m.)
No. 403 Telegraphic [E 9093/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 9, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 393.[1]

Communication by dragomans to Hamid.[2] Hamid Bey, on instructions from his government, has asked French High Commissioner whether armistice proposal had been put forward officially by Greek government and what its object was, i.e., to discuss peace or suspend arms.

French High Commissioner has replied to the effect that request for armistice emanated officially from Greek government and that object was immediate evacuation of Anatolia on conditions to be fixed by representatives of the two armies with a view to preventing further loss of life and devastations.

Italian High Commissioner and I have approved his reply.

As dragomans made position perfectly clear in putting proposal forward, enquiry of Angora government would seem undoubtedly to have been made with object of delaying matters.

Repeated to Athens No. 128.

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 11.

No. 20

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold
(Constantinople)
No. 371 Telegraphic [E 9089/27/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 10, 1922, 7.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 399 (of September 8th: armistice and Thrace).[1]

Greek troops appear to have evacuated Smyrna and, so far as our information goes, may be able to withdraw northern forces via Mudania without serious molestation. If Turks refuse armistice except in return for partial evacuation of Eastern Thrace, there seems no reason why such a concession should be made, even at the risk of failure of armistice negotiations. Once Anatolia is evacuated, belligerents will no longer be in touch. Question might assume a different aspect if, pending discussion of armistice, there are still important Greek forces and material in Anatolia, which could only be saved from destruction by some further concession. Greeks will be best judge of that. On general grounds we should be most reluctant to witness any modification of European situation which may be invaluable factor in ultimate settlement.

In present state of Greek forces and Greek military and political morale, Greek threat to Constantinople cannot be seriously regarded. It will doubtless be used as bogey by French and Italians to secure Greek withdrawal,

[1] No. 16.

and they may still entertain genuine but quite unfounded suspicions of Anglo-Greek collusion. On the other hand, fear of Greek occupation of capital may be an important card in future negotiations with Kemal; and Greek support for allied troops in Constantinople and Straits area, if Kemalists threaten latter, might also not be negligible factor.

We, therefore, object to retirement to any of the three lines suggested by Generals. Of these (b) and (c) are clearly inadmissible, and (a) though less objectionable, would contravene principle which it is desirable to maintain, and could only be justified by a military necessity, which so far as we know, has not arisen.

Repeated to Paris No. 291 (by bag), Athens No. 212, and Rome No. 262.

No. 21

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 374 Telegraphic [*E 9244/27/44*]

Most urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1922, 5.25 p.m.*

We are doubtful from his telegrams[1] whether General Harington is fully aware of policy which was approved by Cabinet on Thursday.[2] It was, while liquidating the situation in Anatolia, to maintain the position in Europe

[1] e.g. his telegram No. 2230 of September 10, not printed (see No. 23, n. 3, below). In a minute to Sir W. Tyrrell, Lord Curzon summarised these telegrams as follows: 'I am puzzled at this sequence of telegrams. For Sir C. Harington appears to think: (1) that we intend to hold the Chanak side alone (2) that it can be so held, and according[ly] he is sending there 1 squadron Cavalry, 1 battery Artillery, and he asks for a battalion from Malta and a second battery.

'Further he proposes to concentrate the British strength on the Chanak side and not to put any British troops on the European side unless the French and Italians retire. Therefore he suggests that we should ask the French and Italian Government their intentions.

'He then says that British force alone would be quite inadequate to hold either side although he has previously proposed that it should hold the Asiatic side. Finally he proposes to ask French and Italians to join in defending Chanak side though he appears doubtful of their consent and proposes if it is refused to undertake Chanak alone.

'Amid this confusion of opinions it appears to me to be necessary to (a) get into touch with the Powers (b) tell Rumbold or Harington what are our views.

'I assumed that after the Cabinet on Thursday [September 7] Sir L. W. Evans had telegraphed a full explanation to Sir C. Harington. But he appears to have done nothing of the kind which if true is most unfortunate. . . . If we don't look out the Generals will land us in a first class mess.' On September 11 at 1 p.m., a conference of Ministers was held at Churt where the telegram here printed (it was drafted by Lord Curzon himself) was approved. The draft Notes of the Conference ran as follows: 'The Prime Minister pointed out that the Greeks had been forced to evacuate Anatolia and we did not propose to stand on the Ismid Peninsula. It was essential that we should prevent troops being transferred by Kemalists to Thrace to attack Gallipoli from the North. In the recent case when Constantinople was alleged to be threatened by the Greeks we intervened and prevented the Greeks dealing a blow at the Turks where they were most vulnerable. In effect we forced the Greeks to fight where they were at a disadvantage. It was now our duty to refuse to allow the Turk to cross into Europe and upset the arrangement concluded by Lord Curzon in March last in Paris.'

[2] September 7.

which was taken up at Paris in March[3] and which can only be altered by conference of powers concerned.

Thus as it was not contemplated to hold Chanak in March, so it is thought undesirable to hold it now, unless, which is most unlikely, the French and Italians were prepared to join in its defence. His Majesty's Government do not contemplate holding it alone and War Office have authorised Commander-in-Chief to withdraw British forces.[4]

On the other hand His Majesty's Government have not the slightest intention of abandoning Gallipoli position, and are prepared to send reinforcements to Harington to enable him to hold it. It will of course be better that this occupation should be allied occupation and we are addressing French and Italian governments in this sense.[5] If, however, they refuse, we should act alone and British fleet would assist the operation.

As regards the Ismid lines, His Majesty's Government did not think it likely that French and Italian troops would co-operate in their defence and therefore they proposed to authorise Harington to withdraw British force sooner than incur defeat.

In pursuance of principle previously laid down Constantinople should be held at all costs, with assistance if necessary of fleet.[6] It was deemed incredible that French and Italy would not join in this defence.

This statement of policy may be useful to you in present emergency and you should communicate it to Sir C. Harington and Admiral Brock.

Repeated to Paris No. 293, Rome No. 264 and Athens No. 213 for their personal information.

[3] See Vol. XVII, Chap. IV.

[4] This authorisation was despatched in a telegram (unnumbered in the Foreign Office copy) at 5 p.m. on September 11. For General Harington's reply, see No. 23, n. 4.

[5] In telegram No. 294 to Paris (No. 265 to Rome) of September 11. The telegram concluded by saying that the defence of Gallipoli and Constantinople was a responsibility which His Majesty's Government 'could not consent to abandon'.

[6] An Admiralty telegram of September 11 to Admiral Brock, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, ran as follows: '. . . the Prime Minister directs that, in co-operation with Allies if possible but in last resort alone, you should exercise necessary surveillance over Turkish shipping to prevent latter from being either used or assembled for purpose of transporting Kemalist troops to any point on European side. Destruction, however, not to be resorted to unless all other means fail. In this connection it is not considered that any undertakings or guarantees by Kemalists could be accepted as satisfactory or effective.'

No. 22

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 267 Telegraphic [E 9095/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 11, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 270 (of September 8th: Venice conference).[1]

We have received a note[2] from the Italian Ambassador[3] here in the same sense from which it is clear that the Italian government are anxious to secure

[1] No. 15. [2] Of September 9, not printed. [3] Signor de Martino.

a full peace conference at Venice under the auspices of Italy. In reply[4] we are thanking Italian government for their suggestion but pointing out that the three allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have jointly recommended that it would be impolitic to send any invitation to a conference to Angora at this stage,[5] and that in our view situation in Anatolia should be allowed to develop until an armistice is concluded or the military situation is stabilised before the allied governments decide whether a conference should be called and if so what its nature should be. We agree with the Italian government that the Venice conference as originally conceived is now out of date and in any case local situation necessitates presence of High Commissioners at Constantinople.

In these circumstances please urge Italian government to agree at once to proposed reference to League of Nations regarding minorities,[6] pointing out that all we suggest is that the League should make recommendations to the supreme council for final embodiment in treaty settlement and that the sooner the League begin this task the better.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 376 and Athens No. 215. Repeated to Paris No. 295 by bag.

[4] Of September 11, not printed.

[5] This recommendation of the High Commissioners was reported in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 388 of September 6 (see No. 11, n. 3).

[6] See No. 12.

No. 23

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 410 Telegraphic [E 9287/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 13, 1922, 5.35 p.m.*

I have communicated your telegram No. 374[1] to General Harington and Admiral Brock. It has crossed my telegram No. 405[2] reporting solidarity of Allies at Constantinople with regard to maintenance of neutral zone opposite Constantinople and Gallipoli peninsula.

In the event of French and Italian governments disavowing the action of their High Commissioners at Constantinople in agreeing to send small contingents into the neutral zones to show allied solidarity,[3] His Majesty's

[1] No. 21.

[2] Of September 10. This ran: 'French and Italian High Commissioners agreed to despatch of small contingents as requested and allied High Commissioners are sending their dragomans to Nationalist agent to-morrow to remind the latter of existence of neutral zone and of their recent notification to Greeks [see Vol. XVII, Nos. 698, 700, and 713] that latter would not be allowed to violate it and occupy Constantinople.'

[3] In his telegram No. 2230 of September 10 to the War Office, General Harington, having reported the action (see n. 2) of the High Commissioners at Constantinople, added: 'High Commissioners have also been requested by me to obtain from their Governments instructions as to policy I am to enforce: are allied forces to defend (a) Constantinople,

Government would be in a better position to withdraw from those zones in conjunction with their Allies than if they were to withdraw by themselves. In any event a withdrawal either from Chanak or from neutral zone in Ismid peninsula after communication made to Nationalist representative by three allied High Commissioners would have a deplorable effect on prestige of allied Powers. It is only right however to warn you that intention of His Majesty's Government proclaimed with such emphasis by the press to hold Constantinople and Gallipoli peninsula may inspire Kemal to act with great rapidity in seeking to threaten allied forces in Chanak district and Ismid peninsula. I do not think that in his present temper it would be safe to try to bluff Kemal.

General Harington will deal with military aspect of the question.[4] I do not see how we can hold Constantinople and ensure freedom of Straits at both ends unless we hold a certain belt of territory opposite both Constantinople and Gallipoli peninsula or unless we can obtain the complete demilitarisation of the present neutral zones on the Asiatic side and rely on Turks to observe this de-militarisation. I would not place any reliance on Turks in this matter.

(b) the Straits, (c) or both the above? For (a) or (b) total forces available here are barely enough, and for (c) certainly not.'

[4] He had already done this in his telegram No. 2248 to the War Office, despatched at 11.30 p.m. on September 12. This ran: 'I have seen Sir H. Rumbold and also seen Foreign Office telegram 374 [No. 21]. I can only think wire was sent under misapprehension. Only on Sunday last I obtained ready consent of both French and Italians to send detachments to Yarimje and Chanak frontiers. French proceed to-morrow, Italians to-day. Only to-day I have been making Allied arrangements for Allied defence in perfect harmony. Nationalists have also been told that Allies stand united. To recede from this position would be fatal. Interpretation placed on it would be that of having deliberately tricked Allies to Asiatic side. I could not do this as I am, as Allied C[ommander] in C[hief], responsible also for employment of their troops. My information goes to show Nationalists will only threaten and will not attack Allies. . . . I think Turks are waiting for a sign from England. If this is given they will be reasonable. Otherwise their attitude will change. It is therefore essential to maintain Allied military unity. If Cabinet do not intend to hold Chanak let Allies stay there as rearguard till withdrawal to Gallipoli is necessitated by situation. Evacuation of Scutari side is left to my discretion and yet I am to hold Constantinople at all costs. I beg to represent impossibility of this: with Nationalist guns, aircraft and rifles on Asiatic side, you could not remain in Constantinople; neither could ships proceed through Bosphorus or remain in anchorage.'

No. 24

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 276 Telegraphic [E 9271/27/44]

Urgent ROME, *September 13, 1922, 6.15 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 244[1] and 267.[2]

Reply just received says Italian government would have no objection to League of Nations being invited by allied governments to consider and

[1] No. 12. [2] No. 22.

suggest, also after consultations with Greeks and Turks, most appropriate means of protecting minorities for eventual [i]nclusion in new peace treaty with Turkey and in minorities treaty with Greece.

Considering however that it is more than ever indispensible on such a question and at present moment to attain perfect agreement between allies Italian government would be ready to associate itself with invitation to League of Nations on condition that French government also consents to do so.

Italian government in such an event would confine itself only to recommending that preparative action to be entrusted to League of Nations for formulation of proposals for protection of minorities should be undertaken in such a way as not to offend susceptibilities of interested parties.

Note ends by affirming view of Italian government that an early preliminary meeting at Venice is desirable.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

No. 25

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 301[1] *Telegraphic: by bag [E 9237/27/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 13, 1922, 7 p.m.*

(Mustafa Kemal's attitude.)

September 12th Mustafa Kemal informed Sir H. Lamb that he considered himself at war with Great Britain and did not recognise His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople or Sir H. Lamb as Sir H. Rumbold's representative or as consul-general. He said he would be justified in interning British subjects but did not mean to do so.[2]

Civil governor of Smyrna, however, told Sir H. Lamb that he need not fear for safety of British subjects until night of September 13th.

Admiral Brock has asked Mustafa Kemal to confirm in writing his declaration about state of war.[3]

[1] No. 301 to Paris, No. 270 to Rome.

[2] This was reported in Smyrna telegram No. 70, which was transmitted by telegram No. 311 of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the Admiralty, repeated to the Foreign Office and the High Commissioner, Constantinople, not printed.

[3] This was reported by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in his telegram No. 312 of September 13 to the High Commissioner, Constantinople, repeated to the Admiralty and Foreign Office, not printed. In his telegram No. 315 of September 14 to the High Commissioner, Constantinople, and repeated to the Admiralty, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, gave the text of his letter dated September 12, which was handed by his Chief of Staff to Mustapha Kemal. The Commander-in-Chief continued: 'Mustapha said reply would be sent at 1700 to-day Wednesday [September 13]. He added that Sir Harry Lamb had misunderstood him and was obviously perturbed at the communication.' In his telegram No. 320, despatched 11.55 p.m. September 13, to the High Commissioner, Constantinople, repeated to the Admiralty, the Commander-in-Chief reported as follows:

'Following is substance of Mustapha Kemal's reply. Letter explains that he had an unofficial interview with Sir Harry Lamb, not an interview with an accredited

Sir H. Lamb has been instructed that if Kemal confirms declaration he is to leave Smyrna with all British subjects who wish to accompany him.

Sir H. Lamb has also been instructed[4] to report Kemal's attitude towards other consuls and to remind him of neutrality of His Majesty's Government in Greco-Kemalist conflict and of fact that Angora government have frequently addressed Sir H. Rumbold as His Majesty's High Commissioner.

You should inform government to which you are accredited.[5]

Repeated to Athens No. 220.

representative to the Grand National Assembly. Letter then recapitulate[s] my interview with Noureddin [and] says that he, Mustapha Kemal, is in accord with the views expressed by Noureddin that although we are not at war no political relations have as yet been opened and before these can be established certain formalities are essential. Finally he says "I have the honour to suggest to you unofficially in reply to your unofficial letter (French *privée*) that the two governments might well establish political relations in accordance with the usual procedure." (Ends). Copy of text will be sent [to] Constantinople by seaplane tomorrow Thursday.' On September 26 the Admiralty transmitted to the Foreign Office, 'in view of its diplomatic interest', the original letter received by the Commander-in-Chief from Mustapha Kemal (E 9978/27/44).

[4] In Foreign Office telegram No. 29 of September 13, repeated to Constantinople, not printed. These instructions confirmed those given to Sir H. Lamb by Sir H. Rumbold (telegram No. 409 to the Foreign Office, repeated to Smyrna as No. 65).

[5] In Paris telegram No. 464 of September 14, Lord Hardinge reported: 'I communicated to M. Poincaré the sense of your telegram No. 301 and have received in reply a note stating that the French consul-general at Smyrna, in informing his Government of this "regrettable incident", added that he intended, at the request of his British colleague, to approach Mustapha Kemal on the subject.'

No. 26

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 385 Telegraphic [E 9277/27/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 13, 1922, 7 p.m.*

If, as appears from Harington's telegrams,[1] Italians and French are acting in co-operation with British troops in holding Chanak position and Ismid line, it would seem to be a pity to withdraw from either position except in case of serious military risk. These positions, which as long as they are held by the allies Kemal is not likely to attack, may constitute a useful pawn in negotiations with him.

[1] For one of these, see No. 23, n. 4.

No. 27

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 15, 11 p.m.)
No. 418 Telegraphic [E 9368/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 15, 1922, 8.15 p.m.*

My telegram No. 415.[1]

At the request of my allied colleagues we discussed the situation this morning. I found that they are in entire agreement with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 4[2] of my above mentioned telegram.

On information at their disposal they consider that Mustapha Kemal Pasha will wait a few days to see whether he is likely to obtain by diplomatic means, i.e. by a conference, what he wants in Thrace etc. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that allied Powers are delaying taking in hand of a settlement he will take advantage of present elation of his troops and of remainder of fine season to advance against Constantinople and the Straits. This would bring him into conflict with the allies.

The three High Commissioners therefore consider that allied governments must face the prospect of war with Mustapha Kemal Pasha unless they act without further delay in the sense of summoning a conference.

It is true that as long as allies maintain control of the seas Mustapha Kemal Pasha cannot transport troops across the sea of Marmora or Straits, but denial by allies of use of sea for this purpose would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Kemalists.

French High Commissioner pointed out that even if Mustapha Kemal Pasha could not transport his troops to Europe he had other means of stirring up trouble in Thrace. According to his information Greek forces in Thrace are thoroughly demoralised and soldiers are boarding trains and forcing officials to transport them. He also said that Greeks are inviting reprisals by arresting Mussulmans in Thrace. We have indications that a considerable number of Kemalist sympathisers are prepared for action in Thrace. One of this morning's papers states that a revolution has broken out in Adrianople and that Greek officers there have proclaimed a Republic.

If allied governments are not prepared to allow Kemalists to impose their

[1] Of September 14.

[2] These ran: 'Military situation is already almost entirely (? decided) in sense that if evacuation of Brussa (? area) is complete in a few days as appears likely belligerents will no longer be in contact. This is the best moment to put forward proposal for conference on basis sufficiently modified to ensure attendance of Kemalists. Such conference will at least give us breathing space. If we allow situation to drift Kemal will not rest quiet. Kemal told army that first objective was Mediterranean. Second is almost certainly Thrace. Unless negotiations supervene he will endeavour to get there via Constantinople or Chanak.... If we delay our position here and at Dardanelles may in near future be so threatened that it can only be safeguarded by considerable military effort for which we are not prepared. Danger in Irak will also be aggravated for Kemalists are certainly concerned at least indirectly in attacks reported in *The Times* of September 8th.'

conditions on them they should lose no time in reinforcing their troops in the Straits and at Constantinople to the utmost possible extent and in shortest time. French High Commissioner laid great stress on necessity for allied solidarity at this juncture.

Allied High Commissioners originally recommended that invitations to conference should not be issued until an armistice had been concluded or there was stabilization of front (see my telegram No. 388).[3]

They consider in practice this condition is fulfilled as hostilities have now practically ceased owing to absence of contact of Greeks and Turks. They recommend that a conference should be summoned as soon as possible and that it is urgent necessity that 3 allied governments should be in agreement before conference assembles as to extent of concessions they are disposed to make to Turks in Thrace etc.

I understand that my colleagues are telegraphing to their governments in above sense.

[3] See No. 11, n. 3.

No. 28

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 16, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 417 Telegraphic [E 9367/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 15, 1922, 9.30 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs[1] called yesterday evening to say that Central government hoped now that nationalists had liquidated situation in Anatolia, Allied Powers would at once take in hand settlement in Thrace, etc. The Central government hope that a conference will be called immediately and in view of fact that it has been suggested in Nationalist quarters that there should be a preliminary conference at Smyrna, Central government consider that Allied Powers should declare at once that Conference will be held at Venice. As Smyrna has been burnt down[2] a preliminary conference there would, anyhow, be out of the question. It seems to me clear that Central government whilst rejoicing at successes of Kemalists over Greeks are nervous of Kemal and anxious that Allied Powers should serve in some sort as a buffer between themselves and Mustapha Kemal.

[1] Izzet Pasha.

[2] This was reported by Sir H. Lamb in his telegram No. 71 of September 15, not printed. Detailed accounts of the destruction of Smyrna were transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sir H. Rumbold's despatches No. 823 of September 18 (E 9883/27/44), which enclosed a Memorandum on events in Smyrna by Mr. Hole, Vice-Consul at Smyrna, and No. 834 of September 25 (E 10382/27/44), which enclosed a report from Mr. P. Hadkinson, who was formerly attached to the British High Commission as a relief officer and who was one of the last to leave Smyrna at the time of the catastrophe. A further report on Smyrna, by the Rev. Charles Dobson, sub-chaplain of the English Church at Smyrna, was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sir R. Graham's Rome despatch No. 1009 of November 2 (E 12182/9024/44).

No. 29

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Millington-Drake[1]
(Bucharest)

*No. 79 Telegraphic [E 9345/27/44]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 15, 1922.*

Your telegram No. 113.[2]

His Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction emphatic recognition in Government organ of Roumanian interest in freedom of Straits and in maintenance of Balkan equilibrium. Both those paramount interests are in great danger from menace which victorious Kemalist army is in a position to exert, and no opportunity should be lost of guarding effectively, while there is still time, against that danger.

His Majesty's Government contemplate early meeting of a conference in which the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres will be taken in hand, and if Roumanian Government desires to be represented thereat they will be prepared to support the request, provided that Roumania herself is willing to assume some share in the responsibility. You should see Foreign Minister without delay and consult him most confidentially in above sense, enquiring whether his Government will be prepared without delay to place a force of a division at disposal of Allied Commander-in-Chief to defend the military position which the three Great Powers have publicly signified their intentions to maintain, pending final solution of problem.

His Majesty's Government are themselves prepared to send large reinforcements. But the larger the number of interested States who join in the demonstration the more effective will it be.[3]

Repeated to Paris, No. 306, 16th September.

To Paris only: Above is for your information and guidance in your conversation with Ferda.[4]

[1] Mr. J. H. E. V. Millington-Drake, First Secretary at H.M. Legation in Bucharest from February 9, 1921. Chargé d'Affaires from July 8 to September 15, 1922, during the absence of Sir H. Dering.

[2] Of September 14. This cited an article in 'Viitorul', recognised mouth-piece of the Roumanian Government, which stated: 'Roumania is interested in freedom of Straits and cannot admit change in Balkan equilibrium to her disadvantage, and declares her solidarity in common interests of all other Allies in maintenance of freedom of Straits.'

[3] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 47 of September 18, instructed Sir George Clerk, Consul-General for the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia, as follows: 'For your confidential information, Jugoslav government is being similarly approached. You should report if you hear of any government similarly approaching Czechoslovak government.' Sir G. Clerk replied, in his telegram No. 104 of September 20: 'No invitation and no suggestion as to common action have reached Czechoslovak government from any country of Great Powers or Little Entente.'

[4] King Ferdinand of Roumania, who was passing through Paris on his way home fro Bagnoles de l'Orne.

No. 30

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 17, 9 a.m.)
No. 421 Telegraphic [E 9384/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 16, 1922, 5.45 p.m.*

Greek High Commissioner has read me a confidential telegram from his government stating that they had heard that allied troops were retiring from Chatalja lines. Greek government had information to the effect that Turkish bands composed of regulars and irregulars were forming with a view to attacking Greek troops in Thrace. Greek government had instructed their High Commissioner to ascertain from British authorities what Greeks should do if attacked by these bands.

I replied that in my opinion Greek troops would be fully justified in repelling attacks made on them by Turkish bands but that they must on no account pursue these bands into neutral zone as such action would be misinterpreted and lead to belief in some quarters that Greek army was menacing Constantinople.[1]

Repeated to Athens No. 132.

[1] Referring to this telegram, Mr. Lindley [The Hon. F.O. Lindley, British Representative to the Greek Government] in his telegram No. 451 of September 17 to the Foreign Office, repeated as No. 259 to Constantinople, reported: 'Military Attaché has also received reports that Turks are organizing forces in neutral zone. If it is policy of His Majesty's Government to keep Kemalists out of Europe at any rate until settlement it appears clear that neutral zone should not be allowed to become armed bridgehead.'

No. 31

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 18)
*No. 466 Telegraphic: by bag [E 9390/27/44]**

PARIS, *September 16, 1922.*

Your telegram No. 304.[1]

I have just received note[2] from M. Poincaré stating that, while appreciating the motives which have led His Majesty's Government to propose reference to the League of Nations of protection of minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor, he considers that there would be objections, from the point of view of the responsibility and authority of the League itself, to ask it to participate in the drafting of stipulations which are to form part of the future

[1] Of September 15. This referred to Nos. 24 and 12, and continued as follows: 'Please ascertain whether French government agree to the despatch of the telegram to the League, text of which was sent you in my telegram No. 280 [No. 12, n. 4].'

[2] Of September 16, not printed. A copy was communicated to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2178 of September 16, not printed.

Treaty of Peace, and which in consequence must be elaborated by the Powers who are called upon to draw up the clauses of that treaty—clauses which must subsequently be put into practice under the supervision of the League of Nations.

Copy of note by bag to-night.

No. 32

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

Unnumbered telegraphic [*E 9674/27/44*][1]

Private and Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 16, 1922.*

Your tel[egram] No. 415.[2]

I think I should send for your personal guidance confidential indication of lines upon which our policy is proceeding. Cabinet yesterday [September 15] was gravely impressed with danger of position in which victorious Kemalist army may, either now, or even while a Conference is sitting, ignore Allied unity, and attempt a military move either upon Straits or Constantinople, or even seek to interfere in Thrace. They felt that if we are to maintain our position in a Conference, it must be supported by adequate force. Accordingly two more battalions and two squadrons of aeroplanes are being sent to Harington. Arrangements are also being made for further reinforcements by a division if required later on: and Dominions' Governments are being approached.[3] Meanwhile I am addressing Roumania[n] and Jugo-Slav Governments,[4] pointing out to them menace to their own interests of a Kemalist descent upon Europe, and a Kemalist solution of Straits question, and am offering to support their admission to European Conference to construct new Treaty, if they will give an earnest of their sincerity by providing troops without delay for defence of Constantinople and the Straits.[5]

I propose to go to Paris next week for a private conversation with Poincaré, being convinced that only by Franco-British understanding can a solution be reached. If I have obtained or can promise military reinforcements above

[1] Only Lord Curzon's draft and a typed copy of the draft are preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[2] See No. 27, n. 2.

[3] This approach was made in a telegram of September 15 (CP 4200) from the Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, and to the acting Prime Minister of Newfoundland. This telegram, having communicated the decisions of the Cabinet taken on September 15, went on to ask whether the Dominion Governments wanted to associate themselves with the action of the Government of the United Kindom, and whether they desired to be represented by a contingent.

[4] See No. 29, and No. 29, n. 3.

[5] At the Cabinet meeting of September 15, Lord Curzon had undertaken to find out from the Greek Government the strength of the Greek forces which could be utilised for the defence of the Straits. In his telegram No. 225 of September 15, he requested Mr. Bentinck to supply this information.

referred to, I shall be in a position to exert strong pressure upon him and to claim similar military support from France. As regards Conference I agree with you that early meeting of such a gathering is indispensible. My idea has been to propose at Paris, that it shall be summoned without delay, that it shall be Peace Conference with power to make new Treaty, that it shall consist of the Great Powers, and, upon understanding already referred to, of States locally concerned, viz. Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, that Greece and Turkey shall of course be present, and that any Power possessing local interest e.g. Bulgaria shall if thought necessary be heard. As to locale of such a conference Italy is pressing hard for conversion of Venice meeting as originally planned into a full European Treaty Conference.[6] Choice lies between Venice and Paris, since for reasons of expediency we do not propose to press for selection of London. Between France and Italy, there is not in respect of loyalty, much to choose; but we are rather afraid of an Italian chairman, playing off France against England and always coming down on the side of former. Drawback of either Paris or Venice is that Kemal would not attend, and that his representative might either not have full powers or be liable to be thrown over on his return.

I am not clear however whether the conference that you suggest is satisfied by above conception, or whether you still have in mind a local meeting, devoted as you say, to bring about formal cessation of hostilities and to examine larger points at issue. I am sceptical about desirability of two conferences but await your views on this point, and also your own idea of best manner and place in which conference whether major or minor should be held.

Alleged Turkish atrocities at Smyrna,[7] if confirmed, strengthen our position and will secure popular support to strong action which I have foreshadowed.

Greatest confidence is felt in judgement both of Harington and yourself, and the more freely you communicate with me, if necessary confidentially,[8] the better will it be.

[6] See No. 15.

[7] See No. 28, n. 2.

[8] In a minute, dated September 16, Mr. Oliphant recorded: 'I have . . . explained to Sir H. Rumbold in a brief telegram that any telegram from him marked "private" will meet the object which Lord Curzon had in view when he used the word "confidentially" in the last paragraph of his telegram.'

No. 33

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 17, 9 p.m.)
No. 424 Telegraphic [E 9385/27/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 17, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 445.[1]

In view of instructions which allied governments have sent (? or) are sending allied High Commissioners here to request Angora government to respect neutral zone at present occupied by allies in region of Constantinople and territorial waters,[2] recommendation made in some quarters in Athens that Greek troops should attack Constantinople is pure insanity. Such action would be best way of bringing about a catastrophe. Best thing Greek government can do now is to reorganise their troops which have escaped from Asia Minor into Thrace, and await events.

Repeated to Athens No. 133.

[1] Of September 15, not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 463 of September 14 Lord Hardinge had reported: 'French government are in agreement with His Majesty's Government in considering that it is desirable, without prejudicing stipulations of future treaty of peace, to maintain neutrality of zone at present occupied by the allies in the region of Constantinople and the Straits. The French government are ready to join the British and Italian governments in informing the Angora government that the allied governments expect that this zone will be respected by their troops.' Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 393 of September 15, instructed Sir H. Rumbold to join his colleagues in making representations on these lines to the Angora government.

No. 34

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 455 Telegraphic [E 9507/27/44]

ATHENS, *September 18, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

As regards future I must warn His Majesty's Government most seriously that Greek army cannot be counted on as a serious factor in the situation anywhere unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to treat Greece openly as an ally. Policy of relying on Greek army for success of British plans while refusing all help to Greece, and . . .[2] French and Italians (? to) reinforce Kemal, has broken down for good and all. But Greece has now

[1] Of September 18, not printed. In this telegram Mr. Lindley referred to Constantinople telegram No. 424 [No. 33] and reported that both the Prime Minister (M. Triandafilakos) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. Kalogeropoulos) had said that the idea of attacking Constantinople 'was insane and was not entertained by any responsible person in Greece'.

[2] The text is here uncertain. The word 'allowing' was suggested in the Foreign Office.

exhausted her moral and material resources as she was bound to do this Autumn: and her army will certainly not unaided defend any part of Thrace which has not been definitely promised to Greece even if it defends the rest.

(? Two) courses appear open:

1. To treat with Kemal at once on basis of national pact and trust that Christians of Constantinople and European Turkey will be treated better than those of Smyrna.

2. To inform Kemal that after experience of Smyrna His Majesty's Government will oppose all return of Turks to Europe and Straits.

His Majesty's Government know the consequences of either course better than Athens but if the second is chosen I believe even now Greek army would be cheapest weapon which could be found for carrying it out provided Greece is treated as an ally and supplied with funds and material and possibly organizers. Events are moving rapidly and I do not know whether it will be possible to say the same in a fortnight's time.

Repeated to Constantinople.

No. 35

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 469 Telegraphic [E 9593-4/27/44]

Most urgent PARIS, *September 19, 1922, 9.20 p.m.*

Part 1

I saw President of the Council this afternoon and I gave him a copy of Your Lordship's telegram No. 308.[1] He read it carefully but said nothing. I think that he would like to have disputed second paragraph.[2]

I told him that I had seen announcement that orders had been sent for withdrawal of French troops from Asiatic side of the Straits and I had also seen it stated in press that His Majesty's Government had been informed[3] yesterday of fact by French Chargé d'Affaires.[4] I was therefore greatly surprised when I received telephonic message from Foreign Office this morning asking for confirmation of news which was published in British and French papers. It seemed to me that His Majesty's Government should have been

[1] Of September 18. This referred to Paris telegram No. 463 [No. 33, n. 2] and continued: 'His Majesty's Government welcome very cordially the assurance from M. Poincaré that the French Government are in agreement with them on the supreme importance of maintaining the neutrality of the two occupied zones, and they have gladly joined the French in making the desired intimation to the Angora government.'

[2] This ran: 'It is in pursuance of the principle thus acknowledged [see n. 1] that His Majesty's Government are taking the precautionary measures which have been announced in the press.'

[3] No record of this communication has been traced in the Foreign Office archives. For M. Poincaré's summary of it, see No. 48, below.

[4] M. de Montille.

informed of such an important fact as withdrawal of French troops which had been sent solely to make a demonstration of solidarity between allies.

President of the Council replied that he did not know whether French Chargé d'Affaires had informed Your Lordship or not but there could be no doubt whatever that French acting High Commissioner at Constantinople would have informed his colleagues as soon as he received instructions sent him in order that military authorities might take necessary measures.[5]

I said at once that to withdraw French troops that had been sent as a demonstration of solidarity, leaving British troops exposed to any attack that might be made was in my opinion the very way to provoke war by giving encouragement to Kemal in showing that solidarity no longer exists. President of Council became very excited and in a long tirade said more than once that His Majesty's Government were pursuing a policy of war. I told him flatly that I would not allow him to say that sort of thing to me and that it was absolutely untrue and that no government or people desired peace more than His Majesty's Government and British people. He then calmed down, retracted what he had said, and told me that he was much preoccupied with knowledge that position at Chanak was in serious danger of an attack by Kemalist troops since Angora agent in Paris[6] had yesterday informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Kemal would not recognise any neutral zone on Asiatic side or any place as neutral which had previously been occupied by Greek troops, and mentioned Chanak in particular. He maintained that French troops would be withdrawn only in complete agreement with General Harington but there could be no compromise on that subject since public opinion in France would not permit life of a single French soldier exposed to risk of an attack by Turkish troops or Turkish irregulars.

I remarked to President of the Council that what seemed to me the best course to put an end once and for all to chance of any hostilities between Kemal's troops and allies would be to invite Kemal within a day or two to a conference.

Part 2 (despatched at 10.10 p.m.)

It might be done without even fixing date or place which could be settled later, but if done it should be done at once. President of the Council agreed entirely but added it was absolutely hopeless to think that Angora delegates would come to conference unless it was clearly understood in advance that their territorial demands would be granted. Unless these were granted President of the Council declared his opinion that there would be a general conflagration in which Turks, the Bolsheviks and Bulgarians would be found in close alliance. He said that Italians and Serbians were also agreed that

[5] In his telegram No. 434 of September 20, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'Acting French High Commissioner informed me today that on instructions from his government French detachment at Chanak was being immediately withdrawn. I understand that Italians will be similarly withdrawing their detachment.' The news of the Italian decision to withdraw from Chanak was confirmed in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 440 of September 20, not printed.

[6] Dr. Nihad Rechad.

territorial demands of the Turks must be conceded. I asked him what they were. He said Maritza frontier with Adrianople and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits when neutralized. They would be ready to accept control of League of Nations or of an inter-allied commission preferably the former and that they would accept nothing less. I said that in addition to political reasons there were very strong sentimental reasons why Turks should not be allowed in Gallipoli Peninsula owing to number of British soldiers who are buried there. He replied that he had considered that point as regards French graves there and he was of the opinion that cemeteries could be extra-territorialized and made British or French territory. I asked him whether he considered all safeguards of last March,[7] such as restriction of Turkish military forces should be maintained. He answered that all those questions must be discussed but that once territorial demands of Turkey had been conceded we would find they would be much more amenable to reason on other points although he admitted useless to uphold. . .[8] last March for Turkish military forces would, under present circumstances, have to be increased.

Finally I asked whether French High Commissioner had gone to Smyrna to see Kemal.[9] He replied that according to information he had received Kemal is no longer present in or near Smyrna.

[7] See Vol. XVII, Chapter IV.

[8] The text is here uncertain.

[9] In his telegram No. 425 of September 17, Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'Both my Italian colleague and I had attempted this morning to get hold of French High Commissioner who we were informed had gone into Constantinople. French Embassy observed mystery about his movements and this was obviously designed to give him several hours' start.

'This proceeding on the part of French High Commissioner has made unfavourable impression on my Italian colleague and myself. We both agree that French High Commissioner has in reality gone to Smyrna to see Mustapha Kemal in order to extricate French government from embarrassing position in which they now necessarily find themselves. French High Commissioner will no doubt appeal to Mustapha Kemal to respect neutral zone in return for promises of support at forthcoming conference.'

No. 36

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 20, 10.10 a.m.)
No. 432 Telegraphic [E 9587/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 20, 1922, 8.40 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 398.[1]

Joint communication respecting neutral zone signed by Italian High Commissioner acting French High Commissioner and myself was handed by three dragomans to Hamid Bey on afternoon of September 18 for immediate transmission by telegraph to Angora (see my telegram No. 427).[1] Hamid Bey received it without comment.

On insistence of my colleagues and in order to ensure their joining in communication, text which I had originally drafted and which was somewhat

[1] Of September 18, not printed.

more categorical was watered down into a form which they believed would be more palatable at Angora.

Text as actually communicated follows in my immediately following telegram.[2]

[2] Of September 20. This ran: 'Les gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie considèrent qu'il est désirable que, sans préjudice stipulations du futur traité de Paix la neutralité de la zone actuellement occupée par les Alliés dans les régions de Constantinople et des Détroits soit maintenue de l'ordre de leurs gouvernements, les hauts commissaires soussignés de France de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur renouveler démarche que leurs premiers dragomans ont faite auprès Hamid Bey, 11 courant et d'inviter son Excellence à informer le gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora plus tôt possible que les trois gouvernements alliés ont confiance que dit gouvernement respectera la zone précitée.'

No. 37

Mr. London[1] *(Geneva) to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*
(Received September 20, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 3 Telegraphic [E 9642/27/44][2]

GENEVA, *September 20, 1922, 4.10 p.m.*

Repeated by bag to Foreign Office.

Following from Lord Balfour[3] for Marquess Curzon.[4]

We hear that you are in Paris and your presence here would be invaluable. Relations between Dominions and European Allies will certainly become difficult unless utmost care be taken.[5] We have asked Dominions for material assistance which gives them special claim to consideration.[6] They think quite rightly in my opinion that the Powers have grossly mismanaged Near East but they do not know and cannot be told whose fault it is. I am by no means sure that the League of Nations might not be best possible instrument for dealing with the situation but my reasons are too long to give by telegraph. Conversation would therefore be invaluable. Mr. Hughes[7] as you know

[1] H.M. Consul at Geneva.

[2] An unnumbered telegraphic copy of this telegram was received in the Foreign Office on September 21.

[3] The Earl of Balfour, President of the Council, and British delegate to the League of Nations.

[4] Lord Curzon was in Paris from September 19 to September 24 for talks with M. Poincaré on the Near East problem.

[5] In an earlier telegram, No. 39 of September 20, not printed, Lord Balfour had stated: 'If I, with France and Italy, am still to deprecate action by League I shall not be able to speak on behalf of the whole British Empire.'

[6] See No. 32, n. 3.

[7] The Rt. Hon. William Morris Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia. In the telegram cited in n. 5, Lord Balfour had reported that Mr. Hughes had instructed the Australian delegate, the Hon. G. E. Rich, Justice of the High Court of Australia, to raise the question of the Near East at the League Assembly.

threatens to leave the League if it declines to make an effort to bring the war to an end.

You should understand that the question of League intervention has been already raised and that it will come before a commission this afternoon. The least that such a commission is likely to propose is that the League should express through the Council its willingness if requested by the Powers to offer good offices to bring about peace. Ends.

No. 38

Mr. Hodgson[1] *(Moscow) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received September 20, 7.20 p.m.)
No. 201 Telegraphic [*E 9662/27/44*]

MOSCOW, *September 20, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Radek who as adviser on foreign affairs in political bureau plays an important part in absence of Chicherin[2] and Litvinoff[3] expressed yesterday in conversation at British Mission conviction that time had now come when British and Russian views on Near East question could be harmonized.[4] Russia would be opposed to Turks gaining a footing in Europe or controlling Dardanelles and would accept solution which would internationalize latter while respecting Turkish sentiment. Soviet Russia might, he hinted, act as intermediary.

[1] Mr. R. M. Hodgson, Head of the British Commercial Mission to Russia.

[2] People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

[3] Vice-People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

[4] Russian views had been expressed in a telegram of September 12 from M. Karakhan (Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) to Lord Curzon. This ran: 'La Russie ne peut consentir à ce que les détroits soient ouverts aux navires de guerre de tous pays et, en particulier, à ce que la Grande-Bretagne de concert avec ses alliés règle le régime de ces détroits sans l'accord et contre le désir des États qui possèdent dans la mer Noire des intérêts vitaux et dont la voix doit être décisive quant au sort des détroits. Il est vrai que toutes les conventions d'avant la guerre sur les détroits ont perdu leur force, mais elles avaient toutes été établies avec la participation de la Russie, et par conséquent tout nouveau régime même de fait instaure dans les détroits en dehors de la Russie ne saurait être reconnu par le Gouvernement russe.

'Le seul acte international valable après la guerre de 1914 sur la question des détroits est le Traité russo-turc conclu à Moscou en 1921. [On March 16; see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 990–6.] Ce traité prévoit le libre passage par les détroits uniquement pour les bâtiments commerciaux de toutes nationalités. Le droit d'élaborer le statut international définitif des détroits est reconnu par ce Traité exclusivement aux États riverains de la mer Noire. Ce principe est professé actuellement par tous les [États riverains à l'exception de la] Bulgarie et de la Roumanie, dont le point de vue officiel ne m'est pas connu, mais qui sans doute consentiraient difficilement à être tenues à l'écart lors de la solution de cette question. La Russie, la Turquie, l'Ukraine et la Georgie, qui tiennent presque toutes les côtes de la mer Noire, ne peuvent reconnaître à personne le droit de s'ingérer dans la solution de la question des détroits et maintiendront le point de vue exposé plus haut, même dans le cas où l'opinion opposée serait appuyée par une supériorité militaire ou navale.

'La Grande-Bretagne devra convenir que les Puissances européennes, épuisées et désorganisées par la guerre et ses conséquences, si elles veulent une paix véritable, sont obligées de résoudre les problèmes internationaux, non point par la force, mais par voie d'accord pacifique avec les nations dont les intérêts vitaux sont engagés dans ces problèmes. Tout autre moyen ne fournirait que des solutions sans portée réelle et des documents sans efficacité, comme certains traités d'après la guerre, et serait la source de conflits nouveaux et de difficultés nouvelles dans les relations entre Puissances.

'Le Gouvernement russe, en attirant particulièrement l'attention sur cette dernière considération au moment où est convoquée à Venise une conférence pour régler la question du Proche-Orient et qui étudiera également la question des détroits, déclare par avance qu'il ne reconnaîtra aucune décision contraire au point de vue ici exposé et cela d'autant plus que la Russie ne participe pas à cette conférence.'

No. 39

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 20, 11.30 p.m.)

No. 119 Telegraphic [*E 9660/27/44*]

Urgent BUCHAREST, *September 20, 1922, 6.20 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs[1] called this morning to state that he had seen French minister after my visit,[2] with the result that Roumanian Prime Minister wishes further message[3] to be delivered to Mr. Lloyd George. Following is translation of French text left with me.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks that it may also be communicated for the information of Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires in London. Message begins.

We learn with regret that understanding between Great Britain and France concerning question of Constantinople and attitude to adopt in case of advance by Kemal is not established.

On the other hand it is confirmed Bolsheviks wish to come to the help of their Turkish allies.

In these circumstances Roumania would be in any case unable to participate in common action (? at) Constantinople until actually in receipt of munitions of war she needs for defence of her eastern frontier in any event.

In communications made to us French appear to think that they could stop Kemal on Asiatic coast if new military manifestations are avoided at

[1] M. Duca.

[2] This had been reported in Bucharest telegrams Nos. 117 (see n. 3, below) and 118 of September 19, not printed. See No. 29.

[3] The substance of the first message to Mr. Lloyd George was transmitted by Sir H. Dering in his telegram No. 117 of September 19, which ran: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me reply of Roumanian government which has been sent by Prime Minister through Roumanian legation to Mr. Lloyd George.... It states that Roumania is in this crisis particularly anxious to safeguard her Russian and Bulgarian frontiers on the Dniester and Danube and must therefore keep the bulk of her forces there. But that will not prevent her participating at Constantinople for its defence with a military contingent which Roumanian government will be ready to supply in view of the danger to Roumanian interests in the Straits threatened by Mustapha Kemal. They intimate that they would wish to be consulted and to participate with allies in discussion to establish peace....'

Constantinople and if Turks are assured of possibility of obtaining by pacific means and by (?international) conference new frontier in Thrace. We consider this a good solution if at the same time a neutral zone between Turks and Bulgarians can be established.

Following is résumé of Roumanian policy in three essential points quoted:

1. Maintenance of Anglo-French solidarity in any solution.
2. Avoid at any price conflict in Balkan peninsula.
3. Not to lose sight of Russian danger which is most serious for Roumania as for all Europe. Ends.

French text by bag.[4]

Repeated to Paris.

[4] This text was transmitted in Bucharest despatch No. 496 of September 20, not printed.

No. 40

Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

Unnumbered Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 9622/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 20, 1922, 8.30 p.m.*

Australian delegate at Geneva has been instructed to raise in Assembly question of League offering good offices to belligerents.[1]

In view of this Cabinet propose to authorize Lord Balfour to join in this appeal if Lord Curzon approves.

Please reply in time for meeting of Cabinet at 9.30 tonight. Cabinet also hope to have by then report of your further interview.[2]

[1] See No. 37, n. 7.

[2] i.e. Lord Curzon's conversation with M. Poincaré at 4.00 p.m. on September 20. For a record of this conversation, see No. 42, below.

No. 41

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference[1] *between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 a.m., Wednesday, September 20, 1922. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 22, 1922.)*

[*E 9735/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré; M. Laroche; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.[2]
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; SECRETARY, Mr. Forbes Adam.[3]

M. POINCARÉ began by asking Lord Curzon to open the conversation.

LORD CURZON said that he would begin by explaining the whole situation briefly, and His Majesty's Government's justification for their attitude. He

[1] Lord Curzon's telegraphic account (by telephone) of this meeting, not printed, was received in the Foreign Office at 3.20 p.m. The account was prefaced by the following: 'Have just returned from first conversation of 2½ hours with M. Poincaré. It was delayed by appearance upon the scene of Sforza, who had been brought back to Paris by Poincaré

need not refer to past history, except to remind M. Poincaré that all attempts to bring Mustapha Kemal to a conference after the Allied meeting in Paris last March[4] had failed. After a long exchange of notes between the French and British Governments, Venice had been agreed upon as the place for a conference.[5] Mustapha Kemal had then, however, decided to attack, and the Greek defence of Asia Minor had collapsed. It became obvious, from that moment, that the territorial question in Asia Minor had been liquidated, although the problem of the protection which the French and British Governments were equally pledged to provide for the racial and religious minorities there remained. On the other hand, the European question (Thrace, the Straits and Constantinople) was left to be decided. Nothing, however, had occurred to modify here the broad principles of agreement reached in March last, and in so far as modification would be required, it ought to be arrived at in friendly consultation between the Powers, either by themselves, or preferably in a full peace conference. His Majesty's Government were unable to admit the view that a decision on these questions could be taken out of their hands by Mustapha Kemal. It was not for him to settle such questions as those of the Straits or Thrace, or even to prejudge them in any way by a military occupation. Nor could he be allowed to rush the position at Constantinople, and thus set the whole of the Balkans aflame. These questions must be settled by conference and not by force—by negotiation and not by invasion. They were emphatically matters for the Allies; and there would be nothing more disastrous than a failure to settle them by agreement and co-operation between the Powers. The question would arise later how far other Powers were involved in the question of the Straits; for the moment, it was a matter primarily for the Great Powers alone. Meanwhile, action had been taken in two directions—at Constantinople by the three High Commissioners and Generals, and in Europe by the Allied Governments. It was satisfactory to know that when danger threatened at Constantinople, General Sir Charles Harington had acted in complete accord with his French and Italian colleagues, who had agreed with him as to the dispositions necessary to represent

for the express purpose, and who insisted upon the right to be present. I replied that I had come over by arrangement with Poincaré to have a private conversation with him, and until this had taken place I could not agree to convert conversation into an allied conference. The conversation with Poincaré alone thereupon proceeded.

'In the meantime, I asked Sforza to come and see me after the meeting, and I shall invite him (with Poincaré's consent, which has been given) to attend this afternoon to hear Lord Beatty's statement.' In a message to Lord Curzon, transmitted in Foreign Office telegram No. 310 of September 19, the Prime Minister had stated: 'Lord Beatty [First Sea Lord] is crossing to-night. We think it of great importance that M. Poincaré and the French military advisers should, as soon as possible, hear what Lord Beatty has to say regarding what the Navy can do. It is of the utmost importance that they should understand the great degree of independent support which the Navy can give even apart from the military situation on the Asiatic shore.'

[2] M. René Massigli, Secretary to the Conference of Ambassadors.

[3] Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam, a First Secretary in the Foreign Office.

[4] See Vol. XVII, Chapter IV.

[5] See ibid., Nos. 733, 737, and 742.

the Allied flags on the Ismid peninsula and on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.[6] He had already reported the actual steps taken to place detachments of the Powers in both places. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government had asked the French Government[7] what was their point of view regarding the defence of the neutral zones around Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; and Lord Curzon had received with much satisfaction M. Poincaré's note of the 14th September[8] stating that the French Government thought it most desirable, in agreement with His Majesty's Government, to maintain the neutrality of the zones occupied by the Allies, without, however, prejudging the future peace, and that they were ready, in concert with the British and Italian Governments, to inform the Angora Government that the Allied Governments expected that these zones would be respected by the Turkish troops.

Sir Horace Rumbold had immediately been instructed to make a communication to the Angora Government in conjunction with his Allied colleagues. There was some doubt as to whether these instructions had been acted upon at once; but Lord Curzon had received a telegram that day reporting that the communication to the Representatives of the Angora Government at Constantinople had been formally made by the High Commissioners yesterday [*sic*].[9]

His Majesty's Government naturally drew the only possible conclusion from the terms of M. Poincaré's above-mentioned note—that the Allied forces were prepared to defend both zones, and that they would never permit Kemal to violate them. His Majesty's Government had thought and hoped that the declaration of the Allies would be itself sufficient to deter Kemal from any attempt to violate either zone. At the same time they had continued to receive from their representatives at Constantinople and in the Straits zone alarming information as to the intentions of Kemal. His forces were reported to be advancing northwards from Smyrna, and already actually to have reached the borders of the neutral zone. His Majesty's Government had heard further that Kemal had announced his intention of settling the question of Thrace by crossing to Europe and deciding it by force of arms. They also heard that he was threatening the Ismid position. Meanwhile, advice was said to be reaching Kemal from many quarters to settle the whole question at once, without a conference, behind the backs of the Great Powers. With this object he was counselled to provoke a rising at Constantinople, and to encourage the military bands who were already said to be active in Eastern and Western Thrace. In consequence of these reports,[10] and in pursuance of a policy which they firmly believed to be that of the Allies as a whole, His Majesty's Government had resolved to reinforce the Allied positions at Chanak and Constantinople.[11] At Chanak, up to the time of that

[6] See No. 23, n. 2. [7] See No. 21, n. 5. [8] Not printed.
[9] Cf. No. 36. [10] See, for example, Nos. 27 and 30.
[11] See No. 21. At a Conference of Ministers held at 5 p.m. on September 18 it was resolved: 'That the Admiralty should reinforce the fleet in the Mediterranean by:
(i) three capital ships,
(ii) submarines.

decision, there had only been one British battalion, the garrison at Gallipoli comprising a French Senegalese battalion, but with the establishment of the three flags at Chanak, and relying on their presence there, His Majesty's Government had proceeded to order all available reinforcements to that place. There was already a considerable British force there (one squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry and a battalion of field artillery). Further, His Majesty's Government had decided to send as large naval reinforcements as could be obtained from the neighbouring waters, and had no intention of allowing Kemal to take the position out of the hands of the Allies, or to cross the Straits at any point. All the available forces of Great Britain were ready to support this decision, and Lord Beatty, who had come to Paris specially for the purpose, would explain to M. Poincaré the precise steps which had been taken by the British navy, and the naval reasons which justified His Majesty's Government in confidently believing that Kemal could not attack or cross the Straits.

Lord Curzon wished here to recall to M. Poincaré the fact, of which he had already reminded him in March, that Gallipoli was a sacred and imperial interest of the British Empire; and the recent appeal of His Majesty's Government to the Dominions[12] and their response showed their ready recognition of this fact.

The attitude of His Majesty's Government was similar in regard to the positions at Scutari and Ismid. Again in pursuance of what they believed to be the Allied policy, His Majesty's Government had reinforced, with all the means at their disposal, the positions there, and were ready, with their Allies, to prevent an invasion of Europe across the Bosphorus by the Kemalists. It had been stated in some quarters that the whole situation could have been easily liquidated by diplomacy, and that the forcible measures of precaution taken by His Majesty's Government were unnecessary and even dangerous. It would be well, however, to remember that diplomacy was not always effective in checking an oriental army flushed with victory, and any weakness on the part of the Allies would simply have been an invitation to Kemal to cut the Gordian knot by force of arms. His Majesty's Government had therefore thought it necessary to act promptly. Had Kemal been permitted to advance to both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, he could at any moment during the Conference have decided to break up the peace discussions and dictate his own terms by throwing his sword into the scale. For the rest, the British action in sending reinforcements was identical in procedure with the recent French action in bringing forces from Syria to Chatalja when the Greeks were threatening those lines.[13] Both had been

'That the War Office should send a Field Company R.E. in addition to the reinforcements already approved. The War Office to consider whether this Company can be ready to sail with the detachment of 1,000 Royal Marines to be despatched on Friday next, September 22nd.

'That the Air Ministry should prepare a fourth squadron of aeroplanes, which should be ready to follow within a few days, the third of the squadrons already under orders.'

[12] See No. 32, n. 3.

[13] See Vol. XVII, No. 691 ff.

perfectly legitimate actions. Indeed, up to the present, His Majesty's Government had believed that the steps they had taken had the full sympathy of the French Government, since they were in pursuance of an agreed policy. It was therefore with considerable surprise that Lord Curzon had heard that orders had been given yesterday by the French Government to withdraw the French contingent from Chanak.[14] This step seemed a direct invitation to Kemal to pursue his designs, relying on France and on the fact that the British forces were faced with the alternative of either defending alone the neutral zone (which the other Allies nevertheless recognised) or of withdrawing and allowing Kemal to settle matters in his own way.

As regards the position at Ismid, there was still some doubt as to whether the French troops had equally been withdrawn from the Allied position in front of Scutari, but on this point, as well as on the question of the withdrawal from Chanak, Lord Curzon sought the fullest explanations which M. Poincaré was prepared to give him. At the same time, it was his duty to point out that if the French Government took the pointed action of withdrawing their forces in one or both of these areas, it was a clear indication to Kemal that France was not ready to support Great Britain, who would have to act alone. Lord Curzon thought it unnecessary to indicate to M. Poincaré the grave consequences to the alliance and, indeed, to the future of Europe, of this step. For the moment, he would only ask for the fullest explanation of French policy. His Majesty's Government had been carrying out an Allied policy, and had applied it in practice with sincerity, courage and promptitude. There was no new factor necessitating a breach of this Allied unity. In Lord Curzon's opinion, it would be disastrous and deplorable to allow it to be broken by the victorious Kemalist forces. To permit Kemal, not only to beat the Greeks, which was a comparatively easy task—but also to overcome the Allies—would have consequences, the range of which it would be impossible to forecast. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to concert urgent steps with his Allies to save the situation while it was still possible, and to insist on an immediate conference to settle the political issues. He would not now trouble M. Poincaré with the question of the place and form of the conference, and the Powers who should be represented at it. These were points which he would be ready to discuss later. For the present he would only confine his statement to the full account which he had just given of the naval and military steps taken by Great Britain, and their desire to maintain the Allied position in the Straits area in the interests of a continued alliance and of the peace of Europe.

M. Poincaré began by thanking Lord Curzon for his full and lucid statement. He was unable, however, to accept the explanation which Lord Curzon had given of the failure since March last to bring Mustapha Kemal to a conference. He would recall that he had explained on several occasions during the March discussions that he feared the Turks would not accept the proposals upon which they were agreeing and would only become more and

[14] See No. 35.

more exacting. A time would soon come when the Allies would find themselves powerless to impose any terms at all. In his opinion, events had proved his forecast to be perhaps too optimistic. In his talks with Fethi Bey and Ferid Bey, M. Poincaré had repeated how deplorable it would be if Angora were to take the offensive when an Allied Conference had been practically decided upon at Venice. His advice had, however, not been taken, and the Turks had been too well informed about the state of the Greek forces not to resist the temptation to attack. Incidently, M. Romanos[15] had told him the day before that the Greek commanders had been deceived by the information given to them by alleged deserters and refugees from the Kemalist army to the effect that the latter was demoralised. Be that as it may, the position to-day was that the Allies could no longer maintain the position which they had taken up in March last. They were now confronted with a nation of fanatics flushed with victory, and it had become a question of saving the general peace of Europe and Asia.

At this point M. Poincaré read a telegram which he had received from General Pellé from Smyrna[16] that morning. The general reported that he had just had a long conversation with Kemal, to whom he had intimated as clearly as possible the exact nature of the Allied note[17] as to respecting the neutral zones. He had urged Kemal not to abuse his victory and to show Europe that the Turkish State, of which he was the head, was a modern civilised organism. Mustapha Kemal had protested his friendship with France and his desire to avoid conflict with the Allies, but he had frankly stated that he could not stop his troops now from occupying all the territory covered by the national pact. It was for the Allies to realise the situation and to allow his troops to occupy Constantinople and Thrace. The Greeks could not defend the latter, and he, Kemal, has no intention of occupying more territory than the national pact contemplated. For the rest he was only sending the minimum of troops and men necessary to maintain order in Thrace, but he must finish the campaign before the winter. Delay would be fatal. He also feared the Allies had no real intention of abandoning Constantinople. He concluded by stating that he was summoning his Government to Smyrna and expected them the next evening. He would ask General Pellé and the French Government to await the full reply of his Government.

M. Poincaré suggested that in these circumstances it was essential to have a conference as soon as possible. To this the Turks must come, but if the Allies told them now that they were not to be allowed to pass the Straits or to occupy the zones they would simply refuse to come to the conference, and meanwhile attack. France, for her part, could not defend herself against such an attack. On the one hand there was a moral impossibility. France was a Moslem Power and could not neglect the serious situation which was arising in all her Moslem colonies. M. Poincaré here quoted a telegram from Tunis explaining the numerous telegrams of congratulation sent by the natives to Mustapha Kemal on his victory. These telegrams have been held

[15] The Greek representative at Paris.

[16] See No. 35, n. 9.

[17] See No. 36.

up by the French authorities, but would eventually have to go forward. Again, the Governor of Indo-China had told him only yesterday that a war between France and Turkey would be completely misunderstood in that colony. The community of feeling between Asiatics was so strong there, and the Governor said that the Annamite troops sent to Syria had told him before their departure that they would only go when they were assured that they would not have to fight against Turkey. M. Poincaré felt that Lord Curzon, as perhaps the only British statesman who had ever visited the colony of Indo-China, would appreciate the force of these facts.

In addition to the moral question France was faced with material impossibility. She had no forces to send there. Only recently the Commission of Finance of the Chamber of Deputies had expressed their anxiety regarding the small credit with which the French Government wished to cover the expenditure on additional forces to be sent to the East. It was only when M. Poincaré explained to the commission that the forces were intended to defend Constantinople against the Greeks, and in no circumstances for an attack upon Turkey, that they had voted the required sum. To prevent the passage of the Straits it was not enough for the Allies to make declarations. Either they must have sufficient strength to prevent the passage of the Straits, or they must persuade the Turks to come to a conference. If the Allies stuck to the March proposals there was no hope of a successful step in the latter direction. M. Poincaré did not believe that they would accept the March proposals either as regards Thrace or Gallipoli.

With regard to the action of the Allied commanders at Constantinople in establishing the three flags at Chanak and Ismid, M. Poincaré emphasised that the only step to which the French Government (as distinct from the French Government's subordinates) had agreed to was to send to the Angora Government the Allied note asking them to respect the neutrality of the two states in Constantinople. The French Government, however, had never agreed to send troops to force Turkey to accept the neutrality of these zones. They never even agreed to send French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It was true that General Pellé had acted on the spot in a spirit of camaraderie, but as soon as he, M. Poincaré, learnt it he had thought the step dangerous and had sent contrary instructions. It must be remembered that there were Turkish irregulars in the neighbourhood who might attack quite apart from regular troops. Once a shot had been fired the outbreak would extend. It was not a question of France favouring the Turks. All France desired was an honourable peace. At the same time, to secure that peace, France was not prepared to defend the Greeks. It was true that Greece had been an ally of France for a time during and since the war, but she had then elected to bring back King Constantine, who was responsible for shooting French troops in the streets of Athens.[18] There was here for France a question of sentiment like that of Gallipoli for the British Empire.

[18] On December 1, 1916. See Frangulis, vol. i, pp. 485 ff.

M. Poincaré here recorded that Ferid Bey had come to him yesterday officially to inform the French Government that Mustapha Kemal would not cross the Straits at once, but that he had among his followers extremists elated by victory who might drive him to precipitate action.

In these circumstances M. Poincaré considered that there could only be one answer to the question, whether Allied troops were to stop the advance of the Turks. It was a material impossibility, and the only action which they could take was to persuade the Kemalists to come to a conference. For this purpose they must tell him plainly that he was to obtain Constantinople, and that the Allies would offer him an acceptable settlement in Thrace and Gallipoli. Hitherto France had refrained from giving any such assurance alone without her allies to Kemal.

As for precautionary measures, M. Poincaré recognised the prompt answer given by the Dominion Governments to the Mother Country, but before such reinforcements could arrive on the scene something irreparable might take place. In the opinion of the French Government there were not sufficient naval forces on the spot to stop the Turks crossing the Straits waters or the Sea of Marmora, at any rate in isolated packets [*sic*] of men. He would again therefore repeat that France's only wish was to obtain peace and that she only disagreed with Great Britain on the question of means for this purpose. She felt that the Turks would not be stopped now merely by the arrival of Allied reinforcements. She feared too that a Turkish attack would be followed by a Bulgarian attack on Serbia and by a Russian attack on Poland and Roumania.

To bring the Turks to a conference, it was essential to tell them in the invitation that they would get such-and-such satisfaction. They must even be given promises as to terms of peace, and, if England thinks that she could not do this herself or join in such an Allied communication, France must do it alone. Otherwise M. Poincaré felt sure that the Turks would never come.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to answer some, at any rate, of the points raised by M. Poincaré. He would begin with the various issues involved in the explanation just given as to the withdrawal of the French troops from the southern shore of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. When the French Government suggested the Allied declaration as to defending the neutral zones and had agreed to the French signature being put to the communication to the Angora Representative at Constantinople, His Majesty's Government had thought the latter a serious document. This was not apparently the view of the French Government, who only regarded it as a pious supplication to Kemal not to cross the neutral zones. There was to be no serious action taken to support its application. His Majesty's Government had hoped for some act of Allied solidarity similar to that taken by the British in the defence of the Chatalja line against the Greek threat upon Constantinople.[19] If General Harington had answered General Charpy's appeal as the latter had been instructed by the French Government to answer General

[19] See Vol. XVII, No. 713.

Harington's, and if General Harington had then excused himself by saying that the English were the friends of the Greeks and could not risk having to fire upon them, the French would have been shocked, and would have thought such action inconsistent with the alliance. It now appeared that the French general on the spot had been only too anxious to help General Harington, but that his action had been disavowed, and in consequence the French forces had been withdrawn both from Chanak and apparently (though this was not quite clear) from Ismid.

If, as appeared to be the case, Kemal was now to be allowed to violate the neutral zones and to remain in unrestricted control of the shores of the Marmora and the Straits opposite Gallipoli and Constantinople, a very serious position for Great Britain would arise.

M. Poincaré had offered in return a slender encouragement of Ferid's assurances that Kemal would not cross the Straits at once. As a matter of fact, the latter could not and would not be allowed to cross them. For the rest, the British Foreign Office knew in fact from their own sources of information that Ferid had actually advised Mustapha Kemal to cross the Straits and attack the Allies.

Lord Curzon had understood M. Poincaré to say that it was impossible for the Allied military forces to prevent Kemal from crossing the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, and in consequence his advice was that the Allies should abandon the game and accede [to] Kemal all his demands in advance of the Conference. He would therefore ask M. Poincaré to hear Lord Beatty's opinion on this subject. He would be in a position to explain that the British naval forces on the spot would soon be quite sufficient to prevent Kemal from crossing the waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile he, Lord Curzon, would ask M. Poincaré to consider seriously what value a Conference would have if Kemal were to be allowed to advance and take possession of Thrace, Constantinople and Gallipoli. His Majesty's Government wanted a Conference, but it must be a Conference with reasonable chances of success.

He could not understand the French view that in order to induce Kemal to come to the Conference we must concede him in advance all the terms of the national pact. Lord Curzon saw no reason why the terms of the March conference must be torn up simply because 70,000 Turks had driven the Greek forces into the sea. There was of course the question of Moslem opinion to be considered. It was a factor with which His Majesty's Government had to deal in Egypt, India and Mesopotamia, just as the French Government had to deal with it in Indo-China, Morocco and Tunis; but it was not a factor which compelled us to surrender the fruits of victory, and agree to set up in Europe a State of militant Turks. He fully agreed with M. Poincaré that the sooner the Conference was held the better, but there was no reason to bribe Mustapha Kemal in advance by conceding the full national pact. The main point was that the Allies should not enter the Conference divided. It would therefore be necessary to consider, before the Conference, questions such as the future of Gallipoli. Here M. Poincaré had

spoken as if it were quite enough to trust the word of Mustapha Kemal; but the British Government could not take such risks. Then there was the question of Constantinople. Lord Curzon had been surprised to hear doubts expressed in certain quarters as to the Allied attitude in this matter. So far as the British Government were concerned, the March proposals stood in this respect; and as soon as peace was ratified, the Allied troops would be withdrawn. Thirdly there was the question of the frontier in Thrace. Many lines had already been discussed, but there was no need to say before the future Conference that such and such a frontier was the final decision of the British Government and of the Allied Governments. On this point the Turks, Greeks, Roumanians and Serbs must all be heard. As to the fears expressed by M. Poincaré of Bulgarian and Russian action, Lord Curzon had seen M. Ninchitch, the Jugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, in London, and he was seriously alarmed with regard to Kemal's advance in Thrace.[20] His Majesty's Government had already consulted the Roumanian Government, and from communications received [that] morning,[21] Lord Curzon understood

[20] In Foreign Office telegram No. 309 of September 19, the following message was transmitted to Lord Curzon from the Prime Minister: 'I spoke to Monsieur Ninchitch [Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs] in the sense of Your Lordship's telegram No. 306 (repeating No. 79 to Bucharest) [No. 29], and assured him of our support in the question of the participation of Serbia in the conference which is to take place, on condition of the acceptance of responsibility by his government in the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium, and I urged that his government should agree to send a division of troops to be placed under General Harington's command in order to meet all eventualities.

'Monsieur Ninchitch said in reply that he had been lunching to-day with the King [of Yugoslavia] and Monsieur Poincaré, and that they were all agreed that an end should be put to the crisis with the least possible delay. The Turks were for the moment respecting the wishes of the allies, but in their present exalted state of mind it was impossible to say what their attitude might be tomorrow. The Serbian government were greatly pre-occupied by the attitude of the Bulgarians, and they were anxious that no opening should be given to the latter to create trouble in unison with the Turks. He would discuss this question with Your Lordship on Tuesday [September 19], and on his return to Paris on Wednesday would be able with Monsieur Pasitch [Prime Minister of Yugoslavia] to arrive at any decision that might be found necessary. He added that of course Serbia would do what was required of her.' (No record of Lord Curzon's conversation with M. Ninchitch has been traced in the Foreign Office archives.)

[21] In his telegram No. 465 of September 16, Lord Hardinge reported: 'Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires called on me this afternoon to say that Roumanian government shared our anxiety regarding repercussion of events in Asia Minor on the Danube and Dniester, with special regard to possible combination of Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia. As main danger was from Russia, they considered interest of Roumania and Europe was best served by keeping main Roumanian force on Dniester. But wishing to maintain solidarity of allied front, Roumania was prepared to co-operate with the principal allied Powers by sending a contingent to Constantinople. Serbia was in a position to do more than Roumania, being less under pressure. He urged that in pourparlers of Great Powers, Roumania should participate both in discussions and decisions.

'He asked for definite assurances as to the command of the Black Sea and for particulars as to the size of the force which Roumania should send. He also asked for assistance in war material and sea transport.

'I gave definite assurances as to the command of the Black Sea and promised assistance as regards sea transport and escort. I reserved expression of definite opinion as to size of

that they too were very anxious about the situation, and were prepared to resist Kemal's attack by military measures.

Meanwhile Lord Curzon would urge M. Poincaré to reassure the Turks that all points which he had stated would be taken into grave and sympathetic consideration by the Allies: that the Allies were perfectly willing to give up Constantinople after peace was established and that an acceptable frontier would be found in Thrace, but that as regards the Straits and Gallipoli, their freedom must be clearly defined. For the rest, it was essential that the Allies should stand together, and in this respect France must realise the dangerous position which would be created if Great Britain were to be left to stand alone while Turkey was given every assurance by the French Government that all her demands would be conceded. He could not sufficiently emphasise that the British action in this matter was not one of bluster and bravado. He hoped M. Poincaré would be convinced of this by the statement which Lord Beatty was to make that afternoon.[22]

M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to make further explanation regarding the French attitude in the matter of the Note as to the neutral zones. He recalled that he had refused to send any ultimatum to Angora during the March discussions, and Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer had yielded to his point of view.[23] Nevertheless, M. Poincaré had regarded the Note[24] which the Allied Foreign Ministers had then sent to Constantinople, Angora and Athens as serious, just as the present Note about the neutrality of the Straits was serious. France could not, however, engage herself to take any forcible action in Asia Minor. In March last it had never been contemplated that Allied troops were to be established on the southern shores of the Straits. As regards Chatalja, the French had had a battalion there already when the Greeks threatened the Allies, and all they had done was to reinforce it; but they had never had any troops south of the Straits. Again, it was a physical possibility to stop the Greek advance, but it was not possible now to stop the Turkish advance; and if they really wanted to prevent the Turks from reaching the Straits, the Allies must not seek to assume a threatening attitude, but do all they can to bring Kemal to a conference. For the rest, he, M. Poincaré, had no wish to give up everything to the Kemalists. There were many points, for example, minorities, the Allied garrison at Gallipoli, and the military provisions of the future treaty, which would have to be debated at length with the Turks. As regards the Straits, their problem would have to be definitely settled one way or another. Possibly the League of Nations would be found the best solution; but as regards the territorial provisions of the national pact, the Allies must be prepared to meet the Turks in advance

Roumanian contingent pending your conversations in Paris, but promised a reply on this point within the next few days when we know the results of your conversations. I asked him to telegraph to his government as to the nature of assistance in war material most urgently required, which I indicated in principle we should be prepared to consider favourably if Roumania should send a contingent.'

[22] See No. 42, below.

[23] See Vol. XVII, No. 560.

[24] See Vol. XVII, No. 560, Annex 3.

in some measure. For, even supposing, as Lord Curzon seemed to think, that the Allies would be found capable of preventing the Turks reaching Europe, the Turks would simply turn again to Syria and Mesopotamia. Then Bulgaria would attack Jugoslavia, and Russia, Poland and Roumania. In these circumstances it seemed to him an act of blindness to invite the Turks to a conference on the basis of the March proposals. This does not mean that he wished to take the Turkish word as a sufficient guarantee for Gallipoli. Here, of course, serious safeguards would have to be provided, even if the Allies were to accept nominal Turkish sovereignty. As for Thrace, the Jugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that he would accept a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and had so stated publicly[25] in the press in Paris. He could only repeat again that it was useless to tell the Turks to come to a conference and simply rely on Allied justice, while, in the meantime, barring their route to Europe by military measures. They must be promised a settlement on certain points in advance, even if others were left for examination and discussion at a future conference. This was the only way to persuade them to come to a conference.

LORD CURZON proposed to discuss the question of the Conference later, but desired first to return to a point about the seriousness of the document intimating to Kemal the Allied intention to defend the neutral zone. The question of its seriousness could be measured by the fact that it was immediately followed by the French and Italian withdrawal of troops from the two vital places in the zones. M. Poincaré was quite right in saying that the Allied occupation had been confined under the March proposals to Gallipoli and the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora as far as Rodosto.[26] But those were provisions for the final peace settlement, and, meanwhile, under the armistice, neutral zones had been fixed by Allied action for the safety of the Straits and Constantinople. Were these safeguards now to be overthrown by one-sided French action? Again, how were the Allies to make Turkey accept in the final settlement demilitarised zones south of the Asiatic shores of the Straits if Kemal was to be allowed to advance to occupy the neutral zones which were actually only part of the larger demilitarised areas contemplated in the final settlement? Lord Curzon trusted that M. Poincaré would again consider the gravity of the French action in withdrawing from Chanak in the light of these observations.

Turning to the question of the conference, Lord Curzon agreed that there were several points, such as minorities, and the military provisions of the treaty, which would have to be discussed in the future conference. But he did not see why all the territorial questions, such as Thrace, the Straits, Constantinople and Gallipoli, were to be settled in advance of such a conference. It was quite true that we might have to modify the March frontier of Thrace, and he did not even wish to exclude the possibility of nominal Turkish sovereignty being allowed in Gallipoli—but these were all points for the future conference.

[25] See No. 42, n. 3, below. [26] See Vol. XVII, No. 566.

As regards M. Poincaré's fears in the direction of Syria and Irak, His Majesty's Government, for their part, were prepared to run the risk. They trusted, however, that the French would have no trouble in Syria, and, indeed, they felt confident that, as a result of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921,[27] France had a real insurance against such trouble. In any case, a firm display of Allied unity seemed the best way to make the Turks pause, if they were really contemplating an attack on Syria and Irak.

M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to add a few words regarding the Allied occupation of the neutral zone. He wished to point out that it was the French Government alone who could settle vital movements of French troops, and it was their view that these troops should not be exposed on the southern shores of the two Straits. Even if British naval action could prevent the Turks crossing the Straits, the force at Chanak was hopelessly exposed. He would emphasise once again that an immediate conference was vital, and that the Turks must be persuaded to come to it. If France were to join with Great Britain in shutting the Straits without agreeing to give the Turks some hope of substantial assistance in the future conference, she would simply be courting disaster in Syria, trouble in her colonies, and a big Moslem upheaval in Asia.[28]

[27] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

[28] In his telegraphic account of these conversations (see n. 1), Lord Curzon stated: 'Poincaré made no complaints of British action or "communiqué" and said nothing offensive. His whole attitude was that, whatever we might choose to do, France would decline to co-operate in any way south of the Straits, and that her co-operation in Europe would take the form of purchasing Kemalist adherence to a conference by conceding all essential points of the Kemalist programme in advance.'

No. 42

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference[1] *between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay, 4 p.m., Wednesday, September 20, 1922. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 23, 1922).*

[*E 9757/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Bargeton, M. Clinc[h]ant.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; SECRETARIES, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper.[2]
Italy: Count Sforza.

[1] Lord Curzon's telegraphic account (by telephone) of this meeting (not printed), was received in the Foreign Office at 8 p.m., September 20. The account is prefaced with the following. 'This afternoon I saw Sforza before the meeting and explained the situation to him adding that I should welcome his presence to hear Admiral Beatty [see No. 41, n. 1] and to take part in subsequent discussion. He attended and was helpful rather than otherwise.'

[2] Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Admiral Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset were also present for part of the meeting.

LORD CURZON, at M. Poincaré's request, opened the conversation. He referred first to a minor point raised by M. Poincaré that morning, namely, the views of M. Ninchitch appearing in the press that morning, notably the 'Matin', about the Turco-Bulgarian frontier.[3] The Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had since called at the British Embassy to explain that M. Ninchitch formally denied the version of his interview given in the press; the gist of all that he had said was that Anglo-French unity was essential.

M. POINCARÉ explained that the declaration of M. Ninchitch, to which he had referred that morning, was not that given by the 'Matin', but views which the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained to M. Poincaré himself. What he had then said was that he did not care much one way or the other about a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that he feared a *bloc* between Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

LORD CURZON said that he must now recur to a point of major importance, namely, the withdrawal of France and Italy from Chanak and Ismid.[4] The arrangement of the Allied troops in the neutral zone had been merely a matter of convenience between the Allied commanders on the spot. Thus, the English had been stationed at Chanak and the French and Italians at Gallipoli. So much was this the case that when the Greeks threatened Chatalja, or, rather, the Chatalja line, General Harington had at once sent British troops to help the French there. He, Lord Curzon, must ask whether M. Poincaré definitely repudiated responsibility for those portions of the neutral zone which lay on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and if so, whether he thought it in accordance with the spirit of the Alliance. Further, he would like to know whether, because the French held certain views about Kemal's strength and the deference which should be paid to him, they were therefore at liberty to withdraw their troops and leave all the responsibility for the defence of these zones on the Asiatic shores to the British alone. If so, public opinion would hardly regard this as a just and loyal arrangement. At the same time, Lord Curzon did not wish to reproach the French Government, but he merely wanted some explanation, and he must add that if they really repudiated their responsibilities in the manner that he had outlined, his Government, with whom he must communicate at once, would take a very serious view of the situation.

M. POINCARÉ said that, as Count Sforza was here this afternoon, he would go back a little way in order to explain the position of the French Government in the matter. It was quite natural that the local commanders should distribute their troops between the zones, but the French Government had never been consulted about the distribution and had never agreed to sending French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. He

[3] In his telegram No. 118 of September 11, Sir A. Young, H.M. Representative at Belgrade, had reported that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and Press stressed the dangers of a common frontier between Turks and Bulgarians.

[4] See No. 35.

was personally prepared to take all responsibility for the orders given for the French retirement. He would not have given such orders two months ago, but a new situation had arisen and England did not seem to understand the extent of the Turkish victory and their [*sic*] resultant state of elation. There was no soldier in the world who would stay at Chanak in the present military situation. It was not only a question of the defence of the town of Chanak but of some fifty miles of front along that territory. They would have to echelon a whole army in order to make any real defence of the Asiatic shore of the Straits. The Allies were, in fact, in face of an imminent peril and he, M. Poincaré, was not prepared to expose French soldiers to that peril. In his opinion, Mustapha Kemal could cross tomorrow if he wished to do so.

LORD CURZON felt, with all respect to M. Poincaré, that the latter could not fully understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921, with the full knowledge of the Allied Governments, neutral zones had existed on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.[5] It was purely a matter of local convenience on which side and in which place the troops of one particular ally were placed. Who, for instance, had a greater right to be in Gallipoli than the British, with their 25,000 graves on the peninsula? Now, apparently, M. Poincaré contended that the Allied responsibility for the neutral zones was a matter only for normal times, to be changed at the first breath of danger. Surely if the danger was so real and so imminent, the French Government should have sought the opinion of their local commanders by telegraph in the first instance, but the opinion of the local commanders was sufficiently reflected by the fact that they had agreed (both the French and the Italians) to the despatch of their troops and had collaborated in drawing up the sectors for the defence of both Chanak and Scutari.[6] However, as M. Poincaré had defined the position, Lord Curzon could only explain to his Government that so far as Asia was concerned, the *Entente* had ceased to exist, and that the French were leaving Great Britain to bear the brunt of the defence of the Asiatic shores of the Straits. In the course of all the Allied Conferences since the Armistice, Lord Curzon had never known a more serious statement than that recently made by M. Poincaré.

M. POINCARÉ thought that Lord Curzon had misunderstood him. What had really happened was that in a time of imminent danger France had been asked to modify the normal situation in the neutral zone to her detriment. It was due to a recent decision of the local commanders, apparently taken out of nervousness. Otherwise it appeared to M. Poincaré incomprehensible. Neither the French Prime Minister nor the French Government, nor the French Parliament, whose sovereignty was involved, was prepared to allow local French commanders to expose French troops to the danger of being shot by Turks. M. Poincaré could only beg the English to follow his example, because militarily the situation at Chanak was untenable.

LORD CURZON pointed out that M. Poincaré's statement merely affirmed all that he had said. He had no wish to impugn the sovereignty of the French

[5] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 159 and 170. [6] See No. 23, n. 2.

Parliament, but he must again record that a change in the local situation had led France to withdraw her troops from Asia regardless of the Allied responsibility for the defence of the neutral zone. Since, therefore, the Allied agreement on Asia no longer existed, it must be understood that England would be free to take a similar line of independent action in Europe—for instance, at Gallipoli. She was in a position to do so, and would do so if she desired. He, Lord Curzon, had come to Paris to re-establish the alliance, and not to upset Allied agreements, but the French withdrawal from Chanak might compel Great Britain to take isolated and independent action. The necessity would have arisen from the French procedure, and was deeply deplored by Lord Curzon himself.

M. Poincaré stated that he could not prevent His Majesty's Government from interpreting French action as they liked. All that he would add was that during the armistice there had been a certain distribution of troops, and suddenly in a moment of danger this was modified in such a way as to expose French troops to being shot.

Lord Curzon suggested that the French Government might have done what we should have done in similar circumstances, namely, consulted His Majesty's Government or the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the spot through the French General there.

M. Poincaré explained that he had to save his men in a most perilous situation, and for this purpose urgent action was necessary.

Lord Curzon pointed out that at Chatalja the situation had recently been just as critical, and His Majesty's Government might then have withdrawn the troops which they had sent and exposed the French to face the Greeks. They did not do so.

M. Poincaré enquired why Lord Curzon felt it necessary to refer to this incident again. The incident of Chanak, he thought, had already been settled by his full explanation that morning.

Lord Curzon said that, in thinking over what M. Poincaré had stated that morning, he had come to the conclusion that M. Poincaré could not have realised the gravity of his attitude, and he had therefore felt it necessary to ask for this further explanation.

M. Poincaré again emphasised that it was simply the urgency of the immediate danger which had led to the recall of the French troops. The French Parliament would never allow France to go to war with Turkey or to expose French troops to being shot by Turkish soldiers.

Count Sforza interposed to say that he shared M. Poincaré's views. Italy, like France, would not fight against Turkey or run the risk of Italian troops being attacked by Turkish troops.

Lord Curzon said that he did not wish to add anything more to what he had already said on this point. He could only adhere to his view about the French action—a view which, he felt sure, would be that of his Government also. He would now ask M. Poincaré to permit Earl Beatty to explain the British Admiralty's views on the defence of the Straits and Gallipoli.

M. POINCARÉ asked that Admiral Grasset, who appeared to hold a less optimistic view than Earl Beatty, might also be allowed to make a statement.

LORD CURZON agreed.

Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset here entered the room.

M. POINCARÉ began by asking Earl Beatty if it were possible for the naval forces now on the spot to defend the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

EARL BEATTY replied that with the forces there, and now on the way,[7] the Allies could hold all the waters from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether if the Turks approached the south coast of the Marmara and the Straits, Allied ships could pass up them and hold them whatever the strength of the Turkish artillery on the coast.

EARL BEATTY considered that with the forces and artillery which the Turks were known to possess, it was possible for ships to keep the passage of the Straits open. Light artillery and infantry would have no effect on the movement of ships of war. Any Turkish guns of sufficient calibre to threaten ships of war would have to come from a big distance. To the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles there were only two roads; one to Panderma and one through Edremid. The first ran for 18 miles along the coast, and was accessible to shell fire for a large part of the distance. The second road through Edremid also ran along the sea for a considerable distance, and was equally open to shell fire. By intelligence and air reconnaissance it ought to be perfectly possible to ascertain what guns of sufficient calibre to threaten the Allied ships were being brought up by the Turks along these roads. If and when these guns had reached the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, their effect would not be great unless they were in a position to deliver a direct fire. Even then, the British navy ought to be able to bring a direct fire in return upon them and make their position untenable.

ADMIRAL GRASSET said that in his opinion the passage of the Dardanelles would be very difficult even if there were no Turkish artillery on the Asiatic shore. He had been on the spot in 1915, and then medium artillery (15-inch) had made the situation very difficult for ships of war. If the Turks were to use the artillery which they had recently captured from the Greeks, the holding of the Dardanelles by the Allied navies would be a very dangerous proceeding, at any rate for any ships other than capital ships. In theory, Lord Beatty was quite correct in saying that it was easy to detect land batteries, but experience in the recent war had shown that in practice it was a very different matter.

LORD CURZON enquired whether Admiral Grasset had not left out of account the fact that Gallipoli was now to be held by the Allies. If the Admiral's

[7] Admiralty telegram No. 924 of September 18 had informed the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as follows: '"Revenge" has been ordered to leave Devonport tomorrow 19th September to join your flag. "Ramillies" and "Malaya" follow when stored.

'Second submarine flotilla is being ordered to Devonport in readiness to proceed if necessary.

'Cabinet decided this morning that you should be notified that the navy is responsible for preventing so far as lies in its power the passage of Mustapha Kemal's forces from Asia into Europe and you are authorised to take all steps which you deem necessary for the fulfilment of this obligation.'

experience meant that Gallipoli could not be held if the Turks had artillery on the Asiatic shore, the question of keeping the Straits open permanently became a most complicated one.

ADMIRAL GRASSET replied that we had held positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the war, and these had been freely sprinkled by shells from the Asiatic batteries, as well as by batteries from other parts of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

LORD CURZON pointed out that if this were so, the situation created by allowing the Turks to reach the Asiatic shore would be a very dangerous one, and merely by holding Gallipoli we might find it very difficult permanently to demilitarise the strip on the opposite coast.

M. POINCARÉ thought that a distinction should be made between the occupation of Gallipoli and the demilitarisation of the Asiatic shores. In future in times of peace we should necessarily have to trust to the Turks to some extent to carry out this demilitarisation under periodic Allied inspection. But in the Gallipoli Peninsula we should have an Allied force or a League force in permanent occupation. These were matters for later examination. For the moment it was necessary to record that we could not keep troops on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

EARL BEATTY continuing his statement pointed out that in 1915 the position had been quite different from to-day. The Turks then had a large number of heavy guns in well established positions on both sides of the Straits. To-day they had no guns either on the southern or northern shores of the Straits. The British Admiralty's information showed that the heaviest guns which the Turks could bring up were of 15 cm. calibre and that there were not many of them. In Gallipoli they could not plant any such guns. If, however, they succeeded in placing some on the Asiatic shore, this would of course make the passage of ships to and fro difficult, but he, Earl Beatty, saw no special difficulty in the Allies being able to place guns of equal calibre in commanding positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula and with aerial spotting (the Allies could surely assume command of the air), and with the aid of sun-ranging (non-existent in 1915) it should be perfectly possible to keep Turkish artillery fire down to reasonable proportions.

ADMIRAL GRASSET pointed out that if cannons were thus to be placed on both sides of the Straits, a zone of fire would be created such as existed on the front in France during the recent war and it would be equally dangerous for vessels to pass between these two lines of fire.

M. POINCARÉ asked Earl Beatty to extend his statement to the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus.

EARL BEATTY explained that the defence of the Marmara was simply a matter of control by the Allied navies over surface vessels. So long as the Allies had command of the sea, they could make it impossible for any Turkish vessels to cross the Marmara.

LORD CURZON enquired whether vessels now on the spot could exercise such control.

EARL BEATTY answered that it was now possible to exercise considerable

control, but not one so fully effective as that which they would be able to establish in a short time.

COUNT SFORZA enquired whether, if Earl Beatty's optimistic views were accepted as against Admiral Grasset's pessimistic opinion, and if we were really in a position to stop Turkish transports crossing, it might not still be necessary to remember that the Allies had very few troops in Europe and that the Turkish Government and soldiers in Constantinople were in fact hostile to them. On the other hand, to the south of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmara, there was a large victorious and fanatical army. How then would it be possible for the Allied navies to stop packets [*sic*] of men and officers and propagandists crossing the Bosphorus from time to time, and what would be the situation if, while we kept control of the sea, the fire broke out on both sides of the water?

EARL BEATTY admitted that the navies could only control the sea, but they could ensure that effective support could not be transferred by the Turks from one side to the other. The rest of the question appeared to him to be a military and political, and not a naval matter. It was true, however, that if Gallipoli were attacked by a European army the navy could play a very real part in controlling the entry to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the Bulair lines, a distance of about 6 miles. Naval gunfire could be brought to bear from ships both inside and outside the Straits and it would be almost impossible for any effective attack to be delivered upon the Allied forces holding Gallipoli from Thrace.

LORD CURZON interposed to say that he thought Count Sforza was referring rather to the Bosphorus end of the Straits and the question of stopping a number of small ships and boats from crossing.

EARL BEATTY replied that, provided the naval commanders received clear instructions in plenty of time, they could secure control of all vessels in the Bosphorus. The Turks might build rafts, but it ought to be possible to capture or destroy these. They would then have to swim across.

ADMIRAL GRASSET pointed out that the Bosphorus was very narrow, not more than three times the width of the Seine, and it would be very difficult to stop an infiltration of men and troops across its waters.

EARL BEATTY said that very likely such an infiltration might take place, but it might take years for any considerable body of troops to pass in that manner.

LORD CURZON drew attention to the fact that the views of both Earl Beatty and Admiral Grasset provided an overwhelming argument for holding on to the Asiatic shores of the Straits as long as possible. It was essential, therefore, not to break up Allied unity at either end of the Straits. It was for that reason that he regarded the French and Italian action in withdrawing their forces as disastrous.

M. POINCARÉ stated that in Marshal Foch's opinion it was essential to have armies and not outposts of men on the southern shores of the Straits in the present military situation. To control the whole of the Straits one must have forces echeloned along their whole length. M. Poincaré urged that the opti-

mism which preceded our failure at Gallipoli should not be again allowed to blind us. There was no military expert who would now claim that the Allies could defend the Asiatic shores against a Turkish attack, and we must not expose ourselves to attack both from the back and the front. By that he referred to the possibility of a revolution in European Turkey. A letter which he had just received from M. Steeg, of the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople, went to confirm Count Sforza's view as to this danger. The one step which the Allies must take must be to hold a conference at once.

LORD CURZON reminded M. Poincaré that his observations seemed to leave out of account the fact that both Italy and France were on very friendly terms with Kemal, while even Great Britain was not at war with him. Surely Kemal, who was a very shrewd person, was not going to shoot Frenchmen and Italians; and, if so, the whole hypothesis of M. Poincaré, that if the Allies did not run away they would be fired at, broke down. If the French and Italians would only remain firm, and if they would only send sound and resolute advice to Kemal, he would obey it and would not shoot at anyone; but, if they retired from Chanak and Scutari, they would make Kemal think that he had only to go down and shoot at the British who were stupid enough to remain. Surely the French and Italian action and advice amounted to being more Kemalist than Kemal, and it would make any successful holding of a conference impossible.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that Angora might well follow their advice officially, but would let Turkish irregulars do her work for her, or perhaps be unable to stop them from doing it. This had happened to the French in Cilicia. It was partly a danger from Turkish irregulars just as much as from Turkish regulars which had led the French troops to be withdrawn from Chanak. Further—and this had been his principal point—the despatch of these French troops to Asia would have been an innovation and in a sense a provocation to the Turks, and it might have started a war between France and Turkey. He would again repeat that it was essential to have a conference, and that if we merely took a negative attitude towards the Turks about the Straits and were to say nothing positive as to concessions to Turkey in the future, they would not come to the conference.

EARL BEATTY then completed his statement as regards the Bosphorus by pointing out that the two coast roads down the Ismid Peninsula to the shores of the Straits could be brought under effective gunfire by ships either from the Black Sea or from the Marmara side, and even the road down the centre of the peninsula, which had been recently built by the British forces, could be similarly controlled. The defence of Constantinople was primarily a military and not a naval question.

The meeting then adjourned for tea.

LORD CURZON said he thought that the position was now clear. On some points, such as the possibility of defending the Straits and the means for defending it, there was unfortunately disagreement. It was, however, agreed that there should be a conference as soon as possible to make a final treaty of peace with Turkey. There was already an existing draft treaty, that signed

at Sèvres in August 1920[8] and drawn up in London and at San Remo earlier in that year. Parts of that treaty had a permanent value, and would be incorporated in the new one. Most of it, however, would have to be changed, and some of it would have to disappear completely. Until the recent Kemalist advance, there had been an idea of holding a preliminary conference at Venice to arrange an armistice, to provide for the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks, and thirdly, to explain the Paris proposals of last March. All these proposals had now disappeared. There was a *de facto* armistice between the Greeks and the Turks. The Greeks had left Asia Minor, and the proposals of the March conference were now in some respects inapplicable. It was now a question whether there was any need for a preliminary conference at all. The Italian Government had very courteously suggested that such a conference might be called at once to Venice.[9] He, Lord Curzon, entirely concurred in the urgency of calling a conference, but he did not agree as to the necessity of that conference being a preliminary one. On this point, however, he would like to have M. Poincaré's and Count Sforza's views. For the rest, much would turn on the place and something on the composition of the conference, whether the latter were a preliminary one or a full peace conference. The natural place for a peace conference was at some European capital. As it was Great Britain who had chiefly brought about the defeat of the Turks, London might have been the most suitable choice; but, for various reasons, he did not wish to press for London. In any case, it would be personally very difficult for him as Minister for Foreign Affairs to be absent for any length of time from London while Parliament was still sitting, or at any place not easily accessible from England. This point was not, however, an essential one. Then there arose the question of Kemal's attitude towards the place of the conference and the conditions under which it were held. It was certainly desirable to secure the presence of Kemal himself, but he was apparently unwilling to leave Asia Minor, and was prepared to send Fethi Bey in his place. It was, perhaps, more important to decide what Powers were to be represented at the conference. Hitherto, the Great Powers had drawn up all treaties of peace, giving the smaller Powers a hearing, and inviting many of them to sign. In his opinion, it was not desirable to have a conference at which all the signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres would be present. It would be a 'Duma' rather than a conference. At the same time, no conference ought to be held without the presence of States directly interested, such as Roumania and Serbia. For the former, the Straits was a vital matter, while to the Allies it was rather a question of great international policy. Serbia had an interest in the Straits, and she also had a strong interest in the question of a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier. M. Poincaré claimed that the Serbs were perfectly prepared to accept the Maritza as the frontier of Turkey. Be that as it may, they were closely interested in the question of the Straits and of Thrace, and they ought to be given a seat. Bulgaria was on a different footing, but she might claim a hearing, and possibly other States

[8] For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 652–776.

[9] See Vol. XVII, No. 737.

ought also to be heard. Lord Curzon suggested therefore a conference of the principal Allied Powers, together with Roumania, Serbia, Greece and Turkey. It was essential to announce that such a conference must be held, and to invite the participants—even if it took a little time actually to bring them to the place of meeting. For the moment we were ignorant of Kemal's attitude; in some quarters he was said to require the Allied acceptance of his desiderata in Thrace as a condition for his entry into a conference. In any case, Lord Curzon was apprehensive of two conferences—a preliminary and a final one—since, if the former were a failure, the whole prospect of peace might break down. It would be more difficult for a full peace conference to collapse.

COUNT SFORZA agreed that a definitive conference was better than a preliminary one. The latter only increased the difficulties and risks. As regards the place of the conference, he spoke from his experience as Foreign Minister of Italy, and did not agree with Lord Curzon as to the objections to absenting oneself when one's Parliament was sitting. He thought, however, that there were advantages from other points of view in having a conference at some town which was not a capital, such as Venice. He also believed it to be in the interest of a successful conference that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers should only come from time to time, while a Minister Plenipotentiary with full powers, who could telegraph home at intervals for instructions, was in a better position to conduct the permanent business of the conference. He agreed as to the presence of Serbia and Roumania, although M. Ninchitch had informed him of his readiness to accept every decision reached in agreement by France, Great Britain and Italy. The first essential step towards holding the conference, was, however, in his opinion, to reach a preliminary Allied decision as to how far the Principal Allied Powers were prepared to go in meeting the Turks.

M. POINCARÉ entirely concurred as to the necessity of holding an immediate full peace conference and not a preliminary conference. As to the place, he would accept Venice, but feared that the Kemalists might not agree to come to any European town. If so, it was desirable not to sacrifice the conference to the town, but rather the town to the conference. He preferred, as far as possible, that the conference should be one of a technical character, conducted by diplomatists, as in this treaty particularly there were so many technical points to be decided by experts. As to the representation of the Powers, he agreed that Roumania and Serbia should come and that Bulgaria should be allowed to state her opinion about Dedeagatch; but his information went to show that Serbia would not in any case accept any increase of Bulgarian territory. On a point of detail he would like to suggest that no mention should be made of the Treaty of Sèvres. Legally it did not exist, as it had not been ratified, and the mention of its name would infuriate the Turks. That did not mean, however, that it would not be necessary to take many articles of permanent value from the Treaty of Sèvres and insert them without modification in the new treaty.

LORD CURZON expressed his agreement on the latter point. As regards the

conference as a whole, he was happy to find everyone in accord. There remained, however, the very important question as to the Great Powers reaching a measure of agreement on certain points in advance of the conference. He thought that he might be able to telegraph to his Government at once and obtain authority to continue the discussion on these points. They appeared to him to comprise the questions of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the status of the Straits, the demilitarised zones and the frontier of Thrace. It would perhaps be possible to have his Government's authority to continue these discussions on Friday afternoon,[10] which he understood was the earliest possible date for M. Poincaré. In the meanwhile, he would urge the French Government to use their well-known influence to stop Kemal from precipitate action. This was essential in order to give time for a discussion of the conditions under which the conference was to be held, and at which it was desired to meet the Turkish views as far as possible, taking into account the changed situation. If any appearance of Allied disunity were shown, Kemal might act and compel Great Britain in return to act alone as the Allies would not follow her. Therefore once again he, Lord Curzon, would urge M. Poincaré to use every channel of influence with the Turks, who appeared to be so docile to the French and so hostile to the British. For instance, it might be possible to make use of Franklin-Bouillon[11] or Ferid Bey.

M. Poincaré pointed out that General Pellé was at Smyrna, and had instructions not only to examine into the damage done by fire,[12] but also to talk to Mustapha.[13] M. Franklin-Bouillon could not go to Smyrna at present, but it might be possible to induce him to undertake another mission. He was very well fitted for it and very Anglophile. As regards Ferid Bey, M. Poincaré was uncertain how he transmitted advice given him into [*sic*] his telegrams to Angora; but on this point he knew England would be better informed. The war had shown that her administrative services were much better at decyphering telegrams than the French. As to the question of terms, he thought that the Turks would be willing to accept certain provisions for the freedom of the Straits, provided they were placed under the trust of the League of Nations. They would probably also accept an Allied garrison upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. It seemed advisable to warn the Greeks as well as the Turks off the neutral zones, and he personally was in favour of Greek retirement behind the Maritza.

Lord Curzon replied that even if the Greeks could be persuaded to withdraw beyond the Maritza, after the conference, if that were the decision of the conference, it would be difficult if not impossible to induce them to do so before the conference had met.

M. Poincaré added that he thought it essential that the Turks should be informed that Thrace was to be given back to them. On this point England should use the influence which she possessed with the Greeks.

Count Sforza suggested to Lord Curzon that Sir H. Rumbold should be asked to telegraph at once whether in his opinion there was not a danger of

[10] September 22.
[11] See Vol. XVII, No. 398.
[12] See No. 28, n. 2.
[13] See No. 35, n. 9.

anarchy in Thrace. His information pointed to growing chaos there with continued thefts and murders. He was sure Sir Horace Rumbold would confirm this, and he proposed that for the time being Thrace might be placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan and be occupied by Allied instead of Greek troops.

M. POINCARÉ thought that the question of the Sultan's authority was a question for the Peace Conference.

LORD CURZON suggested that it might be possible to induce the Greeks to withdraw beyond the Ganos–Istranja line. If they were withdrawn beyond the Maritza, the question of the sovereignty of Thrace would inevitably be prejudged. In any case, Lord Curzon preferred to have the views of his Government on the question of Thrace. It was really a matter for their further discussion on Friday. Meanwhile he would again urge M. Poincaré to use his influence to calm Kemal.

M. POINCARÉ promised to do his best, but said he was not sure how far his influence went.[14]

A discussion followed as to the communication to be made to the press, and in particular as to the enumeration of the Powers to be invited to the forthcoming conference.

LORD CURZON proposed that it was necessary to include Japan.

M. POINCARÉ expressed astonishment.

LORD CURZON reminded the conference that Japan had participated in the preparation of the Treaty of Sèvres, as a Great Power on the Supreme Council, that it was to be represented with two votes on the Straits Commission and had a High Commissioner at Constantinople.

It was agreed to include Japan.

The following statement to the press was then decided upon:

> 'Lord Curzon, Count Sforza and M. Poincaré have agreed upon the expediency of bringing together a conference at which will be represented England, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Jugoslavia, Roumania and Turkey, and at which will be arranged the conditions of future peace. The conversations will be resumed on Friday afternoon at 2 o'clock.
>
> 'At to-day's conference Admiral Beatty gave a report upon the situation in the Straits and the Bosphorus, and Admiral Grasset added some supplementary observations.'

[14] In his telegraphic account (see n. 1) Lord Curzon commented: 'In my own mind I entertain little doubt that he will now stop Kemal from any precipitate or foolhardy advance and that our strong policy will thus have been justified. I can hardly exaggerate difference between his attitude at beginning and end of sitting and begin to think we may emerge from this very difficult position with success. For the moment I would urge that while maintaining our position we desist from any action likely to provoke immediate hostilities.' At 10.20 p.m. on September 20, Sir Eyre Crowe transmitted to Lord Hardinge the following unnumbered telegram: 'From Prime Minister on behalf of Cabinet to Lord Curzon: We are very gratified with firm language you held to Monsieur Poincaré and with your presentation of case of the British government.'

No. 43

Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 312 Telegraphic [E 9952/27/44]

Urgent. Most secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 21, 1922, 2.5 a.m.*

Following telegram has been sent to-night[1] to Sir C. Harington by War Office, begins:—

A summary of the political situation disclosed by to-day's discussions in Paris is being telegraphed to Rumbold separately.[2] This will show you the importance of avoiding anything likely unnecessarily to precipitate hostilities. A revised programme of troop movements showing the earliest possible date of arrival of the reinforcements we are expediting by every conceivable means is also being telegraphed. You should have both these telegrams before you when considering what follows in this message. We think it right to set out for your guidance and subject to your better judgment the relative importance which we attach to the various positions committed to your charge. The foundation of all our policy is the Gallipoli Peninsula and the freedom of the Straits. For this it is of the highest importance that Chanak should be held effectively. Quite apart from its military importance it has now become a point of immense moral significance to the prestige of the Empire. We should regard it as an invaluable achievement if it could be retained. A blow at Chanak is a blow at Britain alone, whereas Ismid and Constantinople are matters of international consequence affecting all the allies. Compared to Chanak we think Constantinople comes second and Ismid third. Probably the Kemalists will not attack the Ismid position. If they do and reach the Bosphorus Admiralty have declared they can still prevent the passage of the Turkish army into Europe.[3] If they bombard Pera Navy can retaliate on some convenient area or take other reprisals. We regard the Ismid position as at once the most difficult to hold and the least fatal if lost. Thus it might well be that at the proper moment you would withdraw your troops from Ismid and even Constantinople to Chanak, and thus secure the position there on an adequate front and in good time. We have entire confidence in your judgment as to whether such a concentration at Chanak is necessary and when it should be made. Should you decide on a consideration of the above and of all the circumstances that there is a good chance of holding Chanak for two or three weeks whatever happens we shall cordially

[1] September 20.

[2] Lord Curzon's telegraphic accounts (by telephone) of his conversations with M. Poincaré (see No. 41, n. 1 and No. 42, n. 1) were repeated to Constantinople as Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 403 and 404 of September 20.

[3] In his telegram No. 381 of September 21 to the Admiralty, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, stated: '. . . it is not considered that this can be done. Navy cannot remain in narrow waters commanded by guns, with which Kemalists are well supplied, and which cannot be controlled by counter-battery fire. Heavy ships cannot operate freely in Bosphorus owing to restricted water and strength of current, and light craft are vulnerable to medium artillery fire.' Cf. No. 42.

approve such a decision. We are deferring decision about two divisions[4] till next phase of situation develops. In this case you are authorised to make through the High Commissioner any notification to Kemal that may be necessary for the purpose of securing Chanak. For instance, you may warn him against penetrating the neutral zone in this region, and should he do so that he will be fired upon if he uses the roads along the sea-coast to approach the position held by your troops. We leave the form and scope of such warning to you. All the above should be taken by you as a guide rather than as a rule for we have the utmost confidence in your comprehension of the whole situation.

Show copy of this to Naval Commander-in-Chief.

[4] War Office telegram No. 91068 of September 16 to General Harington had stated: 'It is intention of Cabinet, if the French agree at the conference mentioned in S[ecretary] of S[tate]'s telegram of today [No. 32], to back their decision to resist Kemal by mobilising one and possibly two Divisions in addition to troops now being ordered to join you from Malta and Gibraltar.'

No. 44

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. London (Geneva)
No. 45 Telegraphic [E 9643/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 21, 1922, 5 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister on behalf of Cabinet to Lord Balfour:—

Your No. 37.[1]

Lord Curzon's telegram[2] approving Resolution of Commission[3] was sent in consultation with and with the approval of the Cabinet.

We should cordially welcome help of League of Nations in securing peaceful settlement and we hope, therefore, that you can support resolution which is to be moved.

[1] Of September 19. This ran: 'Nansen [Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, League of Nations High Commissioner for Russian refugees] in a letter read to Assembly yesterday suggested:

1. That organisation of assistant commissioner for Russian refugees at Constantinople should be utilised to administer relief to refugees from Asia Minor;

2. That in accordance with article 11 of the Covenant, Council of League should consider feasibility of offering good offices to belligerents with a view to immediate cessation of hostilities.'

[2] Unnumbered Paris telegram of September 20, not printed.

[3] See No. 37.

No. 45

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. London (Geneva)
No. 48 Telegraphic [E 9616/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 21, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 42 (September 20th: Turkish minorities).[1]

British, American and French governments undertook to contribute to proposed atrocities enquiry.[2] Italian government has failed to reply.[3] Greek government agreed to admit mission.[4] No reply has been received from Angora.

Since Greek evacuation, although we have not formally abandoned the project, we have ceased to press it. Red Cross delegate, however, stated to Sir H. Rumbold August 28th[5] that if he had not obtained Turkish sanction by September 5th Red Cross would consider this as a refusal. Moreover lateness of season makes it practically impossible to carry out enquiry in Anatolia this year.

If occasion arises you should express surprise at the cynicism of the Turkish request in view of their tacit refusal to admit a commission of enquiry and the admission that this implies of the policy of the Angora government towards minorities, most recently exemplified at Smyrna where it is now reported that deportation is succeeding to massacre.

[1] This, from Lord Balfour, ran as follows: 'Persian delegate announced to assembly that, as only Mahommedan member, he had been asked by delegates of National Assembly of Turkey in Rome to intervene with League for the purpose of organising impartial enquiry into atrocities committed during present war. He proposed resolution inviting council to send at once neutral committee of enquiry to throw light on occurrences, and avoid reprisals against ethnical minorities in Thrace and Asia Minor.'

[2] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 628, 633, 649, 673, and 735.

[3] In Rome telegram No. 288 of September 24, Sir R. Graham reported that the Italian Government had agreed to contribute 25,000 gold francs.

[4] This was reported by Mr. Bentinck in his telegram No. 371 of September 4, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[5] Sir H. Rumbold reported this conversation in his telegram No. 363 of August 28, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 46

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received September 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 449 Telegraphic [E 9767/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 22, 1922, 8.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 400.[1]

General Harington repeated to Hamid Bey yesterday for the information of Kemal his determination to defend neutral line. We consider no further communication with Angora necessary.

[1] Of September 19. Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

General Harington also made it quite clear to Hamid Bey that our preparations were solely for peace not war.

No. 47

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Sir E. Crowe (Received September 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 474 Telegraphic [E 9763/27/44]

Very urgent PARIS, *September 22, 1922, 10.25 p.m.*

Following for Sir W. Tyrrell from Lord Curzon.

Please communicate to Cabinet following telegram from Sir H. Rumbold.

'General Harington appears very anxious about situation at Constantinople. It should be realised that we are living on a sort of volcano. Many undesirable elements have drifted to the town and it is known that some 20,000 Turks and probably an equal number of Greeks are armed. The force at his disposal consists of three battalions two of which are very weak indeed. If French and Italians do not assist in maintaining order in the town in the event of a rising he feels that his force would be inadequate to defend approaches to Scutari and put down rising. This might entail abandonment of Constantinople at short notice. I personally believe that French who have fairly strong force here would be obliged in self defence to help to maintain order but I think it urgent that we should obtain an immediate and categorical statement from French and Italian governments as to their intentions in this matter.[1] I note from your telegram No. 404[2] that Lord Beatty is confident that navy can prevent capture of Constantinople from Asiatic side of Bosphorus, but Admiral Brock informs me he does not concur that navy can do this unless approaches to Constantinople are held by navy. He has so reported to Admiralty.[3] If we had to leave Constantinople owing to defection of our Allies Mustapha Kemal would be in a position to move troops across to Europe.

Wives and children of British officers and men are embarking tomorrow and arrangements have been made to embark British colony at very short notice.'

[1] Foreign Office telegram No. 322 to Paris, of September 23, transmitted the request of the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for War that Lord Curzon should obtain this statement from the French and Italian Governments.

[2] Of September 20, not printed (see No. 43, n. 2).

[3] See No. 43, n. 3.

No. 48

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay, Friday, September 22, 2 p.m. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 25.)

[*E 9843/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Clinchant, M. Bargeton.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; SECRETARIES, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper.
Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARY, Signor Galli.

M. POINCARÉ opened the proceedings by enquiring whether Lord Curzon had received any information from British sources or from his Government regarding the situation.

LORD CURZON said that he understood that their endeavour that afternoon would be to lay down the bases of agreement on certain important points upon which the future peace conference would proceed.[1] The difficulty was undoubtedly great, but it was essential that the three Great Powers, while reaching a general agreement upon these bases, should not lay down publicly on this subject any too precise conditions without consulting the smaller Powers, who might well object to them. It would not only be disrespectful to them, but it would also amount to trying to do the work of the peace conference in advance. To-day, he suggested that the main points of importance should be discussed one by one, and that they should exchange their views upon them and see how far agreement was possible. By this procedure Lord Curzon did not despair of finding some common ground upon which the three Allies could stand. He proposed that they should begin by taking the Bosphorus and Constantinople, then proceed to the question of Thrace, Adrianople, the Straits and Gallipoli. Here he would like again to repeat, as he had done in so many conferences, that it was not in the power of

[1] On September 21, in a telephone message to the Cabinet transmitted by Lord Hardinge, Lord Curzon had stated: 'Meeting for tomorrow is fixed for 2 p.m. owing to Poincaré's engagement in the morning. Its object will be to arrive at a preliminary understanding as to the conditions in which the allies will enter conference and which French will doubtless at once communicate to Kemalists with whom they are in the closest contact. It will be a difficult task, the Kemalists backed by France and Italy press[ing] for full acceptance of national pact as condition of entering conference, and may raise other objections such as choice of place of meeting, admission of Russia, retirement of Greeks from Thrace. Against these pretentions my best arguments are

(1) absurdity of convoking conference in which Roumania and Serbia are to take part and then decide main issues in advance and in their absence.

(2) consciousness of France of moral weakness of her own position and deserting the allies from admitted motives of fear.

(3) her genuine apprehension which was quite apparent yesterday that we not only mean but are able to act alone.'

the Allied Governments to reach a pacific solution unless they were firmly resolved to stand together. For each ally to proceed upon a different policy and to put forward a different solution would be fatal to any chance of success.

Great Britain, for her part, wanted peace as ardently as any other Power, and it distressed him to read, as he had done recently in the press, that one ally stood for peace, but another for war. The last thingt hat Great Britain wanted was another war. At the same time, public opinion was not prepared to throw away lightly the fruits of the Allied victory in 1918. The British people did not want, merely because the Greeks had lost the war, to lose all the gains in that hard-fought struggle. Subject to this reservation, Lord Curzon was ready to open a discussion upon the points which he had already mentioned.

Lord Curzon concluded by stating that he had no fresh information of interest to give to the conference. His own telegrams from his High Commissioner[2] at Constantinople merely passed on the information from General Pellé which M. Poincaré had already outlined to the conference.[3] He himself did not now know where Kemal was, but he trusted that M. Poincaré would have news to give them on this point and others.

M. Poincaré said that he did not quite understand the position as explained by Lord Curzon. All that he wished to do that day was to find a means which would make it possible for the Turks to come to the peace conference. He did not wish to arrange terms of peace without their presence. His aim was to be in a position to state that France, England and Italy were sufficiently in agreement on certain important points to enable Mustapha Kemal or his representatives to come with confidence to a conference.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read two telegrams giving an account of conversations between General Pellé[4] and Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna. General Pellé had found Kemal in a state of some exaltation. He had stated that his troops were ready and eager to advance; but, in General Pellé's opinion, Kemal was prepared to exert some sort of pressure upon them. General Pellé's personal opinion was that, even in the event of the Allied fleets and soldiers being able to prevent the Turks from crossing to Europe, the result would be war, preceded probably by revolution in Constantinople and Thrace. The mere presence of Turkish troops on the southern shores of the waters between the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, together with artillery, torpedoes, &c., would make it extraordinarily difficult for the Allied navies to maintain their position. In his opinion, the only means of avoiding a conflict was to propose at once the opening at Mudania of some sort of conference, provided Great Britain would agree to it and send representatives. It would then be possible perhaps to arrange with Kemal to stop his troops. In General Pellé's opinion, it was quite certain that Kemal would only stop them, however, if he were at once promised that he would receive Thrace up to the Maritza at the future conference. General Pellé concluded his

[2] For instance, Constantinople telegram No. 445 of September 22, not printed.
[3] See No. 41.
[4] See No. 35, n. 9.

telegrams by asking for urgent instructions as to the movements of the French fleet and army in the Near East.

M. Poincaré suggested that in these circumstances, and as the possibility of a Kemalist attack seemed now imminent, it was essential for them at once to decide to give Kemal those territorial assurances which would alone satisfy him. Even if England and Italy would allow France to give him some such assurance at once on their behalf, war might be stopped, and the dangers of a revolution in Constantinople and Thrace be avoided. If England and Italy refused to join in or send any such communication to Kemal, France would have publicly to explain her position, and repudiate all responsiblity for the failure of the Allies to stop the war.

As an instance of the feeling in France and her colonies on this point, M. Poincaré referred to a recent communication from the Sultan of Morocco, who was in Paris, and who had told him that it was absolutely essential that France should not go to war with the Turks.

M. Poincaré concluded by urging again that if only the Allies could say at once to Kemal that, subject to future agreement regarding the freedom of the Straits, the Allies were prepared to accept at once his desire to obtain the Maritza frontier, Kemal would not advance, and the one means of stopping the war would have been found.

Count Sforza then gave some confidential information which he had received that morning from Constantinople. Since he regarded as vital to the interests of the Alliance and of Europe the most intimate co-operation between the Allied military and naval forces at Constantinople, he asked that the information which he was now going to give might be kept strictly confidential, and not regarded as gossip to be passed on to people outside the conference chamber. His telegram showed that General Mombelli[5] had had a conversation either with General Harington or with one of the British generals on the spot. Mombelli had told this general that if a Turkish attack were to develop, he would do his best under General Harington's orders to meet it and to help the British, but in his opinion the military situation was hopeless. The other had replied that it was undoubtedly grave, but that the British were in a position to count on the arrival of French and Italian divisions. Even if these did not come, there were other ways of meeting the danger, and he had then suggested that it might be possible to arm the Christian population of Constantinople and the surrounding country. Count Sforza drew the earnest attention of the conference to the gravity of this advice and the incalculable disasters that might result when war began.

M. Poincaré said that he had had a report in something like the same sense from his own military authorities on the spot. At any rate, the latter were quite as pessimistic as General Mombelli.

Lord Curzon thanked Count Sforza and M. Poincaré for the information they had just given to the conference, to which he attached much importance. He would like to point out, however, that it was quite natural that Kemal

[5] Major General Ernesto Mombelli, Commander of the Italian army of occupation in Constantinople.

should state the position in the glowing colours in which he saw it. It was natural that he should try to show to the Allies that their measures of defence would be useless. It was natural that he should say that he could advance across the neutral zones and the Sea of Marmara. He was simply endeavouring to make a certain impression upon his hearers. Lord Curzon's own information was not quite identical with that of his colleagues. It was true that General Harington was bitterly disappointed that the Allied co-operation on which he had counted had failed. So far, at any rate, as the Asiatic shores of Asia Minor were concerned, General Harington realised thoroughly the danger to himself and his troops, but with the forces at his disposal and the presence of the British fleet he believed that he could render a better account than either his French or Italian colleague appeared to think possible. His attitude was one of resolution and determination. If he were compelled to fight the Turks and withdraw from the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles or of Ismid, the fault would not be wholly that of Great Britain. Public opinion would remember that in the circumstances Great Britain had been abandoned by her Allies, and public opinion would appreciate the very heavy blow thus dealt at the Alliance by those who had chosen to desert us.

Lord Curzon understood from their previous discussions[6] that they were all agreed that the essential need was to have a conference at once. He himself had entirely concurred with this point of view, and had asked that it should be held as soon as possible and in any place that suited his colleagues. Everything went to show that Mustapha Kemal took the same view as to an immediate meeting, but the suggestion which Kemal had made and which M. Poincaré and General Pellé had appeared to support, that this meeting should be held at Mudania, seemed entirely unreasonable. He asked his colleagues to think what this would mean. Were British, French, Italian, Serbian, Roumanian, and Greek delegates to embark upon a ship and go to meet their conqueror at one of his own ports? For his part he must absolutely decline thus to tear up the Venice proposal and proceed to Mudania dragged by Mustapha Kemal like a Roman conqueror in his train. Once at Mudania, the Allies were apparently to be invited by Kemal to give him certain provinces in advance of any conference, for instance, Thrace up to the Maritza. Did M. Poincaré suppose that he, Lord Curzon, had received authority from his Government to agree to such proposals? M. Poincaré seemed to expect that the principal work of the future peace conference was to be done in advance of the conference itself, with a view solely to induce Kemal to come to Mudania and discuss with the Allies whether he would stop his attacks.

Lord Curzon said that he would now like to explain and analyse a little further exactly what it meant to allow Kemal to return to the Maritza at once. It seemed to him essential that when both parties were entering upon negotiations, they should know exactly what they meant as to the point upon which negotiations were to take place. Mustapha Kemal apparently expected nearly all the Turkish territory up to the pre-war Turco-Bulgarian frontier

[6] See No. 42.

to be returned to him at once, that is to say, territory bordered on the west by the Maritza, on the north by the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and on the west, south-west and south by the Ægean Sea, and the Straits, and the Sea of Marmara respectively. It was quite possible that he might agree as to conditions regarding the keeping open of the waters of the Straits. Meanwhile, the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the above area was to be complete. Lord Curzon asked his colleagues to consider what this would mean when they reached the peace conference at Venice or elsewhere. Were Jugoslavia and Roumania to be faced with this agreement in advance of the conference and without their consultation? Surely not. If Kemal were now to march to the Bulgarian frontier, there would be a disastrous war in the Balkans following in his train. Lord Curzon trusted that his colleagues would realise these dangers and regard the proposal as unacceptable. It would not be statesmanship, but suicide. He (Lord Curzon) quite understood M. Poincaré's wish that, as far as possible, the Allies should be accommodating about the future terms in this part of the world. He had asked himself what could be done in this direction. He would recall that, before the Paris Conference in March, various frontiers in Eastern Thrace had been proposed.[7] The British Government had put forward a proposal to push back the Sèvres frontier in Thrace to the Midia–Rodosto line. The French Government had proposed a frontier running down the Tunja River and the eastern bank of the Maritza as far as Kuleli-Burgas, and then across the Sea of Marmara, leaving Rodosto and Gallipoli to the Greeks. In the conference itself the French Government had changed their proposal to that of a buffer State lying to the north of the Enos–Midia line, which was to be the northern frontier of Turkey in Europe.[8] Finally, the military advisers had reached a compromise upon another line, and this had been accepted by the conference.[9] But this line was still open to reconsideration and the whole question would have to be again carefully examined. It was a large area. There were big towns in it such as Adrianople, Kirk-Kilisse, Baba Eske, Rodosto and Gallipoli. Again, as to the population, it was unnecessary now to argue again the old question of statistics which had been fully explored at the March conference.[10]

For a long period of years the population had fluctuated with the wars and the successive deportations from which the country had suffered. It was well, however, to remember that the Greeks had been there nearly since the armistice and that probably as a result of their own measures, and certainly as a result of Moslem emigration, there was an actual majority of Greeks in the country now. Even if there was not a majority, there was a very considerable minority. In addition to the native population there was the Greek army. Lord Curzon had no exact information as to its numbers, but in addition to the forces there before the recent *débâcle* in Asia Minor, they had transferred to Europe via Mudania and Panderma several divisions which

[7] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 496, 509, 513, 516, and 519.
[8] See ibid., No. 564.
[9] See ibid., Nos. 565 and 566.
[10] See ibid., No. 564.

had fought a good fight against the Turks in the neighbourhood of Eskishehr. He thought that there would perhaps be some 50,000[11] Greek bayonets in Thrace in addition to a native population of several hundred thousand.

He (Lord Curzon) would ask the conference how the Greeks were to be turned out of Eastern Thrace. Were they to allow Kemal to come there now and evict them forcibly? There would be another horrible war in Thrace followed by the well-known Turkish methods of dealing with minorities. Europe had looked on with sickening disgust at the stories of deportation in the Pontus region and elsewhere. They would not stand it again as a result of an act of the Allies in Eastern Thrace. It was true that the Greek troops had behaved badly in their retirement and had committed atrocities and depredations, but they were under a provocation to which Kemal was not subjected and their misdeeds differed from the Turkish in degree. Take, for instance, the happenings which had followed the Turkish entry into Smyrna. Kemal was apparently refusing to allow any refugees between the ages of 15 and 45 to leave the town and any refugees at all to leave after a certain date.[12] Already the deportations appeared to have begun. Similar proceedings would follow his entry into Thrace, and it was impossible in these circumstances for the Allies to give him a promise at once that he should have possession. If this was definitely M. Poincaré's policy, Lord Curzon would have to ask for an immediate adjournment in order that the views of the Serbians and Roumanians might be taken by the conference.

Lord Curzon proceeded to suggest that it would be well to examine a little more carefully what was the real aim of the conference as regards the future of Eastern Thrace. We wished to provide for a suitable and stable Government there. For this purpose it was necessary that all should co-operate and see whether it would not be possible to find perhaps some provisional and temporary arrangement to cover the few years ahead, and to give time for the present disturbances to subside. Some form of an autonomous buffer State under the League of Nations might meet this purpose. There was no novelty in the idea. In fact M. Poincaré had suggested it himself during the March conference, but the buffer State which he had proposed was to have been of a very restricted size, as it was only the territory lying east of the Maritza and north of the Enos–Midia line. On that occasion Lord Curzon had enquired whether the League of Nations would really undertake such a responsibility; whether it was possible to provide for the defence of such a State, or to finance it; and whether it would not be a prey to the neighbouring countries.[13] The situation was now, however, rather different; and there

[11] *Note on the original:* 'N.B.—After this statement, Lord Curzon received and gave to the conference the correct figures of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace as 32,000 rifles and 104 guns.'

[12] A telegram from the Rear Admiral Commanding Third Light Cruiser Squadron (transmitted to the Admiralty in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean's telegram No. 376, which was received in the Foreign Office on September 21) reported: 'Noureddin [General Nurreddin Pasha, Governor-General of Smyrna] stated that any refugees remaining after the 30th September would be massacred.'

[13] See Vol. XVII, No. 565.

seemed to him (Lord Curzon) more practicability in the idea if a larger block of territory were taken, such as the whole of Eastern Thrace up to, say, the Rodosto–Midia line and east of the Maritza. At any rate, the idea was worth further examination. Turkish sovereignty might be maintained, for instance, in principle by the display of a flag or some other emblem. The analogy of the Saar Commission[14] under the League of Nations formed a needed precedent. A governing commission might be formed, on which Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria could be represented—perhaps Roumania and Serbia. Such a régime, under the commission, could supervise the possible evacuation of Thrace, look after the minorities and act as the defence for Constantinople by forming a buffer between it, Bulgaria and Greece. At any rate, he would ask his colleagues to consider the proposal further. It must be remembered that the Allies could not turn Greece out of Eastern Thrace without offering her any compensation in return, or any proper protection for the Greeks in Thrace. Lord Curzon ardently desired a pacific solution and peace, and he thought that it was worth while to go a long way in exploring such a solution as he had proposed with this end in view. He would point out that he was ready to concede a great part of the March proposals in order to meet the views of his colleagues; and, in return, he would ask them to do the same with regard to the British attitude in the matter of Thrace. Always subject to the views of the Balkan States concerned, he was ready to say now that he was prepared to look favourably on such a proposal as that which he had just outlined. Did M. Poincaré realise that the proposal which he understood him to have made, that we should telegraph at once to Kemal and say that he might march forward immediately to the Maritza, meant war forthwith? Lord Curzon concluded by pointing out how far he had already gone to meet his Allies, and urging them to endeavour in return to accept his proposal.

M. Poincaré was afraid that he had not made himself properly understood. When he had previously given information as the result of General Pellé's visits to Smyrna, he had not been putting forward simply the views of Mustapha Kemal. He (M. Poincaré) quite admitted, and so did General Pellé, that there might be a good deal of bluff in Kemal's attitude; but he was quoting the evidence of General Pellé himself, who was a soldier of considerable experience and merit, and had played a great part in the recent war. General Pellé, as the result of these conversations, had summed up the situation as very grave.

At this point M. Poincaré read a telegram from General Charpy to the Minister for War, of which he had sent a copy to the British Embassy the previous day.[15] The gist of this telegram was that the Allied generals had had a meeting with General Harington on the 18th September.[16] The latter,

[14] See Part III, Section IV, Chapter 2 of the Treaty of Versailles.

[15] A copy of this telegram of September 19, and of M. Poincaré's note of September 21, was transmitted to the Foreign Office by Lord Hardinge in his despatch No. 2222 of September 23, not printed.

[16] General Harington, in his telegram No. 2325 of September 18, had reported this

preoccupied by the possibility of the violation of the neutral zones, had emphasised to his colleagues the necessity of 'holding themselves in readiness, in conformity with the decision of the Powers, to bar the road to the Turkish Nationalists with all their forces, if the need arose'. General Harington had asked, therefore, for French and Italian reinforcements in both sectors on the Asiatic shore, and that the works of defence should be pushed forward. The Italian and French generals had reminded General Harington in reply of the decision taken at the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Generals on the 10th September,[17] namely, to send small Allied detachments to the neutral zones, simply by way of demonstrating the *Entente*, and the co-operation for the principle of respecting the neutral zones; and secondly, they wished to ask instructions from their Governments, since it was impossible to defend, with any chance of success, with the military means at their disposal, the said zones.

meeting to the War Office as follows: 'I to-day held conference with allied Generals to discuss situation and get action taken. Situation is regarded by both my colleagues as very serious [and] I share that opinion myself but I was buoyed up with hope of real allied unity at last and reinforcements with which to save the situation. Following are now four points of danger (a) attack on Chanak, (b) attack on Yarimje front, (c) upheaval in Thrace, (d) upheaval and fire in Constantinople. I see no reason so long as we stand together why we should not succeed in withstanding all and holding on till arrival of allied reinforcements. However, both Sir Horace Rumbold and I have had serious shock with our respective colleagues (? to-day). It is apparent to both of us that they are not disposed to play. My colleagues have both refused until they receive instructions from their Governments to send any more men at my request to support their allied flags at Chanak and Ismid Peninsula.

Part 2.

'Pellé has gone to see Mustapha Kemal [cf. No. 35, n. 9] and until his return tomorrow night or Wednesday all action is delayed. Meanwhile I want French to send troops to wire their sector of Maltepe line from Dodolu-Chiboukli as, unless they do, British sector, which is wired, is endangered. In this situation time is absolutely it [*sic*] and it is imperative for me to know whether it is intention or not of French and Italians to fight. Charpy's view is that solution should be found by Governments as task is too much for our forces and Mombelli, who has no force, is of much same opinion. Charpy had communication from French F[oreign] O[ffice] inferring that I had trapped Allies into sending Allied flags and detachments to Asia as they had information said to be from British F[oreign] O[ffice] that I had been given orders from W[ar] O[ffice] to evacuate Chanak and Scutari.

Part 3.

'I have satisfactorily explained that it was not until after I had asked for allied unity and secured it that I received W[ar] O[ffice] telegram 91026. It may be Pellé will understand from Mustapha Kemal that pending conference he will not (? attack) Allies but if not it looks very much as if this task may have to be taken on by British single-handed. If so we shall do our best but not a moment must be lost in sending reinforcements. I am not anxious about Chanak though report of intended attack in 3 or 4 days has been received by Colonel Shuttleworth. I am not anxious about Yarimje and Scutari (? front) at present or of Thrace except of marauders. Constantinople is my chief concern. There are some very dangerous elements at work. . . . Christian population is frightened. If any outbreak occurs I shall take very firm line.'

[17] This decision had been reported by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 405 of September 10 (see No. 23, n. 2).

General Mombelli and General Charpy had explained to General Harington that the situation at Chatalja in August had been quite different. The Greek Government was hesitating, and their forces were demoralised and without discipline. The 'terrain' was favourable for the defence, and there was the support of the fleet. The situation now was very different. There was a numerous enemy, with exalted *moral* and much material, determined to reconquer Constantinople and the national territory. On the Asiatic shore, the ground was unfavourable for the Allied defence, owing to its length, and the fact that the sea was behind their backs. There were hostile Turkish elements actually in the zones of occupation. It was necessary effectively to watch the Chatalja zone, because of the troubles in Thrace and the organisation of bands.[18] There was certain to be a rising in Constantinople as soon as Kemal came close to it.

Chanak meant an occupation far away from the centre of the zones being defended. They should not therefore open a fight with several fronts, insecure interior lines, a certain check in front of them, with the possible insult to Allied military prestige. The plan of action was actually based on material means which were quite insufficient. They really required expeditionary corps for the purpose. Even if severals battalions came to reinforce the Allies, the latter would be insufficient to fight the Kemalists with any chance of success. These reinforcements in any case would probably arrive late, and have to be scattered along the front.

General Charpy and his Italian colleague therefore expressed the view that the best way to solve the problem would be by diplomatic means rather than by military action. It had been decided, on his proposal, that the generals should confer with the Allied High Commissioners, and indicate to them the gravity of the consequences of operations risked after the military point of view had been explained as above.

After reading this telegram, M. Poincaré stated that, according to the first paragraph of it, General Harington had attributed a decision to the Allied Governments which they had never taken. His statement, as reported, was incorrect, and in sending a copy of General Charpy's note to Lord Hardinge, the day before, he had energetically protested against General Harington's action.

Lord Curzon said that he could not allow this attack on General Harington to pass. General Harington naturally thought that if the generals and High Commissioners had agreed to the movements of the troops to Ismid and Chanak, their Governments were in accord. He could not have foreseen that they would disavow them.

M. Poincaré said that General Harington had actually referred to a decision of the Governments which had not been taken, and he must maintain his point of view.

Lord Curzon regretted that he could not allow the incident thus to pass. General Harington had always acted with conspicuous loyalty to his allies ever since he had been in command at Constantinople.

[18] See No. 30.

M. POINCARÉ, reverting to General Charpy's telegram, said that in face of such a telegram the Allied Governments ought not to allow such a dangerous operation as that contemplated by General Harington to continue. He cited the opinion of Marshal Foch and various other French generals and members of the French General Staff and of the French Naval Staff who had come to see M. Poincaré the night before. One and all agreed that the present position of the Allied forces and navies was an impossible one.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he had already known for two days that this was the view of the French and Italian generals and their experts,[19] and he did not understand why M. Poincaré kept referring to the matter.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had understood Lord Curzon to have said that morning [*sic*][20] that, if the Allies were now attacked and defeated by the Turks, France would have to bear the responsibility. In fact, that if, after France's defection a misfortune occurred, it would be the fault not of Great Britain but of her Allies. M. Poincaré could not allow this to pass. He emphatically repudiated the idea that he was committing a felonious act, an act of treachery towards his Allies, in withdrawing the French troops from the Asiatic shores of the Straits. It was simply a step necessitated by the situation and essential for the protection of precious lives. He would recall that once before France had allowed herself to be led into danger at the Dardanelles.[21] It was true that they had taken the advice of a man, a civilian,[22] whom M. Poincaré himself much respected, but they had come into it reluctantly, and the results had been disastrous. He did not wish to take such a risk again. Lord Curzon must not be surprised if in such a matter he displayed emotion.

LORD CURZON asked to be allowed to say something to defend himself against the charges which M. Poincaré had made. For the last ten minutes M. Poincaré had been attributing to him certain words which he, Lord Curzon, had not employed, and upon that basis he had built up a fierce attack. As far as he could remember, the words which he had used were that if General Harington had to withdraw from Asia Minor the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain. For the rest, he would remind M. Poincaré that they were holding intimate conversations, and in the privacy of the Council Chamber they did not always prepare their words in advance. However, he would ask M. Massigli to read the passage to which M. Poincaré referred, as he had taken it down and interpreted it.

M. MASSIGLI then quoted a passage in which Lord Curzon had said that if General Harington were compelled to fight and withdraw from the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles or Ismid the fault would not wholly lie with Great Britain; that public opinion would remember that in this instance Great Britain had been abandoned by her Allies; and that public opinion in England would thus realise the very heavy blow dealt at the alliance by those who had chosen to desert her.

[19] See No. 42.
[20] He should have said: 'earlier in the afternoon'.
[21] The reference is to the attack on the Dardanelles in March 1915.
[22] The reference is to Sir (then Mr.) Winston Churchill.

M. POINCARÉ said that he must ask Lord Curzon to withdraw that statement.

LORD CURZON said that he could not do so. M. Poincaré had attributed to him the word 'responsibility' which he had not used, and had wrongly quoted him.

COUNT SFORZA intervened to suggest that it would be well for them to consider how many times during the war there had been difference of opinion in the Council Chamber on various points, and how the necessity for Allied unity had overcome such differences. For the moment, in considering the Allied attitude towards Turkey, it was essential to remember that France, Italy and Great Britain were Moslem Powers. It was particularly owing to that factor in the situation that France had felt compelled to withdraw her troops, as he understood it, and that was certainly one of the main reasons behind the Italian attitude.

M. POINCARÉ entirely agreed with Count Sforza. For the rest, he, M. Poincaré, had never agreed to the despatch of troops to the southern shores of the Straits, and it was to the common Allied interest that these troops should be withdrawn. He agreed with Lord Curzon that in the Council Chamber they did not always, and could not be expected to, weigh their expressions very carefully. But this matter was a very grave one, and he was afraid that he would have to make a public declaration as to what had been said at the conference if British troops were attacked and beaten back from the southern shores of the Straits.

M. Poincaré then proceeded to read a message which he had sent to the French Embassy in London on the 18th September, before the present conference.[23] In this telegram he had clearly explained the French attitude, as he had explained it since at the conference, and showing then that the French Government feared and were greatly impressed by the serious initiative taken by the British Government in sending and seeking reinforcements for the defence of the Straits at this time. He had then explained that it was impossible for the French Government to associate themselves with the measures contemplated by the British Government. He would recall that in March last he had warned Lord Curzon of the dangers they were running in not meeting the Turkish point of view to a greater extent and the difficulties which would face them in trying to obtain the acceptance of any terms which were not thus actually negotiated with the Turks.[24] He then feared that Kemal might defy them with grave consequences to Europe and the Moslem world. His pessimistic forecast was now being proved by events. The British Government, however, appeared entirely to overlook the realities of the situation. The French Government, however, could not afford not to face the dangerous consequences of the Kemalist victory, at which all Moslems throughout the world were rejoicing. The French Government realised the risk of wounding Moslem susceptibilities at the moment, and they were certain from all the information which had reached them that Kemal insisted

[23] See No. 35, n. 3. [24] See Vol. XVII, No. 561.

that he must receive back Adrianople and Eastern Thrace with safeguards for the Straits, or he would never come to a conference, and a conference was the only method of settling the present dangerous situation.

LORD CURZON regretted that he was unable to understand why M. Poincaré had read his instructions to the French Embassy in London at the present conference. He was perfectly well aware of the French Government's views, as were his own Government. He had never for a moment attempted to throw doubt on M. Poincaré's entire consistency, not only during the present crisis, but since March last. He was well aware of M. Poincaré's views regarding the necessity of promising Kemal the Maritza frontier. He was well aware of the views of French expert military opinion upon the whole situation. All Lord Curzon had asked that day was that they should examine quite calmly and rather more deeply the concessions which they were proposing to make to Kemal and the consequences which might follow from them.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had understood Lord Curzon to say that he, M. Poincaré, had changed his views on that question from those that he held two days ago.

LORD CURZON said that he had never made or implied any accusation of inconsistency against M. Poincaré.

M. POINCARÉ then continued to read the instructions which he had sent to his Embassy in London on the 18th September. These instructions, among other things, had pointed out that if England adopted a threatening attitude and proposed to cross the Straits, the Turks might for a short time be prevented from doing so, but they would certainly take Mesopotamia in the meanwhile. As regards the possibility of relying on support from other States in the Balkans, M. Poincaré had then pointed out that the Serbian Government had informed him that they were on excellent terms with Kemal and had been for some time. They did not fear him. Apparently, also, England was now applying for Greek help. M. Poincaré then read out a telegram from a responsible source in Athens to the effect that the British Minister had recently applied to the Greek Government for 60,000 men to help the British Government in defending the Straits. (Lord Curzon intervened to say that he did not believe for a moment that this information was correct.)[25] The British Government must understand that the French Government would never agree to fight beside the Greeks. He wished again to emphasise to Lord Curzon that his point of view on this question had been throughout consistent, and that he was perfectly certain that Kemal would not stop his advance on the Straits and Constantinople, without receiving, before the conference, certain soothing assurances. He regretted that, in spite of all that he had said, Lord Curzon and the British Government still appeared to share the optimism of General Harington regarding the military situation, and that we had only to talk to the Turks in vague terms about giving them back the sovereignty of parts of Thrace in order to stop the Kemalist advance. He, M. Poincaré, did not exclude the possibility of providing some demilitarised zone on the Turkish side of the frontier in Thrace if the Maritza

[25] Cf. No. 32, n. 5.

frontier and Adrianople were conceded to them. We could explain to Turkey that there were precedents in the other treaties for imposing restrictions on the sovereignty of other European States. Take, for instance, the case of the Rhineland. Of course, if the Allies were to demilitarise a part of Turkish Thrace, they would have to do the same across the frontier in Greek Western Thrace.

At this point, LORD CURZON, explaining that he could not tolerate the repeated and unfounded charges against himself and his country that M. Poincaré had thought fit to make, asked leave to suspend the sitting and take time to consider his action.

After an interval, in which private explanations were exchanged, the sitting was resumed.[26]

M. POINCARÉ proceeded to develop again the question of the demilitarisation of parts of Thrace. When the Versailles Treaty was made, a phrase, to which he objected, was inserted in one of its articles which described the frontiers of Germany on the west as Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Thus Germany was left with the Rhineland under her own sovereignty.

Servitudes were, however, imposed as a military precaution—for instance, the Allied occupation and various other controls. On this analogy it might be possible, in the areas to the east and west of the Maritza, to inform the Turks and Greeks respectively that military precautions must be taken by the Allies in the matter of demilitarising certain zones. That, however, was a matter for the future conference, but, meanwhile, the Allied Governments should be able to say something definite to the Turks about the frontiers of Thrace. In doing so there would be no question of treason to Serbia and Roumania. In short, what M. Poincaré desired was to know whether, in the name of France, he could inform Kemal that the Allied Governments were agreed about such and such a frontier in Thrace. Otherwise, France must speak alone.

[26] Lord Curzon's telegraphic account (by bag) of the meeting (Paris telegram No. 472 of September 22) runs as follows: 'Have just returned from meeting of quite unprecedented description.... Poincaré lost all command of his temper, and for a quarter of an hour shouted and raved at the top of his voice, putting words into my mouth which I had never uttered, refusing to permit the slightest interruption or correction, saying that he would make public the insult to France, quoting a telegram from Athens to the effect that the British Minister had asked the Greek Government to furnish 60,000 men for the defence of Thrace and the Straits, and behaving like a demented schoolmaster screaming at a guilty schoolboy. I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a scene. After enduring this for some time I could stand it no longer and rising, broke up the sitting and left the room. Monsieur Poincaré ultimately came out and made an apology, explaining that he had been exasperated at the charge that France had abandoned her Ally—a word which for my part I declared my willingness to withdraw—although I suspect that the sting lay in its incontestable truth. I only report this scene as illustrating the peculiar character and ungovernable emotions of the man with whom I am dealing. I should not have thought it possible for anyone in such a position, the Chairman and host of the proceedings, to make such a display, and it needed more than ordinary self-restraint not to terminate the conference abruptly and announce my intention to return to England. After half an hour I re-entered the room and the discussion was resumed.'

LORD CURZON thanked M. Poincaré for his explanation which he thought had advanced the case without, however, making it absolutely clear. The proposal, as he understood it, was that the three Allies should say to Turkey that her frontiers would now be extended to the Maritza, but that this would not prevent measures of military precaution on the Turkish side of the frontier, and equally on the Greek side of the frontier. This still left one point undecided. He was not accusing M. Poincaré of any inconsistency; he simply wanted some further information as to what M. Poincaré really meant. This was the point on which he had doubts. If he understood M. Poincaré aright, the Allies were to give to Turkey, in advance of any conference, an absolutely definite pledge that she was to receive the Maritza frontier. This seemed a very serious step for the Allies to take at that stage. M. Poincaré appeared to be satisfied after his interviews with the Roumanians and the Serbians that they would accept the position without difficulty. Lord Curzon's interviews with these Balkan representatives[27] had left quite a different impression on his mind as to the gravity of the view which they would take about any such step. He, therefore, thought that it was better not to be definite at this stage, but to try and elaborate provisions for Thrace in the future conference. Lord Curzon wondered whether it would not be possible to arrive at some general formula to-day which might be given to Kemal in the invitation to the peace conference. He had been surprised that M. Poincaré should pick out what was perhaps one of the most controversial questions of the peace discussion, namely the Maritza frontier, and suggest that an assurance could be given about this, but that nothing should be said about the Straits. If it were agreed that it was absolutely necessary to give an assurance to Kemal before the conference (assuming of course that the peace conference would be at Venice and not at Mudania, which General Pellé had seemed to advise), the question arose whether the assurance should not be given in wide and general terms. Before coming down to the meeting that afternoon Lord Curzon had prepared a formula which he thought his Government would allow him to put forward for discussion. The difficulty was that he was not quite certain whether M. Poincaré and Count Sforza had exactly the same intentions as himself in the matter. He did not want to go to Mustapha Kemal and say something which the latter would understand in one way and the Allies in another. Under this reserve, and provided his colleagues were agreeable, he would now present his draft of formula to the conference. Meanwhile, he was afraid that the narrow and very precise assurance suggested by M. Poincaré would not be acceptable, either to himself or his Government.

Lord Curzon would like to add that he particularly wished to say in the formula to be presented to Kemal something about Constantinople. From the various observations made by Ferid and Kemal himself on this point[28] there was obviously some misunderstanding as to the Allied intentions.

[27] Lord Curzon had reported his conversations with the Roumanian and Yugoslav representatives in his telegram No. 471 of September 21, not printed.

[28] Among the reports which Lord Curzon had in mind was presumably that contained

M. Poincaré said that he would like to read some further passages from his instructions of the 18th September to the French Embassy in London. He then cited a paragraph in which he had said that it was essential that the Allies should say something definite to Kemal on the important points of Constantinople, Gallipoli, the Maritza frontier and Adrianople.

As regards Serbia and Roumania, it seemed to him quite possible that if they were asked their opinion they would say that they much disliked a long common frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey. But in the last resort the Allies could make them agree to anything, and it must be remembered that under the March proposals a common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria had been conceded. It was only now a matter of adding a few more kilometres to that frontier.

M. Poincaré had found some differences in the views of M. Ninchitch and the King of Serbia on the one side and M. Pasitch on the other side regarding Thrace. M. Pasitch seemed entirely opposed to conceding anything in Europe to Turkey, while the King and his Minister for Foreign Affairs were as completely opposed to preventing Kemal from obtaining the Maritza frontier.

Count Sforza interposed to say that M. Ninchitch had told him that M. Pasitch was antipathetic to a long Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that, as a matter of fact, he disliked change, and it took time for any new idea to sink in.

M. Poincaré thought that this was quite true. For the rest, he had recently had breakfast with M. Ninchitch and the King of Serbia—a family party, at which both the Queen and the King's doctor were also present; and the King and his Foreign Minister had then told him that their relations with Kemal were excellent, and that they had no fears regarding the return of the Turks to Thrace. The French Government had therefore no apprehensions on this score.

Lord Curzon thought that, at any rate, from the point of view of the Straits, Roumania was perhaps more important than Serbia. Even as regards the latter, it was a curious fact that he had seen the King of Serbia, M. Ninchitch and M. Pasitch; that the first two had taken a different view from the Serbian Prime Minister, but that the positions of both parties were precisely the reverse of those which they had explained to M. Poincaré. In any case, all his information went to show that Roumania took a very serious view of the situation, and her voice must be heard at the conference. He would now ask leave to have his formula read.

in Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 439 of September 15, which ran: 'Young American journalist gave following information this afternoon:

'He saw Kemal in Smyrna on 13th September at noon. Kemal was ready to answer questions, and said he would be in Constantinople within eight days. When asked what he would do if British opposed him, he replied, why should they oppose him? He had no quarrel with Britain, but only with Greeks. But, anyhow, he would be in Constantinople in eight days' time. He was also going to have Thrace up to the River Maritza line. When asked how he would get there, he replied, across the sea; he had made all preparations for crossing.'

M. MASSIGLI then read the draft invitation to the Angora Government which Lord Curzon had prepared before the conference (see Annex to these minutes).

M. POINCARÉ stated that he could adhere to much that was in this document; but there was one grave omission, and that was the lack of any precise statement as to the return of the Maritza and of Adrianople to the Turks. Again, he was not sure that Venice was a good choice for the conference. It was too far from Asia Minor, and Kemal might insist on a conference in the neighbourhood. He would suggest leaving the place of the conference vague in the invitation, and allowing the generals to settle it with Kemal when they met him at Mudania, as suggested in the latter part of the invitation.

COUNT SFORZA interposed to say that Fethi Bey had expressed himself in favour of Venice.

LORD CURZON suggested that if Mustapha Kemal refused to have a conference anywhere outside Asia Minor it would be quite impossible for the conference to be held.

M. POINCARÉ thought that it might be possible to have a conference on a ship at some Asia Minor port.[29]

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA pointed out that a peace conference could not be held in this way.

M. POINCARÉ then said that, unless something more specific could be said about the Maritza, he thought that France would have to send a separate note to Kemal.

LORD CURZON enquired whether M. Poincaré meant a kind of separate annex to, or gloss on, the joint note, which would be on the lines of the draft he had prepared, this annex or gloss making definite mention of the Maritza and Adrianople, or whether he meant an entirely separate note, emanating from the French Government.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not agree, in any case, to the British draft without obtaining the French Government's consent.

COUNT SFORZA asked whether the draft represented England's last word.

LORD CURZON said that it did not, and that he was prepared for modifications, but not on questions of principle. In particular, he was afraid of the Greek population in Thrace and outside Thrace revolting if Adrianople and the Maritza were specifically promised in the note.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether His Majesty's Government would oppose the Maritza frontier when it came to a conference.

LORD CURZON replied that they had no intention of being intransigent on the point; all he desired was that the note should not be excessively precise on this question, and that some latitude should be given for the conference to hear the views of others, such as the Serbians and Roumanians, and explore other solutions, such as the autonomous buffer State. The British Government were ready to be sympathetic, but they did not like to pledge themselves in advance. M. Poincaré was quite at liberty to say to Kemal that the

[29] Cf. Vol. XVII, Nos. 630, 638 and 639.

French Government desired that the future frontier of Turkey should be the Maritza, and include Adrianople.

M. POINCARÉ enquired whether he could inform Kemal that at least there was some hope on the side of England; whether, in fact, he would be able to say that France and Italy supported the Maritza frontier; that there would be no serious opposition from Serbia and Roumania; and that there was hope from England.

LORD CURZON said that he could not give any pledge on the point, as he did not wish to rule out now, before the conference, some form of League of Nations' solution. He did not wish to tie his hands, and so prevent himself from making such a proposal at the conference.

M. POINCARÉ expressed himself as against the League of Nations' proposal, which he would oppose.

LORD CURZON asked whether M. Poincaré really proposed to give back to Turkey all the 1914 frontier, subject only to League of Nations' guarantees for the demilitarisation of certain strips of territory on each side of the frontier, the latter not to be mentioned now to the Turks, but to be discussed later at the conference, after the promise as to the Maritza had been given to them. For his part, Lord Curzon could not confine himself to this. He wanted to argue for the League of Nations' solution at the conference.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was essential to take into account the state of mind in Turkey now, and therefore to give her some definite assurance about the Maritza. This would not imply that such safeguards as the Capitulations might not be discussed at the conference and continued in Thrace.

At this point M. POINCARÉ asked to be allowed to read a long telegram which he had received from Admiral Dumesnil regarding his recent conversations with Mustapha Kemal at Smyrna. He quoted passages from the admiral's account which made it clear that Kemal was relying more and more on France to secure a favourable attitude on the part of the Allies towards his territorial terms. He also quoted passages to show how loyally Admiral Dumesnil had insisted to Kemal that there could be no question of disagreement between the Allies in their policy towards Turkey, and that Kemal must expect to meet a united Allied front. Kemal had explained to him that the refugees' situation in Smyrna had been difficult, because for the first two days he had not been able to bring into the town any Turkish police or gendarmerie. After that, perfect order had reigned. Another passage from the admiral's despatch [*sic*] showed the firm language which he had held regarding the neutral zones and Allied solidarity in defending them. Kemal had informed him that he recognised the neutral zones, but not the terms of the armistice as between Turkey and the Allies. The admiral had pointed out to him how the firm Allied attitude towards Greece and their neutrality had enormously helped Kemal in Asia Minor. It had led the Greeks to take reinforcements of good regiments back to Thrace and place them before the Chatalja lines just before Kemal's offensive. The admiral urged Kemal again and again to rely on diplomacy, and not to take military action at the risk of war with the Allies. Kemal had replied that, provided he

could get what he wanted, namely, the territorial terms of the National Pact as regards Eastern Thrace, he was prepared to obtain them by diplomatic means. He also mentioned the idea of a plebiscite in Western Thrace, in accordance with the terms of the National Pact. He had referred to the question of the liberty of the Straits, and had said that he was prepared for reasonable guarantees, such as were allowed for in the National Pact. He had, however, talked more than once to the admiral about the necessity of driving the Greeks from Eastern Thrace.

LORD CURZON thanked M. Poincaré for his information, and said that he thought the admiral had acted with courage and loyalty in his conversations, but the more he heard of Kemal's views the more he was afraid of the intentions of the Allies being misinterpreted by Kemal. For instance, let them take Gallipoli. The British Government took the view very strongly that, in order to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, both sides of the Dardanelles must be garrisoned permanently, and he would have to defend this point of view at the forthcoming peace conference. The National Pact, however, said nothing about the Dardanelles or about any such guarantees. It was therefore essential that the Allies should be agreed on this point in the conference. Lord Curzon concluded by asking M. Poincaré to take his draft and to submit it to his Cabinet. It was essential that the Allies should agree upon a collective note, and not attempt to send separate documents.

M. POINCARÉ feared that he could not agree to any collective note unless the question of the concession to Turkey of Thrace was made more precise. For the rest, he would point out that Lord Curzon had made entirely new proposals as regards garrisoning the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Under the March proposals, the garrisons were to be confined to the northern shore.

LORD CURZON agreed, but explained that he had precise instructions from his Government on this point,[30] and that in any case, the March proposals, as M. Poincaré admitted, were now open to modification, and had, indeed, been modified by circumstances. The question of guarantees for the freedom of the Dardanelles was in any case a matter for the peace conference. He would like to point out that Great Britain would soon have strong forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, if necessary, be in a position to dictate her terms on this point. He did not mean this in any way as a threat.[31]

At this point M. POINCARÉ read extracts from the *procès-verbal* of the March

[30] In Foreign Office telegram No. 314 to Paris, of September 21, Sir E. Crowe had transmitted the following message from the Cabinet to Lord Curzon: 'We think that the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is an integral part of the system of maintaining the freedom of the Straits and that the same regime as is arranged for Gallipoli should also apply to an agreed zone upon the Asiatic shore. We do not consider mere demilitarisation tempered by visits is sufficient.'

[31] Cf. the draft minutes of a Conference of Ministers on September 18 (E 9770/27/44), which reported Mr. Lloyd George as saying: '. . . the mounting of heavy howitzers on the Gallipoli Peninsula would be very important from a diplomatic point of view. The French were afraid of our establishing a second Gibraltar on the Gallipoli Peninsula and that consideration would make them more inclined to co-operate with us.'

discussions about the Allied garrisons at the Straits and Lord Curzon's views at that time.[32]

LORD CURZON again explained that this was a new situation and that his Government thought it important to strengthen the guarantees for the Straits. They had all heard Admiral Grasset's views,[33] which made it quite clear how essential it was to hold the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles in order to keep the passage free.

At this point it was agreed to adjourn the meeting until 2 p.m. on Saturday afternoon, the 23rd September.[34]

It was agreed to issue the following communiqué to the press:

'Lord Curzon, M. Poincaré and Count Sforza have devoted the afternoon to the consideration of the formula under which an invitation could be addressed to the Government of Angora for the conference of peace. The examination of the formula will be continued to-morrow afternoon.'

ANNEX

Draft of Invitation to Angora Government.[35]

British and French Foreign Ministers and Italian Ambassador in Paris have the honour, on behalf of their Governments, to invite Mustapha Kemal to come himself or the Grand National Assembly of Angora to send a representative with full powers to a meeting at Venice to which will also be invited plenipotentiary representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Roumania and Greece. The meeting will be held as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made by Italian Government and the

[32] See Vol. XVII, No. 564. [33] See No. 42.

[34] Lord Curzon concluded his telegraphic account (see n. 26) as follows: 'I shall do my best to secure a collective invitation, if that be possible, and even if the French choose to add a private gloss of their own. If not, we must each address Kemal in our own way.

'The British Cabinet will I trust appreciate that by these steps we have gained another day both here and at the other end, and that Mudania will mean several days more. Before the end of this time our preparations should be complete and in any case the prospect of an attack upon Chanak or Ismid seems now to be receding.

'I grieve to have to report to my colleagues an experience so painful as that which I have passed through this afternoon and which I hope never to be compelled to repeat.

'I intimated to Poincaré that at conference we should have to raise question of future military position on Chanak side of Straits, upon which he taunted me with departure from terms of March last. I replied that military situation was now wholly changed, as had been admitted by his own generals and admirals. Indeed he has always declined himself to be bound by anything that was settled in March.

'Since writing above I have received a request from Count Sforza to consider whether in lieu of general phrases about Thrace I cannot accept to-morrow a definite reference to the Maritza and Adrianople in the draft formula suggested. He will of course support Poincaré; and he points out undesirability of several Notes to Turks, and certainly that if concession has ultimately to be made, French will get the entire credit. This afternoon I argued that this might produce violent explosion among Greek army and Greek population in Thrace, and would involve complete surrender to Turkish demands. I am reluctant therefore to make concession, and cannot do it without Cabinet authority. I will await your decision.'

[35] The text of this draft was telephoned to the Foreign Office by Lord Hardinge.

other Governments concerned. Its object will be to negotiate and draw up the final treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and thus among other things to mediate a settlement of the outstanding points in dispute between Greece and Turkey.

The British, French and Italian Governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of recording that they view with sympathy and are ready to examine with benevolence at the coming conference the desire of the Government of Angora to secure the return of the greater part of Thrace to Turkish sovereignty. They hope it will be found possible, after taking into account at the conference all the vital interests of the countries concerned, to give such satisfaction to Turkish aspiration in this direction as can be reconciled with the provision, not only of those guarantees for the permanent maintenance of the freedom of the waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean which the Allied Powers are united in regarding as indispensable, but also of that protection of racial and religious minorities under the ægis of the League of Nations which the Government of Angora have already[36] declared their willingness in principle to accord. The Allied Governments solemnly reaffirm the assurances which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople upon the entering into force of the treaty of peace.[37]

As a pledge of their good faith, the Allied Powers are prepared, while the arrangements for the Venice Conference are being made, to use all their influence to secure the withdrawal of the Greek forces to such a line in Eastern Thrace as may be agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople and his Allied colleagues, provided always that the Government of Angora first declare their readiness, pending and during the peace conference, not to enter the neutral zones or cross the Sea of Marmara.

For the above purpose a meeting could be arranged between the Allied generals and Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid.

[36] See Vol. XVII, No. 614.
[37] See Vol. XVII, No. 568, Annex 1, paragraph xix.

No. 49

Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 320 Telegraphic [E 9755/27/44]

Most urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 23, 1922, 1.30 p.m.*

Following for Lord Curzon:

Cabinet this morning agreed upon the following revise[1] of your draft Note[2] with which we are in general accord. In the event of its being impossible to secure agreement with France and Italy on the British Text it would not

[1] See No. 51, n. 8, below. [2] See No. 48, Annex.

be injurious in our opinion to make this communication separately and directly by Great Britain to the Government of Angora. We think also that you should press strongly that before this Note is sent jointly the assent of Roumania and Serbia should be secured. If France and Italy definitely oppose it you should yield recording your protest at exclusion from consultation of these Powers so vitally interested. In the event of your having to make a separate communication you will no doubt deal with them directly yourself.

The Cabinet have read with great regret the account[3] of your painful interview with Monsieur Poincaré and desire formally to congratulate you upon the firmness and self-restraint with which you bore yourself as the representative of Great Britain.[4]

[3] See No. 48, nn. 26 and 34.

[4] A note to the record of conclusions reached by the Cabinet, on September 23, states: 'The Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister decided, in addition to the above, that Lord Curzon should be asked, in the event of a failure to reach agreement, to suggest the reference of the whole question to the League of Nations, and the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State for the Colonies undertook to draft a telegram to carry this into effect. The Lord Privy Seal, however, later in the morning reported to the Prime Minister that on reconsideration he and the Secretary of State for the Colonies had felt considerable doubt as to the expediency of suggesting this, as the Council of the League of Nations might very probably be induced by the French Government to insist as a condition of the Conference, that the British Forces should leave Chanak, the holding of which the British Government considered vital to securing the freedom of the Straits and the prevention of the war spreading into Europe. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was with him, concurred in this view and the telegram was not sent.'

No. 50

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received September 23, 5.50 p.m.)
No. 450 Telegraphic [E 9803/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 23, 1922, 3.40 p.m.*

Admiral Brock has shown General Harington and myself orders he has received[1] to remove craft of every description from Bosphorus so as to prevent Kemalists from crossing to European shore. The Admiral is to decide in conjunction with General Harington and myself when exact moment arrives to take these measures.

I understand Admiral Brock is already taking all measures to prevent Kemalists from crossing Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora. He is also watching Black Sea.

I do not think Admiralty can possibly realise difficulty of carrying out

[1] In Admiralty telegram No. 962 of September 22, not printed, which referred to Admiral Brock's telegram No. 381 (see No. 43, n. 3).

their orders as regards Bosphorus. I entirely appreciate vital importance of preventing Kemalists from transporting their troops to Thrace. But we have to consider effect of situation on Constantinople of removal of all floating craft in Bosphorus.

He can, as a preliminary measure, prevent all traffic at night.

It will be difficult to determine exact moment for dealing with Turkish craft in Bosphorus. In my view this moment will, in principle, have arrived if or when Mustapha Kemal sends an ultimatum to evacuate Constantinople, possibly as a condition of his attending a conference or when General Harington tells us definitely that Mustapha Kemal has concentrated forces, which he is unable to resist, for an advance on Constantinople, or when Mustapha Kemal crosses neutral zone at Chanak. Crossing of neutral zones would be an act of war which would justify action on the part of Admiral.

The repercussion of measures ordered by Admiralty on Constantinople population would be such as to endanger safety of General Harington's force as at present constituted and make it difficult to extricate it. General Harington considers therefore that these measures should not be put into force until British troops are in a position of safety, i.e. have gone to Gallipoli.

We recognise urgent importance of holding Constantinople as long as possible if only to prevent Kemalists from transporting their troops to European shore. But His Majesty's Government must realise that if hostilities unfortunately break out they will be playing a war part from enemy's capital which means holding down a hostile population. The Admiral informs me that he cannot ensure these measures ordered by Admiralty being effective if he has to wait until British troops evacuate, while General Harington states that if they are put into force before he evacuates Constantinople his troops will be in danger.

This is dilemma with which we are faced.

I therefore consider that while bearing steadily in mind necessity of doing our utmost to prevent Kemalist troops crossing Bosphorus it is very difficult for Admiral to carry out his instructions in their entirety.

We must remember necessity of victualling and maintaining economic life of city both of which are largely dependent on water transport.

We cannot remove all Turkish craft from Bosphorus without also taking measures to prevent allied and neutral shipping from falling into Kemalist hands. It will, therefore, be necessary to notify allied and neutral shipping that they must be prepared to leave harbour at twenty-four hours' notice. I understand that it would be practicable within a period of three days to intern Turkish shipping in Golden Horn. It must be recognised that this is only a delaying measure as if and when Kemalists arrive on Asiatic shore shipping in Golden Horn will be at their disposal. The wholesale destruction of shipping in Golden Horn would, I am convinced, produce an explosion which would have most far-reaching consequences without compensating advantages because means of crossing Bosphorus can always be extemporised.

The situation here necessarily varies from day to day and subject to general instructions from His Majesty's Government I trust Admiral Brock, General

Harington, and I myself may be given full latitude to deal with it to the best of our ability.

General Harington is in entire agreement with above.[2]

Repeated to Paris No. 26 for Lord Curzon.

[2] In his telegram No. 451 of September 3, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'While I realise that my telegram No. 450 is not very helpful, I am sure you will appreciate very difficult situation in which orders from Admiralty place Admiral Brock, General Harington and myself. . . . I imagine it is to our interest to hang on to Constantinople as long as possible, and our best policy for the moment, in order to achieve this end, is to remain as quiet as we can while exercising necessary vigilance.' Lord Curzon replied in his telegram No. 428 of September 25: 'Telegrams which have been sent after Cabinet today to Admiral Brock and General Harington will have informed you that we concur entirely in the policy upon which you and they are agreed, and trust to your joint discretion to carry it out in the manner which you deem best.'

No. 51

British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay, Saturday, September 23, 5 p.m. (Received at the Foreign Office on September 26.)

[*E 9955/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Clinchant, M. Bargeton.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; SECRETARIES, Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper.
Italy: Count Sforza; SECRETARY, Signor Galli.

M. POINCARÉ opened the meeting by referring to the desire of the British Government to secure Serbian and Roumanian troops for the defence of Constantinople. He understood that in fact, the week before, a direct request for such assistance had been addressed by His Majesty's Government to Belgrade and Bucharest.[1] This action seemed to him very grave. He was quite sure that the arrival of such troops at this moment at Constantinople would be regarded as provocative by the Turks, and could only risk the peace which they were so anxious to secure instead of helping them to obtain it. He was very strongly of opinion that before the Serbian or Roumanian Governments came to a decision as to the despatch of troops, the Allied Governments should have received and considered Kemal's reply to their invitation.[2] As long as they were in communication with Kemal, they should not seek assistance either from Serbia or Roumania. If Kemal refused the invitation, it might then be necessary to press for the despatch of these Balkan troops. The news of the British Government's request, had, however, already

[1] See No. 29. [2] See No. 52, below.

been announced in Bucharest and Belgrade and had agitated public opinion. This appeared to him (M. Poincaré) a serious situation, and he was already taking steps to make representations at both capitals on this subject.

LORD CURZON replied that he had listened with great respect to M. Poincaré's statement, but he was unable to admit that any of the suggestions to which reference had been made were in the nature of a provocation either to their Allies or to Kemal. In his conversations with the representatives of the Balkan States, he had emphasised the British Government's desire to secure peace. In any case the actual decision, whether troops should be despatched to Constantinople now or later, lay with the Balkan Governments concerned, and, as M. Poincaré doubtless was aware, those Governments had in fact given no direct undertaking as to the immediate despatch of contingents. Indeed, the Serbian Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary, together with the King of Serbia, were understood to be on their way back to Belgrade, and there could be no meeting of the Serbian Cabinet until Wednesday. Roumania might reach a decision sooner, but in any case he (Lord Curzon) saw no necessity for the conference to take any collective action at Bucharest or Belgrade in this matter. If there was any force in M. Poincaré's remarks, and Lord Curzon thought that there might be, it would obviously be appreciated in Bucharest and Belgrade. He would like in any case to explain once again the reasons which had prompted His Majesty's Government to make the representations which they had made at those capitals. He did not wish to touch further on the question of Allied co-operation on the Asiatic shores of the Straits, but he desired it to be clearly understood that in all the communications addressed to the Serbian and Roumanian Governments he had insisted most emphatically on the necessity for Allied unity. In asking the Roumanian and Serbian Governments to show their flags at Constantinople, the only object which he had had in view was to make a display of the unbroken alliance not only of France, Great Britain and Italy, but of the smaller Allies. Such a display would be symbolic of the common Allied front, and would inevitably create a serious impression on Kemal's mind. Whether it was necessary for immediate action to be taken as regards the despatch of troops, he (Lord Curzon) was not in a position to say. Be that as it may, he thought that, since the French as well as the British point of view had been made clear at Bucharest and Belgrade, the matter might be left there for the moment.

M. POINCARÉ said that he did not wish to hint that the British Government had intentionally taken provocative action. The sense of his observations simply was that the despatch of troops from Belgrade [and] Bucharest at this moment might have been regarded as provocative by Kemal. The principal Allies should as far as possible prevent the present trouble from spreading to the Balkans, and, although there had been no mention yet of the actual embarkation of troops from Serbia or Roumania, the press at both Belgrade and Bucharest was talking about it, and the Turks were thus sure to know and misinterpret the Allied intentions. Thus, if Kemal were to ask the French representatives what these rumours meant, M. Poincaré wished to be able

to say that there was no immediate question of the sending of Roumanian or Serbian troops to Constantinople.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that the question of the despatch of these troops might be further considered when Kemal had answered the Allied note. He did not think that it was necessary for the three Allies to take any further decision on the matter at present. It was mainly a question for Serbia and Roumania to decide this, as Lord Curzon had pointed out.

LORD CURZON said that there was no question of a decision on the part of the British Government to provoke Turkey. It was simply now a question of the best way of preventing the Turks from overwhelming the zones declared neutral by the Allies. He had asked the Serbian and Roumanian Governments whether they were indifferent to such a Turkish advance, and they had both replied that they were not, and that they were in fact seriously alarmed. He had further suggested that they should give concrete effect to their feelings of alarm by displaying their flags at Constantinople. In any case, if only the three Allied Governments could decide on some step which would clearly indicate that the Allies were united, he (Lord Curzon) trusted that there might be no need for a recourse to arms, or for the arrival of reinforcements at Constantinople.

M. POINCARÉ was apprehensive of the arrival of even a detachment of Serbian and Roumanian troops, which, however small, might prove a dangerous provocation to Mustapha Kemal. That was why he had raised the matter. He would now like, however, to refer to the question of the invitation to Kemal. The French Cabinet had considered the British draft,[3] but they must first decide at the conference whether they were going to present a single note or three separate notes to Kemal.

LORD CURZON suggested that they should first examine the British note paragraph by paragraph.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he was in general agreement with the main text, subject to certain drafting alterations, except, however, that he regarded it as essential to be precise regarding the frontiers which they were prepared to offer Kemal in Thrace.

LORD CURZON again suggested that they should run through the text and see what changes M. Poincaré and Count Sforza desired. They would thus ascertain whether they were able to reach a general agreement in principle on the rest of the note, and they could return at the end to a discussion on the essential point as to the frontiers in Thrace. He would, however, like to urge and emphasise again the importance of sending a single note in the name of the three Allies to Kemal, and not three distinct notes. Three separate notes would show *ipso facto* that there was disagreement among the Allies, and his whole object in coming to the meeting that afternoon was to reach an Allied agreement upon the text of a single Allied note. He wanted to discuss the whole question in the most friendly spirit to see whether their different points of view could be reconciled.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could bargain about everything except one point,

[3] See No. 48, Annex.

and that was the question of the frontier in Thrace. A Frenchman, a Catholic, who was if anything anti-Turkish, although Bulgarophil, had just telegraphed to him from Constantinople to say that the French colony there were convinced that there was a serious menace to the town unless the Allies promised the Turks at once the frontier of the Maritza and Adrianople. They had the example of Smyrna in front of them, and they must avoid a repetition of it at Constantinople. He (M. Poincaré) therefore was anxious to be able to telegraph in reply to his friend at Constantinople that France was at any rate able to promise the desired concession. There was no use in sending an identic note unless mention were made of the Maritza and Adrianople.

LORD CURZON said that he would like an explanation from M. Poincaré on one point. M. Poincaré had repeatedly emphasised the need of making this concession to Kemal as a condition of the latter accepting the proposed conference. Could M. Poincaré give him an assurance that the Turks would not advance, and would come to the conference if this concession were made? It was a very important point. M. Poincaré was proposing that the Allies should throw away their most powerful card, but a very serious situation would arise if, after taking this important step, they found that they had not attained the object at which they aimed.

M. POINCARÉ said that he felt unable to give such an assurance. All that he was prepared to say was that Kemal would not come to the conference without this concession. But he was not absolutely certain that he would come even if this were offered him, or that he would be prevented from passing the Straits.

LORD CURZON asked M. Poincaré to be kind enough to tell him what other parts of the British text he was prepared to accept. If no agreement could be reached about the Maritza there would be no question of tying M. Poincaré to anything he might say about the rest of the note, but he thought this would be the best procedure.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that they might avoid a useless discussion if they could only settle the Maritza question first. It seemed to him a case where the form and substance of a document were bound up together. They could not separate the decision on the form of the note from the decision upon this question of principle. He suggested that they should adjourn for fifteen minutes, and each work out fresh drafts and then compare notes.

M. POINCARÉ said he agreed with Count Sforza's remarks as to the form and substance of the document, but thought that there was nothing in the British note to necessitate a new draft except the omission of a precise reference to the Maritza and Adrianople. He then proceeded to translate the British text into French. In the first paragraph he suggested that it was to be inferred from the form in which the last sentence was drafted that Greece was still an Ally. France had refrained from regarding her as such since King Constantine's accession, and he could not agree to sign a note which placed Greece among the Allies.

LORD CURZON said that as far as he was able to gather from M. Poincaré's version of the British note, an entirely new text was being proposed. As he

had already explained privately to M. Poincaré, he had had to await the views of his Cabinet upon the text of the British draft, which he had communicated to them the day before.[4] If they were now to propose an entirely new text, he would probably have to refer to London, and the delay which they had desired to avoid would be inevitable. He was perfectly ready to consider French modifications of the text provided they were not of a nature to knock the whole bottom out of the English draft.

COUNT SFORZA suggested that it was in the British and Allied interest not to send out a document which stamped itself as a purely British text. The Turks would resent it as such, and their object would be thwarted rather than furthered. In effect it was only now a question of form and *nuance*, and not of any change in the substantive proposals of the British draft.

LORD CURZON replied that he was quite prepared to accept a French version of his text, and he would ask M. Poincaré to continue reading his French translation of it. In the first paragraph of his own text, he would like to substitute the word 'desire' for the words 'have the honour on behalf of their Governments'.[5]

After some discussion on this point, it was agreed to substitute the words 'prient le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard' for the corresponding passage in the English note.

M. POINCARÉ then asked that the words 'or elsewhere' (*ou ailleurs*) should be inserted after the word 'Venice' in the first paragraph. He thought that it would be necessary to hear Kemal's views on the place of meeting of the peace conference and that the Generals and High Commissioners might discuss this with him at Mudania.

LORD CURZON said that he was quite ready to accept his insertion, but he particularly did not want any conference at Mudania except the meeting of the military authorities for the specific purpose suggested in the British note, namely, that of deciding the lines on which the Greek and Turkish troops were to stand pending and during the conference.

COUNT SFORZA supported Lord Curzon. He had sent the text of the British note to Rome, and, subject to some drafting alterations and to a change in the French sense regarding Thrace, he had received full authority to accept it. But his Government were emphatic as to the Mudania meeting being one strictly confined to the soldiers and to the military question raised in the British note.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to substitute the word 'conclude' for the words 'draw up' in the last sentence of the first paragraph, and in order to meet M. Poincaré's point regarding Greece and the Allies, the last half of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the British note was omitted, and the word 'Greece' inserted between the words 'Turkey and the Allied Powers'.[6]

[4] See No. 48, n. 35.

[5] See n. 8, below.

[6] The word order in the British draft (see No. 48, Annex) was: 'the Allied Powers and Turkey'.

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the second paragraph of the British text (see annex to these minutes for full French version as approved by the conference and despatched).[7]

The second sentence of the second paragraph of this version as originally put forward read 'si le Gouvernement d'Angora est disposé à ne pas envoyer'.

LORD CURZON, while agreeing with M. Poincaré that some such insertion would usefully strengthen the British text, suggested that the version might be made stronger by the substitution of the words 'à la condition que' instead of 'si' and of 'n'envoie pas' instead of 'est disposé, &c.'

These amendments were accepted.

LORD CURZON said that he could not accept the first sentence of that paragraph at this stage, but would return to it later.

Lord Curzon then asked to be allowed to insert in the second half of the second sentence of the second paragraph of the French version the words 'pour protéger les intérêts des pays voisins, pour obtenir le rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque'. These insertions were to meet instructions[8] which he had received that day from his Government, and he believed they would not only be acceptable to his colleagues and to Turkey, but in particular they would show the Balkan Allies, were they summoned to the conference, that their interests were not being lost sight of.

M. POINCARÉ said that he could not accept the first half of this insertion, unless some mention were made of the interests of Turkey. He would willingly, however, accept the second half.

After some discussion, the words 'pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la

[7] Not printed. See No. 52, n. 3, below.

[8] These were transmitted in Foreign Office telegram No. 321 to Paris, of September 23, which referred to No. 49, and continued:

'Paragraph 1. For 'have the honour on behalf of their governments' substitute 'desire'.

'Paragraph 2. The British, French, and Italian Governments desire at the same time to take this opportunity of declaring that they are prepared at the coming conference to meet the desire of the government of Angora for the return of Eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkish sovereignty. Their efforts will be directed in this matter only to securing guarantees for the protection of the interests of the neighbouring states, and the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority. It will be necessary, however, for the conference to reach agreement upon two further points: first, effective guarantees are indispensable for the security and protection for the enjoyment by all nations of the freedom of the waters between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea: secondly, adequate securities are necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities generally. Both these objects are attainable under the League of Nations whose agency the government of Angora have already declared their willingness in principle to accept. The allied governments re-affirm the assurances which they gave in March last to withdraw their troops from Constantinople upon the entering into force of the treaty of peace.

'Paragraph 3. The allied powers are prepared while the arrangements for the Venice conference are being made to use all their influence to procure the withdrawal of Greek forces behind the line of the Maritza provided always that the government of Angora undertake pending and during the peace conference not to enter the neutral zone or attempt to cross the Sea of Marmora.

'Paragraph 4. After the words 'could be arranged' add 'without delay'.

Turquie et de ses voisins' were accepted instead of the first half of the insertion suggested by Lord Curzon.

M. POINCARÉ then suggested that the words 'and that Turkey should be free to choose Constantinople as her capital' should be inserted after the assurance which was given in the English text about the withdrawal of the Allied troops from Constantinople.

Both LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA thought this insertion unnecessary, and as possibly being open to the inference that the Allies claimed the right to interfere in Turkey's choice of her capital.

M. POINCARÉ then withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then suggested the insertion of a phrase as to the Allied Governments supporting Turkey's admission to the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON and COUNT SFORZA willingly accepted this insertion.

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to read the French version of the fourth paragraph of the British text (the third paragraph of the French text).

It was agreed to omit the words 'as a pledge of their good faith' at the beginning of this paragraph of the British text. It was also agreed to substitute the words 'fixed by the Allied general in agreement with the Turkish and Greek military authorities' for the words 'agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople and his Allied colleagues', since M. Poincaré desired to avoid any reference to the Allied Commander-in-Chief in this note.

M. Poincaré also proposed that the British text of this paragraph should be split into two sentences, and the second sentence should begin with the words 'en retour de cette intervention, le Gouvernement d'Angora serait sans doute disposé'.

LORD CURZON agreed to the proposed change, except that he thought that the words 'serait disposé à' should be made much stronger, and he would suggest the words 's'engagera à'.

With this alteration the French proposal was accepted.

It was also agreed to substitute the words 'the zones provisionally declared neutral by the Allies' for the words 'neutral zones'.

Some discussion followed on the last paragraph of the British note (penultimate paragraph of the French text).

M. POINCARÉ suggested the words 'in order to conclude the armistice' instead of the words 'for the above purpose'.

LORD CURZON said that it was essential that the meeting at Mudania should be strictly confined to the single point of fixing the line in Thrace to which the Greek troops might be withdrawn. There could be no question of sending High Commissioners to this conference or of widening the terms of reference such as would be inevitable if all the provisions of an armistice between Greece and Turkey were to be raised.

COUNT SFORZA agreed.

M. POINCARÉ withdrew his suggestion.

M. Poincaré then enquired whether Lord Curzon could accept the first sentence of the second paragraph of the French text. He thought that it

would flatter the Turks and satisfy the Allies if, instead of mentioning the Maritza and Adrianople, the Allies offered to concede the full frontiers of the National Pact in Thrace.

LORD CURZON replied that, in order to secure what he considered to be absolutely essential, namely, a joint note instead of three separate notes, he was prepared to make a concession in this direction, but he could not in any case agree to any mention of the National Pact. The latter covered more than the Maritza frontier and raised the question of the autonomy of Western Thrace. He would therefore agree to a reference to the Maritza frontier and Adrianople in the second paragraph of the French text. He would also accept the French proposal as to the three Governments willingly supporting at the conference such an extension of the Turkish frontiers in the final treaty. He made these concessions in the interests of peace and of the *Entente*, but he trusted that in this case none of the three Allies would attempt to give independent assurances as to their intentions at the final conference. He hoped that M. Franklin-Bouillon[9] would not attempt when he arrived at Angora to make concrete promises to the Turks outside the terms of the Allied note.

COUNT SFORZA here interposed to say that he was apprehensive lest M. Franklin-Bouillon might promise the Turks other concessions which the Allies were not prepared to give.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he thought that there was no danger of this, since he had, in order to avoid any such risk, given M. Franklin-Bouillon written instructions, and had told him that all he was to do was to give counsels of moderation to Kemal to persuade him to come to the conference.

The French text of the note (see annex)[10] was then accepted by the conference.

LORD CURZON said that in conclusion he would like to point out that Serbia and Roumania would soon join them at the conference table. His Government had been anxious therefore to secure their signature to the present Allied invitation to Kemal. It would have given the latter greater weight, and would have shown Serbia and Roumania that the invitation to the conference was not a sham. As, however, it was essential to avoid delay in the despatch of the note, and since it would not be possible to obtain the signature at any rate of the Serbian Ministers until they reached their capital during the next two days, it did not seem possible to do more than communicate a copy of the note to each Government at once. This might be done by the French Ministers at Belgrade and Bucharest on behalf of the conference; and, in communicating a copy, the Ministers should express the hope that it may meet with the concurrence of both Governments.[11] He would like to

[9] M. Franklin-Bouillon left Paris on September 24 on a mission to Mustapha Kemal (see Nos. 64, 68, below).

[10] Not printed (see No. 52, n. 3, below). In his telegram No. 457 of September 24, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'French High Commissioner has to-day communicated invitation for conference to Angora Government and to Grand Vizier on behalf of Allies.'

[11] In Paris telegram of September 23 to Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) and Sir A. Young (Belgrade), repeated to the Foreign Office as No. 475, Lord Curzon gave the following instructions: 'You should obtain from your French colleague the text of the telegram sent

have done more than this, as his Government strongly desired it, but he did not feel in the circumstances able to do so.

COUNT SFORZA, who agreed generally with Lord Curzon's suggestion, said that he was rather apprehensive as to the results of giving Serbia and Roumania an *a priori* equal footing with the other Powers at the forthcoming conference. He said this from no anti-Balkan point of view. He was notorious in Italy as a friend of the Balkan Powers and of the policy of an *entente* between Italy and them; but, if we had asked them to sign this note with the other Great Powers, we should have given them a standing which might prove rather dangerous later. In fact, the British Cabinet might find them adopting an independent attitude at the conference, and that they were actually opposed to the views upon Thrace and the Straits which the British representative would there be advocating.

Lord Curzon's proposal was then accepted by the conference, and it was also agreed that the French Minister at Athens should communicate a copy of the invitation to the Greek Government without, however, commenting upon it in any way.

to-day by the three Principal Allied Governments to the Government of Angora inviting its representatives to a conference.

'The English text is being telegraphed by Reuter's.

(To Bucharest and Belgrade only.)

'You should communicate a copy to Minister for Foreign Affairs.'

No. 52

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Sir E. Crowe (Received September 24, 10.40 a.m.)
Unnumbered Telegraphic: by bag [E 9811/27/44]

PARIS, *September 23, 1922, 11.30 p.m.*

Following from Lord Curzon for the Cabinet.

I am very grateful for wide liberty given to me in your instructions.[1] I at once attended meeting[2] at Quai d'Orsay which lasted for four hours, and resulted in preparation and signature of joint note which was communicated to press at 8.30 p.m. and will presumably appear in London papers tomorrow.[3] Cabinet will see that every one of its desiderata[4] was obtained, although French idiom—that being language of note—compelled departure from exact words of English formula as originally framed. In two respects I refrained from going as far as I was authorised. Firstly by specific mention of Maritza boundary instead of geographical area of Eastern Thrace, I was able to save for Greece considerable slice of Eastern Thrace between that river and Bulgarian frontier, which may be useful lever to them in conference discussions. Secondly by refraining from naming a precise line to which Greek troops will presently be asked to retire, some latitude will be left to allied com-

[1] See No. 49.
[2] See No. 51.
[3] It was published in *The Times* on Monday, September 25, p. 10.
[4] See No. 51, n. 8.

manders in projected meeting at Mudania, to make whatever arrangements are thought best. On the other hand conditions imposed upon Kemalists are very precise; and a phrase was introduced providing for demilitarisation of various zones unspecified, a point which I had forgotten in my draft.[5] A sentence was also added about admission of Turkey to League of Nations. I declined to allow the Mudania meeting to be converted into anything but a military conference on a single and narrowly defined point.

It is of course possible that Kemal may endeavour to secure suspension of reinforcements or withdrawal of British troops as a condition of attending peace conference. But no legitimate loophole for this is left in text of note; and it can therefore be resisted and refused on its own merits.

In expectation that I would not meet him on subject of Thracian frontier, Poincaré had prepared a note for despatch by the French alone. This contained declarations of wider compass. Nevertheless I think he was greatly relieved to find that a single pronouncement was possible; and I believe that French government are genuinely anxious, for reasons of self interest, to see the invitation accepted and the conference summoned.

Sforza lent no aid throughout the proceedings, and was little beyond a shadow in wake of the French. Had it been possible to obtain the concurrence of the Serbian and Roumanian governments before issue of the note, this would have been done. But the Serbian Ministers have already dispersed and are not to meet in Belgrade till Wednesday. Such a delay would have been disastrous. Accordingly I proposed and it was agreed to telegraph the text of note to them at once and express earnest hope that they would concur.[6]

In reply to Prime Minister's telegram concerning situation at Constantinople,[7] which did not arrive till sitting was over, I have at once telegraphed to Graham at Rome[8] requesting Italian government to telegraph orders to their representative to assist in maintenance of order. Poincaré is being addressed in same sense.[9]

I return to London tomorrow and will report to Cabinet, if thought desirable, on Monday morning.

Lord Hardinge lent me valuable assistance throughout.

[5] No. 48, Annex. [6] See No. 51, n. 11. [7] See No. 47, n. 1.
[8] Paris telegram to Rome, repeated to Foreign Office as No. 477 of September 23, not printed. [9] In a note of September 24, not printed. See No. 54, below.

No. 53

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 24)
*No. 474 Telegraphic [E 9801/27/44]**

ATHENS, *September 23, 1922*

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Greek Government were prepared to put all their resources at the disposal of His Majesty's Government, if latter desired their help as an ally.

I thanked His Excellency, and replied that my information was all to the effect that His Majesty's Government desired peaceful solution of Near Eastern question.[1]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] In Foreign Office telegram No. 253 of September 26, Lord Curzon informed Mr. Lindley that his action was approved.

No. 54

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 24)
*No. 478 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 9824/27/44]**

PARIS, *September 24, 1922*

In reply to my representations[1] M. Poincaré states that French Government are naturally ready to associate themselves with any measure strictly destined to ensure maintenance of order in Constantinople. Though not themselves aware of there being so considerable a number of armed men there as is stated by Sir H. Rumbold,[2] they are sending instructions through French High Commissioner to General Charpy to concert with General Harington as to means of preventing outburst of trouble in the town, whilst taking into account necessity of avoiding under present circumstances any measures which might be interpreted as bearing a political character and as being likely to excite local population.[3]

Copy of note by bag to-night.[4]

[1] See No. 52, n. 9. [2] See No. 47.

[3] In his telegram No. 291 of September 25, not printed, Sir R. Graham reported that similar instructions had been sent from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Constantinople.

[4] A copy of M. Poincaré's note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2227 of September 24, not printed.

No. 55

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 26, 7.30 a.m.)
No. 480 Telegraphic [E 9939/27/44]

ATHENS, *September 25, 1922, 7.45 p.m.*

Prime Minister called this morning in order to say that Greece still looked upon Great Britain as her only friend and hoped for her help.

I told him what I had just said to Thracian deputies[1] and he agreed that

[1] In his telegram No. 478 of September 25 to the Foreign Office, Mr. Lindley had reported: 'Deputation of nine Thracian deputies called this morning to plead the cause of their countrymen. In reply to their question I informed them that proposals of the Powers must be regarded as definite and that they must make up their minds that Thrace up to

local resistance was madness and that Greek government must bow to decree of powers. He would accept invitation to conference as soon as he received it and if Chamber which meets in a few days' time did not agree he would resign. I explained to him grave consequences which war with Kemalists would have had for Great Britain. He understood position and only regretted that Greek government had not realised it before.

He said government were quite willing to use Veniselos abroad but latter would not recognise present régime so there was nothing to be done. He then asked whether His Majesty's Government would not recognise King. Nothing would do more to unite Greeks and give them the moral satisfaction they so much needed. If the King were recognised and facilities for a loan accorded he had hopes that Greece might yet pull through.

I said I would report what he had said to you but that I thought it most unlikely decisions on such serious matters would be taken before peace conference had taken place.[2]

Repeated to Constantinople.

Maritza was gone since no [? one] was prepared to go to war to keep Turks out of Europe and they could not do it themselves.'

[2] In his telegram No. 257 of September 27, Lord Curzon replied: 'I approve your excellent advice to the Thracian Deputies and your language to the Prime Minister.'

No. 56

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 26, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 482 Telegraphic [E 9960/27/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *September 26, 1922, 1.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 251.[1]

I have seen Prime Minister who recognized force of Sir H. Rumbold's arguments[2] and said he would lay matter at once before Cabinet and try to have orders issued to-day.[3] His Excellency added that Greeks had information that Turks were landing small parties at Midia and that was reason why Greeks were still at Constantinople. I replied I understood His Majesty's Government would not allow Kemalists to cross into Europe pending negotiations and that Greek ships were therefore useless.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Of September 25. This ran: 'Please urge Greek government to withdraw Greek warships from Constantinople at once and to close their naval base there.'

[2] In his telegrams No. 543 of September 24 and No. 463 of September 25, not printed, Sir H. Rumbold stated that the presence of a Greek cruiser, the 'Averoff', and a destroyer in Constantinople was 'a source of provocation and likely to complicate matters at this critical juncture' and would reinforce the Kemalist argument 'that Greeks are allowed to use Constantinople as a naval base whilst Turks are forbidden to cross the neutral zone'.

[3] In his telegram No. 493 of September 26, Mr. Lindley reported: 'Prime Minister has just let me know that orders have been given to all Greek men-of-war to leave Constantinople except two torpedo boat destroyers which would take off Greek officials in case of need.'

No. 57

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 26, 5.15 p.m.)
No. 481 Telegraphic [E 9965/27/44]

PARIS, *September 26, 1922, 2 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 325.[1]

I have been in touch by telephone with President of the Council who is at his country place till to-morrow night. He promises to send immediate instructions to General Pellé and Admiral Dumesnil to do their utmost with Mustapha Kemal to obtain withdrawal of Turkish troops and to prevent any untoward incident in neutral zone.

He wishes me at the same time to impress upon Your Lordship views which he has already expressed to you recently that maintenance of troops on Asiatic shore was not in reality worth risk and danger that it entails to European peace. So long as troops were there situation was not safe from irresponsible action not on the part of Mustapha Kemal's regular but of his irregular troops and that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would yet take steps to remove this danger.[2]

As an indication of improvement in situation at Constantinople I learned at Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Hamid Bey has informed General Pellé that he has received orders from Mustapha Kemal to prevent any rising or incident in Constantinople.

[1] Of September 25, not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 461 of September 25, not printed, Sir H. Rumbold had reported the appearance of a force of Turkish cavalry in the neutral zone at Eren Keui.

No. 58

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 26, 4 p.m.)
No. 482 Telegraphic [E 9966/27/44]

PARIS, *September 26, 1922, 2 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Now that solidarity has been re-established between us and our allies I think it permissible to hold a different view to [*sic*] that held the other day at opening of conference as to importance of retaining our troops at Chanak.[2] There is force in Poincaré's argument that peace of Europe is exposed to danger by irresponsible action on the part of Turkish troops, whether regular or irregular, and it seems to me that such danger might be averted by agreement between General Harington and Mustapha Kemal that neutral zone should not be occupied by either British or Turkish troops. If an agreement

[1] No. 57. [2] See No. 41.

were come to it would be easy to ascertain whether it was being observed by air reconnaissance.[3]

[3] This telegram was discussed in a Conference of Ministers on September 27. In the draft minutes of this Conference, the Prime Minister is reported as saying that he 'was very doubtful as to this proposal'. He continued: 'The Dardanelles could not be held unless Great Britain commanded both shores. If we were to retire from Chanak we should be in a very weak position and should have made a concession which would render it very difficult for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to maintain the British position at the forthcoming Conference. Mustapha Kemal's assurances on a matter of this kind would be worthless. He might be here to-day and gone to-morrow. Lord Hardinge's proposal no doubt emanated from French sources. Let the French put the suggestion to Mustapha Kemal and let the latter, if he thought fit, submit it to Great Britain.'

No. 59

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 26, 7.30 p.m.)

No. 465 Telegraphic [E 9964/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 26, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

Admiral Brock informs me that Greek transports with troops are coming through Dardanelles bound for northern shore of Sea of Marmora. We think that in view of decision of allied governments to use their influence to bring about withdrawal of Greek forces in Thrace to a line to be fixed by allied generals in agreement with Greek and Turkish military authorities, Greeks should refrain from sending troops into Thrace via Dardanelles.[1] We are denying Thrace to Turkish troops and we are concerned to deprive Kemalists of every excuse for violating neutral zone. Meanwhile Admiral Brock is instructing Senior Naval Officer at Dardanelles to detain Greek transports bound for Sea of Marmora.[2]

Repeated to Athens.

[1] In his telegram No. 256 of September 27, Lord Curzon, referring to this telegram, instructed Mr. Lindley to 'make urgent representations in sense suggested'. In his telegram No. 264, of September 28, however, he instructed him to suspend this action (cf. No. 69, below).

[2] Commenting on this telegram, Mr. Lindley, in his telegram No. 496 of September 27, stated: '. . . I am somewhat uneasy at effect which will be produced on excited population here when it is known that we are preventing that [the Thracian] front being reinforced although Kemal has not yet answered allied invitation. It must also be remembered that no one here expects Kemal to accept invitation as it stands. Neither he nor Bolsheviks are believed to desire peace either in principle or practice.'

No. 60

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes[1] *(Washington)*
No. 290 Telegraphic [E 9951/27/44]

Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 26, 1922, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 376 (of September 25th. American attitude towards Near East Crisis).[2]

We are very glad to hear of American sympathy with our policy, and would cordially welcome any demonstration of that feeling which American government may feel disposed to give. In continuing to occupy Chanak, even though we are alone and run considerable risks, we have no idea of claiming any special or exclusive advantage. Our sole aim is to place beyond all jeopardy the future freedom of the Straits which is a world interest just as much as one affecting the British Empire.

We naturally do not request any American action in support of our attitude on the spot. But if Washington were prepared to make an authoritative statement of their point of view, it would be of immense value. Even if it were limited to concurrence in our objects as defined above it would be of great use. If it went further and indicated belief in disinterestedness of the action that has been and is being taken, the effect on Turkey and on the continent would be very great.[3]

[1] H.M. Ambassador at Washington. [2] Not printed.

[3] In his telegram No. 385 of September 26, Sir A. Geddes transmitted to the Foreign Office the following statement on the Near East situation made to the press by the American Secretary of State. 'American government is gratified to observe that proposal of 3 allied governments seeks to insure effective "liberty of Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus as well as protection of racial and religious minorities". These points of proposal are clearly in accord with American sentiment.

'This government also trusts that suitable arrangements may be agreed upon in the interests of peace to preserve freedom of the Straits pending conference to conclude a final treaty of peace between Turkey and Greece and Allies.' Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 880.

No. 61

Record by Mr. Gregory[1] *of a conversation with Monsieur Berzine*[2]
[E 11083/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 26, 1922*

Monsieur Berzine called this afternoon to enquire why the Soviet Government had not been invited to the Conference on the Near East. He referred to the telegram from Monsieur Karakhan of September 12th[3] and said that he did not understand why no answer had been returned. Russia, he insisted, was necessarily interested in the future regime to be applied to the Black Sea and the Straits, and there was no reason that the Soviet Government could see why it should not be invited to take part in the settlement.

[1] Mr. J. D. Gregory, Head of the Northern Department at the Foreign Office.

[2] Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain.

[3] See No. 38, n. 4.

Monsieur Berzine said that he had just received instructions from his Government to present a note in the sense of his present enquiry and that it would be delivered tomorrow. He said that this note would be on the lines of Monsieur Karakhan's telegram.[4] In reply to a few general questions from me, he said that Russia's relations with Kemal were regulated only by the Russo-Turkish agreement of March 1921,[5] and a subsequent supplementary agreement regarding the Caucasus;[6] that Communist opinion in Russia was divided as to the propriety of supporting the Turks; and that the Soviet Government's view of the freedom of the Straits was a communistic one, namely, that Turkey should be trusted to see to it herself. He added that, were Russia admitted to the Conference, His Majesty's Government would, however, be agreeably surprised to find that on many points the Soviet Government was not opposed to British policy.

I told Monsieur Berzine that I was neither in a position nor authorised to make any statement to him on the subject, and repeated this on a further enquiry as to whether His Majesty's Government would return an answer to the note he was about to present.

He said that he failed to understand our attitude, and asked why, as the Soviet Government had been invited to a European Conference at Genoa,[7] it could not equally be invited to this one. I replied that the Soviet Government had been invited to Genoa in order that we might endeavour to find a basis on which a general peace treaty might be established and that this had failed owing to the attitude of the Soviet Government. The Conference now contemplated had nothing whatever to do with that question. Otherwise I had nothing to add to the answer I had given him.

In connection with this question of inviting Russia to the Conference, I beg to draw attention to the marked passages in the attached secret papers,[8] which have just reached the Department.[9]

[4] This telegram, No. 1130, dated September 24, not printed, was received in the Foreign Office on September 26.

[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 46.

[6] Signed at Kars on October 13, 1921. For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 120, pp. 906–13.

[7] For the Genoa Conference, April 10 to May 19, 1922, see *Survey of International Affairs 1920–1923*, pp. 25–33.

[8] Lord Curzon noted in the margin: 'Keep them for me.'

[9] Mr. Lindsay minuted on September 26:

'The Cabinet informed the S[ecretary] of S[tate] at Paris that if Russia wished to be invited, there would be no objection.

'I presume therefore that when this anticipated note arrives, we should answer that we are consulting our allies; then communicate with Paris and Rome suggesting acquiescence.'

Lord Curzon added on the same date: 'Certainly not.'

No. 62

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 27)[1]

No. 466 Telegraphic [E 10034/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 27, 1922, 3 p.m.*

My telegram No. 461.[2]

At a meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this morning General Harington communicated reply of Mustapha Kemal to his telegram demanding withdrawal of Turkish Cavalry from Erenkeuy.[3] Another Turkish force has meanwhile entered neutral zone from the direction of Bigha. Mustapha Kemal's reply is thoroughly unsatisfactory. He denies any knowledge of neutral zone and says that the sole object of his troops is the pursuit of beaten Greek army. He alludes to activity of Greek aeroplanes near Ezine and to the presence of Greek men-of-war at Constantinople[4] on September 25th as proofs that Greek forces are not respecting neutrality of any zone. He says that Nationalists are most sincere in their desire to avoid regrettable incidents but that they have difficulty in understanding certain measures taken by British forces in Chanak area. He says that British artillery has fired upon, and dropped bombs in neighbourhood of, Nationalist troops. He repeats solemn declaration of Turkish Nationalists with regard to freedom of the Straits and finally asks General Harington 'to contribute to making of such a situation as will permit of no misunderstanding'.

My allied colleagues and allied generals accepted my proposal that General Harington should reply in detail to Mustapha Kemal refuting all his arguments and stating that Greek men-of-war have left Constantinople.[5] Reply is being drafted now and will be considered at a further meeting of Allied High Commissioners and generals this afternoon.[6]

I am convinced that if General Harington could get into personal touch with Mustapha Kemal much good would result from such a meeting.

[1] The time of receipt is uncertain.

[2] Of September 25, not printed; see No. 57, n. 2.

[3] The texts of these telegrams were communicated by General Harington to the War Office in his telegrams Nos. 1221 and 1222 of September 27, not printed.

[4] See No. 56.

[5] Cf. No. 63, below.

[6] The text of this reply was transmitted by General Harington to the War Office in his telegram No. 1223 of September 28, not printed. In his telegram No. 475 of September 28, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'Allied High Commissioners were consulted before despatch and raised [?no objections] to terms.'

No. 63

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 27, 3.50 p.m.)
No. 467 Telegraphic [E 10035/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 27, 1922, 3.30 p.m.*

Your telegram unnumbered[1] to Athens of September 25th, repeated to Constantinople No. 425.

As Greek admiral was without instructions to leave Constantinople[2] and as Nationalist agent in an interview with General Harington yesterday at once commented on presence of Greek warships here implying a connection between their presence here and violation of neutral zone at Chanak by Turkish cavalry, I took it on myself to ask Admiral Brock to request Greek admiral to leave with his warships at six this morning. The Greek admiral asked for a delay of six hours so as to complete coaling and all Greek warships have just left the port. I immediately informed Nationalist agent and Turkish government.

Admiral Brock and I consider that as His Majesty's Navy have been entrusted with task of preventing transfer of Nationalist troops from Asia to Europe it is unnecessary for Greek warships to see to this and that latter should be altogether withdrawn from Sea of Marmora. We hope instructions may be sent to Athens in this sense.

Repeated to Athens No. 145.

[1] It was numbered '251' (see No. 56, n. 1).
[2] Cf. No. 56, n. 3.

No. 64

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 27, 4 p.m.)
No. 468 Telegraphic [E 10036/27/44]

Very urgent. Confidential. CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 27, 1922, 3.45 p.m.*

French High Commissioner told me today that telegram sent by allied governments from Paris[1] had produced a detente in the situation. Mustapha Kemal's delay in replying to this note might be due to a telegram sent by Franklin-Bouillon from Paris before his departure[2] advising Mustapha Kemal to do nothing until his arrival at Smyrna. Mustapha Kemal may have interpreted this to mean that he was to await Franklin-Bouillon's arrival before answering allied note. French High Commissioner sent a strong telegram to his government saying that either Franklin-Bouillon was going to Smyrna to assure Mustapha Kemal of the good will of the French Government, in which case his mission was superfluous, or else that he was bringing with him

[1] See No. 51, n. 10. [2] See No. 51, n. 9.

promise of further concessions. In that case French High Commissioner wished to know what these were and French Government replied that Franklin-Bouillon had no authority to offer any additional concession.

No. 65

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 27, 8.20 p.m.)
No. 470 Telegraphic [E 10040/27/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 27, 1922, 6.40 p.m.*

Nationalist agent has just made following verbal communication to me on instructions from acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora. Begins.

'The concentration of British military forces at Chanak and Constantinople is not of a nature to facilitate conclusion of peace which we ardently desire.' Ends.

I informed Hamid Bey that reinforcements which were being sent to Chanak were solely in the interests of peace and had no hostile intention. I referred to telegram sent by allied governments from Paris last Saturday[1] and which bore your signature and said that having regard to terms of that telegram I could not admit that presence of British military forces on Asiatic shores of Straits indicated hostility to Kemalists.

Hamid Bey then developed at great length argument that during Turko-Greek war allies had allowed Greeks to use Constantinople as a naval base and that Greeks had been able to transport troops from Europe to Asiatic shore of Sea of Marmora. He urged that Nationalist forces should be allowed to cross to Thrace. I replied that Greek ships had now left Constantinople[2] and that allies could not contemplate continuation of war in Thrace which would certainly happen if I said that [*sic*] allied governments had undertaken to support attribution to Turkey of Eastern Thrace as far as Maritza and Adrianople. There was therefore no use in forcing an open door.

I impressed on Hamid Bey that telegram from allied governments had stipulated that in return for their intervention to secure these great advantages for Turkey Angora government must undertake not to send troops either before or during the conference to zone which had been provisionally declared neutral and not to cross Straits or Sea of Marmora.

Hamid Bey enquired at what period Turks would enter into re-occupation of Eastern Thrace. Would it be after proposed meeting at Mudania or Ismid? I said I did not think so and that Turks must be patient for a short time longer. Hamid Bey showed considerable irritation and said that he had received grave accounts of persecution to which Mohammedan population

[1] See No. 51, n. 10.

[2] See No. 63. As reported, however, in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 471 of September 27 to the Foreign Office, not printed, the Greek admiral had remained in hiding in Constantinople.

of Thrace was being subjected. Nationalists felt that they must listen to appeals of their countrymen and put an end to these persecutions.

I am not quite clear whether in his subsequent remarks Nationalist agent was voicing his own feelings or speaking under instructions. He may be bluffing to a certain extent but I am under the impression that situation with regard to neutral zone is becoming increasingly critical.

I urged on Hamid Bey expediency of a speedy meeting at Mudania or Ismid and of prompt acceptance of invitation to attend proposed conference.[3]

I subsequently informed my colleagues and allied generals of foregoing and suggested that we might send small inter-allied commissions to various places in Eastern Thrace to report and to stop excesses if possible. These commissions might have a tranquillising effect on population of those districts and give Nationalists a proof of our good intentions.

[3] In his telegram No. 472 of September 27 to the Foreign Office, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'French High Commissioner tells me that Hamid Bey has informed him that Yussuf Kemal was proceeding in two or three days' time to Angora, where he would lay Allied proposals before Grand National Assembly. It may therefore be a week before Allied Governments receive Mustapha Kemal's answer.'

No. 66

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 2946 [E 9850/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 27, 1922*

My Lord,

I have to request you to reply[1] in the following sense to the note from M. Poincaré, of which a copy was forwarded in your despatch No. 2222 of the 23rd September.[2]

2. If General Harington, as the French Government now declare, was under a misapprehension in inviting his Allied colleagues to co-operate in the defence of the neutral zones on the Asiatic shores of the Straits, it was only natural that he should have fallen into this error in view of the very explicit terms of the note of the French Embassy in London of the 28th July, of which a copy is enclosed.

3. In this note the allusion was to an attack upon Constantinople, and this, it is clear, could be delivered as easily from Ismid as from Chatalja, and specific reference was made to an attack by the Turks, which could hardly, in the circumstances of the case, be delivered from any other quarter than the Bosphorus.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[1] A copy of Lord Hardinge's note of September 28, not printed, was communicated to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2267 of September 28, not printed.

[2] See No. 48, n. 15.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 66

Comte de Saint-Aulaire to the Earl of Balfour[3]

[*E 7512/5/44*]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, LONDRES, *le 28 juillet 1922*

Des renseignements parvenus au Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Paris établissent que le Gouvernement grec prendrait en ce moment des dispositions militaires qui comporteraient une marche sur Constantinople.

Trois nouveaux régiments auraient été transférés en Thrace et des forces qui s'y trouvaient auraient déjà été transportées dans la direction de Constantinople. Les États-Majors auraient été renforcés.

D'autre part, non seulement les journaux grecs réclament et annoncent cette expédition, mais le Président du Conseil hellénique a déclaré à la Chambre des Députés que le Gouvernement allait avoir à prendre, à très brève échéance, des mesures très graves. Il se peut qu'il s'agisse seulement de manœuvres tendant à faire impression, sinon sur les Alliés, du moins sur les Turcs.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement français est d'avis que les trois Gouvernements alliés signifient de la façon la plus catégorique au Gouvernement grec que toute attaque sur la zone occupée par les Alliés, qu'elle vienne des Grecs ou des Turcs, serait réprimée par la force.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant à sa Seigneurie le Comte de Balfour de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté à ce sujet.

Il saisit, &c.

[3] The Earl of Balfour was in charge of the Foreign Office from May 26 to August 8, 1922, during the illness of Lord Curzon.

No. 67

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston

(*Received September 28, 8 p.m.*)

No. 129 Telegraphic [*E 10221/27/44*]

BELGRADE, *September 28, 1922, 3.30 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me this morning to inform you that question of furnishing detachment of two companies to demonstrate solidarity of this country in Eastern question will come before Cabinet as soon as Monsieur Pasitch returns, that is to say in a day or two. Monsieur Nincic explained that French government had recently given this country credit of 100,000,000 francs for the purpose of furthering re-equipment of Serbian army. Monsieur Nincic fears that French may take umbrage at readiness of this country to contribute Serbian detachment and may cut off all deferred credit in question. He desires, therefore, to be in position to assure Council that in the event of French acting in that manner British Government will be ready to accord similar credit and facilitate re-arming of army. M. Nincic

dwelt on the necessity of bettering equipment of army if a policy is to be followed which has potentialities of military action, and he lamented that a hundred-million francs was in any case too small a sum.[1]

[1] In his telegram No. 130 of September 28, Sir A. Young continued: 'I should have added that M. Nincic, when asking for credit similar to that given by French, added proviso that prices asked for British material should not exceed those asked by French.'

No. 68

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 28, 10.35 p.m.)
No. 480 Telegraphic [E 10152/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 28, 1922, 8.30 p.m.*

The position of affairs at Chanak is as follows:

General Marden[1] who has gone down there reports that situation is impossible as Turks have entirely disregarded neutral zone round Chanak and are collecting in considerable numbers close to British defences.[2]

Turks are evidently acting under clear orders and it is evident from Mustapha Kemal's accurate information about demolitions in Chanak area that Turkish force is not out of touch with its General Headquarters. British military authorities at Chanak have pushed restraint to the utmost possible limit.

I at once informed French High Commissioner of above. He promised to send a wireless [message] to Franklin-Bouillon who was due at Smyrna[3] this morning pointing out that danger-point at the moment was Erenkeuy and that his first care should be to get Mustapha Kemal to give necessary orders to withdraw his troops from proximity of Chanak zone and also to get Mustapha Kemal to meet General Harington at Mudania.

French High Commissioner then read an account by Admiral Dumesnil of latest interview with Mustapha Kemal. Essential part of this account was that Mustapha Kemal had given his sincere assurance that he wished to avoid a conflict at Erenkeuy, and that he had, whilst at the moment unable to withdraw his detachments, given formal orders that no aggression should be made against British troops. Mustapha Kemal also asked that if British force was not withdrawn from Chanak similar orders should be given to it.

[1] General T. O. Marden (see Vol. XVII, Nos. 213 and 233).

[2] In his telegram No. 2486 of September 28 to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'I have just received a wire from General Marden saying that at 1545 hours Turkish column 2 miles long was reported marching on Asmali Tepe apparently to cut his mobile column at Kepez. Col. Shuttleworth has gone out to turn them back. General Marden has authorized firing to be opened if this should prove necessary. I have approved. I think this is the column from Erenkeui [see No. 57, n. 2]. I regret very much having to take this action but I have no alternative as Kemalists have challenged me. To avoid ever being charged with provoking a conflict I refrained from shooting them at Erenkeui like (? sitting) rabbits.'

[3] See No. 64.

I have informed General Harington of foregoing. Situation evidently contemplated by Mustapha Kemal is that British and Turks should watch each other whilst Turkish forces are piling up until Mustapha Kemal thinks that he is strong enough to attack.

Admiral Brock informs me he has given orders that Turkish craft should be cleared from Asiatic shore of Dardanelles.

No. 69

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 441 Telegraphic [E 10197/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 28, 1922, 10.15 p.m.*

Cabinet have given prolonged and anxious consideration to proposals made by Harington in his telegram No. 2485.[1] We should have been glad if his views, which he had apparently communicated to you, had been accompanied by an expression of your own opinion,[2] the more so as the proposals made raise political issues of gravest importance, involving some departure from Paris agreement, and therefore necessitating communication with our allies.

Harington's first proposal is for a personal meeting with Mustapha Kemal. War Office has telegraphed[3] to him that an independent meeting is inconsistent with Paris agreement, but that we are entirely in favour of Mudania meeting taking place at once under conditions laid down at Paris and that if personal meeting be proposed it should be converted into Mudania conference.[4]

Harington's second proposal is to fix line to which Greek army are to be invited to retire at Maritsa River. Should the generals concur in this proposal at Mudania, and should the Greeks accept it, no question of a military crossing by Kemalists into Europe will arise, though in that case we shall have to provide for provisional administration in evacuated areas, as contemplated in your telegram No. 469.[5] It seems to us useless to assign this task to Constantinople government, because in the first place we doubt their ability to carry it out, and secondly we doubt if Kemal would agree. He will no doubt express his opinions on the matter at Mudania, and final decision should not be made without reference to High Commissioners and to Allied Powers, since matter is evidently political rather than military.

In the contrary event of the Greeks declining to accept Mudania decision, and refusing to withdraw, a new situation is created, and Harington's plan

[1] Of September 28, not printed.

[2] Sir H. Rumbold had communicated his views in his telegram No. 479 of September 28, not printed. This telegram was received in the Foreign Office at 8.15 p.m. on September 28; the Cabinet had met at 4 p.m. See No. 77, below.

[3] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

[4] This decision was reached by the Cabinet on September 28.

[5] Of September 27. See No. 81, n. 3, below.

for meeting it is not strictly in accordance with Paris decisions. He proposes that passage of Marmora should be permitted to Kemal because the waters and coasts of the Marmora are not included in the neutral zones which the latter has been told to respect. As to this it must be pointed out: (1) that the crossing of the Marmora at present state is expressly prohibited in the Paris terms and could only be permitted with allied consent: (2) that it would involve consequences which Harington has not fully foreseen and which must be carefully considered before proposal is made. The liberty accorded to Kemal could not in logic or fairness be unilateral. If he were permitted to cross into Europe to fight the Greeks and anticipate the decision of peace conference by establishing his rule in Eastern Thrace Greek ships could not be prevented from using non-neutral waters of Marmora at same time, in order to resist his passage; and embargo placed on Greek ships and transports would have to be withdrawn.

In this way proposed plan might have consequence of not only re-opening war between Turkey and Greece but of transferring theatre of that war to Europe with consequences that cannot be foreseen.

These are the important considerations to which we invite your attention and upon which we are reluctant to decide until we have heard your views.

Broadly speaking our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris terms and only to contemplate departure from them where such departure is made subject of allied consultation and can be justified in interests of peace.

No. 70

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 442 Telegraphic [E 10149/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 28, 1922, 10.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 476.[1]

Please make following intimation to Angora representative at Constantinople.

In accordance with spirit of Paris agreement we have hitherto prevented and are still preventing entry of Greek transports and men-of-war into Marmora and Dardanelles.

If however, Mustapha Kemal does not withdraw from neutral zone, justification for this prohibition will no longer exist, and it will be withdrawn.

(For your information).

On the other hand we do not think that neutrality requires us to compel withdrawal of Greek ships at present in Marmora. Please inform Harington and Admiral of this decision.

Repeated to Paris No. 327, and Rome No. 287.

[1] Of September 28, not printed.

No. 71

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 124 Telegraphic [E 10199/27/44]

Urgent BUCHAREST, *September 28, 1922, 11 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 421 to Constantinople.[1]

Having heard from High Commissioner that I might approach Roumanian government[2] I made enquiry indicated in your telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs[3] states that Roumanian government would be ready to supply oil fuel [*sic*][4] and fresh provisions to amount suggested and permit the use of Constanza as base, but on conditions that convention on the subject should be signed with His Majesty's Government guaranteeing Roumania against all consequence of such action.[5] He explained that Soviet government had asserted[6] that to afford these supplies and give use of base was not in accordance with neutrality of Roumania and might make this an excuse for attack.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Of September 23, repeated to Bucharest as No. 84. This ran: 'We desire to learn whether oil fuel and fresh provisions for a naval force of about four thousand men could be provided by Roumanian authorities and whether latter will permit use of Constanza as a base.'

[2] The reference is to Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 462 of September 25 to the Foreign Office, repeated to Bucharest, not printed.

[3] M. Jon Duca.

[4] The word 'wheat' was suggested in the Foreign Office.

[5] In a letter of September 30 to the Admiralty, Mr. Oliphant stated: 'Lord Curzon can hardly conceive that the Cabinet would be prepared to accept such large and undefined responsibilities as are indicated in the Roumanian proposal.'

[6] The words 'had asserted' were queried in the Foreign Office, and the reading 'might assert' was suggested.

No. 72

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 29, 7.30 a.m.)
No. 515 Telegraphic [E 10175/27/44][1]

ATHENS, *September 29, 1922, 2 a.m.*

Military attaché reports that General Staff here are expecting supersession, but their successors not yet appointed, consequently authoritative information difficult to find. General Staff estimate is as follows:

Troops now in Thrace are 4th Army Corps (three divisions) and 3rd Army Corps (two divisions); total, five divisions with (? three) batteries of 6-inch

[1] This was a reply to Foreign Office telegram No. 261 of September 27, not printed. Information concerning the military position in Greece had been requested by the Prime Minister at a Cabinet meeting held at 7 p.m. on September 27.

howitzers and (? six) batteries of field artillery. For further details of 4th Army Corps see my telegram No. 450[2] and my telegram No. 462[3]. Further details of 3rd Army Corps not yet accurately known. The strength of these five divisions has varied; average strength is probably between 8,000 and 10,000. This estimate would make total now in Thrace about 50,000, of which 20,000 count as rifles.

The *moral* of these troops fell after collapse of Greek southern army, but Greek General Staff believe that there has now been some improvement. (*Note.*—Improvement is not confirmed from Constantinople.)

Troops in Athens consist of two regiments of cavalry and two batteries of field artillery; remains of three divisions from Asia Minor; and 2nd division, which marched in to-day to support change of régime. Total about 12,000. *Moral* of 2nd division and of artillery seems good, of others low, but likely to conform to 2nd division.

Troops in Mitylene and Chios are remains of four divisions, total about 15,000. *Moral* unreliable and dependent upon success of military movement here.

Troops in Salonica (excluding details of 14th division, which is stretched along Macedonian frontier) are independent division, strength probably not more than 8,000, *moral* reported good.

Plan at present outlined is to retain four classes, 1919 to 1922, to confirm summons already given to 1923 class and to recall two or more of classes older than 1919; to form two divisions (or three if response is good) here and in the islands and to send them to Thrace with independent division. This would give eight (or nine) divisions in Thrace, say a total of 100,000 men, comprising 36,000 rifles; but no estimate of time required to organise can be given before new Government moves.

General Staff say enough mountain artillery was saved from Asia Minor to provide for projected force; that guns and equipment for more than ten batteries of field artillery are stored in Athens and that, in the absence of horses, guns required by army will be drawn by agricultural tractors, which are available and have given good experimental results. Over 1,000 rounds a gun are immediately available, also personnel for all artillery of 9th Army. There are also three batteries of Skoda 15-cm. guns at Salonica.

Transport: No details yet, but General Staff believe sufficient.

Military organisation, force and supply in Thrace are much hampered by refugees.

General Staff assert that most of the artillery lost in Asia Minor was effectively destroyed.

My own impression is that at present moment everything is fluid and nothing certain can be predicted about *moral*. Original idea of revolution[4] was to strengthen Thracian front, but it is not certain that this idea will continue to predominate. Nevertheless, I still consider that a serious Greek

[2] Of September 17, not printed.
[3] Of September 20, not printed.
[4] See No. 85, below.

army would be available if fighting for definite object and fully supported by Great Britain.

Repeated to Constantinople.[5]

[5] General Harington, in his telegram No. 2524 of September 29 to the War Office, commented on this report as follows: 'I think it is far too optimistic. It does however show that Greeks appear to (be apparently) profiting by measures we are trying to take to stop Kemalists pursuing them to reorganize and reinforce their force in Thrace in defiance [of] declared intention of Allies to hand back Eastern Thrace to Turks. . . . My position will become perfectly impossible unless this Greek organization is stopped at once and it will certainly react on my forces. Greek debacle has been troublesome enough and I consider every effort should be made to prevent them starting more operations which will only lead to another debacle and land us in war as well. I trust Cabinet may be informed of my view at once.'

No. 73

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 447 Telegraphic [E 10147/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1922, 2.45 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 474[1] and 475[2] (of 28th September).

We shall be quite prepared to intimate to Greece decision as to retirement of Greek troops[3] as soon as that decision has been reached in accordance with Paris agreement, i.e. by meeting of commanders at Mudania. Signatories of Paris Note,[4] when providing for retirement of Greeks behind a line in Thrace before opening of Conference were obviously alluding to ultimate Peace Conference. They never contemplated withdrawal before Mudania meeting. If, therefore, Mustapha Kemal desires to expedite Greek retirement, all he has to do is to come to Mudania without delay instead of talking about it. But it is really impossible to take such a step, while Kemal refrains from answering Paris Note, while his forces are directly menacing ours at Chanak, and remain in continued occupation of neutral zone, and while he procrastinates about coming to Mudania. There is a limit of concession beyond which it is impossible to proceed.

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 62, n. 6. [3] See No. 59. [4] See No. 52.

No. 74

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 448 Telegraphic [E 10151/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1922, 3 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 479 (of 28th September).[1]

Notification to Angora Government, which you suggest, has already been made. It is contained in Paris Note[2] which expressly denies to Mustapha

[1] See No. 69, n. 2. [2] See No. 52.

Kemal the passage of Marmora up to and during the Peace Conference. This being so it would appear that French and Italian Admirals, and French and Italian High Commissioners could not refuse to help Admiral Brock in carrying out decisions approved by their Governments at Paris. You should, if necessary, represent matter to them in this light.[3]

[3] Referring to this telegram Sir H. Rumbold, in his telegram No. 494 of October 1 reported: 'French High Commissioner replied that the only instructions he had on the subject were that if British ships attacked Kemal's, French were to take no action.... Italian High Commissioner said he had no instructions on the subject but would ask for them.'

No. 75

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 292 Telegraphic [E 10219/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 29, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Your No. 293.[1]

It may interest you to know that Sforza's claim to responsibility either for policy or phraseology of Paris Note[2] is wholly destitute of foundation. Beyond backing up the French wherever a disputed point arose, he played as is usual a quite inconspicuous part; and his propaganda in Italian press though familiar to us from his achievements in same line on previous occasions, is equally fantastic.

[1] Of September 28, not printed. [2] See No. 52.

No. 76

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 330[1] Telegraphic [E 10145/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 30, 1922, 12.20 p.m.*

His Majesty's Minister at Athens enquires[2] whether Greek retirement in Thrace contemplated in antepenultimate and penultimate paragraphs of allied invitation to Angora of September 23rd[3] is actually to take place prior to Kemal's acceptance of invitation to Peace conference.

[1] No. 330 to Paris, No. 293 to Rome.

[2] In his telegram No. 506 of September 28, not printed. Sir H. Rumbold had commented in his telegram No. 486 of September 29, which was repeated to Athens: 'Request to Greek Government to withdraw troops behind Maritza line should presumably be made immediately after preliminary meeting of Allied generals at Mudania or Ismid, and of course only if result of that meeting is satisfactory.'

[3] See No. 51, n. 10 and No. 52.

In our view, which we cannot doubt will be shared by French/Italian government, the answer is in the negative, and Kemal cannot accept the note in fractions.[4]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 451, and Athens No. 272.

[4] The French reply (a Note of October 1, which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 2292 of October 1, not printed) was: 'Sans entrer dans l'examen de l'interprétation de la note alliée, j'estime qu'il y aurait un intérêt capital pour la paix à ce que l'évacuation de la Thrace par les Grecs eût lieu le plus tôt possible. C'est ce que proposent d'ailleurs, si je suis bien renseigné, les Hauts Commissaires Alliés à Constantinople.'

No. 77

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received September 30, 10.5 p.m.)
No. 487 Telegraphic [E 10263/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 30, 1922, 5.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 441[1] has crossed my telegram No. 479[2] containing my comments on General Harington's telegram No. 2485. I sent these comments immediately after I had received communication of General Harington's above mentioned telegram. My present telegram supplements those comments and deals with specific points you have raised.

1. I entirely agree that it is inadvisable that General Harington should meet Mustapha Kemal alone. If and when Mustapha Kemal says he is ready for a meeting at Mudania the three allied generals should proceed there. In view of Kemalist invasion of neutral zone at Chanak it is obvious that General Harington will have more to discuss with Mustapha Kemal than the two allied generals.

2. I agree that in the event of Maritza being fixed and Greeks accepting it, it would be useless to assign administration of evacuated area to Constantinople government. Mustapha Kemal would never agree to such a procedure. We must rely on allied generals to submit proposals for administration of this area after their meeting with Kemal at Mudania.

3. In the event of Greeks declining to withdraw from Eastern Thrace it appears to me that allies will be confronted with alternative of bringing pressure on Greece to withdraw or of standing aside and allowing Kemal to transport his troops to European shore of Marmora. But allies would not be justified in putting pressure on Greece unless Kemal observed his share of the bargain by respecting neutral zones. If allies stood aside advantages offered to Kemal under Paris proposals would presumably lapse, at all events for the moment. In that event we could not deny Greeks right of entering non-neutral waters of Marmora and attempting to prevent passage of Kemalist troops from Asia to Europe. In practice Kemal would not be able to cross either Dardanelles or Sea of Marmora and he would be limited to

[1] No. 69. [2] See No. 69, n. 2.

trying to cross Bosphorus. This means that he would regardless of consequences try to invade neutral zone opposite Constantinople. The British force would be exposed to weight of bulk of Kemalist army and would inevitably have to withdraw. If Greeks tried to dispute passage of Bosphorus there would be fighting at Constantinople results of which would probably be disastrous to the town.

My telegram No. 479 will have shown you that I am fully alive to consequences of transfer of . . .[3] war to Europe. I consider we should do everything possible to avoid such a disastrous eventuality and I entirely agree that our policy should be to adhere as closely as possible to Paris agreement.

Unfortunately it looks at present as if both Kemal and Greeks will make it difficult to adhere closely to Paris agreement. Kemal's delay in replying to allied telegram from Paris[4] coupled with his invasion of neutral zone at Chanak may at any moment lead to an incident which may mark beginning of hostilities and compromise whole position. It is reported that Kemal is having great difficulty in restraining his generals who are certain to be egged on by Bolsheviks but I believe he is playing for time. On the other hand it would seem that watchword of new Greek régime[5] is to be, reorganize Greek troops for defence of Eastern Thrace. There seems little doubt that Greeks in Eastern Thrace are acting in a manner calculated to exasperate Kemalists.

In view of foregoing considerations our energies locally must be directed to getting Kemal to meet allied generals at Mudania as soon as possible. If we can secure this His Majesty's Government will no doubt consider in good time what form of pressure will have to be applied to Greece to get her to evacuate Eastern Thrace.

I entirely agree with last sentence of your telegram under reply.

I have shown this telegram before despatch to Admiral Brock and General Harington both of whom concur in its terms.

[3] The text is here uncertain.
[4] See No. 51, n. 10 and No. 52.
[5] See No. 85, below.

No. 78

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 332 Telegraphic [E 10249/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *September 30, 1922, 10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 492 (of September 30th. Conversation with Monsieur Poincaré) last paragraph.[1]

[1] Not printed. The paragraph in question ran: 'I presume that the statements of the French press [that General Harington had been authorised to issue an ultimatum to the Turks] are inexact, in view of the fact that I can find no corroboration in the Foreign Office and military telegrams sent to me by bag last night, and it would be useful if I could contradict them here.'

Following telegram sent[2] September 29th to General Officer Commanding Constantinople. Begins:

Secret

Kemalists are obviously continuing to move up troops and are making efforts to net you in. General Staff advises that the defensive position will be seriously endangered if this is allowed to continue and that the time has come to avert this disaster. It has therefore been decided by the Cabinet that immediate notification is to be sent to the local commander of the Turkish troops around Chanak, that unless his troops are withdrawn by a time to be fixed by you at which time our combined forces will be in their proper positions all the forces at our disposal, naval, military and air will open fire on the Turks. You will use the air so long as the enemy is within the neutral zone, in the event of it being necessary to open fire. Time limit given should be short. It should not be forgotten that we have been warned by intelligence reports of September 30th as the date of possible attack. Ends.[3]

[2] By the War Office, telegram No. 91255.

[3] In his Note of October 1 to M. Poincaré (a copy of which was enclosed in Paris despatch No. 2290 of October 1, not printed) Lord Hardinge wrote: 'In view of the continuous movements of troops by the Kemalists—movements which could only result in the encircling of the British forces at Chanak thereby seriously endangering the defensive position if allowed to continue—the Cabinet decided on September 29th that the time had come to avert this possible disaster, and that the local Turkish commander should be notified that the British forces would open fire on his troops if they were not withdrawn from the neutral zone within a time to be fixed by General Harington. Your Excellency will, I feel sure, appreciate the necessity of this step being taken to ensure the evacuation of the neutral zone and thus to avert a serious and growing danger to the British position. I have no official knowledge of the steps taken by General Harington in execution of the decision of the Cabinet.'

No. 79

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received September 30)

*No. 490 Telegraphic [E 10265/27/44]**

CONSTANTINOPLE, *September 30, 1922*

General Harington has shown me his telegram No. 2538 to War Office.[1] I am in agreement with it. General Marden reports a distinct improvement

[1] Of September 30. This was a reply to the instructions from the War Office in their telegram No. 91255 of September 29 (see No. 78). It ran: 'I share Cabinet's desire to end procrastinations of Kemal and I note decision of Cabinet but I would earnestly beg that matter be left to my judgement for moment. There is no question of disaster or danger to British forces until Kemalists bring up serious force of guns and infantry. To have some 4000 so called cavalry at close quarters is only a minor affair and General Marden has said that his position is strong enough to hold out against anything except a very serious attack.... To me it seems very inadvisable just at moment when within reach of distance of meeting between Allied Generals and Kemal which Hamid says will be in two or three days and Angora Government are penning their reply to Allied note [see No. 51, n. 10] that I

in situation at Chanak. The Angora Government is now discussing its reply to Allied telegram, and you will have seen from my immediately preceding telegram[2] that there is now a good chance of meeting at Mudania. If General Harington were to carry out his instructions at once we might compromise the situation irremediably. I do not think we lose anything by delaying action for two or three days to see whether meeting at Mudania materialises. I do not think Kemalists mean business at Chanak. Mustapha Kemal probably means to strengthen his military position at Ismid as much as possible before coming to meeting at Mudania.

should launch avalanche of fire which will put a match to mine here and everywhere else and from which there will be no drawing back. I have incessantly been working for peace which I thought was the wish of His Majesty's Government. To suppose my not having fired so far at Chanak has been interpreted as sign of weakness is quite wrong because I have been very careful to warn Hamid that I have [the power] of England behind me and that I shall not hesitate to use it if time comes. General Marden has full powers from me to strike when he thinks fit. . . .'

It is most interesting to note that in a Cabinet Meeting held at 10 p.m. on Friday, September 29, Lord Curzon, who earlier that day had seen Dr. Nihad Rechad, had, while admitting that the question was ultimately a military one, suggested that there were political grounds for delaying the delivery of the ultimatum by some twenty-four hours. A long discussion followed and it was decided to let the ultimatum go forward. Lord Curzon, when asked whether he differed from the general view, replied that he hoped the decision was the right one. He still had apprehensions, but he thought the question was decided, first by the physical impossibility of stopping the ultimatum in time, and, secondly, by the strong belief of Lord Cavan, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that twenty-four hours, while adding little to the strength of the British forces, might add considerably to that of the enemy.

[2] Of September 30. See No. 83, n. 1, below.

No. 80

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 277 Telegraphic [E 10283/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 1, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

Rumbold's telegram No. 495.[1]

Meeting at Mudania will begin October 3rd.[2] General Harington was instructed some days ago[3] to apprise Greek commander with a view to securing his presence in accordance with terms of Paris note. But we do not know if contact has been established between the two. It seems very desirable

[1] Of October 1, not printed.

[2] Lord Hardinge, in his telegram No. 494 of October 1, had communicated to the Foreign Office the substance of a telegram from M. Franklin-Bouillon to M. Poincaré, in which it had been reported that Mustafa Kemal had accepted October 3 as the date of the proposed meeting at Mudania (see No. 73).

[3] This telegram has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives. It was presumably sent in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet Meeting held at 11 a.m. on September 28, that 'the War Office should ask General Harington to arrange for the presence of a Greek General [at Mudania]'.

that Greek government should appoint and send their representative at once, since it is not in their own interests that matter should be discussed in their absence.[4]

Repeated to Paris No. 335, and Rome No. 297.

[4] In his telegram No. 337 to Paris, No. 298 to Rome, of October 1, Lord Curzon instructed Lord Hardinge and Sir R. Graham to request the French and Italian Governments to send similar instructions to their representative at Athens.

No. 81

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 455 and No. 456 Telegraphic [E 10377/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 1, 1922, 7.30 p.m.*

His Majesty's Government are glad to hear that Mudania meeting is to take place without delay,[1] and have considered very carefully form of instructions to be sent to Military commanders who will take part in it. Under Paris agreement sole object of this meeting is to fix line of retirement of Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with Greek and Turkish military authorities, the Angora government in return for this intervention to undertake not to send troops either before or during final peace conference into neutral zones and not to cross Straits of Marmora.

These conditions must be borne strictly in mind. In accordance with them General Harington, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, was instructed by War Office on September 28th[2] to communicate with Allied Generals and the representative of Greek forces, and to arrange for their presence. It is presumed that this has been done.

When Mudania meeting takes place, on October 3rd, the Commanders should proceed with the duty assigned to them at Paris; and should discuss and fix the line in Eastern Thrace. At the same time they should inform Mustapha Kemal that the allied governments cannot exercise pressure upon the Greeks to withdraw behind the line determined, until

(1) the Kemalist forces have, in accordance with the Paris terms, withdrawn entirely from the neutral zones and

(2) until satisfactory arrangements have been made for the preservation of order, and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality, in the evacuated areas.

This will raise at once the question of the provisional administration of Eastern Thrace pending the meeting of the peace conference. The Generals at Mudania will obviously have no authority to settle this question, which is one for the allied governments acting on the advice of their High Commissioners.

It is necessary therefore that the latter should at once proceed to draw up a scheme and should forward it to their several governments with as little

[1] See No. 80, n. 2. [2] See No. 80, n. 3.

delay as possible. We have duly considered the opinions on this subject put forward in your telegrams Nos. 469[3], 474[4] and 487[5] and have further received representations from the French[6] and Italian[7] governments on the subject. There seems to be a general agreement:

(1) that the administration should be controlled by allied officers;

(2) that local gendarmerie should as far as possible be employed to maintain order, and should, if the necessity arises, be reinforced by allied troops;

(3) that it will be useless to hand over the civil administration to the Constantinople government which is powerless to exercise it.

The French Ambassador has communicated to us a proposal of M. Franklin Bouillon for the employment of allied detachments at selected places[8] which M. Bouillon will doubtless communicate to you on his arrival in Constantinople to-day.[9] He admits that Turkish troops could not be admitted until treaty of peace has been concluded and put into operation; and this is obvious, seeing that the admission of Kemalist forces now would not only provoke a violent conflict but would render peace conference superfluous by anticipating its decisions. Upon the principle of inter-allied occupation there is therefore complete agreement.

We are informing French and Italian governments of these proposals and

[3] Of September 27. This reported: 'Meeting was held this morning to discuss question of instructions to be given to allied generals in connection with their proposed meeting with Mustapha Kemal at Mudania or Ismid to fix line behind which Greek forces must retire previous to meeting of conference.

'In opinion of allied generals only practical solution would be retirement behind Maritza line, east Thrace thereby becoming special zone in which some Turkish administration would have to be immediately instituted.

'Allied High Commissioners concurred in this view and decided to request their governments to furnish them with instructions as to character of that administration and authority from which it should derive i.e. Angora or Central Government. It was agreed that administration would of course only be provisional for say two months and that order should be maintained if possible by local recruitment of gendarmerie with nucleus of allied officers.'

[4] Of September 28. This stated: 'Question of means to be employed to compel Greek government to comply with this intimation and of temporary administration to be set up in eastern Thrace during arrangement of negotiations must then be considered. It is indispensable that such administration should be controlled by allied officers and a nucleus of allied troops but it remains for decision whether Kemalists or Constantinople government officials and gendarmerie should be employed for the purpose.'

[5] No. 77. [6] In a conversation with Sir W. Tyrrell on September 29.

[7] In a verbal communication of September 30 to Mr. Lindsay.

[8] M. Franklin-Bouillon's proposal for the employment of Allied detachments at Adrianople, Cherkesskeui, Babaeski, Rodosto, Kirk Kilisse, Ipsala, Enos, Gallipoli, Midia and Keshan, was communicated to the Foreign Office by the Comte de Saint-Aulaire on September 30 (E 10269/27/44).

[9] In his telegram No. 503 of October 2, Sir H. Rumbold transmitted to the Foreign Office the chief points of Monsieur Franklin-Bouillon's account of his negotiations in Smyrna. This account included the statement that at the last minute he had induced the Turks to suspend all movements of their troops, it being stipulated that the Allies should give proof 'of their good faith by themselves ejecting Greeks from Thrace and preserving that province from the ruin which had befallen Anatolia'.

are asking them to instruct their High Commissioners in above sense.[10] We hope that you will proceed with latter to immediate elaboration of scheme in order that there may be no unnecessary delay. We cannot contemplate Mudania meeting being spun out from day to day, in order to enable Mustapha Kemal to strengthen his position at Ismid with a view to invading Europe. We recognise immense danger of such an invasion in its effect not merely on the general situation but on the population of Constantinople.

In the meantime we are glad to hear from your telegram No. 483[11] that three or four inter-allied commissions are starting at once or have already started for Eastern Thrace, to calm apprehensions both of Greeks and Turks. Their advice should be of value in drawing up scheme of provisional administration.

Object of above instructions which are I trust clear, is:

(1) to confine Mudania decisions of Commanders to purely military role assigned to them at Paris;

(2) to require of Kemal loyal acceptance of Paris terms, as condition of allied influence to secure evacuation of Thrace;

(3) to refer to High Commissioners all questions of a political character upon which Generals will of course report views of Kemal but which they are not themselves competent to decide.

For your own information. General Harington is at the same time authorised to inform Mustapha Kemal that Great Britain cannot participate in above measures, which are designed to bring about peaceful settlement, while Kemalist forces are taking hostile action against Kurdistan and Iraq and that these must be suspended. Kemal cannot go on making war in Asia while we are endeavouring to make peace in Europe.

In the course of Mudania meeting Mustapha Kemal may raise several points upon which you should instruct Harington, who has been duly advised,[12] in following sense:

It is extremely undesirable that we should be drawn into any agreement about the stopping of British reinforcements to the Turkish theatre. Such an agreement would be bound to lead to disputes and to allegations of breach of faith in view of our complicated troop movements which may be necessary from one point to another and to the general service of the Empire. Moreover the stipulation which we should have to exact against the forward movements of Kemalist troops and guns towards the neutral zones would certainly not be accepted by him, or observed by him if accepted. Harington

[10] Telegrams No. 336 to Paris (not traced in the Foreign Office archives), and No. 299 to Rome.

[11] Of September 29, not printed. In his telegram No. 507 of October 3, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'Three inter-Allied commissions are leaving Constantinople to-day for Rodosto, Lule Burgas and Adrianople. . . .'

[12] In accordance with the decisions of a Cabinet meeting on October 1 (E 10539/27/44). The War Office telegram to General Harington containing these instructions (?No. 91289 of October 1) has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives.

should therefore leave it to him to raise the question, and confine him in the first instance to showing all the objections and difficulties.

If, however, an arrangement of this kind is indispensable to the achievement of an otherwise satisfactory settlement we should be willing to agree to the following:

That no reinforcements of fighting units for the Army or Royal Air Force shall be embarked from any territory under the control of the British Government for the purpose of reinforcing the British forces in your command, over and above what has actually embarked before the date of this agreement, and the British Government will ask the Dominions not to despatch any forces after that date. But we must retain liberty to add such medical and administrative personnel as may be necessary, and to replace sick wastage.

It must be clearly understood however

(a) That the above undertaking only refers to the fighting units of the Army and Royal Air Force and not to the supplies and stores required to maintain the said forces in an efficient condition.

(b) That the transport of drafts to and from India and other British territory, through the Mediterranean, is not restricted.

The whole of the above must be subject to such reasonable undertaking by Mustapha Kemal as Harington may deem necessary and will hold good so long as Kemal observes his undertakings.

We must retain the right to carry out air reconnaissance over the neutral zones in the Dardanelles and the Ismid Peninsula.

These instructions are for the general guidance of Harington who will report if other subjects are raised.

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 334.

First part only up to 'For your information', repeated to Rome No. 296 and Athens No. 276.[13]

[13] The first part was also repeated to Washington in Foreign Office telegram No. 298 of October 1, not printed.

No. 82

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 336 Telegraphic: by bag [E 10278/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 1, 1922*

Your Nos. 494,[1] 495[2] and 496.[2]

Cabinet had already completed their instructions to Rumbold and Harington when above arrived, and my telegram[3] containing these instructions has been repeated to you. You should speak in sense of this telegram to Monsieur Poincaré and request him to send similar instructions to French High

[1] See No. 80, n. 2. [2] Of October 1, not printed
[3] No. 81.

Commissioner at Constantinople.[4] Main thing is that Mudania meeting should take place on October 3rd, and it is impossible to lay down a new set of conditions, which were never contemplated at Paris in advance.

[4] Lord Hardinge reported in his telegram No. 498 of October 2: 'I have seen President of the Council and have read him first part of instructions given to Sir H. Rumbold in your telegram No. 455. He appeared to be quite satisfied.'

No. 83

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 1, 9.45 p.m.)
No. 498 and No. 499 Telegraphic [E 10286/27/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 1, 1922, 8 p.m.*

My telegram No. 489[1] and my telegram No. 493.[2]

At meeting with General Harington and Admiral Brock this morning former stated that Kemal was making dispositions which would enable him to attack neutral zone in Ismid peninsula with force of 50,000 rifles. We agreed that he must not be allowed to play for time indefinitely and decided to bring question of Mudania meeting to a head. I sent Mr. Ryan to Hamid Bey this afternoon with verbal . . .[3] on following lines:

'British High Commissioner confirms what he said yesterday[4] about growing impatience of His Majesty's Government in presence of situation which silence of Nationalist authorities and continuous presence of their troops in neutral zone tends to prolong indefinitely in spite of His Majesty's Government's efforts to bring about peaceful solution.

'In view of uncertainty in which he is left regarding Nationalist intentions General Harington declares his readiness to proceed to Mudania on October 3rd[5] at 11 a.m. in accordance with proposal of allied governments for preliminary meeting. He expects Nationalist Commander to meet him. If Nationalist authorities do not comply British High Commissioner and General Harington will draw their own conclusions.'

[1] Of September 30. This ran: 'I have just made communication to Angora representative. I took this opportunity of telling him in strongest possible terms that procrastination on the part of Angora government must cease and that there must be no further vague talk of meeting at Mudania. I said that this meeting must come off without further loss of time and I spoke in the sense of sentence of your telegram No. 447 [No. 73] beginning 'if therefore Mustapha Kemal desires etc.' I said that action of Kemal in entering neutral zone at Chanak was provocative and that there was a limit to the patience of His Majesty's Government. . . . This shook Hamid [who] hastened to say that whilst he could only speak privately he had reason to believe that meeting at Mudania would take place within two or three days, time. He said he would attend it and he asked that one of the vessels of Serai-Sefain fleet, name of which he gave, should be fitted with a wireless apparatus so as to enable him to communicate with Constantinople. I think this means that details of meeting at Mudania have been arranged at Smyrna.'

[2] Of September 30; text not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

[3] The text is here uncertain. [4] See n. 1. [5] See No. 80.

Mr. Ryan explained that General Harington would be accompanied by allied Generals and that object of meeting would be as defined in allied note of September 23rd.[6] He added that we had reason to believe that Nationalists themselves contemplated meeting on October 3rd.

Hamid confirmed this. He said that he had received communication from Smyrna which he had been unable to act on as text was corrupt. He was expecting repetition at any moment. Sense however was that Ismet Pasha, Commander of western army, would come to Mudania on October 3rd to discuss delimitation and evacuation of Thrace. Question of neutral zone was not mentioned but message added for his information that orders had been given to arrest all forward movement in direction of Constantinople, Chanak, and even against Greeks. It also stated that meeting would take place in hope of preparing the way for conference. He himself was instructed to attend Mudania meeting.

Mr. Ryan said that Admiral could not see his way to allow installation of wireless on Turkish vessel but would give all facilities for transmission of messages in cypher or otherwise from Mudania if meeting took place.

Repeated to Athens No. 158.[7]

[6] See No. 52, n. 3.

[7] Referring to this telegram, Sir H. Rumbold, in his telegram No. 500 of October 1, stated: 'In subsequent private conversation Hamid mentioned Western Thrace and said Turks would [insist] on plebiscite at conference. He said population desired reunion with Turkey. No one wanted autonomy.

'He used uncompromising language about Capitulations, even as regards substitution of modernised system with guarantees for foreigners against abuses.'

No. 84

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 2, 6.30 a.m.)
No. 497 Telegraphic [E 10289/27/44]

PARIS, *October 1, 1922, 11.37 p.m.*

President of the Council asked me to come and see him this morning [*sic*] at 7 o'clock. He read to me several telegrams which he had received during the day from Constantinople and Smyrna. Amongst them was a telegram[1] from Yussuf Kemal, Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs, practically accepting proposal for conference with certain reservations in connection with evacuation of Thrace which he expected to be settled by generals at proposed meeting at Mudania on October 3rd where General Ismet would be Turkish representative.

Amongst other telegrams he read one from General Pellé recording what Hamid Bey had repeated to him of an interview with Sir H. Rumbold in which latter made communication contained in your telegram No. 328 (? of

[1] Of September 29. The French text of this telegram is printed in Frangulis, p. 449; an English text appeared in *The Times* of October 2, p. 12.

September 29th).[2] Hamid Bey complained to General Pellé of stiffness with which this communication had been made.

President of the Council remarked to me that statement made by Sir H. Rumbold appeared to be in contradiction with actual facts since Greek warship 'Averoff'[3] on leaving Constantinople had gone to Rodosto and moreover two Greek destroyers were said to be lying at anchor alongside a flotilla of British destroyers in Golden Horn. I replied to President of the Council that it was perfectly true that our naval authorities were preventing Greek warships and transports from penetrating into Sea of Marmora and Dardanelles[4] and that as regards the 'Averoff' though she might have stopped at Rodosto she had certainly passed through Dardanelles and at present moment was at Piraeus.

As for two destroyers lying in Golden Horn they were I understood for protection of Greek subjects and were not engaged in war service. President of the Council insisted that their presence could not but inspire Turks with a feeling that we were not absolutely sincere in statement that had been made to Hamid Bey and expressed opinion that moment chosen for making this communication, when state of tension was being relaxed, was unfortunate. I remarked that tension was then still acute.

Another telegram which was read to me was an interview between Sir H. Rumbold and French and Italian High Commissioners, in which he questioned them as to intentions of French and Italian fleets as regards co-operation with British fleet in preventing Kemalist troops crossing into Europe.[5] I was not told the nature of their replies. It was clear from General Pellé's account that interview provoked some vivacity on the part of those present. Other telegrams which he read were of no special importance but President of the Council begged that now that there really was a hope of securing a peaceful solution on [*sic*] all difficulties at issue, great care should be taken at Constantinople, Chanak and elsewhere that nothing should occur which might endanger a peaceful result which is so much desired on all sides and in every country. He expressed hope that there would be no hesitation on the part of His Majesty's Government in sending General Harington to conference at Mudania, of whose moderation and prudence he spoke in highest terms of praise, since he was convinced that the moment conversations were begun danger of hostilities would be removed.

[2] The reference is presumably (see No. 83, n. 1) to Lord Curzon's telegram No. 447 to Constantinople (No. 73).

[3] See No. 56, n. 2.

[4] See No. 70. In his telegram No. 431 of September 30 to the Admiralty, Admiral Brock stated: 'I am stopping Greek men-of-war as well as [? transports] from passing through Dardanelles into Marmora.'

[5] See No. 74, n. 3.

No. 85

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 11)
No. 556 [C 14093/13/19]

ATHENS, *October 1, 1922*

My Lord,

With reference to my recent telegrams[1] on the subject of the Revolution, I have the honour to report that the first hint I received that trouble was imminent was on the morning of the 26th ultimo, when I had a conversation with a prominent man who had been one of Mr. Venizelos's ministers. This gentleman impressed upon me with great seriousness that the position was becoming untenable and that, unless the King abdicated within a few days, he considered bloodshed and the fall of the dynasty inevitable.

A little later on the same morning an aeroplane flew over Athens and dropped leaflets signed by Colonel Gonatas, in the name of the officers of the Army and Navy and the population of Mitylene and Chios, demanding the abdication of King Constantine in favour of the Crown Prince, the resignation of the Government, the dissolution of the Chamber and the strengthening of the Thracian front. Colonel Gonatas was known as a capable Royalist officer who commanded a division in Asia Minor, but his demands were not taken very seriously in the capital, where there was no sign of any revolutionary movement, since nobody knew what he really represented.

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon Vice-Admiral Aubrey Smith, Head of the British Naval Mission, informed me that he had just received an urgent message from Admiral Dousmanis, Chief of the Naval Staff, to say that Prince Nicholas had requested, on behalf of the King, that a British man-of-war be sent for since the lives of the Royal Family were in danger. I did not act on this information until Admiral Aubrey Smith had been able to see Admiral Dousmanis himself, when I learnt that the latter could get no replies from any Greek men-of-war except those at Constantinople. It was then clear that the Navy had mutin[i]ed and I sent off my telegram No. 489[2] to Your Lordship asking that a British man-of-war might be sent. I am reserving the further treatment of this subject for a separate despatch.[3]

A little later in the evening of the 26th ultimo, we heard that the Greek battleship 'Lemnos' had arrived at Laurium on the east coast of Attica and that the Revolutionary Committee, who were on board, had sent an ultimatum to the Government to accept Colonel Gonatas's terms by midnight; if they did not do so the 'Lemnos' would steam round to Phalerum Bay and bombard Athens.

We learned afterwards that there had been no threat of bombardment, but the Government sent General Papoulas[4] at once to Laurium to negotiate with the Committee. He remained there all night and the King and Government

[1] Not printed. [2] Of September 26, not printed. [3] No. 105, below.
[4] Formerly Greek Commander-in-Chief in Asia Minor.

accepted the terms in the early morning of September 27th. There was something approaching a panic in Athens that morning, since Colonel Constinopoulos, the Military Governor of the Capital, continued to make preparations for defence. A number of Venizelists were arrested, some soldiers got together and civilians armed. This force, or rather rabble, was sent out towards Laurium. At midday the King's Proclamation of Abdication, translation of which formed the text of my telegram No. 503,[5] was issued and orders were given that no resistance was to be made. For some hours after the abdication was known, small bodies of Royalists paraded the streets and shouted for King Constantine, but they lost heart and allowed themselves to be disarmed. By the middle of the afternoon it was clear that there would be no armed resistance to the Revolutionaries.

In the meantime a provisional Authority, consisting of Generals Alex[ander] Mazarakes, Garpalides, and Pangalos, had installed itself at the offices of the 'Elephtera Vime', the principal Venizelist newspaper. The locality seemed to me significant, since it showed clearly the intention of the Venizelists to capture for their party a movement which was essentially patriotic and national. Colonel Gonatas himself was not a Venizelist; and it was notorious that many, if not the bulk, of his officers had no particular affection for the Liberal Party. On the afternoon of this day Venizelist processions were formed and one large one made a friendly and very noisy demonstration before His Majesty's Legation. I received three delegates from the crowd who expressed their great friendship for Great Britain and I replied in suitable terms. It was only after I had appeared on the balcony several times that the demonstration finally dispersed. Mr. Bentinck informs me that the crowd which visited the Legation on the occasion of Mr. Lloyd George's August speech[6] was far bigger and more enthusiastic. But that demonstration was organised by the Government so that a comparison is hardly fair. I should mention that the French Legation was also the object of a friendly demonstration. No one visited the Italian Legation.

On the evening of the 27th one battalion of troops entered the town in good order and during the 28th ultimo the main body of the revolutionary Army, some 12,000 strong came in. They looked very tired and worn, but I was struck by their organised appearance—officers in the right places, pack animals properly loaded, horses in fair trim and distances kept. They were in no sense a rabble.

On this day, the 28th, the Revolutionary Committee definitely assumed authority in the capital. They were represented by a triumvirate consisting of Colonel Gonatas, Colonel Plasteras and Captain Phocas of the Navy, the last-named taking a much less active part in affairs than the first two. I had kept in touch with the Revolutionary Authorities through Mr. Atchley, Second Secretary to this Legation, whose life-long knowledge of Greece and especially of the members of the Venizelist party was invaluable. I was not satisfied with the way things were going. The extreme wing of the Veni-

[5] Of September 27, not printed.

[6] See No. 3, n. 4.

zelists showed signs of a vindictive spirit which promised nothing less than disaster and some of the officers were little better. Messieurs Gounaris, Theotoky, Goudas, Protopapadakis and Stratos had all been arrested; and I was informed on excellent authority that it was intended to try them by Drum-head Court Martial and shoot them. My colleagues of Italy, Spain, Sweden and Holland came to me on the subject and asked me whether I could not intervene in order to save bloodshed. In these circumstances I requested Mr. Atchley to invite Colonels Gonatas and Plasteras to visit me, which they did at 5 o'clock. We were shortly afterwards joined by the French Minister,[7] whom I had informed of the visit.

We found that the idea of the Revolutionary Committee was to deal summarily with those they considered responsible for the national disaster in Asia Minor and then declare a general amnesty. We pointed out to them the bad impression that would be caused by acts which would certainly be regarded as vindictive. I further reminded them that it was essential that the leaders of a movement like this should show their followers that they intended to be masters. I had been through the Russian Revolution[8] and seen the well-intentioned Provisional Government lose all authority owing to initial weakness. Monsieur de Marcilly cited the Caillaux case[9] in France. Many people had urged that he should be tried by Court Martial but a proper tribunal had been constituted. The wisest course, we both urged, was to have these people tried in a Civil Court after the regular Government had been installed. It was clear that the two Colonels were quite willing to do what we asked but feared some of their adherents; so the French Minister and I authorised them to make use of this interview with us to strengthen their hands. They then promised to do what we asked and Your Lordship will have seen from my telegram No. 526 of September 30th[10] that they have kept their promise.

Inevitably the extreme Venizelists have criticised our action and I confess I am not a little disgusted by the vindictiveness of those gentry. I have done what I can to let them hear of my disgust at this action after all the efforts, and on the whole successful efforts, I have made since I have been here to save them from persecution much milder than that which they wish to mete out to their opponents. I do not doubt that, when passions die down, our intervention will be remembered with gratitude by practically the whole community. It is certainly now appreciated by the majority.

Having finished with the question of prisoners, Monsieur de Marcilly and I thought it a good opportunity to enquire what the Revolutionary Committee intended to do about the formation of a regular government. It

[7] M. de Marcilly.

[8] Mr. Lindley was Counsellor of H.M. Embassy at Petrograd from November 1915; in May 1918 he was appointed British Commissioner in Russia.

[9] M. Caillaux, a former President of the Council, had been arrested in January 1918 on a charge of treason; he was tried in February-April, 1920. See *The Annual Register 1920*, pp. 161–2.

[10] Not printed.

became clear at once that Colonel Gonatas was very well satisfied with the present state of affairs and that he considered himself quite fitted to continue to direct the State. I told him that my experience during the war was that nearly every civilian considered himself a born strategist and nearly every soldier thought himself a born politician. I had had brilliant military ideas myself to which, fortunately, no one had ever paid the slightest attention; many soldiers I knew had been equally self-confident and grotesque in the sphere of politics. The best thing he could do was to hand over the direction of political affairs to those who understood them and stick to the Army which he understood himself. Both Colonels laughed heartily at this observation, which Mr. Atchley translated, and asked my French colleague and myself if we could not suggest a Government. The whole idea of the Revolution was to be friendly to the Entente. Monsieur de Marcilly said that he might have ideas as to a Government suitable for France but could not advise as regards Greece. After I had also declined the responsibility, Colonel Gonatas recited a number of names and asked whether we had any objection to them. We declared that we had none, and the Colonels promised that a regular Government would be formed without delay. This promise was also kept and I have the honour to transmit a list of the new Ministers, with some account of their personal peculiarities,[11] who took the Oath to the King on the following day.

With the appointment of a regular government the abdication, and departure from Greece of King Constantine, the installation of King George[12] in his place and the acquiescence by the whole country in the new state of things, the first phase of the Revolution may be considered closed. It is quite possible, though not probable, that there will be no further phase. The Revolutionary Committee is still in being and is the real power behind the Throne. It may gradually retire altogether or may reassert itself and repeat the history of the Military Leagues[13] which kept Greece in a ferment for several years after 1905. A third, and more sinister, alternative is that the power may altogether escape from the hands of the leaders and that the country, humiliated by defeat, overcrowded with starving refugees and short of the necessaries of life, may fall into the chaotic conditions of Russia. Of this third alternative there is, at present, no sign.

As regards the origin of the Revolution, it is clear that the ground was prepared in the Army of Asia Minor and that many officers of that Army have been engaged in the plot for a long time. The execution of the plan was facilitated by the concentration of troops in the Islands of Mitylene and Chios, and the only obstacle to its success was the Navy. From the infor-

[11] Not printed. The principal ministers were: M. Alexander Zaïmis (Prime Minister), M. Soteris Krokidas (Minister of the Interior and *ad interim* Prime Minister), M. Nicolas Politis (Minister of National Economy and *ad interim* Minister for Foreign Affairs). M. Zaïmis had still not accepted the premiership when the government resigned on November 23 (see No. 220, n. 5).

[12] The Crown Prince George, who had assumed the name of George II.

[13] See Vol. XVII, No. 153.

mation I have received it appears that the Navy was gained over by the Army. There is no reason to believe that the Revolution could have been started at Athens, but events showed that the feeling against it in the capital was insufficient to warrant any hope of effective defence. As I read events, the Revolution was organised with the clear intention of turning out the Gounaris Government, which were held responsible for the failures of the last two years, and for the continuance of the great internal feud, and of forcing the King to leave the country because his departure would be followed by a favourable change of attitude on the part of Great Britain and France. It was precipitated by the Allied invitation to Kemal to negotiate peace on the basis of receiving Thrace.[14] The Revolutionaries felt that no time should be lost or Thrace would go, and there is no doubt that they cherish the illusion that, now that King Constantine is gone, the two Western Powers will favour their holding it.

It is never easy to judge of the true feeling of Greeks but I should say that the Revolution had roused singularly little enthusiasm in the population. It is certain that the sympathisers with King Constantine are numerous; and I believe they have only let him go without a struggle because they think his departure a political necessity in the interest of the Great Hellenic Idea. It is disquieting to observe the way the Venizelists have pushed themselves to the front and I should not wonder if the Government, which is preponderantly Venizelist, did not find themselves very soon at loggerheads with the Revolutionary Committee, unless the Liberal Party, as a whole, show more moderation than that section of the party which seems bent on paying off old scores and preventing the healing of the great party feud which it was one of the objects of the Revolution to effect.

I have, etc.,
F. O. LINDLEY.

[14] See No. 52.

No. 86

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 3, 6.30 a.m.)
No. 533 Telegraphic [E 10400/27/44]

ATHENS, *October 2, 1922, 2 p.m.*

My telegram No. 532.[1]

Colonel Plasteras[2] who is real head of the military movement called on me this morning and asked if it was true that allied Generals were to meet Kemal at Mudania tomorrow. I said that was the desire of allied Generals to have the meeting but I was not yet sure that the other side would come.

[1] Of October 1, not printed. [2] See No. 85.

Colonel Plasteras then informed me that he was going to Thrace tonight to try to reform the army there.[3]

Number of officers had already been sent. He asked me what was to be the future of the province.[4] I told him that His Majesty's Government were most anxious for peace and that if Kemal accepted allied invitation to conference it would be madness for Greeks to refuse. Greece would have need of the Powers after the long war and would have a fine country left to her. She could not hope for assistance in putting her house in order unless she accepted the decisions of the Powers.

Colonel Plasteras objected that if Greece refused she would be face to face with an enemy also weakened by war and that the Greeks might well hold their own and even take Constantinople. I replied that whole lesson of the last two years was that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated. Should she act as proposed she would be just as isolated as she had been during these two years and result would be a real catastrophe for her.

Colonel Plasteras admitted the force of these arguments and said that after all he was not a political man. Monsieur Veniselos[5] understood foreign situation and was best judge. He would do what Monsieur Veniselos advised in this matter but he must lose no time in getting army of Thrace into shape.

I said that I thought a disciplined force was very necessary in Greece because one never knew how far successes of Kemal might have turned his head. An army might be required on Maritza and discipline was absolutely necessary in Thrace itself in order to put an end to massacres and excesses of which I had already spoken to him[6] and which would do incalculable harm

[3] In his telegram No. 534 of October 2, Mr. Lindley added: 'Colonel Plasteras said he was confident that in a month he would be able to put in the field really efficient force of 60,000 men to defend Thrace if necessary. Two divisions were leaving Athens almost at once for Thrace.'

[4] In his telegram No. 280 of October 2, Lord Curzon, replying to Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 519 of September 29, not printed, stated: 'His Majesty's Government's policy [regarding Thrace] is clearly laid down in Allied note of September 23rd to the Angora Government and will not be departed from, unless and until it is modified by a further Allied decision, or by the outbreak of hostilities.'

[5] M. Eleutherios Venizelos, see Vol. XV, No. 14, n. 3.

[6] On October 1, reported in Athens telegram No. 531 of October 1, not printed. These representations were made in response to Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 483 of September 29, which reported: 'Information is reaching allied High Commissioners from sources which they cannot disregard that Greeks are behaving very badly to Turks in eastern Thrace. This is causing excitement amongst Nationalists and will certainly be used by them as a pretext for pressing their demand to be allowed to march into Thrace. . . .

'Greek High Commissioner informed allied High Commissioners this morning that Turkish bands which had been forming in Chatalja neutral zone had attacked Greek troops but had been repulsed. Greek Commandant has intimated that army of Thrace declines all responsibility for results seeing that proceedings of the enemy are not only not prevented in neutral zone but that latter is serving as a shelter for concentration and organisation of Turkish armies.'

Referring to this telegram, Mr. Lindley, in his telegram No. 528 of September 30, stated;

'I will make representati[on]s desired by Sir H. Rumbold, but venture to point out that no one here exercises any real authority over Thrace and that until Greek army there is

to the Greek cause. Colonel Plasteras said that his first efforts would be directed to stopping this kind of thing which he hated as much as I.

Impression left by visit was that Colonel Plasteras is a real soldier who will do all he can to put down disorder and will take political advice from those in whom he has confidence. His personal courage is a by-word in the army and I would sooner deal with him than any other Greek I have met.

Repeated to Constantinople.

reorganised, violence is inevitable amongst a mixed population excited by presence of tens of thousands of starving refugees, who have suffered nameless horrors at the hands of the Turks before they escaped from Asia Minor.'

No. 87

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received October 2, 9.20 p.m.)

No. 504 Telegraphic [*E 10367/27/44*]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 2, 1922, 7 p.m.*

At meeting this morning, to discuss attitude of generals at Mudania meeting, French High Commissioner endeavoured to assert that reply addressed to President of the Council by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs,[1] promising, within a few days, reply of his government to conference proposal and accepting Mudania meeting, constituted an actual expression of readiness of Angora government to attend that conference and could be accepted as such by generals who could therefore proceed at once with arrangements for evacuation of Thrace by Greece and organization of temporary administration there.

I told French High Commissioner that I could not admit such an interpretation. In this I was supported by my Italian colleague. I informed High Commissioners that I could not agree to any definite engagements as regards pressure on Greeks etc. being undertaken until formal acceptance by Kemal of peace conference had been received and held to be satisfactory by allied governments. In this connection I notified High Commissioners of terms of your telegram No. 430 [*sic*] to Paris.[2]

It was eventually agreed that there was no objection to generals explaining fully measures which allied governments would be prepared to take in the event of, and in anticipation of, satisfactory reply from Kemal.

[1] In his telegram No. 503 of October 2 (see No. 81, n. 9), Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'Franklin-Bouillon then read letter addressed to President of the Council by Yussuf Kemal promising that an answer would be given to conference proposal in a few days, acknowledging assurances of Allied governments respecting just peace, stating that trusting in Franklin-Bouillon assurances all movements of troops would be suspended, pointing out impossibility of allowing Greeks to stop even a day longer in Thrace and notifying acceptance of Mudania conference at which Ismet Pasha would [represent] government of Angora.'

[2] The reference is to No. 330 (No. 76).

It will be practically impossible owing to conflicting views (? of our) governments to ensure that all three allied generals shall have (? received) identic instructions before meeting. General Harington however fully appreciates that our hands cannot be bound and those of Angora left free. French High Commissioner also raised this morning question of exact line in Thrace behind which Greeks should be requested to retire.

He drew attention to inconvenience, throughout its whole course, of line of Maritza River since railway line from Kuleli Bourgas to Karagatch runs for thirty-eight kilometres west of that river.

French High Commissioner argued that it would be preferable and more practical from point of view of railway communication if line selected between those places were railway line which should be left to Turks rather than line of river. Continuity of railway would thus remain unbroken.

I said that without instructions from you I could not agree to any modification of Maritza frontier which was in fact frontier accepted by Turks themselves.[3]

Italian High Commissioner suggested that this complication was capable of adjustment later by means of arrangement regulating travelling facilities and prohibiting customs barriers on this part of railway.

Repeated to Athens No. 164.

[3] In Yussuf Kemal's telegram of September 29 (see No. 84).

No. 88

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 3, 2.10 p.m.)
No. 506 Telegraphic [E 10433/27/44]

Most urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 3, 1922, 1.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 456. (Second part of 455).[1]

I entirely share your views as to undesirability of spinning out Mudania conference.

I cannot however see how Generals can avoid settling in principle question of civil administration of evacuated area during transitional period.

There is general agreement that it would be useless to propose to hand over civil administration to Constantinople government, main reason being that Kemal would refuse.

My allied colleagues and I consider only alternative is to consent to Kemalists taking over civil administration. Once Greeks have evacuated militarily it would be impossible to maintain present civil administration which is Greek. It would be equally impossible for Allies themselves to construct temporary civil administration.

[1] No. 81.

If His Majesty's Government agree that Kemalists must be allowed to take over civil administration at once it would be useless for us to attempt to exercise any general control of it.

Our efforts would in that case necessarily be confined to endeavouring to prevent violent upheaval and exodus of Christians by insisting on maintenance of allied commissions and if necessary military detachments and attachment of allied officers to local gendarmerie.

It appears to me that these are points which Generals must have power to settle at Mudania meeting if it is to produce definite results.

Repeated to Athens No. 165.

No. 89

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 687 [E 10550/27/44]

Sir, FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 3, 1922*

Yesterday evening M. Veniselos, having informed me in the course of the afternoon that he had received the communications which he was expecting from the new Greek Government,[1] came to the Foreign Office soon after 6 o'clock for the projected meeting with the Secretary of State for War and myself.

Before the former came in, M. Veniselos had had time to explain to me his general attitude towards the peace conference. Realising that, so far as Eastern Thrace was concerned, the case of Greece was lost, he said that, as a statesman, he would bow to the decisions of the conference, and would tell his countrymen that it was quite useless to continue a struggle which would end only in defeat. He understood that Eastern Thrace was gone, but there remained much more for which it was necessary to fight. He then produced from his pocket and read to me some brief reports from Athens which, although they did not differ substantially from our own information as regards the numerical strength of the Greek army still in existence, contained a wholly different account of its armament, equipment, *moral* and capacity to fight.[2]

I had just informed him that our information upon the latter point did not bear out these statements when the Secretary for War entered the room.

M. Veniselos repeated his Athens reports, and Sir Laming Worthington-Evans then proceeded to give him the gist of the reports of our officers in Constantinople, and of the General Staff here, without, however, mentioning the precise allegations which would have been wounding to Greek pride. M. Veniselos had, however, previously told me that M. Countilis [*sic*],[3] who had made in Constantinople the damaging avowal on his return from Thrace last week that, if the Turks reached that country, nothing but the Gulf of

[1] See No. 85. [2] Cf. No. 72.

[3] Colonel Kondylis, a former Venizelist officer and member of the Venizelist party in Asia Minor (see No. 150, below).

Corinth would stop the Greeks from running, was an officer of high military reputation in whom he (M. Veniselos) placed much confidence.

M. Veniselos appeared to be much astonished at the War Office reports, which he declined to believe, arguing with much persistence that the revolution in Athens was not a Veniselist, but a Nationalist revolution, having in view the continuance of the struggle in Thrace, and that it was incredible that its leaders should be misinformed as to the actual state of affairs. If, however, matters were as depicted from Constantinople, he more than once repeated that it would be useless, in his judgment, to continue the struggle.

In the course of our conversation there transpired what M. Veniselos had in mind. When I explained to him the object of the projected meeting in Mudania, which was firstly to draw a line behind which the Greek army should be asked to withdraw in Thrace, and secondly to prepare for the setting-up of some form of inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the peace conference, he revealed at once that that was not at all his idea. He declined to consider the possibility of the Greek army being withdrawn until the peace conference had given its final judgment, and he argues passionately for the necessity of its remaining in occupation, in order to secure the protection of the Greek inhabitants, and to give Greece something in hand for the safeguarding of her remaining interests when the conference assembled. How otherwise, he asked, would his Government be in a position to retain Western Thrace, to resist the demand for the surrender of the Greek fleet and the demand for an indemnity, and to recover the Dodecanese from Italy? Was I prepared to give him absolute and definite guarantees upon this point?

It was not always easy to follow, and it was physically impossible to interrupt, M. Veniselos in his declamation, which occupied the best part of an hour, and in which he appeared at times quite unable to retain his ordinary equanimity. My colleague and I endeavoured to point out to him that the situation was not quite as he had described it. When, in all probability within two days' time, an inter-Allied decision would be arrived at in Mudania as to the line behind which the Greek army was to be asked to withdraw—a line which we did not yet know, but which might be the Maritza—did M. Veniselos mean that, while prepared to agree to the decision of the peace conference in a few weeks' time that the Greek army should withdraw beyond that river, he seriously contemplated fighting to retain the present position of the Greek army during the interval? If he adopted that course, and if the Constantinople reports as to the condition of the Greek army in Thrace were true, was there a chance of his policy being carried out with success? It might very well be that, in a few months' time, the *moral* of the Greek forces would be sufficiently restored to give them a reasonable chance, but could that be expected now? Again, we pointed out to him that, at the present moment, the Kemalist forces were massed in numbers alleged to approximate 40,000 to 50,000 behind the Ismid lines, and, in the event of the Greeks refusing to accept the line to be laid down in Mudania, what was there to prevent Mustapha Kemal, already thirsting to get at Constanti-

nople, from making their refusal an excuse for bursting into Europe, and carrying fire and sword into Eastern Thrace? In such a situation, what chance could there be for the Greek forces? Might not M. Veniselos be jeopardising the very interests that he had in view in Western Thrace and elsewhere, and rendering it even more difficult to vindicate them in the face of a triumphant enemy?

As regards guarantees, I could of course not speak except from the point of view of my own Government. Certainly, if I were at the peace conference, I should fight hard for Western Thrace and the other Greek interests to which M. Veniselos had referred.

As to this, he was somewhat contemptuous in replying, declaring that England would be in a constant minority against France and Italy and that the Greek chance of success would be small.

Both my colleague and I endeavoured to impress upon M. Veniselos the need for some reflection before he embarked upon the line which he contemplated, and which both of us thought would be fraught with great danger to his own interests.

His reply was an indignant complaint as to the way in which the Greeks had been treated when they were not allowed to march upon Constantinople, and an assertion that, in the circumstances predicated, the Greek army still in Thrace would have no alternative but to advance upon Chatalja and to seize the Chatalja lines: then, he said, holding the country from sea to sea, they would be able to resist successfully for many months any attack that the whole of the Kemalist forces might be able to make upon them.

When we indicated that such a course of action was, in the circumstances, quite impracticable, and would not be tolerated by the Allies, M. Veniselos swept aside our arguments and declined to recede from his position.

It is very difficult in a short summary to give an account of a conversation that lasted for an hour and a quarter, in the course of which M. Veniselos spoke with a very pardonable emotion, and used at times language which it was not pleasant to hear.

He said that he was going over to see M. Poincaré to-day, and would not make up his mind until he had seen the French Premier.

The meeting left me with the impression that M. Veniselos was imperfectly acquainted with the real condition of the Greek forces upon which he is tempted to rely; that he hardly realised the position in which the Greeks would be placed if they resisted altogether the Allied decisions to be taken in Mudania; and that he had not given due weight to the fact that, pending the peace conference, the Allied policy was not to surrender Thrace to the Kemalist army, but to set up some form of interim administration and control which should maintain the peace until the peace conference assembled.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 90

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
*No. 3010 [E 10483/27/44]**

My Lord, FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 3, 1922*

The French Ambassador asked to see me yesterday afternoon to communicate some information from his Government.

Among the papers he brought with him was a further telegram to M. Poincaré from M. Franklin-Bouillon, reporting his conversations with Mustapha Kemal in Smyrna.[1] As, however, this did not carry matters any further than an earlier telegram[2] which had already been handed to the Foreign Office, and the substance of which had appeared in the press,[3] it was not necessary for me to make any comment upon it. It contained a number of untenable demands on the part of the Turks, and a not over-modest laudation of M. Franklin-Bouillon's own Herculean labours in the cause of the Allies, and of Great Britain in particular.

A second paper contained a repetition by M. Poincaré of the suggestion that had been made by your Excellency ten days ago,[4] that an arrangement might be considered by which both the British and the Kemalists should retire from their positions in the Chanak area. I pointed out to the Ambassador that, whatever might have been said for such a proposal some time ago, now that the British forces were in a position of such overwhelming advantage that Mustapha Kemal was not in the least likely to attack them, the proposal was entirely out of the question, and might even be dismissed as absurd. To this the Ambassador raised no objection.

We exchanged views for some time upon the order of procedure at the impending meeting in Mudania, concerning which I gave him our latest information, and I outlined to him the scheme of action that I had proposed to the Allies and with which I believed the French Government to be in general sympathy. But I told him that I desired to call his attention and that of his Government more especially to three aspects of the case.

It might be that, at the Mudania meeting, Mustapha Kemal would absolutely refuse to obey that part of the Paris note[5] which required him to respect both neutral zones. In that case he could not expect to derive the advantages in Europe which had been promised him, and I wished the French Government to consider the attitude they should adopt in these conditions. It was true that they had withdrawn their troops from Chanak—an action which, however deeply I felt upon it, I did not propose at the moment to discuss—but that action had been defended by M. Poincaré, not as a desertion of the alliance, but as a military necessity; whereas, if the conditions of the Paris note were flouted, it could not be denied that the alliance itself was challenged and that each party to the note would be directly involved.

The second question I desired to submit for the consideration of his Govern-

[1] See No. 64.
[2] Of September 29, not printed.
[3] See *The Times*, October 2, p. 12.
[4] See No. 58.
[5] See No. 52, n. 3.

ment was this: supposing the generals in Mudania fixed a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek forces were to retire, and the latter declined to do so, we might be confronted with a situation which again would call for Allied co-operation, and which would require very careful scrutiny.

Further, if, either in consequence of such a refusal, or from a deliberate intention to flout the alliance, Mustapha Kemal should advance into the Ismid zone, descend upon Constantinople, and attempt to advance into Europe, what attitude would the French Government adopt? Upon their own admission, the alliance, military as well as political, on the European side of the Straits remained unimpaired. What then was to be done in such a case to save Constantinople from a serious rising and from probably still more serious massacres, and to prevent the affront that would be inflicted upon all of us by a Kemalist invasion? It might be that, in the event of a Kemalist advance of this description, military considerations would compel the British to withdraw either the whole or a portion of their forces and transfer them to the positions they had taken up in Chanak and Gallipoli. I should be most reluctant to see any such course adopted, but it might conceivably become a military necessity. What would the French Government be prepared to do on their own account? They and the Italians could hardly sit still while they allowed the British to be involved. On the other hand, assuming, as I did, that the alliance would remain firm in the face of such an assault upon it, how best should we maintain the defence of Constantinople, or, if we could not do that, at any rate prevent the Kemalist army from advancing into Eastern Thrace?

I put these questions to his Excellency in order that he might refer them to his Government for consideration while the Mudania meeting was still sitting, on the chance that, for any of the reasons which I had indicated, it might break down and confront us with a more serious situation than any that had yet occurred. The problems that I had submitted to him were, I added, being anxiously considered by us. The Paris Agreement was the pivot of our action, and we had every right to assume that in the face of any fresh challenge, that agreement would be maintained.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

No. 91

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 5, 3.15 p.m.)
No. 512 Telegraphic [E 10595/72/44]

Most urgent. Private and Secret CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 5, 1922, 1.10 p.m.*

Following is substance of private letter[1] just received by destroyer from General Harington.

He states he has had a most difficult time. The so-called military conference

[1] Not printed. In his telegram No. 2616 of October 4, to the War Office, General Harington reported as follows: 'A bad turn took place in Conference to-day. Allied Generals

has been surrounded by every sort of (? politician) from Angora. Hamid Bey is actually a member of conference and in attendance on Ismet Pasha.

General Harington describes Franklin Bouillon as a perfect curse.[2] The whole trouble is that Nationalists consider Eastern Thrace is already theirs and they do not want any foreign interference. The line they take is that they intend to have Eastern Thrace. They will endeavour to get it peacefully but if that is not possible they will continue operations at once. Nationalists will not give one single point and came near breaking down the whole conference last night. They adjourn on every point they do not like and telephone to Angora. General Harington had to face most serious threat yesterday that Nationalists would resume operations. Conference sat till midnight yesterday to see if it could come to some arrangement over the outstanding four points. The generals will put up their final document to-day. If this can be signed well and good but if not they will come straight back to Constantinople and consult allied High Commissioners.

Greek representatives[3] arrived late yesterday and will meet allied generals at 9 this morning. General Harington speaks in warm terms of the way in which allied generals have backed him up and says that he and they have shown great patience and forbearance throughout. He states that they have certainly held their own under extraordinary difficult circumstances. The foregoing is not encouraging and I foresee that if Greek representatives are not prepared for big concessions Conference may break down today.

Whilst Franklin Bouillon may have done good work at Smyrna . . .[4] he has presented attitude of allied governments in such a way as greatly to encourage Nationalists in their pretensions.

drew up a very reasonable programme within limit of their instructions but to each clause political objections were insinuated. It is obvious that Turks are trying to anticipate treaty. Franklin-Bouillon very active and gives impression that Turks have been promised by him more than Allied Generals can give within terms of conference. At present main difficulties are: (a) Claim of Turks to Kara[gatch] on grounds that forts across Maritza will be source of danger in Greek occupation. (b) Objection to limitation of number of Gendarmerie. (c) Objection to principle that Allied Missions should remain in any area evacuated by Greeks after it has been taken over by Turkish administration. (d) Turkish claim to right to carry out military operations even after signature of military convention until ratified by Governments concerned.'

[2] In his telegram No. 511 of October 4, Sir H. Rumbold had stated: 'I should think it quite possible that Franklin Bouillon's personal influence and intervention with Mustapha Kemal have been prejudicial to British interests. In his anxiety to be set up as a peace maker he has probably offered Turks more than Great Britain and perhaps even France is prepared to give. From one well informed source I hear that he has undertaken that France will support at conference full realization of national pact including total abolition of capitulations which would hit French interests here, in view of larger capital sums involved, quite as hard as British. From the same source I heard that he informed Mustapha Kemal that England was not only unwilling but incapable of going to war owing to hostility of labour and England's fear of complications in her Moslem possessions. Intervention of this nature by conveying a totally false impression would have effect of increasing chances of war rather than of promoting those of peace.'

[3] General Alexander Mazarakis and Colonel Sariyannis.

[4] The text is here uncertain.

No. 92

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 5, 5.30 p.m.)
No. 516 Telegraphic [E 10569/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 5, 1922, 5 p.m.*

Following is short summary of Angora government's reply to allied invitation,[1] dated October 4th.

It appreciates desire for just and durable peace. Allied note touches on two sets of facts, namely present military situation and negotiations for treaty of peace. Mudania meeting will deal with our point of view regarding military situation, which we communicated in our note of September 29th,[2] and its decisions will be executed in all respects as to peace negotiations. We agree to send representatives to negotiate and conclude treaty between Turkey, Greece and the allies. As allies admit possibility of meeting elsewhere than at Venice, we suggest that the conference should meet on 20th October at Smyrna. Besides the four Great Powers and Greece, only two states are invited to the conference, not because they are belligerents, but presumably because they are most interested in certain questions to be settled by the treaty of peace. Only important question of this kind is the future control of the Straits. We cannot but express surprise that Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, who are deeply interested in this, should not have been invited, as the participation of these three states would only help to make the settlement more lasting, and to avoid all future cause for conflict we definitely propose that they should be invited in the same way as the other two states already invited by the allies, and we hope that the invitation will be addressed to them before the conference. We thank the allies for recognising our rights in Thrace. There is no disagreement in principle regarding the freedom of the Straits, to secure the safety of Constantinople and the Marmora, and the safeguard of minorities within the limits compatible either with the independence of sovereignty of Turkey or the exigencies of an effective settlement in the Near East. We will in due course make known our views regarding our admission to the League of Nations. We are glad to note the renewed assurances regarding the evacuation of Constantinople by the allied troops. We are convinced that the allies appreciate the impatience with which we await the realisation of the promised evacuation. We are impressed by the appeal with which the allied note concludes, and can assure the allies of our loyal and sincere assistance in re-establishing and maintaining peace.[3]

Repeated Athens.

[1] Of September 23, see No. 52, n. 3.

[2] See No. 84, n. 1.

[3] In his telegram No. 519 of October 5, Sir H. Rumbold communicated the French text of the Angora Government's reply, not printed. For the French text, see Frangulis, pp. 450–2; an English text appeared in *The Times* of October 9, p. 11.

No. 93

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 1.45 a.m.)
No. 514 Telegraphic [E 10593/27/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 5, 1922, 7.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 464.[1]

All my information shows that present civil administration of Eastern Thrace is run by Greek superior officials many of whom come from old Greece and that subordinate staff also is mainly Greek. Police and gendarmerie are directly controlled by military authorities.

If Greek army were to evacuate and existing civil administration were retained difficulty would be to get officials to remain unless their lives were assured by complete allied occupation.

Proceedings of first day at Mudania[2] show that Kemalists would never accept such proposal. Greek administration and more particularly police and gendarmerie cannot fail to go to pieces once Greek army evacuates. Problem is to provide substitute. Allies cannot organise temporary administration of their own. Constantinople government has been ruled out. There remains no alternative but to let Kemalists take over. This will certainly not of itself tend to pacify the country or appease racial animosity but it will not defeat these objects any more than would the maintenance of Greek administration. It is better anyhow than chaos. My proposal is that Kemalists should take over administrative services generally, that we should not attempt to establish control of all such services, but that we should endeavour to obviate panic and mutual vengeance by continued presence of allied commissions, by attaching allied officers to gendarmerie and by reserving the right to send allied detachments to Eastern Thrace.

Question of officials is one of detail. Principal officials would doubtless come from Anatolia but Kemalists can if they like draw on local notables and unemployed officials here to fill subordinate posts.

My French and my Italian colleagues share views indicated in my telegram No. 506.[3] While expressing readiness to join me in elaborating scheme for civil administration as proposed in your telegram No. 456[4] they have both stated that this procedure does not seem to them to answer the requirements of the situation which necessitates speed above all. French High Commissioner states in this as in all other matters agreement with Turks is necessary and that he has empowered General Charpy to settle questions on which agreement depends. In these circumstances it is useless to attempt to formulate scheme until general principles are settled as result of Mudania meeting as contemplated in your telegram No. 441.[5]

I realise my proposal prejudges future of Thrace to greater extent than

[1] Of October 3, not printed.
[2] See No. 91.
[3] No. 88.
[4] No. 81.
[5] No. 69.

your note[6] contemplated but we have promised Eastern Thrace to Turks and expediency seems to be only possible guide on this question.

Repeated to Athens No. 169.

[6] Presumably the Allied Note of September 23 (see No. 52, n. 3).

No. 94

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 470 Telegraphic [E 10614/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 5, 1922, 9.15 p.m.*

Monsieur Veniselos, who, when I saw him on Monday[1] was inclined to adopt an obdurate attitude about the possibility of immediate withdrawal of Greek troops from Thrace to line about to be laid down at Mudania, came to Foreign Office to-day and said that he had upon reflection urged his government to agree to immediate evacuation, on condition that administration of the evacuated territory should not at once be confided to the Turks but be placed under effective allied control. Only if this advice were accepted would he be willing to s[er]ve his government. This attitude appears to remove difficulty attending Greek military withdrawal. But it brings into immediate prominence the question which I raised in my telegram to you No. 464,[2] viz. the arrangements to be made for provisional administration in evacuated areas. I still await your views about this.[3] But Greek anxieties seem to be eminently reasonable and general attitude of Kemalists at Mudania which is evidently very trying does not predispose us to make any concessions outside Paris note.[4]

Repeated to Paris No. 346, Rome No. 306 and Athens No. 293.

[1] See No. 89.

[2] Of October 3, not printed.

[3] See No. 93 which reached the Foreign Office at 1.45 a.m., October 6.

[4] In his telegram No. 470 of October 6, Sir H. Rumbold commented: 'Possible solution of deadlock might be to induce M. Veniselos to withdraw condition respecting handing over of administration of evacuated territory to Turks and to authorise General Harington to inform Ismet Pasha that Greek Government is prepared to evacuate immediately on sole condition that effective Allied control be maintained there till the conclusion of peace.

'This appears to me not unreasonable compromise, especially if number of Turkish gendarmes in Thrace be limited to what is strictly necessary.'

No. 95

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 472 Telegraphic [*E 10589/27/44*]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 6, 1922, 1.25 a.m.*

Harington's telegrams[1] have reached us in a form which is partly unintelligible and partly corrupt. We have therefore sent orders[2] to him not to return to Mudania until we have been able to consider his full reply and to receive your opinion upon the situation as it now stands. We should also like your views upon the four points of Harington's telegram[3] which we do not fully comprehend, particularly those relating to gendarmerie and allied missions.

Please also telegraph to us copy of document handed to Kemalists by allied Generals, and inform us of nature of impossible proposals referred to in Harington's telegram No. 2615.[4] Further we should like to know what happened at Mudania about respect of neutral zones. You will of course have understood that words 'effective allied control' in my telegram No. 470[5] meant control by allied troops.[6]

[1] No. 2616 of October 4 (see No. 91, n. 1), and Nos. 2615, 2617, and Part I of D. 2 of October 4 and 5, not printed.

[2] In War Office telegram No. 91326, despatched at 3 a.m. on October 6, not printed.

[3] No. 2616 (see No. 91, n. 1). [4] Of October 5, not printed. [5] No. 94.

[6] In telegram No. 351 to Paris, No. 311 to Rome of 6 October, Lord Curzon instructed Lord Hardinge and Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please inform French/Italian government that owing to obscurity of telegrams received from General Harington about proceedings at Mudania, we have been obliged to order him not to return there for meeting arranged for tomorrow until we have received accurate report of what has passed.'

No. 96

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received October 6, 5.30 a.m.)

No. 523 Telegraphic [*E 10576/27/44*]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 3 a.m.*

General Harington has returned from Mudania and has explained situation.[1]

[1] See No. 91. In his telegram No. 513 of October 5 Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'Allied High Commissioners have just considered situation at Mudania as revealed by their latest information from allied generals.

'French High Commissioner states that Turks demand Karagatch which is a suburb of Adrianople on western bank of Maritza. Franklin-Bouillon has urged on French President of the Council that British and Italian generals should be empowered definitely to sign at Mudania the instrument recording decisions of conference instead of signing ad referendum. . . . French and Italian generals have great latitude in negotiations at Mudania. I explained that His Majesty's Government had gone to extreme limit in agreeing to Paris

He has shown me protocol drafted by Allied generals as result of three days' discussion with Ismet Pasha. This protocol gives very great and important concessions to Turks. Generals hoped that this protocol would have been signed to-day but at the last moment Ismet Pasha demanded that Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks before peace treaty and that all the allied contingents and missions should be withdrawn. This demand is of course entirely at variance with allied proposal of September 23rd.[2]

Ismet Pasha intimated that he would set his troops in motion if allied generals did not agree to this proposal, which annuls the whole basis of the conference.

General Harington proposed that (? conference) should adjourn until 2.30 tomorrow afternoon in order that generals should have time to refer to their governments and High Commissioners. After some discussion Ismet agreed that he would not move his troops until 2.30 p.m. i.e. 11.30 G.M.T. tomorrow. French general then announced that he was authorised by his government not only to . . .[3] protocol but to restitution to Turkish authorities of Eastern Thrace, before peace treaty, and without allied supervision. He had informed General Harington of these instructions before (? this) last sitting. In view of this situation which hopelessly weakens the allied front, the generals had no alternative but to return to ask for instructions.

Allied generals had no knowledge of reply from Angora[4] accepting peace conference until after they had left Mudania this afternoon. You will have noticed that reply is entirely silent on subject of acceptance by Mustapha Kemal of conditions attaching to promise of support of Turkish claims to Eastern Thrace.

Turkish claim to consider Eastern Thrace before peace treaty seems difficult of acceptance. I imagine that Paris proposals contemplated setting up of machinery by peace conference for adequate protection of minorities. This would go by the board under new Turkish claim.

Turks (? have) just requested permission to transport to Eastern Thrace an unlimited force of gendarmerie which might in effect be an army. They also claim Karagatch and the right to carry on military operations even (? after) signature of military convention until latter is ratified by governments concerned.

Allied High Commissioners are meeting allied generals immediately to consider deadlock . . .[3] at Mudania.

My colleagues will probably wish unofficially to advise in an identic telegram to three governments. In view of French attitude which can only be characterised as a treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin-Bouillon it was necessary for me to send this separate telegram. In view of General Harington and Admiral Brock the only way to avoid conflict (? is) for His

proposals and that it was for Kemalists to fulfil conditions attaching to offer made to them under Paris proposals. I said that I could not give instructions to General Harington about Karagatch nor could I authorise him to sign Mudania protocol in the manner suggested by Franklin-Bouillon.'

[2] See No. 52, n. 3.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

[4] See No. 92.

Majesty's Government to authorise General Harington to tell Turks that His Majesty's Government will summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and allied troops will be sent there forthwith to replace Greeks.

Please get Admiralty to send your instructions to General Harington by wireless tomorrow to 'Iron Duke'.

No. 97

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 524 Telegraphic [E 10577/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 4.30 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Allied High Commissioners and Generals met to-night to discuss deadlock reached at Mudania.

I asked French High Commissioner whether French government was as stated by Franklin Bouillon really ready to agree to Turkish demand for restoration of Eastern Thrace in full sovereignty previous to entry into force of peace treaty and without adequate guarantees through allied commissions for minorities there. If so it was quite contrary to Paris decisions.

French High Commissioner said that Franklin Bouillon was very affirmative on this point and that his own instructions to the effect that it was desirable if possible to maintain allied commissions and contingents there till conclusion of peace indicates that their maintenance in view of French government was not indispensable. I immediately said that I did not recognise Franklin Bouillon as representing my government and that I considered his impolicy had been pernicious.

Italian High Commissioner having said that Franklin Bouillon had had no authority to speak for Italian government at Smyrna argued strongly in favour of yielding to Turks. French High Commissioner took the same line. They said that two points left outstanding namely Karagatch and maintenance until conclusion of peace of allied commissions in Thrace did not constitute justification for possible world war; question of Karagatch was of comparative unimportance and as a suburb of Adrianople Paris note might be interpreted as including it in that city while Thrace was in any case to be restored in a few months' time to full Turkish sovereignty and that during that time conference would be sitting.

French High Commissioner pointed out that at base of Turkish demands was their distrust of vague promises of Allies and suggested that it might be possible to allay this by some immediate gesture giving proof of our good faith such as despatch forthwith of several allied battalions into Thrace. All three generals agreed that without some such gesture Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance.

[1] No. 96.

Italian High Commissioner urged that if war resulted world would attribute it to unwillingness of allied High Commissioners and generals to take responsibility for concessions which were of small account in comparison with issues involved.

I replied that world would attribute it to intractability of Turks, that the more we yielded to Turks the more demands they would make and that the next might well be evacuation of Constantinople, that General Harington, Admiral Brock and I had done our utmost to avoid war, that there were limits of forbearance of His Majesty's Government and that I must now report facts to my Government and leave it to them to appreciate whether in refusing these demands they were prepared to contemplate war.

In the meantime pending the receipt of your views I have requested General Harington to make every effort to gain time, to point out to Izmet Pasha on his return to Mudania tomorrow that powers have now received reply of Angora Government[2] and to ask him how he can reconcile readiness of that Government to attend conference with threat to recommence military operations.

Repeated to Athens No. 175.

[2] See No. 92.

No. 98

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 526 Telegraphic [E 10636/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 11.45 a.m.*

Following is text of final draft convention which allied generals stated that they were prepared to sign at Mudania.[1]

1. Conformément aux intentions de la note adressée au gouvernement d'Angora par les puissances alliées le 23 Septembre 1922,[2] et de la note adressée par le gouvernement d'Angora le 29 septembre[3] une réunion entre les généraux alliés, le général Harington pour la Grande-Bretagne, le général Mombelli pour l'Italie, le général Charpy pour la France, et le général Ismet Pacha pour le gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale, le général Mazarakis pour la Grèce, a été tenue à Moudania les 3, 4 et 5 octobre 1922.

2. La réunion a pour but de préciser la ligne au delà de laquelle les forces grecques sont invitées à se retirer de la Thrace orientale et de préparer les modalités d'évacuation et de contrôle de cette région, pour éviter des troubles, des destructions, et d'une façon générale d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique, en vue de la remise de la Thrace orientale, y compris Adrinople, au gouvernement d'Angora.

3. Il est établi tout d'abord, qu'à la date d'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention, les hostilités cesseront entre les forces turques et helléniques.

[1] See Nos. 95 and 96. [2] See No. 52, n. 3. [3] See No. 84, n. 1.

4. La ligne, derrière laquelle les troupes helléniques de Thrace doivent se retirer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente convention, est constituée par la Maritza jusqu'à la frontière bulgare, la portion de voie ferrée longeant la rive droite de la Maritza à partir de Kuleli Bourgas, et en amont de ce point jusqu'à Svilengrad (Jisr Mustapha Pacha), sera l'objet d'une surveillance, à régler par une convention spéciale, par une commission mixte interalliée turque et hellénique, qui devra maintenir intégralement le libre parcours de cette section de voie qui permet l'accès de la région d'Andrinople.

Se basant sur la note des alliés du 23 septembre[2] dans laquelle est envisagée la remise à la Turquie de la Thrace orientale, y compris Andrinople, le représentant du gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale interprète cette note de la manière suivante: la forteresse d'Andrinople dans son ensemble, y compris Karagatch et les forts situés sur la rive droite de la Maritza, sera remise au gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale. Les Généraux alliés afin d'éviter toute complication jusqu'à la conclusion du traité de paix décident que la partie de la forteresse d'Andrinople située sur la rive droite de la Maritza jusqu'à la ligne des forts inclus et comprenant la gare et la ville de Karagatch sera évacuée par les troupes grecques et qu'un détachement de troupes alliées y sera établi.

5. L'évacuation de la Thrace orientale par les troupes grecques commencera aussitôt que possible. Elle comprendra les troupes elles-mêmes, les services et formations militaires diverses, et approvisionnements, stocks en matériel de guerre, munitions, dépôts de vivres, cette évacuation sera effectuée dans le délai d'environ 15 jours.

6. Au fur et à mesure que les autorités helléniques se retireront de chaque région administrative, les pouvoirs civils seront remis aux autorités alliées, qui les remettront, autant que possible le jour même, aux autorités turques. Dans l'ensemble de la région de Thrace cette remise devra être terminée dans un laps de temps aussi court que possible, au maximum de 30 jours. Les fonctionnaires du gouvernement d'Angora seront accompagnée[s] de forces de gendarmerie nationaliste d'effectif strictement nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité locale.

7. Cette transmission des pouvoirs, ainsi que les diverses opérations de retrait des troupes grecques, s'effectueront sous le contrôle de missions interalliées, qui seront installées dans les principaux centres. Le rôle de ces missions est de s'entremettre pour faciliter la transmission des pouvoirs et les opérations ci-dessus. Elles s'effectueront d'empêcher les excès de toute nature de quelque côté qu'ils viennent à se produire.

8. En outre de ces missions seront envoyée[s] en Thrace à l'est de la Maritza des contingents alliés, qui occuperont les centres les plus importants de la région, y assureront le maintien de l'ordre, et serviront de soutien aux missions interalliées ci-dessus. Ces contingents composés d'environ sept bataillons resteront en principe groupés dans les centres principaux.

9. La date du retrait des missions et des contingents alliés sera décidée par les gouvernements alliés d'accord avec le gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale.

10. La présente convention sera soumise d'urgence à l'approbation des gouvernements respectifs, en vue de son entrée en vigueur dans le plus bref délai possible.

11. Jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du traité de paix, le gouvernement grec s'engage à se porter garantie de la vie de tous les otages pris par leurs armées et leur accordera le traitement réservé aux officiers prisonniers d'après la convention de la Haye. Par contre la grande assemblée nationale empêchera toute molestation des habitants de la Thrace orientale pour tout acte politique ou militaire, qu'ils auraient commis avant la ratification de la présente convention.

12. L'appui qui sera donné à l'acceptation de cette convention depend de la conclusion d'un accord entre le général commandant-en-chef des forces britanniques en Turquie et le général Ismet Pacha au sujet des mouvements de troupes vers la zone délimitée dans la proclamation des hauts commissaires alliés en date du 18 mai 1922 [*sic*].[4]

[4] For the declaration of May 18, 1921, on neutral zones, see Vol. XVII, No. 170.

No. 99

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 2 p.m.)
No. 527 Telegraphic [E 10615/27/44]

Most urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 12.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 472[1] has crossed my telegram No. 523[2] and my telegram No. 524[3] which partly answer your telegram under reference. My comment on four points mentioned by General Harington's telegram No. 2616[4] is as follows.

(a) Turkish claim to Karagatch is not entirely unreasonable as it is a suburb of Adrianople. The restitution of Karagatch will however enable Turks to complete chain of fortifications round Adrianople.

(b) If Turks were allowed to send gendarmes to Eastern Thrace in unlimited numbers they might very well build up an army in a very short time. This is the danger.

(c) Turkish demand that allied missions should withdraw until after Turks have taken over administration of area evacuated by Greeks would leave Christian minorities at the mercy of Turks.

I do not think we should concede this.

(d) As one of the principal objects of Mudania meeting is to bring about cessation of hostilities, demand of Turks to have the right of military operations until military convention is ratified by Allied governments is both novel and unreasonable.

[1] No. 95. [2] No. 96. [3] No. 97. [4] See No. 91, n. 1.

I am telegraphing separately text of military convention which allied generals handed to Kemalists[5] and which latter refused to accept.

I understand that impossible proposals mentioned in General Harington's telegram No. 2615[6] included suggestion that Greek troops should be withdrawn to a distance of 100 kilo[metre]s from Adrianople. This would facilitate Turkish aggression against Western Thrace. It is becoming more and more evident that Turks hope to get back Western Thrace. Impossible proposals I understand also included demand that Eastern Thrace should be restored to Turkey before signature of peace treaty.

Generals had no time to speak about neutral zones at Mudania. They were occupied throughout three days with question of Eastern Thrace.

It seems to me impossible that we should accept Turkish demand for restitution of Eastern Thrace before signature of peace conference.

I am not convinced that mere statement to Kemalists that we would summon Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace at once and send allied contingents forthwith will satisfy Kemalists who are evidently out to get Eastern Thrace at once by hook or by crook.

[5] No. 98. [6] Not printed (see No. 95).

No. 100

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 473 Telegraphic [*E 10577/27/44*]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 6, 1922, 1.45 p.m.*

His Majesty's Government take so grave a view of the situation revealed by your telegrams Nos. 523 and 524[1] that I am proceeding myself to Paris to-day for the purpose of a personal discussion with M. Poincaré.[2]

Please inform Sir C. Harington that pending result of this Paris discussion he should not return to Mudania. In the event of his having meanwhile already returned Mudania, he should be warned not to commit himself on any important point without further instructions.

Repeated to Paris No. 354, Rome No. 314, and Athens No. 297.

[1] Nos. 96 and 97 respectively.

[2] In his telegram No. 355 of October 6, not printed, Lord Curzon requested Lord Hardinge to arrange the meeting for the night of October 6, or, failing that, early the following morning.

No. 101

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 3.10 p.m.)
No. 529 Telegraphic [E 10619/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 1.55 p.m.*

Should Mudania conference unfortunately break down, I have instructed General Harington to make following declaration to Ismet Pasha, subject of course to other instructions from you. If General Harington can get his colleagues to endorse this declaration so much the better. Begins:

In my desire to arrive at a peaceful solution of questions which allied generals were empowered to discuss at Mudania, I have gone to extreme limit of concessions and forbearance. I regret to have to state that Nationalist representatives have not shown a similar spirit. Their demands went far beyond proposals made to Angora government on September 23rd,[1] and are designed to pre-judge the proceedings at contemplated conference at Venice or elsewhere. I find it inexplicable that in order to obtain his demands, which are anyhow inconsistent with procedure outlined in allies' note of (? September 23rd), Ismet Pasha should have threatened to resume march of his troops at very moment when Angora government have accepted to attend proposed conference,[2] and have themselves suggested that conference should meet on October 20th. I cannot reconcile these conflicting proceedings on the part of Angora government.

In view of foregoing, I decline all responsibility for the consequences resulting from any resumption of march of Kemalist troops. This responsibility will fall on Angora government.

Repeated to Paris.

[1] See No. 52, n. 3. [2] See No. 92.

No. 102

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 3.15 p.m.)
No. 530 Telegraphic [E 10620/27/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 3 p.m.*

Proceedings at Mudania coupled with passage in Angora note of October 4th[1] relating to Mudania conference clearly reveal manoeuvre of Nationalists. Before sending their reply to invitation to Peace Conference Nationalists had hoped to obtain a document signed by allied generals conceding practically all their territorial demands. This manoeuvre has been foiled. Franklin Bouillon did his utmost to get generals to sign protocol telegraphed in my telegram No. 526[2] with addition of concession restoring Eastern Thrace to Turkey before signature of Peace Treaty.

[1] See No. 92. [2] No. 98.

No. 103

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 6, 9.50 p.m.)
No. 532 Telegraphic [E 10641/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Franklin Bouillon leaves for Mudania this afternoon prior to departure from here of Allied Generals.

He came with French High Commissioner to appeal for authority from me to hold out to Turks prospect of concessions by His Majesty's Government to Turkish demands. I told him I had reported, very fully, to Your Lordship and that I could not prejudge decisions of His Majesty's Government.

In the meantime Franklin Bouillon with authorization of French High Commissioner telegraphed in his own name and that of Nationalist agent here to Ismet Pasha asking that reassembling of Conference fixed for 2.30 p.m. today should be delayed till late afternoon in order to enable Paris and London decisions to arrive.[1]

[1] See Nos. 112 and 113, below.

No. 104

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 7, 6 a.m.)
No. 533 Telegraphic [E 10638/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 6, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 469.[1]

As you will have seen from my 552 (*sic*)[2] I am absolutely opposed to Smyrna and consider proposal for . . .[3] or some other town in Italy should be maintained. Question of date is subordinate to rapidity with which allied governments can make preparations for conference. While a fortnight would seem inadequate for this purpose conference should if possible be held by October 30th or say a fortnight after actual issue of invitations.

I do not think His Majesty's Government should object to participation of Russian states mentioned provided it be limited to that part of negotiations

[1] Of October 5. This referred to No. 92, and continued: 'If conference is to retain character contemplated at Paris, it seems to me impossible that it should be held within a fortnight, on Turkish soil, and in a place destroyed by fire.

'As to seats at the conference, it must be remembered that its object will be not merely to make provision for future freedom of Straits, which will be left in the main to League of Nations, but to conclude peace between Turkey and the powers with whom she is still at war, the terms of which peace must deal with a large number of issues unconnected with the Straits, or with the states for whom admission is now demanded.'

[2] The reference is to Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 522 of October 5, not printed, which was not received in the Foreign Office until 8.30 a.m. on October 6.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

relating to the freedom of the Straits. In that case Bulgaria has every right to be similarly invited. Danger of allies being out-voted owing to presence of three Russian states might be met by insistence on separate votes for British dominions, to which they would seem no less entitled than Georgia and Ukraine.

It is matter for consideration whether Straits régime should not form subject of entirely separate negotiation. This would obviate many difficulties and present certain desirable advantages. Above views are based on presumption that it will be allied ministers and not High Commissioners who will represent their governments at the conference.

Repeated to Athens and Paris.

No. 105

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 16.)
No. 564 [E 14246/13/19]

ATHENS, *October 6, 1922*

My Lord,

As reported in my despatch No. 556 of the 1st instant,[1] the Chief of the Naval Staff sent a message to Admiral Aubrey Smith, Chief of the British Naval Mission, on the 26th instant to say that he could get no replies from any Greek men-of-war except those at Constantinople. A few hours later the Chief of the Naval Staff gave a message to the Admiral from Prince Nicholas asking him if it were not possible to send for a British man-of-war to take off the Royal Family, who were in imminent danger. The revolt of the Greek Navy appeared to me to contain very dangerous possibilities and it was in these circumstances that I addressed to Your Lordship my telegram No. 489 of the 26th ultimo[2] recommending that a British man-of-war be sent.

Your Lordship replied (telegram No. 258 of September 27th)[2] that the despatch of a man-of-war would be left to the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean; and added: 'It is certainly to be hoped that we shall not become involved in the misfortunes (this word was corrupt)[3] of the Greek Royal Family. On the other hand we would, of course, intervene to avoid actual bloodshed.' During the next two days it became abundantly clear that there were a number of people at Athens who thought that the best thing to do was to murder King Constantine and his family as well as Nicholas, at once. My French colleague, who, throughout the crisis, has shown himself both loyal and animated by humane feelings, spoke to me more than once of the necessity of getting the King away without delay if he was to avoid assassination; and from all sides I was warned that the danger

[1] No. 85. [2] Not printed.
[3] The word in the telegram as sent was 'actions'.

was imminent. It was in these circumstances that I addressed to Your Lordship my telegram No. 514 of the 28th ultimo[2] asking sanction to send the Royal Family provisionally to Malta if necessary.

I confess that it was with some perplexity that I read Your Lordship's telegram No. 266 of the 29th ultimo[2] in reply to this request. This telegram ran as follows: 'As I said in my telegram No. 258, if there is any risk to life of late King and Royal Family we shall be ready *if requested* to take them away in a British ship for conveyance to some non-British port. We do not therefore approve Malta suggestion.' My perplexity was due to the fact that I was unable to find in Your Lordship's telegram No. 258 the words to which 'as I said' could refer; since there was nothing in that telegram either about being invited or a non-British port.

In the meantime I had seen Colonel Gonatas and Colonel Plasteras and, acting in the spirit of the instructions contained in Your Lordship's telegram No. 258, had represented to them that the prestige of the Revolutionary Committee would be best served if they sent the Royal Family away in a Greek ship. At the same time I made it clear that His Majesty's Government wished to have nothing to do with the business. I found the two Colonels as anxious to get rid of the Royal Family as I was, since they realised they were in great danger and wished to be relieved as soon as possible of responsibility for their safety. They promised to do all they could to hasten the departure and suggested putting all the arrangements in the hands of Admiral Smith. I welcomed this suggestion, since I knew that endless delays would result if this matter were left to the Greeks. After this interview the matter passed out of my hands and I cannot do better than transmit to Your Lordship a letter[4] I have received from Vice-Admiral Aubrey Smith giving an account of the arrangements made and the departure of the Royal Family.

The Admiral desires me to express his sincere thanks to Your Lordship for the congratulations contained in Your Lordship's telegram No. 283 of the 2nd instant;[5] and I venture to take this opportunity of also thanking Your Lordship for so encouraging a mark of Your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.,
F. O. LINDLEY.

[4] Of October 2, not printed.

[5] This ran: 'I entirely approve and congratulate you and Admiral Aubrey Smith on satisfactory solution.'

No. 106

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 6, 1922, at 11 p.m. (*Received at the Foreign Office on October 9.*)

[*E 11463/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré, M. Peretti; SECRETARIES: M. Massigli, M. Barjeton, M. Clinchant.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge; SECRETARY: Mr. Vansittart.
Italy: Signor Galli; SECRETARY: Signor Boscarelli.
INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON said that a grave situation had arisen and that recent events at Mudania seemed to His Majesty's Government to render desirable an immediate conversation.[1] He regretted the trouble to which M. Poincaré had been put at this late hour, but the issues were very serious and immediate decisions were necessary. The conference would remember that it was only a fortnight since representatives of the Three Powers had made an agreement[2] calculated to bring peace in the Near East, to maintain Allied solidarity and to end the lamentable series of events which had taken place there. Lord Curzon had made, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, substantial concessions with a view to arriving at peace. He had then regarded and still regarded the Paris Agreement[2] as pivotal, a point to be adhered to as the sole guarantee for the execution of the objects in view. Since that date, so far as His Majesty's Government were responsible, everything had been carried out in scrupulous accord, both as regards the substance of the agreement and the order in which the different stages should be taken. He regarded the agreement, therefore, as guiding and continuing to guide the action of His Majesty's Government in the troublous times which might still be ahead.

When the meeting at Mudania had been agreed upon, it was decided that it should be a meeting of Allied generals whose business it would be to lay down the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw. The Greeks also had been invited to attend. So far as His Majesty's Government knew, no one else was to be invited to take part; and he had therefore been somewhat surprised when Ismet Pasha had appeared accompanied by Hamid Bey, who apparently was actually taking part in the conference. Lord Curzon had also heard that Franklin-Bouillon was at Mudania, though not actually in the conference; and he was not sure that the latter's influence had proved very pacific.[3] The Allied generals had discussed the line behind which the Greeks were to withdraw, but the Greek representatives had arrived late[4] and other questions had been discussed, although decisions in these matters

[1] See No. 100.
[2] See Nos. 51 and 52.
[3] See Nos. 91, 96, and 97.
[4] See No. 91.

could only be taken *ad referendum* to the High Commissioners and the Allied Governments. At every point, questions of vital importance had been raised by the Turks, and there had been constant objections and references to Angora.[5] Yet the three generals, acting in accord, had been able to draw up a draft protocol or convention to be put before the Turks as a basis of possible agreement.[6]

M. POINCARÉ said that the French Government had not received this document.

LORD CURZON said he would explain it and show how far the spirit of conciliation had been carried. The convention had been handed to the Turks on the second day of the conference. The following were its principal features:

Hostilities were to cease at once. The line of withdrawal was to be the Maritza up to the Bulgarian frontier. A special convention was to be concluded for the supervision of the railway on the right bank of the Maritza by a Greek and Turkish Commission. (The Turkish general had said that he interpreted 'Adrianople' as including Karagatch and the forts on the right bank, which must be evacuated by the Greeks and ceded to Angora at once.) The draft protocol also provided that the complete evacuation by the Greeks was to be begun at once and carried out in fifteen days. The Greek civil administration was to retire, and civil powers were to be handed to the Allies, who would at once begin to transmit them to the Turks and complete the operation in thirty days. The Angora officials, who were to be placed in charge, were to be accompanied by a limited gendarmerie to secure order. All this was to be done under the supervision of Allied Missions in the principal centres, where their presence would be a guarantee against excesses. Allied contingents were to be placed east of the Maritza to keep order and support the missions which had already been sent out from Constantinople. These contingents would amount to seven battalions. The date of the retirement of the missions and the contingents was to be decided by agreement between the Allies and the Turks. This convention was to be submitted for immediate approval. Until the execution of the Treaty of Peace, the Greek Government was to guarantee the lives and good treatment of the hostages in its hands, and the Turks on their part were not to molest the inhabitants of Eastern Thrace for any previous acts.

The conference would agree that this document had been drawn up in a spirit of liberal and generous concession, going beyond the Paris proposals and showing an extreme desire to meet Angora.

In the course of discussions on the draft convention the representatives of Angora had advanced further claims. These could not be accepted for they lay entirely outside the scope of the Paris note. The claims[7] were four in number:

1. That the gendarmerie now to be introduced into Thrace should be unlimited. This was absolutely impossible, because the Kemalists would then introduce an army under the thin disguise of another name. It was, moreover, quite inconsistent with the Paris note.

[5] See No. 91. [6] No. 98. [7] See No. 91, n. 1.

2. That in reoccupying Adrianople the Kemalists should also occupy Karagatch and the forts on the right bank of the Maritza. This might be held to be not unreasonable, but it was a matter to be considered by the Peace Conference and not by the generals.

3. That after the signature of the convention the Kemalists should have the right to continue military operations until ratification by the Allied Governments. This was both unreasonable and impracticable.

4. That the Allied missions, which had already started from Constantinople, should be withdrawn immediately after the Greek evacuation. This would be tantamount to saying that there should be no protection for Christians. These and other such preposterous claims had, of course, to be resisted.

The draft convention had been agreed to by the three Allied generals. But two days ago Ismet Pasha had demanded that the whole of Eastern Thrace should be handed over to the Turks at once, and that all Allied officers, missions and contingents should be immediately withdrawn. He had threatened to set his troops in motion if these demands were not at once conceded.[8]

Here the French general, who up till then had acted in accord with his Allies, had suddenly announced that he had instructions from the French Government to agree to the Turkish demands. The meeting had accordingly broken up, and the generals had returned to Constantinople to consult the High Commissions.[9] His Majesty's Government had instructed General Harington not to return or resume negotiations until the matter was cleared up.[10]

Lord Curzon did not know what explanation M. Poincaré would be good enough to favour him with about these alleged orders to the French generals, but he hoped that he might at once point out that the Turkish demands were utterly inconsistent with the Paris Agreement. They anticipated the agreement of the Greeks, ignored the Peace Conference and destroyed all provision for minorities; if the Kemalists were now allowed to establish themselves fully in Eastern Thrace they would be able to exact what terms they wished for Western Thrace or for anything else, because they would already be in full possession, whereas the Allied aim was to attach conditions to such possession. If this claim were upheld, and if the French Government supported General Charpy, it would render all co-operation between the Allied Governments well-nigh impossible and the situation even more dangerous and disquieting than it now was. M. Poincaré had, he believed, seen M. Veniselos. Lord Curzon had also seen him three days ago, and had informed Count Saint-Aulaire of the conversation.[11] Lord Curzon had advised M. Veniselos[12] to accept the Allied line of withdrawal. M. Veniselos had, of course, found the advice unpalatable, but two days later he had returned and said that he had advised the Greek Government to acquiesce, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the shape of Allied contingents pending the Peace Conference.[13] Whether the Greek

[8] See No. 96. [9] See No. 96. [10] See No. 100.
[11] No record of this communication has been traced in the Foreign Office archives.
[12] See No. 89. [13] See No. 94.

Government had accepted this advice Lord Curzon did not know. But clearly when the Greeks were showing this good disposition, this was not the moment for the surprising attitude apparently adopted by some of the Allied representatives at Mudania. M. Poincaré might ask what, in view of His Majesty's Government, should be done? Lord Curzon thought the answer was clear.

The Kemalists' demands with regard to the possession of Eastern Thrace without delay or withdrawal should be firmly rejected. The four additional claims, which were part of the same proposal, should also be rejected or at least referred to the Peace Conference. Finally, it was essential that, if the Greek army would withdraw, the Allies should make themselves responsible for order and security in the interval between now and the Peace Conference by sending in Allied missions and contingents, while allowing the Turks to set up a civil administration with a strictly restricted gendarmerie. This was the least that the Allies could do unless they tore up the Paris note that night.

Ismet Pasha had announced his intention to advance at two o'clock that day unless these conditions were granted. If he had done so it would be he who had torn up the Paris note. In such case the whole position would have to be reconsidered, but for the moment Lord Curzon would assume that this was bluff, and that the Turks were not so foolish as to execute the threat; and he would hope that the situation still allowed the Allies to act together under the Paris note.

M. Poincaré said that he associated himself with the hope expressed by Lord Curzon. He trusted that the irreparable had not occurred, but he feared that Mustapha Kemal was already carrying out his threat. The seriousness of that threat had been the reason why General Charpy had given way. He wished also to protest against any suggestion that M. Franklin-Bouillon was not inspired by a friendly spirit. M. Franklin-Bouillon was animated by the best intentions in the world, and had done all he could. He had gone to Mudania in this pacificatory spirit; he had gone without instructions from the French Government, and had acted on his own initiative. The case was not the same as when he went to Smyrna; he had been officially sent there. Before leaving Smyrna he had sent home a Kemalist draft indicating their present claims.[14] The French Government were therefore prepared for them and for this threat.

M. Poincaré's own opinion was that we ought to stand by the Paris note. When he had seen Lord Hardinge the latter had asked him to join in the British instructions to Constantinople. He had replied that he would join, in so far as these instructions were capable of realisation and could be reconciled with the possibilities of the case.[15]

General Charpy had not had orders; he had only had an authorisation with wide latitude to use his judgement on the spot. If the instructions could not be realised he was to try to harmonise them with Turkish claims.

Signor Galli said that the Italian representative had instructions to acquiesce in three out of the four points, but not in the immediate Turkish possession of Thrace.

[14] See No. 90. [15] See No. 82, n. 4.

M. POINCARÉ said General Mombelli had entirely adhered to the French point of view.

LORD CURZON said that General Mombelli might have been overruled, but at first had adopted the same attitude as General Harington.

M. POINCARÉ repeated that General Charpy had no orders but only latitude to avoid war. The general thought that point had been reached, and M. Poincaré did not hesitate to say that, if these concessions were necessary to avoid war, we must resign ourselves to them.

LORD CURZON said that he could see no difference between instructions and this 'authorisation'.

M. POINCARÉ repeated that General Charpy's action had been necessary to avoid war.

LORD CURZON replied that he understood this contention, but did M. Poincaré realise where this course was leading him? General Charpy had consented to something entirely inconsistent with the Paris note.

M. POINCARÉ asserted emphatically that there was no inconsistency. He asked leave to read the Paris note to prove this; and did so with some signs of irritation.

LORD CURZON said he must wholly disagree with M. Poincaré's assertion. Did the Paris note contemplate the immediate handing over of Thrace to the Turks?

M. POINCARÉ then read his instructions to General Charpy, and added that it was dangerous to propose anything immutable. General Charpy was to support the British, placate the Turks and refer home any case of difficulty.

LORD CURZON enquired if General Charpy had done so.

M. POINCARÉ replied, 'No.' But communication took thirty-six hours. General Charpy had thought himself empowered to accept the Turkish claims in order to avoid war. His Majesty's Government did not agree; but let them realise that, if war broke out, it would be against Russia and Bulgaria as well as Turkey. Was His Majesty's Government ready for that? The French Government would not contemplate it, or have it at any price. What did the Turks claim after all? Only that the Allies were not to remain when the Turkish gendarmerie and civil authorities were installed.

LORD CURZON said that the demand was for an unlimited gendarmerie.

M. POINCARÉ said that even the Greeks did not oppose this demand. He had seen M. Veniselos, who had said that he would not object to a return to the frontiers of 1914.[16] There was, therefore, no difficulty in regard to Karagatch. M. Veniselos only asked for Allied troops for a month in order to enable such Greeks as wished to be evacuated, and M. Veniselos now asked for nothing more in regard to the protection of minorities. After one month let Turkey do as she please.

M. Poincaré then read a telegram from General Pellé saying that the Patriarch of Adrianople and the local Greeks did not wish any resistance to be made in regard to the retrocession of Thrace. There was, therefore, no case for a stiff attitude on the part of the Allies. In any event, being at

[16] See No. 125, below.

Constantinople, at Chanak and Gallipoli, the Allies would still be masters of the situation, and have their hands full of levers at the Peace Conference. But even now the Turks might be marching; he had been told that their advance was imminent. M. Poincaré then read snatches of corrupt telegrams which did not appear to bear out this statement.

LORD CURZON replied that M. Poincaré had assured him of his fidelity to the Paris note, and had also defended M. Franklin-Bouillon as a peace-maker. Lord Curzon could give evidence in a very opposite sense, but he had no desire to rest his arguments on personalities. He was dealing with far larger issues.

What General Charpy's instructions really amounted to was that, if the Kemalists threatened or bluffed, General Charpy was authorised to separate himself from the Allies and make concessions inconsistent with the Paris note.

Lord Curzon was at a loss to understand how such an attitude could be defended. It was due to General Charpy's sole initial action that the Mudania Conference had broken up.

M. POINCARÉ defended General Charpy, repeating that the general had to consider that war might result from refusal, a war in which Russia and Bulgaria would join.

LORD CURZON said that on this showing the Allies must invariably give way to any Turkish demand, no matter how outrageous, if it were coupled with a threat. He could accept no such proposition, and he could not picture the reception that His Majesty's Government would give to such an idea. M. Poincaré had urged that the action was not inconsistent with the Paris note. Lord Curzon would also read the Paris note which stipulated for the full protection of Christian minorities, and that pending this the Kemalists were not to cross with troops to Europe. But if the Turks were to be in immediate occupation, how would it be possible to protect minorities? The crossing in itself, moreover, would be an infringement of the agreement.

As for M. Veniselos, Lord Curzon was greatly surprised to hear M. Poincaré's statement. M. Veniselos must have gone much further than when Lord Curzon had seen him.[17] M. Veniselos had then said nothing in regard to territory west of the Maritza, nor of the retention of Allied troops for one month only.

To Lord Curzon, M. Veniselos had pleaded for an hour on behalf of the minorities in Thrace, or indeed the majorities as he claimed them to be. M. Veniselos had said he was considering the evacuation of the whole Christian population. Counting Constantinople with Eastern Thrace, this would amount to over a million souls. How would this be possible in a month? Transport was deficient, and there were in reality few destinations to which these unfortunate people could be directed, even supposing that they were willing to pluck up their own roots from the soil on which they had grown.

M. Poincaré had seemed to suggest that this was a matter of small relative importance. Was it? The protection of minorities was part of the Paris note.

[17] See No. 89.

Were they going to tear up that part? If so, would not more of it be gone next week? And the next stage would be that it would go altogether.

M. Poincaré's statement was the most serious that Lord Curzon had ever heard him make. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to appeal to the Paris note, but it seemed to be gone or going. He had come to appeal for adherence to the draft convention of the Allied generals, but General Charpy had thrown it over in a fit of terror. The Turk had held up his sword, and all Allied conditions were to vanish. If that were indeed the case, he would have to tell the conference what view his Government would take of so grave a situation.

But Lord Curzon was still wondering whether he had not misunderstood M. Poincaré, and he would still ask for a clear answer whether his first propositions were accepted or rejected. In the latter event the whole position must be reconsidered. He would moreover ask whether M. Poincaré was really prepared to concede the four Turkish points, and finally he would enquire what M. Poincaré proposed to do at Mudania. His Majesty's Government were not prepared to make, and would not make, these concessions. Were Generals Charpy and Mombelli to be allowed to break the Allied front? Was the conference to be suspended? And if Mustapha Kemal attacked again what would M. Poincaré propose to do? The Paris note spoke of the respect of the neutral zones, but M. Poincaré thought Mustapha Kemal might already have attacked. If so, what course was M. Poincaré going to adopt?

M. Poincaré retorted that if the Turks advanced he would do nothing. Let there be no doubt about that. He would do nothing in any circumstances. French troops should never fire a shot in the East. He had said that before. France could not fight in the East, and would not. If concessions must be made she would make them reluctantly.

Lord Curzon said that this seemed to be a most humiliating position, and he could not conceive that any Great Power should adopt it.

M. Poincaré replied with great heat that there was no question of humiliation. He needed no lessons from anyone and would take none. He represented France, and France required no lessons. He wished to make it clear once and for all that he would tolerate no criticism of any word or action of his. Moreover, matters were not as Lord Curzon represented them. The three generals had at first drafted together a project giving entire satisfaction to the Turks. It was General Harington who had gone back on them. Again he repeated that he had not given General Charpy any liberty inconsistent with the Paris note, but only as regards provisional measures. Lord Curzon's expression seeming to convey some incredulity, M. Poincaré declared that Lord Curzon was laughing at him, and that, as he tolerated no criticism, he would tolerate no smiles.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Allied generals were only authorised to draw a line of evacuation.

M. Poincaré claimed that it had never been laid down that the Allies should undertake the burden of supervision in Thrace. Ways and means

must therefore be left to the generals. (At this point M. Poincaré was fumbling for arguments, and became somewhat incoherent. The following passages are reported so far as he could be understood.)

Thrace was the property of Turkey, and it was only natural and in conformity with the law to return property, even when it was territory, immediately to its possessor *de facto*. The *de jure* possession would be regulated by the peace. During the provisional period the Turks only asked for the progressive transfer to them of the civil administration. This was necessary precisely in order to prevent the passage of troops and renewed warfare. Here M. Poincaré drew an obscure analogy with the French re-entry into the possession of Alsace-Lorraine. He proceeded to say that the Allies could attain what they desired by staying at Constantinople and Gallipoli; but even so, if they could only attain what they wanted by war, France would not stay.

Reverting to M. Veniselos, M. Poincaré read a telegram saying that M. Veniselos had urged his Government to retire behind the Maritza, and had accepted the idea of a Turkish administration within a month.

SIGNOR GALLI interpolated that the Italian Government had coupled their instructions to General Mombelli with some observations. They had thought the danger so pressing that the Thracian régime would have to be dealt with to some extent by the generals. The Italian Government also would not oppose Mustapha Kemal by arms, even if his force was small. Between General Mombelli's first and second attitudes the situation had become more dangerous. He had therefore joined the French. Signor Galli asked whether the conflict could not somehow be avoided without loss of prestige. The Italian Government would agree to anything to avoid a fight.

M. POINCARÉ said that those were the principles of the French Government. The Turks were not bluffing; they would attack.

LORD CURZON replied that was just what General Charpy's attitude was calculated to encourage. M. Poincaré had begun by answering Lord Curzon's last question; what would the French Government do if the Turks attacked the neutral zones? For the British part they should defend Chanak. What about Ismid? M. Poincaré had said definitely that he would do nothing. Why then had they put into the Paris note that the Kemalists were not to send troops to the neutral zones or cross the Straits?

M. POINCARÉ replied that the penalty for that would be that the Allies should not press the Greeks to withdraw. He had never said that the French would fight about it.

LORD CURZON pointed out that it might now be hoped that the Greeks would withdraw; but a Turkish attack would ruin the prospect of this peaceful solution. And the French Government would do nothing! M. Poincaré argued that, when the generals drew the line, they had no alternative but to prepare the installation of a Turkish administration, and that territory automatically reverts to a quondam possessor. Why then, after full discussion at the last conference, had the duties of the generals been clearly limited? M. Poincaré need only look at the agreement to verify this. Moreover, this

was not a question only of civil administration: that had been conceded by the protocol of the three Allied generals. What the Turks now asked was immediate occupation, the transport of unlimited gendarmerie, the cession of Karagatch, the continuance of military operations, and the withdrawal of any Allied contingents. Once again, Lord Curzon asked, did M. Poincaré agree to the four points? M. Veniselos had agreed to something quite different—the evacuation of the Greek army and population in a month under provisional Allied administration. Angora and Charpy proposed something quite different. What did M. Poincaré accept or refuse?

Once again, this was not a question of civil administration: Angora now demanded that Eastern Thrace should be taken out of Allied hands altogether. Did M. Poincaré agree? Lord Curzon could get no reply.

M. POINCARÉ asserted that he had never heard of the four points or of the draft protocol. He understood that the Turks asked only for the introduction of Turkish gendarmerie, not for military occupation. The latter the Allies would refuse. The only real difficulty was that of the civil administration. But were not the Allies agreed upon that?

LORD CURZON said that his information was evidently fuller than that of the French Government. General Harington asked for specific instructions on a number of points unconnected with civil administration. Lord Curzon quoted General Harington's telegram,[18] and asked for the views of the French Government. He referred M. Poincaré to the generals' protocol;[19] if General Charpy had confined himself to the point of civil administration, the conference would not have broken up. What had split it was the point of full and immediate Turkish possession of Thrace.

M. POINCARÉ said that the Allies were agreed upon Greek evacuation, and they were also agreed in regard to the civil administration. But the Turks would not tolerate Allied troops or missions alongside their administration. Only the British Government held out on this point. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had acted rightly in yielding.

LORD CURZON pointed out that, beyond drawing the line of evacuation, the generals had only the right to make suggestions.

M. POINCARÉ then argued that there was really no difference between the Allies, but only a misunderstanding. He read a telegram from General Pellé, who had taken M. Franklin-Bouillon to give explanations to Sir H. Rumbold.

LORD CURZON read out General Harrington's telegrams,[20] which proved that there was more than a misunderstanding. But time was passing; it was already past 2 A.M., and he still could not get a clear answer. Would the French Government tell him later that morning, if not that night, what exactly they were prepared to accept or refuse?

Lord Curzon had explained the real nature of the Turkish demands. What attitude did M. Poincaré adopt in regard to Allied officers, missions and contingents?

[18] Presumably No. 2616 of October 4 (see No. 91, n. 1).
[19] No. 98.
[20] See No. 95, n. 1.

M. POINCARÉ replied that the Turks accepted them, but they would not have them after the Turkish Administration was installed.

LORD CURZON retorted that this was really too transparent. The Turks asked that their possession should be immediate; in other words, the Allied contingents would disappear before birth, or even before conception. What did M. Poincaré really mean? Would he formulate the exact conditions of the Allied rôle in Thrace as he understood them?

M. POINCARÉ said he would draft something, but if the Turks did not like it he would not stand to it. He would do anything to avoid war, but added that the Allies were in reality very close to an agreement.

LORD CURZON said he was glad to hear it, and he would be still more encouraged if M. Poincaré would be precise.

M. POINCARÉ repeated that he would produce something, but nothing rigid. The great thing was to avoid war. He then produced another soothing telegram from M. Franklin-Bouillon to Mustapha Kemal, and added that M. Veniselos did not object to the cession of Karagatch.

LORD CURZON enquired if the Allies were really to go beyond the original Turkish demands. For his part, he could not do so. Even if M. Veniselos had given way as regards the territory west of the Maritza, he doubted whether the Greek Government would do so.

M. POINCARÉ said he had not discussed the matter at great length with M. Veniselos. His suggestion had been that the Greeks should leave Karagatch and that Allied troops should be put in.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the French Government would send troops, and M. Poincaré replied in the affirmative, as did also Signor Galli.

Lord Curzon explained that His Majesty's Government could only provide troops for Thrace if they were not for war, i.e. if Mustapha Kemal did not cross the neutral zones. In that case, the British forces might all be needed at Chanak and Gallipoli.

M. POINCARÉ said that French troops might be sent to Thrace first.

LORD CURZON enquired what contingents the French Government would provide locally.

M. POINCARÉ answered that there were eight or nine battalions handy, and only partly coloured.

LORD CURZON asked Signor Galli how many troops the Italian Government could dispose of.

SIGNOR GALLI, after some hesitation, replied, 2,000; but he added, if it was only a question of peaceful sojourn at Karagatch, the Italian Government might perhaps contribute more troops from home.

M. POINCARÉ assured Signor Galli that there was no danger in regard to Karagatch. The Turks had indeed asked for Allied troops on the right bank of the Maritza.

LORD CURZON said he must revert again to what he had already pointed out, and ask a last time for their attention. Let them as practical and humane men face the facts. The evacuation of the Greek population could not be carried out in a month. There was nowhere to send them; and the

Smyrna refugees were already starving. It had been suggested that the populations of Eastern and Western Thrace could be exchanged. That might sound like, but it was not really, a solution. A peasant population could not be lightly transplanted. The time allowance should be liberal, and in any case if the Allies were not there to supervise the partial attempt there would be excesses. There should also be more security for the remnants when the transportable portion had gone.

M. POINCARÉ replied that was not possible. Moreover he was not anxious on this score. He had received information of atrocities by the Greeks, but of none by the Turks. The latter might get excited in Asia, but they would behave in Europe. He was, however, quite ready to send French troops to Thrace from Constantinople.

LORD CURZON said that the three flags should be shown.

It was finally arranged that M. Poincaré should formulate his views as to the conditions under which the evacuation of Thrace should be carried out.[21]

(*The conference adjourned at 3 a.m. until 9 a.m.*)[22]

[21] In his unnumbered telegram of October 7 to the Prime Minister, Lord Curzon, having summarised these conversations, concluded: 'Whether Monsieur Poincaré will recede from his position in the morning I cannot say. But I judged from his general demeanour (1) that he is greatly embarrassed by the position into which he has got himself, (2) that he is genuinely afraid of a rupture and (3) that he thinks he has the Kemalists pretty well in hand.'

[22] October 7.

No. 107

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 7, 1922, at 9 a.m. (*Received at the Foreign Office on October 9.*)

[*E 11538/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France*: M. Poincaré, M. Peretti; SECRETARIES: M. Massigli, M. Barjeton, M. Clinchant.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge; SECRETARY: Mr. Vansittart.
Italy: Signor Galli; SECRETARY: Signor Boscarelli.
INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ said he had nothing new to report, except a telegram from Rome to the effect that Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted a period of fifteen days for the evacuation of Thrace and the withdrawal of Allied contingents.[1]

LORD CURZON replied that he could not accept this. The conference was

[1] In a telephone message of October 7 to the Prime Minister, reporting these conversations, Lord Curzon stated: 'Whether this proposal had been communicated to the Turks was not clear, though it seems highly probable.'

faced with another remarkable performance. Generals Charpy and Mombelli had again broken away from General Harington and had made another concession on their own initiative.

M. POINCARÉ said the telegram only came from Rome. It might possibly not be authentic. Had General Harington referred to his Government in the matter?

LORD CURZON said that he would if necessary refer to his Government, but must state plainly that he would never advise his Government to accept, all the less as he had said at the earlier meeting, that even thirty days were really too short a period, and he had only agreed to that because M. Poincaré had advocated thirty days on M. Veniselos's own suggestion.[2] M. Poincaré should surely now instruct General Charpy to act in the sense of the agreement reached at the previous meeting.

M. POINCARÉ said he would give no instructions but only advice to General Charpy, to whom he must leave full discretion. Personally, he remained of the opinion already expressed as regards the period of thirty days; but, if Generals Charpy and Mombelli had accepted fifteen days, he could not go back on an undertaking given to the Turks. The point at issue was whether troops should be withdrawn when the administration was established. He did not mind saying that personally he thought fifteen days insufficient.

LORD CURZON repeated that he had said even thirty days were not enough for the uprooting of this large population. The thing was a physical impossibility. How could a civil administration be imported and installed in a fortnight? Such things did not spring from the soil. Moreover, order had to be maintained; a gendarmerie could not at once be properly organised; Allied occupation was absolutely necessary. The conference had discussed its composition earlier that morning,[2] but if all Allied supervision was to be withdrawn in fifteen days the thing would be a joke. For his part he would associate himself with no such idea, and, if it was persisted in, the Mudania Conference would be at an end. The responsibility for that would not be Great Britain's; and if war followed, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's; and if British troops had then to retire from Ismid and Constantinople, the responsibility would not be Great Britain's. The blame in this case would not lie on His Majesty's Government who here and now disclaimed it. But did the President of the Council really seriously say that he could not send orders to his own representative? Would not M. Poincaré be surprised if Lord Curzon were to say the same about General Harington? So far as Lord Curzon knew this was the first time that the head of a Government had ever taken such a line; and again, as Lord Curzon had said earlier, it would mean that the Allies must accept whatever General Charpy said after Kemal had threatened. Such a decision would be too derogatory for Lord Curzon to in any way be a party to it.

M. POINCARÉ retorted that there was nothing derogatory in General Charpy's decision; in any case France was the best and only judge of that, and needed and would take no lessons from anyone. He had said that he

[2] See No. 106.

would not give orders without knowing the situation. Such information he would only take from his own representatives and not from any foreigner. It would not be the first time in history that such a course had been adopted. If it was a novelty he would be proud of it, but reiterated that he would accept no criticism.

LORD CURZON said the point was that M. Poincaré, as he had already admitted, had not received information. Generals Charpy and Mombelli continually ceded without reference. For his part Lord Curzon was prepared to assume the responsibility of giving orders, but not in that sense.

SIGNOR GALLI suggested that perhaps the two generals had only accepted fifteen days *ad referendum*, and as between themselves.

M. POINCARÉ said No. If they had agreed definitely, as he thought, there could be no going back on it.

LORD CURZON pointed out that this again meant that the Allies must always yield to the Turks. It was the thin end of the wedge: the month would become fifteen days and then a week, and then nothing. General Charpy had instructions to give way on anything to avoid war. Lord Curzon did not criticise M. Poincaré's instructions, but they meant the breakdown of the Mudania Conference and of common action. He thought it had been arranged that M. Poincaré would submit instructions to be sent to General Charpy, and Lord Curzon had hoped to have been able to send them to his Government, and to recommend that similar ones be sent to General Harington. But the situation had apparently again changed.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had perhaps explained himself badly. A period of fifteen days was a regrettable innovation, and perhaps it had not really been accepted; but if such was the case he could not go back on it without putting France in a bad light in Turkish eyes. If fifteen days had not been promised he would stand out for thirty days; if a promise had been made he would not accept an increase.

LORD CURZON emphasised that there was another aspect of the matter. He referred to M. Veniselos. Lord Curzon had understood that M. Veniselos's willingness to recommend withdrawal depended on the adoption of a period of thirty days. If that period were now to be reduced, M. Veniselos would be relieved of his promise, and the Greeks might refuse to withdraw.

M. POINCARÉ said he had made no arrangement with M. Veniselos. He would not do such a thing without consulting his Allies. He was not even clear what thirty days meant. Did they run from the date of evacuation, or from the signature of the Mudania Conference?

LORD CURZON replied that he understood the matter thus: A provisional administration with Allied officers and contingents was to be set up and would remain for a month during which arrangements for the departure of the Greeks and the installation of the Turks would proceed. In practice this would work out at more than a month. Personally he had been astonished that M. Veniselos had agreed to a month. If fifteen days were now substituted, everthing would go by the board, and the result would be chaos. The period of fifteen days was not a practical proposition for practical men. The

concession made by the two generals was obviously impossible; it was surrender to an unjustified Kemalist demand, and in no wise compatible with the Paris note. To adopt this proposal would lead to disaster. Was the conference, he asked, to break down over a difference between a month and a fortnight?

M. POINCARÉ said that if fifteen days had been promised by two out of the three generals, the promise must be observed.

LORD CURZON replied that such decisions could only be reached by unanimity.

After further discussions, the following formula was proposed:

'Les trois Gouvernements alliés sont d'accord pour accepter que les troupes grecques soient invitées à se retirer le plus tôt possible à l'ouest de la Maritza. Les Gouvernements alliés assureront à l'aide d'une occupation alliée provisoire l'installation dans la Thrace orientale de l'administration turque et de la gendarmerie turque. Cette installation devra avoir lieu dans un délai qui ne dépassera pas un mois à partir de l'évacuation des troupes grecques. À l'expiration de ce délai les troupes alliées ne continueront à occuper pendant la durée de la conférence que certains points de la rive droite de la Maritza et les endroits où elles se trouvent en ce moment.'

(At this point Mr. Vansittart left the room to telephone the formula to London.)[3]

LORD CURZON said it must be clear that the last words of the formula covered Chatalja, Constantinople, Ismid, Gallipoli and Chanak.

M. POINCARÉ assented.

LORD CURZON said that he must have time to examine the draft more closely, and if necessary to propose modifications. Suppose the administration were set up with Allied officers and contingents in the country; at the expiry of the month would the Allies be absolutely pledged to withdraw? He would like to see a little more elasticity. The moment for departure might be ill-chosen. He agreed to the spirit of the formula and thanked M. Poincaré

[3] The English translation of this formula was included in Lord Curzon's telephone message to the Prime Minister (see n. 1). This message continued: 'I am not quite satisfied with these words myself and I have since the meeting shown them to Monsieur Veniselos.

'The latter denies that he ever accepted the frontier ascribed to him by Monsieur Poincaré and was grateful for my insistance on the Maritza. He also denies having expressed no anxiety concerning the Christian population of whose fate he is very apprehensive at the end of the period of allied occupation.

'I shall, therefore, endeavour to make more clear at the further meeting with Monsieur Poincaré this afternoon the conditions under which the Turkish return is to be admitted and shall press for some such formula as follows:

"In the territories thus evacuated the allied governments will ensure by means of a provisional inter-allied occupation the maintenance of order and public security during thirty days after the evacuation by the Greek troops, which will be necessary for the installation in Eastern Thrace of the Turkish administration and Turkish police."

'When I asked Monsieur Veniselos whether Greek government have accepted his advice [see No. 94] and instructed their generals at Mudania in the above sense, he said he had no definite assurance as he had been urging them to make one unpalatable concession after the other, but he felt reasonably confident that they would accept.'

for his assistance, but the draft seemed somewhat too rigid. Lord Curzon would be reluctant to be committed to withdrawal whatever might be happening at the moment. If disturbances were just then arising, withdrawal might have disastrous consequences.

M. Poincaré said that the object of the conference was to avoid a Turkish attack. If the present crisis could be smoothed over an amicable extension might be arranged later.

Lord Curzon asked if the words 'à partir de l'évacuation' meant after the completion of the Greek evacuation? He would prefer to substitute 'après' instead of 'à partir de' in order to make this clear, for he must insist on this point.

M. Poincaré accepted the substitution of the word 'après'. He claimed again, however, that if two out of three generals were committed to a period of fifteen days he also considered himself committed. In any case if the Allies were at Karagatch and Chatalja, they were masters of Thrace.

Lord Curzon enquired how one could be master of anything if one would not do anything in any circumstances.

M. Poincaré replied that that was not precisely what he had said or intended. Police work was different to war. Policemen shot in the streets of Paris, but that was not a Parisian war! French troops would be prepared to maintain order but not to make war. In regard to the formula he would prefer the expression 'in the shortest possible delay not exceeding one month'.

Lord Curzon claimed that his Government would only send General Harington back to Mudania with definite instructions and even so perhaps reluctantly. General Harington was awaiting instructions now. His Majesty's Government would certainly not authorise General Harington to resume discussions at Mudania on any conditions less than those that Lord Curzon had proposed. The other fantastic Turkish demands must be rejected.

M. Poincaré suggested that if unanimity on the period of fifteen days was not attainable, all that could be done was to say that His Majesty's Government refused, and to try to persuade the Turks to accept a month in order to ensure unanimity.

Lord Curzon declared that this would be creating a most invidious position for His Majesty's Government. Hitherto the Allied representatives had proceeded in common accord; Lord Curzon would never agree to two of them overruling the third. A united front must be preserved; there must either be concord or no agreement at all. It was not contended, he presumed, that Generals Charpy and Mombelli should have the right to commit three Governments. What would the French and Italian Governments say if General Harington had gone behind their backs?

M. Poincaré said he supposed the Turks knew that two of the generals had accepted fifteen days, but also that His Majesty's Government had not yet even accepted one month. Could they not be frank with the Turks and say that the three Governments, after consultation, proposed one month.

Lord Curzon said this might be acceptable, if Generals Charpy and Mombelli were clearly instructed accordingly.

M. POINCARÉ replied that that was of course understood.

LORD CURZON said in that case he would agree.

SIGNOR GALLI urged that if the Turks stood out for fifteen days it would not be worth while to wreck the conference for so small a difference.

LORD CURZON replied that in such a case a reference would be necessary to their respective Governments, and that he knew what his own Government would say. He would further like to emphasise the fact that there must and could be no deviation from the Paris note in regard to the evacuation of Greek troops as conditional upon the Kemalist engagement in respect of the neutral zones. General Harington would be bound to insist on the strict application of this clause of the Paris note.

M. POINCARÉ replied that he had heard of no difficulties on this point, but that there had been some suggestion of a restricted zone.

LORD CURZON answered that there might be a slight variation in the Chanak zone if it were judged desirable for practical purposes. He however was contending for a principle. Mustapha Kemal was adopting a very menacing attitude in regard to the Ismid zone.

M. POINCARÉ interrupted to contend that the Turks were entitled to continue their concentration during the Mudania Conference, inasmuch as British reinforcements continued.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the real contingency to be considered was that of Mustapha Kemal trying to cross the neutral zones.

M. POINCARÉ declared that France would never make war. He had already said so frankly.

LORD CURZON answered that if Mustapha Kemal violated the Ismid zone, and if Great Britain were deserted by her Allies, His Majesty's Government would withdraw from Ismid, and if necessary from Constantinople, and would wash their hands of the matter.[4] The French and Italian Governments must bear the entire responsibility. In his turn he said so frankly.

M. POINCARÉ said that the French troops would go out with the British.

LORD CURZON presumed that M. Poincaré had fully considered the consequences.

M. POINCARÉ said he had done so.

LORD CURZON concluded by saying that he must consult his Government, but before he left he would like to have a few words about other points arising in connection with the Angora note,[5] i.e. in regard to the date and place of, and the participants in, the eventual Peace Conference. Lord Curzon was not now empowered to make any final decision, but it might be helpful if M. Poincaré and Signor Galli would say what was in their minds. Smyrna

[4] At 11.40 p.m. on October 7, the War Office sent the following telegram (No. 91353) to General Harington: 'M. Poincaré's declarations to Marquess Curzon in Paris make it appear extremely doubtful whether you can rely upon assistance from French in event of advance by Turks in Ismid Peninsula. As soon therefore as any advance is clearly indicated you should make formal demand upon Charpy for his troops to co-operate. If he refuses, instructions contained in 19328 M.O.1. of October 6th ["you are not to attempt to fight at Scutari unless you can rely upon French troops standing with our troops there".] should be acted upon.'

[5] See No. 92.

was of course unacceptable. Again, were the Soviet Government, Georgia and the Ukraine to be admitted?

M. POINCARÉ asked if it were really necessary to answer the Angora note except as to the place of the conference? The date need not now be specified. As to Soviet participation, M. Franklin-Bouillon had told him that the Turks would not insist: the point had only been put in as a sop to Soviet pretensions.

LORD CURZON said that the Allies should come to an understanding in these matters, not necessarily for communication anyhow as yet to Angora.

M. POINCARÉ said he did not like the idea of Taormina which had been suggested as a meeting place. Smyrna of course was impossible. Why should not the conference be held at Prinkipo?

LORD CURZON expressed doubts as to the desirability of a conference on Turkish territory. In such an event, for instance, who would convoke the conference, and who would preside?

M. POINCARÉ suggested that the presidency might be held in rotation, but he would at present sooner not consider that point.

(The conference then adjourned until 2 p.m.)

No. 108

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay on October 7, 1922, at 2 p.m. (Received at the Foreign Office on October 9.)

[*E 11539/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France*: M. Poincaré, M. Peretti; SECRETARIES: M. Massigli, M. Barjeton, M. Clinchant.
Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge; SECRETARY: Mr. Vansittart.
Italy: Signor Galli; SECRETARY: Signor Boscarelli.
INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

LORD CURZON began by saying that he had asked leave to study the draft[1] drawn up at the previous meeting. It seemed capable of improvement. The changes he had to propose would be in strict accord with its principle. It might be made clearer that, in the interval of one month after the evacuation of the Greek troops, the presence of Allied officers and contingents was intended to maintain order. The morning's draft seemed to suggest that public security was less the object of occupation than the speedy introduction of a Turkish régime.

This brought Lord Curzon to the question of minorities. He had seen M. Veniselos since the last meeting.[2] On this point M. Veniselos had the gravest fears, and must have given an incorrect impression when he saw M. Poincaré. M. Veniselos had said that he was advising his Government to withdraw,

[1] See No. 107. [2] See No. 107, n. 3.

although they had already been highly tried by a series of concessions. But M. Veniselos felt that the only security for the Greek population would be, firstly, a distinct period for the evacuation of Greek troops, and, secondly, a clear month under Allied supervision during which the evacuation of the inhabitants might be peaceably effected; otherwise the moment the Allied troops departed the peasants would be persecuted in every conceivable way, and their existence rendered intolerable, even if there were no massacres. The doubtful words were those beginning, 'The Allied Governments will ensure,' &c., which had the implication already alluded to, viz., that the Allies would be in Thrace less to keep order than to instal the Turks. A more precise drafting would be preferable. He suggested the following:

'Dans les territoires ainsi évacués, les Gouvernements alliés assureront à l'aide d'une occupation interalliée provisoire le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique pendant les trente jours après l'évacuation des troupes grecques, qui seront nécessaires à l'installation dans la Thrace orientale de l'administration turque et de la gendarmerie turque.'

His Majesty's Government would find this easier of acceptance.

M. Poincaré said that he could not accept this text. He had shown the previous draft to the French Cabinet, who had accepted it. He would not, however, object to the following formula:

> 'In the territories thus evacuated, the Allied Governments will ensure, by means of provisional inter-Allied occupation, the maintenance of order and public security until the establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish civil administration and gendarmerie. This establishment shall take place, . . .'

Lord Curzon's suggestion seemed to him incompatible with the spirit of the previous draft as establishing a minimum of thirty days. The French view was that that period was a maximum with possible reductions, and the French Government had not felt able to go beyond the first text.

Lord Curzon said that he would accept M. Poincaré's amendment, but he would remind him that the morning's text had not been accepted by His Majesty's Government, to whom it had merely been referred.[3]

M. Poincaré reverted to the point that the French and Italian generals might wish to abridge the period of thirty days.

Lord Curzon replied that such a decision could not be taken by a majority, but only by unanimity, and that he should instruct General Harington to insist on a full month.

Signor Galli read a telegram from his Government saying that, as regards the four Turkish conditions,[4] Italy was in agreement with France. He suggested that the three Allied generals might in agreement contemplate a delay of less than thirty days.

Lord Curzon repeated that there could not be unanimity on such a

[3] At 4.15 p.m. on October 7, the Foreign Office transmitted in telegram No. 367 the following message to Lord Curzon: 'The Cabinet was sitting when your message containing draft agreement arrived and is considering it now.'

[4] See No. 91, n. 1, and No. 106.

suggestion, as General Harington would be told not to be unanimous. He deprecated the idea, because it might lead the Turks to press again for only fifteen days. The French and Italian Governments could, of course, say what they wished to their own generals, but nothing of the sort should be said to the Turks, who would only be encouraged to think that they could squeeze yet further concessions from the Allies. Moreover, the proposal would only bring about disagreement between the generals and end by throwing the sole responsibility on General Harington. Lord Curzon would not make the position of His Majesty's Government or its representative more difficult than necessary.

SIGNOR GALLI again pressed his proposal, and was supported by M. Poincaré, who urged that it offered the Turks a premium on good behaviour. The two generals would probably not press for abridgment. The proposal was a means of preventing the Turks from breaking off on some point of detail. Could it not be said that the generals might have latitude for abridgment?

LORD CURZON asked why it was necessary to talk at all about a shorter period. A month was really insufficient. He had agreed to a month, but that was a minimum, and even now he was not sure that his Government would consent.

M. POINCARÉ agreed to drop the subject, the more readily, he added, in that he considered the text as it already stood to admit of the possibility of a time-reduction.

LORD CURZON said that he would submit the final text to his Government.[5] Meanwhile he would like to revert to the last note[6] of the Angora Government. It raised the questions:

1. Smyrna as a meeting-place.
2. The 20th October as the date.
3. The participation of Russia, Georgia and the Ukraine.
4. It was very vague on the subject of the Straits.
5. It was ambiguous about admission to the League of Nations.
6. It raised the question of the evacuation of Constantinople.

It seemed to Lord Curzon unnecessary to reply on the last three points, but on the first three the Allies should come to an understanding. He reminded the meeting, however, that he had not yet had an opportunity of discussing the matter with his own Government.

The freedom of the Straits was a most important issue, but there were

[5] Lord Curzon submitted the final text in a telephone message which was received in the Foreign Office at 4.45 p.m. The text ran: 'In the territories thus evacuated the allied governments will ensure by means of provisional inter-allied occupation the maintenance of order and public security, until establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish administration and gendarmerie. This establishment shall take place within a period not exceeding a month after the evacuation of Greek troops. At the expiry of this period, the allied troops shall only continue to occupy during the conference certain points on the right bank of Maritza and the places where they are at the present moment.'

[6] See No. 92.

States interested in it who had no concern with the rest of the treaty. The freedom of the Straits might have to be discussed by all the interested parties, but the drawing up of a new Treaty of Peace should in any case be restricted to the Powers who had been, and in fact were, at war with Turkey.

M. POINCARÉ thanked Lord Curzon, and said he was glad to have this talk with a view to smoothing various susceptibilities. There were other difficult points, for instance, Bulgaria's economic access to the Ægean—all being agreed, of course, that there should be no territorial access. Such access was a servitude on Greece, as the freedom of the Straits was a servitude on Turkey.

M. Poincaré agreed with what Lord Curzon had said on the latter point: the rest of the treaty certainly did not concern the Powers not at war with Turkey. He suggested that the conference might examine the questions relating to the conclusion of peace, and reserve for another meeting the question of the Straits, after having obtained from Turkey in advance precise engagements to satisfy the Allies. He recalled that in 1856, when the Treaty of Paris had been signed, the Straits were the subject of a special convention.[7] A new convention might be elaborated by all the Powers concerned; in any case, as regards *de facto* Governments, the rights of the countries that they represented should be reserved.

As to the date, the 20th October was too soon, but any long delay should be avoided: it was advisable to strike while the iron was hot. As to the place of meeting, he agreed with Lord Curzon that Smyrna was impossible, but it would be difficult to get the Turks to consent to any conference outside their own territory. He suggested Prinkipo. In that case the presidency of the conference could be held in rotation. Anyhow, this was a detail which could be easily solved. It was just as well that peace should not be made under the auspices of any one Power. He and France, for instance, were not proud of the Treaty of Sèvres.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Prinkipo would be highly inconvenient. The delegates would have to go to and from Constantinople daily in a rough sea, losing at least an hour morning and evening.

LORD HARDINGE suggested Constantinople or Scutari, which would be easier of access and much better accommodation.

M. POINCARÉ preferred Scutari to Constantinople and Prinkipo to Scutari. He did not think the Turks would come to a conference under Allied cannon.

LORD CURZON said that he must consult his Government.[8]

SIGNOR GALLI remarked that he had no instructions, but that Lord Curzon's views seemed to him reasonable and he would transmit them to his Government.

LORD CURZON suggested as a possible date the first week in November.

SIGNOR GALLI emphasised the necessity of choosing a spot of easy access. Signor Schanzer would have desired that the conference be held in Italy, but Signor Galli would communicate to him the suggestions advanced at this conference, and he did not doubt that his Government would take full

[7] Printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 46, pp. 18–21.

[8] This was done on his return to London on October 8.

account of it, and that Italy would renounce the honour of holding the conference on her soil.

M. POINCARÉ said that, in his view, the suggestion of Lord Curzon as to the separation of the conference into two parts was ingenious and valuable.

LORD CURZON said there was another point. If Georgia claimed admission to the Straits Conference as a Black Sea State, Azerbaijan might claim also on account of the vital necessity to her of her oil exports.

M. POINCARÉ suggested that the question of participation might be left for the moment, and that as regards the date and place of the conference the High Commissioners should be authorised to tell the Turks that it should be held at Scutari as soon as possible after the 1st November.

LORD CURZON said that he would discuss this with his Government and send M. Poincaré an answer by Lord Hardinge as soon as possible. His Majesty's Government would, of course, have to consider very carefully the manner in which the freedom of the Straits should be dealt with.

M. POINCARÉ asked if the Government of Angora could be told that the details of the freedom of the Straits would not be treated by the main conference. In that case, participation of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia would not immediately arise.

LORD CURZON repeated that he must consult his Government, and raised the further question of the status of the delegates who should represent their Governments. There had been a suggestion that the High Commissioners might act at the preliminary stages, and M. Poincaré had thought that the plenipotentiaries might attend either at the beginning or at the end, or both. The discussion might well be a long one and, so far as Lord Curzon himself was concerned, he would find it very difficult to go such a distance as Constantinople; indeed, his official and parliamentary duties would make it well-nigh impossible, and, of course, he could not be continually going to and fro. France would presumably be in same case. M. Poincaré might not be able to go himself and would wish to be represented by a Minister of some rank.

M. POINCARÉ replied that, from the constitutional point of view, there was no difficulty. Treaties were negotiated in the name of the President of the Republic, and the Government could name any representative—Minister, diplomatist or general. From the moment he was invested with the requisite authority he represented France. On Lord Curzon referring to the position of M. Barthou at Genoa,[9] M. Poincaré added that M. Barthou was not a plenipotentiary. He had only a letter from M. Poincaré, but not full powers. It would be necessary for a plenipotentiary to be present at the Peace Conference.

LORD CURZON said that he also was not discussing any constitutional difficulty; he only wished to know what type of representatives the Allies should select. Were High Commissioners sufficient, or did the French contemplate sending a Minister?

M. POINCARÉ replied that special representatives should, he thought, be

[9] i.e. at the Genoa Conference (see No. 61, n. 8).

sent, probably political personages accompanied by experts, who might even in certain questions act as plenipotentiaries.

LORD CURZON said he understood M. Poincaré also to adhere to the view that the participants in the main conference should be confined to those decided upon at the time of the last meeting in Paris.

M. POINCARÉ replied in the affirmative, but added that he would like to say that the Straits would form the subject of special deliberation.

No. 109

Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 369 Telegraphic [E 10705/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 7, 1922*[1]

Following for Lord Curzon from Prime Minister. Begins:

We have considered carefully your final formula.[2] The Cabinet accept this formula, provided Monsieur Poincaré on his part accepts the following conditions:

(1) That agreement on any other point must be contingent upon Turkish withdrawal from, and respect for, neutral zones.

(2) That any agreement for admission of Kemalist gendarmerie before conclusion of treaty of peace must contain a limit on the numbers of such gendarmerie, failing which it might easily become, in fact, the Kemalist army under another name, and endanger the position of the allied occupying troops. The numbers to be allowed should be left to be fixed by the allied generals in consultation with the High Commissioners.

(3) That there shall be no withdrawal of the allied troops from Eastern Thrace before the termination of the period of thirty days agreed to by Monsieur Veniselos unless the allied governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of order and the protection of the non-Turkish population.

The new formula does not make these points sufficiently clear.

We repeat to you a message sent by Monsieur Veniselos to the Greek legation here,[3] and communicated to the Foreign Office yesterday, which bears on point number 3 above.

This message has already been circulated.

Ends.

[1] The time of dispatch is not recorded.

[2] See No. 108, n. 5.

[3] This ran: 'At this morning's interview [Monsieur Poincaré] . . . promised to M. Venizelos that instructions would urgently be despatched to General Charpy directing him to do all in his power in order to obtain that, upon the withdrawal of Greek forces and civil authorities from Eastern Thrace, the administration of this province should be taken up directly by detachments of Allied troops, this allied administration to be continued for a month and Turkish administration and gendarmerie not to be re-established before this month lapses. This period would allow all those wishing to leave Eastern Thrace to do so. Monsieur Venizelos adds in his message to the Greek Legation that he would feel deeply indebted to His Britannic Majesty's Government if they could see their way to issue instructions in the same sense to the British Commander-in-Chief at Constantinople.'

No. 110

Message from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Prime Minister
(Received October 7, 7.30 p.m.)
By telephone [*E 10706/27/44*]

PARIS, *October 7, 1922*

Your No. 369 of today.[1]

1. This point was made at this morning's meeting and not challenged. (See our message received at 1.30 p.m. page 3 first paragraph.)[2]

2. It also has been repeatedly laid down in meetings that numbers were not to be unlimited and that therefore limitations will have to be agreed on by the allied High Commissioners and Generals.

3. Lord Curzon has rejected any attempt to diminish and has made clear that no abridgement of that period will be agreed to except unanimously. He also made clear that instructions to Harington would also be not to agree to any reduction and therefore as any reduction can only be achieved by unanimity, if unanimity is not secured no reduction can take place.

He thinks it will be very undesirable to engage in telephonic correspondence with Monsieur Poincaré who is now in the country. He therefore proposes to write a letter[3] saying that he has communicated with His Majesty's Government and has assured them that all points therein raised are provided for and specifically agreed to during conversations.

[1] No. 109.

[2] The telephone message referred to in No. 107, n. 1; this had stated: 'I further made clear that, in accordance with Paris note, evacuation of Greek zones could not be arranged without corresponding engagements on the part of Kemal to respect neutral zones.'

[3] This letter, of October 7, not printed, was addressed to M. de Peretti. In a further letter of October 8, also to M. de Peretti, Lord Curzon wrote as follows: 'I understand that with reference to our correspondence of yesterday on the three conditions laid down by my government for acceptance of the formula agreed to by the conference, you desire to be clear on the following points. 1. That the neutral zone may if neccessary be modified behind Chanak in details by agreement between the Generals. As I stated during our meetings a slight modification had for practical reasons already been contemplated by our military and naval authorities. The answer to your question therefore seems clearly in the affirmative. 2. You ask if you are right in understanding that it is to be left to the Generals on the spot to fix in agreement with the Kemalist representatives the number of gendarmerie that they may consider strictly necessary to allow in Thrace. The answer to this question is that the matter will certainly be left to the Generals to discuss and if possible to arrange. If there be disagreement they will of course have to refer to their governments.' On October 8, in Paris telegram No. 508, Lord Curzon stated: 'French governement have explicitly accepted conditions . . . and have so informed their representative at Constantinople. It is not doubted that the Italian government are doing likewise.'

No. 111

Sir E. Crowe to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 480 Telegraphic [E 10707/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 7, 1922, 11.50 p.m.*

Very urgent

My telegram No. 479 (of to-day).[1]

The Cabinet learns from Lord Curzon[2] that the three conditions subject to which His Majesty's Government have accepted the Paris draft formula were in his opinion fully understood and agreed to by the French in the course of the discussions. This impression has now been confirmed to him by the Director General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (he used the expression that the points referred to were 'entendus et bien compris') and Lord Curzon is writing to him, in the absence of M. Poincaré, who had already left Paris, to obtain written confirmation. We have no reason to believe this will not be forthcoming.

This being the position, Your Excellency is now requested to inform General Harington of the above and to authorise him to resume the negotiations at Mudania on the basis of the Paris formula[3] as regards Eastern Thrace but on the clear understanding that the reservations and conditions insisted upon by the Cabinet here and by Lord Curzon in Paris are accepted and embodied in the convention to be signed by the generals.

Repeated to Paris No. 371, Rome No. 320 and Athens No. 301.

[1] Not printed. This communicated to Sir H. Rumbold an account of Lord Curzon's negotiations at Paris (see Nos. 106, 107, and 108). It ended: 'Please now inform General Harington that Paris negotiations are not yet completed but seem to promise satisfactory solution. We shall send instructions as soon as final decision is reached. Meanwhile he should, as already instructed, not commit himself. He of course realises that Franklin Bouillon has no authority to represent us and that no confidence can be placed in any statement of his as to allied intentions.'

[2] See No. 110.

[3] See No. 108, n. 5.

No. 112

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Paris)
No. 32 Telegraphic [E 10702/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 8, 1922, 4.20 a.m.*

Following is text of a letter which I have just received from General Harington and which was brought by destroyer which left Mudania just before midnight, begins:

I hope that you will expedite any reply that has been received from Cabinet as I have already twice postponed conference here pending this reply and in meantime Turkish cavalry and infantry have crossed into neutral zone on

Ismid peninsula.[1] I am concerting action with Admiral as a reprisal but do not actually intend to commence hostilities until I know what has passed in Paris. Kindly consider matter as extremely urgent as I cannot allow my military direction to be compromised any longer through delay in negotiations.

I am issuing an ultimatum to Izmet tomorrow (i.e. this, October 8th) morning to say that latter has broken faith regarding frontier and cessation of movements, and that unless he withdraws I will oppose him with all available forces. Ends.

I have informed General Harington by wireless that I interpret delay in receipt of a telegram from you as indicating that you are having great difficulties at Paris.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 542.

[1] In his telegram No. 541 of October 7, Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'A Kemalist force consisting of cavalry and about 3,000 infantry with artillery is reported to have advanced 4 miles within neutral zone of Ismid Peninsula. It stated it had come peacefully. It has been told to clear out at once.'

In his telegram No. D. 26 of October 9 to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'There has been continued penetration of Ismid peninsula by Turkish cavalry in spite of Ismet's written assurance given me on October 8th that he had ordered cessation of all troop movements and reported withdrawal of Turkish detachment at Shile and Yarimja. Nearest cavalry were this morning only 21 miles from Bosphorus. It is quite possible detachments in question have no telegraphic communication and therefore can not be recalled easily but situation is becoming embarrassing. My troops on Ismid peninsula are not at present in any danger and I hope to get the military convention signed today but I must get back to look after my troops and cannot afford to wait here any longer. In case negotiations are not satisfactorily concluded this afternoon, the Admiral is taking precautionary measures on Bosphorus tonight.'

No. 113

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received October 8, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 547 Telegraphic [E 10733/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 8, 1922, 10 p.m.*

Very urgent

Your telegrams Nos. 479[1] and 480.[2]

French and Italian generals returned from Mudania this afternoon to fetch their instructions which had not yet arrived. Those instructions came this afternoon and meeting was held this evening to compare them with those of His Majesty's Government.

I read out to my colleagues your telegram No. 482;[3] nevertheless I found that French instructions respecting conditions insisted upon by cabinet differed from those in your telegrams in following respects:

[1] See No. 111, n. 1. [2] No. 111.

[3] Of October 8. This referred to No. 111 and stated: 'French government have accepted in writing the three points stipulated for by Cabinet.'

1. First condition in your telegram No. 479 mentioned Turkish withdrawal and respect for 'neutral zones' as if referring to neutral zones laid down by allied high-commissioners' proclamation of May 1921.[4] French instructions mention 'neutral zone to be laid down by allied generals'.

2. Second condition in your telegram states that number of gendarmerie shall be fixed by allied generals in consultation with high commissioners. French instructions omit this sentence altogether and merely state that gendarmerie shall be limited to number strictly necessary.

3. Third condition is (? identic).

Allied generals (Colonel Gribbon representing General Harington) declared categorically that Turks would never accept neutral zones of 1921 which had never been recognised by them. Generals agreed that difficulty could be got over if French formula were accepted and General Harington had contemplated this (? even) as regards Chanak as most practical one previous to receipt of your instructions.[5] I feel this is mainly a military question and should be left to discretion of General Harington.

As regards gendarmerie allied generals stated that Turks had consistently refused to fix exact number as constituting limitation of Turkish sovereignty. While I strongly upheld views of His Majesty's Government at meeting I was forced to conclude that a deadlock will be reached unless some formula be found such as inducing Turks to state a number which allied generals should accept if they thought it reasonable and which could then be inserted in convention as being number considered strictly necessary for maintenance of law and order.

It was agreed that convention should come into force three days after signature.

Please telegraph immediate instructions by wireless to General Harington at Mudania as to manner in which cabinet wishes him to interpret conditions as next meeting is fixed for tomorrow October 9th at 3 p.m. (South Europe time).

Repeated to Paris and Athens.

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 170. [5] Cf. No. 114, below.

No. 114

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 483 Telegraphic [E 10733/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 9, 1922, 11 a.m.*

Very urgent

Your No. 547.[1]

The phrase neutral zones in my 479[2] undoubtedly referred to zones laid down in May 1921.[3] But we had understood from your 531[4] that Harington had prepared neutral zone convention specifying that, in the case of Chanak,

[1] No. 113. [2] Of October 7, not printed (see No. 111, n. 1).
[3] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 159 and 170. [4] Of October 6, not printed.

neutral line meant line which had been held by British troops for past three years. This is further alluded to in Harington's telegram No. 114 Personal for C.I.G.S. of October 5th:[5] and this proposal was well known at Paris where I agreed that Chanak neutral line meant line as interpreted by Harington. I have never heard of any proposal for modification of Ismid line which was originally laid down in conjunction with Turks. When therefore Harington in his telegram to War Office D 19 cypher of October 8th[6] said he hoped to secure signature to protocol including definite undertaking to withdraw from neutral zones at once, we interpreted it in this sense. Matter is one that may confidently be left to discretion of Harington.

As to limitation of number of gendarmerie, words in our instructions were accepted by Peretti with concurrence of Poincaré.[7] It does not matter whether this limitation is effected on initiative of Generals or by acceptance of number suggested by Turks and regarded by Generals as reasonable and strictly necessary for maintenance of law and order.

War Office have accordingly instructed Harington by wireless[8] in above sense.

[5] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

[6] This ran as follows: 'Cabinet instructions received 1100 hours to-day. I am preparing protocol strictly in accordance therewith and at 1500 hours we shall submit it to Ismet who has arranged that Mustapha Kemal shall be on the telephone at Angora. Have received assurance that definite orders have been issued to stop all movements of Kemalist troops. Hope to-night to secure signature including definite undertaking to withdraw from neutral zones at once. To-day I issued strong warning to Ismet that contrary to my recent communiqué he had violated both neutral zones and that if conflict opens responsibility is his, pointing out that his recent movements during conference constitute distinct breach of faith and that we have gone to limit of endurance.'

[7] See No. 111.

[8] These instructions were repeated in War Office telegram No. 69060 of October 9, not printed.

No. 115

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 9, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 548 Telegraphic [E 10798/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 9, 1922, 7.45 p.m.*

I have just sent following message to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean at Mudania.

'Admiral Tyrwhitt[1] has just shown me your instructions[2] to him to prepare

[1] Rear Admiral Sir Reginald Yorke Tyrwhitt, Officer Commanding Third Light Cruiser Squadron.

[2] Cf. Constantinople telegram 545 of October 8, in which Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'Admiral Tyrwhitt has received instructions from Admiral Brock to stop all traffic at night across the Bosphorus. No ferry steamers will be allowed to run after 6 p.m. as from today. Admiral Brock has also instructed Admiral Tyrwhitt to consult me as to advisability of commencing to clear the Bosphorus of Turkish craft this afternoon.'

to put into force tomorrow orders for clearing the Bosphorus. You say definite instructions will be given to him after meeting tonight.

I assume that these orders have been given . . .[3] because you anticipate that conference at Mudania will break down today or because of continued advance of Kemalist detachments from Ismid towards Constantinople. In the absence of reports today I do not know what explanation Izmet has given of these movements.

General Harington has definitely summoned Izmet to withdraw them within a specified period failing which action would be taken.[4] I am of opinion that such a summons to withdraw should precede enforcement of measures for clearing Bosphorus. In instructions received from Admiralty on this subject, I think you were asked to consult General Harington and myself as to proper moment at which to put orders for clearing Bosphorus into force.[5]

Whilst I am most reluctant to mix myself up in any way with military or naval matters, have you considered the expediency of sending a couple of battleships into Gulf of Ismid in order to make show of force? Such action might possibly exercise an excellent deterrent effect and could not be considered as provocation having regard to violation of Ismid peninsula by Kemalists.

I am greatly impressed by panic and enormous inconvenience which will be caused by putting into execution one moment before it is necessary measures for clearing Bosphorus. These measures among others would entail cutting off all traffic between Stamboul and Galata.

Please show telegram to General Harington.'

My own view is that this measure should only be put into force in the last resort.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

[4] This had been reported in General Harington's telegram D. 19 of October 8 to the War Office (see No. 114, n. 6).

[5] Admiralty telegrams Nos. 983 and 989 of September 24 and 25 repectively, not printed.

No. 116

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 376[1] *Telegraphic [E 10680/27/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 10, 1922, 4.30 p.m.*

His Majesty's Government have received a telegram from the Soviet government dated October 1st[2] alleging that British navy have declared a blockade of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and are preventing the passage of merchant vessels to and from the Black Sea.

[1] No. 376 to Paris, No. 325 to Rome. [2] Not printed.

We propose to reply[3] that there is absolutely no truth in these accusations and we should be glad to learn whether the French/Italian government will return a similar reply to the telegram which we understand has also been addressed to them.[4]

[3] The reply was made to M. Berzine on October 21, not printed, and was repeated to Mr. Hodgson in Foreign Office telegram No. 243 of October 21, not printed.

[4] Sir R. Graham, in his telegram No. 318 of October 19, replied: 'Italian government have replied to Soviet government in sense desired.'

Lord Hardinge, in his telegram No. 520 of October 14, replied: 'Monsieur Poincaré replied on October 5th to Soviet government's protest by a telegram stating that the Allied Governments had no knowledge of the measures alleged to have been taken in regard to passage of merchant-vessels through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—measures which in any case had never been applied.'

No. 117

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 11, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 549 Telegraphic [E 10870/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 10, 1922, 4.20 p.m.*

Most urgent

Military convention[1] including stipulations respecting neutral zones in Ismid peninsula and Dardanelles was handed to Turkish General last night at Mudania.[2] French and Italian Generals agreed that convention was the last word.

Turks thereupon asked for adjournment till 5 p.m. to-day for Angora government to consider convention.

Neutral zones as defined by General Officer Commanding are in Ismid a

[1] No. 98.

[2] The negotiations at Mudania on October 9 were reported to the War Office in telegrams of which the following are extracts: (*D. 29 of October 9*) 'Turks are very difficult and obstinate and several other points arose with them today. They want no Allied troops or Missions when they arrive in Eastern Thrace and would rather Allies took over administration of Eastern Thrace for 45 days and then handed it over completely. This is contrary to Paris agreement. Greeks would prefer (?this) also. Point over gendarmerie I quite appreciate and have always contested. (?I) think they will accept a number.

'You can rely on me not to accept any zones which do not safeguard troops and Straits from Kemalist guns. Shall return Constantinople tonight and if necessary come back for answer. We have done all in our power to get agreement, but I am not very hopeful.'

(*2704 of October 10*) 'We again met Ismet Pasha at 1900 hours this evening and presented him with final draft, after thoroughly revising convention today in light of most recent instructions (? and) authority for personal discretion and after full consultation and co-operation with Allied Generals. Acceptance of convention by Greeks subject to reservations:—(a) regarding 1915 frontier East of Maritza as ratified by Treaty of Neuilly and (b) date of evacuation of Eastern Thrace, had made the situation easier. I cannot speak too highly of bearing of Col. Sar[i]yanis and General Mazarakis representing Greek Government and my colleagues and myself extended fullest sympathy for their trying duties.'

line just east of Chile Guetze and in the Dardanelles sixteen kilometres from coast between Kara Bigha–Besika Bay.

General Harington returned last night and meeting with Allied High Commissioners was held here at noon to-day.

It has been definitely decided between General Harington, Admiral Brock and myself that, if [? Turks] refuse to sign convention tonight in view of modifications which they wish inserted in respect of Thrace and other matters not concerned with neutral zones, Allied Generals are authorised to accept slight modifications of form and to refer back to High Commissioners and governments larger questions of principle, provided that Turks accept neutral zones as defined by General Harington and give satisfactory guarantees for their observance. This procedure was agreed to by my allied colleagues.

On the other hand, if Turks decline to agree to withdraw from and to accept neutral zones, General Harington will give Ismet Pasha written ultimatum calling upon Turks to withdraw from these zones within a specified period (probably thirty-six hours) at expiration of which he will take all necessary measures to expel them by force.

As soon as ultimatum is delivered, Admiral Brock will issue his proclamation (see my telegram No. 548)[3] for clearing Bosphorus of all traffic which will be rounded up in Golden Horn. That proclamation gives twenty-four hours' warning. Restricted traffic will be permitted between Haidar Pasha and Islands and Admiral will endeavour to interfere as little as possible with allied and neutral shipping.

It was made clear to French and Italian High Commissioners that ultimatum and consequent measures were necessary to ensure as far as possible safety of British troops whose position was being endangered by gradual infiltration of Kemalist forces not only in neutral zones but into Constantinople, and that General Harington could not accept responsibility for further delay.

French and Italian High Commissioners admitted force of this consideration but former added that he had received a telegram from French Minister for Foreign Affairs stating definitely that France would in no case go to war with Turkey and that he had so informed you in Paris.[4]

[3] No. 115. [4] See No. 107.

No. 118

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 10, 6.45 p.m.)
No. 550 Telegraphic [E 10871/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 10, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

Very urgent

My telegram No. 549.[1]

There were six points in final draft convention to which Ismet Pasha demurred and on which he said he must take instructions of his government.

[1] No. 117.

1. Karagatch.
2. Fixed limit for gendarmerie effectives.
3. Area of neutral zones.
4. Extension of time limit to forty-five days.
5. Omission of clause respecting civilian hostages.
6. Prisoners of war.

French High Commissioner stated that principal points [*sic*] to which Angora government would take objection was Karagatch.

He urged inasmuch as Karagatch was suburb of Adrianople abnormal and difficult situation would be created by separating it from that city and that it would be preferable to include it at once in area to be restored within forty-five days to Turkish administration. I replied that this point had been considered in Paris on October 7th and that Allied occupation of Karagatch, until a conclusion of peace, was held as temporarily covering that point.[2]

After some discussion respecting civilian hostages which we finally agreed was also covered by your telegram No. 481[3] and similar instructions received by Italian and French High Commissioners, latter asked what instructions High Commissioners were to give their Generals in the event of Turks refusing to sign convention as a whole and insisting on further discussion as to modifications and reservations. Instructions of his government were that no irrevocable action should be taken before French government had been consulted. In his opinion Generals should refer back to High Commissioners for submission to their governments of any important points.

I said I had discussed question with General Harington and that I could consent to no further delays which would put . . .[4] status quo ante in danger. Small detachments of Kemalist troops were being continually pushed forward and behind them main body of their forces was being concentrated. By last Paris agreement[5] three Powers had expressly stipulated that neutral zones should be respected; for this reason clause in regard to them had been

[2] See No. 106. This had been reported in Foreign Office telegram No. 479 (see No. 111, n. 1) to Sir H. Rumbold.

[3] Of October 8. This ran: 'With reference to General Harington's telegram D 10 of October 7th [not printed], Your Excellency is requested to inform him that whilst welcoming the release of any prisoners of war or hostages, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to press the Greeks beyond the point of reciprocity.

'According to a communication made to us by Italian Ambassador here Kemal has announced intention of trying as rebels or traitors the men who served as volunteers in Greek forces and whom he now holds prisoners. If condemned they would be shot. We can hardly believe that whatever might be advanced as technical legal justification Kemal seriously contemplates such wholesale fusillades, but the possibility must be borne in mind in any arrangement made with regard to civilian or regular military prisoners.

'Italian government propose joint remonstrance by High Commissioners at Constantinople. Your Excellency is authorised to associate yourself with your Italian colleague in such action and should endeavour to obtain co-operation of French High Commissioner also.'

[4] The text is here uncertain. The words 'safety of' were suggested in the Foreign Office.

[5] See Nos. 109, and 110.

inserted in convention and we could not take responsibility of agreeing to any prolongation of discussions at Mudania on the subject of those zones.

General Harington added in spite of verbal and written assurances Kemalist patrols were gradually approaching the Bosphorus.[6] He wished to know in view of important decision which he had to take in a few hours whether he could count upon French and Italian support.

At this stage French High Commissioner announced that he had been categorically informed by President of the Council that France would in no case go to war with Turkey. Italian High Commissioner associated his government in this attitude.

Decision was then taken as reported in my telegram referred to and French High Commissioner concluded with very warm tribute to General Harington's great patience and tact during Mudania conference which he said world would recognize.[7]

General Harington left again for Mudania at close of our meeting and I have since requested him by wireless to get his Allied colleagues to associate themselves in warning Turks that refusal to respect neutral zones will mean that Allied decision respecting Thrace automatically lapses.[8]

[6] See No. 112, n. 1, and No. 115.

[7] In his telegram No. 552 of October 10, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'I think both French and Italian High Commissioners were much relieved that ultimatum, if it had to be presented, should in effect have referred to neutral zones in (? Asia), where British troops alone are exposed, thus affording a loophole for their governments to decline responsibility.'

[8] In a further telegram, No. 551 of October 10, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'Significant feature of last evening's conference at Mudania was effect produced on Ismet by General Harington's clear intimation that Allies, after showing utmost generosity, had reached limit of possible concessions. For the first time he took refuge in necessity for obtaining instructions of his government. He expressed surprise at fact that French and Italian Generals now seemed ready to agree to less than in earlier conversations; he obviously realised that French and Italians had had to come into line with us and was duly impressed.'

No. 119

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 11, 4.20 p.m.)
No. 554 Telegraphic [E 10922/27/44]

Most urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 11, 1922, 3.10 p.m.*

Military convention[1] between allies and Turks was signed early this morning and takes effect as from midnight October 14th/October 15th. Greek delegates declared their inability to sign in the absence of full instructions from their government.[2] As Greek withdrawal must commence on October

[1] For the draft convention, see No. 98. For the French text finally agreed, see Frangulis, pp. 456–9. The English text of the convention was printed in *The Times*, October 14, p. 9.

[2] Mr. Lindley reported in his telegram No. 569 of October 11: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to inform me that Greek government have not yet received text of agreement to be signed at Mudania. They had instructed their General to sign agreement

15th it is urgently necessary that Greek government should issue a statement that it adheres to convention as signed this morning and of which Greek delegates have a copy.

General Harington has telegraphed full text to War Office.[3]

Signature of convention is largely due to patience, tact and spirit of conciliation shewn by General Harington. Factors which probably determined Turks to sign were knowledge of arrival of British reinforcements, presence of British warships, and fact that these would be used in last resort. Policy of His Majesy's Government has in fact been fully justified.[4]

Repeated to Athens No. 183.

on lines of formula contained in your telegram No. 479 [see No. 111, n. 1] on the understanding that line of Maritza was Turko-Bulgarian frontier of 1915. Yesterday desiring at all costs to avoid a rupture and in spite of not knowing text, they instructed General to sign under reserve even if line chosen was frontier of 1913. Minister for Foreign Affairs has just heard that General has left Mudania without signing and fears that he has not received his instructions.' Mr. Lindley added, in his telegram No. 570 of October 11: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called again and asked me to explain that Greek government reserved to themselves right to examine Mudania agreement if line was not that of 1915 frontier as understood from Monsieur Veniselos. It seems clear to me that they are awaiting instructions from Monsieur Veniselos.'

[3] In his telegram No. G. 38 of October 12, not printed. This was an English text. It did not reach the Foreign Office until October 13. A French text was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Constantinople despatch No. 886 of October 12, not printed.

[4] Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 491 of October 11, telegraphed to Sir H. Rumbold: 'I desire to congratulate you on the wise diplomacy and skilful handling on your part which have enabled us to emerge successfully from the recent very critical stage in settlement of Eastern question; and I beg you to convey a similar message from me to General Harington, who has shown rare qualities of conciliation, courage, and statesmanship. I fear that our difficulties are not yet over. But the fact that we can rely upon your combined counsels and action at Constantinople gives His Majesty's Government great encouragement.'

In his telegram No. 559 of October 12, Sir H. Rumbold replied: 'General Harington and I are very grateful for your kind message of appreciation, which is a great encouragment to us. General Harington desires me to say that it was only due to action of His Majesty's Government in sending reinforcements—naval, military and air—so promptly, and to the wonderful restraint of troops that he was able to score some measure of success at Mudania.

'He desires to express his thanks for confidence and support given to him by His Majesty's Government. I would like to associate myself with this.'

No. 120

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 309 Telegraphic [E 10922/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 11, 1922, 7.0 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 554 of 11th October:[1] Mudania Agreement. Greek signature.

On the assumption that the Greek Government will have received text of convention by the time this telegram reaches you, you should explain that it

[1] No. 119.

contains the maximum safeguards for Greek interests and Greek population in Eastern Thrace which Allies were able to secure after prolonged negotiations. By signing the convention the Allied Governments have made themselves responsible for evacuation of Greek army within time-limit fixed. We cannot doubt, therefore, that acting on M. Veniselos's advice[2] Greek Government will at once authorise signature of convention by Greek general,[3] and will arrange forthwith for evacuation as proposed.

You should, if possible, obtain co-operation of your French and Italian colleagues in this communication, but do not delay it on this account.

Repeated to Paris (by bag), No. 379; Rome, No. 329; and Constantinople, No. 490.

[2] In a record of a conversation, dated October 11, Sir Eyre Crowe stated: 'M. Venizelos called today in order to inform H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] that the Greek Government had formally agreed to act altogether on his advice.'

[3] In his telegram No. 574 of October 12 to the Foreign Office, Mr. Lindley stated: 'Text has now arrived. Quickest way of obtaining assent of Greek government is to get Monsieur Venizelos to telegraph at once.'

No. 121

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
Unnumbered Telegraphic: by bag [E 11023/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 12, 1922*

Now that the Mudania convention has been signed,[1] we must proceed without delay to fix the details of the proposed conference of peace. I have been in communication with Sir H. Rumbold[2] on the matter and I have discussed it with His Majesty's Government; and the following considerations emerge, on which I shall be glad if you will at once consult M. Poincaré. If France and ourselves are in general agreement, we shall, I hope, be successful in obtaining the consent of Italy.

Date of Meeting: In order to convince the Turks of the good faith of the allies, it is very desirable that this should be as soon as possible. The Paris decision to hold it at the beginning of November should stand. We might meet if possible in the week beginning November 7th, if not, at the latest on November 14th.

Place of Meeting: At Paris we discussed a Turkish site. This, for the weighty reasons stated by Sir H. Rumbold,[3] seems to be very undesirable. There is the further objection that I at any rate would find it quite impossible to go to such a distance from England or to remain there for any considerable time, and the same difficulty might present itself to other allied representatives.

[1] See No. 119.

[2] In his telegram No. 486 of October 9, not printed, to which Sir H. Rumbold replied in his telegram No. 553 of October 11 (see n. 3, below).

[3] Sir H. Rumbold had stated, in his telegram No. 553: 'Atmosphere of Constantinople would be a bad one for a conference and it would be undesirable to hold a conference at any place within easy distance of a strong Kemalist army. This applies to Scutari. Kemalists

If a Turkish locality be rejected, we must fall back upon a European. France and Great Britain have voluntarily withdrawn the claims of Paris and London. Italy offered Venice at an earlier stage, but was willing to withdraw it at Paris. There would seem to be a great advantage in a similar and simultaneous withdrawal on the part of all the three Great Powers, and in the selection of such a neutral and disinterested country as Switzerland.

If this be conceded, the choice seems to be between Geneva and Lausanne. The former, as the seat of the League of Nations, may conceivably be objected to by America (if she is invited to be present in any capacity); by Russia, who ignores the League; and conceivably by Turkey. On the other hand Lausanne has the following advantages:

(1) It is on the direct line of the Orient Express to Constantinople (which Geneva is not).

(2) It has excellent hotel accommodation and a good climate even in winter.

(3) It was the seat of the peace conference between Turkey and Italy in 1912.[4]

(4) The League of Nations establishment at Geneva would doubtless be willing to assist in the arrangements for the Conference at Lausanne, just as they did in the case of the Genoa Conference.[5] They could supply a large and trained staff of typists, shorthand writers, and translators in English and French and possibly other languages.

(5) The central position of Lausanne would enable foreign delegates to go to and fro with comparative ease.

I now come to the Conference itself. At Paris it was agreed:

(a) that the States invited to it should be the Great Powers, together with Roumania and Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece;

(b) that Bulgaria should be heard, but should not be a member of the Conference.

This decision should stand as regards the Peace Conference in its main capacity, i.e. as the framer of a new Treaty between Turkey and the Powers who are still at war with her.

On the other hand, one of the main questions to be discussed and decided will be the Freedom of the Straits; and as to this, not only will the States already mentioned be entitled to a voice, but Russia, with her satellites the Ukraine and Georgia (as maritime Black Sea States), has claimed[6] to be admitted also and will, together with Bulgaria, have a right to be heard.

would moreover decline to come to Constantinople whilst it is in allied occupation. There is no accommodation whatever at Scutari. I cannot too strongly remind Your Lordship that although Kemalists are at present in forefront of picture contemplated peace conference is definitely to bring to an end armistice between Allies and Turks. Dispute between Kemalists and Greeks is in a sense subsidiary.'

[4] This conference resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne (Ouchy), October 18, 1912.

[5] See No. 61, n. 8.

[6] See No. 61.

Two suggestions have presented themselves:

(A) That the question of the Freedom of the Straits should be handed over *ab initio* to the League of Nations, who should hold an independent and possibly simultaneous Conference on the matter at Geneva, while the main Conference is sitting at Lausanne. I am not inclined to favour this idea for the following reasons:

(i) It may be the function of the League of Nations to provide the machinery for and to supervise the execution of whatever arrangements may be arrived at—at a later date. But the arrangement itself is a part of the responsibility of the Powers and must be embodied in the Peace Treaty.

(ii) It is not clear under which Article of the Covenant the Council of the League could properly assume the initiative at the present stage.

(iii) It is quite probable that Russia or Turkey might object.

(iv) There would be considerable difficulty in providing the representation and staffs for two Conferences, even though they were only one hour apart.

(B) My inclination therefore is to think that there should be one Conference and one only, and that it should sit at Lausanne; that it should begin with the Constituent Powers and in the manner agreed to at Paris; but that it should announce that at a given date, say two or three weeks after its inception, it would take the question of the Freedom of the Straits, and that the interested States (Russia and her satellites, as well as Bulgaria) should be invited to attend at that date and to join in the deliberations on that subject, and that alone. Every one should be satisfied by this arrangement, and no important interests would be compromised.

The decisions arrived at could then be incorporated in the Treaty, and the League of Nations, if it were so decided, could be invited, either at once or a little later, to meet and make the necessary provisions for carrying out the plan agreed upon.

Representation: Sir H. Rumbold's idea of the appointment of two plenipotentiaries by each of the Allies seems a good one, although the number of the delegation would not necessarily be confined to that figure. For instance, certain of the British Dominions, as well as India, will no doubt desire to be represented, particularly when the question of the Straits is discussed.

My general idea is as far as possible to prevent the Conference from degenerating into a public meeting at which the various speakers will get up and make long speeches. I much prefer the plan pursued at the Conferences which I have attended, where all the members sit at a table or tables and speak from their seats.

If the meeting takes place, as suggested, in a neutral country, the Great Powers might provide chairmen, not on successive days, which would produce confusion, but for separate subjects; for instance, France might find the chairman while capitulations or some other subject were being taken, Great Britain for another, and so on.

If M. Poincaré will favour you with the general views of the French Government tomorrow, I will then submit definite proposals to the Powers concerned.

An answer will also have to be sent to Turkey and to Russia.
I assume that both Turkish governments will have to be invited.

No. 122

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos
[*E 11215/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 12, 1922*

Monsieur Venizelos called on me to-day, and asked whether I could communicate to him the text of the military convention signed at Mudania.[1] He explained that he had received an urgent telegram from his Government, informing him that Greece had not signed the convention, and asking him to advise them whether they should still do so. M. Venizelos said he was quite unable to form any opinion, not having the text of the document. He had seen the version in the newspapers, which had filled him with dismay, but, of course, he could not say whether it was authentic. I said that, to my great regret, I was not in a position as yet to give him the text, which for, to me, some quite inexplicable reason had not yet reached us,[2] although we knew from a message received from General Harington, that he had telegraphically sent off the full text some time ago. We had called for an immediate report from Constantinople, and were obliged to await its receipt.

2. M. Venizelos asked me whether I had any information that could explain the non-signature of the Greek General.[3] Had he protested against the agreement, either as a whole or in part, and had he assigned any reasons for his attitude? He much regretted that his Government had not given him these particulars. I said that, so far as I understood the situation,[4] the Greek Government had, in vain, waited for a report from their general at Mudania, which apparently had been delayed. When they did receive his report, they appear to have authorised him to sign, subject to a reservation that the line of the Maritza, behind which the Greek forces were to withdraw, should be understood to mean the Turko-Bulgarian frontier of 1915. But this instruction did not reach the Greek General at Mudania before the Conference had terminated. M. Venizelos said he had seen a statement to this effect in the press, and was much puzzled by it, as he could not understand the exact meaning of the Greek reservation. I observed that the reservation probably meant that, as the frontier of 1915 ran 2 kilometres east of the Maritza, and not down the medial line of the river itself, the Greek Government wished

[1] See No. 119, n. 1. [2] See No. 119, n. 3. [3] See No. 119, n. 2.
[4] On October 14, M. Venizelos communicated to Sir Eyre Crowe a copy (not printed) of a written statement (which General Mazarakis had presented to the Conference of Mudania) objecting to the provisions for the time limit of the re-establishment of Turkish Administration in Thrace and for the safe departure of the Christian population.

the line of evacuation to run east, and not west, of the river. M. Venizelos thanked me for this observation, which he thought might explain the matter; so far as I could gather, he did not attach much importance to the point. He then said that he was chiefly alarmed at the provision, which, if correctly reported in the papers, would mean not only that the evacuation of the troops must be completed in fifteen days—which he considered difficult of fulfilment—but that at the end of thirty days after the completion of the evacuation, the Kemalists would take over the whole administration and policing of the country. M. Venizelos would have thought that provision ought to have been made for the contingency that it might be found practically impossible to complete the withdrawal of the civil population, or that part of it which wished to withdraw, within the stipulated thirty days. Should that contingency arise, surely the period of allied occupation and control ought to be prolonged. It would be a terrible situation if a large proportion of would-be emigrants were still left on Turkish territory when the Kemalists entered into occupation.

3. I said that I was under the impression that the thirty days had been accepted by him, or his Government, as sufficient to carry out the evacuation of the civil population. He denied this,[5] and said, of course the Greek Government were in a position to have to agree to anything that the allies demanded. I asked him whether he, or the Greek Government, had got any plans for carrying out this civil evacuation. He declared that there were no plans of any kind, and that, in fact, neither he nor anybody had any notion how, in practice, the withdrawal of a hundred thousand Greeks from Thrace into Greece proper was to be effected. No doubt it was imperative, but it was a problem which terrified him. He said there were already half a million refugees arrived in Greece from Asia Minor; more were coming from the islands. There might be between eight and nine hundred thousand Greeks in Eastern Thrace and Constantinople; how many of these might want to leave he could not say, but thought that there would be many. Where all these hundreds of thousands of people were to be put raised a physical problem of the greatest complexity. He had been thinking about it a good deal, and felt that he might be driven to some ruthless measures, such as ordering all Greek villages and towns to set aside one-half, or a certain proportion, of their buildings for the incoming families, forcing the inhabitants to huddle together as best they could in the remaining accommodation. I asked him whether he had considered the possibility of now proceeding with the plan, of which I knew he had been in favour formerly, as regards Bulgaria and Macedonia, namely, the interchange of Greek and Moslem populations.[6]

[5] Cf. No. 109, n. 2. Lord Curzon minuted on October 12: 'As it was M. Venizelos himself who suggested the month to the French he must have been either very rash or very shortsighted. Might we not in view of his impotence telegraph as I suggested yesterday to Sir H. Rumbold? I have amended the draft [see No. 126, n. 2, below].'

[6] On October 11, Lord Curzon had minuted: 'I think that as the idea of expatriation is that of M. Venizelos and as he is here we should see him and find out what he thinks or proposes before we thrust this task on the High Commissioners at Constantinople. He may

He would no doubt himself have realised that there might be a technical advantage for Greece to have in Western Thrace as many Greeks coming from Eastern Thrace as possible. If the Turks of Western Thrace, and perhaps of Thessaly, were ready to migrate to Eastern Thrace in return, this would offer some means of finding room for the refugees. M. Venizelos said he had not overlooked this possibility, but, apart from the question of making arrangements for such an elaborate exchange within the short time available, there was the difficulty that the total number of Turks in the whole of Greece were probably a good deal less than 200,000, so that such a scheme would only offer a very partial alleviation of the difficulty.

4. M. Venizelos said it was no use discussing the situation created by the Mudania convention until he had the text, and he begged me to communicate it to him as soon as we received it, which I promised to do.[7]

5. I then referred to the communication[8] made to M. Caclamanos[9] by Mr. Lindsay yesterday, concerning the danger of a further insurrectionary movement being engineered in Greece by officers of the Greek fleet. I said that our Minister at Athens regarded the situation as an anxious one, and kept on urging that a message from M. Venizelos strongly deprecating any such

have ideas. Please consult him at once particularly on the W. Thrace proposal. The more Greeks can be got into W. Thrace and the more Turks or Bulgars extruded the easier will it be for Greece to retain her hold upon it.'

[7] A note by Mr. Nicolson on the original states: 'It has now been sent to him.' On October 13, M. Venizelos communicated to Lord Curzon the following letter: 'Allow me to assure you that it is with the greatest misgiving that I have read the protocol of armistice that has been signed. It would seem that the terms of this document are not in accordance with the request which I made to you recently and which, from our last conversation in Paris, I thought had been granted. I had asked that the Turkish Administration and gendarmerie be established in Thrace one month after the evacuation of that province by the Greek army. This would give to those of the unfortunate Christian populations who wanted to leave time to do so. Instead of this, it appears that the Turkish authorities are to be restored immediately after the withdrawal of the Greek troops, and that the whole transference of the province to the Turks is to be completed within a month. The satisfaction that is thus given to Turkey on this point is not justified by any vital interest of hers, while a population of 400,000—exclusive of the Christian population of Constantinople—is exposed to the danger either of complete annihilation, if they remain on the spot, or of a sudden headlong rout, as was the case in Smyrna, where the refugees took to flight, leaving every possession behind them in order to save their lives. The tragic situation of these unfortunate populations will be the more increased by the fact that the Turks have not been compelled to give any amnesty to those who, thinking themselves to be Greek subjects for the past two years, either served in the Greek army or collaborated in the Greek administration, and who will now be prosecuted for high treason, as has already happened in Smyrna, and will be hanged.

'I would be guilty of a lack of sincerity, my Lord, if I neglected to state that the Greek nation feels that in this hour of its misfortune it has not been supported in its legitimate claims to the extent it was justified in expecting support from those of its former Allies, with whom it shared the common sacrifice of lives in order that the liberty of the world might be safeguarded. Its chief fault, for which it is so severely treated, has been that, believing the Great War was fought, among other things, to assure the liberty of small nations, it wished to settle its affairs of internal government according to its own aspirations.'

[8] Not printed.

[9] M. Caclamanos had been appointed Greek Minister in London on October 2.

movement would be the best means of averting a very real danger.[10] M. Venizelos said he must declare very emphatically that he had no intention whatever of interfering in any question of the internal politics of Greece at this moment.[11] He did not know what was going on; he did not know what were the currents of information; he did not know [w]hat the country felt as regards maintaining the new king, and he was therefore not in a position to offer advice from a distance. Nor did he regard this as being within the scope of the duties which he had declared himself willing to undertake on behalf of the new Greek Government. He had agreed to advise them on foreign affairs; he was not a Greek Minister, and he was not going any further. He added, speaking, as he said to me, as a friend, that he would strongly advise us on our own part not to mix ourselves up more than could be helped with questions of Greek internal politics. He wished to warn me that British advice was not at this moment very welcome, and that, if we persisted in foisting it upon the Greek Government, it might again lead to our being held by the Greek people responsible for further disastrous developments. He said, if we really wanted to help Greece, the best thing we could do for the moment would be to recognise King George II.[12] It was quite possible that the king would not remain on the throne very long; he was unable to forecast events with any accuracy, but he believed there was a strong current of anti-monarchical feeling, which might burst out at any moment. He, M. Venizelos, wanted to hold entirely aloof from this matter. I said that I was surprised at his advising us to proceed to the immediate recognition of the king when it appeared to him so doubtful whether the present régime would last. He replied that, after all, there would be no difficulty for us in recognizing the king now, and, should his reign come to an end, recognizing some other régime thereafter. He had only suggested our recognizing King George as being the one method by which the British Government could at present contribute to stabilising the existing régime, if it were possible.

[10] As, for instance, in Athens telegram No. 567 of October 11, not printed.

[11] Mr. Lindley was informed of M. Venizelos's view in Foreign Office telegram No. 315 of October 14, not printed.

[12] See No. 85, n. 12, and No. 303, below.

No. 123

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 381 Telegraphic: by bag [E 11024/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 13, 1922*

Your telegram No. 516 (of 13th October).[1]

Before forming a final opinion I will await the letter which M. Poincaré kindly

[1] Of October 13. This telegram, which transmitted to Lord Curzon M. Poincaré's views on No. 121, ran: 'As regards the date of the meeting, he considers it important that it should be as soon as possible. He thinks the week of the 7th rather late and would prefer the first

intends to write to me.[2] But I may say at once that suggestion of Smyrna as site of conference is wholly unacceptable and could not be acquiesced in by His Majesty's Government. I have looked up the Minutes of Paris meetings, and find that M. Poincaré concurred with me in regarding it as impossible;[3] while French ambassador here has always treated it with ridicule. As regards any other place in Turkey, Scutari was not, as M. Poincaré says, suggested by me. It was suggested by Your Excellency as a preferable alternative to Prinkipo, which he had named; and in discussing it I more than once made it clear that I could come to no decision without consulting my government, that personally I seriously doubted the desirability of holding the conference on Turkish soil at all, and that, if I were invited to represent my government, I should find it practically impossible to go to such a distance or, if I did, to remain there any length of time.

I am still more surprised, however, in view of M. Poincaré's insistence upon meeting of conference within less than three weeks from to-day, that he should propose to defer a decision upon this most important point until the return of M. Franklin-Bouillon to France.[4] I have just told the French ambassador that I regard the constant intervention of this gentleman and the subordination of allied decisions to his authority as lacking in any justification; and it would not be amiss if M. Poincaré were made aware of the sentiment which this reiterated deference to the action and opinions of M. Bouillon arouses.

week in November, if that would be possible. As to the place of meeting, he himself would be quite favourable to the selection of Lausanne, but he has received a telegram from M. Franklin-Bouillon stating that the Turks insist on Smyrna. . . . He feels that he must, under the circumstances, await Franklin-Bouillon's return before coming to any decision, and having heard him must also consult his government. . . . As regards the composition of the conferences, he is personally of the opinion that they should be entirely separate with a brief interval between them. He does not wish Russia with her satellites to have any pretension to take part in the main conference. . . . M. Poincaré has no objection to the allies being represented by two plenipotentiaries. . . . He must, however, make a reservation as regards the representation of the British dominions and India, since if they were represented, it would be impossible to eliminate the representatives of Tunis and Morocco, who, as Mahommedan states, are greatly interested in the peace settlement and the question of the Straits. . . .'

[2] Not printed (see No. 127, below).

[3] See No. 108.

[4] See n. 1; Lord Hardinge had reported that M. Franklin-Bouillon would not be back for two or three days.

No. 124

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 13, 10.45 p.m.)
No. 578 Telegraphic [E 11035/27/44]

ATHENS, *October 13, 1922, 9.30 p.m.*

Very urgent

Minister for Foreign Affairs[1] has just communicated to me text of declaration to be made by Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople to allied High Commissioners.

Following is translation:

Greek government considers that declarations made by Greek delegates at Mudania should have been taken into consideration especially regarding guarantees and delegations strictly necessary for safety of lives and property of Christian populations of Eastern Thrace.

Greek government makes a final appeal to sentiments of humanity of allied Powers in favour of these populations.

Desiring nevertheless to conform to decisions of Powers Greek government see themselves obliged to submit and declare that they adhere to armistice protocol signed at Mudania on October 11th.[2]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Monsieur N. Politis (see No. 85, n. 11).

[2] Referring to this telegram, Mr. Lindley reported in his telegram No. 579 of October 13:

'Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that Revolutionary Committee had accepted solely because they were impressed with necessity for agreeing with Allies. Committee believed that from military point of view acceptance was not necessary.

'Minister for Foreign Affairs did not hide his conviction that Christian population would be panic-stricken at early return of Turkish gendarmerie, and that it would not be possible to evacuate population in much better conditions than those that had prevailed in Asia Minor.'

No. 125

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 15, 3 p.m.)
No. 570 Telegraphic [E 11098/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 15, 1922, 2.10 p.m.*

Very urgent

French propagandist paper of last night reproduced statement alleged to have been made by Monsieur Veniselos to President of the Council on October 6th[1] that Greece was ready to accept Turkish frontier of 1914. In telegram sections just received I note that Monsieur Veniselos denies he ever

[1] See No. 106.

accepted frontier ascribed to him by President of the Council. At final meeting of allied High Commissioners with General Harington before latter returned to Mudania for the last time French High Commissioner made use of statement attributed to Monsieur Veniselos to try to get me to agree that Karagatch should be promised to the Turks.[2] I replied that I had no knowledge of Monsieur Veniselos's alleged statement and that I could not give General Harington instructions suggested. The publication by French propagandist paper of Monsieur Veniselos's alleged statement to President of the Council will do a lot of harm as it will encourage Turks to demand 1914 frontier at conference. They anyhow demand a plebiscite for Western Thrace. They will probably be supported by French and Italians in both demands.

I assume and hope His Majesty's Government will not consent to any further territorial concessions to the Turks in Europe beyond possibly Karagatch. The line of Maritza is best natural frontier. The 1914 frontier is an artificial one and if accepted will certainly give rise to trouble in future. Although Karagatch is a suburb of Adrianople it is five kilometres distant from it and its fortification by the Turks will constitute a permanent menace to Western Thrace.

Point is of great importance in connection with refugee question. The refugees and Christian population in Eastern Thrace are already on the move westward. In a very short time large numbers will be pouring into Western Thrace. If a portion of Western Thrace is to be returned to Turkey or if there is uncertainty as to final attribution of Western Thrace Greek government will have no incentive to provide for definite accommodation of thousands of refugees in Western Thrace.

It would seem essential therefore that this matter should be cleared up as quickly as possible by means of an official statement either by Greek government or by Monsieur Veniselos that Greece is not prepared to concede 1914 frontier. The Greeks will also be well advised to concentrate their army in Western Thrace so as to be in a strong position at peace conference.

Repeated to Athens No. 194.

[2] See No. 91, n. 1 and Nos. 99, 106, and 118.

No. 126

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 16, 3.45 p.m.)
No. 574 Telegraphic [E 11167/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 16, 1922, 12 noon*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

We also discussed question raised in your telegram No. 493.[2] General

[1] No. 573 of October 16, not printed.

[2] Of October 13; this ran: 'It seems very important to examine the question of the exodus of the population of Eastern Thrace and to set up some organization to act as

Harington has already despatched allied military missions to Eastern Thrace to ensure order and allay fears of population. We agreed that League of Nations was most appropriate body to act as liaison between Greek and Turkish authorities in order to ensure a gradual and orderly evacuation and to examine the whole question of transfer of population. Representatives of League of Nations could be attached at once to allied military missions and carry on work after their departure. Role of allied High Commissioners would be limited as far as possible to using their good offices when necessary. Doctor Nansen[3] has telegraphed to Sir E. Drummond[4] requesting permission to institute at once an organisation on above lines. Experts are available in minorities section of League of Nations. We assured Doctor Nansen of our support. Funds will be required for setting up and running of this organisation which will be called upon to deal with a big problem.

Full report follows by despatch.[5]

Repeated to Athens No. 198.

liaison between the Greek and Turkish authorities and to ensure gradual and orderly evacuation.'

[3] See No. 44, n. 1.

[4] Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General to the League of Nations.

[5] No. 901 of October 17 (E 11500/17/44), not printed.

No. 127

Letter from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Poincaré
[*E 11262/27/44*]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 18, 1922*

My dear President,

I am much obliged for the full and frank statement of your views regarding the Near East Conference contained in your letters[1] of the 14th and 16th October, and I am happy to find that we are already agreed on a large number of points.

I am glad that you are willing to accept Lausanne as the seat of the conference. I share your view as to expediting the date of meeting, but there is now barely more than a fortnight before the 1st November, and I think it would be physically impossible for the various delegations to make their arrangements as regards hotel accommodation, &c., by that date, even if we had already fixed on the seat of the conference. Moreover, the uncertainty of the internal political situation both here and in Italy calls for consideration. From this point of view, a too early assembling of the conference might meet with practical obstacles, and it would be unfortunate if, when the conference assembled, a full representation of all the principal countries were not at once forthcoming. To my mind, the important point is to announce a date as soon as possible for the opening of the conference to show the Angora Government that we are as anxious as they for an early meeting. It is comparatively immaterial whether, for physical reasons, the date be fixed at the beginning

[1] Not printed. See, however, No. 123.

or the middle of November, and I therefore propose the 13th November as the most convenient and, in all probability, the earliest practicable date in all the circumstances.

We are happily in agreement regarding the rôle of the League of Nations in dealing with the Straits question in its final stage. As regards the conference itself, however, I still prefer my plan that there should be a single conference meeting at Lausanne which should deal on a specified date at a later stage in its sittings with the Straits, admitting other Powers, such as Russia and the Black Sea States, to the discussions, rather than your proposal for two distinct and concurrent conferences in different places, one for the Peace Treaty and the other for the Straits. The latter question cannot in reality be regarded or treated as distinct from the Peace Treaty, of which it forms an inseparable part. We shall almost certainly find it necessary to include in the treaty some general definition of the freedom of the Straits, even if the details of its application be elaborated in a separate instrument and handed for execution to the League of Nations. Further, the Straits question is at once so complex and so important that it is neither desirable nor indeed possible to have it examined and treated by plenipotentiaries and experts other than those who are dealing with the main treaty. These objections make it, to my mind, impossible to hold two different conferences in two different places, and it will be found that the analogy of the Paris Conference of 1856, which you quote, strongly favours my contention. That conference drew up firstly a Peace Treaty to end the Crimean war, signed by Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, on the 30th March (ratifications exchanged 27th April), and secondly, a Straits convention (which, by article 10 of the Peace Treaty, was to be regarded as annexed to the treaty), signed by precisely the same Powers and the same plenipotentiaries on the same day and at the same place, with ratifications exchanged on the same day as the Peace Treaty.[2]

As regards the procedure for admitting the *de facto* Governments to the discussions on the Straits question, I am disposed to accept your Excellency's ingenious suggestion,[3] which seems to be well designed to give legitimate satisfaction to Russia, while avoiding the necessity of any premature or indirect *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Government.

To sum up, while accepting your Excellency's suggestions for a separate Straits instrument, annexed, however, to the Peace Treaty, and for the procedure as regards the admission of Russia, I trust that you will now see your way to accept my proposal for the treatment of the Straits question by the main conference at Lausanne.

[2] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 46, pp. 8–21.

[3] In his letter of October 14, M. Poincaré had written: '. . . en ce qui concerne les Gouvernements de fait, il serait possible, après les avoir entendus, de réserver tous les droits des pays qu'ils représentent; le protocole de signature resterait ouvert, et ces pays seraient admis à signer aussitôt qu'il y aurait chez eux des Gouvernements reconnus *de jure* par les Puissances. Une clause particulière indiquerait que la convention pourrait entrer en vigueur dès qu'un certain nombre de signatures seraient obtenues.'

Touching my suggestion to invoke the assistance of the League of Nations' secretariat, your Excellency uses the words 'League of Nations' delegates'. I had in mind only the loan of the assistance of a technical staff of translators, interpreters and typists from Geneva. In so far as we have to consult the League as regards the Straits and minorities in the course of our discussions, I would prefer to employ the regular procedure of a reference to the Council of the League, if necessary summoned to an *ad hoc* meeting.

I have carefully considered your Excellency's suggestion as to a Swiss chairman. M. Ador,[4] himself, has a reputation for tact and impartiality which are universally recognised. His presidency might further promote a peaceful and unacrimonious atmosphere and there would be advantages in thus invoking indirectly the assistance of the Swiss Government for the organisation of the conference, arranging telegraphic facilities and perhaps the requisition of hotel accommodation, &c. On the other hand, I am rather apprehensive as to the dangers of creating so startling a precedent whereby the representative of a neutral, and a small, Power would be asked to preside over a conference between belligerents where there has been no question of a reference to the good offices or arbitration of a third Power. Again, it would in practice be very difficult for the chairman to confine himself to mere formalities, such as deciding when and in what order delegates should speak. Almost inevitably he would be called upon to intervene in controversies between the belligerents, and in questions with which he would *ipso facto* not be *au courant*. On the whole, therefore, I would prefer to confine our invitation to M. Ador or to any other distinguished Swiss, such as the President of the Republic, to the formal opening of the conference, and therefore to attendance only at the first meeting. After that, I would propose to follow my suggestion for a presidency rotating according to the subjects discussed.

On a point of detail, I am not clear as to your argument regarding the rights of the *de jure* Government of Georgia. In my view, the principal Allies recognised the *de jure* independence of Georgia and not the *de jure* existence of certain specified persons composing one particular Georgian Government. At present, His Majesty's Government do not recognise either *de jure* or *de facto* the present Georgian Soviet Government but if Georgia were admitted to the discussion on the Straits, His Majesty's Government would have to regard the present Soviet Government of Georgia as the *de facto* Government for the purposes of admission to that discussion.

I now come to a more important question, that of the status of the Dominions and India in relation to the forthcoming conference. Your Excellency cannot but be aware that this question was examined and settled once and for all at the conference in Paris in 1919.[5] M. Clemenceau readily admitted on that occasion that the independent contribution of the Dominions and India in waging the war, and particularly the war in the Near East, fully

[4] Swiss Representative on the League of Nations, and Chairman of the Provisional Economic and Financial Commission of the League of Nations (see Vol. XVI, No. 346 n. 3).

[5] See H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference* (London 1920–4), Vol. VI, pp. 344–6.

entitled them to participation in the conference. Their representatives therefore had seats on the various sub-commissions of the conference. They signed the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties, including the Treaty of Sèvres. They became independent members of the League of Nations. I am not aware that any such independent status has been claimed or recognised for Tunis and Morocco, which are protectorates of France, and I regret, therefore, that I cannot admit their right to be accorded the same status as the Dominions and India. Meanwhile, however, and pending consultation with the latter Governments, I am not sure that they will desire to participate in the preparation of the new Peace Treaty or the Straits Convention although they will necessarily have to sign these instruments as they signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

As soon as I learn from your Excellency in reply to this letter that you are prepared definitely to accept the 13th November as the opening date of the conference and that you agree generally to the procedure which I now propose for dealing with the Straits question at Lausanne, and the question of the presidency, we can concert in the drafting of joint notes to be issued in the name of the three principal Allied Governments to Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey (both the Constantinople and the Angora Governments) as well as Russia (including the Ukraine and Georgia) and Bulgaria as also to the Swiss Government regarding the seat of the conference and its formal opening by a Swiss president. I will, in the meantime, prepare such draft notes which I shall be happy to submit to your Excellency for examination and approval in collaboration with Lord Hardinge and Count Sforza. I have to-day explained to the Italian Ambassador in London the main features of the above proposals, for communication to his Government so that they will be fully aware of the lines upon which we are proceeding.[6]

Believe me, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[6] To this M. Poincaré replied in a letter of October 19, not printed (see, however, No. 130, below).

No. 128

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 19, 5.55 p.m.)
No. 590 Telegraphic [E 11315/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 19, 1922, 2.10 p.m.*

Urgent. Private

I hope allied governments will very soon be in a position to notify date and place of meeting of conference. Whilst I do not wish to strike a note of alarm I feel bound to point out that any considerable delay in meeting of conference may render situation here critical. The Turks are very impatient and very suspicious of our intentions. The situation has not been rendered easier from

a military point of view by fixing of limits of neutral zone on Ismid peninsula at a distance of 25 miles from Bosphorus. This means that Kemalist troops could get to Bosphorus in 48 hours if they wished to do so, and were not opposed. Delay in meeting of conference will subject Kemalist commanders and troops to a severe strain, and might even induce them to seek some excuse to denounce or break Mudania agreement.

Preparations which have been made for welcome of Kemalist gendarmerie as well as for arrival of Refet Pasha[1] today are not calculated to allay fears of christian population. A semi-official communiqué has been issued today stating that Kemalist gendarmerie[2] will not pass through Constantinople en route for Thrace.

There is a good deal of panic in this town already, and I am greatly concerned by consequences to Christian population if a hasty evacuation of Constantinople by British forces became necessary.

[1] Refet Pasha had been appointed Governor of Thrace after the Mudania Conference.
[2] See No. 129, below.

No. 129

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 21, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 595 Telegraphic [E 11409/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 20, 1922, 8 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 591.[1]

Introduction of Turkish gendarmerie before expiration of 14 days from midnight October 14th/15th is not excluded by terms of Mudania Convention.

Evacuation of Greek administrative personnel in certain places before end of 14 days may make it essential to introduce Turkish gendarmes but this will only be done on recommendation of allied authorities on the spot to whose discretion question must necessarily be left. I cannot too strongly emphasise fact that allied authorities in Thrace are doing all that is possible to reassure population and should be glad if Greek government could be so informed.

I think there would be some advantage in sending a British Consular officer to Adrianople for next few weeks if only to check alarmist and tendencious reports sent here by French consul. Presence of a British Consular officer would be useful in many ways and subject to Your Lordship's sanction I propose to send Mr. Matthews.[2]

Repeated to Athens No. 209.

[1] Of October 19, not printed.
[2] Mr. W. D. W. Matthews, Consul and Legal Dragoman at Constantinople from October 1, 1920.

No. 130

Letter from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Poincaré
[*E 11358/27/44*]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 20, 1922*

My dear President,

I hasten to reply to your letter of the 19th October[1] regarding the peace conference with Turkey, from which I am happy to note that we are now in agreement on nearly all essential points.

2. With regard to the date of the opening of the conference, I find it impossible, for the practical reasons which I have already explained to you, and which have been accentuated since I wrote, to fix any earlier date than the 13th November, but I will accept that date as the opening day of the conference. I agree with you that it is essential to announce that date as soon as possible.

3. Further, I am gratified to see that we are now in accord as to the place of the conference and the procedure to be followed as regards the Straits question.

4. I merely put forward the proposal as regards technical assistance from the League of Nations' Secretariat as a suggestion, and have no wish to press it. Each delegation will now provide their own staff of translators and typists, but I trust that your Excellency will be able, as on previous occasions, to give the conference the invaluable services of interpreters from French into English and *vice versa*.

5. With regard to the presidency of the conference, I fear that I still regard the objections to a neutral chairman put forward in my letter of the 18th October[2] as insuperable, and I think that we must confine ourselves to inviting M. Ador to open the conference. In order to overcome the difficulty which your Excellency has foreseen with regard to the smaller Powers or Turkey having to preside over the conference, I would propose to confine the chairmanship (by rotation according to subjects) to the four principal Allied Powers. No formal arrangements to this effect need be proposed to the conference, but it could be arranged by a preliminary informal understanding between the four principal Allied representatives, who would propose each other in turn as chairman. The smaller Powers and Turkey would doubtless raise no objection in practice to this arrangement.

6. I have looked up the question of the *de jure* recognition of the Georgian Government. I find that on the 26th January, 1921, the Supreme Council decided to recognize *de jure* the independence of Georgia, provided it was clearly established that the latter desired immediate recognition. Accordingly, the next day (27th January) the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs (at that time in Paris) wrote to the Supreme Council to express officially to

[1] Not printed (see No. 127, n. 6). [2] No. 127.

M. Briand, as President, the demand of the Georgian Government and of the Georgian people to be recognised *de jure* by the Powers. The Supreme Council (not the Conference of Ambassadors) agreed on the 27th January that this letter was sufficient and M. Briand thereupon wrote the letter of which you sent me a copy;[3] but clearly the decision of the Supreme Council[4] related to the *de jure* recognition of the independence of Georgia, and I cannot accept that the then existing Georgian Government could be regarded as the *de jure* (much less the *de facto*) Government of Georgia to-day, or that it has any right to representation at the conference.

7. I am afraid that I cannot allow the question of the relative rights of the Dominions and India and Morocco and Tunis respectively to participate in the conference to be passed over without any discussion of the reasons—irrefutable, as they appear to me—put forward in my letter of the 18th October, which render completely distinct the status of the Dominions and India on the one hand and the French protectorates on the other. No British Government could now reverse the decision formally taken at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, regarding the status of the constituent members of the British Empire, and I must formally reserve their right to be represented in the British delegation at the forthcoming conference and to sign the Treaty of Peace and the Straits Convention as they signed the Treaty of Sèvres, should they so desire it. I can, of course, raise no objection to representatives of the French protectorates of Morocco and Tunis being attached to the French delegation.

8. The question whether and, if so, to what extent Egypt should participate in the conference raises certain difficulties. Egypt is not at war with Turkey and did not formally break off relations with that country. On the other hand, the questions dealt with in the Treaty of Sèvres relating to Egypt, while of a technical character, are of considerable importance, especially in their bearing upon the relations of Egypt with His Majesty's Government. Moreover, although Egypt did not sign the Treaty of Sèvres, the status of Egypt has altered since the date of the signature of that treaty.[5] While, therefore, it is probable that an Egyptian delegation will have to be present at the seat of the conference, the question whether she should participate in the preparation of the clauses of the new treaty relating to Egypt and their signature, and, if so, in what form, is a matter which cannot be settled at the present moment. Meanwhile, I am in communication on the whole subject with the Egyptian Government,[6] but it will not be necessary to send Egypt any formal invitation from the three Powers before the conference meets.

9. As your Excellency is aware, the Hedjaz did not actually sign the Treaty of Sèvres, although invited to do so. As King Hussein has consistently refused and still refuses to accept the mandatory principle, I see no reason to suppose that he would participate in the signature of a new treaty

[3] Addressed to M. Guéguetchkori, not printed. [4] See Vol. XV, Nos. 6 and 8.

[5] The reference is to the termination of the protectorate on March 15, 1922 (see Cmd. 1592, and Cmd. 1617, for 1922).

[6] In his telegram No. 263 of October 19, not printed.

in which that principle will again be recognised. There does not therefore appear to be any reason why the three Powers should send an invitation to Mecca.

10. I enclose for your Excellency's consideration drafts of notes—[7]

(*a*) To the Governments of Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Turkey (both Constantinople and Angora); and
(*b*) To the Russian Soviet and Bulgarian Governments;
(*c*) To the Swiss Government.

As soon as your Excellency has had time to examine these drafts, I would propose that you should instruct the French Ambassador here to signify your concurrence as to the drafting modification, if any, which you desire to make in them.[8] I would then collaborate with Count de Saint-Aulaire and the Italian Ambassador here, to whom I would ask his Government meanwhile to send similar instructions. I would suggest it should be left to us to fix the date upon which each Government should send off the identic telegrams. In the case of Russia, they would be despatched direct to Moscow. In the case of the United States, Japan, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria and Switzerland, they would be despatched to the respective representatives of the principal Allied Powers for communication to the said Governments. Perhaps the telegram to the Swiss Government should, as a matter of courtesy, be sent off a few days in advance of the other telegrams.[9] As regards Turkey, I would suggest that the telegrams should be sent to the three High Commissioners for communication to the Government of Constantinople, and to Hamid Bey, for transmission to the Government of Angora.

11. I have not hitherto raised with your Excellency the question of the participation of the United States in the conference, but your Excellency will doubtless have noticed from the press certain indications that the United States might desire to take part in the discussions on the question of the Straits. It would, I feel, be in the general political interests of all the Powers concerned that such participation, if possible, should be secured. I have, therefore, thought it well to prepare for your Excellency's consideration a

[7] Not printed (see No. 134, below).

[8] In a letter of October 25 to Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Sir Eyre Crowe stated that, in deference to M. Poincaré's views, Lord Curzon was reluctantly prepared to agree to the suppression of the last paragraph of the draft invitation to the Russian Soviet Government. This paragraph ran: 'The three principal Allied Governments will be glad if the Russian Soviet Government will communicate this invitation to the Governments of the Republics of the Ukraine and Georgia, with a view to arrange for representatives of these republics to accompany the representatives of the Russian Soviet Government to Lausanne.' Sir Eyre Crowe added, however, that Lord Curzon wished it to be clearly understood 'that should the omission of any reference to the Ukraine and Georgia lead to any delay in the arrangements for the conference, the responsibility must rest with the French Government', and that in any case he adhered to the views regarding the Government of Georgia expressed in paragraph 6 above.

[9] This was not done.

tentative draft of an invitation from the three principal Allied Governments to the Government of the United States.[10]

Believe me, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[10] Cf. No. 134, n. 2, below. For Lord Curzon's conversation of October 12 with Mr. Harvey, the American Ambassador, see *F.R.U.S.*, 1923, vol. ii, pp. 881–2.

No. 131

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 23)
No. 2473 [E 11442/27/44]

PARIS, *October 22, 1922*

My Lord,

On receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 3189 of yesterday's date,[1] I called upon the President of the Council at 9.30 this morning, and spoke to him fully in that sense.

M. Poincaré with his usual attitude of assuming the defensive, stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the French Government claimed the right to appoint as plenipotentiaries in the Near East Conference anybody they liked. I at once disclaimed any intention on the part of your Lordship to encroach upon the rights of the French Government, which were indubitable in such a case, although it was at the same time perfectly legitimate on the part of His Majesty's Government to point out to the French Government the disadvantages that might accrue from the appointment of any particular person as their representative.

As regards M. Franklin-Bouillon's association with the Angora Agreement of 1921,[2] M. Poincaré reminded me that he had constantly in his articles protested against the manner in which this agreement had been concluded, but, he remarked, the blame was not to be attributed so much to M. Franklin-Bouillon as to the Government who directed him in this matter. He reminded me that you had approved of the despatch of M. Franklin-Bouillon to Smyrna,[3] and that he himself would not have sent him without your assent. On the whole, he considers that M. Franklin-Bouillon did well at Smyrna, although he was not of quite the same opinion as regards his proceedings at Mudania. When M. Franklin-Bouillon returned to Paris, he asked at once if he would be appointed a plenipotentiary in the Near East Conference.

[1] This referred to indications that the French Government intended to appoint M. Franklin-Bouillon as their chief plenipotentiary at the Lausanne conference, and continued: 'I shall be glad therefore if your Excellency will seek an early interview with M. Poincaré and explain orally to him that whatever view may be taken of the part played by M. Franklin-Bouillon in recent events, his appointment as a plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference would create a very unfortunate situation.'

[2] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

[3] See Nos. 42 and 51.

M. Poincaré had given an evasive reply, for he did not consider that M. Franklin-Bouillon's relations with Mustapha Kemal would conduce to the efficient protection of French interests, the defence of which must necessarily arise during the progress of the forthcoming conference. He had therefore never seriously thought for a moment of appointing M. Franklin-Bouillon as one of the French representatives. The question of their selection had preoccupied him greatly, and he told me confidentially that he was considering the names of M. Leygues, now President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies, and former President of the Council, and M. Bompard, former Ambassador at Petrograd and Constantinople, and now a member of the Senate. He asked me my opinion as to the nomination of these two gentlemen, and as I happened to know both of them, I expressed my personal view that they would be very suitable. He mentioned that he had already discussed their appointment with the President of the Republic, who entirely approved of their selection.

I remarked to M. Poincaré that I had seen statements in the press to the effect that the Turks desired the conference to be held at Lugano rather than at Lausanne. M. Poincaré replied that he had made enquiries as to the origin of this rumour, and he had ascertained that the Turks had put forward the suggestion because they feared that they would find Lausanne to be a centre of Greek intrigue, because Lausanne is associated with the Turco-Italian Treaty, which they do not like, and because Lugano is a more cosmopolitan and mundane place. He himself would greatly prefer Lausanne, because Lugano had not been sympathetic to the *Entente* during the war, and because we did not wish the conference to assume the character of some of the previous conferences which had been held at San Remo and elsewhere. Still, he would prefer that the conference should take place at Lugano if the Turks raise an absolute objection to its being held at Lausanne, rather than that it should collapse.

I have, &c.
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

No. 132

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 391 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 11466/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 23, 1922, 11.45 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 539.[1]

There is no truth in the statement. Since new government[2] is not yet formed it would obviously not be accurate to refer to any 'intention' of theirs.

[1] Of October 23, not printed. This referred to newspaper reports that His Majesty's Government had asked for a postponement of the Near Eastern Conference and enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any intention of making such a request.

[2] Mr. Bonar Law had withdrawn his support of the Coalition Government on October 19 and Mr. Lloyd George had resigned. A general election, which placed the Conservative party in power, was held on November 15. In the new Cabinet of Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Curzon retained the Foreign Office.

No. 133

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 519 Telegraphic [E 11540/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 25, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 611 (of October 23rd; preliminary allied meeting).[1]

Our proposal for preliminary meeting of experts here was abandoned owing to acrimonious spirit of French reply[2] and their insistence on Paris.

It seems improbable that any preliminary allied meeting will now take place before conference but if not, we shall endeavour to arrange at conference that preparation of new proposals shall be carried out and agreed upon by allies sitting separately, before they are made to the Turks.

[1] This ran: 'Press announces that preliminary meeting of experts has been abandoned. I should be grateful to know whether this means that preliminary meeting will not be held or whether it is merely postponed. There is good reason to believe that Angora government is most anxious to prevent any united standpoint being adopted by the Powers on financial and economic questions prior to conference and has been exercising pressure on French government to this end.'

[2] Reported in Lord Hardinge's telegram No. 525 of October 18, not printed.

No. 134

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington), Sir C. Eliot (Tokio), Sir H. Dering (Bucharest), Sir A. Young (Belgrade), Mr. Lindley (Athens), and Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 312[1] Telegraphic [E 11637/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 26, 1922, 3 p.m.*

My immediately following telegram[2] contains the text of the invitation to the conference at Lausanne from the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the government to which you are accredited.

You should concert with your French and Italian colleagues for the simultaneous presentation of the identic notes to the government to which you are accredited. If the French and Italian representatives desire their text to be in French and Italian, you should satisfy yourself as to their translation of the note, the original text of which was in English, before the notes are presented.

[1] No. 312 to Washington, No. 113 to Tokyo, No. 91 to Bucharest, No. 76 to Belgrade, No. 333 to Athens, No. 521 to Constantinople.

[2] These telegrams are not here printed. That to Washington (No. 313 of October 26) concluded with the words: 'The three principal Allied Powers recall that a representative of the United States government was present at San Remo in the final stages of the proceedings of the Supreme Council which led to the drafting of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. They would welcome the presence of a United States representative at Lausanne in a similar capacity or in a more active capacity, especially in the discussion upon the question of the Straits.' (Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 884–5, 889.)

(Constantinople only). Invitations should be presented to Constantinople government and to the Angora government through whatever channel you and your allied colleagues consider most suitable.

No. 135

Letter from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Greek Minister in London
[*E 11459/10524/44*]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 26, 1922*

Sir,

In reply to your two notes of the 21st[1] October asking that a time-limit may be fixed between the evacuation of the Greek troops in Thrace and the arrival of the Turkish gendarmerie and also that the Allied commander-in-chief may be instructed to cause the inter-Allied contingents and missions to give all possible assistance to the Greek authorities, I have the honour to inform you that there is little to add to the information regarding Thrace conveyed to you in my note of the 25th October[2] and to M. Veniselos in Sir E. Crowe's letter to him of the 25th October.[1]

2. As regards the progressive replacement of Greek by Turkish authority, it is clearly impossible for His Majesty's Government to announce a uniform time-limit for the whole of Thrace, but arrangements have been made for the gradual installation of Turkish administration and gendarmerie in different districts within successive periods and the dates before which the Turkish gendarmerie will not reach the areas in question are being widely published. This arrangement seems to satisfy the request in your first note.

3. General Harington is being informed of the statements contained in your second note, but they are not corroborated by his reports. On the contrary, in a telegram dated the 23rd October[1] he states that, though extremely difficult and painful, evacuation is proceeding better than he anticipated, with only minor incidents; he adds that the withdrawal of the Greek army is to programme and that there is reason to hope that the shipment and rail transport of refugees will be similarly effected.

I have, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[1] Not printed.

[2] This ran: '. . . the principle of the evacuation scheme is that it should be gradual. While the Allied contingents and missions can, if necessary, remain for the full period of thirty days, it is for the Allied generals, representing the Allied Governments, to determine the exact moment at which they can or should leave. It is proposed to draw up a scheme fixing various districts for progressive evacuation and various dates before which Turkish administration and gendarmerie will not be admitted to these districts. Arrangements will be made known in each district so as to allow the Greek civil administration and population time and opportunity for preparing to withdraw. Even after the installation of the Turkish administration it will not be obligatory for the Allied contingents to withdraw before the expiry of the thirty days; but they will be withdrawn, so far as possible, gradually from the various districts if and when the Allied generals are satisfied that their withdrawal will not endanger public order.'

No. 136

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 28)
*No. 630 Telegraphic [E 11727/27/44]**

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 27, 1922*

My telegram No. 628.[1]

I hear that Nationalists have recently shown less eagerness for an immediate meeting of Peace Conference. Hamid has been putting it about that conference would not meet until 25th November. This date nearly coincides with date on which Angora Government will have taken over administration of Eastern Thrace. The Nationalists will then be in a stronger position, and there are somewhat persistent rumours that it is their intention to create a kind of army in Eastern Thrace, of which gendarmerie would form nucleus.[2] Nationalists no doubt also hope to have completely paralysed Constantinople Government in another month.

[1] Of October 27, not printed.

[2] Referring to this telegram, General Harington, in his telegram No. 2875 of October 30 to the War Office, reported: 'Since Midsummer this year Turkish military organization in Eastern Thrace has been under observation. At time of Greek threat [to] Constantinople last (? July) confirmation of Thracian military organization at which French command connived, was obtained by 3rd Hussars at (? Chatalja). Constantinople Government at that time applied officially for permission to raise 2 Divisions for defence of Chatalja. It was presumably considered by (? Turks) that allied force was insufficient to (? guarantee) situation. French wishing to pose as their protectors connived at secret organization apart from official proposal which was never sanctioned. While Greek threat remained this Thrace organization continued and Essad the chief of police was known to be enrolling as many as 15,000 men whom he was gradually equipping. . . . It is possible that there is still some idea of threatening Allied positions at Constantinople but it is considered probable that present role of this organization is: (A) to watch evacuation of Greek Army to west of Maritza and to form advanced guard to 8,000 gendarmerie who are now beginning to arrive from Anatolia, (B) to prevent attempts of Bulgarian bands to occupy territory between Tunja and Maritza river north west of Adrianople before Peace Conference. Turks must fear Bulgarians will endeavour to regain frontier (? ceded) them in 1915 by Turkey.'

No. 137

Mr. Russell[1] (Berne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 27, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 28 Telegraphic [E 11735/27/44]

BERNE, *October 27, 1922, 8.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 25.[2]

Identic notes were presented at political department this afternoon by my French colleague and my Italian colleague and myself after a careful com-

[1] H.M. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Berne, from September 15, 1919.

[2] Of October 25, not printed. This telegram transmitted to Mr. Russell the text of the invitation (see No. 130, para. 10) to the Swiss Government.

parison of texts. Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs in his own name as well as in that of the whole Federal council who it appears had discussed the matter in anticipation extended a most cordial welcome to the Conference on Swiss soil and will tonight instruct cantonal and communal authorities of Lausanne to make all appropriate arrangements and to place themselves in communication with the Consuls of the three Powers in that city. As Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded us Lausanne is not without experience as a peace conference was held there in 1912[3] and our governments could rest assured that all possible assistance would be rendered.

With regard to possibility of Swiss participation Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had evidently been sounded through Paris, emphasized very strongly that while preferring to remain entirely aloof Federal government would if pressed consent to opening ceremony being performed by President of the confederation but by no other Swiss subject. I gathered that Swiss took no part in 1912 conference and would prefer to confine their rôle to that of mere hosts on this occasion if Powers are agreeable.

After thanking Minister for Foreign Affairs cordially on behalf of our governments for kind welcome extended to conference we took our departure.

[3] See No. 121, n. 4.

No. 138

Mr. Peters[1] *(Moscow) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received October 28, 8 a.m.)
No. 228 Telegraphic [E 11741/27/44]

MOSCOW, *October 27, 1922, 10.35 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 249.[2]

I presented invitation this evening to Chicherin who after cursorily examining it with Monsieur Litvinoff raised following points without prejudice to his eventual reply.[3]

1. On what principle have Powers been selected to discuss peace treaty—if as allies, why not Belgium, if as interested parties, why Japan and not Bulgaria?

2. Were Russian representatives invited to discuss question of the Straits or only issues raised thereby? Would they actually have a voice in decisions or merely required to express views?

3. Was invitation extended to Ukraine and Georgia?[4]

[1] Assistant Agent of the British Commercial Mission to Russia from July 1921.

[2] Of October 26, not printed. This instructed Mr. Peters to present to the Russian Soviet Government the invitation to participate in the discussion on the Straits during the conference at Lausanne.

[3] The reply, dated November 2, was communicated to the Foreign Office by M. Berzine, Assistant Official Agent of the Russian Soviet Government in Great Britain, in a Memorandum of November 6, not printed. See Degras, pp. 342–5.

[4] Cf. No. 130, n. 8.

4. Was date of opening of conference liable to be conditional by [*sic*] British election?

I should be glad to receive such information as can be supplied on above points.

No. 139

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 399[1] *Telegraphic: by bag [E 11666/557/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 30, 1922, 8 p.m.*

Constantinople telegrams Nos. 620[2] and 626[3] (of October 26th and 27th: financial position of Constantinople government).

Please enquire of government to which you are accredited whether they will join in such an immediate intimation to the Angora government through the three High Commissioners at Constantinople and whether they are prepared to insist on insertion of a clause in new treaty recognising validity of all acts of this nature concluded by the Constantinople government with allied nationals etc. since the armistice.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 529.

[1] No. 399 to Paris, No. 345 to Rome.

[2] Of October 26. This, transmitting to the Foreign Office the text of an identic telegram addressed by the three high commissioners to their governments, concluded: 'The three high commissioners have already protested to Hamid Bey in strongest manner against decision of Angora government [that all acts, treaties and official decisions of the Constantinople Government since March 1920, including its financial operations, were to be considered null and void]. Are the three governments prepared to concert as to measures to be taken to assure existence of Constantinople government until a peace is concluded? To achieve this will the three governments agree to impose on Nationalist government by an article in treaty, recognition of all administrative and financial acts and operations of Constantinople government between armistice and conclusion of peace? Only some such guarantee from the three powers would successfully enable Constantinople government to find means to make up budget deficit which threatens to bring about its total collapse.'

[3] Of October 27. In this telegram Sir H. Rumbold reported that he had advised the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Telephone Company not to pay monthly royalties to the Constantinople government pending further advice, and added: 'It is intolerable that nationalist agent here should in this manner under the nose of inter-allied military occupants institute financial blockade of Constantinople government and give orders to allied institutions. I would strongly urge that French and Italian governments be invited to join in categorical intimation that this interference will not be permitted and in guarantee that peace treaties will include clause protecting allied institutions from prejudice as result of Angora declaration.'

No. 140

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received October 31, 4.35 p.m.)
No. 635 Telegraphic [E 11894/557/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 31, 1922, 4 p.m.*

My telegram No. 620.[1]

Three allied High Commissioners decided to-day to take upon themselves responsibility of ordering Ottoman Bank to sell a sufficient part of £T252,000 gold which were sequestered by them in 1919 to provide sum of £500,000 paper to meet payments due to-day for priorities and salaries of officials.

Situation was such that it was indispensable to take immediate steps to procure money for Treasury.

I am reporting more fully by despatch[2] and trust that our action may be approved.[3]

[1] Of October 26 (see No. 139, n. 2).

[2] Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 951 of October 26, not printed.

[3] In his despatch No. 1108 of November 16 referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon informed Mr. Henderson, Counsellor of Embassy at Constantinople and acting Chargé d'Affaires, that the action taken in this matter was approved.

No. 141

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 1, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 637 Telegraphic [E 11926/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 31, 1922, 8.10 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Having had inkling this morning of intention of Angora to make acceptance of invitation conditional on exclusion of Constantinople government, I have agreed with my colleagues to let Hamid Bey know that High Commissioners thought this would amount to a request that they should consider

[1] No. 636 of October 31. This ran: 'Following is substance of two notes dated October 29th handed simultaneously to High Commissioners this afternoon by Hamid Bey: First note. Government of Grand National Assembly having received allied note of October 27th is ready to send plenipotentiaries to Peace Conference. . . . Turkish government draws attention to the advantage which Smyrna would present from the point of view of celerity of negotiation. Anyhow establishment beforehand of rapid and secure means of communication between Turkey and Lausanne would be "of very great interest for Turkey". Second note. . . . Invitation as representatives of Turkey of delegates from Constantinople, which is merely administrative district in allied occupation, might prevent government of Grand National Assembly from assisting at Conference besides which the said invitation would appear to be in formal contradiction with the spirit and even the existence of Mudania convention.'

Constantinople government as having been superseded. We could not accept this view and I told him so plainly when he delivered note and said that second note appeared to me to cancel the first. I trust my colleagues will have used similar language as agreed.

As note contained no mention of date I asked him whether acceptance referred to meeting on November 13th as proposed by Allies.[2] He said that he understood that to be the case. I told Hamid that argument used by Angora government in connection with Mudania agreement was very weak.

He gave me to understand that intention of Angora was to dispatch delegates to Lausanne but to refuse to enter into conference if Constantinople delegates were there also. I reminded him that similar situation had arisen in March last year[3] when the two separate delegations had gone to London and that it had then been found possible to combine forces.

Central government is making great effort to come to an understanding with Angora for joint action on basis of recognition of great rôle which Angora had played but without formally abdicating its own position. Refet Pasha[4] visited Sultan on October 29th.[5]

[2] Cf. No. 136.

[3] See Vol. XV, Chapter II.

[4] As reported by Sir H. Rumbold in his despatch No. 897 of October 17, immediately after the signature of the Mudania Convention of October 11, Refet Pasha had been appointed military Governor-General for the taking over of Eastern Thrace. His enthusiastic reception in Constantinople was reported by Sir H. Rumbold in his despatch No. 930 of October 24, which concluded: 'To return to Refet Pasha himself, I feel it my duty to warn your Lordship that, however amiable he may appear in conversations with those Allied authorities here with whom he has had to come in contact, and however rosy the pictures he may draw of the ideal conditions which the Kemalists intend to establish in Thrace, he is as chauvinistic as any of the military clique who run the Angora Government, as determined as any of them to exact the letter of the National Pact, and apparently as obsessed as any of them with revolutionary and expansionist ideas.'

[5] In his telegram No. 638 of October 31, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Constantinople government telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal yesterday to say that it had been invited to Peace Conference. . . . I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs what had passed between Sultan and Refet Pasha. He said he had not got detailed information but that he understood from Grand Vizier that Refet Pasha had asked Sultan to dismiss his government in order to allow Angora government to send a governor general here. Sultan is stated to have replied that he would consult his ministers.'

No. 142

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)
No. 322 Telegraphic [E 12017/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 31, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 433.[1] I am somewhat surprised at categorical character of statement concerning Lausanne Conference, foreshadowed in fourth

[1] Of October 30, not printed. This reported the principal points in a speech which the Secretary of State was due to deliver at Boston that evening.

paragraph,[2] since only yesterday American Ambassador handed me reply[3] of United States Government to invitation to attend that Conference. This reply declares American special interest in seven subjects which are likely to come before Conference and indicates willingness of American Government to send observers to it. Further the note explicitly states, and the Ambassador stated in answer to my enquiry, that these observers would attend meetings of Conference whenever requested in order to express views of their Government on above points, concerning which they would receive full instructions beforehand. He added that they would not sign Treaty; but when I said there would probably be a special Straits Convention outside the Treaty, he did not seem to regard their adhesion to such an instrument as impossible.[4]

I warmly welcomed American reply and should be sorry to think that it meant nothing.[5]

[2] This ran: 'United States Government, although interested deeply in some phases of Near Eastern question, cannot appropriately attend Lausanne Conference, because it was called to settle a war to which United States was not party.'

[3] Not printed. See *F.R.U.S.*, 1923, vol. ii, pp. 886–8, 890–1.

[4] Lord Curzon reported at length his conversation of October 30 with Mr. Harvey in his despatch No. 1602 of October 30 to Sir A. Geddes, not printed.

[5] Referring to this telegram, Sir A. Geddes, in his telegram No. 435 of November 2, stated: 'My telegram No. 433 was written on Associated Press summary prepared to be issued after speech was delivered. It used words "cannot appropriately attend Lausanne Peace Conference," whereas actual text of speech runs: "We are not appropriately parties to peace negotiations which are about to take place."

'This should not, in my opinion, be regarded as modifying the sense of text of *aide-mémoire* regarding United States participation in conference handed to you by United States Ambassador.'

No. 143

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 400 Telegraphic: by bag [E 11741/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *October 31, 1922*

Moscow telegram No. 228 (of October 27th; Russia and Lausanne conference).[1]

I propose to reply to first three questions as follows:

(1) As those allies and signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, most immediately interested in the questions likely to arise in the new treaty.

(2) To discuss question of the Straits which involves having a voice in the decisions.

(3) No, but the Russian government are free to include representatives of these republics in their delegation as they did at Genoa.

Please enquire of Monsieur Poincaré as soon as possible if he agrees, pointing out as regards (2) that to my mind the expression 'hav[e] a voice in the

[1] No. 138.

decisions' does not imply more than that Russia will be perfectly free to take a full part in the debate and that due weight will be attached to her views in arriving at a decision but not that she will be allowed by exercising a veto to prevent a final decision being arrived at by the conference.

I of course regard myself as bound by Monsieur Poincaré's suggested procedure for the signature of the Straits convention, but the allies should do all they can to avoid giving Russia the opportunity, which she doubtless desires, of proclaiming that the allies intend to decide the Straits question without her.

No. 144

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 7)
No. 957 [E 12152/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *October 31, 1922*

My Lord,

Both my Allied colleagues spoke to me last night in terms of evident anxiety with regard to the present attitude of the Kemalist Government towards foreigners and foreign enterprise generally. They had both received information from a Frenchman and an Italian, who had just come from Smyrna, of the intolerable régime at present in force there. The old Turkish officials had been ejected by young Kemalists from Angora who were imbued with chauvinistic feelings. Customs duties had been enormously increased and the importation of articles of luxury absolutely forbidden. Further than this, although firms which had imported articles of luxury were not allowed to clear these from the customs, they were equally prohibited from re-exporting them. Measures had been threatened against foreign banks, and foreign subjects were liable at any hour of the night and day to domiciliary visits by the Nationalist police. It was a fact that the officers and men of the Kemalist force at Smyrna had taken part in the pillage of that town. In these circumstances trade was impossible, and the French High Commissioner had even been advised that it would be useless for French subjects to remain there.

2. The French High Commissioner also informed me that he had received reports from Colonel Mougin, the French agent at Angora, to the effect that the extremists in the National Assembly appeared to have the upper hand for the moment. General Pellé had also heard that at Zungouldak, and probably elsewhere on the littoral of the Black Sea, the Kemalists were applying the measures which they had applied in Ionia, namely, that they were retaining men between 18 and 45 and giving the women, children and old men the choice between expulsion and deportation. These unfortunate persons preferred expulsion, and it was to be foreseen that a fresh mass of refugees might be expected from the regions in question.

3. The French High Commissioner said that, as a result of this state of things and of the general attitude of the Kemalists, he meant again to urge on M. Poincaré the absolute necessity of preliminary conversations between the three Allied Governments,[1] so as to enable the latter to decide, before the conference, to what extent they were prepared to accept the probable Kemalist demands, and at what point they would make a stand. He told me that he had already suggested this course at least twice to M. Poincaré, but that the latter, under the influence of the irritation produced on him by Mr. Lloyd George's speech at Manchester,[2] had rejected the idea. General Pellé added very frankly that M. Poincaré was not always an easy man to deal with, and that the tone of his correspondence was often disagreeable. I told General Pellé that, in my opinion, absolute solidarity between the Allies was the only chance there was of resisting Kemalist pretensions at the forthcoming conference.

4. Admiral Dumesnil, who spent a considerable time at Smyrna both before and after the destruction of that place by fire,[3] has also in conversation with me dwelt on the intractability and arrogance of the Kemalists. He expressed the view that Mustapha Kemal would endeavour to hold fresh elections for a National Assembly at as early a date as possible. As at present constituted the National Assembly was not sufficiently under his influence. In the course of a recent tour Mustapha Kemal had openly said to a gathering of notables that the people must not send any more Hodjas[4] to the Assembly. These men had been the curse of Turkey in the past, and if any more were elected he would throw them into the sea.

5. Meanwhile, Refet Pasha has continued to make speeches and to indulge in all manner of activities at Constantinople. His speeches have produced a bad impression on the Constantinople Turks, and it may be said with truth that he has outstayed his welcome. In one of his earlier speeches Refet Pasha spoke slightingly of Western republics, which, he implied, no longer corresponded to present-day conditions. He claimed that the Nationalist Government had discovered a far more up-to-date system of government, in that sovereignty was vested directly in the Grand National Assembly. He seems, however, to have forgotten the Convention at the time of the French revolution. His allusions to the abolition of the Sultanate but to the maintenance of a Caliph, who would have no power of any sort, has puzzled even if it has not shocked moderate opinion here. Refet Pasha seems to have had in mind some such system as prevailed in Japan before the Restoration, i.e., an Emperor who was a mere figure-head, with a shogun, in this case possibly Mustapha Kemal, exercising sovereign powers.

6. It is probable that, with the knowledge of what has happened at Smyrna, the official classes of Constantinople are not looking forward with any enthusiasm to the installation of the Kemalist régime here. It may mean the dismissal of many of them in favour of office-seekers from Angora. The

[1] See No. 133.
[2] On October 14 (see *The Times*, October 16, p. 17).
[3] See No. 28.
[4] Hodja or Khoja: a professor or teacher in a Moslem school or college.

extreme doctrines proclaimed by Refet Pasha must also be a shock to the more conservative Turk. A few days ago one of the Associations arranged a procession of Refet Pasha's escort through the town. This procession consisted of thirty-two motor-cars with three of Refet Pasha's men in each, but as far as I could see it evoked no enthusiasm whatever. In speaking to me of the first detachments of gendarmerie which have gone into Thrace, the Italian High Commissioner informed me yesterday that he had reliable information to the effect that the men were carefully-selected officers and non-commissioned officers, but that they were *des fripons*.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

No. 145

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 346 Telegraphic [E 11970/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 1, 1922, 8 p.m.*

I have received from M. Mussolini[1] a cordially worded telegram[2] in which he expresses confidence that he may count on receiving my friendly co-operation in dealing with the problems confronting our two countries, linked as they are by bonds of traditional friendship. I have sent a reply conceived in the same spirit. A similar exchange of telegrams has taken place with Mr. Bonar Law.[3]

I request Your Excellency to take an early opportunity of seeing M. Mussolini for the purpose of confirming the satisfaction with which I have received the assurance that the new Italian government relies on the solidarity of the allied nations for the successful pursuit of their common interests. I welcome that assurance the more warmly in view of the difficult situation facing the allies in the Near East. Like M. Mussolini, I am convinced that a satisfactory solution of the difficulties can only be found by proceeding on the basis of the most frank and singleminded co-operation, to the exclusion of all attempts on the part of the allies to enter into separate negotiations or arrangements with the Turks. This is the line of policy which I myself have consistently advocated and strictly adhered to both in regard to the troubles in the Near East ever since they arose, and generally in all questions of common concern.

[1] Signor Mussolini had become Italian President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim* on October 31. See *D.D.I.* (*i*), p. 1.

[2] Of October 31, not printed. See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 8.

[3] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 7. Cf. Sir R. Graham's report in his despatch No. 897 of October 4: 'Signor Mussolini writes in the "Popolo d'Italia" (1st October): "Signor Schanzer has vaguely announced that Italy will take no military part. But this is not enough. We must prepare ourselves for the eventuality of giving active force to a practical anti-British policy. The mass of the Italian people sympathises with Kemal. It is not in Italy's interest to support the British Empire. Italy's interest is to collaborate in its destruction."'

It is therefore with a feeling of considerable uneasiness, which I do not think it right to conceal, that I learn from certain quarters in Constantinople, in whose reliability I am bound to repose confidence, that the Italian government which has just resigned, was at the very moment of its fall contemplating the re-opening of separate negotiations with Angora for the conclusion of some special arrangement between Italy and Angora.[4] Of the terms of the proposed agreement I am in ignorance, but the fact alone that such an agreement was being sought by M. Schanzer appears to me altogether incompatible with the spirit of loyal co-operation between the allies which M. Mussolini proclaims to be the keynote of the allied policy which he intends to pursue.

I therefore earnestly trust that the new Italian government will refrain from pursuing the policy credibly attributed to their predecessors and will give definite and early orders for putting a stop to any separate negotiations which may have been in contemplation with Angora. The announcement in England that any one of the allies was engaged in concluding a separate agreement behind the backs of the others, on the very eve of the Lausanne conference, would have a very deplorable effect.[5]

I beg Your Excellency to speak to M. Mussolini with the utmost frankness.

[4] Cf. Vol. XVII, No. 60.

[5] In his telegram No. 532 of November 1, not printed, Lord Curzon instructed Sir H. Rumbold as follows: '. . . should you be approached either by the Italian special agent or by your Italian colleague, you will no doubt be careful not to commit yourself nor take them unnecessarily into your confidence.' Sir H. Rumbold replied in his telegram No. 648 of November 3, that M. Maissa, the special Italian agent, had called that day. He continued: 'During interview, which was brief, he endeavoured to enlist my sympathetic support in the manner foreshadowed by you and gave a somewhat confused account of object of his mission. . . . M. Maissa is an old man, and has reputation of being crafty and pro-Kemalist.'

No. 146

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 533 Telegraphic [E 12000/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 2, 1922, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 636.[1]

Your Excellency is authorised to concert with your French and Italian colleagues joint replies to Hamid's two notes in the following sense, which have been suggested by the French government.

First note, which, although somewhat ambiguously worded, can be considered as an acceptance of Lausanne as meeting place of conference, should be answered by taking note formally of such acceptance, and by adding an assurance that the necessary steps will be taken to facilitate as much as possible communication between Lausanne and Turkey.

[1] Of October 31; see No. 141, n. 1.

In reply to the second note, the three High Commissioners should observe that their governments have strictly followed the procedure adopted on the occasion of the previous conference dealing with the affairs of the Near East held in London,[2] and that it is for the Angora and Constantinople governments to make arrangements among themselves for the despatch to Lausanne of one single delegation, which should be easy in view of the Angora contention that Constantinople is merely an administrative district of Turkey.

Repeated to Paris No. 401 and Rome No. 347.

[2] See Vol. XV, Chapter II.

No. 147

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 534 Telegraphic [E 12000/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 2, 1922, 9.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

French government in suggesting answer to second Angora note proposed[2] to add, as a further reason justifying allied attitude, that the Mudania convention precluded the allied Powers from insisting that the Constantinople government should be separately represented.

I have informed French government[3] that, for reasons which I explain, this argument should not in my opinion figure in the reply of the three High Commissioners to Hamid's note and that I have therefore warned you not to include it.

Please act accordingly.

Repeated to Paris No. 402 and Rome No. 348.

[1] No. 146.

[2] In a note of November 2, not printed, from the Comte de Saint-Aulaire.

[3] In a letter of November 2, not printed, from Sir E. Crowe to the Comte de Saint-Aulaire.

No. 148

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 4, 8 a.m.)
No. 345 Telegraphic [E 12083/27/44]

ROME, *November 3, 1922, 3.30 p.m.*

President of the Council called on me this morning to return my visit and I spoke to him in the sense of Your Lordship's telegram unnumbered [*sic*][1] of November 1st adding that such separate negotiations with Turks must inevitably destroy any prospect of that frank and loyal co-operation which we had hoped to establish.

[1] The reference is apparently to telegram No. 346 (No. 145).

His Excellency said that he knew nothing of alleged negotiations and refused to believe his predecessor could have contemplated them. At any rate in so far as he was concerned I could assure Your Lordship that any such separate action would be in absolute contradiction with policy he intended to follow. According to his information Turks had now accepted Lausanne but he enquired whether date of conference was likely to be retarded by difference between governments of Angora and Constantinople. He was perturbed at growing arrogance and intransigeance of Turks and their extreme pretensions which now include the whole of Western Thrace. He thought it very desirable that Allies should decide on a correct policy vis-à-vis Turks (? before our) meeting them at Lausanne, otherwise conference would be the scene of complete confusion; he was ready to come to immediate understanding with His Majesty's Government on the subject if he could be informed of their views. He was also prepared to negotiate an immediate agreement to embrace Dodecanese[2] and Jubaland.[3]

My impression is that Signor Mussolini who seems eminently a man of practical ideas and quick decisions has lost no time in arriving at conclusion that friendship and co-operation with Great Britain rather than with France are likely to be of most value to Italy and is anxious to work in with us. Your Lordship will agree that this trend should be encouraged.

At the end of very friendly conversation His Excellency begged me to reassure His Majesty's Government and public opinion in England as to his policy which would not be one of aggressive adventure or surprises but of steady and sustained effort to further (? practical) interests of Italy. He expressed pleasure at tone of British press in its references to new government.[4]

[2] See Vol. XIII, Nos. 104–5, 107, 111–12, 115–18, and Vol. XVII, Nos. 177 and 404; see also No. 583, below. On October 9, the Italian Government had denounced the arrangement which they had signed with M. Venizelos on August 10, 1920 (see Vol. XIII, No. 118, and *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 1078–80). In his telegram No. 626 of October 25, however, Mr. Lindley reported: 'Italian Minister told me the other day that he hoped to arrange Dodecanese question amicably, and I now learn that he has been approaching through third parties Dr. Zervos, head of Dodecanese party here. The most interesting of several suggestions made to Dr. Zervos was that all the islands should be returned to Greece in exchange for an offensive and defensive alliance between Greece and Italy, and a promise not to renew Greek alliance with Serbia.'

[3] See *Survey of International Affairs 1924* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford and London, 1926), pp. 463–6.

[4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 38.

No. 149

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 4, 8 a.m.)
No. 646 Telegraphic [E 12077/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 3, 1922, 7.55 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 530.[1]

I have consulted General Harington.

Secret organisation, referred to in General Harington's telegram No. 2875[2] controlled by Essad who though chief of police here has long been suspected by us of active Kemalist sympathies amounting almost to his being a Kemalist agent, is possibly what French Ambassador had in mind.

General Harington knows nothing of any definite open Nationalist recruiting bureaux in Thrace which would warrant any protest being made to Nationalist government on lines suggested by French Ambassador.

Both General Harington and I consider nothing would be gained by making such protest at present.

Situation will be very carefully watched.

Discouragement of recruiting in Syria would be a distinct breach of convention. The numbers proceeding to Thrace are being checked. There is practically no transport left in Thrace and Nationalists certainly have no guns.

General Harington does not look upon matters as serious yet but they may become so later. French High Commissioner who has been informed by French government of démarche made by French Ambassador in London has telegraphed that his government must have acted under a misapprehension. All he did was to sound note of warning as to likelihood of Kemalist Turks starting to recruit an army after allied troops have left Eastern Thrace. This warning seems to be justified by that passage of Shakir Bey's manifesto to the effect that if gendarmerie is insufficient local inhabitants may be employed to supplement it (see my telegram No. 645).[3] French High Commissioner does not consider a protest called for, at present.

[1] Of October 31. It ran: 'This afternoon French Ambassador asked me to instruct you to join your colleagues in Allied protest against alleged attempt of Nationalist Turks to establish recruiting offices in Thrace, with a view to raising Turkish Army of two divisions in Europe. . . . Since then I have seen Harington's Number 2875 to War Office, but am not clear that this relates to same organisation, since the force there alluded to was to have been raised by Constantinople Government, with connivance of French. Please report and, if joint protest is now required, act accordingly.'

[2] See No. 136, n. 2.

[3] Of November 3, not printed. Shakir Bey had been appointed Vali of Eastern Thrace, after the signature of the Mudania Convention.

No. 150

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 13)
No. 635 [E 15517/13/19]

ATHENS, *November 3, 1922*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that an official notice appeared in the newspapers of the 23rd ultimo to the effect that a special Court Martial would be constituted to try the arrested Ministers.[1] This decision was contrary to the promise given me by Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras, as reported in my despatch No. 527 of September 28th,[2] and I considered it advisable to speak on the subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to impress upon him the deplorable effect which would be produced in Greece by the trial of these persons before a tribunal whom no anti-Venizelist would consider either impartial or competent. As reported in my telegram No. 623 of the 24th ultimo,[2] I found Monsieur Politis far from sympathetic. He used the stock arguments of the Venizelists that it was necessary in Greece to impress upon Ministers that they would suffer severely if they involved the country in disaster through their mismanagement. There had been far too much irresponsibility in Greece and it was necessary for the political education of the country to make an example. I pointed out that a lot of partisan soldiers were hardly people whose judgment on political blunders would inspire confidence; and that it was a dangerous precedent to execute Ministers for mistakes of foreign and military policy. Greek Ministers were certainly not the only ones who were guilty in this respect since the Armistice.

Not only was Monsieur Politis unsatisfactory in his attitude generally, but it was easy to see that he was actuated by the most violent party hatred and that he would be glad enough to see the leaders of the old parties summarily dealt with in order to remove from the political arena some of his opponents and to strike terror into the rest.

I should mention that, ever since the arrest of the Ministers, the wildest rumours have been in circulation; and hardly a day passes without someone reporting on the best authority that the prisoners are to be executed the following day. These reports multiplied during the days after my conversation with Monsieur Politis and, when I learned that Prince Andrew and Monsieur Baltazzi, late Minister for Foreign Affairs, had been arrested, I thought it advisable to intervene again. On the 26th ultimo I, accordingly, addressed a personal letter to Monsieur Politis, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy.[2] This letter brought the Foreign Minister round to the Legation within the hour and I had a long conversation with His Excellency during the evening of that day.

Monsieur Politis took my letter in very good part and quite changed his tone. He said he was convinced that it would be fatal to yield to the clamour

[1] See No. 85. [2] Not printed.

for vengeance and that he would endeavour to get the tribunal postponed until a Court which afforded real guarantees of justice could be formed. In any case, he informed me in strict confidence, he would resign rather than consent to the actual execution of the accused.

This was satisfactory, as far as it went, and I reported what had been done in my telegram No. 628 of the 27th ultimo[2] to Your Lordship. The same day the Italian Minister informed me that his Government were communicating with London and Paris with the object of making concerted representations at Athens in favour of the prisoners. The next day he himself made official verbal representations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as his instructions authorised him to do, without waiting for his colleagues. Monsieur Politis did not receive them particularly well and the Italians are so unpopular in this country and known to be so violently anti-Venizelist, that I fear Monsieur Montagna's intervention may do more harm than good. I should mention that I have kept my French colleague informed of all I have done. Monsieur de Marcilly, whilst personally entirely opposed to reprisals, has not felt justified in taking further action since his conversation with Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras reported in my despatch No. 519 of September 28th.[2]

On the 31st ultimo I received Your Lordship's telegram No. 338[3] approving my action and authorising me to give the strongest official warning, should there be the least chance of savage or vindictive treatment of the political prisoners. This telegram, for which I am most grateful and which should strengthen my hands immensely, I have not yet acted upon; not because there is no chance of the prisoners' receiving the treatment described but because I think it more judicious to leave matters alone for a few days. The danger from the civilian, or professional political side is, I believe, for the time being dispelled; for Monsieur Politis is far the most influential member of the Government and I think he can be relied upon to do his best to avoid excesses. The danger from the military side, however, remains; and there is no doubt that a large number of junior officers and men are clamouring to justify their own disgraceful conduct in the field by taking revenge on the members of the late Government. The pressure these people can exercise is very great in present circumstances; and they are headed by such men as Colonel Condylis[4] and Captain Hadjikyriakos,[5] who are agitators of a dangerous type. It is not easy to know the right psychological moment to make use of Your Lordship's telegram but I am inclined to think that it will come at my first official interview with Monsieur Zaimis, the Prime Minister who is due here on the 7th instant.[6]

The prisoners at present under arrest are the following: Messieurs Gounaris, Stratos, Theotoky, Baltazzi, Goudas, Stratigos, Protopapadakis, all

[3] Of October 30, not printed.

[4] See No. 89, n. 3.

[5] A naval officer who, for a few days, was a member of the Revolutionary Committee when its membership was increased to five.

[6] M. Zaïmis, at the time of his appointment as Prime Minister (see No. 85, n. 11), had been in Vienna for medical treatment.

members of the Gounaris Government, Monsieur Calogeropoulo, Minister for Foreign Affairs under Monsieur Triandafillakos and Prime Minister in 1921, Monsieur Craniotakis, Editor of the 'Kathemerine'. The military men are Prince Andrew, (in a private house), General Hadjiannesti, late Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Constantinopoulos, late Chief of the Military district of Athens, Colonel Tsoudas, late Garrison Commandant of Athens. All these prisoners have been subjected to close examination during the past ten days at the hands of General Pangalos, a fanatical Venizelist who is charged with the duty of Public Prosecutor. The newspapers, ever since the arrests, have been full of articles which, in England, would have landed the editors in gaol for contempt of court; but this is an ordinary feature of Greek justice.

The Constitution of the special Military Tribunal which is to try the prisoners was promulgated in a Decree, dated October 25th, of which a translation is enclosed herewith.[7] A supplementary Decree was published on October 29th, of which a translation is also enclosed,[7] modifying the constitution of the Court and strengthening the position of the Revolutionary Committee.

The salient points of the Constitution of the Tribunal appear to be that the Court is purely military and naval; that the members are all appointed by the Revolutionary Committee; that very little time is given to the accused for preparing their defence; that the accused may not call more witnesses than the prosecution; that the accused may employ one counsel; that the Greek Constitution, in so far as it deals with final [*sic*] offences and punishments, does not apply to the Tribunal; that there is no appeal from the sentence. In short, the Court is a thoroughly revolutionary body which offers no guarantees of justice as that word is understood in England. It must, however, be admitted that, in this last respect, it does not differ very widely from the ordinary Greek tribunals.

It has not yet been decided who is to preside over this Court or who are to serve on it. I am informed that a number of officers have refused but, even if this is true, it is certain that plenty will be found ready to take their places. The delay which has already occurred in trying the prisoners has raised the ire of the rank and file and given rise to the suspicion that the trial was to be indefinitely postponed. The Revolutionary Committee, therefore, published on the 22nd instant a denial that the trial was to be adjourned and stated that it would take place as soon as the preliminary examination was over—probably next week.

I have &c.,
F. O. LINDLEY

[7] Not printed.

No. 151

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 5, 8 a.m.)
No. 652 Telegraphic [E 12079/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 4, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Grand Vizier called this morning to speak of situation created for Constantinople government by recent decisions of Grand National Assembly at Angora as reported in my telegram No. 644.[1]

Grand Vizier after recapitulating role of his government during last two years and telegraphic correspondence which he had had with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, asked for my advice on following two points:

1. Whether Constantinople government should now resign, and
2. Whether Constantinople government should send a delegation to Lausanne.

In reply to first question I said I could not take on myself the responsibility of advising His Highness as to his action.

His Majesty's Government did not interfere with internal affairs of other States. As regards the second question I explained reasons for which invitations to conference had been addressed, both to Constantinople government as government of Sultan with which allied governments had been in relations since Armistice and to Angora government which was de facto government of greater portion of Turkey. There again I could not advise Grand Vizier one way or the other, and I reminded him of procedure followed last year when delegation from Sultan's government and Angora government were present at conference in London.[2] Grand Vizier said that he was under the impression that Angora government would not take over government at Constantinople whilst the latter was in allied occupation. Supposing Constantinople government resigned would Allies be prepared to step into breach? I replied that resignation of Constantinople government would produce a situation which I would have to discuss with my allied colleagues. All I could tell him was that as long as inter-allied occupation of Constantinople lasted, whatever administration was set up here, would have to work under the same conditions as those under which Constantinople government had worked i.e. would in last resort be under the control of Allies. Grand Vizier begged me to consult my colleagues and I am doing so this evening.

[1] Of November 3. This ran: 'Latest information shows that on November 1st Grand National Assembly adopted decision that under fundamental law Turkish people represented by Assembly is sole sovereignty of Turkey and that people recognize no other government and that Constantinople form of government has ceased for ever as from March 16th, 1920. Caliphate remains vested in the house of Osman but incumbent must be elected by Grand National Assembly. Turkish state is support on which Caliphate rests.

'Preamble states even more explicitly that office of Sultan has ceased to exist.

'No decision has yet come through as to maintenance or otherwise of present Sultan in office of Caliph.'

[2] See Vol. XV, Chapter II.

Grand Vizier then commented in scathing terms on wild proceedings of Grand National Assembly. It was not within the province of such an irregularly constituted assembly to decree the abolition of Sultanate or to make changes in Caliphate. Caliphate was a question which was of profound interest to the whole Mussulman world.

Grand Vizier foresaw that proceedings at the conference would be most difficult. In their present frame of mind Kemalists would ask for the impossible.

No. 152

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 352 Telegraphic [E 12083/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1922, 7 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegram No. 345 (of November 3rd).[1]

Please see Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 648[2] (of same date).

You should at once inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that our High Commissioner reports the intended departure for Angora on (Monday) November 6th of Signor Maissa clearly in pursuit of the very mission respecting which it would appear that Signor Mussolini has been left in ignorance.

Please urge His Excellency in pursuit of the line of policy which he indicated to you, and of which I have taken note with the utmost satisfaction (intending to recur to the subject more fully later on), to take immediate steps to stop Signor Maissa's departure for Angora.[3]

[1] No. 148. [2] See No. 145, n. 5.

[3] Referring to this telegram, Sir R. Graham reported in his telegram No. 348 of November 5: 'I understand yesterday from Secretary-General [to the Italian Foreign Ministry] that Maissa had already left for Angora. But President of the Council has at once agreed to stop him, and has telegraphed to Constantinople instructing him to remain there pending further orders. His Excellency assured me that no separate negotiations had been contemplated, but quite appreciated false impression which Maissa's mission might create.'

In his telegram No. 686 of November 9, not printed, Sir H. Rumbold reported that the Italian High Commissioner had informed him that M. Maissa had been recalled to Rome.

No. 153

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 406[1] Telegraphic [E 12045/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 4, 1922, 10 p.m.*

Difficult situation has arisen at Constantinople out of Nationalist claim, formulated by Refet Pasha, to instal Kemalist civil administration and

[1] No. 406 to Paris, No. 353 to Rome.

gendarmerie in allied occupied zones under the terms of the Mudania convention. Question has been referred to their governments by the allied High Commissioners.[2]

Now that the authority of the Constantinople government is crumbling it seems difficult to resist Nationalist claim to take over the civil administration in Constantinople, Ismid, Chanak and Gallipoli. In the case of Gallipoli, the Mudania convention actually provides for the replacement of Greek administration and gendarmerie by Turkish throughout Eastern Thrace, which undoubtedly adds weight to the Kemalist claim.

In the view of His Majesty's government, it is however essential that in all four areas the civil administration, with or without gendarmerie, must remain subject to the control of the allied military authorities in occupation of those areas, without which the military occupation specifically recognised in clause 12 of the Mudania convention, would cease to have any meaning.

Please therefore suggest to the government to which you are accredited that they agree to the following as the attitude to be maintained by the allies on this question, and should instruct their civil and military representatives at Constantinople accordingly.

Gallipoli. The installation of Turkish Nationalist administration and of a limited gendarmerie is admitted as a concession, or may, if judged necessary, be allowed as a right deriving from the provision of the Mudania convention, which covers the replacement of Greek by Turkish administration in Eastern Thrace, and from the fact of the recent withdrawal of the Greek administration, which implies to some extent the assimilation of Gallipoli to the rest of Eastern Thrace.

Chanak. Turkish administration is admitted as a right and an existing fact, and a limited gendarmerie is allowed as a concession.

Constantinople and Ismid. The allied Powers claim no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Turkey not affecting any treaty rights. They consequently have no intention of opposing the replacement of the authority of the Central government by that of Angora but the latter cannot be allowed to instal any new gendarmerie since the transfer of authority would cover the already existing police and gendarmerie in these districts.

In all four areas, however, Turkish civil administration, with or without gendarmerie, must remain subject to the control of the allied military authori-

[2] In his telegram No. 647 of November 3, Sir H. Rumbold had reported: 'Allied High Commissioners and Generals met this morning to discuss view of Nationalist government that Mudania convention merely contemplated respect of zones under allied occupation in so far as military troops were concerned but not in respect of civil administration. If this view were accepted Nationalists could introduce their administration into Gallipoli and Ismid zones and ultimately into Constantinople. In Chanak to all intents and purposes they have already done so. View of allied Generals is that while Nationalist administration might be admitted without military objection into Gallipoli provided it be subordinate to allied control, as a concession to practical order, it cannot under convention be yielded as of right. Since admission even as a concession is of nature to prejudice future arrangements as regards Constantinople General Harington requests views of allied governments on political aspect of the question.'

ties who are in occupation of the territory in question and are responsible therefor; this occupation is based upon article 7 of the armistice, and has been admitted, de facto and de jure, by the Angora government by their signature of the Mudania convention.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 538 and Athens No. 345.

No. 154

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 5, 5.30 p.m.)
No. 657 Telegraphic [E 12274/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 5, 1922, 1.20 p.m.*

Private. Urgent

My telegram No. 644[1] and your telegram No. 536.[2]

The first difficulty mentioned by you has been solved by resignation of Constantinople government.[3] Turkey will therefore be represented by delegation from Angora. The Angora delegation includes Hamid Bey.

I am inclined to think now that Kemalists have taken over or are about to take over administration of Constantinople a postponement of conference will be less unwelcome to them. There is further consideration that by the end of this month Kemalists will be firmly installed in Thrace whilst assumption by them of administration at Constantinople will greatly strengthen their position.

I think, however, that Lausanne conference should meet before the end of the month and that my allied colleagues, or at all events my Italian colleague, and I should be authorised to inform Angora government officially that in view of impending election in England[4] and recent change of government in Italy[5] it will be necessary to adjourn meeting of conference for ten days. This notification should be made at once.

[1] See No. 151, n. 1. [2] Of November 4, not printed. [3] See No. 155, below.
[4] See No. 132, n. 2. [5] See No. 145.

No. 155

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 6, 8 a.m.)
No. 658 Telegraphic [E 12097/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 5, 1922, 4.30 p.m.*

Urgent

My telegram No. 655.[1]

In view of reports current since yesterday evening of resignation of Cabinet

[1] Of November 5; this ran: 'Grand Vizier who saw French High Commissioner this afternoon informed the latter that he had sent a telegram to Angora expressing his readiness to resign and asked to whom Constantinople government should hand over.'

and assumption of authority by Refet Pasha I sent Mr. Ryan this morning to ask the Grand Vizier for account of situation.

Grand Vizier said that question of resignation had been discussed at the Palace on November 3rd. Sultan had pointed out impossibility of constituting new government. Cabinet nevertheless decided yesterday afternoon to resign. Sultan directed ministers to carry on current business. Grand Vizier had officially communicated this order to ministers but in these circumstances government could take no action regarding conference and ministers would not hold councils.

Grand Vizier said that Refet had taken no action at Porte. He had gone to Prefecture of City and told Prefecture that he must be re-elected by Municipal Council and that relations with Ministry of Interior should cease. This was accepted and Prefecture was formally re-elected. Refet had told acting Vali of Constantinople that he could carry on but only as incipient of Angora government. Officials generally had been given the option of remaining or taking leave and had been told that Angora government would see to payment of salaries.

He said Sultan had authorized him to contradict all reports of his abdication as he had no intention of deserting his post. Sultan had asked that I should go and see him tomorrow, Monday afternoon. He was willing to receive my French colleague and my Italian colleague also but had not so far decided to invite them.

I am accepting Sultan's invitation and will inform my colleagues this evening.

Grand Vizier made no mention of telegram which French High Commissioner understood him to have sent to Angora.

Refet has stated to press that as only authorized representative of Angora government on the spot he has on his own responsibility taken over administration of Constantinople as from midday on November 4th in order to ensure continuity in working of public services. According to this statement he maintains staff of Municipality and Vilayet of Constantinople but places all other officials en disponibilité without prejudice to their salary rights.

No. 156

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 409[1] *Telegraphic* [*E 12274/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 6, 1922, 3.15 p.m.*

Very urgent

There appear to be great and almost insuperable difficulties in the way of Lausanne conference meeting as proposed on November 13th.

No. 409 to Paris, No. 354 to Rome.

Although the situation at Constantinople has become clearer owing to disappearance of separate government there,[2] position must remain anxious and critical until questions of instalment of Angora civil administration in four zones of Allied occupation and of precise relation of new administration to the Allied military and civil authorities, especially as regards ultimate control over police and gendarmerie have been satisfactorily decided.[3] For the moment it is not clear if Angora are going to observe the Mudania convention, and it seems essential that Peace Conference should not assemble until this and above mentioned points are settled.

Secondly, I learn from Rome that Signor Mussolini on his part would welcome a postponement.[4]

Thirdly, we are placed in some difficulty ourselves owing to the fact that the general elections are fixed for November 15th, and the opening of Parliament by the King for November 23rd. If the present government are returned to power, I shall have to speak in the debate on the address on November 23rd and if I am to represent His Majesty's Government at Lausanne, as seems inevitable, I can hardly leave England until the end of the month.

Fourthly, I have received with satisfaction the clear expression of the views of both Monsieur Poincaré and Signor Mussolini, which I heartily reciprocate, as to the necessity of a united Allied front at Lausanne.[5] But if this is to be secured, some preliminary exchange of views in writing, if not personally, seems essential and November 13th would give us no time for this.

Lastly, in the face of these elements of uncertainty, it is impossible to make definite arrangements for hotel accommodation at Lausanne. Indeed we have not yet heard from the Swiss government as to the building in which the meetings of the conference are to be held, and this decision must to some extent affect the choice of hotel accommodation.

I shall be glad if you will explain these difficulties to M. Poincaré/Signor Mussolini at once, and ask him to agree to a joint notification by the three governments to all the governments who received the original invitation, requesting them to accept a postponement of the date of meeting at Lausanne until near the end of the month, say November 27th.

You should add that I am meanwhile instructing His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople[6] to warn Hamid Bey of this representation in order that Ismet Pasha,[7] who is understood to be leaving

[2] See No. 155. [3] See No. 153.

[4] In his telegram No. 346 of November 4, Sir R. Graham had reported Signor Mussolini as saying that, in view of a Chamber meeting on the same date, November 13 was 'extraordinarily inconvenient' for the opening of the Lausanne Conference.

[5] See No. 148, and No. 160, n. 5, below.

[6] In Foreign Office telegram No. 540 of November 6, not printed.

[7] In his telegram No. 631 of October 28, Sir H. Rumbold had reported Ismet Pasha's election as Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs, and continued: 'He will be almost certainly head of Angora delegation at Conference. This is not reassuring. It portends sabreing at conference. Ismet's attitude at Mudania was most intractable until last day when some concessions were reluctantly made under instructions from Angora. If he goes to

for Lausanne tomorrow, may be informed of the possibility of postponement.[8]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 539.

conference he may attempt to play rôle of Hoffman at Brest-Litovsk. [See J. W. Wheeler-Bennet, *Brest-Litovsk The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938, pp. 111–228 *passim*.]

'His extreme deafness adds to difficulty of discussion.'

[8] In his telegram No. 351 of November 7, Sir R. Graham replied: 'Ministry for Foreign Affairs say that Italian Ambassador, London, has been instructed to inform your Lordship that Italian Government could be ready for meeting of conference on 13th November, but they agree to postponement till 27th November if your Lordship is satisfied that success of conference will not be prejudiced thereby; they are, however, disposed to consider an earlier date, say, 24th or 25th November, preferable if feasible.'

No. 157

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 6, 9.45 p.m.)
No. 665 Telegraphic [E 12131/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 6, 1922, 6.20 p.m.*

Urgent

My telegrams Nos. 660[1] and 661.[2]

Allied High Commissioners sent for Hamid this morning, and told him quite plainly that whilst their governments had neither wish nor intention to interfere in any way with Turkish internal affairs by which we specified change of régime at Constantinople it must clearly be understood that so long as inter-allied occupation of this town lasted, Turkish administration must be subject to allied surveillance. This was necessary for security of allied forces of occupation.

We told Hamid that inter-allied force of occupation was in last resort responsible for order, and that this consequently involved maintenance of certain measures such as control of police, sanitary services, etc. We could

[1] Of November 5. This ran: 'Angora representative here has communicated to three High Commissioners under instructions from his government note [dated November 5] of which following is summary: As result of abolishment of personal sovereignty and of spontaneous desire of the population of Constantinople to place itself under the orders of Grand National Assembly the latter has given necessary instructions for maintenance of order and transaction of public business in Vilayet of Constantinople. Though Nationalist troops will not cross the frontiers laid down at Mudania it is the duty of the government of Grand National Assembly, now virtually established in Constantinople, to maintain order and to introduce therein as in Eastern Thrace its officials and detachments necessary for safety of the town. Grand National Assembly in view of situation arising out of recent events sincerely hope that the Powers will recognize uselessness or even impossibility of further maintenance of allied troops in Constantinople zone.'

[2] This communicated to the Foreign Office the text of another note of November 5 (not printed) from Hamid Bey informing the Allied High Commissioners of naval regulations to be considered in force in Turkish ports.

not admit that there should be any change in this system. These declarations were very categoric and firm.

Hamid, who had in the meanwhile received our replies to two notes mentioned in my telegrams under reference, said that he would at once communicate our statement to him to Angora Foreign Minister, under whose instructions he had handed us notes in question yesterday.

I wish to emphasize fact that my colleagues are working in complete harmony. We take so grave a view of situation that we consider that a united and firm stand at present moment is only way of avoiding one of two alternatives, i.e., an ignominious capitulation to all Turkish demands, or a rupture with Turkey which means war. We think that the two notes delivered to us yesterday were largely in nature of bluff, but measures taken to-day by Kemalist administration and which are described in my immediately following telegram[3] show an insolent defiance of allied authorities here.

We are confident that allied governments will give us most complete support during this critical period, and will show that they are as united as their representatives on the spot.

My colleagues are telegraphing in a similar sense to their governments.

[3] Not printed. See No. 158, below.

No. 158

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 7, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 668 Telegraphic [E 12164/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 7, 1922, 1.30 a.m.*

Very urgent

My telegram 665[1] and my telegram 666.[2]

After having examined situation this evening with Generals, allied High Commissioners decided to address following identic telegram to their governments.

'Initial measures taken by new administration of Constantinople constitute not only serious blow to interests and prestige of allies, but also threaten to stop economic life of town. As result of application of new customs tariff, price of bread and of articles of primary necessity has already doubled. Certain articles indispensable to foreigners are prohibited. Justice between Europeans and Ottomans is suspended. Assumption of control by Turkish authorities over Ottoman police, gendarmes and troops here is a grave danger to safety of allied troops and foreign colony.

[1] No. 157.

[2] Of November 6, not printed. This described the measures taken by the Kemalist administration in Constantinople.

Strong representations will be made tomorrow to Nationalist agent here in name of allied powers. But contingency that these remonstrances will have as little effect as previous ones, must be considered. I fear that series of those measures which are already in force in Anatolia will follow:[3] expulsion or deportation of Ottoman Christians, sequestration of their property, perquisitions in banks, prohibition for foreigners to come here or leave without authorisation, arrests, arbitrary executions, etc., etc.

Allied governments cannot allow a situation of this nature to develop in a zone occupied by their troops and hitherto administered by their representatives without betraying confidence of population and without suffering an irremediable loss of prestige. Moreover normal operations of different services and allied controls can no longer be re-established except under surveillance and immediate protection of allied forces of occupation.

Armed conflict with police, gendarmerie, and 2,000 Turkish garrison troops here may ensue. The necessity for disarming latter [*sic*] must be contemplated.

In agreement with allied Generals, High Commissioners are unanimously of opinion that establishment of a state of siege here is necessary if above measures are to be put into execution. Nevertheless operation is a delicate one and may provoke conflict. Available allied forces here consist only of about eight battalions, two squadrons, an artillery group, tanks, armoured cars and flying machines. Assistance of fleet can also be counted upon.[4]

High Commissioners were unwilling to accept responsibility for such a decision without reference to allied governments. They would be grateful for an immediate reply since every day lost aggravates situation and renders a peaceful solution less probable.

If their suggestion be not approved, High Commissioners consider they are no longer in a position to carry on task assigned to them and request fresh instructions.'[5]

[3] In his telegram No. 669 of November 7, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'Their [the Kemalists'] plan is to present powers at Lausanne conference with a fait accompli and when questions of capitulations and customs régime &c. are raised at conference, to reply that there is no need for discussion of these questions as they have been settled already.'

[4] In his telegram No. 2932 of November 7 to the War Office, General Harington stated that to establish a state of siege would mean withdrawal from Ismid and Chanak, which regions would be occupied by Kemalists, who within a few days could have some 36 to 40 battalions opposite each front and who could, before very long, cross the Bosphorus in considerable force. General Harington went on to say: 'I should be glad of *immediate instructions* as you will realize this means a complete reversal of military policy you have given me and from which I cannot depart until further orders are given me. Meanwhile all necessary plans will be made by Admiral and Generals.'

[5] In his telegram No. 547 of November 7, Lord Curzon replied: 'Your proposals approved. We learn from Paris that French government has already telegraphed instructions to the same effect.'

No. 159

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 9, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 673 Telegraphic [E 12383/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 7, 1922*[1]

Secret

My telegram No. 658.[2]

Sultan gave me an audience yesterday exceeding three and a half hours. He insisted on illegal character of Angora government (? especially) now that lawful government was in state of suspended animation and questioned me as to attitude of powers. I parried his enquiries by pointing out necessity for us of facing fact that only Angora could send representatives to conference and leaving question of legality until later.

He urged importance of allies taking . . .[3] line in Constantinople pending conclusion of peace. I explained present position.

He said that Caliphate was matter of spiritual concern to whole Moslem world and Grand National Assembly could not usurp rights of all Moslems.

He believed attitude of Angora government to be that they dare not depose him but wanted to make him abdicate. He would not do this unless situation became such as to absolve him from obligation, under which he at present felt himself, to guard his trust.

He said his decision must depend largely on attitude of allies in Constantinople. I observed that our principles were clear but that actual course of events could not be foreseen. He accepted this answer and asked whether we could get him away if he decided to leave. He referred to promise given in 1920 to protect his person in the event of imminent personal danger.[4] I said that promise held subject to our ability to carry it out. As regards immediate future, I said I had no doubt we could enable him to leave if necessity arose, but I was dubious as to whether we could do so in all conceivable circumstances even if occupation lasted.

Sultan was composed and did not seem to despair absolutely of reaction in his favour.

Details follow by bag.[5]

[1] The time of despatch is not recorded.
[2] No. 155.
[3] The text is here uncertain.
[4] See Vol. XIII, Nos. 150 and 153.
[5] In Constantinople despatch No. 990 of November 7, not printed.

No. 160

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 414[1] *Telegraphic: by telephone* [*E 12164/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 7, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Urgent

Successive demands made by Angora government or by Kemalist representative at Constantinople for evacuation of allied military and naval forces, Turkish control of police and gendarmerie in capital, closing of Mixed Court, and assumption of complete fiscal and financial independence, have produced a state of affairs in which allies have to decide whether to resist these pretensions, which are in direct violation both of Mudros armistice[2] and of Mudania convention,[3] or to abdicate their position. The former alternative may lead to crisis in Constantinople which, if firmly dealt with, would probably subside. The latter would involve final destruction of allied prestige and early withdrawal of allied forces under conditions of no small humiliation.

The High Commissioners and the allied Generals appear to be acting in closest co-operation, and have addressed identical appeal for support to their respective governments.[4] It seems to His Majesty's Government that this should now be given. We have been willing to make every possible concession to the Angora demands, including the return of their civil administration and gendarmerie to Chanak, Gallipoli, and Ismid areas, subject to allied supervision and control in those areas. We were about to enter Lausanne conference with warmest desire for a fair and reasonable satisfaction of Turkish claims. It is also possible that their larger demands may contain a considerable element of bluff and may mask a design to drive wedge between allies or to test the measure of allied unity.

In any event it seems to us that the case has now arisen to demonstrate that unity, and, in M. Poincaré's own words, quoted in your telegram No. 564,[5] that it is absolutely essential for His Majesty's Government and the French government to preserve a united front on all questions that may arise out of the insupportable demands and attitude of the Turks.

The immediate crisis is at Constantinople, where withdrawals of allied troops would produce grave panic and might lead to a repetition of deplorable scenes at Smyrna. The High Commissioners are unanimously of opinion that establishment of a state of siege in city is necessary, and have reported

[1] No. 414 to Paris, No. 357 to Rome.

[2] See Vol. I, No. 14, n. 6.

[3] See No. 119, n. 1.

[4] No. 158.

[5] Of November 5, not printed. Lord Hardinge had reported in this telegram: 'Monsieur Poincaré added that he contemplated the Near Eastern conference with the utmost apprehension and that it was absolutely essential for His Majesty's Government and the French government to preserve a united front on all questions that might arise, and he expected the difficulties to be very great owing to the demands and attitude of the Turks which had become quite insupportable.'

to their governments that, if this suggestion be not approved, they are no longer in a position to carry on task assigned to them.

I shall be glad if you will see M. Poincaré at once, and ask if we may expect support of French government for action of allied representatives at Constantinople. If once it is realised that allies are absolutely united, and that there is no question of division between them or of isolated action by any one of their number, and further that present Turkish attitude may render peace conference impossible, situation may still be saved. The case is one of extreme urgency.

We have received a telegram from General Harington in which he requests immediate sanction for measures to be taken in accordance with advice of allied generals and High Commissioners.[6]

We cannot give this authority until we know to what extent we may rely upon the co-operation of French/Italian government.

[6] See No. 158, n. 4.

No. 161

Mr. Erskine (Sofia) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 8, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 67 Telegraphic [*E 12289/27/44*]

SOFIA, *November 7, 1922, 9 p.m.*

I have received today note[1] from Bulgarian government of which following is summary:

After thanking for invitation[2] to attend conference, Bulgarian government expressed regret that they are only invited to participate in discussions on Straits, and not [in] those having for object termination of war between Turkey and Greece, fixing frontier between those states and solution of question of Thrace; Turkish victory having created new situation and important problems in which fate of Bulgaria is bound up.

Note then refers to promise under treaty of Neuilly of outlet to sea which still remains unfulfilled, although Bulgarian government have on their side executed all their engagements,[3] and which is closely connected with question of frontier between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. This, and question of return to their homes in Eastern and Western Thrace of over 200,000 refugees now in Bulgaria and involving her in heavy expenditure, are matters which must necessarily be considered at conference; in these circumstances Bulgarian government hope that their point of view cannot but have some

[1] Dated November 6, not printed. A copy of this note was communicated to the Foreign Office in Sofia despatch No. 323 of November 8, not printed.

[2] See No. 130.

[3] As reported in his despatch No. 334 of November 15, not printed, Mr. Erskine pointed out to M. Vaneff, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that 'Bulgaria had made no payments in respect of reparations and had given no indication of any serious intention of doing so'.

interest for Powers, the more so seeing that they have invited to conference Serbia and Roumania who are interested in questions in a much lesser degree.

Bulgarian government, therefore, beg that they may also be heard in regard to the frontier to be established between Turkey and Greece and outlet to Aeg[e]an sea,[4] and they beg His Majesty's Government to put forward this request to French and Italian governments.

Text follows by bag tomorrow.[5]

[4] In Foreign Office telegram No. 50 of October 30th to Sofia, Lord Curzon, referring to the invitation to the Bulgarian Government, had instructed Mr. Erskine as follows: 'You may inform M. Stamboul[i]isky and let it be generally known that no objection will be raised by H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] to Bulgaria being heard at the conference on the question of her outlet to the Aegean. I myself suggested this to M. Poincaré who raised no objection and there is no reason to believe that Italian Government will dissent. It will be well therefore that Bulgarian delegation should be prepared to attend at Lausanne for above purpose, apart from their participation at later stage in discussion on Straits.'

[5] See n. 1.

No. 162

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 7, 8.40 p.m.)
No. 570 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 12232/27/44*]

PARIS, *November 7, 1922*

Your Lordship's telephone message of this evening.[1]

I have seen M. Poincaré who told me that he had this morning approved General Pellé's action for co-operation with his colleagues at Constantinople and had authorised the proclamation of a state of siege if he and his colleagues consider such a step necessary.

As regards the last sentence in the message which I have received, M. Poincaré reserves his view on the ground that it is premature to consider measures to be taken if the state of siege should prove insufficient to establish and maintain order.

M. Poincaré wished me to tell Your Lordship that he considers any delay in the meeting of the conference most dangerous and he is so apprehensive of the result that may ensue that he refuses to assume in any way the responsibility. He told me that he has written me a note[2] which I shall receive shortly, explaining his reasons. I shall not fail to forward it by telephone or telegram as soon as possible. He says that any delay would produce a catastrophe.[3]

[1] No. 160.

[2] See No. 164, n. 2, below.

[3] Referring to this telegram, Lord Hardinge, in an unnumbered telegram of November 7, reported: 'Poincaré mentioned to me tonight that in no case would he embark on a war which he considered it would be very easy to provoke.'

No. 163

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 7, 11.15 p.m.)
No. 571 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 12232/27/44]

PARIS, *November 7, 1922*

Your telegram No. 399.[1]

A note[2] just received gives the following as the views of the French government on the identic telegram of the three High Commissioners.[3]

1. Owing to the dissolution of the Constantinople government[4] which has just taken place the first question namely the help to be furnished to that government no longer arises. Henceforward it will be for the government of the Grand Assembly to provide for the functioning of the public services of Constantinople. The assistance which the Angora government may have to ask for this purpose from the allied Powers will have to be conditioned on recognition by the former of the undertaking and measures previously taken in order to assure the operation of the public services and the economic existence of a region which has never ceased to be a part of the Ottoman state.

On the second point referred to in the High Commissioners' telegram, which in fact relates to the recognition by the Angora government of the treaty convention and acts concluded and put into force by the Constantinople government, French government agree with His Majesty's Government on the necessity of inserting in the future treaty a clause providing for the formal recognition by Turkey of these treaties, acts, and conventions. They consider however that it would be inadvisable to put forward previously to the opening of the Lausanne conference the insertion of this clause as a condition of the opening of the negotiations.

The three governments would be justified in renewing in a formal manner the protest already made by their High Commissioners and insisting on the impossibility of agreeing to the repudiation of engagements and acts based on the necessity of maintaining order and of assuring public services and the economic existence of the capital and of an important part of the Ottoman state.

Finally as regards the guarantees to be given by the three governments for the execution of engagements previously taken by the late government of Constantinople towards institutions, establishments, or private persons, the French government is of opinion that owing to the financial responsibility to which it would expose them the three governments cannot give this guarantee but that as pointed out above they ought after having immediately renewed their protest against the decision of government of Angora

[1] No. 139.

[2] Of November 7, not printed. This note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2607 of November 8, not printed.

[3] See No. 139, n. 2.

[4] See No. 155.

to act in agreement and in the most energetic manner during the negotiations in order to obtain recognition of these engagements.

French government would be glad to learn the form which Your Lordship considers this new protest should take and also what answer Your Lordship proposes to send to the letter[5] from the Angora representative on this subject, which the French government assume you have equally received.

[5] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 164

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 7, 11.30 p.m.)
No. 572 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 12233/27/44*]

PARIS, *November 7, 1922*

My telegram No. 570[1] last paragraph.

Note[2] just received from M. Poincaré states that he was on the point of instructing French Ambassador in London to urge on Your Lordship the cardinal importance of accelerating to the utmost possible extent the step [*sic*] to be taken by the allies for the re-establishment of peace. The uncertainty, as to the actual conditions of peace, which exist at the present moment in Turkish army and amongst Turkish people is causing an excitement which government of Angora seems unable to control and which is likely to develop in spite of the Mudania convention[3] into a resumption of hostilities or at any rate into the taking of steps by the Turks which will result in allied governments being faced by a fait accompli.

M. Poincaré goes on to recall that as long ago as last March he urged His Majesty's Government to agree to a conference being held without delay at Constantinople.[4] If his advice had been followed the last phase of the Turco-Greek conflict might have been avoided and the allies would at all events have secured better peace terms than they will now ever be able to get. He is convinced that every day's delay increases difficulties in way of concluding peace and he fears that the illusions of their rapid victory has [*sic*] given rise in Turkish mind, accompanied by a feeling of mistrust, and they are coming to believe that they will only obtain by force of arms the advantages which they feel now to be within their grasp [*sic*].

Poincaré does not believe by postponing date of meeting of conference that satisfactory relations between allied authorities and Turkish civil authorities in Constantinople will be facilitated nor does he think that question of accommodation at Lausanne can really be regarded as a justifiable reason

[1] No. 162.

[2] Dated November 7. A copy of this note was communicated to the Foreign Office in Paris despatch No. 2605 of November 8, not printed.

[3] See No. 119, n. 1.

[4] Cf. No. 166, below.

for further delay. [I]f however His Majesty's Government and Italian government for reasons special to them feel that they are absolutely unable to send their delegates to Lausanne on 13th Poincaré urged with the utmost insistence that the postponement should be as short as possible and under no circumstances later than 20th. In any case he declined to take any responsibility for effect which news of this postponement may have on Angora government and Turkish public opinion.

Poincaré considers that the best method of calming excitement which this news will produce at Angora would be to sign with as little delay as possible the preliminaries of peace which should include, in a small number of articles, the essential terms of treaty. We should thus obtain an immediate acknowledgment by Turkish government of certain general principles; this would produce a calming effect on Angora government and would enable the elaboration of the definite treaty to proceed at leisure. This procedure to which Mustapha Kemal is believed to have been favourable a short time ago might yet be accepted by him. Poincaré is not blind to difficulties of settling such a preliminary treaty but he is certain of its great advantage and that the earlier sessions of the peace conference should be devoted thereto. Poincaré is anxious to know whether Your Lordship approves and if so what are questions which in Your Lordship's opinion should properly form basis of such a preliminary treaty.

Discussion of these questions would in Poincaré's opinion correspond with proposal originally made by Your Lordship for an exchange of views between our two governments prior to opening of conference.[5]

In a postscript Poincaré adds that he has further considered question since my interview with him this evening (reported in my telegram No. 570) and that he must now insist on maintenance of the date of November 13th and that he cannot admit any postponement even until 20th. The dangerous thing and thing which may well lead to a resumption of hostilities is announcement made to Turks of any delay whatever. If date of November 13th is not changed Turks will have no pretext for not coming to Lausanne and once there on the spot it might be possible if necessary to postpone effective opening of discussion. First essential is to meet Turks in a conference with peace as its objective (réunion pacifique).[6]

[5] Cf. No. 133. Lord Curzon's original suggestion for a conference of technical experts in London was made in Foreign Office telegram No. 384 to Paris, No. 332 to Rome, of October 14, not printed.

[6] The note ran: '. . . Mais l'essentiel est, d'abord, de se rencontrer avec eux dans une réunion pacifique.'

No. 165

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 8, 11.30 p.m.)

No. 149 Telegraphic [E 12365/27/44]

BUCHAREST, *November 8, 1922, 8.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 95 of Nov[ember] 6th.[1]

Following is summary of attitude of Roumanian government to be adopted at Lausanne conference, defined last night by Minister for Foreign Affairs. Despatches[2] on this subject by messenger on Thursday.

1. *Straits.* Freedom should be absolute, not in principle only, but effective and secured as such. Control in the hands of a commission preferably of all interested nations. Liberty of passage secured by stationnaires and even by international contingents stationed at both the Bosphorus and Gallipoli ends. Minister for Foreign Affairs is not entirely favourable to idea that League of Nations should be among those responsible for freedom of the Straits, as it has no organs of execution. He appears to prefer commission of interested nations rather than that of Great Powers only but would not press point.

2. *Capitulations.* If allies decide upon abolishing these Roumanian government would not oppose. If maintenance is preferred Minister for Foreign Affairs would press that smaller nations should be placed on precisely similar footing as Great Powers.

3. *Eastern Thrace.* Minister for Foreign Affairs does not approve Bulgarian desire for autonomy either of Eastern or of Western Thrace. He considers future of Eastern Thrace settled by decision of Great Powers to return it to Turkey. In view however of danger to Roumania of encirclement by former enemies namely Hungary, Germany, Russia, Angora and Turkey and finally Bulgaria, he advocates demilitarised zone between Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria, though recognising that zone would probably only last a few years. It would nevertheless be of great utility.

4. *Western Thrace.* He suggests that it might also be well to separate Turkey in Eastern Thrace from Greece in Western Thrace by prolongation of demilitarised zone along the Maritza to include Dedeagatch whereby Bulgaria's exit to Aegean Sea might be assured. He thinks that entire zone from Black Sea to Aegean Sea might be entrusted to the same Powers controlling the freedom of the Straits. He opposes Bulgarian desire for autonomy for Western Thrace because it would only lead to intrigues and to possible later attempts by Bulgaria to regain possession.

5. *General and Eastern Question.* Roumania desires above all peace and harmony with allies; her chief danger is from Russia, but Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs to make personal

[1] Not printed.

[2] Bucharest despatches Nos. 595, 596, and 597 of November 6, not printed.

suggestion at Warsaw [*sic*] conference of November 30th[3] that Roumania would not improbably be ready to negotiate with Russia and abandon her claim to restitution of gold deposited at Moscow provided that Russia recognises definitely Roumanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and agrees to restore archives and state papers sent to Russia during the war. He hopes that this will show conciliatory attitude of Roumania and improve situation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has no reason to think that Yugoslav government will adopt different attitude, but has not yet heard their views. I informed him that I should report all the above for the information of His Majesty's Government.

[3] The reference is presumably to the disarmament conference of Russia, Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, which was to meet in Moscow on November 30 (see *The Times*, November 2, p. 11, and November 3, p. 13). This conference did not meet until the first week in December (see *The Times*, December 14, p. 11, and *Survey of International Affairs 1920–3*, p. 242).

No. 166

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 417 Telegraphic [E 12233/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 8, 1922, 9.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 572 (of November 7th).[1]

Monsieur Poincaré's recollection of what happened at Paris in March last is at fault. It was I who on last day of meeting suggested conference at Constantinople, which was rejected by Monsieur Poincaré on ground that Angora Turks would decline to attend. I continued to press for meeting at Therapia, Beicos or any suitable place in neighbourhood. Monsieur Poincaré's suggestions were first Brusa which being still in Greek occupation was impossible, and afterwards a French ship at Ismid, which we could not accept.[2]

His Majesty's Government have no desire to urge postponement of Lausanne conference on other grounds than those of public necessity. But information which Monsieur Poincaré has himself now sent to us concerning intended demands amounting to an ultimatum of Turkish delegate to conference as reported by Colonel Mougin,[3] sufficiently demonstrate[s] that it will be useless to enter into such a conference unless allies are agreed beforehand as to the line that they mean to adopt in respect of some at any rate of these demands.

For instance the demand for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, for an indemnity, for the Islands, and for the complete abolition of capitulations, which

[1] No. 164. [2] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 567, 630, 638, 639, and 645.

[3] In his telegram No. 573 of November 8, not printed, Lord Hardinge, at M. Poincaré's request, had communicated to Lord Curzon a telegram from Colonel Mougin at Angora, saying that Ismet Pasha had insisted that the Conference should not be delayed.

concern all the allies are questions upon which we have hitherto believed that the latter were united, and about which they would absolutely refuse to give way. Should this impression be ill-founded and should a disagreement between the allies on any of these points arise at the meeting, upon which the Turks are probably counting, the result would be a break down of the conference and the bankruptcy of the alliance.

It seems therefore indispensable to His Majesty's Government that there should be a preliminary interchange of views and a clear understanding on these and kindred points between the allied ministers before the opening of the Lausanne conference, as was proposed by me in my No. 409 of November 6th.[4] Whether Monsieur Poincaré would prefer to communicate his views in writing or whether it would be possible to arrange for a meeting between Monsieur Poincaré, Signor Mussolini and myself in Paris on the way to Lausanne is open to consideration. But that the conference should not begin without such an understanding seems to His Majesty's Government to be indisputable.

Monsieur Poincaré's suggestion of a preliminary treaty of peace to which the earlier sessions of the Lausanne conference should be devoted does not appear to meet this or the other difficulties involved. For firstly such a treaty must deal in general terms with the question of frontiers, the freedom of the Straits, minorities, capitulations and the debt, the discussions of which would occupy almost as much time as the negotiation of the final treaty itself; and secondly, there would be no guarantee that in such a discussion conducted under the conditions proposed the allies would be found in unison. His Majesty's Government therefore press most earnestly that an opportunity may be found for this preliminary interchange of views, in the manner most convenient to their allies.

On this understanding the date of meeting of conference might be definitely fixed for November 20th.

Repeated to Rome No. 362[5] and Constantinople No. 551.

[4] No. 156.

[5] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 364 of November 8, instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please make communication to Monsieur Mussolini giving substance of above and ask for his views and invite his co-operation.'

No. 167

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 148 Telegraphic [E 12379/27/44]

BELGRADE, *November 8, 1922, 10 p.m.*

My telegram No. 144[1] and my telegram No. 145.[2]

I had an interview with Monsieur Nincic this morning. He said that until it was known what demands Turks would bring forward at conference it was

[1] Of November 5, not printed. [2] Of November 6, not printed.

difficult to define what the attitude of Serb-Croat-Slovene government would be. As regards Western Thrace he was in favour of placing a slip of territory down to Dedeagatch under an international commission like that of Danube which would afford to Bulgaria her economic outlet to sea. This would at any rate provide an internationalised barrier between Turkey and Greece. He let me suppose that Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs[3] had expressed agreement to above, though it does not quite correspond with what I learnt at Greek legation. According to Monsieur Todorov, Monsieur Stambolisky's best friend, such an arrangement is about all latter expects to obtain.

With Greece's present position in Western Thrace confirmed Monsieur Nincic regards question of Eastern Thrace as already settled by note of powers of September 23rd. He is of course in favour of no Turkish military force, save what is necessary to maintain order, being admitted in Europe.

As regards freedom of Straits this government has little knowledge of question and will leave it to Great Powers to provide their scheme for securing it. Serb-Croat-Slovene government are not much interested in capitulations which Serbia had not hitherto enjoyed except as regards her former Austrian subjects, but he would co-operate with Greece in demanding a more efficacious protection of christian minorities than that afforded by recent treaties of peace.

Monsieur Stambolisky is to arrive tomorrow but I do not now expect that his visit will result in any noteworthy modification in views.

[3] Monsieur Politis had visited Belgrade, arriving there on November 5.

No. 168

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 8, 10 p.m.)
No. 577 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 12313/27/44]

PARIS, *November 8, 1922*

Urgent

Monsieur Poincaré has just sent me an urgent letter to say that he has heard from General Pellé that Sir H. Rumbold has informed Ismet Pasha of proposal for adjournment of conference.[1] This news has, as Monsieur Poincaré expected, produced the worst effect and General Pellé fears it may even lead the Turks to refuse to take part in the conference. General Pellé adds that the proclamation of state of siege runs the risk of having the gravest consequences owing to the adjournment of the conference, as the Turks will regard it as being connected therewith. It may precipitate an immediate conflict.

[1] Sir H. Rumbold reported this in his telegram No. 677 of November 8, not printed.

In these circumstances Monsieur Poincaré insists in the most energetic fashion on the date of the 13th being adhered to.[2]

[2] Cf. Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 683 of November 9, which ran: 'Ismet Pasha left this morning for Lausanne with Turkish delegation although I told him quite clearly yesterday that he would probably not find anybody when he got there. His attitude is that as Angora government has received no official notification of adjournment of conference, he ought to be at Lausanne on date originally indicated. He may then enter a protest against non-attendance of allied delegates on November 13th. This action would be designed to (? place) allies in the wrong.'

No. 169

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 419 Telegraphic [E 12395/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 9, 1922, 2.20 p.m.*

Your telephone message of this morning.[1]

The arguments fully set out in my telegram No. 417[2] of last night retain all their force. Moreover Sir H. Rumbold has already explained to Ismet Pasha that conference could not in any case meet before November 20th and has appealed to me most earnestly to accept that date in preference to November 27th.[3] This accordingly I have done.

I have notified this not only to Italian government[4] but to all the governments to whom original invitation was sent.[5]

In these circumstances it is important that you should make communication in accordance with my telegram No. 417 with as little delay as possible. Monsieur Poincaré must be got to understand that this is no question of convenience or even of practicability. I am not going into the conference in order to find myself let down very likely on the first day by the French or the Italians. I must know where I am and whether in face of the Turkish attitude allied solidarity, to which everyone pays lip service, is a reality or a sham.

[1] Mr. Leeper, in a minute of November 9 to Sir E. Crowe, stated: 'Lord Hardinge has just telephoned to ask whether his telephone message sent at 10 o'clock last night [No. 168] had modified in any way the position taken up in F[oreign] O[ffice] tel[egra]m No. 417, sent at 9.45 p.m. [No. 166]. Lord Hardinge wishes again to urge the difficulties that M. Poincaré will make if Nov[ember] 13th is not accepted [and] feels sure that M. Poincaré will make the refusal of this date an excuse for disclaiming all further responsibility.

'Lord Hardinge would be glad if he might be informed by telephone whether, in spite of these considerations, he is to inform M. Poincaré of the views of H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] as contained in tel[egra]m No. 417.'

[2] No. 166.

[3] In his telegram No. 677 of November 8, not printed.

[4] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 91.

[5] In Foreign Office telegram No. 333 to Washington, No. 255 to Moscow, No. 55 to Sofia, No. 84 to Belgrade, No. 33 to Berne, No. 98 to Bucharest, No. 347 to Athens, No. 118 to Tokyo, of November 8, not printed.

No. 170

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 421 Telegraphic: by bag [E 12438/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1922*

Your telegram No. 582.[1]

M. Poincaré's latest suggestion is quite impracticable.

Neither Rumbold nor I can possibly be at Lausanne on November 13th; nor have I any intention of despatching British secretariat to twiddle their thumbs in Switzerland for a week.

An opening meeting with half the nations absent and Great Britain unrepresented followed by an adjournment for a week, would be ridiculous, and is clearly only intended to save M. Poincaré's face. If he dislikes idea of joint preliminary conference at Paris for reasons given by him, I am quite willing that you should put forward suggestion which on whole seems preferable that Barrère[2] should come here after seeing Mussolini, but only on condition that he is in a position to speak for both Italian and French governments, and to come to a clear understanding with me as to the points on which the three Allies intend to stand firm. It will be of no use to talk with him in a tentative way and then to find that he is repudiated by his government. I shall want to know exactly where the Allies mean to stand on each of the main issues, and whether they will or will not see the matter through. Otherwise we shall have a humiliating fiasco.

Repeated to Rome No. 376.

[1] Of November 10. This telegram, which transmitted to Lord Curzon M. Poincaré's views on No. 166, ran: 'M. Poincaré therefore welcomes proposal for a conversation in Paris which must not however assume the character of an official meeting before the conference restricted to certain only of the Allies. To give time for this conversation the first meeting of the conference should still be on the 13th but should be clearly of a formal nature and attended by one plenipotentiary of each power. The secretariat should meanwhile proceed to Lausanne to make the necessary arrangements.'

[2] French Ambassador in Rome, who was a French delegate designate for the Conference. In his telegram No. 357 of November 8 to Lord Curzon, Sir R. Graham had stated: 'I think Your Lordship may feel satisfied with choice of Barrère as French delegate. At time of Mudania (? discussion) he was in private sympathy with our attitude, and I know he told Poincaré at the time that if British forces were attacked by Turks it was imperative that French should give military support.'

No. 171

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 11, 8 a.m.)
No. 363 Telegraphic [E 12478/27/44]

ROME, *November 10, 1922, 9.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 345.[1]

Note from Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that Italian government would have agreed to participate in warning to Angora to put an end to economic blockade of Constantinople government if fall of latter[2] had not rendered such a warning unnecessary.

As regards insertion in peace treaty of clause (? recognising) validity of all financial and administrative acts of Constantinople government Italian government have no objection to co-operating with allies to obtain insertion of such a clause from Ottoman delegates but they consider it would not be prudent to give any guarantee of the kind to interested parties. Such a guarantee is all the less necessary now that idea of allowing Constantinople government to negotiate new (? credits) and collect certain dues under cover of guarantee has come to an end with Constantinople government itself.

[1] No. 139. [2] See No. 155.

No. 172

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Peters (Moscow)
No. 257 Telegraphic [E 12211/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 10, 1922, 10 p.m.*

The French, British and Italian governments have carefully examined the observations formulated by the Russian Soviet government[1] on the subject of the invitation which they addressed to that government on October 26th[2] to be represented in the discussion on the question of the Straits.

The three governments desire to make it clear that they have invited to the conference, which is to assemble at Lausanne to conclude the state of war in the East by the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Turkey, the States which are actually not in a state of definite peace with the latter Power.

They also wish to explain that the representatives which the government of the Soviets has been invited to send in due course to Lausanne will have in the discussion of the question of the Straits the right to participate in the negotiations and in the decisions and will thus be in a position to make known their point of view on the different aspects of this question.

[1] In a Memorandum of November 2, not printed. See No. 138, n. 3.
[2] See Nos. 130 and 138.

The three governments would add that the Russian Soviet government has complete liberty to include in its own delegation the Ukrainian and Georgian delegates in the same manner that representatives of these Republics were included in the Russian Soviet delegation at the Genoa conference.[3]

Repeated to Rome No. 373.

[3] The identic reply here given was initiated as early as October 31 by Lord Curzon (see No. 143), but the final draft, which was communicated to Lord Curzon in Paris despatch No. 2606 of November 7, not printed, and which was accepted by him on November 10 (Foreign Office telegram No. 424 to Paris, not printed), was made by M. Poincaré. In a Note of November 14, not printed, the Italian Government, in accepting the Anglo-French text, added: 'En cette occasion, Monsieur Mussolini désire que le Gouvernement Britannique soit informé qu'il a accepté le project franco-britannique pour éviter toute discussion et divergence entre les Alliés à propos de l'intervention russe à la conférence de Lausanne, mais qu'il doit maintenir toutes ses réserves sur cette question qui a déjà formée l'object d'une claire exposition du poi[n]t de vue italien.' Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 113. Mr. Lindsay minuted on November 17: 'I have not so far been able to trace any exposition of the Italian point of view.'

No. 173

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received November 11, 1.30 p.m.)

No. 693 Telegraphic: by wireless [*E 12488/27/44*]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 10, 1922*

As I am uneasy . . .[1] as to safety of Sultan having regard especially to murder of Ali Mustapha Kemal[2] I informed General Harington officially yesterday that my allied colleagues and I would deplore any violence to Sultan whilst allies were in occupation of this town. I added that I did not think it fair that responsibility of Sultan's safety[3] should devolve especially on British military authorities and I suggested that he should consult allied Generals with a view to provision, if necessary, of an inter-allied guard.

This matter was brought before a meeting of allied High Commissioners and Generals this evening. The latter pointed out difficulties in the way of ensuring absolute safety of the Sultan's life and Italian General dwelt on the size of force which would be required to protect him. I was not at all impressed by his arguments and derived impression that he was not at all willing to share responsibility for protection of Sultan.

[1] The text is here uncertain.

[2] Former Minister of the Interior and editor of anti-nationalist newspaper, 'Peyem Sabah'. His arrest by Turkish authorities was reported in Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams No. 663 of November 6 and No. 675 of November 7, not printed. In his telegram No. 684 of November 9, not printed, Sir H. Rumbold further reported that Ali Kemal had been taken to Ismid where he had been lynched and hanged by the crowd.

[3] See No. 159.

No. 174

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 694 Telegraphic [E 12489/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 11, 1922, 2.55 a.m.*

At a meeting held this afternoon allied generals informed High Commissioners that in their opinion it was very undesirable to proclaim a state of siege[1] (? here) unless allied governments fully realise that this would in all probability lead to an immediate advance of Kemalist forces across the line of demarcation, to meet which, forces considerably in excess of those at present available would be urgently necessary.

I understand that forces at present at Constantinople would in the opinion of allied generals only suffice to declare and maintain a state of siege for a limited period and would be quite inadequate to deal with any other military (? duty). Pending definite (? assurances) from allied Governments that they are prepared to undertake active hostilities (? and) provide necessary means to facilitate [*sic*], generals recommend a temporizing policy.

Generals also point out that the whole administration here might collapse with the introduction of a state of siege and Italian High Commissioner and . . .[2] general in particular considered we might be faced by a strike of necessary services of the town as it would be impossible to find functionaries or labour without a guarantee . . .[2] would be protected after return of Nationalists to Constantinople. I believe this point of view to be greatly exaggerated as it would undoubtedly be possible to find Greek labour. The attitude of Italians was markedly timid and in keeping with small contribution of two battalions which they make towards allied forces of occupation.

I was unable to extract from generals an authoritative expression of opinion as to length of time during which they could maintain a state of siege, pending arrival of reinforcements. There was a suggestion that we could hold out for a fortnight. I understand that despatch of reinforcements to European shore of Bosphorus and Sea of Marmora is not excluded by Mudania agreement.[3] If Kemalists violate that agreement Greeks would presumably be at liberty to re-enter Eastern Thrace and two Greek army corps could be here in a fortnight. The seven allied battalions now in Eastern Thrace could also be recalled.

In my view the declaration of a state of siege can alone prevent situation from getting worse here and from our having to submit to successive demands of Kemalists who will soon have completely undermined our position. But I see difficulties of generals. Kemalists have now twice suggested[4] that we should evacuate Constantinople. When infiltration of Kemalist forces is considered sufficient by them Kemalists may be expected to summon us to leave.

[1] See No. 158.
[2] The text is here uncertain.
[3] See No. 119, n. 1.
[4] See No. 157, n. 1, and No. 160.

A suggestion was (? made) during the meeting that Allies might fix a date by which they would evacuate this town. I refused to endorse this suggestion as being for one thing a violation of allied note of September 23rd.[5] Further reasons against it are that Constantinople is a useful pledge to hold during conference and that a premature evacuation would certainly [be followed] by wholesale atrocities on Christian population and on Turks suspected of hostility to Kemalists.

If French and Italian governments are prepared to purchase peace at any price there is nothing more to be said. But if they are ready to make a stand with us on questions such as capitulations, Western Thrace, The Islands and Straits we must face possibility of conference breaking down and war ensuing. From that point of view allied governments would do well to consider advisability of strengthening their military position here as rapidly as possible. The present situation is deplorable and humiliating to the three Great Powers.

French High Commissioner tells me he has recommended despatch of re-inforcements by his government, if a state of siege is proclaimed. He deplores the fact that French press seems unable or unwilling to grasp situation here and he supposes that it is under the influence of financiers.

[5] See No. 52, n. 3.

No. 175

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 425 Telegraphic [E 12530/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 11, 1922, 12.30 p.m.*

What I fear is that whether I go to Paris on way to Lausanne, or Barrère is instructed to come here,[1] Poincaré will so arrange that the conversation is delayed till the last moment, with a view of throwing upon me the responsibility, should we fail to come to an agreement, of again postponing or even breaking down the Lausanne conference. Is it not worth while putting the case to Poincaré quite plainly and stating that unless France, Italy and ourselves have a prior understanding, it is in my opinion useless to hold the conference at all? Information reached me yesterday evening from what was alleged to be a good source that Poincaré might be willing to come over here for preliminary conversation.

This would appear to be best solution and in view of my four successive visits to Paris,[2] a not unreasonable plan to adopt.

Repeated to Rome No. 385.

[1] See No. 170.

[2] For Paris Conversations of June 18–19, 1921, see Vol. XV, Chap. V; of March 22–26, 1922, see Vol. XVII, Chap. IV; of September 20–24, 1922, see Nos. 41, 42, 48, and 51; and of October 6–7, 1922, see Nos. 106–8.

No. 176

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 11, 11.40 p.m.)
No. 364 Telegraphic [E 12497/27/44]

ROME, *November 11, 1922, 3.40 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegram No. 364.[1]

I have repeatedly pressed for immediate reply. Cabinet met twice yesterday to consider matter, and late last night President of the Council sent a secretary to tell me that answer had been despatched through ambassadors in London and Paris.[2] Italian government considered it would be better to evacuate Constantinople rather than risk expulsion, but that in all other respects a firm line should be adopted.

President of the Council did not see how he could possibly leave Rome before the meeting of the Chamber on November 16th, but is most anxious to meet Your Lordship for preliminary discussion.

[1] See No. 166, n. 5.

[2] This answer was transmitted to the Foreign Office by Signor de Martino in a verbal communication of November 11, not printed. See No. 180, below.

No. 177

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 560 Telegraphic [E 12489/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 11, 1922, 5.45 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegram No. 694 (of November 11th. Imposition of state of siege in Constantinople).[1]

View of His Majesty's Government of the situation is as follows: On November 7th Allied High Commissioner and Generals unanimously agreed to recommend immediate proclamation of a state of siege in Constantinople, and sought approval of their governments, even threatening resignation of High Commissioners if their advice was not accepted.[2] The three governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy at once gave the desired authority:[3] upon which we presumed that action would be taken without delay on the spot. We think that fullest advantage should be taken of this authority, and

[1] No. 174.

[2] See No. 158. Cf. the last sentence of No. 183, below.

[3] See Nos. 160 and 162. In his telegram No. 354 of November 8, Sir R. Graham reported: 'President of the Council has sent instructions to Italian High Commissioner to the effect that only representatives on the spot can judge whether state of siege will accomplish desired results and has given him full discretion in the matter.' See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 82.

of allied accord so happily established. The question of what supplementary action may be required must depend mainly upon what occurs after state of siege has been declared. If the Allies are in agreement as to the first step, they will find difficulty in repudiating the responsibilities that it may entail: and the breaking away of any member of the Alliance will be less easy than it was at Chanak or Ismid. Should either of our Allies however decline to act with us in carrying out the measures demanded by this preliminary accord, then we shall have to decide whether to act independently or to follow their example.

In the meantime we entirely deprecate the fixing of any date for the evacuation of Constantinople. This is a matter for the Lausanne conference, not for the allied representatives at Constantinople.

As regards the military position, British reinforcements cannot be sent from England without mobilisation, which we should be unwilling to undertake unless France and Italy consent to send corresponding number of troops—nor even did we decide upon it, could troops arrive from England in time to influence the local situation that may immediately arise.

Our view is in general accord with yours. His Majesty's Government thinks that certain risks must be run and that Kemalists will in all probability hesitate to force an issue at Constantinople either before Lausanne conference meets or while it is sitting. If they do Mudania convention will have been torn up by them, and either the conference will break down, or Allied Powers will be driven to take joint military action. But we are far more likely to induce Allies to act with us if we allow situation to develop and do not press at this moment for military reinforcements which are almost certain to be refused. If I meet French and Italian ministers or consult personally with their governments before proceeding to Lausanne as I have proposed, I can raise the question of local danger which may have arisen in consequence of state of siege and shall have better chance of being successful then than if I act prematurely now.[4]

Repeated to Paris No. 426 Rome No. 379.

[4] In their telegram No. 91471 of November 11, the War Office instructed General Harington as follows: 'Foreign Office telegram No. 560 of to-day sent to Sir Horace Rumbold by Lord Curzon after consultation with the C.I.G.S. gives views of His Majesty's Government. In close co-operation with Rumbold, as regards imposition of state of siege you will act accordingly.'

No. 178

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 11, 7.50 p.m.)
No. 588 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 12482/27/44*]

PARIS, *November 11, 1922*

Upon receipt this morning of Your Lordship's telegram No. 421,[1] I addressed a note to Poincaré proposing suggestion that M. Barrère should

[1] No. 170.

go to London in order to come to a preliminary understanding with you. He had not received this note when I met him in the train going to Compiègne to attend an official ceremony in connection with the memorial to commemorate signing of armistice.

In President's train I had a discussion for more than an hour with the President of the Republic,[2] M. Poincaré and Count Sforza upon the Near Eastern affairs and the forthcoming conference. I insisted upon absolute necessity of an agreement with the French and Italian governments in order that you might be quite certain of the support which you would get from them on certain questions likely to be raised in the conference to which the Turks will probably be in opposition and how far those governments would be ready to go. I pointed out difficulties of your own position owing to elections not taking place until 15th, and stated my belief that you will not be absolutely sure that the present government is definitely in office until at least the evening of 16th. Consequently it would be materially impossible for either you or Sir H. Rumbold to be at Lausanne on 13th, or for you to have an interview with M. Poincaré in Paris on your way to Lausanne before the 18th, at the very earliest. These views provoked a long discussion in which both President of the Republic and M. Poincaré pressed very hard that the conference should be opened on 13th by a secondary member of the government as your representative and that conference should then be adjourned for a week. In the event of it being impossible to send a member of the government, His Majesty's minister at Berne might be instructed by you to act as your representative at opening meeting when practically no business would be performed except to adjourn to the following week. I pointed out that it was hardly possible to find time to send any member of government from England but I would put forward their suggestion as I was pressed very much to do so by the President of the Republic. I may add that Bompard,[3] 2nd French delegate has been ordered to be in Lausanne on morning of 13th and the Roumanian and Greek governments to my knowledge and probably other governments have been asked by Poincaré to send representatives also by that date. M. Poincaré made a great point of fact that Turkish delegation arriving from the wilds of Asia, would consider it almost an affront that the Western Powers would not come up to time, while they, having travelled more than 1,000 miles would be there at date which had been fixed.

As regards my proposal for Barrère's mission to London, Poincaré objected to it on ground that he could not represent both French and Italian views and that he himself was particularly anxious to discuss the matter with you. He considered that 18th, if you could manage to come on your way to Lausanne, would be a very convenient date for a discussion and Count Sforza added that he was almost certain M. Mussolini would gladly come and meet you and M. Poincaré in Paris on that day.

M. Poincaré remarked to me that having seen views of War Office which

[2] Monsieur Alexandre Millerand.

[3] Monsieur Maurice Bompard, a former French Ambassador to Turkey.

had been communicated to Marshal Foch,[4] he believed that there would be very little disagreement between himself and you although he fully realised that views of War Office did not represent entirely views of His Majesty's Government. As far as I am able to judge, 19th would be equally convenient to M. Poincaré and it is only a night's journey from Paris to Lausanne. Count Sforza emphasised fact that M. Mussolini would, he thought, be willing to come to Paris as a halfway house but not to come as far as London. Since my return from Compiègne I have received your telegram No. 425[5] which I think has been fairly covered by my conversation this afternoon, as I think I made it clear that a conference would be useless without a prior understanding between us and French government. If M. Poincaré's lass proposal is unacceptable I will put forward your suggestion that he should go to London.

[4] In his telegram No. 434 of November 14 to Lord Hardinge, Lord Curzon stated: 'I should like it to be made quite clear to him [M. Poincaré] that His Majesty's Government are in no sense responsible for the paper referred to [see Appendix II], it having never been discussed by Cabinet or approved by me. Nor did I know that War Office had sent over a general to discuss the paper with French military authorities until I read his Report.' The general in question was Major-General J. Burnett-Stuart, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, who saw Marshal Foch and General Weygand in Paris on November 9. A copy of the record of their conversations, not printed, was transmitted to the Foreign Office on November 13 (*E 12868/27/44*). In a minute of that date, Mr. Forbes Adam wrote: 'It is a pity that the War Office representative should have emphasised the desire of His Majesty's Government to withdraw their troops altogether from these areas and also to have announced His Majesty's Government's policy with regard to the Straits, without, of course, knowing what this policy is. On the other hand the French idea of limiting the Turkish forces in Thrace seems a sensible one, though our War Office appear to have shown no great alacrity in welcoming it.' In a letter of November 15 to the War Office, Sir E. Crowe, having pointed out the serious breach of constitutional practice, went on to say: 'More serious still is the fact that the paper communicated to Marshal Foch makes definite proposals concerning important modification of the frontier of Eastern Thrace. Such a question may have a military aspect, but it is in its essence a political one. It is moreover one of the most delicate and contentious questions likely to trouble the forthcoming peace conference, and whilst the Sec[retary] of State for F[oreign] A[ffairs] is not, as at present advised, at all prepared to concur in the suggestions put forward on this point by the War Office, he is likely to find himself seriously handicapped by their having actually gone forward to the French government as the views of our military authorities.'

[5] No. 175.

No. 179

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 11, 8.20 p.m.)
No. 589 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 12484/27/44*]

PARIS, *November 11, 1922*

During course of conversation held in President's railway carriage this afternoon,[1] the Italian ambassador made a proposal under instructions from his government which, I understand, has been probably made to you too.[2]

[1] See No. 178. [2] See No. 176, n. 2 and No. 180, below.

It was to effect that in order to avoid possibility, which seems not unlikely, of the Turks exercising pressure upon Allies during conference which might necessitate their withdrawal owing to the impossibility, recognized by the generals of holding Constantinople against a Turkish advance, the conference should be suspended and the troops withdrawn in order to avoid humiliation of having to withdraw under pressure of the Turks and during the conference.

Both President of the Republic and M. Poincaré replied that such a suggestion was quite unacceptable since it would expose all Europeans and Christians in Constantinople to immediate and serious risk, besides leaving at the mercy of the Turks European property of very great value. I added that it was my conviction that such a proposal would not be acceptable to His Majesty's Government since it would be likely to entail a repetition of massacre at Smyrna followed by destruction of the Christian quarters of Constantinople. I also remarked that to hand over Constantinople to the Turks after the conclusion of the conference and ratification of the treaty, was a very different thing to handing over Constantinople immediately after evacuation by our troops under pressure.

Count Sforza then made a proposal that the question of the evacuation of Constantinople by the allied troops should be left to the discretion of the generals on the spot. M. Poincaré seemed not indisposed to agree to this suggestion but I remarked that I was confident that no government would oppose the generals if they informed their governments that in their opinion the evacuation was necessary and that I did not see question need arise for the present. I promised however to telegraph to you what had passed.

No. 180

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 382 Telegraphic [E 12581/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 11, 1922, 11 p.m.*

My telegram to Sir H. Rumbold No. 560 (of to-day).[1]

Italian Ambassador here has just made a communication[2] to the effect that, since, in the opinion of the allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, it is now impossible to give effect to the measures at first proposed by them[3] and approved by their respective governments, the Italian government considers the only means of escaping without loss of dignity from the intenable position in which the Allies are placed, is to withdraw their troops as rapidly as possible. For the troops could not remain inactive witnesses of the arbitrary acts and methods of the new Turkish administration after the latter had shaken off allied control. Nor could the Lausanne conference very well be assembled whilst the allied troops remained exposed to Turkish

[1] No. 177. [2] See No. 176, n. 2. [3] See No. 158.

pressure, which would in such circumstances be continuously exercised throughout the negotiations.[4]

M. Mussolini therefore proposes to suspend the Lausanne conference pending a meeting to be held between the Allies at the earliest possible date in order to consider the changed situation. Meanwhile he advises that a note should be addressed to the Angora government, of which he submits a draft, protesting against, and throwing upon the Angora government the responsibility for, their departure from the Mudania Convention involved in the demand for the withdrawal of the allied forces from Constantinople, and announcing that in these circumstances the allies have decided to withdraw their troops from Constantinople.

I am replying[5] that our most recent news from Constantinople does not bear out M. Mussolini's account of the advice of the High Commissioners. Your Excellency will see from my telegram above referred to what in our view is the situation, and how we consider that it should be met.

His Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the Italian government will not now withdraw the authority which they have already given to the Commander of the Italian forces at Constantinople to act in accord with his allied colleagues in proclaiming martial law (state of siege), which the three High Commissioners only 4 days ago unanimously and most categorically recommended as the one way of avoiding a great danger. In our view were the Lausanne conference to meet either now or later the position would be intolerable if the Turks had meanwhile in direct violation of the Mudania Convention[6] constrained the allied forces to retire from Constantinople. In such a case it would seem better to abandon the conference altogether. A united allied front in the face of Turkish encroachment can alone, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, now save the situation at Constantinople from becoming one of supreme humiliation for the three allied powers. They are disposed to believe that resolute and united action on the part of the allies will make the Turks hesitate before openly attacking their forces in the districts which the latter occupy in virtue of the armistice of Mudros[7] and clause XII of the Mudania Convention.

Please speak at once in above sense to M. Mussolini.

Repeated to Paris No. 427, and Constantinople No. 564.

[4] In his telegram No. 702 of November 12, Sir H. Rumbold commented on the Italian proposal, which was made also at Constantinople (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 104), as follows: 'Judging by information at their disposal as to present attitude of grand national assembly and Turkish army [that] adjournment of conference might seriously endanger the maintenance of armistice, High Commissioners therefore urgently recommend that conference meet as soon as possible and that definite date be fixed immediately. As regards proposed withdrawal of troops prior to conference there is reason to fear lest such evacuation be interpreted by Turks either as trap with a view to resumption of hostilities later under better conditions or as confession of weakness. This might induce them in the first case to refuse to evacuate and to resume hostilities and in the second contingency to increase their demands.'

[5] In a note of November 12 to Signor de Martino, not printed.

[6] See No. 119, n. 1.

[7] See Vol. I, No. 14, n. 6.

No. 181

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 428 *Telegraphic* [*E* 12485/27/44]

Very Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 12, 1922, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 590 (of November 12th: Allied meeting before Lausanne).[1]

I am very grateful to M. Poincaré for his kind suggestions. They seem however to involve certain drawbacks, affecting both of us though in different ways.

In the first place my conversation with M. Poincaré at Paris would not take place till Saturday[2] and supposing that we could not arrive at an agreement, I should nevertheless find it very difficult to decline to accompany him on Sunday to Lausanne.

Once arrived there, on the very night before the meeting of the conference, it would be additionally difficult for me to withdraw, in the event of a disagreement still being found unhappily to exist between M. Poincaré, Signor Mussolini and myself.

As regards M. Poincaré, this plan has the further drawback of compelling him to make a journey to and from Lausanne, unless indeed he proposes to remain there as chief French plenipotentiary, an idea which I have hitherto understood him not to entertain.

I spoke yesterday with utmost frankness to the French Ambassador here as my record of the conversation which is being sent to you today will show.[3]

[1] Not printed. This transmitted a text of a telegram sent by M. Poincaré to the French Ambassador in London.

[2] i.e. November 18.

[3] In Foreign Office despatch No. 3391 to Paris. This ran: '. . . The date of the 20th had now been definitely fixed and notified to all the States concerned, who were taking measures accordingly. The really important thing was, not the date of the conference, but what was to be done by France and ourselves before it met. I could not, I told the Ambassador, exaggerate the importance, and even the indispensability, of reaching a prior understanding between France and Great Britain, and if possible Italy also, in that interval. Without such an understanding, I was not prepared to enter the conference at all. I could not submit my Government and my country to the humiliation of open disagreement with our principal Allies at the conference table, in the eyes of the Turks and before the face of Europe. I was not prepared, once again, as I had to do on at least three previous occasions, to fight a battle against the French and Italians in combination, and to make concessions, in order to arrive at an Allied agreement which was forgotten or broken as soon as it had been concluded. When we reached Lausanne, either we should have to yield to Turkey all along the field, or there must be a definite understanding under which France, Italy and ourselves undertook to side together and even to break up the conference sooner than yield. Such an understanding could not be secured, as M. Poincaré had suggested, by my calling at the Quai d'Orsay for a conversation of an hour or two with him on my way to Lausanne. Supposing that, in such a case, we failed to come to an agreement: was I to be vested with the sole responsibility of breaking up the conference by returning to England, or was I to proceed to Lausanne with the certainty that on all important points I was going to be deserted by my Allies? No, the conversation and the understanding must both take place under conditions that were free from any such danger. . . . Upon his remarking that the

But I am not sure whether M. Poincaré as yet fully understands how crucial is the position, and how determined are His Majesty's Government that I shall not go to the conference at all until I know that France and ourselves have decided to show a common front on all the main issues. If we do so, Italy will doubtless follow suit.

M. Poincaré's plan does not render this position sufficiently secure. It was for this reason that of my three alternatives[4] I urgently pressed upon Comte de St. Aulaire the suggestion that even at the cost of a Parliamentary absence of two or three days M. Poincaré should be willing to come here on Wednesday or at the latest Thursday. We could then devote one or more days to our conversations, and at the end I should know whether our accord was sufficient to justify me in proceeding to Lausanne. In the latter case I would suggest that Signor Mussolini who has let me know that he could get away from Rome after the 16th[5] might be invited to Paris, where M. Poincaré and I might converse with him on Sunday. I could then proceed alone to Lausanne on Sunday night. M. Poincaré would escape his journey to Switzerland and Signor Mussolini could return to Rome.

I may add that I am also apprehensive that the discussion à trois which M. Poincaré recommends at Lausanne would not be pursued in the most favourable of atmospheres and might give rise to local interpetations which would not facilitate our subsequent labours.

Please make an immediate representation to M. Poincaré in this sense.

Repeated to Rome No. 383 and Constantinople No. 565.

French Government did not propose to send reinforcements to the Turkish capital, I observed that I deprecated more than I could say these constant asseverations on the part of M. Poincaré that, whatever the circumstances might be, nothing would induce him to fire a shot or to send a man. They served only to aggravate the insolence of the Turks and to demonstrate the futility of the Alliance. Circumstances might arise in Constantinople, even during the ensuing week, in which, in a local riot or disturbance, or in the event of a serious attack by the Kemalists upon the Allied forces, the blood of French soldiers might be shed. Was it the French intention that, even in such a case, not a man should be moved or a shot fired? I was unable myself to believe that it was. There was one thing that I hoped Mr. Bonar Law and myself had made absolutely clear: we were doing our best, in the face of considerable risk, to see the matter through together with our Allies in Constantinople; but if, in the event of serious trouble arising, our Allies were not going to stand by us, we should not hesitate to withdraw. We had the ships, and we had the means, and to Gallipoli our troops would go. The discredit, and even shame, of the evacuation would be considerable, but it would not rest with those who had been compelled to withdraw because they were called upon by their Allies to bear the burden and to face the peril alone.'

[4] In his account of this conversation (see n. 3) Lord Curzon stated: '. . . I had myself proposed three alternatives to M. Poincaré. The first was that Signor Mussolini should go to Paris, see M. Poincaré, and then come to London. This might be difficult, owing to the possible inability of the Italian Prime Minister to leave Italy at present. The second alternative was that M. Poincaré should empower M. Barrère, after conversations with the Italian Government, to come to London and make an agreement with me. But as to this there was uncertainty whether M. Poincaré would be willing to invest M. Barrère with the requisite powers. The third, and much the best solution would be that M. Poincaré should do me the honour of coming to London in the middle of next week and having a conversation here.'

[5] See No. 176.

No. 182

Sir G. Grahame[1] *(Brussels) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received November 12, 8.30 p.m.)
No. 96 Telegraphic [E 12529/27/44]

BRUSSELS, *November 12, 1922, 7.18 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 45.[2]

My French and Italian colleagues and I have now made necessary communication to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Delay was due to fact that French ambassador received his instructions some days after my Italian colleague and I received ours.

[1] H.M. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Brussels from August 24, 1920.

[2] Of November 7, not printed. This referred to Foreign Office telegram No. 416 to Paris (No. 358 to Rome) of November 7, which ran: 'Belgian Ambassador has . . . proposed on behalf of his government the following formula: "In view of the importance of the economic and financial interests of Belgium in the East proposals should be made to the Belgian government to send to Lausanne two delegates who would be summoned by the president of the conference at their request to take part in the discussion when financial and economic questions of special interest to Belgium are being studied."'

'Please inform M. Poincaré/S. Mussolini that I am prepared to agree to this formula if he is and suggest that joint instructions to make a communication to the Belgian government in this sense should be sent to allied representatives at Brussels.'

Foreign Office telegram No. 45 to Brussels instructed Sir G. Grahame to act accordingly.

No. 183

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 12, 9 p.m.)
No. 700 Telegraphic [E 12494/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 12, 1922, 7.35 p.m.*

Confidential. Very urgent

Your telegram No. 560.[1]

It is necessary that I should give you a fuller account of meeting between allied High Commissioners and Generals on November 10th as a result of which I sent you my telegram No. 694.[2] Owing to break in cable I made telegram No. 694 as short as possible as it had to be transmitted by wireless and as soon as I realised at meeting that allied Generals had apparently shifted their position with regard to expediency and feasibility of proclaiming a state of siege, I protested and said that it would be difficult for me to explain this to Your Lordship. I added that it was essential for me to know exactly where we stood. I reminded the meeting of tenor of identic telegram from High Commissioners No. 668.[3] This telegram clearly showed that allied

[1] No. 177. [2] No. 174. [3] No. 158.

Generals were in agreement with proposal for a declaration of a state of siege. The telegram had warned allied governments that such a declaration might produce a conflict and it enumerated forces at disposal of allies here. I reproached the Generals vehemently for receding from attitude they had taken up on November 7th. The Generals warmly defended themselves and discussion became very heated. During this time my allied colleagues remained silent.

It transpired further that whereas Your Lordship's assent to our proposal to proclaim a state of siege had been as prompt as it had been unqualified,[4] my colleagues had only received their instructions three days later. Although they did not produce text of their instructions as I had done I gathered that assent of French and Italian governments was somewhat grudging in the sense that High Commissioners were only to proceed to declare a state of siege if it were absolutely necessary.

My allied colleagues were visibly impressed by arguments adduced by Generals against advisability of declaring a state of siege at this juncture and acquiesced in recommending that we should temporize.[5] They were also influenced, as I admit I was myself, by argument that it seemed advisable to avoid . . .[6] of precipitate rupture on eve of conference. In these circumstances I had no alternative but to send my telegram No. 694, much as I regretted impression that . . .[6] knew would be produced on His Majesty's Government by this change of front.

Your Lordship will I am sure recognise allied High Commissioners are bound to rely on advice of their military advisers here. I myself am convinced that in view of present situation at Angora the proclamation of a state of siege which in effect means tightening up of martial law which is at present in force and taking over by Generals of administration of this town would produce an immediate rupture with Kemalists. We know that Kemalist troops at present on Ismid peninsular are short of food and only too ready to come here.

I understand from General Harington that a rupture means that Kemalist[s] would attack both at Chanak and on Ismid front and that they could bring heavy guns to the Bosphorus in eight days. Once Kemalists were established on Bosphorus allied troops could no longer hold Constantinople and would indeed have to embark at a moment's notice. This amongst other things would leave Christian population at mercy of Kemalists. My colleagues whilst admitting that we have already lost face feel that an enforced evacuation of Constantinople in above conditions would entail a further great loss of prestige. Before meeting ended however I warned my colleagues and

[4] See No. 158, n. 5.

[5] In his telegram No. 609 of November 11 to the War Office, General Harington had stated: 'I regret to find myself in disagreement with British High Commissioner who thinks that state of siege should have been declared before now. I have tried holding on and so far succeeded because if conflict once started it might well lead to war and I thought that I would be succeeding in the wishes of His Majesty's Government to avoid this at any rate until we knew whether allied Powers were prepared to mobilize. Our position is certainly humiliating but might be more so if we embarked on use of force and then found ourselves unsupported.'

[6] The text is here uncertain.

allied Generals that we were descending a slippery slope. I considered that as Kemalists' position at Constantinople got stronger allies' position would get weaker and I expressed belief that it was at least an even chance that we should be driven into war with Turkey. I said policy of concessions did not pay with Turks.

I freely admit that these considerations should have been present to minds of allied High Commissioners and Generals when they concurred in recommending on November 7th that a state of siege should be declared. The subsequent examination of the matter led the Generals to conclusions submitted to us on November 10th.

I am sure that Your Lordship will make allowances for the very difficult situation in which allied High Commissioners and Generals find themselves. Throughout this long drawn out crisis which seems to us on the spot never ending the allied High Commissioners have been skating on the thinnest ice. I can only express my personal gratitude to His Majesty's Government for the splendid and ungrudging support which it has given me through you during the whole of this crisis. Finally I would point out with reference to second paragraph of your telegram under reply that it was not intention of High Commissioners to offer their resignations if their advice was not accepted but to suggest that they could not usefully fill the rôle assigned to them and must have fresh instructions.[7]

[7] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his despatch No. 1113 of November 20, not printed, expressed his appreciation of the attitude which Sir H. Rumbold had adopted on this occasion.

No. 184

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 12, 10 p.m.)
No. 701 Telegraphic [E 12495/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 12, 1922, 8.30 p.m.*

Very urgent

Your telegram No. 560[1] and my immediately preceding telegram.[2]

Allied High Commissioners and Generals met this morning to consider situation. I read them first part of your above mentioned telegram down to word 'after a state of siege has been declared'.

French High Commissioner read telegram he had sent after our meeting on November 10th. This telegram was much on the lines of my telegram No. 694.[3] He also read a telegram from French President of the Council stating that French government could not send reinforcements and that we could only count upon French troops actually on the spot. I then made it clear His Majesty's Government could not undertake to send reinforcements unless France and Italy consented to send a corresponding number of troops.

[1] No. 177. [2] No. 183. [3] No. 174.

As no mention was made of Italian reinforcements which presumably will not be forthcoming allied High Commissioners and Generals had to make up their minds to the fact that they were thrown on their present resources. Just prior to meeting I had received a telegram from Smyrna which is being repeated in my telegram No. 698.[4] I read this to meeting. It is clear from this telegram that if we proclaim a state of siege immediately British and probably all other allied subjects will be hostages in the hands of Turks.

In view of above mentioned telegram coupled with military considerations contained in latter part of my immediately preceding telegram and which were developed at length by General Harington allied High Commissioners and Generals decided that they could not afford to precipitate matters by declaring a state of siege and that this measure must be reserved for last extreme.[5]

[4] Of November 12. This ran: 'Following from Vice Consul Smyrna November 11th. Something approaching reign of terror exists here. Evictions of tenants from Greek and Armenian owned houses take place. Aggressive behaviour of military causing extreme apprehension. We have planned surreptitious evacuation of British subjects which could . . . be effected if necessary provided sufficient notice of declaration of state of siege or some such action is given. (? Reprisals) here consequent on such action at Constantinople will certainly prevent free evacuation. Even now British subjects are virtual prisoners.'

[5] Cf. *D.D.I.*(*i*), No. 107. In his telegram No. 2978 to the War Office, drafted on November 12, but despatched on November 13, General Harington stated: 'I have received your 9147 D.D.M.O. & I. [see No. 177, n. 4] and have seen Foreign Office wire to High Commissioner [telegram No. 560, i.e. No. 177]. I wish to say at once that I accept full responsibility for fact that a state of siege has not been instituted. There have been no incidents for last 48 hours and at the same time concessions we have granted have not so far lowered our position or hold on city. In my position I considered it only right to hold position up to commencement of Peace Conference if I could, and as I think is now possible, and I also wanted quite definite assurance that the three powers were prepared to send strong reinforcements. . . . I have met with High Commissioners and Generals this morning and it appeared evident that it was not the intention of either French or Italians to send reinforcements, and from Foriegn Office telegram No. 560 [No. 177] it would appear that in the absence of similar help from Allies mobilization would not be ordered. If it is so desired I can act singly, but, as I have said previously, I think that without strong reinforcements such action would seriously endanger safety of my troops, and might result in my being forced to retire and in Christian population having to be abandoned.'

No. 185

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 369 Telegraphic [E 12555/27/44]

ROME, *November 12, 1922, 10.15 p.m.*

I communicated to President of the Council your reply.[1] French government have also refused to accept Italian proposal on the grounds of effect in Moslem world.[2]

[1] See No. 180, n. 5.

[2] In a personal and most secret telegram of November 12 to Lord Curzon, Sir R. Graham reported: 'I informed French Ambassador this afternoon of my instructions regarding

Signor Mussolini said that there had never been any question of withdrawing authority given to Italian High Commissioner and General to proclaim state of siege if they and their colleagues thought it desirable. Reason for Italian proposal for withdrawal was that allied representatives, after being authorised to proclaim state of siege, had never done so apparently because they felt unable to enforce it. If, as appeared from your telegram,[3] situation in Constantinople had improved or was not so serious as represented by Italian High Commissioner, His Excellency did not press for withdrawal. If, however, situation became so grave that there was danger of allied forces being massacred it would be better to withdraw them before such a thing could happen. Proposal for withdrawal had not signified any weakening in Italy's attitude which remains perfectly solid with that of her allies.

Repeated to Constantinople.

answer to Italian proposal. He then read me a telegram from French President of the Council giving him more general instructions and stating why French Government also disagree with Italian suggestion. In this telegram following passage occurred. "You will bear in mind that in no case can further reinforcements be sent to Near East and General Pellé must do best he can with forces he has." I called French Ambassador's attention to gravity of this statement. He became embarrassed, said that he ought not to have read passage to me and begged no use should be made of it. I feel bound to report statement to Your Lordship but in the circumstances would beg that you should use it only as a piece of personal information and for no other purpose.'

[3] No. 180.

No. 186

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 13, 10 a.m.)
No. 371 Telegraphic [E 12556/27/44]

ROME, *November 12, 1922, 10.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 376.[1]

French ambassador whom I saw this afternoon said that he did not think for a moment that Italian government would authorise him to speak for them and this was confirmed to me later by Secretary General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Latter declared that Italian government were in full accord with Your Lordship in the matter. They had, however, just heard from Paris that conference was postponed to November 20th. In the meantime they had authorised Italian Minister at Berne to attend opening meeting of conference if held tomorrow, as they understood that British Minister had been similarly instructed. I said that I had heard nothing about it and suggested that Italian Minister should only attend if his British colleague did so. Secretary General agreed to send instructions accordingly.

Later in the day I asked President of the Council to tell me if meeting with

[1] No. 170.

Your Lordship and Monsieur Poincaré was arranged, and at which dates his engagements might make it possible for him to attend. President of the Council said that he must be at opening of Chamber on November 16th and nothing but very grave circumstances such as imminent war with Turkey could justify his leaving Rome before November 18th. But he would be available to meet you at any time after that, and was extremely anxious to do so. He did not, however, feel prepared to come to a brief and cursory meeting at which important questions at issue could only be treated superficially and no real agreement reached. He desired thorough and comprehensive discussion of all the problems now facing allies.

No. 187

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 13, 10 p.m.)
No. 372 Telegraphic [E 12586/27/44]

ROME, *November 13, 1922, 2.45 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegram No. 383.[1]

At the risk of repeating myself, may I again impress on Your Lordship that if any value is attached to Italian co-operation, there should be no preliminary meeting between yourself and Monsieur Poincaré at which Italy is not represented.[2] If such a meeting is held and Signor Mussolini is invited to later meeting, he will consider that he is being placed before a fait accompli and either refuse to attend or give a lot of trouble. At present moment I believe attitude of Italian government on the whole question to be satisfactory, far more so than that of France. You might receive useful support from (? His Excellency) but if alienated he could prove awkward opponent. Please bear in mind idea of Italy 'following suit' to decisions taken by France and Great Britain [is] exactly what he is pledged to resist.

[1] No. 181. [2] Cf. *D.D.I.(i)*, No. 108.

No. 188

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 13, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 593 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 12587/27/44]

PARIS, *November 13, 1922*

Late last night I received Your Lordship's telegram No. 428 of yesterday[1] and I called upon M. Poincaré at 9 o'clock this morning.

[1] No. 181.

On entering his room he told me that he was absolutely stupefied at the attitude of the press in England which seemed to be working up to a crisis between England and France, which as far as he knew had no foundation whatever, and that even posters were placarded in London announcing the existence of a crisis. Further in two important journals yesterday the statement was made that the French government were endeavouring to bargain over the Near Eastern question and making their attitude conditional on British concessions on the question of reparations. He said with some heat that he had never contemplated a bargain and that he would be ashamed to propose one. All that he had said had been to express the pious hope that in coming to terms with us over the Near Eastern question, we would equally be able to come to terms with him later over the question of reparations, and he reminded me that, to show his good-will towards the new government in England, he had made a concession in the postponement of the adjudication for the port concession of Tangier.[2] To him it was quite incomprehensible that there should be any question of a crisis as he could see no valid reason for any divergence of views between the two governments in their policy in the Near East which for his part would be based on the agreements of March[3] and September 23rd[4] with a few modifications in the former to suit the development which had since occurred in the situation and to be agreed upon between the two governments.

In determining these, he could foresee no difficulty whatsoever. He considered it very desirable from the point of union between the allies that these reports and rumours in the press of a crisis should cease, for from his point of view he could see none or even any danger of one arising. He was determined to come to an agreement with us and there would be no going back. Everything between the two governments would, either here or at Lausanne, be discussed between the representatives and a common front determined. He regarded this as elementary.

As for your suggestion that he should go to London this week, he regretted very much that it was quite impossible for him to do so owing to the budget debates which commence tomorrow and would be prolonged probably during the whole week. He said that he had no personal feeling in the matter and would be very glad to come to London to meet you if it had been materially possible, but it was not so. Nor did he think that a discussion in London would be desirable since it would be resented at Rome,[5] while a conversation in Paris on your way to Lausanne would be quite natural and not open to misconstruction. Since yesterday he had received a telegram from Mussolini stating that owing to parliamentary exigencies he found he would not be able to come to Paris and he had suggested that there should be a meeting between you and Poincaré and him at Nice. This Poincaré thought out of the question as Nice was not on the road to Lausanne and would make a long détour and the alternative to it seemed to him to be a meeting at Lausanne, but in view of your opinion that the atmosphere at

[2] See Vol. XVII, No. 508.
[3] See Vol. XVII, Chapter IV.
[4] See No. 51.
[5] Cf. No. 187.

Lausanne might not be favourable, he was suggesting to M. Mussolini that the meeting might be at Geneva where this objection would not exist and which would be close to Lausanne.

I read to Poincaré your telegram No. 428 of yesterday. He said he could not understand your fears of disagreement. He considered that if you could be here on Saturday to lunch or dine with him and to discuss matters with him for as many hours in the day as you please, there would be no difficulty whatever in settling every point. If necessary the discussion could be continued in the train and resumed with M. Mussolini at Geneva Sunday night or Monday morning. He has seen the War Office memorandum[6] containing their views on the Near East which had been communicated to the French military authorities with the authority of the Secretary of State for War, and Marshal Foch had expressed to him his general agreement with the views contained therein. I emphasised the fact that it did not follow that the War Office views would be the views of His Majesty's Government, to which M. Poincaré replied that in any case they would form a basis which has already received the approval of the military authorities on both sides of the Channel.

In your interview with the French Ambassador, you had mentioned the questions of the Straits, frontiers, minorities agreement for Thrace, judicial, financial and other questions as those to which you attach importance.

As regards the Straits and frontiers, the French government were ready to accept the War Office views if accepted by His Majesty's Government. The question of minorities might have to be settled on the basis of minorities in Hungary, Bulgaria and in other countries. He did not understand exactly what the views of the Foreign Office might be as to the régime to be applied in Thrace, but he supposed it might mean the demilitarisation of certain districts. This, just as the other judicial, financial and other questions, would be a matter of discussion between the two governments and he felt absolutely convinced that there would be no difficulty in arriving at a complete accord. He emphasised to me that he had his hands perfectly free. He asked me if I could explain your fears and anxiety. I told him quite frankly that what I believed you feared was that when an agreement had been come to between you and him and the Italian government, as to the attitude to be adopted towards the Turks on some particular question, he might under military pressure from the Turks, give way to them and leave us alone and in the lurch. To this he replied that he had already been asked what the attitude of the French troops at Constantinople would be in the event of a Turkish advance and his reply had been that they would answer force by force. Even if it in his opinion was desirable, that the allies should yield to the Turks on any particular point in order to avoid hostilities, he would say so only to you and the Italians, but towards Turks the attitude of France would be solid with allies. He reminded me of the agreement of September 1914 by which the allies pledged themselves not to make a separate peace with the enemy.[7] This was his own handiwork which he as President of Republic

[6] See No. 178. [7] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 108, pp. 365–6.

had forced upon M. Doumerque who was Prime Minister at the time and who had not wished it, and he would adhere strictly to its terms. He was resolved to do his utmost to make a satisfactory peace between allies and Turkey, and though the Turks would be displeased with the attitude of the French government, he would act solidly with Great Britain and Italy.

These are the chief points in the conversation which lasted more than an hour. My feeling is that an end must be put to this situation of mistrust which may have very serious consequences and as it is quite evident that M. Poincaré who, it must be remembered is Prime Minister as well as Minister for Foreign Affairs, is detained here by the debate on the budget which may last the whole week, I do hope it may be possible for you to put an end to this state of tension and to be here on Saturday to discuss informally these questions with him, as I feel fairly certain that you will arrive at a satisfactory agreement, especially as it is in M. Poincaré's own personal interest to do so for a failure would almost certainly bring about his fall. If on Saturday you failed to come to terms, there would be nothing to prevent your returning to London on Sunday.

I should add that criticism in English press has so far done only good and has produced an entire change of atmosphere to our advantage, but if pressed too far it will produce resentment and have the effect of strengthening Poincaré's position. There are already indications of this.

I have just received advance copy of your despatch to me of 11th November[8] and I see no reason to change my opinion.

[8] The reference is presumably to Foreign Office despatch No. 3391 to Paris (see No. 181, nn. 3 and 4).

No. 189

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 430 Telegraphic: by bag [E 12324/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 13, 1922, 4 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 2604 (of November 8th. Armenians and Lausanne Conference).[1]

Please inform Monsieur Poincaré that I am sending reply to Armenian note[2] regarding representation at Lausanne in the sense agreed upon, but that I have kept the words 'which is understood to include' in the last paragraph of the text of my draft, which I prefer to the words 'qui aurait à comprendre' in the French translation. I did not think it necessary to await further for a reply from the Italian government who will doubtless be willing to accept the note upon which we are both agreed, and I am so explaining to Signor Mussolini.[3]

[1] Not printed.
[2] Of October 18, not printed.
[3] Foreign Office telegram No. 388 to Rome, of November 13, not printed.

You should point out to Monsieur Poincaré that the case of Georgia is quite different. We are only admitting the possibility of hearing Armenian representatives at Lausanne should we desire information regarding Armenian minorities in Turkey during the course of the proceedings. The Armenian representatives who may thus be summoned to Lausanne will not be the representatives of the pro-Soviet Armenian Government of the Caucasus, but Armenian national representatives including particularly Turkish Armenians. There is no similar question of Georgian minorities in Turkey at issue.

As regards the Georgian Government my view remains that we recognised Georgia's independence de jure in January, 1921 and of course the then existing government of Georgia as a de jure government.[4] This did not, however, imply that our recognition of that government, as distinct from the independence of the Georgian state, would last longer than the term of that government's power. There seems no reason to suppose that the men who composed it will now ever return to office in Georgia and it is absurd to deal with them now as either the de facto or de jure representatives of that country.

[4] See Vol. XV, No. 8.

No. 190

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 431 Telegraphic: by telephone [E 12587/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 13, 1922, 11.45 p.m.*

Your No. 593.[1]

The press here merely reflects the opinion which is universal in England that unless there is a definite agreement between the three Great Allied Powers before entering the conference at Lausanne, that [unless] they will stand together in resisting the extreme Turkish pretensions which increase daily and are already intolerable, there will be no advantage in holding the conference at all. It cannot be denied that there is much force in this plea, since on every occasion when I have been to Paris, whether in March, September or October of this year, the press has seen a widely advertised agreement which has subsequently either been flouted by the Turks or not adhered to by the allies, with the result of shaking all confidence in the sincerity or power of the alliance, and stimulating the Turks to present fresh and more extravagant demands. The latest illustration of this lack of concord may be seen at Constantinople, where the High Commissioners and the allied Generals have had to abandon the decision to declare a state of siege[2] because the allied powers have not sufficient forces to control the situation that might arise, while the French and Italian Generals announce that their governments refuse to send any more troops. I recall also the repeated

[1] No. 188. [2] See No. 184.

declarations of M. Poincaré at Paris that in no case would the French consent to fire a shot. If the powers then are unable to act together at Constantinople to resist the flagrant breaches of the Mudania convention[3] of which the Turks have already been guilty, why, asks the press, should there be any greater unity or resolution when some fresh action is threatened or taken by the Turks at Lausanne? Perhaps the above remarks may help to explain the attitude which so deeply surprises M. Poincaré.

As regards the substance of his reply, I greatly regret that the parliamentary situation in Paris will prevent M. Poincaré from coming here, since that would have been from every point of view the best solution. On the other hand I welcome his assurance, more than once repeated, that in his opinion there is no divergence between the views of the two governments, and that there will be no difficulty in arriving at a complete accord. Further I note with extreme satisfaction his statement that in the event of a Turkish advance at Constantinople, the French will answer force by force and I earnestly trust that Generals Pellé and Charpy may not only be acquainted with these instructions but may be supplied with the forces with which to render them effective. I also hail with satisfaction the assurance that towards the Turks, in the event of trouble the attitude of France will be solid with the allies.

These assurances relieve His Majesty's Government of a great anxiety and lead them to think that the unity which they have so long and consistently preached may at last be realized and maintained.

The French Ambassador has just called to make the suggestion that I should acquaint M. Poincaré in advance with the points upon which it seems to us that agreement is essential before I proceed to the conference.

Acting upon this suggestion which had already occurred to me, I propose to send to you tomorrow for communication to M. Poincaré, a list of these points, with the views of His Majesty's Government upon them. They will have reference to the agreements already concluded between the allies, to the published demands of the Turks and to the facts of the existing situation.

If M. Poincaré, after consideration of these points, finds it as easy to agree with us upon them as he contemplates, and as I most earnestly hope, I will then come over to Paris on Friday, in order to pursue the discussion with him on Saturday. Should an agreement have been found impossible, I could, as you point out, abstain. In the opposite and I hope more probable case, since it appears that Signor Mussolini cannot now come to Paris, I would then be ready to proceed to Lausanne on Sunday in order that we might have the suggested discussion à trois that night. Though M. Poincaré has been good enough to suggest Geneva to meet my views, I do not think the diversion would be worth undertaking in view of the delay involved, and I should be content to proceed direct to Lausanne.

The main conference could then be opened on Monday[4] morning or afternoon.

[3] See No. 119, n. 1. [4] i.e. November 20.

In the above proposals I have sought to meet M. Poincaré in every possible way while reserving the freedom of action which His Majesty's Government have been bound to claim.

No. 191

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 393 Telegraphic [E 12586/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 14, 1922, 3.35 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 372.[1]

My No. 390[2] of yesterday will have shown that there is no ground for Signor Mussolini's suspicions. No one is more anxious than myself to consult and humour Signor Mussolini in every possible way. But if an Italian Minister is unable, though invited to proceed either to London or Paris, he really cannot make his absence a ground for preventing any conversation between the Foreign Ministers of his allies. If no conversation is ever to take place between the Foreign Ministers of France and England except in the presence of the Italian Foreign Minister, diplomacy will soon become an *extinct* art. I might equally claim that if the French Foreign Minister visited Rome, he should not be allowed to converse with Signor Mussolini unless I were specially summoned from London. The next step will be that I may not see the French Ambassador here except in the presence of the Italian Ambassador. Nearly every conversation now is made the subject of protest or misrepresentation by the Italian government: and I may not even go to Paris without Italy regarding herself as insulted unless she is there also. This is an entirely new departure in diplomacy. If only Signor Mussolini would realise that everyone and not least myself is most anxious to pay all due respect to his country and himself, things would be much easier.[3] This is for your

[1] No. 187.

[2] This ran: 'In the inability of M. Poincaré, owing to parliamentary engagements, to come to London and of Signor Mussolini, for similar reasons, to go to Paris, I have agreed to draw up a list of the points [see No. 193, below] upon which agreement seems to me indispensable with the views of His Majesty's Government in brief upon them. I propose to telegraph this tomorrow both to Paris and to you. Should I learn, as I hope to do, that both the French and Italian governments agree with His Majesty's Government upon them, I then propose to go to Paris at the end of the week and to accompany M. Poincaré to Lausanne on Sunday, arriving there in the evening in time for the suggested conversation with Signor Mussolini.'

[3] In his telegram No. 382 of November 15, Sir R. Graham replied: 'I have made situation quite clear to Signor Mussolini and he understands it perfectly. But he is mainly preoccupied with his own political position in face of very impressionable Italian public opinion. One of the main planks in his platform is that the previous government allowed Italy to be humiliated and dragged in the wake of Great Britain and France whereas with his own advent to power new era has dawned. He fears that his numerous enemies will be only too glad to assert that Italy is still placed in secondary position. Nor are these fears unreasonable in view of recent press articles and intensive French propaganda through Havas Agency and Paris correspondents to show that Italy has only been saved from humiliation at our hands by attitude of French President of the Council. Mussolini is at

general guidance in your conversations. When I have the pleasure of meeting Signor Mussolini at Lausanne I am confident that these unreasonable suspicions will be dissipated.

present dictator of Italy. His foreign policy appears likely to be more satisfactory than that of previous government or than that of France. He seems to be inclined to lean towards us rather than French. His support might be useful to Your Lordship but he could certainly prove very obstructive. In the circumstances an exaggerated regard for his susceptibilities might not be altogether wasted.'

No. 192

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 433 Telegraphic [E 12653/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 14, 1922, 7.15 p.m.*

Your No. 597.[1]

I am sending over by bag tonight the points[2] which I desire to submit to M. Poincaré, upon which it appears to me, in some cases essential, in other cases most desirable, that an agreement should be arrived at between the principal Allied Powers before we proceed to Lausanne. The former can be briefly stated and scarcely call for explanation, being based upon agreements already arrived at by the allies and embodied in documents signed by them. In case M. Poincaré should desire any explanation upon the items in the second category which will call for closer examination, I am sending over Forbes Adam tonight, to supply it.

Any discussion of these points, unless they be accepted without discussion by M. Poincaré, should be reserved for my conversation with him on Saturday; and my proposal is merely that Forbes Adam should attend at the Quai d'Orsay for the limited purpose above described. I shall hope to receive from you by tomorrow night sufficient assurances on the points in both categories and particularly in the first, to justify me in asking the Cabinet on Friday morning to authorise my departure for Paris on that afternoon.

M. Poincaré is mistaken in his reference to paragraph 11 of article III of Mudania convention.[3] This only precludes allies from sending reinforcements to Chanak and Ismid, and there is nothing in the convention to prevent

[1] Of November 14, not printed. In this telegram Lord Hardinge reported that he had communicated to M. Poincaré the substance of No. 190.

[2] The points were telegraphed to Rome the same evening (see No. 193, below).

[3] In his telegram under reference, Lord Hardinge had stated: 'There is one point in your telegram to which I would draw attention. You refer to the inadequacy of the French and Italian contingents and to the announcements by the French and Italian Generals that their governments refuse to send any more troops.... According to paragraph 11 of article 3 of Mudania convention, the allied Generals undertake not to increase the number of their troops. In giving to M. Poincaré the substance of that portion of your telegram, he at once fixed upon this point and remarked that to send reinforcements was a violation of the convention and that this was therefore out of the question.'

such reinforcements from being sent to Gallipoli and Constantinople either for local defence or to cross Straits, if Turks violate Mudania convention lines in Asia.

M. Poincaré therefore can claim no justification in terms of Mudania convention for his refusal to send more troops to Constantinople. Moreover Turks have themselves already been guilty of gross violation of that convention in demanding allied evacuation of Constantinople and Straits, and in steady infiltration of officers and men into European areas, either as gendarmerie or in disguise.

My fear as regards Constantinople position is that threat of military action there may be used by Turks at any moment in conference as a lever to secure compliance with their demands; and that presence of adequate allied forces is sole effective protection against this menace.

No. 193

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
*Nos. 394 and 395 Telegraphic [E 12653/27/44]**

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 14, 1922*

I am communicating to French Government the following document[1] regarding revised treaty with Turks. It is in two parts, of which (A) represents the points of cardinal importance on which His Majesty's Government must have an absolute assurance of their allies' support, without which assurance I shall not feel justified in entering the conference.

(B) represents various points on which agreement is most desirable, but which nevertheless admit of discussion.

CATEGORY (A).—('ESSENTIAL.')

I. *Western Thrace.*—Adherence to the understanding arrived at in the March discussions that the position in Western Thrace shall not be altered, and that the Turkish demands for a plebescite shall be refused.

II. *Frontier of Western Thrace* to be the frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria under the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of September 1915.[2]

(This agreement may be subject to possible creation of a neutral zone to provide railway access for Bulgaria to the Ægean.)

III. *Freedom of the Straits.*—This principle is accepted by all the Allies (*vide* note of the 23rd September).[3] The actual manner in which it is to be applied remains for discussion. The Allied Governments should maintain a firm accord as to the demilitarisation of certain zones on the Dardanelles, Marmora and Bosphorus and as to the inspection of these areas under conditions to be determined.

[1] This document was taken to Paris by Mr. Forbes Adam (see No. 192).
[2] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 109, pp. 882–3.
[3] See No. 52, n. 3.

IV. *Capitulations.*—Adherence to the March resolutions[4] with certain modifications which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to suggest to their allies.

V. *The Islands in the Ægean.*—To be ceded by Turkey to the Allies, to be disposed of in the manner agreed to by the latter.

VI. *Frontiers of Syria and Irak.*—To be maintained except in so far as the mandatory Powers may be disposed to consider or to propose local rectification.

VII. *Mandated Territories in Syria, Irak and Palestine.*—No change to be admitted.

VIII. *Allied Graves.*—The Allies to insist upon a transfer of the ownership of the soil to them.

IX. *Indemnites.*—A Turkish indemnity to be demanded as proposed in the March resolutions. The exact figure to be determined by agreement between the Allies.

The Turkish demand for an indemnity from Greece to be refused.

X. *The Mudania Convention.*[5]—To be strictly enforced, and all Turkish violations of it to be firmly resisted.

XI. *Constantinople Position.*—No withdrawal of Allied troops until ratification of the new treaty with Turkey (September note).[3]

CATEGORY (B).—('MOST DESIRABLE.')

I. *Protection of Minorities.*—As regards minorities in Asia, adherence so far as is still possible to resolutions of March, and as regards minorities in Europe strict adherence to terms of September agreement.[6]

II. *Turkish Military Forces.*—General adherence to terms of March resolutions. If a relaxation of these is conceded, this should not apply to the Turkish army in Europe, which should be strictly limited in numbers.

III. *Financial Clauses.*—These should remain for discussion between the Allied experts.

IV. *Economic Clauses.*—Insistence upon recognition by Turkish Government of Allied pre-war concessions, and annulment of Turkish repudiation of contracts since the armistice.[7] The methods to be discussed by the Allied experts.[8]

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 570. [5] See No. 119, n. 1. [6] See Nos. 12, 24, and 31.
[7] See No. 139 and No. 163. [8] See No. 196, below.

No. 194

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation[1] *with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires*
[*E 12866/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 14, 1922*

The Italian Chargé d'Affaires called upon me to-day, in order, as he announced, to convey an important message from Signor Mussolini. The

[1] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 114.

communication turned out to be that already reported by Sir Ronald Graham, in his telegram No. 374,[2] that the Marquis della Torretta[3] was being sent to London in order to take part in the conversations with M. Poincaré in London. I told Signor Preziosi that this communication from Signor Mussolini had crossed a telegram which Lord Curzon had sent to Rome last night,[4] explaining that M. Poincaré had declared himself unable to come to London and that, in consequence, a meeting between Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré was in contemplation at Paris, provided that a satisfactory understanding of a general kind could be arrived at beforehand respecting the particular points on which the British Government thought it necessary that the allies should present a united front to the Turks at Lausanne.

Signor Preziosi asked what, in these circumstances, he had better do. I said I could hardly advise him on that point. I could only say that, if and when the Marquis della Torretta arrived here, he would not find M. Poincaré. Nor could I gather whether Signor Mussolini had now definitely abandoned the idea of meeting M. Poincaré at Lausanne, a proposal to which the latter appeared still to adhere. Signor Preziosi said he would suggest to his Government that the Marquis della Torretta might be stopped at Paris, and should wait there until Lord Curzon's arrival; but, of course, he could say nothing as to whether this suggestion would be approved at Rome.[5]

[2] Of November 13, not printed.

[3] Marquis della Torretta had been appointed Italian Ambassador in London in succession to M. de Martino. He had his first conversation with Lord Curzon on November 16 (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 125).

[4] Foreign Office telegram No. 390 (see No. 191, n. 2).

[5] Lord Curzon commented on November 14: 'I greatly regret this. (1) I would have let Torretta come here [and] dangle his legs. (2) I would never have mentioned that I was going to Paris to talk to Poincaré (except on the journey to Lausanne). (3) The last thing I want is Torretta at Paris where apparently I shall be landed with him.'

No. 195

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 15, 2.30 p.m.)
No. 599 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 12743/27/44*]

PARIS, *November 15, 1922*

I sent M. Poincaré at 9 o'clock this morning your memorandum containing views of His Majesty's Government on the points to be discussed at Near East conference.[1] I have just seen him on his leaving a sitting of the Chamber at noon.

He has carefully studied this memorandum and he asked me to say that he sees no grounds for any serious divergence anywhere and that although he will have observations to make to you on some of the points, he can assure you that he will be able to maintain with you a united front before the Turks.

[1] See Nos. 192 and 193.

If he has views on certain points as to the force of which he is unable to convince you, he will nevertheless give way and be with you in front of the Turks. He is determined that there shall be complete accord and he anticipates no difficulty whatever at it in discussion with you. He asks me to say that he invites you to luncheon on Saturday and will devote the whole afternoon to discussion with you and will start on Sunday with you to Lausanne.

I have told M. Poincaré that it is most important that there should be no leakage in connection with the points under discussion. He agreed and assured me he would take every precaution on his side but he remarked that in the account telegraphed over to him from London of the contents of this morning's papers there were indications that the press had obtained information somewhere of the contents of the memorandum.[2]

[2] Lord Curzon replied, in his telegram No. 436 of November 15: '. . . my memorandum which was written by myself was not completed and handed to Forbes Adam [see No. 193, n. 1] until 7.30 p.m., and no press correspondent was seen at the Foreign Office after that hour.'

No. 196

Lord Hardinge (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 16, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 600 Telegraphic: by bag [E 12745/27/44]

PARIS, *November 15, 1922*

In accordance with your instructions[1] I arranged with Monsieur Poincaré that Mr. Forbes Adam should attend at the Quai d'Orsay to furnish any explanations which Monsieur Poincaré might desire regarding your memorandum. Mr. Forbes Adam saw Monsieur Peretti this afternoon. Following points seem worth recording:—

1. *Western Thrace.*

Monsieur Peretti said that if the Turks raised this question, the allies should definitely refuse to discuss it.

2. *Frontier of Western Thrace.*

Monsieur Peretti, who seemed unfamiliar with the terms of the Bulgaro-Turkish agreement of 1915,[2] said that Monsieur Poincaré only felt doubt as to whether the question of Karagatch and of the Forts of Adrianople on the right bank of the Maritza was of sufficient importance to warrant allied intransigence if the Turks pressed for them as a necessary defence for Adrianople and Eastern Thrace. He asked what was the precise frontier of the 1915 convention and whether Monsieur Poincaré was right in supposing that you only proposed a neutral zone for the Turkish side of the Maritza. Mr. Forbes Adam explained the detailed tracé of the convention by which Turkey had voluntarily surrendered Karagatch and that your proposal related to the

[1] See No. 192. [2] See No. 193, n. 2.

possible creation of a neutral zone comprising a strip of territory on both the Greek and Turkish sides of the Maritza, and perhaps up the Tunja to the Bulgarian frontier, thus meeting any Turkish argument as to the defence of Adrianople. Monsieur Peretti said that he would explain this to Monsieur Poincaré.

3. *Straits.*

Accepted without comment.

4. *Capitulations.*

Monsieur Peretti asked whether he could be given some idea of the modications which we might suggest. Mr. Forbes Adam gave him informally a copy of the text of the first five articles in the draft revise of the economic clauses of November 3rd,[3] explaining that this had been worked out by the experts as a basis for allied discussion but not formally approved by you. Monsieur Peretti said that this seemed to be more or less what the French Foreign Office and Ministry of Commerce had in mind. Opinion in France was very strong on this point and whatever concessions might be made to the Turks in form as regards abolishing the judicial and fiscal capitulations, in substance they must be maintained at any rate for some time to come. As regards the future eventual mixed or unified system Monsieur Peretti volunteered that the French were thinking of the possibility of a majority of foreign judges sitting as nominally Turkish judges to try mixed civil and criminal cases.

5. *Islands of the Aegean.*

Monsieur Peretti said that Monsieur Poincaré was uncertain to which Islands you referred. Mr. Forbes Adam explained that they were those dealt with in articles 84 and 132 of the Treaty of Sèvres. Monsieur Peretti said that their cession by Turkey was of course essential on the ground of their ethnical character, if for no other.

6, 7, and 8. *Frontier of Syria and Iraq. Mandated territory in Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Allied Graves.*

Accepted without comment.

I may here add that Monsieur Poincaré mentioned incidentally this morning that as to the question of Mosul he regarded it as a point of honour to support His Majesty's Government.

9. *Indemnities.*

Monsieur Peretti asked if this meant a demand for the payment of the costs of occupation or for reparations for war damages to civilians and their property. Mr. Forbes Adam explained that this was a matter which you would discuss but that what you mainly had in mind was the latter. Monsieur Peretti explained that if so, the French government were entirely at one with His Majesty's Government. The French unsifted claims amounted to over a milliard francs and there was a strong group in the Chamber who wanted payment by the Turks. The amount of the reparations which could now be obtained and the modalities were matters, of course, for discussion.

[3] Not printed. This redraft of the economic clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres [E 12050/10102/44] was transmitted to the Foreign Office by the Treasury on November 4.

As regards the Turkish demand for reparations by Greece the French government thought that it would be difficult to refuse to allow the Turks to put forward a claim for the damage done by the Greeks since they began fighting on their own responsibility, say March 1921, but that the Greeks would have a legitimate counter-claim for the previous years which might cancel out Turkish claim. Even if there were a paper balance against Greece, it could be cancelled by such part of the allies' claims against Turkey as they would perforce have now to forgo owing to the impossibility of obtaining large payments from Turkey.

Monsieur Peretti added that France might have to press the claim of some French nationals against Greece for damage to their property by the Greeks since March 1921 in the Smyrna area.

10. *Mudania Convention.*[4] Accepted without comment except that Monsieur Peretti volunteered that Monsieur Poincaré had recently misinterpreted article 3, paragraph 11 of the convention. Monsieur Peretti had at once pointed out to him that the convention did not prevent allied reinforcements going to Gallipoli and Constantinople.[5]

11. *Constantinople position.* Accepted without comment.

CATEGORY B.

1. *Protection of Minorities.* Accepted without comment, except that Monsieur Peretti said that the French government were still hopeful as to the possibilities of an exchange of population under the treaty since their information was that Nansen[6] had not been tactful in conducting his now abortive negotiations with Angora and that he was much disliked by the Turks.

2. *Turkish Military Forces.* Monsieur Peretti remarked that the French Foreign [Ministry] thought that it might be a good thing to try and demilitarise the whole of Eastern Thrace. Otherwise no comment.

3. and 4. *Financial and Economic Clauses.* No comment, except that Monsieur Peretti emphasised that the interest of France in obtaining economic safeguards from Turkey, as regards existing concessions etc., was even greater than Great Britain's.

Monsieur Peretti remarked incidentally that the French Foreign [Ministry] were very sceptical as to the genuineness of the seven Turkish claims[7] recently reported by Colonel Mougin.[8] Apparently he was merely reporting rumours picked up in conversation and from the Angora press.

[4] See No. 119, n. 1. [5] Cf. No. 192. [6] See No. 44, n. 1.

[7] These were: 'les territoires fixés par le Pacte National, comprenant Mossoul; plébiscite en Thrace Occidentale; rectification de la frontière de la Syrie; autonomie des Îles; indemnité pour réparation six milliards de francs or; indépendance ratifiée; aucune capitulation.'

[8] See No. 166.

No. 197

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 437 Telegraphic [E 12825/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 16, 1922, 2.5 p.m.*

Very urgent

Military situation in Constantinople as reported by General Harington[1] is extremely serious, and allied unity of action is as essential there as it is at Lausanne. Otherwise allies may be confronted with disastrous panic, if not worse, and may be compelled to evacuate under conditions of extreme humiliation which would not only prejudice but might entirely wreck peace conference in its opening stages. I propose therefore to bring over General Burnett-Stuart[2] with me tomorrow and shall be glad if you can arrange a

[1] In his telegram No. 3000 of November 16 to the War Office, General Harington had stated: 'I am unfortunately and much against my will fettered in Constantinople by presence of 500,000 Christians who are very frightened and if British withdraw, panic will result. Owing to demands of Kemalists and attitude adopted by them in Constantinople centre of gravity has moved here. If I could I would gladly get out, and consider only way to avoid humiliation unless all allies are prepared to reinforce strongly, is to fix date for allied evacuation far enough ahead to allow previous removal of Christians. Admiral considers that until Constantinople is evacuated, Chanak should be held, but it is agreed by allied generals that our present Chanak position does not really safeguard Straits. I cannot against serious opposition hold Constantinople and Scutari and also hold Chanak, especially as I have troops detached in Thrace till November 30th. Constantinople has become of such importance that I can not hope to do more than hold Chanak as an outpost.'

[2] See No. 178, n. 4. General Burnett-Stuart was furnished with the following War Office Memorandum of November 17, a copy of which was sent to Lord Curzon.

'1. *The existing situation.* Our policy must be to maintain the present state of affairs as long as Allied unity remains unbroken and it is possible and safe to do so. General Harington has his orders to this effect. These orders give him a free hand, and authorise him to evacuate Constantinople and transfer his forces by sea to Gallipoli and Chanak if the situation on the Bosphorus becomes militarily impossible to maintain. The decision for taking this extreme step is left to his judgement.

'2. *The situatiot if the Turks continue to observe the Mudania convention and to behave reasonably.* The General Staff in these circumstances would be prepared to agree to the evacuation of Constantinople on a date to be fixed without waiting for the end of the Lausanne Conference. The troops would retire to Gallipoli and the date should allow of time for such Christians as wish to leave Constantinople to get away before the troops leave.

'3. *The situation if during the conference the Turks break the Mudania agreement, repudiate allied control in Constantinople, and force the allied troops to leave.* In this case the Allied troops will rally at Gallipoli and Chanak as already arranged. Those which are engaged in the handing over of Eastern Thrace (till November 30th) would also be withdrawn to Gallipoli in order that whatever subsequent steps it may be decided to take shall not be hampered by these detachments. As soon as the concentration on Gallipoli is complete it will have to be decided whether the Allies will undertake an active campaign against Turkey or not.

'In the above circumstances a state of war will automatically have risen, and whether the Allies decide to embark on an offensive campaign or not, Gallipoli and the Dardanelles must be held until a settlement is arrived at; or, if it is decided to leave Turkey alone, until the stores now accumulated can be evacuated. In the former case, which implies a continuance of military pressure and free access to the Sea of Marmora, Allied reinforcements to the extent of three or four Divisions would be required to reinforce or re-occupy the

conversation with M. Poincaré and Marshal Foch on Saturday morning in order that we may arrive at a discision on this subject before we proceed to discuss the points raised in my memorandum[3] on Saturday afternoon.

Asiatic shore. In the second case, the Allied troops now in the Near East would probably suffice to cover the final evacuation. If, however, it is decided to engage on an active campaign against Turkey the General Staff are of the opinion:

(i) That the objective must be limited to the expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the securing of the Straits.
(ii) That the Allied forces required for its successful prosecution would be about 15 Divisions.
(iii) That no such campaign could be started before the late Spring of next year.
(iv) That an immediate necessity would be the despatch of sufficient reinforcements to secure the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles—i.e. 3 or 4 Allied Divisions.
(v) That the General Staff would be prepared to accept a Frenchman as the Allied Commander-in-Chief for such a war.

'Such a campaign would entail a strong military occupation of the Straits for an indefinite time after it is over.'

[3] See No. 193.

No. 198

Mr. Henderson[1] *(Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received November 16, 7 p.m.)
No. 714 Telegraphic [E 12805/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 16, 1922, 4.40 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[2]

Note of Angora government while civilly worded and no longer suggesting withdrawal of troops leaves matters where they were in so far as it insists on complete liberty of action in respect of all civil administration and only admits discussion on points affecting safety of allied troops.

Situation is therefore as follows:

Allied High Commissioners have formally protested against measures already introduced as reported in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 666[3]

[1] Mr. N. M. Henderson, First Secretary at H.M. Embassy in Constantinople from October 1920, acted as Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of Sir H. Rumbold who was attending the Lausanne Conference.

[2] No. 713 of November 16. This reported the receipt of the Angora Government's answer, dated November 12 (not printed), to the joint Allied Notes respecting the withdrawal of allied forces and the changes made by the Nationalists in the administration of Constantinople (see Nos. 157 and 158). The telegram continued: 'Note explains that Grand National Assembly, while ready to admit presence of allied troops within limits fixed at Mudania and to discuss measures affecting safety of allied troops, had requested withdrawal of those troops in order that responsibility of maintenance of law and order in Constantinople having been assumed by Grand National Assembly, control exercised by allied troops over internal administration should cease. In this connection Angora answer takes note of statement made in the communication addressed by allied generals to Refet Pasha, that High Commissioners had no objection to form of administration set up by Grand National Assembly in Constantinople.'

[3] See No. 158, n. 2.

which modify civil administration as exercised by allies until fall of central government. These measures have not been withdrawn and it is certain that further measures of same category will be introduced. It is almost equally certain that French and Italian governments will not be prepared to resort to forcible action to prevent these further encroachments, at any rate provided they do not endanger safety of troops.

Issue at present is therefore military i.e. whether or not allied control of services such as police and gendarmerie which are essential to safety of allied forces is to be maintained. Decisions of allied generals in respect of police were communicated yesterday to Refet Pasha who has declared his intention of re-discussing question with the generals.

If modus vivendi acceptable to generals can be reached, situation here will drag on until conference meets and has had time to discuss it. But in the meantime if force be excluded in non-military issues undermining of forces will continue, and Nationalists will gradually acquire absolute control of civil administration. Ultimate result of this in . . .[4] may be to render military position untenable. If however process be really gradual situation here can possibly be prolonged until conference has had time to fix date for evacuation of Constantinople.[5]

Repeated to Athens No. 248.

[4] The text is here uncertain.

[5] In his telegram No. 717 of November 16, Mr. Henderson explained: 'I have raised this point because I consider unless forcible action is to be taken soon and jointly with our allies, situation here will be such that instead of holding Constantinople as a pledge we shall ourselves be in the position of hostages.'

No. 199

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris)
No. 3426 [E 12655/10102/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 16, 1922*

My Lord,

I request your Excellency to make the following communication to the French Government:

'His Majesty's Government have learnt[1] that the Egyptian Government desire to participate in the conference at Lausanne, whilst the revision of articles 101 to 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres is under consideration. Though no formal agreement has been concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government in regard to the nature of such revision, which is rendered necessary by the fact that Egypt is now an independent

[1] From Cairo telegram No. 348 of October 11, not printed.

sovereign State,[2] His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that the Egyptian Government are willing to agree to provisions acceptable to the allies and less cumbrous than the original articles,[3] and to sign a protocol of accession to the peace treaty on its conclusion.

'In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government will join with them in addressing a formal invitation to the Egyptian Government to send to Lausanne duly accredited representatives who will participate in the proceedings of the conference when matters dealt with in articles of the Treaty of Sèvres affecting Egypt are under discussion.

'A similar communication is being addressed to the Italian Government by His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.'

2. For your private information, I may say that negotiations have been proceeding between His Majesty's High Commissioner and the Egyptian Government during the last four weeks[4] in regard to the revision of the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres referred to in the above communication.

3. As a result of these negotiations, a general measure of agreement has been arrived at, and I transmit herewith the provisional text[5] of the clauses which it is now suggested should be substituted for articles 101 to 114 of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Egyptian Government have signified their acceptance of the text of articles A,[6] B and D.[7] Article C, being designed to exclude Egypt from the category of territory detached from Turkey which is burdened with a proportional share of the Ottoman public debt, is unlikely to meet with Egyptian opposition.

4. As regards article E, the Egyptian Government have shown no disposition to repudiate their obligation to continue meeting the service of the loans secured on the Egyptian tribute, but they are anxious to make it clear that henceforth such payments are no longer in the nature of a tribute payable by a vassal State. The text, therefore, of this article is entirely provisional, and is liable to considerable modification.

5. As regards article F, the Egyptian Government are understood to accept the principle of accession to the Turkish Peace Treaty by a protocol, and this article provides the machinery whereby this accession may be achieved.

[2] See No. 130, n. 5.

[3] This was reported in Cairo telegrams Nos. 396, 398, and 399, of November 13–14, not printed.

[4] See No. 130. Numerous telegrams, not here printed, reporting these negotiations are preserved in the Foreign Office archives, on file E 10102/44.

[5] Not printed.

[6] Articles A and E were incorporated in Articles 17 and 18 of the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, p. 549). The remaining articles concerning Egypt and the Suez Canal Convention of October 29, 1888 (Article B), the status of Egypt and Egyptian nationals, their goods and vessels (Article C), nationality, naturalisation and capitulary privileges (Article D) and accession by Egypt to the relevant articles of the new treaty (Article F), were not separately embodied in the Treaty of Lausanne.

[7] The agreement of the Egyptian Government to Articles A and B was reported in Cairo telegrams Nos. 384 and 385, of November 6, and to Article D, in Cairo telegram No. 398 of November 13, not printed.

6. You should take a very early opportunity of making the communication referred to above to the French Government. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.[8]

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

[8] Despatch No. 1386 to Rome.

No. 200

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received November 17)
*No. 719 Telegraphic [E 12846/27/44]**

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 17, 1922*

My telegram No. 712.[1]

Arrangements which had been made by General Harington for the departure of the Sultan were carried out this morning without hitch.

His Imperial Majesty left the Palace at 8 o'clock by side entrance to Yildiz barracks, where Grenadier Guards received him and where he was met by acting first dragoman[2] and General Harington's aide-de-camp.

Sultan was met at naval base by General Harington and myself, who accompanied him on board H.M.S. "Malaya", where he was received by Commander-in-chief of Mediterranean. H.M.S. "Malaya" left for Malta shortly after.

Once on board the ship I conveyed suitable message to Sultan from the King and His Majesty's Government. His Imperial Majesty begged me to convey to His Majesty and British nation his thanks for protection they were affording him.

Sultan laid much emphasis on fact that he had not abdicated. He begged that suitable person with knowledge of Turkish might be placed at his disposal at Malta. Communiqué will be published in press this afternoon to the effect that Sultan, fearing his liberty and life to be in danger, had appealed, as Caliph of all Moslems, for British protection and transportation from Constantinople and announcing his departure.

King informed.

[1] Of November 16, not printed. This stated that the Sultan had requested General Harington in writing to arrange for his immediate flight from Constantinople.

[2] Mr. W. D. W. Mathews, Consul and Legal Dragoman at Constantinople from October 1, 1920.

No. 201

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 17, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 388 Telegraphic [E 12852/27/44]

ROME, *November 17, 1922, 4 p.m.*

I had satisfactory conversation this morning with President of the Council who is looking forward to meeting Your Lordship at Territet[1] on Sunday evening. He had had time to consider points in your telegram No. 395[2] and said that I might assure you that in principle he was in agreement with you on all of them, both (a) and (b), though some required further elucidation and discussion.

Secretary General had given me to understand that there might be difficulties about (a) [No.] 1, but Signor Mussolini declared himself strongly against a plebiscite. As regards No. 4 he thought that full substance of capitulations should be retained but possibly under some other name. In regard to [No.] 5, he required some explanations. With reference to No. 7 he enquired whether Conservative victory at election[3] might mean that His Majesty's Government were no longer so anxious to maintain mandate. I replied that I had no information to show that we desired to divest ourselves of serious obligations. In regard to [No.] 11 he was still of opinion that it might be advisable to withdraw allied forces rather than risk their expulsion[4] but was quite open to argument on the subject.

His Excellency expressed the hope that I had considered his reference to the Turks in his speech yesterday[5] as satisfactory. It is regarded here as a strong warning to the Turks. He was optimistic in regard to the conference declaring that if only allies were united, and this ought to be achieved without great difficulty, Turks would accept our terms.

Finally His Excellency said that his general foreign policy would be as follows. Condition of whole world was unstable and disturbed. There was great danger of combination of Germany and Russia and possibly Turks to disturb it still further. Only hope of continued stability lay in closest understanding and co-operation between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium during the next ten or twenty years. These powers if really united would present a solid block against which disturbing elements would beat in vain.

[1] In his telegram No. 385 of November 15, not printed, Sir R. Graham had reported that Signor Mussolini preferred some place other than Lausanne for the preliminary meeting.

[2] No. 193. [3] See No. 132, n. 2. [4] See Nos. 179, 180 and 185.

[5] This speech of November 16 was given in the Chamber of Deputies (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 127, n. 2).

No. 202

Memorandum by Mr Rendel[1] *on the Situation of the Refugees in Greece*

[*E 12845/10524/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 17, 1922*

The present situation as regards the refugees in Greece is as follows:

During September and October at least 500,000 Ottoman Greek refugees reached Greek territory from Asia Minor. This figure, originally reported[2] by His Majesty's Minister at Athens, has been confirmed by detailed reports from the Save the Children Fund,[3] the British Naval authorities, the captains of the refugee ships, and information in the possession of the various relief societies. These refugees are for the most part destitute, and include no men of military age, all men between 15 and 45 having been retained by the Turks for service in labour gangs in the interior of Anatolia. All reports are agreed on this point. The naval reports on the embarkation of the refugees all emphasise the fact that the refugees were passed through two lines of Turkish soldiers before being allowed to embark, and that not a single able-bodied man of less than 45 was allowed to leave. The director of the British School of Archæology in Athens,[4] who is a member of the British Relief Committee, and who arrived yesterday direct from Greece, states that among the refugees in the Athens district he did not see a single able-bodied male between 15 and 50.

The absence of these men greatly complicates the whole problem of relief, since it means that the refugees cannot support themselves, and cannot be settled on the land. Mr. Lindley,[5] Dr. Nansen and Sir H. Rumbold[6] all agree that it is of the first importance to attempt to obtain the immediate release of these men from the Turks. In view of the number of refugees which is known to have arrived in Greece, it seems clear that the men detained and deported by the Turks must amount to not less than 100,000. We know from other sources that if they remain in labour gangs through the winter few of them can survive.

The Turks have also detained a great number of young women from among the refugees. This fact was particularly emphasised in the reports of His Majesty's consular officers from Smyrna. It will, however, be a matter of great difficulty to obtain the release of these women, who are probably already distributed in Moslem houses all through Anatolia.

In addition to the 500,000 refugees from Asia Minor, the entire Greek population of Eastern Thrace has migrated to Greek territory. According to the latest reports from the inter-Allied commissions in Eastern Thrace,[7]

[1] Mr. G. W. Rendel, a second secretary in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

[2] In Athens telegram No. 556 of October 6, not printed.

[3] Report of October 17, not printed.

[4] Mr. A. J. B. Wace.

[5] Athens telegram No. 605 of October 6, not printed.

[6] As reported in Constantinople despatch No. 888 of October 14, not printed, agreement between Dr. Nansen and Sir H. Rumbold had been reached in a meeting held at the British Embassy at Constantinople on October 6.

[7] See No. 126.

hardly a single Greek remains in that province. According to the Turkish figures for 1914, the Greek population of Eastern Thrace in that year amounted to 235,000. This is probably an underestimate, more especially as the Greek Government had already settled a large number of Greek refugees from Anatolia and Pontus in that district. It therefore seems probable that the exodus from Eastern Thrace has brought another 300,000 refugees to Greece. These, however, include able-bodied men, and a large proportion of them were able to bring their carts and cattle and a proportion of their possessions. Recent reports from Western Thrace and Macedonia, however, show that the condition of these refugees is hardly less appalling than that of the Asia Minor refugees in Old Greece.

In addition to these 800,000 refugees, large numbers of Ottoman Greeks are daily reaching Greek territory from Constantinople and elsewhere. Sir H. Rumbold recently reported that the Greeks were leaving Constantinople at the rate of 3,000 a day. He also reported on the 5th instant[8] that the surviving Greek population of the north coast of Anatolia, with the usual exception of the able-bodied men, was being expelled by the Turks, and the Greek Government have informed us that they are trying to make arrangements to evacuate these people to Greece.

It may, therefore, safely be assumed that the number of refugees in Greece is already in the neighbourhood of one million, or one-fifth of the total normal population of the territory in which they have taken refuge.

One of the most urgent questions is the liberation of the men retained in Anatolia. Their absence has vastly complicated the problem and greatly increased the hardships to which the refugees are exposed.

An equally urgent problem is that of relief. The food supply is totally inadequate and the local population of Greece is already being severely rationed. There is no doubt that a serious famine is imminent. Shelter is also most urgently required as a large proportion of the refugees are sleeping in the open and winter conditions have already begun.

The sanitary problem is equally serious, and epidemics have already broken out in several camps. When these conditions develop, it will probably be necessary to draw a sanitary cordon round Greece. On the 14th November Mr. Lindley reported[9] that the Central Co-ordination Committee for refugees in Athens had decided to telegraph to the League of Nations recommending that the action of the latter in Greece should be confined to fighting the epidemics in the hope that the sanitary situation may thus be got under control.

G. W. Rendel

[8] Constantinople telegram No. 656, not printed.
[9] Athens telegram No. 674, not printed.

No. 203

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received November 27)
No. 658 [*C 16165/13/19*]

ATHENS, *November 18, 1922*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that the special Court Martial, the constitution of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 635 of the 3rd instant,[1] began its sittings on the 13th instant. The President of the Court is Major-General Othonaios, whom Venizelists describe as a moderate and their opponents as a rabid Venizelist. I will not trouble Your Lordship with the names of the other eleven judges. It is sufficient to say that they are all officers. The accused are: Messieurs Gounaris, Baltazzi, Protopapadakis, Stratigos, Theotoky, Goudas and Stratos, and General Hadjianesti, late Commander-in-Chief.

The indictment against these persons was published before the Court began to sit and I have the honour to transmit a translation of it herewith.[2] It will be observed that the prisoners are accused of 'having willingly and intentionally allowed an invasion of foreign troops into the territory of the Kingdom'; and that fourteen separate charges are made to prove that they have done so. I will not go further into this remarkable document than to say that I have been unable to trace any connection between the general accusation and the individual charges which are cited in support of it. Two of the charges, as reported in my telegram No. 669 of the 10th instant,[2] are based on the action of Monsieur Gounaris in entrusting the Greek case to the Allies[3] and in concluding a financial arrangement with His Majesty's Treasury.[4]

I am informed by credible persons who have attended the sittings of the Court, that the proceedings have been marked by a decorum which is unusual in Greece; and even the friends of the prisoners admit that the most perfect order has prevailed. The trial is being held in the Parliament building so that there is ample room for the public and the press. The proceedings themselves would, in England, be considered purely farcical, few of the questions put to the witnesses being relevant and hardly any of the answers being admissible as evidence. A great deal of time has been taken up in disputing as to whether Allied help was really withdrawn as the result of the return of King Constantine;[5] though it is notorious that this was the case and the matter has nothing to do with the question at issue. Some of the evidence given is of political and historical interest and I will furnish Your Lordship with a summary of it when the trial is concluded. Up to the present the fact which has most discredited Monsieur Gounaris in the eyes of the public is that, after he had denied in his preliminary

[1] No. 150. [2] Not printed. [3] See Vol. XVII, No. 449.
[4] See ibid., Nos. 544 and 549. [5] See Vol. XII, Nos. 485 and 488.

examination that Western statesmen had expressed themselves adversely on the subject of King Constantine, telegrams, addressed by him to the Greek Government were discovered, in which he gave a full account of a conversation with Mr. Lloyd George who had declared that the presence of King Constantine on the Throne was a fatal hindrance to Greece receiving help from Great Britain. These telegrams were hidden amongst the papers mentioned in my telegram No. 518 of the 29th [ultimo],[6] and Monsieur Gounaris is blamed for having concealed the fact of their existence from the public, and for not having shown them to the King and resigned had the latter refused to abdicate.

As regards the fate of the accused, I have the honour to report it became evident during the course of the week following my despatch No. 635 of the 3rd instant that it would be more difficult to prevent the execution of the prisoners than Monsieur Politis had given me to understand. I made use, therefore, of Your Lordship's telegram No. 338 of the 30th ultimo[7] and, on the 10th instant, addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an official Note of which a copy is enclosed herewith.[8] On the following day I received Your Lordship's telegram No. 350 of the 10th instant[9] instructing me to obtain written assurances that no executions would take place.

I read this telegram at once to Monsieur Politis who did not seem at all taken aback by its contents. He declared that the whole Government were anxious to avoid executions and he hoped that they might bring the Revolutionary Committee into line. If His Majesty's Government insisted on written assurances the Government would have to tackle the Committee at once, and, in the event of failing to persuade them, would have to resign. He begged me therefore to leave the matter in his hands. I replied that I would report what he had said to Your Lordship and see him again in two days' time.

It was not easy to decide on the best course, as the situation here is so involved that it is difficult to know exactly where the real power in the State resides. Moreover, Monsieur Politis is of no assistance to me in this matter since, to put it colloquially, you cannot believe a word he says. Thus when I called again on him on the 13th instant, he entirely changed his

[6] Not printed.

[7] Not printed; see, however, No. 150.

[8] Not printed.

[9] This ran: 'Judicial murders which appear now to be contemplated would perpetuate internal feuds which have already done such incalculable damage, and would completely destroy Greece's reputation as a civilised Power.

'Loth as I am to intervene in internal affairs of a friendly country I shall be obliged, unless you can obtain explicit and written assurances from Greek government that death penalty will in no case be resorted to, to invite French government to join in enforcing observance of Greek constitution of which we are guarantors.

'Please communicate above to M. Politis and add that I earnestly hope that Greek government will be able to furnish such assurances as will render it unnecessary for me to take such action. These contemplated proceedings on the part of a civilised government are a curious commentary on the proposal which you continually repeat that recognition should be given to its sovereign.'

ground.[10] He was obviously very much afraid and declared that, if His Majesty's Government persisted in their demand for written assurances, the Government would have to resign and the Revolutionary Committee too. For the latter had no more power than the Government and was at the mercy of a body of extremist officers who would murder not only all the prisoners but a number of other people besides. He implored me to represent the case again to Your Lordship and not to push matters to an issue. It might, in that case, be possible to save some though not all of the prisoners. I told Monsieur Politis that his communication was an extremely serious one, as it amounted to an admission that the country was without any Government at all. I must consider this new situation and would see Monsieur Zaimis, who is still considering whether or not to accept the office of Prime Minister, that afternoon.

I called, accordingly, on Monsieur Zaimis who, in a much more moderate manner, took the same line as Monsieur Politis. But at the end of the conversation he suggested that the prisoners might be reprieved if His Majesty's Government could guarantee that they would not return to Greece, anyhow for a considerable period. This suggestion seemed to me to show that the Government and the Committee had a good deal more control than either Monsieur Politis or Monsieur Zaimis were willing to admit.

I discussed the position with one or two people here in whose judgement I have confidence and decided, in spite of the protests of Monsieur Politis, to address him an official Note in the terms of Your Lordship's telegram No. 350 of the 10th instant[11]. I have the honour to enclose a copy of it, herewith.[12] I did not see Monsieur Politis that day or the next, but the King had some days previously asked my wife and myself to tea at Tatoi on the 15th instant; and His Majesty told me that Monsieur Politis had been to

[10] In his telegram No. 671 of November 11, Mr. Lindley had reported: 'I communicated contents of your above mentioned telegram [No. 350] of November 10 [see n. 9], except last paragraph, verbally to Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency replied that he and the whole government were strongly in favour of remitting death sentences if they were passed. Difficulty lay with revolutionary committee but he hoped to win them over to government's point of view. If His Majesty's Government insisted on written assurances from Greek government it would be necessary for latter to inform revolutionary committee and crisis would at once arise. Should committee refuse to authorise government to give desired assurances government would have to resign and result would be worse both for prisoners and for country than before. His Excellency therefore hoped that His Majesty's Government would allow him to use the means he thought best to deal with committee. After some discussion I replied that I would inform Your Lordship of what Minister for Foreign Affairs had said and would see him again on Monday [November 13] after I had myself had time to reflect.' In his telegram No. 672 of November 13, Mr. Lindley had further reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that Greek government would not be able to give assurances requested in your telegram No. 350 because they were not in a position to make them good. He had seen revolutionary committee yesterday and found it much less open to persuasion than before; moreover committee itself was not now able to control forces behind it and Minister for Foreign Affairs was certain that if committee yielded to British pressure, these forces would sweep it away and murder all the prisoners and probably many others besides.'

[11] See n. 9.

[12] Of November 14, not printed.

him with my Note that morning and had asked His Majesty to discuss it with the Revolutionary Committee. This the King had refused to do. It is typical of Monsieur Politis that he should have asked the King to perform a duty which he was afraid to carry out himself.

On the same day, the 15th instant, Monsieur Montagna had a stormy interview with Monsieur Politis in which he demanded, on instructions from his Government, a promise that the prisoners would not be executed. The Italian Minister had just been nominated Second Italian Delegate at Lausanne and declared frankly that, unless he received the assurance before he left, the results might be extremely unpleasant for Greece.

On the evening of the 15th I received Your Lordship's telegram No. 353,[13] leaving it to my discretion to insist on a written assurance and explaining that your only desire was to prevent Greece from being discredited in the eyes of the civilised world. I called on Monsieur Politis on the 16th instant and found that he had again changed his ground. He said he had shown my Note to the Revolutionary Committee who were deeply hurt at its wording. To this I replied that I had purposely not attenuated the expressions in Your Lordship's telegram in order to show the Committee the light in which the matter was viewed in England. After some discussion regarding the trial, Monsieur Politis said that the real trouble was the fear that the ex-Ministers, unless they were executed, would return in a short time and again upset the country. Could His Majesty's Government give any guarantee that they would not do so? I replied that it was out of the question that His Majesty's Government should control the movements of these persons in any way. He then suggested that perhaps it might be sufficient if they gave their word to me, as His Majesty's Representative, that they would not return. I said that I would report[14] this suggestion to Your Lordship but rather doubted whether it would be entertained. After the interview I saw my French colleague and told him what had occurred. I asked him whether he thought it would be a practicable solution if the prisoners gave their word to both of us as representing the two Protecting Powers. Monsieur de Marcilly rather favoured the idea and said he would telegraph to his Government.

I again saw Monsieur Politis this morning and found him much perturbed at a telegram from Monsieur Caclamanos, reporting a conversation with Your Lordship in which you had hinted that a rupture of diplomatic relations was not impossible. I said I had not received any account of this interview,[15] but it did not surprise me that Your Lordship had raised this question, since I was beginning to ask myself of what use I could be here if there were no Government with which to deal. Monsieur Politis then went on to describe once more the difficulty of his position and the point of view

[13] Of November 14, not printed. This was a reply to Athens telegram No. 671 (see n. 10) in which Mr. Lindley had requested that it be left to his discretion 'whether or no to insist on written assurances'.

[14] Mr. Lindley did so in his telegram No. 673 of November 14, not printed. Cf. No. 216, below.

[15] See No. 205, below.

of the Revolutionary Committee. They could not understand why His Majesty's Government insisted on saving these men who had done so much to injure Greece. If a guarantee could be given that the prisoners would not return, it would be different, but His Majesty's Government would give no such guarantee. I will not weary Your Lordship's with the rest of the conversation, which followed familiar lines and which I terminated by saying that I hoped Monsieur Politis would be able to arrange the matter as it was clear that Greece would find herself in an awkward position if he did not.

This long despatch, which I fear Your Lordship may find tedious, will, I trust, show better than any general report the state of affairs in Greece and the mentality of this people. The course of events seems to demonstrate that Monsieur Politis, whilst anxious to avoid friction with the Allies, would be quite glad, like many of his fellow Venizelists, to see the ex-Ministers executed were it not for this friction. He is terrified of the Revolutionary Committee, who could probably impose their authority if they really wished to do so. But most of them are in favour of revenge, or what they call justice and they are to a great extent under the influence of men like General Pangalos, the 'judge d'instruction' in the trial, and Colonel Condylis, who are fanatics. There is not the slightest sign of any cooling of the hatred between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists. The Revolution, or rather the military coup d'état, for that is what it really is, has failed to effect its avowed object of uniting the country. The Venizelists have obtained control of the machine and mean to use it to destroy their enemies. As regards the ex-Ministers, this is the easier for them in that Monsieur Gounaris and his colleagues are thoroughly unpopular and there are many non-Venizelist officers who would see them executed with pleasure. But it will not stop with the ex-Ministers and already other arrests have been made.

In the meantime, the formation of a real Government seems farther off than ever. Monsieur Zaimis, it is clear, does not intend to accept office until the question of the ex-Ministers is out of the way; and even then he will probably fail if he continues to insist on a Cabinet of moderate men and on the freedom of the elections. The next fortnight will be a critical one. If the trial is finished and the prisoners exiled or sentenced to terms of imprisonment, it may be hoped that some improvement will take place in the general political situation. Otherwise this will in all probability deteriorate further.

I have &c.,

F. O. LINDLEY

No. 204

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,[1] *and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, held at the Quai d'Orsay on November 18, 1922 at 3 p.m.*

[*E 13148/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré, M. Barrère, M. Bompard, Marshal Foch, M. Peretti de la Rocca; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli.

Great Britain: Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Sir William Tyrrell; SECRETARY, Mr. Forbes Adam.

Italy: Baron Avezzana.

The Hon. H. Nicolson and Mr. Leeper were also present for the latter part of the meeting.

Admiral Lacaze, General Weygand, Captain Parker,[2] Major-General Burnett-Stuart and Major Macleod were also present throughout the meeting.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ opened the discussion by referring to a telegram which he had received from General Charpy to the effect that the Turks were showing a more conciliatory spirit and that Constantinople was calm. His information was of a purely military nature, but General Charpy must have been in agreement with General Harington when he telegraphed. The relations between the Allied missions and the Allied troops were excellent. M. Poincaré understood that Lord Curzon wished Marshal Foch to explain the question of how an attack by the Turks on Constantinople could be met.

LORD CURZON explained that he did not wish to raise the local aspects of the military situation alone, nor only the question of defending Constanti-

[1] Lord Curzon had crossed to Paris on November 17. In his telegram No. 610 (in the Paris series) of November 18, he stated: 'Discussion this afternoon lasted nearly five hours and covered all points raised in my memorandum [No. 193]. New Italian Ambassador [Baron Avezzana], although not yet accredited, took advantage of his presence at preceding official breakfast at Quai d'Orsay to insist upon attending meeting; and the certainty that responsibility for refusal would be thrown upon me alone compelled me to acquiesce, even though I shall have to go through the entire business again with Signor Mussolini tomorrow. The conference was also joined by the two French delegates for Lausanne, to the co-operation of one of whom I look forward with dismay. Although it left us in general but rather indeterminate agreement on principal points, and would not justify me in refusing to proceed to Lausanne, it nevertheless left upon my mind a somewhat discouraging impression. For there was the familiar disputation on rather narrow and technical points. M. Poincaré seemed a somewhat reluctant convert to the doctrine of complete harmony: and the edifice which we succeeded in erecting was one for which no one seemed to predict any sure success and which in many respects is a façade rather than a structure. That the Turks will accept it seems very unlikely. That if accepted it will provide any permanent solution of the problem is improbable.'

[2] Captain H. W. Parker, Director of Operations Division of the Naval Staff.

nople. There was a larger question which he would like to discuss, and he would certainly wish to hear Marshal Foch's views on this. M. Poincaré had just read a telegram which he had received from General Charpy showing that the military situation was easier. He (Lord Curzon) was very glad to hear this, because the British telegrams from General Harington gave[3] a rather different impression. General Harington telegraphed that in spite of the Mudania Convention the Turks at Constantinople under Refet Pasha were trying to assume the entire government of the town, that the Sultan had been practically deposed and had fled, that one Department after another was being taken over under the eyes of the Allies by the Kemalists, and that the Allied troops were, in short, exposed daily to the danger of considerable humiliation. He understood that the actual military forces at Constantinople were as follows. On the European side of the Bosphorus, 2,000 British infantry and 2,000 French infantry; on the Asiatic side there were 2,500 infantry and sixteen guns, all British. He need not refer at this stage to the Dardanelles or Thrace, and would confine his observations to Constantinople. Although the situation there was perhaps somewhat easier, he (Lord Curzon) felt apprehensive as to what might happen in the future while the conference was sitting at Lausanne. No doubt the Allied military administration and the Turkish civil administration might continue to sit side by side, but sight must not be lost of the large number of Turkish gendarmerie present in Thrace and in the neutral zones, and the continued infiltration of Turkish soldiers into the zones and into Thrace. In these circumstances, the Allied position might in time be rendered impossible. General Harington had asked more than once whether he could receive reinforcements. Already the British force was in the ascendant throughout the area; in fact, the British had contributed 11,000 troops out of a total of 16,000. It was therefore not for the British at this stage to send more troops. He (Lord Curzon) would, therefore, ask his colleagues whether they could possibly add to the number of their troops in this area. That was his first question. The second question was whether, if trouble occurred at Lausanne and the Turks were to continue resisting some Allied demand, we might not find ourselves faced with a Turkish request to retire immediately from Constantinople. The Turks had, in fact, already made such a demand when Refet Pasha asked both the naval and military forces of the Allies to leave Constantinople.[4] The third question was what Allied action should be taken in the event of the Allied position in Constantinople becoming intolerable and the Allied forces having no alternative but to withdraw. He (Lord Curzon) had assumed from M. Poincaré's remarks that if one of the three Allies evacuated, the rest would go too. If so, there arose the question in what direction evacuation should take place. The British forces were well supplied with ships and were prepared to go to Gallipoli. He was not aware whether the French had material means at their disposal for evacuating

[3] The many telegrams from General Harington are not here printed. See, however, Nos. 183, 184, and 197, n. 1.

[4] See No. 157, n. 1, and No. 160.

their troops in the same way. He would like to know, however, from his colleagues whether they were prepared to go to Gallipoli with the British in the event of the eventuality which he had put. Once there, were the Allies going to remain at Gallipoli?

These questions, although they were mainly military, must be answered because neither M. Poincaré nor Signor Mussolini intended to stay at Lausanne, and, after their departure, the Allied plenipotentiaries must know what they were going to do if during the conference their forces were suddenly faced with a dangerous situation, and the Turks demanded that they should withdraw. In short, was the united Allied front at Lausanne to be coupled with an equally united front at Constantinople throughout the conference? It was all very well to state that this could be—and must be—done by diplomatic means. The Turks would laugh at diplomacy, for which they would care nothing if they really meant to attack. It was, therefore, essential to have military and naval opinions on these points.

M. Poincaré thought that he had already answered the essential points which Lord Curzon had put. In the long communications which had passed between himself and Lord Curzon during the past year he had made it quite clear that France could not send reinforcements to Constantinople. France was neither in the material nor the moral position to do so. Great Britain might be in a different position but the French Chamber had determined once and for all not to send a man. As regards Lord Curzon's second question, M. Poincaré thought that if the Allies were attacked at Constantinople they would certainly have to meet force by force. It was not so much a question of "if the Allies are in danger", but rather "if the Allies are attacked". He disliked the formula "if they are in danger"; such a formula often meant that the person in danger, or who fancied he was in danger, thought it necessary to attack without waiting. If the Allies were attacked, however, it was quite possible that the French Chamber might agree to send troops, but M. Poincaré could not say for certain in advance. As to the military question of defending Constantinople and Gallipoli, he (M. Poincaré) thought that General Harington had changed his opinion during the last few months. At first he had been in favour of evacuating Constantinople and going to Chanak and Gallipoli; now, apparently, he wished to stay at Constantinople and Gallipoli and abandon Ismid and Chanak. On this point he (M. Poincaré) was quite prepared to trust to the military opinion of General Harington and that of his Allied military colleagues. If, then, the Allies were attacked, the French troops would certainly stand with their Allies, and if compelled to retire they would withdraw with them to Gallipoli. As to a difficult situation arising while the conference was sitting at Lausanne, in his opinion the best solution was to let things develop. To his mind it was unlikely that the Turks would do more than threaten.

At Lord Curzon's request Marshal Foch then made a statement.

Marshal Foch said that he would like to call the attention of the conference to one or two points, which were vital if the position at Constantinople was to be cleared up. Apparently, the British and Italian High Commissioners

were going to Lausanne. Marshal Foch suggested that the French High Commissioner should also be summoned to the conference, and that the three Generals should then be left in complete charge of the situation there. As it was, the presence of the High Commissioners and a certain conflict in their spheres of action made it very difficult for the Allied generals really to know who was in command. If the Allies really wanted to defend Constantinople as well as possible, the Allied generals there should be told so quite clearly, and instructed to make the best position there in the circumstances. When they examined the question in detail they might find that they had plenty of cavalry and infantry, and not enough artillery. They then might have to bring artillery from Gallipoli to Constantinople. At all costs, the generals should examine the whole situation and prepare a joint plan.

LORD CURZON said that he had listened with much respect to M. Poincaré's and Marshal Foch's observations. He understood that M. Poincaré, as at present advised, was not in a position, or perhaps did not wish to send reinforcements to Constantinople. He would not know the Italian view until Signor Mussolini entered the conference. As regards his second question, he deduced from M. Poincaré's reply that the French and British were united in agreeing to resist force by force. They must act together, and carry out one Allied military operation, and, if necessary, retire to Gallipoli. M. Poincaré's answers to his last question appeared to him less satisfactory. Apparently, the Allies were to await events and see how the situation developed. He (Lord Curzon) feared that if that were their policy, the Allies might find themselves too late. As regards Marshal Foch's suggestion, he could not agree that the powers of the High Commissioners, even in the absence of Sir Horace Rumbold and M. Garroni, should be transferred to the generals. Sir Horace Rumbold had been replaced by Mr. Henderson, who had been well known in the Embassy in Paris, and was regarded as a man of good judgment with plenty of experience. The British Government had full confidence in him.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] intervened to say that the Italian High Commissioner had been replaced by Signor Maissa,[5] who was a very capable man.

LORD CURZON enquired whether General Pellé was to remain at Constantinople.

M. POINCARÉ said that the arrangement was that he should come to Lausanne when required or summoned.

LORD CURZON expressed the hope that he would remain, as he had much authority and ability, and would prove a great support to the conference. On the general question it had always seemed to Lord Curzon a good thing to have some check on the opinions of the generals, and a double point of view, namely, that of the High Commissioners and the generals. As regards Marshal Foch's second suggestion, he understood that the Allied generals on the spot had already attempted to draw up an Allied plan for the defence of Constantinople, but they had found that such defence was in fact

[5] See No. 145, n. 5, and No. 152, n. 3.

impossible. It was not so much an attack from outside by armed forces that was feared, but rather an internal rising following upon a large infiltration of Kemalist soldiers in civilian guise. The rising might be accompanied by an ultimatum to the Allies to quit. No number of guns would enable them to remain, and the question was what were they going to do? General Harington himself was so convinced of the danger that he would like a date fixed at once for the evacuation of Constantinople, before the conclusion of the conference.[6] Lord Curzon himself was entirely against any such step, both because it would be humiliating for the Allies, and because it was entirely a matter for the Lausanne Conference to decide. It was essential that the Allies should keep to the date fixed in the March resolutions,[7] in the Allied note of the 23rd September,[8] and the Mudania Convention,[9] namely, the ratification of the new treaty by Turkey. In these circumstances, the situation appeared to Lord Curzon rather more dangerous than might be inferred from the remarks of M. Poincaré and Marshal Foch. Apparently, the answers to his questions were, 'Defend Constantinople if you can, and if you can't, then retire if you can'. Lord Curzon was apprehensive if their examination of the question were to be left at this stage. That was why he had asked the conference thoroughly to study the whole situation.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] intervened to say that he would like to state his opinion, while reserving generally the views of Signor Mussolini. The latter had gained the impression that, in the present situation, the despatch of further troops would not be accepted by Italian opinion, whereas, if the situation grew worse, or the Turks attacked, Italian public opinion might change and find itself quite ready to send reinforcements.

M. POINCARÉ said that the question put to him by Lord Curzon as to what the Allies should do in case of a menace seemed to him rather too vague. It all depended on what the menace really meant. If it were a question of an ultimatum, M. Poincaré would certainly not accept it in any conceivable event. It would be intolerable for the Allies to submit to it, and they must simply refuse to retire. Again, if General Harington were to advise that the Allied troops should retire because the situation was not tenable it did not seem to him (M. Poincaré) that it was therefore necessary for France, Great Britain and Italy to decide to declare war on Turkey. Lausanne was close to Paris, and when the situation arose, it could be discussed by telegram or telephone between Paris and Lausanne. Generally speaking, he (M. Poincaré) was not prepared to accept either a threat or an ultimatum, but he feared that preventive measures would be interpreted as provocative, especially in the state of over-excitement in which the Turks were at present. His advice therefore was that the Allies should be firm and independent, but avoid indiscretions, both in Paris and at Lausanne. If it were a question of an ultimatum, then he would act at once, but if it were a question of a distant threat, he would ask time to reflect on the action which France was prepared to take.

[6] See No. 197, n. 1. [7] See Vol. XVII, No. 570. [8] See No. 52, n. 3.
[9] See No. 119, n. 1.

LORD CURZON explained that he was only talking of an eventual threat. He was glad of M. Poincaré's assurance that if the Turks issued an ultimatum at Lausanne for the Allied troops to retire, M. Poincaré would regard it as an intolerable situation, and would agree to the Allies taking all measures possible to keep their positions. He had one further observation to make. If the generals at Constantinople were to say that the situation was too delicate, and that the Allied Powers ought to retire, Lord Curzon trusted that M. Poincaré would examine with him at once what was to be done. Meanwhile, he hoped that he might infer from M. Poincaré's remarks that generally the Allies should agree to stand by the September note, and stay at Constantinople until the conclusion of the new treaty with Turkey, even if they were forced by circumstances to deviate in particulars from the line of conduct which they had agreed upon. He felt that their conversations had not been without value, since it had been decided to reject vehemently any form of ultimatum by the Turks, and that the Allies should do their utmost to stay at Constantinople until the conclusion of peace.

M. POINCARÉ said that he had never thought the agreement of the 23rd September irrevocable, although he, for his part, was very anxious to fulfil it to the letter. If, however, the generals thought that the Allies could not stay at Constantinople as long as the note laid down, it would, of course be necessary for them to discuss the matter. He would like to point out, however, that the idea of retiring from Constantinople came from General Harington. At first, the latter had thought that he could not hold the town, and now apparently he thought he might be able to.[10] There was also apparently a question of using guns for the defence of Constantinople. On this M. Poincaré thought it necessary to make a reservation. He was doubtful if it was a good precedent to set in the East; that was, however, a military matter.

MARSHAL FOCH intervened at this stage to urge that the High Commissioners and Generals should be clearly told that the Allies wished to stay at Constantinople 'jusqu'au bout'. Every place was defensible if there was really the will to defend. The Allies might stay at Galata and Pera and leave Stamboul, or they might stay round the town. In any case, it was essential to tell the Generals clearly that they would have to make plans and do their best on certain lines. If they replied that they could not stay at Constantinople they should make plans for a second line of defence or for a retirement. If they had their plans they would not be surprised.

LORD CURZON said that while he felt it impertinent to make observations on a military question in the presence of Marshal Foch, he understood that it was General Harington's opinion, and also that of his colleagues, that Constantinople was quite indefensible in spite of the plans which they had made and the guns and troops which were on the spot. If General Harington were asked what he required to defend Constantinople, he would certainly ask for two or three more divisions. It must be remembered that General Harington had been ordered, not only to hold the town and prevent massacres, but also to make preparations for withdrawal and evacuation in face of an

[10] See No. 197, n. 1.

excessive threat, should this be delivered.[11] They must not ask General Harington to do too much with the limited forces at his disposal. It was, in fact, impossible for the Allies to stay there in the event of a sustained attack by the enemy.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that if such a situation arose it would not only be a question of Constantinople. The Allies would have entered on another war with Turkey, and Syria and Irak would have to be defended. France had taken most of her troops from Syria, and he believed Great Britain had done the same as regards Irak. Then there was always the danger of Russia marching against Poland and Roumania. If Poland were to give assistance to Roumania, Germany would attack her, and the Allies would be faced with a general European war.

MARSHAL FOCH asked to be allowed to refer again to the question of defending Constantinople. He thought that General Harington had been told to concentrate his attention too much on the town itself. It was much better to take the larger view and try to hold the Bosphorus as long as possible. General Harington should receive clear instructions on this point and examine all possible plans with this object.

LORD CURZON pointed out that the British Government had already contemplated the question in its fullest possible aspect. General Harington's orders were to hold Constantinople as long as possible. If the Ismid Peninsula were indefensible, General Harington was to withdraw from that peninsula. If Constantinople proved indefensible, he was to retire to Chanak or Gallipoli. In any case, General Harington had full authority already to retire in the manner or direction which seemed best to him.

MARSHAL FOCH said that at the risk of being thought importunate he would like again to point out that General Harington must not be limited too narrowly to the question of Constantinople and Ismid. He should be given the largest latitude possible to defend the European shore of the Bosphorus. If he were told 'Constantinople or death' or 'Ismid or death', he would certainly die.

M. POINCARÉ then suggested that a discussion should take place on Lord Curzon's memorandum (see Annex I)[12] point by point.

Question of Western Thrace.

M. Poincaré read the Allied note of the 23rd September, and, in particular, the passage regarding 'certain zones to be demilitarised'. He enquired whether both the Greek and Turkish sides were to be demilitarised. If not, it would be necessary to modify the words in the memorandum, 'the 1915 frontier was not to be altered'.

LORD CURZON said that his proposal was to demilitarise both banks of the Maritza. His suggestion was that the angle of territory between the Maritza and the frontier ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1915, as well as a strip of

[11] See No. 43.

[12] Annex I is not printed. For Lord Curzon's Memorandum, see No. 193.

territory further south on both sides of the Maritza, including Adrianople, should be constituted as a demilitarised zone. He proposed this not only as a defence for Turkey, but also to facilitate Bulgaria's railway access to the sea. Bulgaria would really like Salonika or Cavalla as her port of exit, but the Powers were already bound by the Treaty of Neuilly[13] to give Bulgaria access to Dedeagatch, and they would be killing two birds with one stone by forming this demilitarised zone. He suggested that the proper course for the Allies to take at Lausanne was to put the proposal which M. Poincaré had already made regarding the demilitarised zone on both banks of the Maritza in the September discussions,[14] and follow this up with the argument which he (Lord Curzon) had put forward regarding Dedeagatch.

M. POINCARÉ said that there was also the question of the limitation of the Turkish army in Europe. If such a limitation were effected, the Turks must be given guarantees. There was a general agreement in principle; the details would have to be settled by the experts at Lausanne.

MARSHAL FOCH then called attention to the difficulty of demilitarising Adrianople.

M. POINCARÉ said that he thought it best to continue taking Lord Curzon's memorandum point by point, and he read paragraph 2 regarding the frontier in Thrace. This raised the question of Karagatch. In September, M. Poincaré believed that the Allies had reached an agreement that a concession should be made if the Turks pressed for it,[15] as they would certainly do.

LORD CURZON said that he had certain observations to make on this point. In the first place, why did the Turks give up Karagatch to the Bulgarians voluntarily in 1915 if it were so important for the defence of Adrianople? Secondly, under his own proposal, which was also that of M. Poincaré, all the forts were to be pulled down. He enquired whether M. Poincaré did not intend to include Karagatch in the demilitarised zone.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that Lord Curzon's argument should be directed to his own War Office rather than to the French Government. The War Office themselves wished to give Adrianople to the Turks with certain forts, including Karagatch.[16]

LORD CURZON suggested that they should not lose sight of the fact that by allowing Turkey to recover the station of Karagatch and thus obtain a footing on the railway line, they might be frustrating one of their objects which was to afford Bulgaria access to the sea.

M. POINCARÉ, in reply, referred Lord Curzon to the treaty relating to Western Thrace of 1920,[17] and pointed out that by this treaty, or similar provisions in a new treaty, Bulgaria would, in any case, obtain economic

[13] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 781–896.

[14] See Nos. 41, 42, 48, and 51.

[15] The question of Karagatch was in fact discussed in the October conversations in Paris (see No. 106).

[16] The view of the War Office about Karagatch was put forward in a War Office Memorandum of October 19 (Appendix II).

[17] Signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 479–85).

access to the Aegean Sea, whether or not the Turks had Karagatch. The Allies should agree now to yield on this point in the last resort.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] concurred.

LORD CURZON enquired what precisely the proposal was, and whether the Turks were to be given both Adrianople and Karagatch, in spite of both being demilitarised.

M. POINCARÉ said that this was so, although in fact it was doubtful, in French opinion, if it would be possible actually to demilitarise either of these places.

M. BOMPARD intervened to point out that Turkey would certainly want railway access to Adrianople in her own territory.

LORD CURZON suggested that M. Poincaré's last remarks really meant that we were to construct a sham neutral zone in which, at the end of five years, Turkish forts would be found both at Karagatch and Adrianople.

M. POINCARÉ hoped this would not be the case, and thought that the League of Nations might be able to do something in the matter.

LORD CURZON said that civilian League officials visiting this area every three years, or some such plan as this, would hardly suffice to check the Turks. In any case, they could not agree to settle the question there and then; it must be decided at Lausanne after the Turks had been heard.

M. POINCARÉ then took point 3 of the British memorandum regarding the freedom of the Straits.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to know precisely what M. Poincaré meant by the phrase. It might refer either to ships of war or ships of commerce. At the beginning of the war the Turks, by having fortifications on the Dardanelles, had been able effectively to close the Straits. They had thus cost the Allies many valuable lives and had prolonged the war. The British Empire particularly had suffered from the fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula. If Turkey is no longer to fortify the Straits or close them in time of war, how would such prescriptions of a new treaty be observed. Would inspection by civilians belonging to the League of Nations suffice? It was essential that the Allies should know precisely what they meant to do and have an agreement as to whether the freedom of the Straits was to be freedom for warships as well as vessels of commerce.

M. POINCARÉ presumed that there would only be complete freedom for both ships of war and ships of commerce in time of peace. It would certainly be necessary, in any case, to limit the numbers and tonnage of the vessels and the duration of their stay in the case of ships of war.

LORD CURZON enquired whether in peace ships of commerce and a limited number of warships were to be allowed through the Straits, while in war the Straits were to be shut altogether to vessels of commerce and warships.

M. POINCARÉ said he did not think so. All future hypotheses as regards a war must be considered on their merits, and it must be seen what in practice the Allies might hope to effect. They should, however, begin to work on the question from the point of view of times of peace.

LORD CURZON said that he was in entire agreement, but this was probably

not the way in which the question would be put to them at Lausanne. Turkey and Russia would probably both ask that in war the Straits should be closed to all ships of war.

M. BOMPARD intervened to suggest that the Turks would also probably ask that the Straits should be shut to vessels of war in time of both peace and war.

ADMIRAL LACAZE suggested that there were really two different questions—the passage of vessels through the Straits and the stationing of vessels in the Straits. As regards the former, there ought to be complete freedom for both kinds of vessels in time of peace and war.

Both M. BOMPARD and M. POINCARÉ pointed out that there would have to be a limitation of numbers.

M. Bompard also pointed out that in 1912 and 1914 the Turks had, after war had broken out, shut the Straits to both warships and ships of commerce. The Allies had not been able to stop it, and it would be very difficult for them to do it in the future if Russia and Turkey were to co-operate.

LORD CURZON said that all he wanted was to see that they had a clear understanding as to what they actually meant to do at Lausanne. He was in agreement with M. Poincaré in so far as he understood the latter's proposals. He enquired whether at all times (both in peace and war) the Straits were to be open to ships of commerce.

M. POINCARÉ replied in the affirmative, provided Turkey were neutral.

LORD CURZON then enquired whether the Allies were to try also to enable the Powers to send warships through the Straits in time of peace, and, if so, what was the object of obtaining such a result.

M. POINCARÉ said that he was in favour of warships being allowed to go through without formalities in time of peace, provided there was agreement as to numbers. As regards the object of their passage, it might well be that in the future France and Great Britain might wish to go to the Crimea. Provided the Allies could settle in advance with Turkey the question of passage, they need not now consider hypothetical objects to justify passage.

LORD CURZON pointed out that before the war only a limited number of ships of war were allowed into the Straits, and that their admission depended upon the agreement of the Turkish Government.

M. POINCARÉ said that he must distinguish between stationing vessels in the Straits and obtaining permission for them to pass. There would be much more opposition to the former than to the latter. He had asked M. Fromageot[18] to explain by a formula what precisely the Allies should seek as regards the freedom of the Straits. He then read this formula, which will be found as Annex II[19] to this memorandum.

[18] Monsieur Fromageot was legal adviser to the French Foreign Ministry.

[19] Not printed. In Paris telegram No. 610 (see n. 1), Lord Curzon stated: 'Poincaré produced a formula drawn up by Fromageot, which provides (1) for the complete commercial freedom of the Straits subject to Turkey, if she is a belligerent, retaining the right of visit and search, (2) as regards ships of war, free passage in peace for ships of all flags, subject to a limit of numbers and tonnage and duration of stay. In time of war, if Turkey

LORD CURZON said that he did not raise any objection to M. Fromageot's formula, which seemed very clear, but that he would like time to examine it after communicating with his Government.

Lord Curzon then raised the question of the demilitarised zone round the Straits. He recalled that by the March proposals,[20] as modified by the proposals of Marshal Foch and the War Office, the Dardanelles (including the strip from Rodosto to the Gulf of Xeros), the Sanjak of Chanak, the Ismid Peninsula, and the Chatalja zone were to be demilitarised. How was this to be ensured? In the Treaty of Sèvres there was an Allied force in the whole zone and Greek sovereignty in the Gallipoli Peninsula and on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. Now there was to be full Turkish sovereignty on both sides of both Straits. Even under the March proposals the Allied force was confined to the Gallipoli Peninsula and Allied officers were sent from there to inspect the zones. Were these arrangements to be continued, or were the Allies going to have inspectors under the League of Nations, as was foreshadowed in the note of 23rd September? As regards the Bosphorus, were the two demilitarised zones to be maintained in spite of the fact that Constantinople was to be handed back to the complete control of the Turks, with a Turkish force garrisoning it? Even if the Allies secured the destruction of the forts, it would be difficult to insist upon the coasts remaining unfortified. It was useless for the Allies to ask the Turks to agree to something which they knew they could not enforce.

M. POINCARÉ explained that he had had in mind an international commission working under the ægis of the League of Nations with sufficient moral and international authority to carry out the inspection of the demilitarised zone. Perhaps it might not prove necessary to have any material force to back up the commission. Marshal Foch himself thought that the important thing was to secure the destruction of the coast fortifications of all kinds. All they could hope to do was to secure this and to trust to inspection by the commission to prevent their being re-established.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with M. Poincaré's proposal, but under the Sèvres Treaty it must be remembered that the international commission had only had the duty of looking after the buoys, sanitation, shipping dues, &c. The commission was now to be given quite other duties. It was, in fact, to have the military and naval duties of keeping these waters open. Apparently M. Poincaré was quite frank as regards the nature of this authority, which was only moral. He (Lord Curzon) feared that this was only a euphemism for the absence of all authority in practice. It was true that a slight advantage might be gained at the beginning of hostilities if the Turks had been forced to carry out their part of the bargain as regards the destruction of fortifications, but he feared that it might be difficult to make them do

is neutral a corresponding freedom of passage subject to Hague convention restrictions as regards belligerent action. If on the other hand, Turkey is a belligerent, complete freedom for neutral vessels only. As the French are prepared to put forward this formula, which is in excess of our proposals, I agreed to their suggesting it at the conference.'

[20] See Vol. XVII, No. 566.

this. Nevertheless, in his opinion, the Allies might have to have some such arrangement, although they should realise how little it really meant.

M. POINCARÉ had pointed out that the views which he had expressed were really those of the British War Office. If Lord Curzon could secure a better guarantee at Lausanne, he would be all the more pleased. It would always be possible for the three Allies to re-enter the Straits if Turkey violated the clauses referring to the question of coastal fortifications.

LORD CURZON said that he feared M. Poincaré was basing his arguments too largely on the memorandum by the British War Office. This memorandum contained the views of neither the Foreign Office nor the Cabinet, who had never even seen it.[21]

ADMIRAL LACAZE said that he would like to point out that at the beginning of the war the difficulty had always been the presence of permanent works, torpedo tubes, &c. in the Dardanelles. The Allies would really have taken a valuable step if they obtained the suppression of these engines of war.

LORD CURZON said that he was much interested in what Admiral Lacaze had said. He enquired whether M. Poincaré wished to place the commission under the League of Nations.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that the Allies had said so in their note of 23rd September.

LORD CURZON feared that the League of Nations might not agree to assume the responsibility for a commission with such powers. He was also doubtful whether Turkey or Russia would accept the supervision of the League. In fact, he was quite sure that the latter would not. He was, however, fully prepared to press the solution advocated by M. Poincaré, although he would like to know at once whether M. Poincaré was agreed that the Allies should do this, and whether they were to hold out at Lausanne to the end for some general solution, or whether, in certain circumstances, they were to contemplate modifications. The whole question was a very difficult one, and Lord Curzon doubted whether the conference had sufficiently explored it.

M. POINCARÉ observed that Lord Curzon himself had proposed to place the commission under the auspices of the League of Nations in September, but, of course, the Allied invitation to the Russian Soviet Government[22] raised a new issue. For the rest, it seemed to him (M. Poincaré) better to wait and see how events developed, and to maintain a close alliance outside the conference. The Allies might have private talks every night, and they could then decide what their procedure the next day should be. In March they had talked of an Allied military occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula; they could think no more of that now.

ADMIRAL LACAZE suggested that even if the League were only a moral force, it was always material for the Allies to fall back upon. Moreover, once Turkey was in the League, the guarantee of that body for the freedom of the Straits would be, in practice, a more serious one.

M. POINCARÉ then proceeded to run briefly through the other points in the

[21] See No. 178, n. 4. [22] See No. 130.

British memorandum, and it was agreed that they might all be passed except the Capitulations, the Aegean Islands and the indemnity, which were reserved for further discussion.

(At this point the meeting adjourned for tea.)

On resuming, M. Poincaré raised the question of Capitulations. The Allies must endeavour to secure the utmost guarantees, but they should have no illusions on that point. He had had a talk with Ismet Pasha on the subject. He was very deaf. From this talk he had inferred that it was absolutely essential, in any case, to suppress the main Capitulations, while aiming at obtaining substantial safeguards. For the present, the matter might be left over and discussed at Lausanne by the experts.

M. Barrère pointed out that the neutrals were on the Allies' side.

M. Poincaré said that Ismet Pasha had insisted on Turkey being treated on a footing of equality, and had kept repeating this point. It was characteristic of the Kemalist attitude.

Baron Avezzan[a] explained that the neutral Powers had demanded to participate in the Lausanne Conference for the question of the Capitulations, and he asked what were the views of the conference.

Lord Curzon replied that Sweden and Spain had applied to His Majesty's Government, and he had answered the Swedish Government that they would be kept informed and that the Allies would look after their interests.

M. Poincaré thought it most important not to lose their support. Neutral Powers with capitulatory treaties, such as Spain, Holland, Poland, Norway and Sweden, ought to be allowed to present their views to the conference.

M. Barrère suggested that they might choose two delegates among themselves.

M. Poincaré said they would never decide in that case on the delegates. For the rest, it would be a good thing to let the whole world talk to the Turks. The United States would be there in any case.

Lord Curzon pointed out that Poland had no capitulatory treaty with Turkey, unlike Sweden and Norway.

M. Poincaré agreed, but Poland had a general interest in the settlement. There was the question of Russia and the Straits, for instance.

Lord Curzon said that he had explained to M. Skirmunt[23] in London that the Allied Powers had decided who was to be invited, and it was too late to change their decision. They might agree, however, to neutral States with capitulatory treaties coming to Lausanne to present their views on the Capitulations.

M. Bompard agreed that this was an excellent idea. Turkey had tried to get rid of the Capitulations by unilateral acts. The treaties of these neutral Powers with Turkey were really still in force.

Lord Curzon agreed and referred to the five draft articles[24] prepared by the British delegation, giving generally the British idea as to how the fiscal and judicial Capitulations might be modified. He enquired whether M. Poincaré had examined them.

[23] Monsieur Constantin Skirmunt, Polish Minister in London. [24] See No. 196.

M. POINCARÉ said that he was in general agreement, but that the French Government wanted greater precision on certain points, and especially more safeguards for French schools.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the neutral Powers should only send one delegate each, and who precisely these Powers were.

M. POINCARÉ replied that they were Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland. The United States had already been asked to Lausanne.

LORD CURZON suggested that Portugal might also expect to be asked.

M. POINCARÉ proposed also Brazil.

It was agreed that Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Holland should each be invited to send one delegate to Lausanne, at a date to be fixed, to give their views on the Capitulations. (See Annex III for the French text of the invitation.[25])

M. BARRÈRE then raised the question of the sanitary administration in Turkey which was bound up with the Capitulations and was very important.

LORD CURZON suggested that this might be left to the Straits Commission so far as the Straits zone was concerned, as was done in the Treaty of Sèvres.

M. BARRÈRE said that this would not be enough, as the Turks could not execute any sanitary measures.

LORD CURZON said that he did not propose that; he suggested that the League or the commission should have this function of executing sanitary measures together with the other functions, given in the Treaty of Sèvres. In any case, the matter was one for the experts to consider at Lausanne.

M. POINCARÉ then went on to the question of the Aegean Islands, and enquired which Lord Curzon had meant.

LORD CURZON said that he had meant all the islands. Some were already in the hands of the Greeks; for instance, those round the mouth of the Dardanelles which were to be demilitarised. Then there were the Dodecanese Islands, which had been ceded to Italy by Turkey in article 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and, except for Rhodes, by Italy to Greece in a treaty signed at the same time as the Treaty of Sèvres between Greece and Italy.[26] All that he now proposed was that all these islands should be taken away from Turkey at Lausanne.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] asked why, in these circumstances, the question of the Dodecanese should be raised with the Turks at all.

LORD CURZON referred him to article 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and enquired whether Italy did not wish to maintain it. The Allies must provide for the cession of these islands by Turkey in the new treaty.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] agreed to this point.

M. BOMPARD suggested that the Allies need only deal at Lausanne with the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Castellorizo; all the rest were already non-Turkish.

LORD CURZON said that he feared the Turks would raise the question, even if the Allies did not. For the rest, the juridical position of these islands was not satisfactorily settled before the war. That was the point of articles 84

[25] Not printed. [26] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 1078–80.

and 122 of the Treaty of Sèvres. All Lord Curzon wished to do was to keep these articles in the Treaty.

BARON AVEZZAN[A] replied that he did not wish the question to be reopened to the extent that it appeared to be reopened in the British memorandum,[27] namely, that all the islands were to be handed back to the Allies for disposal. The situation was already a delicate one as regards their fate.

M. POINCARÉ suggested that it might be possible, while taking all the islands in the first instance from the Turks, to give them back Imbros and Tenedos as a concession, while demilitarising them.

LORD CURZON said that he could not agree to this, as the islands were entirely Greek.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the question of indemnities, and pointed out that France might wish to obtain reparation for the damage done to the properties of French nationals by the Greeks on Turkish territory.

LORD CURZON explained that his memorandum on this, as on other points, had been much compressed, but all he had meant to do was to refer to the 240 million pounds sterling indemnity, which, in the press, the Turks were said to be claiming from the Greeks. In point of fact, we should find at Lausanne that everyone would have claims to put forward one against another. These could be balanced one against another, and, as there was actually very little money about in this part of the world, no claims would probably be satisfied. This question might, however, be left in the first instance to the experts at Lausanne, who could assess the claims and draw up the balance sheet.

M. POINCARÉ agreed. He then took the points in category (B), beginning with minorities.

LORD CURZON explained that there were still probably some Armenians in Asia Minor and a few Greeks, and the Allies must do what they could to safeguard them by provisions in the treaty.

M. POINCARÉ agreed. The Allies should retain the March resolutions so far as it was now possible to do so. It was no good trying to do more in Turkey than they had done elsewhere, e.g., as in Greece. As regards the Turkish military forces, M. Poincaré wished again to refer to the memorandum of the British War Office. It would be impossible to retain the March resolutions, especially as regards Asia; they could agree so far as Europe was concerned.

LORD CURZON pointed out that he could not accept the views of the French and British War Offices on a point like this. They seemed to like the idea of a large Turkish army, and he was sure that there were English and perhaps French generals who longed to be sent to command them. But there was an important political aspect of this matter. Take, for instance, conscription. Logically, Germany, Austria, [Hungary] and Bulgaria would ask for similar treatment if conscription were left in Turkey. It might be possible, therefore, to maintain the March proposal in principle, and in practice for the Allies to continue postponing the date at which the voluntary principle

[27] See No. 193.

was to be established in Turkey. Very wide limits might also be fixed for the Turkish army. Thus, in principle, the Allies would be following the lines of the other treaties, while, in practice, offering Turkey really all she wanted. In Europe, on the other hand, he entirely agreed with Marshal Foch, and thought it essential to limit the Turkish forces. He enquired whether Marshal Foch had any views as to the figure at which this limitation should be put.

MARSHAL FOCH said that his experts had arrived at the figure of 15,000 gendarmerie and troops in Europe, including Constantinople, but it would be necessary first to decide whether the Allies were to try and fix a minimum or maximum number of gendarmerie inside the Turkish military forces as a whole.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Turkey might want European officers for the gendarmerie. If so, the Allies should decide that there should be complete equality between the three Powers.

M. POINCARÉ thought that the Turks would only agree to take Allied instructors in the schools, and not officers for the gendarmerie.

LORD CURZON said he wished to be quite clear on this point, as he was afraid that the Angora Agreement and the letters accompanying it threatened to provide for a French monopoly of French instructors or officers.[28] He referred to the letter from Yussuf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon of the 20th October, 1921, and to the paragraph in it about French specialists. It was necessary to have a clear answer as to the suggested monopoly.

M. POINCARÉ said that his text of the letter which Lord Curzon had read was different, and he believed that the letter from which Lord Curzon had read was a version prepared at the Quai d'Orsay of several letters from Yussuf Kemal to M. Franklin-Bouillon.[29] In any case, whether there were any Allied officers at allei ther in the gendarmerie schools or the gendarmerie, depended on the Turks.

LORD CURZON concluded the proceedings by emphasising the necessity of Allied unity throughout the conference at Lausanne, and thanked M. Poincaré for having agreed generally to his memorandum and for the full and frank explanations which he had offered.[30]

After a communiqué to the press had been agreed upon, the meeting adjourned.

[28] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 429, 437, and 438.

[29] In Paris telegram No. 610 (see n. 1), Lord Curzon reported: '. . . Poincaré inadvertently admitted that text of incriminating letter supplied to us was Quai d'Orsay version of more than one letter exchanged between Franklin-Bouillon and Kemal.'

[30] In Paris telegram No. 610 (see n. 1), Lord Curzon concluded: 'The bulk of these agreements will I suppose have to be thrashed [out] again with Signor Mussolini, whom we meet at the end of an exhausting journey on the Lake of Geneva tomorrow night.'

No. 205

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 358 Telegraphic [*C 15699/13/19*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 19, 1922, 4.00 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 681 (of November 16th. Execution of Greek Ministers).[1] Greek Minister here was told on November 17th in an interview, full account of which goes to Athens by bag on November 20th,[2] that His Majesty's Government take gravest view of apparent intention of Greek government to execute late Ministers and Generals, and that if this threat, so contrary to civilised practice, is carried into effect, His Majesty's Government will be compelled to cease diplomatic intercourse with Greek government, withdraw their Minister from Athens and no longer receive Greek Minister here.

M. Caclamanos, who was evidently impressed, undertook to send urgent warning to Greek government and to press them not to take a course that, apart from its other consequences, would inevitably lead to definite withdrawal of allied support in forthcoming negotiations with Turkey at Lausanne.[3]

As it appears from your telegram that situation is in fact under control if Greek government choose to exert themselves, any guarantee against the return of the ex-Ministers such as that suggested in last paragraph of your telegram, seems undesirable and might even prove ultimately embarrassing for it would be difficult to carry out in practice. Drastic action already taken here should prove effective and it seems better to await its result before committing ourselves to anything further.

[1] Not printed.
[2] Despatch No. 781 of November 20, not printed.
[3] Cf. No. 203.

No. 206

British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian President of the Council, held at the Grand Hôtel des Alpes at Territet, at 7.30 p.m., on November 19, 1922

[*E 13149/27/44*]

PRESENT: *France:* M. Poincaré, M. Barrère, M. Bompard; SECRETARIES, M. Laroche, M. Massigli.
Great Britain: Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir William Tyrrell; SECRETARY, Mr. Forbes Adam.
Italy: Signor Mussolini, Signor Contarini, Signor Lago; SECRETARIES, Signor Barone Russo, Signor Guariglia.

Also present:

Admiral Lacaze.
General Weygand.
INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

M. POINCARÉ opened the discussion by explaining that Lord Curzon and he had had a conversation in Paris[1] in the presence of Baron Avezzana on the various points enumerated in the British memorandum. (See Annex I to Minutes of Paris Meeting of the 18th November.)[2] They had reached a fairly precise agreement on most points, and had realised generally that there should be no difficulty in maintaining a common attitude before the Turks.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he wished to ask a preliminary question, and that was whether it was really necessary for all the experts present to assist at their discussion.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON explained that they thought it desirable that the French and British plenipotentiaries for the Lausanne Conference should be present at this discussion on the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that it might be necessary later for all the experts and delegates to be present, but there were several other questions which he wished first to consider.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON agreed to have a private discussion first, if Signor Mussolini so desired.[3]

[1] See No. 204. [2] See No. 204, n. 12.

[3] In his telegram No. 1 from Lausanne, drafted on November 19 and despatched the following day, Lord Curzon reported as follows: 'Upon arriving with Monsieur Poincaré at Lausanne this evening, we found we were expected to proceed to Territet to meet Signor Mussolini. The latter had declared his inability to come to Lausanne for personal reasons but when we found later that he had arranged to return with us at night and is indeed now installed in the same hotel we realized our progress to Territet was required for spectacular effect. This was successfully accomplished and Monsieur Poincaré and I were escorted by Mussolini through large crowds to his hotel. There we sat down at once to a conference which was attended by French and British delegates and secretaries. Mussolini, however, asked that room should be cleared and left to Monsieur Poincaré, himself and me. He produced a paper and declared that he must decline to proceed until Monsieur Poincaré and I, on behalf of our governments, had signed a formula declaring the perfect equality of Italy with France and Great Britain in respect both of interests, duties and rights in the East. This we both declined to do on double ground that equality did not in fact exist and that any declaration of common interests should follow and not precede agreement on points we had met to discuss.

'Monsieur Poincaré eventually drew up a harmless formula to be issued after we had come to an agreement. The company having been re-admitted we then took points in my memorandum one by one, with an interval for dinner in which we were guests of Mussolini. Everything was devised for effect and Italian premier is evidently a finished actor. He speaks French well and conducts himself with a certain rather histrionic dignity. But it was soon obvious that he knew next to nothing of the subjects and his agreement was procured with little difficulty to all points by President of the Council and myself, former showing considerable ingenuity in meeting arguments or flattering the vanity of our host. The unexpected spectacle was thus offered of France and England presenting a firm front to the somewhat feeble assaults of our ill-informed ally. A few subjects were reserved for

At this stage all present withdrew except M. Poincaré, Lord Curzon, Signor Mussolini and M. Camerlynck.

The full conference resumed at 8.15 p.m.

M. POINCARÉ began by taking the points in the British memorandum one by one.

As regards *Western Thrace*, he explained that during their conversation in Paris the day before he had made it quite clear that France was agreed as to there being no plebiscite, but that he was anxious that both sides of the Maritza, and not merely the Turkish, should be demilitarised. Otherwise the Turks might easily be attacked, and this might not be treating them quite fairly. Lord Curzon had told him, however, that he was in agreement with the French Government on this point.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI enquired what was the population which would have to vote in a plebiscite supposing one were agreed to.

M. POINCARÉ replied that it was difficult to state, as it had never been decided what was Western Thrace.

LORD CURZON pointed out that there could be no question of a plebiscite in any case. The matter no longer concerned Turkey, as, by the Treaty of Neuilly, Western Thrace, which was Bulgarian territory, had been surrendered to the Allies and had been provisionally disposed of by them in favour of Greece. The plebiscite could not therefore be admitted. The real point, which M. Poincaré had already raised, was the question of the demilitarised zones. He (Lord Curzon) had yesterday suggested two zones, one on either side of the Maritza. Such an arrangement would have the added advantage of facilitating Bulgaria's access to the sea along the railway to Dedeagatch. If only the Allies could come to an agreement regarding these zones, they would be carrying out in full their agreement of March last and at the same time satisfying Bulgarian legitimate claims.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the *western frontier of Eastern Thrace*. He explained that in his discussion with Lord Curzon the day before they had agreed that the 1915 frontier should be put forward, except possibly as regards Karagatch and the Adrianople forts on the right hand bank of the river. He believed that the Turks would be very intransigent on this point. Karagatch was the railway station of Adrianople. In Lord Curzon's view, however, no offer of Karagatch should be made to the Turks, at any rate at the beginning of their proceedings. Later on the Allies might consider among themselves whether a concession should not be made in return for Turkish concessions elsewhere. In any case he wished to emphasise that he entirely agreed with what Lord Curzon had said on the point of principle the day before, viz., that the Allies should never separate in the face of the

discussion tomorrow morning and we then all returned by train to Lausanne having to wait three quarters of an hour for Mussolini's railway carriage to be retrieved and attached. He will return to Italy tomorrow and the general impression left upon me is that Italians will not give much trouble provided they can get some advantage which they can parade to their countrymen.'

Turks, but should compose any differences which they might have among themselves.

LORD CURZON explained that his view was that we ought to wait and see what the Turks had to say on this matter. There were three very good reasons for not giving them back Karagatch:

1. It had been voluntarily ceded by Turkey in 1915 to Bulgaria, so it could not have been very important to her then;
2. If the Turks argued that Karagatch and the forts in other hands would be a threat to the safety of Adrianople, the Allied proposal for demilitarised zones would fully meet them;
3. If Turkish sovereignty were restored over this bit of the railway, the Allies might find difficulty in assuring Bulgarian access to the sea.

These, however, were matters for Allied discussion. They should first hear the Turks, and then consider among themselves, if the Turks expressed their case, how they (the Allies) should reply, while firmly maintaining throughout the principle to which M. Poincaré had referred as to the absolute necessity of a united front in the conference chamber.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he had no objection to offer.

M. POINCARÉ then read the *Straits* section of the British memorandum, and explained that Lord Curzon and he were in general agreement on the formula proposed therein.

LORD CURZON observed that M. Poincaré had the day before put before him an agreed formula prepared by M. Fromageot defining the freedom of the Straits.[4] He suggested that M. Poincaré might hand a copy later to Signor Mussolini.

M. POINCARÉ agreed and suggested that for the present they should continue to examine the remaining points of the memorandum. He then read the *Capitulation* proposal,[5] and explained that both France and Great Britain had prepared formulae on this point which might serve as a basis for discussion and as a proposal to be made to the Turks. Doubtless Italy had a draft also. There would be great difficulty with the Turks on this point, but the Allied interests were the same, and they must therefore remain united throughout the conference.

LORD CURZON suggested that the essential line for the Allies to follow was to avoid the use of the word 'Capitulations', which acted as a goad to the Turks. The British, French and Italian experts should concert together as soon as possible and produce a common draft. In this draft, while avoiding the word which the Turks disliked, they should retain substantial safeguards. He entirely agreed with M. Poincaré that the Allies here had all the same interests. Fortunately, too, there were neutral States, and the United States of America, who would come to their assistance and help them to fight a stiff battle with the Turks. They must bear in mind that Allied nationals would not be able to continue to live at Constantinople unless the Capitulations in some form or other, however modified, were maintained.

[4] See No. 204, n. 19. [5] See No. 204, n. 24.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said he entirely agreed that they must avoid the word and keep the substance, and that Europeans living in Turkey must be properly protected.

(The meeting then adjourned for dinner and resumed at 9.40 p.m.)

M. POINCARÉ took the next point in the memorandum, namely, the *Aegean Islands*.

LORD CURZON said that he would like to explain at once lest his formula might give rise to some misinterpretation. All he had wished to do was to make it quite clear that Turkish rights in all the islands in the Aegean were to be extinguished in the new treaty. He did not intend to refer at all in the formula to the question of the ultimate disposal of these islands. That was a matter for the Allies to discuss amongst themselves.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he quite understood, but that he must make a reservation regarding the Dodecanese.[6] They were entirely independent of the Sèvres settlement, and their fate was decided by article 8 of the Treaty of London.[7] He asked whether Lord Curzon had meant to exclude the Dodecanese from his formula.

LORD CURZON replied that the formula was meant to comprise all the islands in the Aegean which were dealt with in the Treaty of Sèvres, and, therefore, the Dodecanese. Signor Mussolini seemed to be not quite aware of the actual facts regarding the treatment of the Dodecanese in the Sèvres settlement. He did not, however, think it necessary to discuss this point now. All that they had to do was to meet the Turks. Italy would be free later to discuss the disposal of the Dodecanese with Greece and the Allies.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to pass the point subject to the general reservation which he had already made.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the question of the *frontiers of Syria and Mesopotamia*. The French Government agreed with the British Government that there should be no change in these except the rectification which the mandatory Powers were prepared to agree to. There was a similar agreement between France and Great Britain as regards the principle of the *mandates* not being discussed. As regards *Allied graves* he and Lord Curzon were in agreement that there should be a transfer of the ownership of the soil to the Allied Governments concerned.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to accept these points in the memorandum, but that he must make a reservation as regards the question of the mandates in Syria, Irak and Palestine, as between, France, England and Italy.

M. POINCARÉ said that he assumed this reservation did not apply to Turkey.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed that it was only a question as between the Allies.

M. POINCARÉ then took the question of *indemnities* in the British memorandum. He pointed out that the general lines of the settlement in this matter had been agreed to by the Allies in March last.[8] He had, however,

[6] See No. 148, n. 2.

[7] Of April 26, 1915, printed in Cmd. 671 of 1920.

[8] See Vol. XVII, No. 570.

yesterday made certain reservations to Lord Curzon as regards French property destroyed by the Greeks in Asia Minor. Doubtless there was other Allied property in a similar position. Lord Curzon agreed with him that it might be necessary to calculate the various demands and set them off one against the other.

LORD CURZON intervened to explain that the mention in his draft of an indemnity demanded from the Greeks referred only to the reported Turkish claim for the payment of [£]240,000,000 by Greece.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the *Mudania Convention*[9] and explained that he entirely adhered to Lord Curzon's proposal on this point.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then explained that they had had a long discussion the day before on the next point, the question of the Allies remaining at Constantinople until the ratification of the new treaty with Turkey. Marshal Foch had explained his views at length. They had understood from General Harington that if Constantinople were attacked by the Turks, it might be very difficult for the Allies to keep their hold on the town, and that it would be better to withdraw and concentrate on Gallipoli. In the circumstances, he (M. Poincaré) had thought that it might be better for the Allies to retire in advance before they were forced out. Apparently Signor Mussolini shared this view. On the other hand, Lord Curzon disagreed and believed that it would be a great blow to Allied prestige. However, the most recent news from Constantinople received from both General Charpy and General Pellé was that there was a considerable *détente* in the situation and little chance of a Turkish attack for the present. If so, it would not be necessary for the Allies to consider 'une retraite préventive'. They had therefore decided that it was better that the question of withdrawal should be discussed by the conference when it actually arose again in a serious form. They must not forget, however, that the Turks had an army of 150,000 men in Asia Minor, and the Turkish forces in front of Chanak and Ismid had two army corps echelonned behind them.

LORD CURZON admitted that there were certain dangers in the situation, but his first point was that the Allies had reached an agreement both in March and September that they would maintain their hold on Constantinople until the ratification of the new treaty with Turkey.[10] A premature retirement would otherwise deal a terrible blow to Allied prestige. He (Lord Curzon) did not believe that any serious difficulty was now likely to arise. It was therefore much better for the Allies to hold on as long as possible and not to evacuate Constantinople unless they were actually forced to until the new treaty came into force. The better news from Constantinople, to which M. Poincaré had referred, was welcome. For the present, therefore, there was no need to reopen the argument of September last.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI confessed himself to be pessimistic as regards the situation in Constantinople. His own news was grave. The Allies could not

[9] See No. 119, n. 1.

[10] See No. 41, and Vol. XVII, No. 566, Annex 3.

dispute his contention that the number of troops at Constantinople was totally insufficient to defend the town.

LORD CURZON intervened to explain that there were in fact about 16,000 bayonets in the whole area, of which some 8,000 were in Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula, and about a similar number in Gallipoli and Chanak. There were actually in Constantinople 4,000 men to maintain order. He admitted that from a purely military point of view these numbers might be insufficient, and he had therefore asked M. Poincaré the day before to send reinforcements, if possible. He had found himself unable to make any promise, but he (Lord Curzon) would be very glad if Italy could see her way to adopt a different attitude and send reinforcements. He had a special right to speak on this matter as the majority of troops in the area were British, 11,000 against 4,000 French troops and one battalion of Italian troops.

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that if they were attacked by the Turks, it would not only be in the direction of the Straits. The Allies would also have to fight in Syria and Irak, and this at a time when French troops had already been transferred from Syria to Constantinople.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that they were agreed that in any case the troops at Constantinople were insufficient and that it would be difficult to reinforce them in time. The real question was whether the presence of this insufficient number of troops in the town encouraged Turkish intransigence or the reverse. How were the Turks going, in fact, to continue if Constantinople were retained by the Allies?

M. POINCARÉ pointed out that the Mudania Convention had really settled the question as between the Allies and the Turks, and that the Allies were to remain there until the conclusion of peace. If the Allies now retired without being forced to do so their attitude would be interpreted by the Turks as one of weakness.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI admitted the difficulty of the position. The Allies, while being conciliatory, must be prepared to show extreme firmness at a certain point, and we were in the difficulty of finding ourselves weak when we wished to be firm.

M. BARRÈRE said that once the Turks really understood that the Allies were together they would not attack them.

SIR H. RUMBOLD pointed out that if the Allies retired they would leave not only their very important colonies in Constantinople in danger, but also the Christian minorities. It would be deplorable if the Allies retired before a retirement was really necessary.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI asked whether the Allies were really in a position to defend either the colonies or the minorities.

M. POINCARÉ said that he did not think the Turks would attack if the Allies were united in staying in Constantinople. For the rest, the French had an agreement with the Turks[11] which the latter would violate if they attacked Constantinople. He believed the Italians also had an agreement.

[11] The reference is presumably to the Angora Agreement of October 20, 1921 (see Vol. XVII, No. 423).

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that this was not so, and that he believed the Grand National Assembly had recently repudiated the French agreement.

M. POINCARÉ replied that the agreement was still in force, and he did not think the Turks would break it.

SIGNOR CONTARINI said it was important to decide whether, if the Turks *did* attack, the Allies would resist.

M. POINCARÉ explained that he and Lord Curzon had agreed the day before that if the Turks did attack, the French and British forces should meet them force by force. If they evacuated before they were forced to, Constantinople and its Greek population might meet the fate of Smyrna.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI asked if there were not already Kemalists in Constantinople.

SIR H. RUMBOLD replied that there was a steady infiltration which was producing a gradual increase in the effective total of Turkish forces in, or near, the [t]own.

M. BOMPARD intervened to explain that, as far as he could ascertain from his own experience as Ambassador at Constantinople,[12] not only was there a large French colony in Constantinople, but there was also a colony of some 15,000 Italians. There was danger of the most terrible massacres which the prestige of the Allies symbolised by their presence in the town alone prevented.

SIR H. RUMBOLD added that there were also some 500,000 Armenians and Greeks in the city to be protected.

SIGNOR CONTARINI said that he thought there was no disagreement between the Allies in principle, but there was only the question that they should arrive at some decision as to what they should do in the event of a serious Turkish threat.

LORD CURZON pointed out that there were really three alternatives before the Allies:

1. The reinforcement of their troops at Constantinople. He would be glad if Italy would send them. M. Poincaré was apparently unwilling.

2. Immediate evacuation. This seemed to Lord Curzon deplorable.

3. The Allies should stay as they were and run a certain risk, meanwhile trying to reach the end of the Lausanne Conference without evacuation. He believed that as long as Ismet Pasha was at Lausanne talking to the Allies it was incredible that the Turks would attack them. Therefore let the Allies stay and run the risk rather than give the town over to massacre by retirement.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he would not insist.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the next point in the British memorandum, namely, *minorities*. The Allies were agreed that they should do what they could. Turkey was unlikely to accept any clauses as severe as those suggested in the March resolutions, but they might accept something similar to those in the European minority treaties.

[12] M. Bompard had been French Ambassador to Turkey from 1909 to 1914.

LORD CURZON thought that the Allies might be able to attain rather more than this. Provision had been made for a League of Nations High Commissioner at Constantinople.[13] It might be possible to confirm his position in the treaty and give him powers to visit certain areas and exercise a certain supervision over the execution of the minority clauses of the treaty. He (Lord Curzon) felt very strongly that, in virtue of the Allied proposals to the Greeks, the Allies must do all they could to protect such of these unfortunate people as remained in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace. It was quite true that the minorities were diminishing, and might end by disappearing, and that the Allies might not be able to do very much; but the eyes of the world were upon them, and America, who was sending representatives to the conference, was also watching, For his part, he would insist upon the Allies making the best fight possible.

M. POINCARÉ said that, although Lord Curzon had talked of American assistance, the difficulty was that America might take no part in the minorities settlement if, as Lord Curzon proposed, the League of Nations were in any way brought into the arrangement.

LORD CURZON replied that he did not think America would object to the League of Nations in this connection. She had shown herself ready to assist in the establishment of the International Court of Justice under the League. All that America really wanted was not to be actually mixed up in European politics. He was hopeful, however, that the American observers at the Lausanne Conference would give the Allies real support. In any case, the Allies must try to do something for the minorities with or without such support.

M. POINCARÉ then referred to the formula in the British memorandum regarding the *military forces of Turkey*. He explained that in the Allied conversations the day before[14] he had pointed out the difficulty of retaining the March resolutions. The Allies could hardly now ask Turkey to suppress purely and simply conscription, at any rate at once. Lord Curzon had presumably seen this by referring to the impossibility of attempting to abolish conscription in Asia Minor at any rate. The best line for the Allies to pursue was to be conciliatory as regards Asia, but very strict about Europe. In any case, the details of the military clauses might be examined by other experts.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI agreed.

M. POINCARÉ then raised the question of *finance and economics*. These were of a special interest to Italy and France. He proposed that the Allied experts should begin by preparing their joint draft. Perhaps however, Signor Mussolini would have something to say on the question of economics.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI replied in the affirmative, and said that he would like to-morrow to discuss the question of the islands, the mandates and economic matters.

M. POINCARÉ and LORD CURZON pointed out that as regards the mandates they had not come prepared to discuss this question with Italy. They were there to make peace with the Turks, and it was agreed that there could be no discussion of the mandate question with the latter.

[13] See Vol. XVII, No. 483. [14] See No. 204.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI said that he was prepared to agree on this point, while maintaining a general reservation regarding mandates in the new treaty, and that he would like to-morrow to discuss the Aegean Islands and the economic clauses.

It was agreed to adjourn until 10 a.m. on the 20th November, when the meeting could be resumed at the Beau-Rivage Hôtel at Lausanne.

The following communiqué to the press was agreed upon by the three Allies at the end of the sitting:

'M. Raymond Poincaré, M. Mussolini et Lord Curzon ont eu ce soir une première conversation dans laquelle s'est nettement affirmée leur commune résolution de régler dans l'esprit de la plus cordiale amitié, et sur la base d'une parfaite égalité entre Alliés, toutes les questions qui vont être traitées à la Conférence de Lausanne.

'Ils auront demain matin une seconde réunion.'[15]

[15] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 136.

No. 207

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 20, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 2 Telegraphic [E 12958/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 20, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Meeting of allied delegates and experts together with French and Italian Présidents du Conseil was resumed this morning when Italians raised question of Dodecanese and mandates. I replied as to former that we were only now concerned to discuss terms with Turks and that future of Islands was to be determined as part of entire peace settlement by friendly discussion between Allies. With this Signor Mussolini appeared to be satisfied. Marquis Garroni[1] then made a long and futile protest against French and British mandates on the ground that Italy had obtained no corresponding advantage but he did not seem to welcome suggestion of Monsieur Poincaré and myself that they should share mandate with ourselves on condition of sharing cost. Performance, which augured ill for future activities of my chief Italian colleague in conference, finally subsided, and we continued in a smaller meeting to discuss procedure of main conference. Chief point was Turkish demand to be admitted to share in presidency of principal commissions. This we decided to refuse on the ground that, just as it would have rested with inviting Power if place of meeting had been France, England or Italy, so it must be shared between inviting Powers in a neutral country. Plenary session of conference will be held at 3.30 p.m. this afternoon confined to speech of welcome by Swiss president.[2] Tomorrow morning we hold second meeting to accept proposals as to procedure, and first session for formal business will begin in the afternoon when we shall probably start upon frontier and territorial questions, myself in the chair.

[1] Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople.

[2] Dr. Robert Haab.

No. 208

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 21, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 689 Telegraphic [C 15886/13/19]

ATHENS, *November 20, 1922, 11 p.m.*

Very urgent

Your telegram No. 358.[1]

There has been a Cabinet Council sitting nearly all day to consider communications made to Monsieur Caclamanos; and negotiations between government and revolutionary committee have been continuous since Saturday.[2]

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that revolutionary committee have refused to give assurances asked for in my note (see my telegram 673)[3]. Instead, committee have drafted a reply in friendly terms arguing case and requesting His Majesty's Government not to insist. Minister for Foreign Affairs before sending this reply came to ask whether it would do more harm than good. He explained that government had decided to resign unless cause of complaint, friction with His Majesty's Government, were removed. He did not think any other civil government could be formed, and he supposed that a purely military one would take office. He could not say what such a government would do.

I have satisfied myself that government will certainly resign unless some issue is found. This would be no loss if any government, except one of military extremists, could be formed; but it certainly could not. And it is impossible to say to what lengths such a government would go. Papers are full of government criticism though no mention is made of cause, and government are only staying in office in order to give me time to receive instructions.

The position here is liable to change from day to day, and the attitude of the revolutionary committee has hardened since Saturday.[2] It appears to me that the best course would be for me to tell Minister for Foreign Affairs to send me his reply to my note. He suggested that I should not make any counter reply, but I told him that I did not think His Majesty's Government would consent to this as it would look as though they took no further interest in the fate of prisoners. I would submit it however to you.

Another alternative is for me to say in my counter reply that His Majesty's Government do not insist on written assurances (see your telegram No. 353)[4] but are confident that Greek government, knowing our wishes in the matter, will be mindful of them.

There remains threat to break off diplomatic relations conveyed to Monsieur Caclamanos.[5] I do not think any civil government could be formed as long as that threat stands. But it has not been put in writing, and I might

[1] No. 205. [2] November 18. [3] See No. 203, n. 14.
[4] Of November 14, not printed (see No. 203, n. 13). [5] See No. 205.

be authorised to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that under the exceptional circumstances explained since it was made, it would not be carried into effect.

If none of these alternatives are accepted there is nothing for it but for me to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is useless for him to reply to my note in the sense proposed as His Majesty's Government intend to insist on their previous representations.

I would recommend this course without hesitation did I not fear that in the present state of excitement it might be immediately fatal to prisoners and perhaps others. Situation has become so unsettled that I hesitate to recommend a course which may precipitate a catastrophe. Moreover, I am informed by people really behind the scenes that there is a fair chance of saving prisoners if officers now have appearance of acting without pressure. It is just possible that revolutionary committee, on finding that no civil government . . .[6] be found, may accept our demands, but I am bound to say that risk of their not doing so is very great, and if this happens and we break off diplomatic relations anarchy is inevitable.

Sent to Lord Curzon, Lausanne, No. 1.

[6] The text is here uncertain.

CHAPTER II

Correspondence and Memoranda relating to the Conference of Lausanne

November 20, 1922–February 5, 1923

No. 209

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 20, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 6 Telegraphic [E 12960/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 20, 1922, 8 p.m.*

First plenary meeting of conference[1] took place this afternoon in a large hall open to public and press. Swiss President presided and read an appropriate and well-worded speech of welcome.[2] It had been agreed that I should respond on behalf of delegations in a few words of a complimentary character. This I did[3] and proceedings would have terminated had not Ismet Pasha advanced to the platform pulled out a paper and read speech containing some very partisan and rather truculent remarks.[4] French President of the Council told me that but for his influence speech would have been much worse.

French and Turks are staying in same hotel and contact between them [is] constant and close. Ismet Pasha is coming to call upon me presently.

His attitude to-day was (? example of) spirit in which Turkish delegation are approaching conference and foreshadows trouble at every turn.

[1] For the Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, see Cmd. 1814 (1923), *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs* (Turkey No. 1 (1923)). In a Memorandum of April 9, 1923, Mr. G. W. Rendel, a member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, noted: 'When our Lausanne blue book was published the French official "textes définitifs" of the minutes of the following meetings had not yet been issued:

'First Commission, meetings 19–25 inclusive.
Second " " 3 and 4.
Third " " 4 and 5.

'The blue book versions of the minutes of those meetings were therefore taken from provisional texts, and were only authoritative in so far as the British speeches were concerned.'

The official French texts of the minutes of the meetings of both the Commissions and the sub-committees were published by the French Government in a publication, here cited as *Recueil* (*1*) (see List of Abbreviations). The French publication does not contain Lord Curzon's correspondence with Ismet Pasha concerning Mosul (Cmd. 1814, pp. 363–93), or the record of a meeting of January 26, 1923, which discussed the question of the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean (Cmd. 1814, pp. 457–64).

Minutes and correspondence concerning the preparation and distribution of Cmd. 1814 are to be found on file E 23/44.

[2] Cmd. 1814, pp. 1–3. [3] Ibid., pp. 3–4. [4] Ibid., p. 4.

No. 210

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 20, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 5 Telegraphic [E 12959/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 20, 1922, 8.10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 1.[1]

I have very carefully considered with Sir H. Rumbold[2] suggestion contained in above, which Lord Derby had made to me before leaving London. I do not think suspicions mentioned to me by the French President are entertained by French government. They have never been alluded to by M. Poincaré. Question should therefore be decided in the main by local considerations as affecting Constantinople itself. Even if French did not take advantage of offer to suggest some other commander than Marshal Foch, and even if they refused it for Marshal Foch himself, as I think they would probably do, knowledge that it had been made, which they would take care to disseminate, would certainly weaken both General Harington and British position in Constantinople. Further, Turks would profit by it to spread report that we had abdicated in favour of the French and were unable to cope with situation ourselves. Lastly I am apprehensive that French would regard it as a strategem devised by us to throw discredit of a possible disaster at Constantinople on to them. For all of these reasons in which Sir H. Rumbold concurs I would prefer not to make the suggestion.

[1] Of November 19. This ran: 'Prime Minister, much impressed by apparently still continuing French suspicions of designs on our part to establish special position for ourselves at Constantinople or in Dardanelles, asks me to suggest for your consideration whether we should not propose that French government should confer command in Turkey on Marshal Foch, in which case we should offer to place the British troops there under his orders. If French government were to accept such arrangement, it would present obvious advantage (1) of convincing them that designs attributed to us have no existence in fact, (2) of impressing Turks with reality of allied unity in face of possible military encroachments, and (3) of France becoming more definitely committed to making determined stand against such encroachments in co-operation with Great Britain and Italy.'

[2] Sir H. Rumbold was the second British delegate at the Conference of Lausanne. He had left Constantinople on November 15.

No. 211

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 21, 8.45 p.m.)
No. 9 Telegraphic [E 13003/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 21, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

First business meeting of conference[1] was held this morning with myself in the chair and a full attendance of every delegation with their staffs.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 5–14.

Subject of discussion was draft rules of procedure raising such important questions as appointment and chairmanship of committees for dealing with main subjects of new treaty, creation and duties of secretariat, rules of business and announcements to press.

Upon great majority of these points Turks raised objections often of a very trivial character intended to establish their claim to complete equality or to satisfy their national pride. These protests were heard and answered with perfect courtesy but received no other support.

Three principal committees were appointed to deal with:

1. Territorial and military questions, chairman myself.

2. Régime of foreigners and minorities in Turkey, chairman Signor Garroni.

3. Financial and economic questions, ports and railways, health arrangements, chairman Monsieur Barrère.

This afternoon we meet again for a general preliminary discussion should anyone desire to raise it.

Tomorrow first commission commences its labours.

No. 212

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 22, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 12 Telegraphic [E 13005/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 21, 1922, 11.55 p.m.*

Second meeting[1] began at 4 p.m. to-day. Turks endeavoured to re-open principal question regarding our programme of procedure which had been decided in the morning. Although this was entirely irregular I allowed them to state their case but declined to reconsider decisions already arrived at and placed on record. They acquiesced in this situation with unexpected equanimity. I then invited general discussion in the event of anyone desiring to raise it but there being no response we adjourned in best of tempers. Discussion on Thrace begins tomorrow morning and allies have met in my room this evening to settle a common line of action.

In the course of this morning's discussion I appealed to conference to observe strict silence about our proceedings from day to day, an agreed press communiqué being issued after each session. This appeal was cordially supported by French and Italian delegates and was unanimously agreed to. How long it will be kept I refrain from prophesying.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 15–19.

No. 213

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 22, 3.25 p.m.)
No. 13 Telegraphic [E 13063/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 22, 1922, 12.30 p.m.*

I had a long and friendly conversation with Signor Mussolini for over an hour this evening.[1] He described his policy at home and abroad pointing out that he was in position of a director who could carry out his promises and translate every intention into action. Abroad he was strongly in favour of Entente on basis of equal rights, and friendship with England was a cardinal principle of his creed. Two questions particularly concerned him. One was that of Dodecanese[2] in which he was intensely anxious that Turkey should not be allowed a voice but that it should be settled by an agreement between Allies. He was gratified by assurance that this was precise meaning of clause in my memorandum[3] referring to this subject. He then spoke at great length upon question of mandate, of the history and character of which he appeared to have haziest notion. At the back of his mind is clearly the idea that Italy, having practically lost tripartite agreement,[4] and being unlikely to retain greater part of Dodecanese, has nothing to show to the world as eastern reward for her victory in the war whereas her allies have acquired possession of valuable territories which are a source to them of wealth and power. I pointed out that such was far from being our own estimate of value of Mesopotamia and Palestine, that Italy having been offered, and having at one time accepted, mandate for Caucasus[5] had then voluntarily backed out and that while her military contribution to defeat of the Turks did not entitle her to any considerable prize in the East, she had gained more than any other of the Allies in Europe. He wanted me to authorize a declaration that his country had equal rights in mandated territories with ourselves and sketched a vague programme of Italian participation in position there created, even going so far as to take a share in military and financial responsibilities of maintenance. I declined to give any assurance and reminded him that mandates had been solemnly conferred after years of discussion by League of Nations, that Italian representatives on Council had enjoyed abundant opportunities of stating his views, but that never once in four years since the war had I received hint of Italian desire for participation. I urged Mussolini to study question very carefully before arriving at final opinion and promised to consider any [vi]ews that he might submit through Italian ambassador but I warned him against any sanguine expectations.

It was clear to me that he knew little of the subject and was merely impressed with the idea of making some startling revulsion [*sic*] of policy that would gratify his countrymen and perhaps of obtaining economic

[1] i.e. November 21. [2] See No. 148, n. 2. [3] No. 193.
[4] Of August 10, 1920, printed in *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 797–803.
[5] See Vol. II, No. 55, minute 9.

concessions which would make up for disappearance of tripartite agreement. I should add that in our numerous conversations during the last forty-eight hours Mussolini has struck me as a sincere and attractive and certainly a remarkable personality though strangely immature and lacking in experience in some of his views. The theatricality of his demeanour wears off in private intercourse.

No. 214

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 732 Telegraphic [E 13082/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 22, 1922, 11.50 p.m.*

Allied Generals failed to reach agreement to-day in regard to police with Refet Pasha who declined to admit jurisdiction of allied police over Hellenes and Russians. Please see General Harington's telegram on the subject.[1] Refet also objected to presence here of Greek High Commissioner and apparently threatened to arrest General Kat[e]chakis[2] who arrived here two days ago to take over from Monsieur Canellopoulos[3] and to close down Greek legation.

If there is to be duality of control in police matters only logical division is Ottoman and non-Ottoman subjects. So long as allies remain here it is inconceivable that Hellenes and Russians should be left at the mercy of Turkish police. Immediate result would be expulsion of Russian diplomatic mission and installation in Russian Embassy of Soviet Mission. Generals told Refet to discuss question of Greek High Commissioner with allied High Commissioners. My view is that we should tolerate no interference with Greek mission here.

In my opinion so many important questions depend on maintenance of allied police control over non-Ottomans that this is probable reason why Turks are offering such opposition.

Refet who will be occupied during next two days with arrangements for enthronement of Caliph[4] will not meet Generals before November 25th. It would be well if French and Italian Generals who show signs of weakening to-day should receive very categorical instructions to insist on allied police protection for Russians and Greeks.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 11.

[1] No. 3061 of November 22 to the War Office, repeated to Lausanne, not printed.

[2] Previously Civil Governor of Adrianople, and one of the leaders of the Greek National Defence Movement in Constantinople. As reported in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 1049 of November 25, not printed, he left for Athens on November 24.

[3] M. Kanellopoulos, a member of the Greek Government, had arrived in Constantinople on November 18 to act temporarily as Greek High Commissioner.

[4] In his telegram No. 726 of November 19, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'After prolonged secret session, in which apparently only 162 Deputies participated, telegrams from Angora state that Grand National Assembly elected Crown Prince Abdul Mejid by 148 votes, Selim getting three and Abdul Rahman two.'

No. 215

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 23, 2.35 p.m.)
No. 19 Telegraphic [E 13103/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 23, 1922, 12 noon*

First meeting of frontier commission under my chairmanship was held this morning to discuss Thracian question.[1] It opened with Turkish demand for reversion to entire pre-war frontier of Thrace and as regards Western Thrace holding of plebiscite in an area of that territory the boundaries of which they had not even considered. I have the utmost difficulty in dealing with the Turkish delegation who appear to think it sufficient to put forward a demand unsupported by any arguments or figures or facts then to express utmost surprise if claim is not acquiesced in and finally to ask for an adjournment in order to prepare reply which when the moment arrives is found not yet to be ready. I can only conclude that this is part of deliberate plan to waste time of conference and to show their contempt for ordinary usage. Otherwise it is wholly inept. Turks having briefly stated above claim, Monsieur Venizelos made a speech first part of which though quite irrelevant was an emotional defence of Greek action since early days of the war. Second part consisted of effective reply to Turkish pretensions as regards Karagatch, triangle in which it is situated and Western Thrace. Monsieur Nincic on behalf of Serbia and Monsieur Duca on behalf of Roumania then made short but very useful speeches in which they vigorously contested Turkish case and threw themselves whole-heartedly on side of the allies, Nincic formulating suggestion of a demilitarised zone or strip on both sides of entire Turco-Bulgarian frontier from Black Sea to Aegean. We then adjourned till 4 p.m. in order to enable Turks to prepare their rejoinder. When we reassembled[2] Bulgarian premier[3] was first heard on demand of his country for an outlet on the Aegean. Turks then took everyone's breath away by declining to give their promised reply on the ground that case against them had not been sufficiently clearly defined. No appeals, protests or warnings could move them from this position and accordingly I said that while I regretted having to speak before I was in full possession of their arguments or counter arguments I was left with no alternative but to put before them reasoned opinion of the three principal allies. We had spent one half hour yesterday evening in discussing this in my room on basis of firm agreement already arrived at between Monsieur Poincaré, Monsieur Mussolini and myself and I was therefore in a position to cover the whole ground. I said that allies must decline to tear up or ignore treaties by which Thracian frontier had been determined. We must adhere to Maritza frontier which was boundary consistently demanded by Turks themselves. As regards demilitarised zones I thought idea ought to be examined by a sub-committee

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 19–28.
[2] See ibid., pp. 29–40.
[3] M. Stambouliisky.

of military experts on which Turks would of course be represented. As to northern frontier I could express no opinion. But on west I developed a scheme upon which we had agreed for creation of demilitarised zones twenty or thirty kilometres wide on both banks of Maritza river from north west corner of eastern Thrace to sea. This would provide both for military security of Thrace and for commercial access of Bulgaria to Aegean. I proposed an international control of this railway and of port. As regards Western Thrace I said that the powers must absolutely decline to re-open this question which had been settled by Treaty of Neuilly and could not consider suggestion of a plebiscite which would only introduce further confusion in an area to which Turks had no claim whatever. On conclusion of my remarks I was loyally and warmly supported by principal French and Italian delegates who expressed their agreement with everything that I had said and declared that allies were solidly united.

We then adjourned till tomorrow to enable Turks to deliver their reply. Exhibition of so firm an allied front at this stage and on so important an issue took Turks very much by surprise and will probably exercise a decisive influence on our future proceedings.

No. 216

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 365 Telegraphic [C 15969/33/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 23, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegrams Nos. 689[1] and 690[2] (of November 20th and 21st; trial of Greek ex-ministers).

There is no occasion for your arranging for exchange of further notes with Greek government. It will be sufficient for you to inform them that the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government have been made quite clear to the Greek government through their Minister in London[3] and that they therefore now clearly understand that execution or barbarous treatment of ex-ministers will be followed by our severing diplomatic relations. His Majesty's Government have nothing to add to this unequivocal warning.

I would be reluctant to adopt proposal contained in your telegram No. 690.

[1] No. 208.

[2] This ran: 'I think it possible that solution might be found if I were authorized to accept from such of prisoners as may be condemned to death an undertaking in writing not to return to Greece for a period of say ten or fifteen years.' Cf. No. 203.

[3] See No. 205.

No. 217

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 23, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 23 Telegraphic [E 13109/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 23, 1922, 8.20 p.m.*

At meeting of frontier commission this morning[1] the Turks, who had apparently realised the unwisdom of their proceedings yesterday, and who were alleged to have sat up till 3 a.m. preparing their reply, delivered full and (? amiable) rejoinder to the case that had been made against them by different speakers yesterday. They reiterated their previous demands for 1913 frontier and a plebiscite in Western Thrace but without heat or discourtesy, and they concluded by accepting suggestion which I had thrown out yesterday, that the question of a demilitarised zone or zones on northern and western frontier of Eastern Thrace, as well as that of railway control in area between Maritza and the sea and the creation of port facilities at Dedeagatch, should be referred to a sub-committee of military and economic experts. This proposal was carried unanimously and the sub-committee was at once appointed and commenced its sittings this afternoon. General Weygand will be chairman and British representatives are General Burnett-Stewart and Mr. Nicolson assisted by other experts. Monsieur Veniselos delivered an impassioned harangue in reply to the Turkish statement but it was agreed to defer continuance of main discussion until sub-committee has reported which we hope may be tomorrow afternoon.[2] Tone at this morning's meeting was much more amicable although broad difference on issues remains unabated. Protest was made by the Turks against an alleged violation of obligation about press secrecy but as the case was not serious the matter was not pursued. Difficulty is, however, acute and growing; although we are making attempts to supervise such information as is given to the press, I doubt our ability either to satisfy or to control the immense number of press correspondents assembled here.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 40–61.

[2] For its report, see Cmd. 1814, pp. 77–80.

No. 218

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 24, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 24 Telegraphic [E 13120/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 23, 1922, 11.35 p.m.*

This evening I invited Ismet Pasha to call upon me to meet French and Italian delegates and discuss military situation at Constantinople.

I pointed out to him how undesirable and indeed improper it is that while we are seated round a table here trying to make peace, Angora representative at Constantinople should be acting in a manner that may at any

time render our relations there impossible.[1] I reminded him that allied governments had promised to evacuate city as soon as new peace treaty has come into operation[2]—to which pledge we should faithfully adhere—and argued absolute necessity of preserving a friendly status quo in the interval. High Commissioner then gave a list of cases concerning allied police and other matters in which there continues to be danger of friction at Constantinople, and, promising him brief memorandum[3] about these, I urged that replacement of Refet Pasha by another governor as reported in press provided good opening for a more conciliatory policy. Ismet Pasha said that he had no authority to issue orders himself but that he would at once telegraph to Angora on subjects mentioned in memorandum and would ask that instructions be sent in the sense desired.

After meeting I asked French and Italians to telegraph instructions to their High Commissioners vigorously to maintain claim that allied police should protect allied subjects including Hellenes and Russians.

[1] See No. 214. [2] See No. 48, Annex, No. 51, nn. 8 and 10, and No. 52.
[3] Dated November 23, not printed.

No. 219

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 12 Telegraphic [E 13150/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 24, 1922, 12.45 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 27.[1]

Your telegram No. 11.[2] My telegram No. 24 to Foreign Office.[3]

Record of action taken here. We understood from your telegram No. 9[4] that generals had consented to Turkish subjects arrested by Allies for offences against allied forces being tried by Turkish courts. Penultimate sentence of first paragraph of General Harington's telegram No. 3061 to War Office[5] seems to suggest that question of tribunal to try such cases is still open. Please clear this up as soon as possible as we have cited generals' readiness to allow Turkish subjects arrested by Allies to be tried by Turkish courts as fresh proof of moderate attitude of generals and it seems impossible now to depart from this position.

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 24 at 2.30 p.m.
[2] No. 214. [3] No. 218.
[4] The reference is to General Harington's telegram No. 3045 of November 20 to the War Office, not printed, which Mr. Henderson repeated to Lausanne.
[5] Not printed. See No. 214, n. 1.

No. 220

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 693 Telegraphic [*C 16071/13/19*]

ATHENS, *November 24, 1922, 11 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 365.[1]

I warned Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that in absence of fresh instructions warning to Monsieur Caclamanos[2] held good and this morning I communicated to him your above-mentioned telegram. Minister for Foreign Affairs was much perturbed and said that government would resign to-day. I told him I could not believe revolutionary committee was so devoid of political sense as not to accept situation and commute any death sentences that might be passed. He said that he doubted it very much and dwelt on fact that French government had shown complete reserve regarding prisoners. I said that French government were not in the same position as we, since they had, since 1920, adopted frankly hostile attitude towards Greece, whereas we had kept in close touch with Greek government and knew that whatever mistakes ex-Ministers had made they had not worked wittingly against Greece. Moreover French government had not withdrawn their diplomatic representative after the murder of Serbian sovereigns whereas His Majesty's Government had.[3] Present case was analogous.

Since action by French Minister reported in my telegram No. 517[4] he has, on instructions from his government, avoided all mention of prisoners and has refused to join in unofficial collective démarche in their favour which the whole of the rest of the Corps Diplomatique desired to make. This attitude has of course been wilfully misinterpreted here as meaning that French government desire execution and has had much influence in encouraging extremists.

I presume that Monsieur Veniselos knows all that has passed. Advice from him based on purely external aspect of question would probably have effect.[5]

[1] No. 216. [2] See No. 205.

[3] On June 11, 1903 (see G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, ed., *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, vol. v (London 1928), pp. 133–5).

[4] Of September 28, not printed.

[5] In an unnumbered despatch of December 8, written after he had arrived at Lausanne (see No. 232, n. 4, below), Mr. Lindley wrote: 'On November 23rd, I received Your Lordship's reply [see No. 216] to the effect that His Majesty's Government had nothing to add to their previous communications to the Greek Government, who knew what would result if any executions took place. I immediately informed Mr. Politis of this communication, the Government resigned the same day and the Revolutionary Committee assumed control. Colonel Gonatas, President of the Committee, was charged with the duty of forming a government, and the new Ministers took the oath on the 27th ultimo. General Pangalos was the new Minister for War, and Mr. Rentis, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. The former acted during the trial as public prosecutor, and was more responsible than any other single individual for the demand for exemplary punishment; the latter was a Republican Venizelist who had given evidence during the trial. Colonel Plastiras remained outside the Cabinet as 'sole representative of the Revolution' with undefined power. He is the man who has most influence over the more turbulent of the junior officers.'

No. 221

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 25, 4.15 p.m.)
No. 695 Telegraphic [C 16093/13/19]

Very urgent ATHENS, *November 25, 1922, 12.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 693.[1]

Late last night I received note[2] from Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing resignation of the government and enclosing reply[3] of revolutionary committee to my notes (see my telegrams Nos. 669[4] and 673).[5]

Reply is on line foreshadowed by Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported in my telegram No. 689.[6]

Note begins by protesting against opinion expressed in first paragraph of your telegram No. 350.[7] It claims that revolution is above political parties but that its work will be ruined without exemplary punishment being meted out to guilty.

One of principal objects is rapid re-organization of the army but this, it states, is impossible without wiping out past and punishing those who have placed King before country and contributed to bring about present tragedy.

Revolution seeks justice and claims that all necessary guarantees have been given in this respect at trial.

Whilst admitting that existence of revolution is violation of constitution it claims that revolution has unanimous approbation of people whereas it accuses absolutism of King Constantine of having in fact abolished constitution since 1915 and again during last two years. Note hopes that as His Majesty's Government abstained during this latter period from intervention in internal affairs so they will not now persist in intervention which would ruin revolution.

Note claims to appreciate sentiments of humanity inspiring His Majesty's Government and re-affirms that one of the principal objects of revolution is close relations with traditionally friendly Powers.

Note ends by appeal to His Majesty's Government not to insist on demand which will result in revolution coming to an end and consequent internal anarchy.

Copy by first available safe opportunity.[8]

[Repeated to] Lord Curzon.

[1] No. 220.

[2] Of November 11/24, not printed.

[3] Of November 7/20, not printed.

[4] Of November 10, not printed. In this Mr. Lindley reported that he had that day addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an official note in terms of Lord Curzon's telegram No. 338 of October 30 (see No. 203, n. 7).

[5] Of November 14. In this Mr. Lindley reported that he had addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs an official note in terms of Lord Curzon's telegram No. 350 (see No. 203, n. 9).

[6] No. 208.

[7] No. 203, n. 9.

[8] Athens despatch No. 673 of November 25, not printed.

No. 222

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 25, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 31 Telegraphic [E 13191/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 25, 1922, 1.50 p.m.*

Sub-committee appointed with General Weygand as chairman to consider questions:

A. Constructing demilitarized zones on both sides of frontier of Eastern Thrace i.e. northern frontiers facing Bulgaria and western frontiers facing Greece and

B. Measures to be adopted for providing a free outlet for Bulgaria on the Aegean sea,—reported[1] this morning, after prolonged sittings in which all parties concerned including Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece lent a helping hand. Report recommended creation of such demilitarized zones 30 kilometres broad along the entire frontier of the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea. Reservations were made by the Turks and in less degree by Greece in favour of additional step neutralizing these zones and placing them under the individual and collective guarantee of signatory powers. Turks further reserved their claim for 1913 frontier to the west of Maritza as opposed to the frontier of Maritza River itself which has been laid down by the Allies. Concerning maritime outlet for Bulgaria sub-committee reported in favour of the creation of international commission to undertake construction of equipment and development of port at Dedeagatch and supervision and development of railway running thither from Bulgarian frontier. This alteration was agreed to by all the Powers represented on the sub-committee though Bulgarians put in a note to the effect that only by direct possession of territory required for port and railway terminus at Dedeagatch, or by creating autonomous régime for such territory, would port be of any use to Bulgaria. This afternoon we met[2] to discuss the above report. Turks explained their contentions about neutralization as necessary for their security from possible attacks in the future. I pointed out that this demand was one raising issues of the greatest importance and requiring reference to all governments concerned. Further I argued that discussion of questions by our committee should be postponed until we came to consideration of other demilitarized zones on both sides of the Straits and the Bosphorus, when the question of neutralization might more properly be examined. Turks further objected in toto to the inspection of demilitarized zones if created but were told by me that the Powers would probably insist on it. As regards Dedeagatch and railway a merry encounter took place between Monsieur Veniselos and Monsieur Stambouli[i]ski who belaboured each other with good natured fury to the great delight of the committee. I told Stambouli[i]ski that he ought to be profoundly grateful to us for giving him all that he had asked for so long, and that his further demands could not be

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 62–76. [2] See ibid., pp. 77–80.

conceded. At bottom we all know his petition for Dedeagatch as an economic outlet is sham and will never materialize and that what he wants is a jumping off place for the recovery of Western Thrace. Discussion ended in a very amicable manner and tomorrow we resume consideration of the main frontier problem. Monsieur Barthou [who] supports me with consistent loyalty and display of undeviating allied unity is making a great impression on the Turks who become more amenable every day. To what extent, however, Turkish delegation represent the views of Angora or will be supported, if they adopt a moderate attitude, by extremists of Grand National Assembly is still entirely doubtful.

No. 223

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 25, 6.45 p.m.)
No. 735 Telegraphic [E 13186/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 25, 1922, 5 p.m.*

My telegram No. 733.[1]

Refet requested meeting with high commissioners yesterday evening to discuss allied police question.[2]

Refet insisted that Hellenes, as enemy subjects, could not benefit by any special treatment, and that their interests should be entrusted to neutral (Swedish) government. He showed violent animosity against them. His attitude as regards Russians was quite different, and obviously influenced by effect which any concession to our point of view might have on Soviet government.

After interminable discussion compromise was reached on following lines:

Hellenes and Russians to be omitted from enumerated list of allies enjoying allied police protection as hitherto, but annex to General[s'] proposals to be attached to following effect:

'Until such time as further arrangements shall be made, Hellenes and Russians, provided that latter do not claim to be citizens of Soviet government, will continue to be treated in accordance with procedure laid down in clause concerning allied subjects.'

Omission of Hellenes from list of allies will not commend itself to Greek government, but substance is thereby obtained and question might otherwise have dragged on with daily risk of incidents. As it is, status quo for Hellenes and Russians is maintained though Angora will probably take an early opportunity of pressing further arrangements to be made in respect of Hellenes on lines of neutral [*sic*] protection.

Generals meet Refet today, when I hope that proposals will be agreed to and signed.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 18.

[1] Of November 23, not printed. [2] See No. 214.

No. 224

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 16 Telegraphic [E 13192/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 25, 1922, 11.10 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 32.[1]

Your telegram No. 14 from Harington to War Office.[2]

It would considerably assist task of allies here at present stage if General Harington would assume existence at Constantinople of complete allied unity now established at conference, and on this presumption now take where essential firm stand justified (? by this) unity. I feel that any further (? concession) at Constantinople must react on (? strong) attitude taken up by myself and other allies at Lausanne. I cannot but think risk entailed by continued submission to Turkish governor's demands is greater than that entailed by threat, or, even in last resort, use of force in support of just allied claims in Constantinople itself. A stand must be made somewhere and now appears to be the time to make it. Attitude of Turks here indicates that effect of such a stand would be salutary rather than the reverse. No doubt some risk is involved but with loyal allied co-operation, which can hardly be refused, I think it should be taken, and that General Harington should feel assured that he will be officially absolved of accomplished (*sic*) consequences that may . . .[3] ensure [*sic*]. It is considered that safe-guarding of non-Moslem population would best be ensured by assuming a firmer allied military stand, and consequent removal of all doubt as to allies' intentions. Safety of Christians seems to me incidental to re-establishment of full allied military prestige. Turkey should not, therefore, be allowed to become a (? skeleton) calculated to hamper complete freedom of military action.

Please show above to General Harington.

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 25 at 11.45 p.m.

[2] General Harington's telegram No. 3071 of November 23 to the War Office, not printed, which was repeated to Lausanne.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

[4] In his telegram No. 3091 of November 26 to the War Office, repeated to Lausanne, General Harington stated: 'Reference Lord Curzon's telegrams Nos. 16 [and] 32 to Constantinople and Foreign Office respectively, I hope I can assure Lord Curzon that his wishes are being carried out at Constantinople. I have conceded nothing from moment Conference met. Last week I have twice flatly refused Refet's demands and secured the arrangements we wanted regarding the police. . . . City is perfectly quiet, which state I think will continue during Conference. To avoid precipitating matters before allied unity was established I thought action of temporizing nature was justified up to meeting of Conference but I am doing and will do everything possible to carry out Curzon's wishes as indicated in cable under reply now that Conference has commenced.'

No. 225

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 20 Telegraphic [E 13216/27/44][1]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 25, 1922, 4.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 20 of November 23.[2]

Committee of Imperial Defence recommend that French Memorandum of November 18th on Freedom of Straits[3] should be accepted, on the understanding that the proposals contained therein are read in conjunction with Marshal Foch's proposals for the demilitarisation of the Straits (F[oreign] O[ffice] Memo[randum] of November 15th, page 7)[4] and subject to certain qualifications by the Admiralty set forth at the end of this telegram.

As regards Marshal Foch's proposals the Committee realise that as an allied force cannot be provided to ensure demilitarisation the Turks may succeed in rendering it ineffective. Nevertheless they agree with the remarks

[1] The text here printed is taken from a revised draft of the telegram transmitted to Sir E. Crowe by Sir M. Hankey in a private letter of November 25, 1922. This telegram had been discussed at the Committee of Imperial Defence on the evening of November 24. As Sir M. Hankey explained, the passage underlined was added by the Prime Minister.

[2] Not printed.

[3] This memorandum, communicated to Lord Curzon by M. Poincaré at the Paris meeting of November 18 (see No. 204) ran: 'Une condition essentielle de l'établissement d'une paix durable en Orient est l'organisation d'un régime assurant la Liberté des Détroits. L'exercice de la souveraineté ottomane devra subir à cet effet certaines restrictions, qui ne sauront toutefois lui être utilement imposées que si elles sont maintenues dans les limites strictement nécessaires pour assurer la liberté de la navigation.

'La question paraît donc pouvoir être posée dans les termes suivants:

I. NAVIRES DE COMMERCE ET ASSIMILÉS.

(a) *En temps de paix:* Liberté complète de navigation quels que soient le pavillon et le chargement, sans aucune formalité, taxe ou charge quelconques.

(b) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant neutre:* Liberté complète de navigation dans les mêmes conditions.

(c) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante:* Liberté de navigation pour les navires neutres, si le navire ne se livre pas à un transport d'assistance hostile (transport de contrebande, transport de troupes ou de passagers hostiles).

II. BÂTIMENTS DE GUERRE.

(a) *En temps de paix:* Liberté complète de passage, quel que soit le pavillon, sans aucune formalité, taxe ou charge quelconques, mais sous réserve d'une réglementation limitant le nombre et le tonnage des bâtiments d'un même pavillon, ainsi que la durée de leur séjour.

Il sera stipulé que les Puissances signataires qui avaient avant 1914 le droit de posséder des stationnaires, continueront de jouir de ce droit dans les mêmes conditions.

(b) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant neutre:* Liberté complète de passage dans les mêmes conditions. Interdiction aux bâtiments belligérants de tout acte de guerre, capture ou exercice du droit de visite; interdiction de séjourner plus de 24 heures au delà du temps de navigation, sauf force majeure; ravitaillement et réparations dans les termes de la Convention III de la Haye 1907 sur la neutralité maritime.

(c) *En temps de guerre, la Turquie étant belligérante:* Liberté complète de passage pour les navires neutres.'

[4] This memorandum, by Mr. H. G. Nicolson, is printed as Appendix I, pp. 974–83, below. The memorandum explains and discusses Marshal Foch's proposals.

by Marshal Foch in Lord Curzon's telegram of November 18th from Paris:[5] 'that though the protection thus afforded would be largely illusory, it might avail to give a breathing space of a week on the outbreak of hostilities when the Straits could be forced before the Turks had had time to block or defend them'.

The Committee also suggest that there would be diplomatic advantages in the future in securing the adoption by the Lausanne Conference of Marshal Foch's proposals even though later on the Turks succeed in evading them. On the whole the Committee consider that Marshal Foch's proposals for demilitarisation are the utmost we can hope to obtain in present circumstances.

In view of the uncertainty as to whether Marshal Foch's proposals can be made permanently effective the Committee do not feel justified in recommending that insistence on them should be carried to the point of wrecking the Lausanne Conference. The matter is one in which you will no doubt use the general discretion given you by the Cabinet.

The Committee of Imperial Defence recommend that you should ask the French Delegation, before they submit their proposals to the Conference, to make the following qualifications, on which the Admiralty lay stress, but the Prime Minister wishes it to be understood that the extent to which you press these views is left to your discretion.

Para[graph] 1 (*c*). In order to prevent the Turks from laying mines and also possibly using nets, hawsers or booms, the following paragraph should be added:

'The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as to interfere with the free passage of neutral ships.'

Para[graph] 2 (*a*). We presume that the proposal in the French Memorandum of November 18th does not mean that any limitation is to be placed on the total number of warships allowed in the Black Sea, but only on the number proceeding through the Straits at one time. Even so, the limitation of tonnage under 2 (a) if applied under 2 (b) might expose a fleet entering the Black Sea to the danger of being beaten in detail. They suggest therefore that reference to the limitation of tonnage should be omitted, or that such modification should be made as would avoid that danger.

A clause should be added to the following effect:

'Naval aircraft shall have the same rights as surface vessels in and over the Straits Zone.'[6]

[5] See No. 204, n. 1.

[6] In a minute of November 25 to Lord Curzon, Sir E. Crowe wrote: 'The Prime Minister thinks you will be interested to know, and therefore begs me say that Lord Robert Cecil with whom he has had a friendly conversation respecting the Freedom of the Straits has declared himself quite satisfied with the role assigned to the League of Nations under the proposals of Marshal Foch, which H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] are ready to support, and according to which the League would become responsible for the Inspection of the demilitarized zones with a view to ensure the proper execution of the treaty stipulations in this respect.'

No. 226

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 17 Telegraphic [E 13193/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 26, 1922, 2.10 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 35.[1]

Following is summary of progress up to this evening for the information of yourself and General Harington:

This morning frontier commission resumed discussion[2] of Thracian question. Ismet Pasha answered previous speech of Monsieur Veniselos and Monsieur Veniselos then answered Ismet. Serbian delegate Monsieur Nincic also made as before a very concise and (? serviceable) speech. I then summed up on behalf of the allies after previously consulting with the allies and declared inflexible adherence to decision (a) to decline any Turkish interference in respect of plebiscite or otherwise with Western Thrace and (b) to adhere to Maritza frontier of Eastern Thrace. On the other hand I announced concessions which we were (? willing) to make to the susceptibilities of Turkish government by restoring to them small enclave between the right bank of Maritza at Adrianople and boundary line drawn by Turkish government when it ceded Karagatch and surrounding district to Bulgaria in 1915. This concession will give separate railway station and small branch railway starting from Maritza river to Turks while keeping Karagatch which is Greek town in the hands of the Greeks.

I invited the Turkish delegation to reflect upon the entire situation before returning final reply, and pointed out to them the unwisdom of coming into collision not merely with inviting Powers, who were united, but with the solid bloc of Balkan States; such a collision could only end in failure for themselves and instead of leading to peace might revive war.

The chief American delegate intervened with a statement of American object in attending the conference on lines of the reply sent by his government to invitation of Powers, but attaching special importance to policy of the open door.

This afternoon[3] we took up question of Aegean Sea islands. Here Turks made a claim for:

1. Recognition of Turkish sovereignty over islands of Imbros and Tenedos and Samothrace commanding entrance of Dardanelles and for complete demilitarisation of those islands.

2. Similar demilitarisation of main group of islands now in the hands of Greeks lying between above group and Dodecanese, and

3. Abrogation of Greek sovereignty over this second group and institution of a form of autonomy which Ismet made no attempt to describe; this was

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 26 at 6.0 p.m.

[2] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 80–94.

[3] See ibid., pp. 94–101.

a try-on which I dismissed without difficulty and which was not heard of again. As regards question of demilitarisation for which there was more to be said, I proposed to defer official decision both as to demilitarisation of three most northerly islands, and as to sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos, until we take in hand question of Straits with which it is intimately connected. I proposed then to appoint a sub-committee of military and naval experts to examine this question, and at the same time to advise whether any, and if so what, form of demilitarisation should be applied to more southerly group which Veniselos declared his willingness to submit to this form of servitude. My suggestions were unanimously accepted by conference, and sitting was adjourned to Monday[4] when we take up the question of frontier of Syria and Irak. Ismet has asked to see me privately about latter subject tomorrow.

Concurrently, Third Commission on financial and economic questions under M. Barrère will be set up and will commence to sit on Monday or Tuesday.

First week of our labours has thus terminated and I think we may without exaggeration claim to have made progress that would have been deemed impossible a week ago.

[4] i.e. November 27.

No. 227

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 19 Telegraphic [E 13194/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 26, 1922, 2.5 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 36.[1]

With reference to my telegram No. 16[2] please acquaint General Officer Commanding from me with following.

Not feeling satisfied as to . . .[3] delay in arrival of Angora reply to representations concerning position in Constantinople made by Ismet Pasha at my request, or as to nature of reply when received, I spoke again to him on the matter this morning and obtained promise from him to telegraph privately to Selah-ed-Din[4] enjoining a circumspect and friendly attitude in

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 26 at 4.35 p.m.

[2] No. 224.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

[4] Selaheddin Adil Pasha, Under-Secretary for War, who was to replace Refet Pasha at Constantinople. In his telegram No. 3012 of November 28, addressed to Lausanne and repeated to the War Office, General Harington stated: 'For information contained in your cipher cable 19 I am greatly obliged. A wire has been sent by Ismet to Selaheddin and he will no doubt (? pass) [it] to Refet who is still officiating. While Conference lasts I think we shall avoid further incidents. Every day now they appear less aggressive.'

the city. This he undertook to do promising that no incident[s] should occur. I replied that they were occurring daily and that situation was becoming intolerable.

In the event of these protests and promises proving futile, I intend to raise the question in full conference next week, and to propose sending telegram from President to Angora direct insisting on a correct attitude at Constantinople and a maintenance of the status quo there, during the sittings of the conference, as a condition of continuance of latter.

No. 228

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 27, 10.40 p.m.)
No. 41 Telegraphic [E 13286/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 27, 1922, 7 p.m.*

This morning we were to have discussed question of Syrian and Mesopotamian frontiers at meeting of frontier commission. Ismet Pasha came to see me yesterday evening, and we had a conversation of one and a half hours on the whole situation. I think that he regards me with some confidence, and accordingly I responded with equal frankness. He asked me what I was going to say. I replied 'nothing until I knew what he was going to propose or ask for'. He said that he intended to ask for rendition of Mosul and Khurdistan, and when I asked on what possible grounds he could sustain such a request, he advanced a number of arguments ethnic and otherwise which it was not difficult to demolish. I then said that if demand were persisted in I should have no alternative but to say before the whole conference, 'I cannot and will not'. In fact I should return an absolute refusal, and from that attitude nothing would induce me to depart. In these circumstances I asked what would be the use of such a sitting if it were merely to result in the creation of another point of absolute and irreconcilable difference between us; surely that would not make for a treaty of peace. On the other hand there were practical questions such as settlement of frontier with possible modifications on both sides, which might well be discussed in an amicable spirit. Ismet Pasha then murmured word for which I was waiting, namely 'oil'. Upon my asking what he meant he said that Anatolia was a poor country without oil and that he would very much like to have some. I replied [that] this seemed to me not an unreasonable request which was well worthy of examination. I further remarked that as poverty of Turkey had been mentioned, it would probably cover a wider area than Anatolia, and that when a peace had been concluded and a strong and independent Turkish government had been set up, it would probably want cash. It was my experience that everyone who wanted cash ultimately turned up in London, and it might be well to contemplate this movement in advance. In other words instead of a public disagreement in conference, would it not be well

to see if we could arrive at a private agreement outside of it? Whereupon Ismet Pasha himself proposed postponement of discussion of tomorrow, and I shall now await his invitation to private conversation.

I have my own ideas as to way in which oil problem might be solved, but I shall be glad if you can ask Petroleum Department to send out Mr. F. C. Clark[e] to advise me without delay. I know what modifications of frontier to press for.

Ismet then turned discussion on to wider issues and asked my ideas as to future of conference and subjects to be discussed, notably freedom of Straits and demilitarised zones and capitulations. I gave him rough sketch of what I had in view without committing myself to any details and warned him against complete absorption of Turkish in Russian point of view about Straits, since, I said, in a short time difference of ideals and interests between two peoples might compel Turkey to look to West rather than to East, and she might regret a subordination which would no longer be of use to her. He adopted a stiff attitude about capitulations, but I urged that Turkey could not ask Europe to give all sorts of guarantees for protection to her, while she declined to afford any guarantees to Europeans who resided in her midst.

I ended by enquiring to what extent Turkish government would favour association of League of Nations in the various objects that we had in view, and strongly recommended Ismet to study question as likely to provide Turkey with a more effective and desirable guarantee than any other. He evinced no hostility to the idea and appeared far from indisposed to consider suggestion.

Of course difficulty will arise when Russians appear on the scene.

For this reason I propose to embark on Straits discussion directly they arrive in order to curtail opportunities for propaganda and intrigue.

Conversation with Ismet was of a distinctly hopeful character,[1] and every day that passes in such exchanges diminishes the chances of a rupture.

[1] Sir W. Tyrrell called upon Ismet Pasha, who had requested the meeting, on the evening of November 27. In a memorandum describing this interview, dated November 28 (*E 13599/13003/44*), Sir W. Tyrrell wrote: 'At the conclusion of our conversation Ismet Pasha assured me that he would at once make a thorough study of the League of Nations and its machinery, with a view to discover how far he could follow my advice. He also added that when he had made this study and cleared his mind, he would again get into touch with Lord Curzon with a view to resumption of his private conversations.'

No. 229

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 27, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 701 Telegraphic [C 16216/13/19]

ATHENS, *November 27, 1922, 8.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 700.[1] Monsieur Alexandri[s] has not yet taken oath and Monsieur Rentis, new Minister of Justice, is acting Minister for Foreign

[1] Of November 26, not printed.

Affairs.[2] He has given evidence in trial against ex-ministers and is a declared republican.

I called on him this afternoon and found him very reserved. I used every argument to show gravity of breach of diplomatic relations and I think I impressed him before the end of the interview. He promised to repeat all I had said to Cabinet this evening and said he would try to bring Colonel Plastiras to see me after dinner. Colonel Plastiras is not in new Cabinet but remains outside as sole representative of revolution.

There seems no doubt that military members of Cabinet have decided to proceed with executions and trial may end tonight and will almost certainly not last over tomorrow. Monsieur Rentis in his conversation reverted again to question of guarantee against return of ex-ministers to power and I said that His Majesty's Government could not offer such guarantee. Nevertheless I notice that in your telegram No. 365[3] Your Lordship does not absolutely refuse to consider proposal contained in my telegram No. 690[4] and I venture again to suggest I may be authorised to receive from ex-ministers a written undertaking that they will never take part in Greek political life.

This might even at eleventh hour save situation as it would enable revolutionary committee and Veniselists to save their faces and would show that His Majesty's Government were not backing parties to ex-ministers as against them (*sic*). It may already be too late for this proposal to be acted upon and I request earliest possible reply. If it is approved, I will not make use of it unless absolutely necessary.

Now Monsieur Veniselos has refused to intervene, it seems the only chance.[5]

Repeated to Lord Curzon No. 7.

[2] See No. 220, n. 5. [3] No. 216. [4] No. 216, n. 2.

[5] In Lausanne telegram No. 3 to Athens (No. 37 to the Foreign Office), of November 6, Lord Curzon stated: 'M. Veniselos disassociated himself completely from internal Greek affairs and refuses to intervene.'

No. 230

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 702 Telegraphic [C 16199/13/19]

Urgent ATHENS, *November 27, 1922, 11.30 p.m.*

Sent to Lord Curzon.

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

I have just had a long conversation with Colonel Plastiras who is now a kind of military dictator above the government. Although I used every argument I failed to move him from position that sentences of court martial must be carried out whatever they were. Sentence will probably be pronounced tonight or tomorrow.

[1] No. 229.

No. 231

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 2 Telegraphic [E 13331/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 28, 1922, 10.26 a.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 42.[1]

Russian delegates,[2] who have arrived here, have to-day addressed a letter to President of the conference quoting an opinion expressed by head of Italian government in favour of participation of Russia in all labours of conference,[3] and basing on this a demand to be admitted to the whole of our proceedings on a basis of equality with the Great Powers. We have drawn up draft reply referring to telegram of Monsieur Poincaré, and notes of British and Italian governments to Russian in second week of November,[4] in which invitation to Russians was confined to discussion of Straits question. This reply should have been forwarded to Russian delegation tonight, but, though Italian delegates accept it both in essence and form, they dare not join in sending it from fear of Signor Mussolini and his speech. Thus we are held up by this gratuitous reference to Rome.[5] Original invitation having been sent in the name of Italian government, who agreed at Paris[6] before Signor Mussolini assumed power, it is not possible now to depart from it, nor, I am sure, would Signor Mussolini wish to do so since I explained to him quite clearly here conditions under which Russians are coming and he raised no protest.

Please see him at once and ask that instructions be sent to Italian delegation to join in proposed reply.

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 28 at 1.0 p.m.

[2] The delegates of Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, were M. Chicherin, M. Rakovski, M. Mdvani, and M. Vorovski.

[3] See No. 172, n. 3. [4] See No. 172. [5] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 167.

[6] See No. 108, and No. 238, n. 4, below.

No. 232

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindley (Athens)
No. 4 Telegraphic [C 16246/13/19]

LAUSANNE, *November 28, 1922, 12.40 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 45.[1]

Your telegram No. 701.[2]

I observe that your present suggestion which is to obtain from condemned Greek ministers a written undertaking never again to take part in Greek

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 28 at 2.0 p.m.

[2] No. 229.

political life differs from that contained in your telegram No. 690[3] which was not to return to Greece for ten or fifteen years. I authorise you to obtain whichever undertaking is most likely to secure its object which is to save lives of sentenced men.[4] I should have thought exile from the country likely to be more effective than promise of abstention inside it.

[3] See No. 216.

[4] Before this telegram was received in Athens six of the sentenced men had been shot. In his telegram No. 704 of November 28, Mr. Lindley reported: 'Monsieur Gounaris, Monsieur Baltazzis, Monsieur Protopapadakis, Monsieur Theotokis, Monsieur Stratos and General Hadj[i]anestis were condemned to death late last night and were shot at eleven this morning. [Cf. No. 248, below]. I have asked for my passports and leave tonight by Simplon for Lausanne.' In his unnumbered despatch of December 8 (see No. 220, n. 5), Mr. Lindley reported: 'I learned of the executions at 2 p.m. and at once addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs asking for a laisser-passer and stating that my departure signified a breach of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Greece [Cf. No. 272, below]. The same evening I left Athens, being seen off by all the heads of the Foreign Missions and by the Chef du Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.' Mr. Lindley continued: 'It may be of interest, now that the tragedy has been accomplished, to examine certain aspects of the events leading up to it. It will be remembered that, in the first days of the revolution, Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras promised the French Minister and myself that the ex-Ministers would be tried by a civil court. This decision was published, and the failure to keep the promise then made was the origin of the evils which followed. The responsibility for setting up the Court Martial and suspending the constitutional guarantee against the death penalty for civil crimes cannot, in my opinion, be laid solely on the shoulders of the officers who carried out the coup d'état. I hardly spoke to a single Venizelist who did not desire to execute the late Ministers, and the ladies of the party were more bloodthirsty than the men. When it became known that His Majesty's Government were prepared to break off relations over the question, the more politically minded of the Venizelists were anxious to avoid a rupture, but it was then too late to damp down the fire they had helped to light. There can be no doubt that in Greece the execution of the Ministers will be regarded as a Venizelist crime; the part played by the Officers of other than Venizelist opinion will be forgotten. That Mr. Venizelos himself could have prevented the executions any time before the civil government resigned is, I think, undoubted. Whenever I represented to Mr. Politis the harm which the Greek cause would suffer owing to a breach with His Majesty's Government, his invariable reply was 'Why does Mr. Venizelos not tell me so?' He assured me that he had repeatedly telegraphed for Mr. Venizelos's opinion and received no reply. Once the Revolutionary Committee were in full control, it is possible that Mr. Venizelos's advice would not have been followed; and it is to be remarked that from that moment the trial was hurried on. It may be only a coincidence that this speeding up began also on the day when it was known to the Revolutionary Committee that Mr. Gerald Talbot [see No. 235, below] was on his way from Lausanne to Athens.

'There is no one in Greece who seriously contends that the ex-Ministers intentionally brought about the downfall of Greece. Yet this is the crime of which they were specifically charged and on which they were executed. They may have committed terrible political blunders but no impartial observer can fail to come to the conclusion that the true cause of the Greek disaster was the result of the elections of 1920 [see Vol. XII, Nos. 428, 429, and 437]. That election was fought on the issue of Constantine versus Venizelos; and the former won by an enormous majority in spite of the fact that the whole administration of the country was in Venizelist hands. It is easy to see now that the proper course for the first Constantinist Government to have followed was to notify the Allies that, unless help were forthcoming, Asia Minor must be evacuated immediately. Such a decision required more courage than Mr. Gounaris and his friends possessed; but it should be observed that the Venizelist papers were the loudest in their denunciation of any withdrawal from Asia Minor.

'As regards the trial itself, it is only fair to say that the most perfect order and decorum were observed. It should also be remembered that no judicial proceedings in Greece correspond to our ideas of justice; and it is doubful whether Greek public opinion was shocked by the methods pursued at the Court Martial. The fact remains that I did not hear of a single foreign observer who did not consider that, from the judicial and legal point of view, the trial was a farce. In the first place the judges were neither impartial nor trained to consider adequately the very complicated charges brought against the prisoners. The evidence was mainly either inadmissible or grotesque in its irrelevancy. Finally Mr. Gounaris, the principal accused, was ill with typhoid during the [later] stages of the trial and was condemned in his absence. In short the proceedings were those of a Revolutionary Tribunal and not of a Court of Justice.

'I have made little mention in my preceding reports of the efforts of my foreign colleagues to save the ex-Ministers; but it must not be supposed that they were idle. Mr. de Marcilly, after his first energetic intervention with me, received instructions from the Quai d'Orsay to abstain from all further action. I will revert to this subject later. The Italian Minister received early instructions to take the matter up and, before leaving for Lausanne, Mr. Montagna used very strong language to the Minister for Foreign Affairs [see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 178]. At that time both he and I believed the prisoners would escape. The American Chargé d'Affaires was authorised to do all he could unofficially, and Mr. Caffery made the best use he could of the extensive help afforded by American Relief Societies to the Refugees. In fact, he let it be widely known that the springs of charity were likely to be dried up should any executions take place. Of my other colleagues the Belgian, Roumanian, Serbian, Polish, Dutch and Swedish Representatives spoke several times to Mr. Politis, and the whole Diplomatic Corps intended to present to the Greek Government a signed petition in favour of mercy. This project was not realised because the French Minister did not consider that his instructions authorised him to sign it. The Serbian and Polish Ministers therefore backed out, and the plan was abandoned.

'My failure to prevent the execution of the Ministers and to make the wishes of His Majesty's Government prevail in this matter has been a great disappointment to me; and the only consolation is that no stone was left unturned to prevent a proceeding which the whole Diplomatic Corps at Athens considered to be both inhuman and unjust. My failure was due, externally, to the abstention of the French Government and Mr. Venizelos [see No. 229, n. 5] from intervention and, internally, to the determination of those who were in power to get rid, once and for all, of those who guided the State at the time of the catastrophe. The motives at the back of this determination were both complicated and various. The Venizelists were inspired by fears for their own personal safety in the future, by the belief that the death of the heads of all the old parties would make a certainty of the election, and by the belief that exemplary punishment was necessary for the political education of the country. The Corps of Officers desired, naturally, to revenge themselves on those whom they considered responsible for the military defeat, and thus to wipe out the memory of their own disgraceful conduct in the field. Many of them had also become obsessed with the idea that, unless exemplary punishment were dealt out to those whom they called 'les grands coupables', it would be impossible to deal adequately with such smaller fry as deserters and insubordinates.

'The picture of the Greek people painted in this despatch is not a pleasing one and there is no doubt that their party passions continually blind them to all else. But their position is tragic. Two years ago the attainment of their secular ambitions was within their grasp and the reunion of nearly the whole Greek race seemed about to be accomplished. Today the whole Hellenic dream is shattered, and the territory of the Kingdom is flooded with the starving remnants of the Greek Colonies who inhabited Asia Minor for centuries before the Turks were heard of. It is no wonder that bitterness and revenge fill the minds of a beaten soldiery and of a political party who owe allegiance to the great statesman who so nearly turned the Hellenic dream into reality.'

No. 233

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 28, 7 p.m.)
No. 742 Telegraphic [E 13334/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *November 28, 1922, 4 p.m.*

Lausanne telegram No. 29 [*sic*].[1]

In my opinion situation is easier as a result of satisfactory development hitherto of peace negotiations at Lausanne. I am more confident than I was ten days ago of it being possible to prevent any danger of modification of status quo. A crisis at Lausanne will doubtless react here but provided that no rupture occurs I do not anticipate serious incidents in Constantinople particularly since recognition of allied police protection for allied subjects, Russians and Hellen[e]s.

My view of the position here is as follows:

Turks control civil administration and refuse to admit any allied interference therein. Our failure to impose state of siege and thereby actively to resist their assumption of this control in its initial stages renders it difficult and illogical for us to go back on our acceptance of the situation in this respect.

On the other hand Turks under Mudania convention[2] admit the presence of allied military forces and therefore cannot reasonably expect us to give way on issues affecting the safety and prestige of our military position.

There is thus a dual control here, Turkish civil and allied military. Difficulties should not arise if this principle be admitted except where these two controls clash for instance in respect of telegraphs and railway communications. Where concessions in such matters would modify military position any change in status quo should not be tolerated. I venture to suggest that if representations be made at Angora they should take account of the distinction between civil and military controls and while reserving position under treaties and capitulations disclaim desire to interfere with Turkish internal affairs so far as new régime does not affect allied military situation.

[1] The reference is presumably to Lausanne telegram No. 19 to Constantinople, i.e. No. 227.

[2] See No. 119, n. 1.

No. 234

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 28, 8.15 p.m.)
No. 47 Telegraphic [E 13337/13003/44]

Confidential LAUSANNE, *November 28, 1922, 6.40 p.m.*

Arrival at Lausanne of advance guard of Russian delegation renders it possible that question of Straits will come before Conference towards the

end of the week. I am endeavouring to ascertain in advance the probable attitude which will be adopted by the Russians and if, as is possible, they raise question of principle not already covered by Cabinet discussion, I shall invite the opinion of Committee of Imperial Defence.

Meanwhile general line which may be adopted by Turks is becoming sufficiently apparent. Their aim is to secure international guarantee under guise of neutralization such as will give them absolute security for Constantinople and Turkey in Europe and leaving them absolutely free to prosecute their Turanian policy in Central Asia. Procedure which I intend to adopt is first to invite the views of Turkish and Russian delegation, then to hear Greeks, Roumanians and Yugoslavs, and finally to allow French to produce as planned the three invit[ing] powers' treaty scheme of November 18th,[1] as supplemented by Marshal Foch's proposal,[2] and with modifications and additions suggested in your telegram No. 20.[3] I hope I shall by then have induced French to agree to these modifications although there is likely to be some difficulty in securing their abandonment of the principle of limitation of tonnage.

Point on which I desire immediate opinion of Imperial Defence Committee is following:

Turks have already accepted principle of demilitarization for northern and western frontiers of Eastern Thrace. They will doubtless also accept this principle as applying to zone of Straits. Eastern Thrace will then be surrounded on three sides by belts of demilitarized territory and it will only be logical to demilitarize the whole. The Turks will probably agree to this on one condition only, namely, that Powers undertake to guarantee both severally and individually perpetual neutrality and inviolability of these territories. In other words they will endeavour to apply to Turkey in Europe safeguards which existed in 1914 for above.[4] In my opinion although Turkish demand would be logical in itself, although a manifesto as apart from a collective and separate guarantee might possibly be given, yet we should be careful not to commit ourselves either to necessity of intervention in the event, for instance, of an attack by Bulgaria upon Turkey or to an undertaking vis-à-vis other powers in no circumstances to attack Straits if we were ourselves at war with Turkey. It would be of value to me to have before Saturday next[5] the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee upon this aspect as well as a considered legal opinion as to whether any formula could be devised which, while satisfying as far as possible Turkish apprehensions regarding our naval power, would not bind us to other signatories in no circumstances exercising that power.

[1] See No. 204, n. 19. [2] See No. 225, n. 4. [3] No. 225.

[4] The reference is to the Treaty of London, 1839. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 27, pp. 990–1002. On the interpretation of this Treaty, see Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London 1930), pp. 118–22.

[5] i.e. December 2.

No. 235

Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 29, 8.30 a.m.)
Unnumbered: Telegraphic [C 16410/13/19]

Private and Secret ATHENS, *November 28, 1922, 8.30 p.m.*

My telegram private of November 23rd.[1]

There is no doubt that Prince Andrew's position has become much more dangerous since execution of Ministers and I hear his trial is to begin on November 30th. Mr. G. Talbot,[2] who arrived this morning after execution, is concentrating on saving Prince Andrew and I think he will have a better chance of succeeding than legation now that rupture of diplomatic relations has taken place.[3]

We both agree that a show of force such as presence of man-of-war would do more harm than good. On my suggestion, he is considering possibility of bribery.

Prince Andrew arrived here this morning.

[1] Not printed. This was a reply to a private unnumbered Foreign Office telegram of November 22, which ran: '. . . The King is most anxious concerning Prince Andrew. Please report on His Royal Highness' present position, and continue to keep us informed by telegraph of any developments.'

[2] Formerly Commander Gerald Talbot, who was a personal friend of M. Venizelos.

[3] See No. 232, n. 4.

No. 236

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 29)
*No. 49 Telegraphic [E 13368/13003/44]**

LAUSANNE, *November 28, 1922*

First meeting of Commission on Financial and Economic Questions was held under chairmanship of M. Barrère yesterday afternoon.[1]

I had had some difficulty in advance with Barrère, who had drawn up a very precise and logical scheme for developing [*sic*] entire work of this commission upon sub-committees. In a personal interview, I told Barrère that I could not agree to this proposal because, first, it denied any opportunity for commission either to hear case of Turks or to lay down main principles of Allied policy in reply, and secondly, it referred matters of highest importance to bodies who were unlikely to possess requisite authority.

Barrère deferred to this reasoning, and while three sub-committees were set up to deal with different branches of subject, main question of indemnities, costs of occupation, reparation for damages, and pre-war Ottoman debt was reserved for discussion in main commission.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 536–41.

Ismet Pasha made a brief statement and principal discussion was reserved for to-day.

This afternoon[2] Ismet Pasha and M. Veniselos stated their respective cases in several speeches which comprised number of charges and counter-charges on character and degrees of destruction wrought by Turkish and Greek armies. Barrère finally, under pressure from me, . . .[3] to make a general statement on behalf of Allies on principal subjects mentioned above, but this was not so firm or so clear as I could have wished, and I look forward with some anxiety to future work of this commission with its sub-committees, which seem likely to consume an immense amount of time with doubtful results. M. Barrère in his conduct of business is not a Napoleon.

[2] See ibid., pp. 541–55. [3] The text is here uncertain.

No. 237

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 5[1] *Telegraphic* [*C 16261/13/19*]

LAUSANNE, *November 29, 1922, 1.30 a.m.*

On hearing this afternoon that six Greek leaders had been sentenced to death I at once saw M. Veniselos and asked in what position he would be placed as representative of Greek government here if it transpired in a day or two that these men had been executed, and that he had declined, as he so far had done, to use his influence with his government to prevent what would be regarded by public opinion as an abominable crime. He said he had already sent his friend Talbot,[2] who should have arrived at Athens this morning, to urge counsels of moderation on revolutionary committee. I said this was not enough; M. Veniselos then said that he would be willing if I required it to resign his post here and no longer join in work of conference in the event of sentences being carried out. I declined to accept responsibility for such a decision but urged him to telegraph at once to Athens that in his opinion conscience of Europe in general, and Great Britain in particular, would be horrified at such a crime, and that if it were consummated his position here would be indeed one of extreme difficulty. This he undertook to do at once and left the room for the purpose.[3]

Repeated to Foreign Office.

[1] No. 5 to Athens, No. 50 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on November 29 at 8.30 a.m.

[2] See No. 235, n. 2.

[3] Referring to this telegram, Mr. Bentinck, in his telegram No. 715 of December 1, reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Talbot this evening [November 30] M. Veniselos had telegraphed (? intimation of) probable resignation from conference. Whole Cabinet with Colonel Plasteras have discussed matter and they have begged him to do his

utmost to prevent this as Cabinet would then have to resign and general anarchy would result, endangering the lives of all prisoners awaiting trial.

'Mr. Talbot is convinced, and I agree, that resignation of M. Veniselos at this moment would have disastrous effect on internal situation in Greece and that we should do everything possible at Lausanne to prevent his resignation.' In a further telegram No. 718 of December 1, Mr. Bentinck stated: 'In view of tragic result of abstention from action, I trust M. Veniselos will strongly support Mr. Talbot's action, as unless he urges moderation, I fear more lives will be in danger.

'I have given Mr. Talbot complete list of ex-Ministers and he will endeavour to get specific assurance about each. When this has been obtained he will do best he can for military men.'

No. 238

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
Unnumbered: Telegraphic [E 13397/27/44]

Urgent ROME, *November 29, 1922, 2.30 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 391.[1]

Your telegram No. 2 of November 27th[2] appears to have been despatched at 10 a.m. November 28th and only reached me late yesterday evening.

President of the Council was occupied at Senate and it was impossible to see him, but this morning his chef de cabinet has informed me that Italian delegates have been instructed by telegraph[3] to accept reply to Russians as desired by you, in view of your present representations, and of the fact that late Italian government agreed to original restricted invitation,[4] though President of the Council himself still considers that it would have been better to admit full participation of Russians and that Allies may yet be obliged to give way on this point.[5]

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 29 at 5.50 p.m.

[2] No. 231. [3] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 172.

[4] See No. 108. A note of October 25 from the Foreign Office to the Comte de Saint-Aulaire (E 11637/27/44) stated: 'The Italian Ambassador has concurred in . . . the texts of the invitations [to the peace conference] on behalf of his Government.'

[5] A note to this effect was communicated to the Conference of Lausanne by the Italian Delegation on November 29, not printed.

No. 239

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 8 Telegraphic [C 16335/13/19]

LAUSANNE, *November 29, 1922, 11.55 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office.[1]

Your telegram No. 706[2] to Foreign Office.

You may certainly offer refuge of legation to the King and Queen should they be in danger and I am asking Admiralty to issue instructions to Com-

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on November 30 at 8.30 a.m.

[2] Of November 28. In this telegram Mr. Lindley had stated: 'King sent his marshal of court to see me last night in order to enquire whether His Majesty's Government would

mander-in-Chief Mediterranean to send man-of-war in case of necessity to take them off.[3]

be inclined to help to save His Majesty in the event of his life being threatened and to ask my advice as to what should be done. He did not anticipate any immediate danger nor do I myself, but it is impossible to foresee what may happen.'

[3] Similar instructions were sent to Mr. Bentinck in Foreign Office telegram No. 371 of November 29, not printed. This telegram was sent by order of H.M. the King, and with the approval of the Prime Minister.

No. 240

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe (Received November 30, 8.30 a.m.)
Unnumbered Telegraphic [C 16410/13/19]

Private and most secret ATHENS, *November 30, 1922, 1.0 a.m.*
Most urgent

Addressed to Sir E. Crowe, repeated to Sir W. Tyrrell.

My telegram private and secret November 29th.[1]

Mr. Talbot has obtained this evening [November 29] promise from Minister of War and also from Colonel Plastiras, the two leaders of government (see Mr. Lindley's telegram No. 702[2]), that Prince Andrew will not be executed but allowed to leave the country in charge of Mr. Talbot.

Following is arrangement agreed upon:

Prince will be tried on Saturday[3] and sentenced probably to penal servitude or possibly to death.[4] Plastiras will then grant pardon and hand him over to Mr. Talbot for immediate removal with Princess by British warship to Brindisi or to any other port en route to England. British warship must be at Phaleron by midday on Sunday December 3rd and captain should report immediately to legation for orders, but in view of necessity for utmost secrecy, captain should be given no indication of reason for voyage.

This promise has been obtained with greatest difficulty and Talbot is convinced it is essential that above arrangement be strictly adhered to so as to save Prince's life. As success of plan depends on absolute secrecy of existence of this arrangement, even Prince and Princess cannot be given hint of coming. . . .[5] Talbot is convinced that he can rely on word given him and I see no other possibility of saving Prince's life.

I should be glad of early intimation that ship will arrive at appointed hour.

[1] Not printed.

[2] Of November 27, not printed.

[3] December 2.

[4] In his telegram No. 723 of December 3, Mr. Bentinck reported: 'He has been degraded and condemned to perpetual banishment.'

[5] The text is here uncertain.

No. 241

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 30, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 55 Telegraphic [E 13421/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *November 30, 1922, 1.15 a.m.*

Meeting of territorial commission was held this afternoon,[1] myself in the chair, to receive and discuss report[2] of sub-committee appointed under General Weygand to examine demilitarisation of Aegean Islands and North Dodecanese.

Sub-committee had recommended a form of demilitarisation for central group consisting of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, sufficient to save Turkey from their being used as a base for attack, while enabling Greece, in whose hands they will remain, to maintain order and ensure defence. This report was adopted subject to Turkish reserves on two points of minor importance.

Demilitarisation of northern group of islands outside Dardanelles, viz., Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Samothrace, which will probably be on more complete scale, was reserved for final decision of sittings of commission that will deal with freedom of Straits.

A discussion ensued on sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos, a final decision on which was postponed but which I declined to refer to Straits commission on the ground that it is a political and not military or naval issue.

Reply from inviting powers to Russian demand to be admitted to all sittings of conference and not to Straits question alone, which has been delayed in consequence of a dilatory objection raised by Italians,[3] will be issued this evening.[4]

It reminds them of Paris decision and renews invitation confined to sittings about the Straits. Should they either accept or not decline, I propose to put down Straits discussion for Friday[5] and it may last for two days. In any case we shall not recede from decision about scope of Russian invitation which embraces Ukrainian and Georgian representatives.

[1] November 29. See Cmd. 1814, pp. 101–9.
[2] See ibid., pp. 109–11.
[3] See Nos. 231 and 238.
[4] This note (not printed), which was dated November 27, was transmitted to the Russian delegation on November 30.
[5] i.e. December 1.

No. 242

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received November 30, 5.30 p.m.)
No. 59 Telegraphic [C 16366/13/19]

LAUSANNE, *November 30, 1922, 4.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 30.[1]

So much of our case is contained in minutes or conversations e.g., mine with Caclamanos, that I am not sure whether a very good consecutive account would appear in published telegrams. On the other hand anyone reading case as put up by Foreign Office could make without difficulty a very powerful exposé and defence. I should be inclined, therefore, to favour latter course, although in absence of full record of telegrams it is difficult for me to form definite judgment here.

[1] Of November 29; this ran: 'Many questions are being asked in Parliament concerning events at Athens. Although Prime Minister has not so far suggested laying of papers, I should be glad to know whether Your Lordship would favour this, so as to show how and why we intervened; or whether you think it better merely to make statements in both Houses.'

No. 243

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 1, 11.30 a.m.)
No. 60 Telegraphic [E 13483/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 1, 1922, 11.10 a.m.*

Following for Prime Minister.

I am astounded at statement quoted in House of Commons that Greek Ministers received encouragement oral or otherwise from me to continue their advance in Asia Minor.[1] As is well-known to Foreign Office, my entire efforts were directed to inducing them to withdraw and to place their case in the hands of Powers. My first effort was made at Paris in June 1921[2] when I proposed allied mediation on basis of retirement of Greek forces from Asia Minor. My second attempt was in October and November 1921[3] when Monsieur Gounaris and Monsieur Baltazzis came to London and after a prolonged discussion I induced them to place Greece in the hands of the allies on the same basis.[4] These discussions were reported to French and Italian governments at the time. It is monstrous to detach an isolated expression of friendliness or sympathy for Greece from report of these

[1] See 159 *H.C. Deb. 5s.* col. 705.
[2] See Vol. XV, Chapter V.
[3] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 425, 427, 431, and 449.
[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 449.

proceedings and to cite it in a sense diametrically opposed to entire course of my policy and advice.[5]

[5] To this telegram the Prime Minister replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 44 of December 2: 'I think the question of our recent action as regards Greece is over, but it may of course be revived by steps taken in regard to Greek Royal Family. As to charges about encouraging Greeks in the past, though your Office is mentioned, the attacks are really directed against late Prime Minister, and I am sure that it would be foolish for us to take any action unless the position changes.'

No. 244

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 1, 4.0 p.m.)
No. 62 Telegraphic [E 13493/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 1, 1922, 1.20 p.m.*

Yesterday was a quiet day. The financial sub-committee[1] met in the morning and commenced discussion of pre-war debt without making much advancement. A meeting took place between our oil experts and Turkish delegates about which a separate telegram is being sent.[2] It seems probable that if we can make an arrangement by which Turks will be admitted to a share either in produce or in royalties their demand for Mosul will be altogether withdrawn.

War Office and Admiralty experts are considering Straits question with their French and Italian colleagues in the light of what appears likely to be Turco-Russian demands. In the course of the day Turks asked that discussion on Straits fixed for today should be postponed in order to enable Chicherin to arrive from Berlin. I agreed to this and case will be opened Monday. I do not expect any further trouble about Russian demand for a place in other discussions. I am trying to hurry on setting up of commission on capitulations which is one of the corner stones of any new treaty but find some difficulty owing to dilatoriness of Italians who make little or no contribution to our proceedings and to constant request by Turks for postponement arising from their case not being ready or their staff being insufficient for manifold labours in which they are called upon to take part. Behind the scenes Italians are giving great trouble putting forward outrageous demands for commercial or other concessions as price of their remaining in the conference.

[1] Each of the three main commissions appointed sub-commissions, the minutes of whose meetings are printed in *Recueil* (*1*), vols. i, ii, and iii. A list of the sub-commissions and of the number of times each met was, at Mr. Lindsay's suggestion (made in a minute of February 23, 1923, (*E 1927/23/44*), not printed), included in Cmd. 1814 (p. ii) to meet attacks in the Paris *Temps*. This newspaper, in pointing out that the First Commission had met more frequently than the other two, had stated that the Conference of Lausanne had paid little attention to financial and economic matters.

[2] No. 246, below.

I have had to speak plainly to them about this shameless attempt at blackmail which seems to be inseparable from Italian conceptions of policy and renders any dealings with them very difficult. I have been obliged to ask that certain proposals tentatively put forward by them should be withdrawn if they are to escape serious official notice at my hands.

I should not be surprised if they are all the while seeking to negotiate some private agreement with Turks although what they have to offer them I am at a loss to imagine. Further, I fully expect Mussolini, the arch anti-communist, who is seeking to make a trading agreement with Soviet government,[3] will also grant them full de jure recognition before conference has come to an end.

Veniselos abstained for a day after news of Greek murders[4] but has resumed participation in conference proceedings. He again offered through an intermediary to place himself in my hands but I refused to respond.[5]

Statements in English newspapers that conference is at a standstill or is a failure have no foundation. While technical questions are being thrashed out in committee dramatic progress cannot be expected.

[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 144, 185, and 212.
[4] See No. 232, n. 4.
[5] See No. 237.

No. 245

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 39 Telegraphic [E 13337/13003/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 1, 1922, 5.30 p.m.*

Urgent

Your telegram No. 47 of November 28th[1] was considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence today.

View taken by the Committee, and endorsed by the Prime Minister, is that His Majesty's Government ought not to shoulder grave responsibility of an individual pledge to guarantee perpetual neutrality and inviolability of Turkish territory. As regards a collective guarantee against foreign aggression they consider that His Majesty's Government should not go beyond the obligation by which they will become bound under article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the event of Turkey joining the League, which it is understood she will be pressed to do.

So far as any demilitarised portions of Turkish territory are concerned it may be necessary, and His Majesty's Government should be prepared, to go somewhat further and undertake to act upon the advice which the Council of the League may give as to the means of fulfilling the obligations under article 10 of the Covenant, provided the other signatories of the present treaty give the same undertaking. It would be well specifically to reserve to

[1] No. 234.

each signatory the right to act independently in the event of the Council being unable to arrive at a unanimous decision.

The committee, having heard the advice of Sir Cecil Hurst, believe that the above suggestions will be found to meet the two-fold requirements to which Your Lordship refers in the concluding sentence of your telegram.

If the Turkish concession to the arrangement now proposed could more easily be obtained by restricting demilitarisation to the western and northern frontiers of Thrace and the zone of the Straits, the committee consider that no commensurate advantage would be obtained by insisting on the demilitarisation of Central Thrace.

No. 246

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
No. 63 Telegraphic: by bag [E 13523/132/65]

LAUSANNE, *December 1, 1922*

Following for Secretary of State for the Colonies and President of the Board of Trade:[1]

Following my conversation with Ismet Pasha,[2] I arranged that Vernon,[3] Clarke and Forbes Adam should have informal conversations with Turkish expert, Mukhtar Bey, regarding oil in Irak.

At first conversation, Mukhtar asked at once definitely for participation of Turkey in Turkish Petroleum Company[4] on same lines as France and United States. It was explained to him that question was one of participation in commercial company, in which His Majesty's Government could not dictate terms, and that great difficulties were involved. He did not seem much impressed with this argument in view of arrangement already made by His Majesty's Government to bring in French and Americans, although my experts pointed out that American participation was a purely commercial transaction between the American and British companies. He was satisfied that Turkey could find necessary capital to take up her shares. He also seemed generally aware that claim of company in pre-war concession might not be legally watertight.

Given Turkish participation, he said that question of Mosul frontier might be regarded as decided in our favour. Of course, no one section of treaty can be definitely settled apart from the rest.

At a second conversation, experts, on my instructions, sounded Mukhtar as to Turkey accepting some percentage of royalties paid by company to Irak Government as an alternative to participation in the company. *Prima facie*, this seemed to me to offer a less complicated method of satisfying Turkey. It would, of course, require the consent of the Irak Government, but experts

[1] The Duke of Devonshire and Sir P. Lloyd-Greame.
[2] See No. 228.
[3] Mr. R. V. Vernon of the Colonial Office, a member of the British delegation at Lausanne.
[4] See Vol. XIII, No. 286.

discussed it informally with Jaafar Pasha,[5] before putting it forward to Mukhtar Bey, and Jaafar seemed to think that if it really gave to Irak the frontiers which they desired and security for the Mosul Vilayet, his Government would not think the price too great. Mukhtar Bey promised that his delegation would consider this alternative, but explained that his present instructions only allowed him to discuss direct participation in the company.

This brings me to the question of Italian participation. Italian experts here have already made it quite clear to my experts that they think that His Majesty's Government should help Italy to participate in oil exploitation in Irak. Italy's claim is indeed difficult to resist. Article 9 of the Treaty of London, 1915,[6] practically promised Italy as a prize for coming into the war compensating advantages for Italy in Turkey for any advantages secured by France and Great Britain. Whatever may be the French and British view of advantages actually accruing from administration of mandates, Italy regards them as definitely profitable to Great Britain and France. The tripartite agreement[7] was framed in 1920 to meet Italy's claims arising from article 9 of the Treaty of London. So far as Italy is concerned, the actual benefits which she was to derive from the tripartite agreement depended in the main on the clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres, which gave the Allied Financial Commission control over the grant of new Turkish concessions. From this point of view the tripartite agreement is no longer applicable. It seems to me therefore of great importance, in order to liquidate Italy's general claim upon us, which Signor Mussolini is obviously determined to press, that every endeavour should be made, however great the technical difficulties, to give Italy some percentage of shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company, even if that percentage be not as great as those of France and America. It is for this reason that I personally favour the alternative of payment of royalties by the company to Turkey instead of actual participation of Turkey in the new company, provided Turkey would accept former in satisfaction of her claim on Mosul. I realise from experts' explanations here that it would be very difficult to secure a rearrangement of shares in the company so as to admit both Turkish and Italian participation.

Political importance of a settlement on the above lines, from point of view of His Majesty's Government, Irak Government, Italian and Turkish Governments, cannot be overestimated, and I trust that matter may be taken up at once with interested parties and Irak Government, and that I may be informed as soon as possible what definite proposals can be made to Turkey and Italy. Company must be made to realise that the value of their rights is entirely dependent on diplomatic and political support, and that this means that due weight must be attached to political objects connected with the concession quite apart from commercial advantages resulting from a satisfactory political settlement.

I would prefer that no representatives of Turkish Petroleum Company should come here without further consultation with me, as I am anxious to

[5] Irak representative in London. [6] See No. 206, n. 7. [7] See No. 213, n. 4.

avoid giving colour to stories, already rife in press of London and Paris, that private commercial bargains on a large scale are being negotiated outside the conference.

No. 247

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 2, 11 a.m.)
No. 65 Telegraphic [E 13521/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 2, 1922, 10.00 a.m.*

This afternoon I convened first commission[1] to discuss question of exchange of Greek and Turkish populations and prisoners of war. I had circulated in advance statement by Doctor Nansen[2] who had been invested by League of Nations with charge of this subject and had been in contact both with Greek and Turkish governments.[3]

He was present but his official character was denied by Turks who also admitted no recognition of League of Nations.

Nevertheless after a long discussion in which I pleaded immense urgency of subject, described numbers involved,[4] and laid down principles on which exchange should be based, Turks agreed to appointment of sub-committee in order to draw up a convention with least possible delay. This sub-committee will meet tomorrow, chief points to be decided being whether exchange should be voluntary or compulsory and whether it should apply to all areas concerned or only to some.

It was then decided to set up second commission on capitulations under Marquis Garroni without further delay and its first meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 111–24. [2] For the English text, see ibid., pp. 113–17.

[3] Dr. Nansen's reports (League of Nations documents C. 736, M. 447, C. 736 (a), and M. 447 (a), of November 15 and 18, 1922) were communicated to the Foreign Office by the Secretary General of the League.

[4] Lord Curzon based his statements principally on a Foreign Office memorandum, dated November 20, on the Proposed Exchange of Greek and Turkish Minorities (E 13044/10524/44) by Mr. G. W. Rendel, not printed.

No. 248

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 679 [C 16975/13/19]

ATHENS, *December 2, 1922*

My Lord,

Since Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 658 of the 18th ultimo[1] on the subject of the trial of the ex-Ministers, the situation has changed with extraordinary rapidity. These changes have been reported telegraphically from time to

[1] No. 203.

time, but I venture to think that a connected narrative will be of interest and will bring out the apparent effect on the situation exerted by the news of Mr. Talbot's departure for Athens.[2] I am reporting fully on the trial of the ex-Ministers in another despatch.[3]

2. At first sight it appears that the Revolutionary Committee, in resorting to the death penalty, were actuated merely by party politics and desire for revenge. There is no doubt that a certain section were demanding death in order to avoid all possibility of exposing themselves to reprisals should a revulsion of public feeling put their enemies into power again. The position was, however, not so simple. The Revolutionary leaders did not apparently feel strong enough to take drastic steps against the mass of extremist officers who had sworn the death of the ex-Ministers by fair means or foul. These officers, I now understand, numbered certainly between one and two thousand in Athens alone; they had intimated to the Committee that they would take matters into their own hands on the first sign of any weakening of the Court; they were fully prepared to take this step and had taken all the necessary measures. While imbued with a due regard for their own personal safety, the Committee doubtless realised that their disappearance would be the signal for complete anarchy. They were further, I understand, misled by the attitude adopted by Mr. Venizelos.[4] They argued that he would never allow them to break with Great Britain; that he had not sent them one word on the subject of the trial and had even proclaimed publicly his entire detachment from Greek internal affairs. They heard of his friendly relations with the British delegation at Lausanne, and inferred accordingly that His Majesty's Government were merely bluffing and were not prepared to carry matters to extremes. Their own opinion was that these men should die. When to this is coupled M. Venizelos'[s] strange silence, the threats of the Greek extremists and the scarcely veiled approval of the French Military Mission here,[5] the decision is possibly less incomprehensible than it appeared at first.

[2] See No. 237. [3] Athens despatch No. 690 of December 1, not printed.

[4] See No. 229, n. 5 and No. 237.

[5] In his despatch No. 683 of December 1, Mr. Bentinck reported as follows a conversation with M. Taigny, who on November 29 had retired from his position as French representative on the International Financial Commission in Athens: 'Monsieur Taigny confirmed to me today what I had already heard from many other sources, that General Gramat, Head of the French Military Mission, certainly encouraged the executions. This, I may observe, Commander G. Talbot, who is staying here and who has a large circle of friends in influential circles, has reason to believe to have been the case.' In that same despatch Mr. Bentinck stated: 'He [M. Taigny] told me today that he had, in conjunction with the French Roman Catholic Archbishop here, done his utmost to persuade the French Minister to try and prevent the executions or at any rate to issue a statement in the newspapers to the effect that France did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, but that the reports that she was encouraging the execution were untrue and that if such an order were given the entire responsibility for the deed must rest upon those who perpetrated it. Monsieur de Marcilly, however, refused, in obedience to instructions from his Government, to take any action whatsoever. He now regretted his silence, which was taken as encouragement.'

3. The fact that there was prolonged discussion and even disagreement within the Government before this decision was reached, is borne out by the attached letter to the Chief of the Committee from Colonel Gerontas, handing in his resignation on the grounds that the Committee should take no irrevocable step before Mr. Talbot's arrival. Colonel Gerontas handed this letter personally to Mr. Talbot who has kindly allowed me to transmit it to Your Lordship.[6]

4. The Committee, having once decided on their line of action, determined to carry it out at once, and to allow nothing to stand in their way. They were apparently apprehensive of Mr. Talbot's bringing irrefutable arguments to dissuade them, and accordingly they took such measures as would enable them to present him with a fait accompli on his arrival. The Court was for the first time ordered to sit throughout Sunday. M. Stratos and General Hadjianesti were limited on the Monday to half an hour and a quarter of an hour respectively to finish their defence. The trial ended at 11 p.m. on Monday night and the verdict was pronounced at 6.30 a.m. on Tuesday, November 28th. The execution took place at 11.30[7] that morning, half an hour before Mr. Talbot arrived at His Majesty's Legation.

5. This despatch must not be taken as intended as in any sense a plea on behalf of the Revolutionary Committee and their horrible act, but it is merely an attempt to show their frame of mind and its consequent reaction on the events of those few fateful days.

6. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch direct to Lausanne.[8]

I have &c.

C. H. BENTINCK

[6] Not printed.

[7] Cf. No. 232, n. 4.

[8] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on December 11.

No. 249

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 3, 3.55 p.m.)
No. 724 Telegraphic [C 16476/13/19]

ATHENS, *December 3, 1922, 11.45 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 374.[1]

General Stratigos in his (? evidence) declared that when Greek deputation was in London, Lord Curzon (? openly) stated that England was always favourable to his régime as she had been to the former. At M. Gounaris's

[1] Of December 1. This ran: '"Times" of November 29th states that during court martial mention was made of support alleged to have been given to Gounaris while in London by Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon and of a letter sent to him by Chancellor of the Exchequer promising financial support. Please telegraph particulars of these allegations.'

request this was given in writing and General had seen note.[2] General also referred to record of conversation with Mr. Lloyd George which was presumably amongst M. Gounaris's papers which had been seized.

In December 1921 when General was in London M. Gounaris had received a letter from Chancellor of the Exchequer stating that His Majesty's Government had decided to assist Greece (? and that) financial blockade was raised. A draft convention had followed. A newspaper article was then produced containing publication of Sir R. Horne's letter.[3]

See newspaper articles of November 22nd and November 23rd enclosed in despatch No. 690 by bag.[4]

I am consulting lawyer friend as to last paragraph of your telegram.[5]

[2] In a minute of December 5, Mr. Lampson, head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, commented: 'In his first meeting [on October 27, 1921] with MM. Gounaris and Baltazzis, Lord Curzon prefaced his reply to M. Gounaris's opening statement by saying [see Vol. XVII, No. 425] that "H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] had throughout been friendly and sympathetic to Greece—to the present Greek government as to M. Venizelos". At the end of the second meeting, which took place on the same afternoon, M. Gounaris asked that they might have an account of the two meetings in writing to study and reflect upon [see Vol. XVII, p. 457]. A copy of the Minutes, taken by Mr. Vansittart, was therefore sent to them.

'It is perfectly inexplicable how a statement by the Secretary of State to the effect that H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] had been friendly and sympathetic to Greece, whatever the government in power,—which is what it amounts to—could have been used as evidence against the late Ministers. There was of course no declaration in writing to this effect; the statement occurred in the Minutes of the two long meetings and, in spite of its complete harmlessness, should not have been quoted outside its context. Its purpose was to prepare the way for a straight talk to M. Gounaris.

'Mr. Vansittart confirms the above and says that the Minutes of the third meeting [see Vol. XVII, No. 427] confirm this. Lord Curzon's words were nothing more than a friendly entrée en matière for a dispassionate and plain spoken review of the situation.'

[3] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 493, 495, and 499.

[4] Of December 3, not printed.

[5] This ran: 'I presume that you are sending full report of proceedings of the Court. It would be useful if in doing so you emphasised any departure from usual constitutional procedure that may have occurred in trial of the ministers. . . .' In his despatch No. 697 of December 5, not printed, Mr. Bentinck cited article 80 of the Greek Constitution and a Greek law of February 23, 1877. He commented: 'It will be noted that no provision is made in the above articles for the infliction of the death penalty and as the terms of these articles were not complied with, the whole procedure was extra-Constitutional. In fact it is expressly stated in article 18 of the Decree of the Revolutionary Committee forwarded in Mr. Lindley's despatch No. 635 of November 3rd [No. 150], that the Constitution would not apply in this case.'

No. 250

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 3, 3.45 p.m.)
No. 67 Telegraphic [E 13525/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 3, 1922, 1.40 p.m.*

Part 1.

Yesterday afternoon first meeting of second commission was held, Marquess Garroni in the chair, to deal with question of capitulations.[1] Chairman made brief introductory statement, laying down necessity of substituting for existing capitulations some other variety that would be consistent with Turkish independent sovereignty, while guaranteeing necessary protection for foreigners. A general discussion followed in which Turks, in the course of several speeches, repudiated all idea of capitulations and declared unwillingness to do anything beyond the substitution for them of provision in the new commercial treaties.

Japanese delegate[2] pointed out that only after twenty years' minute study of question had Japan obtained freedom from judicial capitulations. American delegate[3] in a halting sentence indicated general concurrence with position of Allies. Commission then set up three sub-committees to deal with the different branches of the subject.

Part 2.[4]

I look forward with some anxiety to their labours since Turks are certain to adopt an absolutely intransigent attitude and hope of reasonable compromise at this stage does not strike me as bright.

In the course of proceedings chairman announced transfer to my commission of protection of minorities which he had previously proposed referring to a sub-committee of capitulations commission. I had vigorously protested against latter proposal in private as wholly inconsistent with importance and world wide interest of subject, but really because I knew in his hands it would never be properly argued or pushed. I shall take it at an early date and will press it with all (? force) at my command.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 465–80.

[2] Baron Hayashi.

[3] Mr. Child, American Ambassador in Italy. Associated with him were Mr. Grew, American Minister at Berne, and, when he could be spared from his other duties, Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner at Constantinople. For the role of the American Special Mission at Lausanne (First Phase), see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 899–974. For the status of the American representatives, see ibid., pp. 898–900.

[4] This part was numbered 67A: it was received at 3.30 p.m.

No. 251

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 3, 6.30 p.m.)
No. 68 Telegraphic [E 13527/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 3, 1922, 4.10 p.m.*

Discussion on Straits begins tomorrow when I shall invite views of Turks, Russians, Roumanians, Greeks, Bulgarians and other delegations concerned. Various schemes of demilitarisation and neutralisation extending to the whole of the Black Sea will be put forward by one or other of these parties, and explanation of them will probably occupy greater part of the day.

I shall then adjourn the discussion to enable Allies to take various proposals into consideration before delivering concerted reply. This will probably not be till Wednesday.[1]

We have been in close consultation with French and Italians and they seem likely to join us in a formula embodying scheme contained in (? French) memorandum of November 18th supplemented by Foch's proposals and modified by suggestions of Committee of Imperial Defence.[2] It is unlikely that either Turks or Russians will accept this proposal as it stands and in that case British naval and military authorities here are anxious to propose the following alternatives:

1. Acceptance by Turkey of unrestricted right of passage for merchant ships and men-of-war not only in peace but so long as Turkey remains neutral in time of war.

2. In return for this admission, Turkey to be given full sovereignty over Straits and allowed to fortify them.

Authors of this scheme claim that it would be practical and reliable, and that our naval and military staff would be able to make their plans on a firm basis of fact, and not as under first scheme upon considerations which in time of war would prove uncertain. Further they add that when Turkey is at war she would, under French proposals, have right and probably power to close the Straits, and although we might, by processes of demilitarisation, gain a few days in which fleet might rush Dardanelles, our position at the end of the week would be so precarious as in practice to be ineffective. On the other hand they argue that by giving Turks complete control of Straits, we should only be admitting in principle a privilege which after a few days would be theirs in fact, and we may in return gain unrestricted right of passage for warships in all eventualities except in that of Turkish belligerency. Finally they think that by thus making a virtue of necessity and rendering Turkey capable of self-defence in case she is attacked, she will become less subservient to Russia, and will tend to look to us for support in the future.

[1] i.e. December 6. [2] See No. 225.

For my part I am indisposed towards above proposals for the following reasons:

1. I gravely doubt their acceptance by the Allies, while Russia will fight against them tooth and nail.

2. I think that they would be regarded as a cunning device by Great Britain to purchase friendship of Turkey.

3. I am not clear that they would work out in manner suggested.

4. They would be popularly regarded as complete surrender of all that we have fought for in the war inasmuch as pre-war status in Straits would be not only restored but aggravated, while compensating advantages would be either ignored or misunderstood by public. Nevertheless I shall be glad if a considered opinion upon them can be sent me on Tuesday next.[3]

[3] i.e. December 5.

No. 252

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
*No. 27[1] Telegraphic [E 13597/53/44]**

LAUSANNE, *December 4, 1922*

Your telegram No. 38, last paragraph.[2]

I see by your telegram No. 41[3] that General Harington has obtained personal assurance from Refet regarding Patriarch. Should he nevertheless be in danger in future you should not stand too much on technicalities of national status, but should do your utmost to prevent his expulsion or arrest. I agree that if he is actually arrested you should insist on his release. If he wishes to leave of his own accord facilities should be given, but we cannot advise him to do so in view of panic which would ensue.

[1] Repeated to the Foreign Office as No. 73.

[2] Of December 1, not printed.

[3] This repeated to Lausanne General Harington's telegram No. 3139 of December 2 to the War Office, not printed.

No. 253

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with Italian Ambassador
[E 13390/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 4, 1922*

The Italian Ambassador called upon me tonight, at my request, as I wished to convey to him Lord Curzon's answer to his note of November 26,[1]

[1] Not printed. Marquis della Torretta had communicated this note to Sir E. Crowe on November 27 (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 145, 153, 157, and 166).

on the subject of M. Mussolini's request for an exchange of notes recording the understanding alleged to have been arrived at between Lord Curzon and M. Mussolini at Lausanne. I began by saying that the surprise to which I had given expression[2] when the Ambassador communicated to me his note of November 26 had not been dispelled by what I now learnt from Lord Curzon had actually passed between His Lordship and the Italian Prime Minister at Lausanne. The surmise, which I then expressed, that M. Mussolini must have been under a complete misapprehension as to what Lord Curzon had said on the occasion, was fully confirmed. I then read to the Marquis della Torretta the memorandum,[3] of which I attach a copy hereto, giving in

[2] Sir E. Crowe's record of his conversation of November 27 with Marquis della Torretta (E 13333/27/44) ran: 'I said that I was a good deal embarrassed by receiving this communication, since I was quite unaware of an agreement of the nature described having been arrived at between Lord Curzon and M. Mussolini. . . . I should have expected to have heard of such an important agreement having been arrived at, and to have received Lord Curzon's instructions as to the exchange of notes into which M. Mussolini understood him to have authorised the Foreign Office to enter.'

[3] This, dated December 4, ran: 'It is clear from the following summary of Lord Curzon's record of his conversations with the Italian President of the Council that Signor Mussolini's impressions of the purpose and result of these conversations, as set forth in the Italian Embassy's note of November 26th, are based in certain essential particulars upon a complete misunderstanding of the views and intentions of His Majesty's Government as expounded by the Secretary of State.

'The question of the mandates was discussed on three occasions. The first was the meeting of the three Ministers at Territet on November 19th when, according to the recorded minutes [No. 206], Signor Mussolini "made a reservation as regards the question of the mandates in Syria, Irak and Palestine, as between France, Italy and England", but "agreed that it was only a question as between the Allies" and did not apply to Turkey. The second was when the discussion was resumed at Lausanne on the morning of November 20th [see No. 207] and after a series of speeches by the Marquis Garroni an agreement was reached that the question should be "left open as between the three Powers but it must not be raised by or with the Turks—to which proposition Signor Mussolini signified his assent". This clearly implies that while Signor Mussolini explicitly agreed that the question of mandates, if it were to be raised at the Conference, must be met by a refusal on the part of the three Allied Powers to discuss it with the Turks as being outside the pale of the Conference, Italy retained entire liberty to express her own views or to make any independent proposals on the matter either to Great Britain or to France whenever she chose.

'The third occasion was when, presumably in pursuance of this undertaking, Signor Mussolini explained his views on the question of the mandates in a long conversation with Lord Curzon on November 21st [see No. 213]. Signor Mussolini spoke at length, albeit somewhat vaguely, of Italian participation in the mandates; he did not specify which particular mandates he was referring to, nor for instance even mention the name of Palestine. He hinted that Italy might be prepared to take her share in the military and financial responsibilities deriving from the mandates, but did not explain precisely what form of participation he was contemplating.

'In reply, after outlining the history of the mandates and explaining the obligations they involved towards the League of Nations, Lord Curzon expressed the view that the subject could not with advantage be pursued between himself and Signor Mussolini at Lausanne, but suggested that the latter, after further study of the question, might submit in writing to the Foreign Office, through the Italian Ambassador in London any proposals he might desire to put forward when they would receive the fullest consideration. To this proposal Signor Mussolini agreed.

detail the version of what passed, based on the records made at the time. This memorandum I handed to the Marquis della Torretta. I then said I was reluctant to send a written reply to His Excellency's note, principally for the reason that, if I did so, I should have to give formal expression to the strong objections which Lord Curzon was bound to take to some of the statements appearing in that note. I was anxious to avoid aggravating in any way a situation already sufficiently delicate and I therefore begged the Ambassador to let me put to him verbally what Lord Curzon thought it necessary should be said. The Ambassador would remember that already, when he handed me the note, I had, speaking for myself, deprecated M. Mussolini's attitude in declaring his co-operation with his allies at the Lausanne conference to be dependent on the conclusion of an agreement with Great Britain, under which Italy was to obtain certain not clearly defined, but apparently far-reaching, advantages. This point in the Italian note had, not unnaturally, attracted Lord Curzon's special attention. According to the Italian note, M. Mussolini 'made it clear in his conversations with Lord Curzon that the solution of the problem of Italy's position in the Eastern Mediterranean would form the indispensable basis of Italian participation in the single front of the allies at the Lausanne conference'. These words appeared to Lord Curzon to amount to a claim on the part of M. Mussolini to the right to break the allied front at Lausanne unless he were given whatever terms he might choose to put forward for the maintenance of what he described as 'the equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean'. This was a menace which Lord Curzon could not bring himself to believe that M. Mussolini intended to offer, and it certainly was entirely alien both to the spirit of the very friendly conversations between them and to the specific conclusions at which, as stated in the memorandum I had just handed to the Marquis della Torretta, they had arrived.

The Ambassador said he fully appreciated the feeling of courtesy and amity which made me make these observations verbally, instead of con-

'There is thus no ground for the statement in the Italian Embassy's note to the effect that Lord Curzon had been convinced by Signor Mussolini of the necessity of satisfying the Italian request regarding the mandates, while reserving the right to define the practical form to be taken by Italian participation, and had further consented that the agreement reached on a question of principle should be embodied in an exchange of notes between the two Governments. Not only did Lord Curzon not reserve the right to define the practical form of Italian participation in the mandates, but he expressly stated that he had no proposals to offer, because he had no idea what form of participation the Italian Government desired, or would prove to be feasible in practice. He added that it was therefore for the Italian Government to furnish him with such proposals as they might contemplate. Still less did he suggest embodying in an exchange in notes an agreement on a question of principle, which had in itself neither been admitted nor defined; all he did was to suggest an exchange of views through the recognised diplomatic channels.

'As regards the question of the Dodecanese, it is only necessary to say that when the question of the islands came up for discussion at the Conference at Lausanne [see No. 226], Lord Curzon succeeded in preventing it from being raised with the Turks and thereby elicited an expression of warm thanks from the Senior Italian delegate, Marquis Garroni.'

For an Italian text of this memorandum, see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 211.

signing them to an official note. He would not fail to make clear to M. Mussolini the impression which his statements had made upon Lord Curzon. He desired at once to say that he felt sure that such an impression was far from anything that M. Mussolini could have wished to produce. He must reluctantly admit that evidently M. Mussolini misunderstood the general drift of the conversations which he had with Lord Curzon. There was, however, no doubt that M. Mussolini did desire a friendly understanding with Great Britain in regard to Italy's position in the mandated territories, and he still thought it ought to be possible for us to agree upon a formula which would give satisfaction to the desires of the Italian Government. He earnestly begged me to help him, not only in smoothing over the misunderstanding which had arisen, but in advising a friendly solution on the basis of some concessions to Italy as regards the British mandates.

I replied that I thought I had given evidence of my desire to help in smoothing over the misunderstanding by giving to the communication, which I had to make to His Excellency, the particular form in which I was making it. The Ambassador gratefully acknowledged this. As regards the idea of an understanding on the subject of mandates, I said I must really decline to put forward proposals. The position was that Italy wanted something. Neither M. Mussolini nor the Marquis della Torretta had yet been able to have [*sic*] any clear idea what it is they require, and it seemed to me therefore quite futile that I should put forward suggestions in order to give satisfaction to a demand, the essence of which was unintelligible to me. The only suggestion that I could make was that M. Mussolini should put forward what he wished to propose, in such a precise form that we could understand it. The Ambassador said that, of course, he would lose no time in urging M. Mussolini to do this, but begged me that I should declare here and now our readiness to accept any reasonable proposal which M. Mussolini might make. I said that, even if I had authority to bind the British Government in this way—which I certainly had not—, I should not dream of binding myself to accept blindfold anything that might be put before me and in any case it must be clearly understood that any consideration to be given to whatever proposals M. Mussolini might put forward, must be strictly on their merits, and not be treated as part of a bargain in which the continuance of Italy's upholding the allied front at the Lausanne conference was involved.

The Ambassador, evidently anxious to let down M. Mussolini as easily as possible, finally asked me for an assurance that any proposal which the Italian Government were to submit would receive sympathetic consideration. To this I replied that the Italian Government could certainly rely upon any proposal submitted by them being carefully considered by the British Government, and of receiving the friendly attention which any such communication from an allied Power naturally merited.[4]

[4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 204 and 205.

No. 254

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
No. 695 [C 16984/13/19]

ATHENS, *December 4, 1922*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 726 of to-day's date,[1] I have the honour to report that before Mr. Talbot left Athens yesterday he had a farewell interview with General Pangalos, Minister of War; General Gonatas, Prime Minister; Colonel Plastiras, the members of the Revolutionary Committee, and M. Rentis, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the latter's private residence.

2. My colleagues and I have been anxious during the last few days, I believe with reason, lest further executions should follow those already perpetrated. Mr. Talbot thought, however, that he could obtain from the above-mentioned members of the Cabinet a renewal, in my presence, of the promise made to him a few days previously[2] that no more political prisoners should be shot.

3. As such great interests were involved and as I believed the renewal of such a promise in my presence, on the understanding that I should report it to Your Lordship, would guarantee the safety of these men, some of whom are already in prison, I consented to go to M. Rentis's house and meet these Ministers in an entirely private and informal manner. They then renewed to me in emphatic terms the promise already given which, they stated, included all civilians, whether politicians or journalists etc., excepting two journalists guilty of inciting to murder about whom they said they could not bind themselves if they should ever return to Greece, whence they had escaped. These were Mr. Vlachos, Editor of the 'Kathimerini' and Mr. Cambanis of the 'Protevousa'. The charge in these cases is, I fear, only too true. They could not bind themselves either regarding certain military men such as General Constantinopoulos, the notorious ex-Head of the Athens Military District whom M. Stratos dismissed on assuming office; Colonel Tsoudas, his assistant; General Papoulas, former Commander-in-Chief in Asia Minor, but three who had been arrested (Generals Pallis, Valetas and [E]xadactylos) had just been released. Although they declared that M. Calogeropoulos shared with M. Gounaris the responsibility for the disaster which had befallen the country, they promised me that he would not be executed, and M. Rentis undertook to see that he was informed of this, as I pointed out that he was old and infirm and greatly upset at hearing of the executions. I also obtained an assurance as to General Metaxas's safety.

[1] Not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 715 of December 1 (see No. 237, n. 3), Mr. Bentinck had reported: 'Mr. Talbot . . . extracted promise from Cabinet that no more political prisoners [w]ould be shot. M. Cal[o]geropoulos was especially mentioned as all ex-King Constantine's Ministers since December 1920 were in danger.'

They said that they had purposely not arrested him as he was now a politician rather than a military man and they did not wish to give the impression of removing all their political rivals. Mr. Talbot advised them to keep the Venizelists in check as they were also apt to stir up strife and ill-feeling, and pointed out that the movement should be a national rather than a Venizelist one. They expressed their desire for the establishment of order and discipline and they maintained that they now had control of the situation which had been out of hand at the time of the executions.

4. I could not let the occasion pass without drawing attention to the terrible shock which these executions had caused generally and to myself, and reminding them of the steps repeatedly taken by His Majesty's Legation during the last two years on behalf of the Venizelists. M. Rentis, whom Mr. Lindley had succeeded in convincing that the executions must be avoided and who was only prevented by Mr. Talbot from subsequently resigning, shared my views, but explained that soldiers did not look upon the taking of life in the same way as did civilians.

5. The assurances already given to Mr. Talbot about the position of the King, which had been repeated to His Majesty,[3] were then renewed to me. The Revolution, they said, had placed His Majesty on the throne and intended that he should remain there.[4] His Majesty was *their* King. He did not interfere in politics like his father, but was endeavouring to follow in the ways of his late grandfather[5] whose testament, so full of wise councils for the Constitutional King, His Majesty had been studying. As our conversation was of a quite informal nature, I observed that a Constitutional Monarch need not be a puppet and instanced the great influence exercised by King Edward VII, always within the limits of the Constitution. I referred to the wild rumours which had circulated regarding His Majesty's safety and to the anxiety felt by my King and other monarchs. I also reminded them that His Majesty was the great grandson of Queen Victoria. They said that they hoped shortly to get him out of his present seclusion, to arrange for him to review the troops and perhaps later on visit the Army in Thrace.

6. M. Rentis wished the nature of the assurances given to me to be treated as confidential for the present until the Government had decided in what way to make the matter generally known. He promised to treat our interview as strictly private and not allow anything to appear in the press.

7. Before I left both M. Rentis and General Gonatas expressed their deep sorrow at the rupture of diplomatic relations with His Majesty's Government,[6] and they assured both Mr. Talbot and me that they would always

[3] In his telegram No. 722 of December 2, Mr. Bentinck had reported: 'Minister of War saw the King today and gave him reassuring message as to His Majesty's position. Mr. Talbot also saw him, and after reassuring His Majesty generally, he gave him a secret message from me in the sense of your telegram No. 371 [see No. 239, n. 3].'

[4] In his telegram No. 709 of November 30, Mr. Bentinck had stated: 'General Pangalos, Minister of War, told Mr. Talbot that they intended to keep King George on the throne and he promised to go and see King to encourage him and assure His Majesty of their support.'

[5] George I, King of the Hellenes (1864–1913).

[6] Cf. No. 272, below.

be ready to listen to and to take advice from His Majesty's Government. M. Rentis added that he would always be at my service to assist me in any way if I cared to address him a private letter. I thanked him but said I thought that any communication on my part should more properly be addressed privately to the Secretary General.

8. I think that the situation has now undergone a distinct change for the better, but as in the case of Judas, repentance has come too late.

9. I cannot close without calling Your Lordship's attention to the great services rendered by Mr. Talbot during his brief stay here.[7] I believe that he has succeeded in checking the Greek Government in their course of madness.

10. I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter[8] handed to Mr. Talbot by the Minister of War. In so doing General Pangalos explained that it was a private letter from a soldier.

11. My American, Swedish, Dutch, Belgian and Spanish colleagues have received instructions to avoid relationships as far as possible with the present Government. The American and Swedish Chargé d'Affaires have been instructed to call attention in very strong terms to the intense indignation created in their respective countries. Some of my colleagues, like myself, have returned no reply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' first Note,[9] expressing a desire for friendly relations. Others have, I understand, merely acknowledged it. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to keep in close touch with me and to do as I do for the present. My Bulgarian colleague told the Minister of Foreign Affairs that Bulgaria would give everything to gain the friendship of Great Britain. The Greeks had enjoyed it and had now lightly thrown it away.

12. The present Cabinet are, I understand, anxious that M. Rentis should retain the portfolio for Foreign Affairs instead of M. Alexandri[s].[10]

I have &c.

C. H. BENTINCK[11]

[7] His Majesty the King conferred on Mr. Talbot the K.C.V.O.

[8] Of November 20/December 3, not printed. [9] Of November 14/27, not printed.

[10] M. Alexandris assumed direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on December 12.

[11] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on December 11.

No. 255

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 5, 12.45 p.m.)
No. 74 Telegraphic [E 13660/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 5, 1922, 10.30 a.m.*

Part 1.

This morning[1] first sitting of commission on Straits question,[2] myself in the chair, provided a sequence of curious scenes. Hall was crowded in addition to ordinary attendance with Bulgarian and Russian delegations,

[1] i.e. December 4. [2] Cmd. 1814, pp. 125–36.

latter attended by a swarm of Myrmidons. Upon my inviting Turkish delegation to speak Ismet Pasha responded in half a dozen sentences of purely general character affirming Turkish sovereignty in the abstract and indicating sympathy with commercial freedom of Straits but containing no proposals or arguments and formulating no plan. I expressed my surprise at this reticence from which he declined to depart and I then invited views of Russian delegation. Chicherin thereupon read a statement in which he claimed on behalf of Turkey as well as of Russia:

(1) Complete and permanent freedom of waters from Aegean Sea to Black Sea for commercial navigation of all nations in peace and war.

(2) Closure both in peace and war to ships of war and aircraft of all nations except Turkey.

(3) Recognition of full sovereignty of Turkey on land and sea and right for her to arm and fortify shores, own a war fleet and employ every engine of modern warfare.

He further demanded withdrawal of all foreign forces but made no mention as was expected of neutralisation of Black Sea. Duca, the Roumanian delegate, then made excellent speech in which he proposed under international sanction (1) freedom of Straits equally for ships commercial and war, (2) demilitarisation of coasts from Aegean Sea to Black Sea, (3) creation of Straits commission, (4) demilitarisation of Black Sea.

Bulgarian Prime Minister[3] then advocated freedom for ships commercial only, both in peace and war, and expressed desire to participate in international administration. I then challenged Turkish delegation to say whether Russians had expressed their views and commented on extraordinary situation in which Chicherin had been called to appear in quadruple capacity of representative of Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey as well while the latter [*sic*] maintained an inexplicable silence.

Stirred by this challenge Ismet declared that he still awaited expression of views of governments who had not spoken but that Russian proposal corresponded generally to Turkish point of view.

I have not a doubt that it did not, but that Russia was put up by agreement to state extreme case, Turkey desiring not to commit herself at present stage.

I pointed out that Turkish attitude was hardly respectful to the conference and would be received with general astonishment in the world and said that I had no alternative but to adjourn discussion to an early date when I would state views of inviting Powers. Chicherin intervened with rude complaint that these were not at once placed before the meeting but was easily suppressed. I also reminded him that while I concurred in hoping that foreign forces in the Straits would not be permanent element in the situation they were a not unimportant factor in immediate solution of the problem.

Part 2.

General impression produced by sitting was that Turkey had openly and unnecessarily placed herself in position of humiliating subjection to Russia,

[3] M. Stamboliisky.

and that latter had proposed a ridiculous plan designed only to convert the Black Sea into a fortified Russian lake, and to make Turkey her vassal.

One of Turkish delegates has since been to see me and desires tomorrow to have private conversation based, as he definitely asserts, on genuine Turkish desire: (a) to conclude peace (b) to break with Russia (c) to resume ancient friendship with Britain. He said my attitude had convinced them of wisdom of this policy. I will report further developments.

No. 256

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 50 Telegraphic [E 13700/27/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 5, 1922, 8 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister.

Your telegram No. 68[1] has been considered by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The chiefs of naval military and air staffs are so decidedly opposed to conceding the right to fortify the Straits that the committee feel unable to recommend endorsement of the proposal of your naval and military advisers.

A difference of opinion has arisen on the point whether, in the event of your being unable to obtain both demilitarisation and free passage for warships, the first or the second of these desiderata should be regarded as the more important.

As political considerations are involved, this question may have to come before the Cabinet, and as yet there has been no opportunity for this. I do not anticipate that you will have to take a final decision immediately on this particular point and I feel sure we shall hear again from you before this stage is reached. My personal view is that the main thing to aim at is demilitarisation.

[1] No. 251.

No. 257

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 6, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 80 Telegraphic [E 13695/13003/44]

Secret LAUSANNE, *December 6, 1922, 3.45 a.m.*

Second Turkish delegate Riza Nur Bey called this morning to renew private conversation which he had begun yesterday. After many (? protestations of) friendly intentions on both sides his case boiled down to this—that Turkey would meet us on every point, conclude satisfactory treaty and even

break with Soviet, if only we would give them Vilayet of Mosul. Grounds upon which he based this request were four in number:

1. Ethnic, which I sharply contested.
2. Historical, i.e., long connection with Turkey.
3. Economic, i.e., necessity for future economic life of Turkey in Asia.
4. National pact, i.e., absolute and unalterable refusal of Angora to conclude any treaty that does not embrace Mosul.

I combatted whole of these points, and declined to yield upon any more.

Colonial Office argument has led me to think that Mosul cannot be given away without loss of Baghdad nor Baghdad without loss of Irak and collapse of Irak kingdom, nor collapse of Arabs without return of Turks and final defeat of British policy in the East. I also wonder somewhat how far Turks demand for Mosul was really genuine, how far it might be inspired by hope of thus wresting formal victory for Turkey in Asia; or again whether it might not be subtle device of Turks, perhaps instigated by Russia to be able to say to the world later on 'we offered to make peace with allies and notably with Great Britain, we were willing to meet them on every point provided only we recovered Mosul, but for the sake of Mosul and its oil Britain flouted us and refused peace to the world'.

This afternoon idea occurred to me that it might perhaps be possible ostensibly and partially to meet Turkish wishes by offering them Kurdish part of Mosul vilayet following line of mountains and including Keui Sanjak, Rowanduz and Suleimanie[h], while retaining for Irak Amadia for the sake of Assyrian Christians Mosul town, Erbil, Kirk[uk] and whole of plain country inhabited by Arabs. Jaafar Pasha to whom I submitted proposal was quite favourable, while pleading strongly against any surrender of plain country.

Please ask Colonial Office to send out Young[1] if he is sufficiently recovered, or failing him Bullard[2] who has great local knowledge, and to favour me with their views on above suggestion. It is not intended to exclude Turkish participation in Mosul oil on lines already under examination.

[1] Major H. W. Young, a former member of the Egyptian branch of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

[2] Mr. R. W. Bullard, member of the Middle East Division of the Colonial Office, on temporary secondment from the Foreign Office.

No. 258

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 6, 4.15 p.m.)
No. 82 Telegraphic [E 13708/27/44]

Personal LAUSANNE, *December 6, 1922, 3.40 p.m.*

Following for Chief of the Imperial General Staff from Stuart.[1]

Foreign Office telegram No. 50.[2]

I note that views of General Staff as set forth in their printed memorandum of October 19th[3] have undergone considerable change. As I have consistently represented these original views which conformed to my personal conviction, my position here becomes difficult and illogical now that my representations are officially repudiated. I should be glad to receive instructions. Personal letter[4] on this subject left by bag last night addressed to Bartholomew.[5]

[1] See No. 178, n. 4. [2] No. 256.
[3] See Appendix II.
[4] No copy of this letter has been found in the Foreign Office archives.
[5] Colonel W. H. Bartholomew, Deputy Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.

No. 259

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 7, 9.25 a.m.)
No. 757 Telegraphic [E 13729/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 6, 1922, 4 p.m.*

My telegram No. 44[1] to Lausanne.

1. General Harington is telegraphing separately[2] result of passport dispute. In my opinion situation is as follows:

2. Turks regard Mudania convention[3] only as binding on them. They will respect Mudania convention but only as interpreted by themselves. Convention makes no mention of occupation. By article 12 they undertake to respect *presence* of allied troops in territories in which they are stationed (not in territories 'which they occupy'). Hence they do not recognise allied forces in Constantinople as constituting military occupation. They admit

[1] Of December 5. This telegram (No. 751 to the Foreign Office, repeated to Lausanne as No. 44) reported: 'Turks are attempting to prevent departure of all Greek and Armenian Ottoman subjects who are not provided with Turkish passports. Procedure hitherto has been that all Ottoman subjects could leave provided they had inter-allied visa on special laissez-passer. My French and Italian colleagues will not (? co-operate if we) resist a Turkish claim of principle which they consider fundamentally justified as indeed it is. There is no question of objecting to inter-allied visa which would still of course always be required.'
[2] Telegram No. 3163 of December 6 to the War Office, repeated to Lausanne (see n. 6, below). [3] See No. 119, n. 1.

that military forces have certain inherent rights practically restricted to that of self-protection. They have also agreed to admit pending conclusion of peace right of allied forces to protect persons of allied subjects.

3. But they do not admit that presence of allied forces gives any right to interference in internal administration of Constantinople especially in matters affecting Turkish subjects including native Christians.

4. Issue therefore lies in interpretation of (a) presence or (b) occupation.

5. If we accepted Turkish interpretation of presence most that will be possible will be to avoid incidents and excesses and to do what we can to alleviate the lot of native Christian population.

6. On the other hand if Turks are to be properly made to realise that latter is true interpretation only course likely to be really effective would be declaration of martial law for which it would be necessary first once more to obtain sanction of French and Italian governments.

7. Even less than before however this sanction would be considered insufficient without promise of immediate reinforcements. It is also questionable whether such declaration would be calculated to help matters at Lausanne.

8. Nevertheless some form of action is desirable even if it does not go so far as martial law. We are once more at parting of the ways.

9. Through failure to institute state of siege a month ago[4] we have in fact abandoned all protection of native Christian population. Last step in this respect has been admission of principle that henceforth Ottoman subjects to leave Constantinople must be provided with Turkish passports. We cannot now go back on this.

10. But first step on new road will be Turkish claim to subject allied citizens and interests to Turkish jurisdiction in all matters except actual arrest (personal liberty) which is provided for under police arrangement. Turkish action will follow in fact same lines as in Smyrna, Cilicia and in Anatolia generally.

11. Already foreign companies have been officially invited to conform immediately with company law of November 1914. Penalty for not complying is closure. Press has announced that foreigners are to pay municipal taxes.

12. Turks are claiming right to interfere with landing and departure of allied subjects here who have not got Turkish visas.[5]

13. We will not be able to resist these claims unless we are prepared to use force even though martial law be not instituted from which both my allied

[4] See Nos. 158, 162, 168, 174, 177, and 183.

[5] In his despatch No. 1102 of December 7 (E 14185/27/44), Mr. Henderson gave (in the words of Mr. Rendel's minute of December 20) 'an admirable narrative of the progressive humiliation of the allies at Constantinople' since the Mudania Convention. Lord Curzon commented, on December 28, as follows: 'Yes. But it is only fair to remember that for the terms of the Mudania Convention we had no responsibility and that we never saw their final form until it had been signed; and also that the failure to enforce martial law was not ours but that of the Generals on the spot.' (Cf. No. 183, n. 5.)

colleagues shrink. Best method of avoiding incidents in this respect would be to leave no doubt in the mind of Refet and Angora that force really will be employed if attempt be made, before conclusion of peace, to apply to allied persons or companies regulations not in accordance with capitulatory régime. Would French and Italian governments be prepared to instruct their representatives to make such a communication? Without instructions neither would be prepared to act.

14. I have shown this telegram to General Harington who agrees except that he sees no half measure between martial law and mere presence here.[6]

Sent to Lausanne No. 52.

[6] In his telegram No. 3163 (see n. 2) General Harington stated: 'It is my opinion that allies must either agree to give up their claims to power altogether and merely sit here or, as ground is slowly slipping, we must enforce martial law. The latter will be taken as breaking Mudania convention, and will bring us into open conflict with considerable secret forces now in city, and we must be prepared for operations on Chanak and Ismid Peninsula. If we precipitate conflict here I do not know how such action will affect Lausanne conference. I have had some very serious words with Refet, and have done everything since Lausanne assembled to take as firm a line as possible. This morning I consulted Generals Mombelli and Charpy as to whether definite action should not now be taken. They put down power which Refet has acquired to changed conditions, and did not agree to definite action being taken as they do not think we have lost prestige.'

No. 260

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 6, 7.0 p.m.)

No. 83 Telegraphic [*E 13709/13003/44*]

LAUSANNE, *December 6, 1922, 5.40 p.m.*

This morning at meeting of first commission,[1] I spoke at length in reply to Chicherin's proposals of Monday last with regard to Straits,[2] demonstrating their impracticable character and inner meaning. I understand that my speech is to be telegraphed in extenso to British press[3] so I need not recapitulate it here. I then went on to give a general exposition of plan of the allied governments for the freedom of the Straits and demilitarised zones announcing that detailed proposals[4] would be circulated at the close of the meeting and that military and naval experts of the allies would be available this afternoon to give detailed explanations to delegations.

As regards offer of any guarantees in return for demilitarisation, I said that this question must be reserved for further examination in relation to all the demilitarised zones. My statement was followed by cordial expressions of allied solidarity from Monsieur Barrère who made a useful little speech, and from Marquis Garroni.

American delegate then made a well phrased and effective declaration of

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 136–54.
[2] See No. 255.
[3] See *The Times*, December 7, p. 11.
[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 151–4.

American views, particularly with regard to freedom of access, both for ships of commerce and ships of war, to the Black Sea, viewing the Straits as an international highway and claiming right of every state to protect its commerce.[5]

Serb-Croat-Slovene representative followed with a declaration of interests of his government in the Straits question.

Ismet Pasha reserved reply of Turkish government to a later stage.

Chicherin then intervened with a voluble and rather fiery harangue in which he defended himself from criticism which I had applied to his scheme, and insisted on innocent, friendly and disinterested character of Russian proposals.

Russia and Turkey having insisted on a full day for consideration of their full reply, discussion was then adjourned till Friday morning.[6] There will probably be some lively encounters then. But first impression produced by allied statement is unquestionably good, and I expect it to receive warm support of smaller states.

Marquis Garroni having called to tell me that Signor Mussolini will spend a few hours here tomorrow night on his way to England,[7] I have invited him and Italian delegation to dinner.

[5] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 913–14. In his telegram No. 490 of December 7 to the Foreign Office, Sir A. Geddes reported: 'Child at Lausanne has instructions from Secretary of State not to oppose at this stage any Allied proposal to set up an international commission to control the Straits. His later instructions either are or will be to announce that United States cannot accept membership of such a body, and that United States will be satisfied with treaty on lines indicated in my foregoing telegram. Conceivably in this way United States hopes to appear as Turks' best friend.

'I to-day asked Secretary of State if Child had instructions to make plain to Lord Curzon real position of United States, and he told me that his instructions were to make "it clear at appropriate moment".

'Neither Secretary of State nor President has slightest intention of asking Senate to authorise United States participation in an international commission of control.

'This information as to intentions of Secretary of State and President is absolutely sure and may be implicitly relied on. It comes to me direct from best possible source [cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 912–13].'

[6] i.e. December 8. For the separate conversations of the American Special Mission with Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha on the evening of December 6, see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 914–15.

[7] Signor Mussolini arrived in London on December 8 for conversations with M. Poincaré and Mr. Bonar Law on German reparations (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 217 and 224).

No. 261

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 53 Telegraphic [E 13750/27/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 7, 1922, 2.20 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister.

Situation at Constantinople as described in Sir C. Harington's telegram No. 3163 of December 6th[1] makes it necessary to consider without delay what

[1] See No. 259, n. 6.

instructions should be given to him as to imposition of martial law and consequential matters. Do you think it possible by arrangement with Ismet Pasha to arrive at some definite understanding that Turks at Constantinople will cease their unreasonable and aggressive attitude?

Cabinet would be glad to learn whether you share serious view of the situation taken by Sir C. Harington and whether you would advise that in present circumstances he should be directed to continue doing his best to maintain the position without provoking a conflict.[2]

[2] The Cabinet, which on December 7 had considered General Harington's telegram No. 3163 and a Joint Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, Army and Air Force, dated December 4, had resolved: 'That, in the event of Lord Curzon replying that he sees no immediate danger of a break at Lausanne, the Secretary of State for War, in consultation with the Prime Minister, should have authority to instruct General Harington to make the best of the situation without enforcing martial law.'

No. 262

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 8)
*No. 89 Telegraphic [C 16799/99/18]**

LAUSANNE, *December 7, 1922*

Following for Prime Minister:—

When Signor Mussolini came this evening,[1] I was fully prepared for an assault upon familiar Italian lines. Greatly to my surprise, however, he said not a word about mandates or islands or economic concessions or formulæ for Italian consumption. He devoted himself entirely in conversation before dinner to enquiries about the London Conference, British attitude towards reparations and Allied debts and personality and opinions of British Prime Minister, being apparently nervous that he might arrive to find a *chose jugée* and an unwillingness to discuss solutions . . .[2] from those previously favoured. I assured him that no decision had been formed in advance upon any of these subjects, that any or every plan would admit of discussion and that Prime Minister would be the last person to enter conference with a *parti pris*. He seemed much relieved. I attributed his anxiety to inexperience[3] of international situation and procedure.

As regards his silence on Eastern questions, I cannot doubt that after the fright I gave to Italian delegation some days ago, when I told them that incessant Italian blackmail during conference was intolerable,[4] and that if they were unable to continue loyal co-operation with France and ourselves we might be forced to act without them, they had warned their chief against

[1] See No. 260, last paragraph.

[2] The text is here uncertain. Lord Curzon's draft, preserved in the Lausanne delegation archives (F.O. 839/14), ran: '. . . solutions different from . . .'.

[3] Lord Curzon's draft has 'genuine inexperience'.

[4] See No. 244.

exerting illegitimate pressure now if Italy was to hope to get anything later on.

Mussolini left in most amiable mood, and I think you will find him easy of approach, though startlingly ignorant of external affairs.

No. 263

Minute by Sir Cecil Hurst respecting the Withdrawal of His Majesty's Minister from Athens

[*C 16745/13/19*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 7, 1922*

On the 7th December the Duke of Marlborough asked in the House of Lords whether His Majesty's Government 'are in a position to explain the circumstances in which His Majesty's Minister has been withdrawn from Athens'.[1]

In preparing the reply to this question the Marquess of Salisbury[2] asked the opinion of the Foreign Office as to (1) how far the action of the Greek Government in sentencing the ex-Ministers to death was unconstitutional; (2) if unconstitutional, how far it was illegal; (3) whether His Majesty's Government have any special *locus standi* in appealing to the Constitution. These three questions were considered by the legal adviser,[3] who gave his opinion to the following effect:—

1. *How far was the Action Unconstitutional?*

The Ministers were tried and condemned by an extraordinary court-martial, which was set up by decree of the Revolutionary Committee, dated the 25th October. This Revolutionary Committee had become the real governing power in Greece. It had seized the control about the end of September, but, having obtained the control, it was persuaded to set up a regular Government, but the decree of the Revolutionary Committee was issued after the new Government had been installed. The decree emanated from a body wholly unknown to the Constitution, one of [*sic*] which had installed itself by force. Its existence and its acts were both contrary to the Constitution, which in fact it had set aside. If the decree constituting the court-martial had purported to emanate from a Greek Government installed in accordance with the Constitution, article 18 of the decree would have been contrary to the Constitution of 1911.[4] The real truth is that the

[1] See 52 *H.L. Deb. 5 s.*, cols. 329–30.

[2] Lord President of the Council and Deputy Leader of the House of Lords.

[3] Sir C. Hurst.

[4] *Note on the original:*

Article 18 of the Decree:—

The sentences passed on the accused will be inflicted according to the responsibility of each one of them and according to the sovereign decision of the tribunal, in whose conscience

action taken by this military tribunal and the executions which it ordered were unconstitutional, not so much in the sense that they violated any particular provision, but in the sense that they emanated from a body not provided for in the Constitution and claiming a right to ignore it.

2. *If Unconstitutional, how far Illegal?*

The answer to this question is really contained in the last. The whole Constitution had been set aside and the ordinary laws ignored. The court-martial and the executions emanated from a body which had obtained the control of the Government of Greece by an act of force.

3. *Have we any special* locus standi *in appealing to the Constitution?*

The special *locus standi* of Great Britain is historical and traditional, and dates from the prominent part which Great Britain (with France and Russia) took in rescuing Greece from the oppression of the Ottoman Empire. The three Powers have always taken a very special position in connection with Greece, and have watched over her development in order to protect her against Turkey. It was under their general supervision that the Bavarian dynasty was placed on the throne of Greece in 1832 and that the Danish dynasty was placed on the throne of Greece in 1863. The only written instrument to which Great Britain could point as entitling her to a special right to intervene in the affairs of Greece is the treaty between the three Powers and Denmark,[5] under which Prince George ascended the throne, but that treaty was only symptomatic of the special right which the three guaranteeing Powers claimed to exercise in connection with the independence and welfare of Greece. It is not desirable to lay too much stress on the specific article in the treaty of 1863 because Greece was not a party to this treaty, and technically, therefore, it could give no right to Great Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the kingdom.[6] There certainly is no specific engage-

the Revolutionary Committee trusts. The sentences will be those provided for by the military penal code and common law, and, in addition, exile for life or for a certain time fixed in the sentence. The present case will not be affected by the dispositions of the Constitution on this point.

Article 18 of the Constitution:—

'Torture and general confiscation are prohibited. Civil death is abolished. The penalty of death for political offences, except complex crimes, is abolished.'

[5] Of July 13, 1863 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 53, pp. 28–31).

[6] To a minute of December 8 (C 6460/13/19), Sir C. Hurst annexed a copy of a memorandum which he and Mr. Malkin had written in 1917. This memorandum concluded: '. . . the terms of the 1863 treaty imposed no obligation upon them to continue the Danish dynasty upon the throne of Greece contrary to the wishes of the people. The guarantee was, in fact, not a guarantee to Denmark to maintain a Danish dynasty, but a guarantee to Greece to maintain against Turkish aggression the form of government which her people had then selected. Furthermore, the guarantee given in the treaty of 1863 was not merely that Greece was to be *monarchical*, but also that it was to be an *independent* and *constitutional* State. There is no reason to attribute to the first of these three epithets an effect which would override the second and third. If Greece is to be independent and constitutional, the right of the Greek people to change their form of government must be recognised; it is

ment on the part of Great Britain in connection with the Greek Constitution of 1911. The maintenance of that Constitution is not committed to the three guaranteeing Powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, but by Article 111 'the preservation of the present Constitution is committed to the patriotism of the Greeks'.

an essential part of the right of every independent State to adopt what form of government it pleases.

'The terms of the treaty of 1863 do not, therefore, oblige the three protecting Powers to maintain a monarch in Greece contrary to a clear expression of a determination on the part of the Hellenic people to establish a republic.'

No. 264

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 9, 8 a.m.)
No. 93 Telegraphic [E 13801/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 8, 1922, 12.10 a.m.*

Following for Prime Minister.

Your telegram No. 53.[1]

I do not agree nor does Sir H. Rumbold with General Harington's conception of position at Constantinople. No doubt it is humiliating and difficult to tolerate: and I propose to take following steps to produce some amelioration. It is I think useless to appeal again to Ismet who did intervene before both at Angora and with Refet[2] but with only temporary effect. I propose, if my colleagues will agree, to send joint telegram from three Presidents of the Conference here to Mustapha Kemal at Angora, to say our proceedings at Lausanne are gravely prejudiced by Turkish refusal to recognise position of allied armies of occupation and constant encroachments of . . .[3] at Constantinople, and urging him, if he wants a treaty of peace, not to destroy all hope of it by allowing situation there to develop, as it will shortly do if not checked, into armed collision between Kemalist and allied forces.

As regards Harington's proposals I think it is too late now to declare martial law, which he had two previous opportunities of doing. Until reply from Angora has been received I am not in favour of sending further instructions to him, either in the direction of increased firmness or of conciliation because he will evidently regard latter as an additional proof of weakness, while, as regards former, if a collision ensues in consequence of resolute action authorised by us his one solution seems to be to clear out which I can only regard as disastrous. All the more will this be the case if as he now foreshadows French and Italians instead of clearing out with us persist in staying, leaving entire odium of retiring upon the British. Further I cannot contemplate without dismay repercussion upon negotiations here, just at the moment

[1] No. 261. [2] See No. 218. [3] The text is here uncertain.

when we seem to be coming to an agreement about the Straits, of military withdrawal of entire British forces from Constantinople and Ismid and Chanak to Gallipoli. That I think would be death-blow to hopes of Lausanne.

I have contemplated asking War Office to allow Director of Military Intelligence[4] to go from here to Constantinople to steady Harington but will postpone this request until I receive reply from Angora.

[4] Major-General J. Burnett-Stuart.

No. 265

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 60 Telegraphic [E 13812/13003/44]

Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 8, 1922, 10.0 p.m.*

My telegram No. 57 (of yesterday).[1] Mosul.

Question was considered this morning by Cabinet committee. Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Chief of Air Staff were in attendance as well as representatives of Colonial Office. Committee were unanimous in supporting attitude taken up by Your Lordship in regard to four arguments advanced by Riza Nur Bey. They were also unanimously of opinion that compromise suggested by you in latter part of your telegram would not furnish acceptable solution of difficulty. They based this opinion on following grounds.

(1) It would weaken our whole position to offer Turks a compromise which they would be very unlikely to accept. The view taken was that, assuming Turkish offer to be a genuine one and not prompted merely by desire to put us in the wrong, what they really want is Mosul itself and Turkish-speaking towns of Erbil, Kirkuk and Kifri, not wild Kurdish hills which would bring them trouble rather than advantage. It seemed to the committee that so long as we adhere to the position that our obligations etc. make it impossible for us to cede any part of territory within present Irak boundary we are on solid ground and that it would be very undesirable to abandon this ground for sake of making an offer which Turks would probably reject.

(2) It is open to grave doubt whether even supposing compromise were accepted, arrangement could be maintained for any length of time. Once we had surrendered Kurdish tracts, we could not indefinitely resist Turkish pretensions to above-named Turkish-speaking towns to which Turkish claims on ethnical grounds are much stronger. Sooner or later we should be bound to admit Turkish influence up to edge of plains and should thus be cut off from natural line of communications between Mosul and Baghdad, which runs via Kifri, Kirkuk, Altun Keupri, and Erbil.

[1] Not printed. This stated that Lord Curzon's telegram No. 80 (No. 257) had been referred by the Cabinet to a Cabinet Committee which would meet on December 8.

(3) Even supposing that compromise frontier were accepted and could be maintained, whole length of our Baghdad-Mosul communications for some 200 miles would be flanked by turbulent hill country. Our communications could be cut at any moment and in fact retention of Mosul from a military point of view would be rendered impracticable.

(4) Turkish control over Kurdish areas could scarcely be more than nominal, while we should be precluded from direct intervention. In the event of raids and disturbances etc., our only remedy, viz: diplomatic action at Constantinople would clearly be inadequate.

(5) Cession of Kurdish country would similarly endanger important line of communications between Baghdad and Persia via Kizil Rabat and Khanikin.

(6) Suggested division of tribesmen of Southern Kurdistan would create administrative difficulties.

(7) Considerable reinforcements to existing garrison would become necessary if position was to be maintained.

Upshot was that your suggestion did not appear to the committee to contain the elements of a real compromise. If accepted by the Turks, it would be merely as a first step towards further expansion, which would inevitably lead to our abandonment of the whole Mosul vilayet with all the consequences which that would entail. Committee regret that they are unable to suggest any alternative local re-adjustment of territory that would meet the case. They consider that, if Turks persist in making Mosul crux of whole question of peace settlement, it will be necessary to decide whether their claim is to be accepted or rejected in toto.

Bullard[2] arrives Lausanne 8 a.m. Sunday.

[2] See No. 257.

No. 266

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 9, 8.0 a.m.)

No. 92 Telegraphic [E 13800/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 8, 1922, 11.35 p.m.*

At sitting this morning[1] Turkish delegation delivered carefully prepared reply[2] to allied proposals regarding Straits, tacitly accepting main principles but demanding guarantees for protecting Straits and Constantinople against sudden attack, as well as some other limitations of allied plan.

Ismet Pasha then named seven additional points in respect of which Turks asked for assurances or modifications. Chicherin spoke next and delivered a reply to my speech of Wednesday,[3] but indicated no departure from his

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 154–65.
[2] Ibid., pp. 156–9.
[3] See No. 260.

original scheme though he subsequently read out a formula proposing a conference on certain unrealiseable conditions with Black Sea riverain states on question of their security. In the course of his remarks he let out that Turkish views had come upon him with surprise. Representatives of Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece followed with hearty and unqualified acceptance of allied proposals. I then adjourned discussion till the afternoon to enable me to reply to Turkish case.

On resuming[4] I made full statement on behalf of allies whom I had consulted in the interval.

I adopted a very conciliatory attitude towards Turkish demands, many of which were quite reasonable, and suggested a discussion between our respective experts. Japanese Ambassador followed with cordial endorsement of allied proposals and an appeal to Turkey to accept solution. Then ensued a period in which Chicherin was continually jumping up with purely obstructive object, his main contention being that Russia had a right to be consulted on every matter affecting Turkey's position whether military or naval, because all such questions were bound up in freedom of the Straits. I firmly resented this pretension, acceptance of which would mean intrusion of Russia in every sub-committee or expert meeting. But I fully expect it will be revived, Soviet delegation being out for mischief.[5]

[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 165–73.
[5] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 917–18, 919–20.

No. 267

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 9, 12.40 p.m.)
No. 94 Telegraphic [E 13806/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 9, 1922, 10.52 a.m.*

Following for Prime Minister and Cabinet:

I am amazed at the audacity of attempt made by some of my recent colleagues to throw upon me blame[1] for a policy which as everybody knows late Prime Minister carried on, sometimes in cabinet more frequently outside it and behind the back of Foreign Office in favour of Greece, and I am quite willing that all papers[2] should be published. None were [*sic*] ever withheld by me from the cabinet. Circulation is arranged automatically by Foreign Office.

It is exceedingly difficult for me here without any official papers to recall

[1] See 52 *H.L. Deb. 5 s.*, cols. 337–47.
[2] In a minute of December 5 commenting on an extract from the Parliamentary Debates of December 4, when the question had been raised whether any encouragement had been given to the Greeks to follow a policy which had led to their defeat, Mr. Lindsay wrote: 'I fear this question may not be allowed to drop, but the Foreign Office archives throw no light on it.'

exact course of events. But broad fact remains that it was I who had persuaded Greece in October 1921 to recognise that her case was lost in Asia Minor[3] and who from that date forward was pressing allied conference to bring about retirement without bloodshed desiring only that debacle which I foresaw should not take place before conference began. I am not willing that this gross and malicious travesty of my conduct, which is simply designed to cover up deplorable policy of late Prime Minister, should pass unchallenged and I am prepared to write a letter to be read by you in Parliament or to take any other step which you may advise, to make truth known.[4] Real facts are to a large extent revealed in 'Morning Post' communication of December 8th.

[3] See Vol. XVII, No. 425.

[4] Referring to this telegram, the Prime Minister informed Lord Curzon (in Foreign Office telegram No. 65 of December 10, not printed) that no further action on his part seemed to be necessary at the moment, as the case would be re-stated in both Houses on December 11, in answer to questions. See 52 *H.L. Deb. 5 s.*, cols. 349–56, and 159 *H.C. Deb. 5 s.*, cols. 2367–8.

No. 268

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 10, 12.15 p.m.)
No. 98 Telegraphic [E 13802/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 10, 1922, 10.50 a.m.*

Yesterday was taken up with meetings of important sub-committees[1] and also with conferences between our military and naval experts and Turks about the Straits.

At former meetings which dealt with capitulations and debts the two chairmen Sir H. Rumbold and Bompard report that Turkish delegates were not only frankly obstructive but insolent. They are said to be waiting to see what happens in London. I propose with M. Barrère (? to) send for Ismet Pasha and to point out to him that we cannot go on treating the Turks with courtesy and conciliation in main commissions if they are to respond with obstinacy and rudeness in the committee rooms. Sub-committee on exchange of populations has also come to a standstill owing to insistence of Turks on complete expulsion of Greeks from Constantinople. Telegram[2] (? as) drafted by me from three Presidents here to Kemal at Angora about Constantinople situation was despatched yesterday.[3] Discussion between our naval and military experts and Turks represented by Ismet continued throughout yesterday on the subject of demilitarised zones. He was intensely suspicious and demanded guarantees against every conceivable contingency, being

[1] See No. 244, n.1. [2] Not printed. [3] See No. 264.

apparently quite unable to imagine a world at peace. Nevertheless I cherish hope that we can come to terms over the Straits. I propose to have a serious talk with him about prospects of a peace treaty.

No. 269

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 35[1] *Telegraphic [E 13816/27/44]*

LAUSANNE, *December 10, 1922*

Your telegrams No. 46[2] and No. 48.[3]

I cannot agree to suggestion that Greek High Commission should be made branch of three allied High Commissions and neutral legation put technically in charge of Greek interests. If Refet cannot be induced to leave matters as they are and you foresee danger of action on his part, most suitable arrangement would be to make Greek High Commission branch of Spanish legation[4] and arrange with latter to invoke assistance of allied High Commissioners in the event of Turks taking advantage of new arrangement to interfere with persons or property of Hellenic subjects.

[1] Repeated as No. 100 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on December 11 at 8 a.m.

[2] Of December 5, not printed. This reported that Refet Pasha had again raised the question of the Greek High Commission in Constantinople and had claimed that it had no right to continue except as branch of a neutral mission.

[3] Of December 6, not printed. This stated that the Greek High Commissioner had proposed that the Greek mission should continue to function as a branch of the three Allied High Commissions.

[4] In his telegram No. 764 of December 10 to the Foreign Office, sent to Lausanne as No. 64, Mr. Henderson reported that the Greek High Commissioner had 'received telegram from Greek delegation at Lausanne conveying decision that Greek High Commission be closed and Greek interests entrusted to Spanish Minister'.

No. 270

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe (Received December 10, 8.15 p.m.)

No. 101 Telegraphic [E 13817/27/44]

Very urgent LAUSANNE, *December 10, 1922, 8 p.m.*

Following for Vansittart[1] from Sir W. Tyrrell[2]:—

I remember last September late Prime Minister denying that Lord Curzon's

[1] Mr. R. Vansittart, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[2] Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

note to M. Gounaris[3] had been circulated to Cabinet or seen by him. Question Mr. Akers Douglas[4] on a letter from Mr. Glyn, M.P. to Prime Minister of the day, accusing Foreign Office of having encouraged Greeks to renew fight. I asked Mr. Lindsay to find out as to circulation to Cabinet, and my recollection is that with assistance of Hankey we proved note had been circulated and seen by Cabinet.[5]

Lord Curzon thinks that if I am correct Prime Minister may find this point useful in his speech on Monday.[6]

Enquiry was made by Hankey at the time and a reply was drafted and is to be found in eastern department.[7]

[3] Of March 6, 1922 (see Vol. XVII, No. 549).

[4] The Hon. Aretas Akers Douglas, Diplomatic Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from August 1, 1919, to November 25, 1921.

[5] An extract of Mr. Glyn's letter, not printed, was given in Sir M. Hankey's letter of September 16, not printed, to Sir W. Tyrrell. In his reply of September 20, not printed, Sir W. Tyrrell informed Sir M. Hankey that M. Gounaris's letter of February 15 to Lord Curzon (see Vol. XVII, No. 549, n. 1) together with Lord Curzon's reply of March 6 (see Vol. XVII, No. 549) had been circulated to the Cabinet.

[6] December 11.

[7] See Vol. XVII, No. 544, n. 3.

No. 271

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 70 Telegraphic [E 13817/27/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 11, 1922, 3.30 p.m.*

Following for Sir W. Tyrrell from Vansittart:

Your telegram No. 101 (of December 10th).[1]

There is nothing in the correspondence to which you refer beyond the fact already stated in both Houses,[2] and being re-stated to-day,[3] that the two notes were circulated to the Cabinet.[4]

[1] No. 270.

[2] See 52 *H.L. Deb.*, *5 s.*, col. 343, and 159 *H.C. Deb.*, *5 s.*, col. 1989.

[3] See No. 267, n. 4.

[4] In his telegram No. 74 of December 11, Sir E. Crowe informed Lord Curzon: 'In House of Lords today Lord Birkenhead accepted unreservedly statement that Foreign Office papers had been circulated and expressed sincere regret to everyone in Foreign Office concerned in circulation of these documents.'

No. 272

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 387 Telegraphic [C 16700/13/19]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 11, 1922, 7.10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 732.[1]

Course proposed in second paragraph[1] approved. Your position being that of chargé d'affaires you and your staff do not suffer any diminution of diplomatic privilege.[2]

Repeated to Lausanne No. 73.

[1] Of December 6. This ran: '. . . I presume that I should abstain from direct contact with any Cabinet Minister but that when essential, I should communicate privately with Secretary General or Private Secretary at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Relief etc. Am I and staff still entitled to diplomatic privileges and courtesies in respect of customs, etc?

'It is of course difficult in present circumstances to press British claims.'

[2] In a minute of December 7, which was initialled by Lord Curzon on December 8, Sir E. Crowe stated that this ruling was based on the assumption that diplomatic relations were not broken off: the British Minister, he explained, had been withdrawn as a mark of displeasure.

No. 273

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 106 Telegraphic [E 13891/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 12, 1922, 12.50 a.m.*

My conversation with Ismet yesterday[1] was friendly but unfruitful. For he continued to insist on surrender of Mosul and declared that he could never go back to Angora without it. I declined to yield in the smallest degree and propose to send him a note[2] which may be useful for subsequent publication, stating in detail our reasons for refusal. I shall make a good deal out of point that surrender is not even consistent with first article of national pact to which he constantly appeals as magna charta of new Turkey.

At meetings of sub-committees to-day,[3] Turkish delegates, who had evidently been reprimanded by Ismet after my protest, displayed a much more conciliatory attitude and some progress was made.

Sub-committee on exchange of populations, which had been brought to standstill owing to Turkish insistence on expulsion of all Greeks from Constantinople, also made a slight move forward.

[1] December 10.

[2] This note, dated December 14, enclosing a memorandum on Mosul, is printed in Cmd. 1814, pp. 363–93, 'Correspondence between Lord Curzon and Ismet Pasha respecting Mosul'.

[3] December 11.

Military and naval experts have completed detailed examination of Straits proposal with Turks and matter will now come back to my commission. Turkish acceptance will depend on nature of political guarantees.

Monsieur Barrère intended to see Ismet and give him a serious warning to the effect that unless Turks descend from pedestal and show a disposition to conclude an early agreement on essential points, there will be no use in going on. M. Bompard is confident that in last resort Turks will yield on majority of points.

Tomorrow I propose to initiate discussion on protection of minorities.

No. 274

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 110 Telegraphic [E 13943/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 13, 1922, 12.20 a.m.*

Text of my speech[1] this afternoon[2] introducing question of minorities has, I believe, been telegraphed to English press.[3] Upon entering room, Turkish secretary asked me privately to excuse Turks from delivering an immediate reply, to which I readily assented. Nevertheless Ismet Pasha produced a paper[4] and for over an hour read a dissertation, probably dictated beforehand at Angora, which contained:

(1) A lengthy travesty of bygone history;

(2) Quotations from unnumerable authorities of every nationality who had ever said anything favourable to Turkish rule, and;

(3) A statement of views of Turkish government full of contempt and hostility towards Armenia, disparagement of League of Nations and refusal to allow that there was any minority question that required to be dealt with otherwise than by expulsion of Christian populations and by ordinary Turkish law.

I expressed my profound disappointment and regrets at this exhibition which if at all fully reported in press, will produce lamentable impression throughout the world. I added that if this were real view of Turkish government, it would be useless to set up sub-committee which I had proposed in order to pursue matter in detail, but that I would adjourn until eleven tomorrow to permit of Turks preparing a considered reply to my proposals. In the course of discussion, these were unanimously and warmly supported by French, Italian, American, Greek and Serbian delegates and Turks found themselves, not only isolated, but hopelessly in the wrong. It was their first big blunder since tactical mistakes of opening days and can only be explained either by orders from Angora, or by Russian pressure, or by complete

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 173–204.
[2] December 12.
[3] See *The Times*, December 13, p. 11.
[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 190–204.

obliquity of mental vision. If they adopt a similar attitude tomorrow, they will have to be told that it is useless to proceed with conference and should a rupture come on these grounds, there would not be a voice raised on their defence in the world.

I warned Ismet Pasha afterwards that if he did not completely change his attitude, disaster was inevitable.

No. 275

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 13, 7.0 p.m.)
No. 113 Telegraphic [E 14010/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 13, 1922, 3.25 p.m.*

This morning[1] Ismet Pasha delivered his reply to my speech yesterday about minorities. It was scarcely more satisfactory than its predecessor.[2] As to Armenians they would live fraternally and harmoniously with the Turks in future and require no protection. A national home was out of the question since it would involve dismemberment of Turkey and was inconsistent with independent sovereignty. League of Nations, which he had derided yesterday, he now said was regarded by Turkey with respect, but there was no hint of co-operation. He altogether rejected the idea of an independent body or organization to supervise minority protection in future. He was prepared to consider an amnesty but absolutely refused to commute military service, although as I pointed out Turks are levying such a tax at this moment upon Greeks in Constantinople. As to special guarantees, analogous or superior to those contained in minority clauses of European treaties, he ignored them altogether.

I then delivered much the most serious speech that I have made in this conference. Turkey, I said, if she persisted in this attitude would set against herself public opinion of the world. No one wanted to infringe her sovereign independence. But this fetish could not be invoked to resist every reasonable proposal or guarantee. Turkey must make up her mind definitely whether she proposed to utilize and appeal to League of Nations or not. Decision could not be in suspense. Allies had spent three weeks in trying to throw down barriers to peace. Every day Turkey persisted in e[r]ecting new ones. This could not go on. Neither I nor Allies were prepared to sit indefinitely at Lausanne while this process was repeated on every subject. If Turkey chose to break on question of minorities not a voice would be raised anywhere in her defence. I concluded by warning Ismet Pasha that critical moment had arrived and that we must advance or separate. He will reply tomorrow.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 204–15.
[2] See No. 274.

No. 276

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 38 Telegraphic [E 14017/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 13, 1922, 11.25 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 60[1] and 62[1].

Matter has been discussed by Sir H. Rumbold with American, French and Italian High Commissioners. Sir H. Rumbold stated that I was prepared if necessary to authorise protection of British companies by use of force in Constantinople if Turks close offices of those companies. Other High Commissioners were unwilling to contemplate above procedure at present juncture though they did not preclude possibility of having recourse to it in the last resort if other steps failed.

High Commissioners decided to ask three presidents of conference to address to Ismet note, substance of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.[2] American High Commissioner promised that American delegation would associate itself in some manner with this note.

You should address a similar communication to Refet when your colleagues are instructed.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 116.[3]

[1] Of December 9 and 10 respectively. These referred to the new Turkish law concerning companies (see No. 259, para. 11). In the second of these telegrams, Mr. Henderson suggested: 'Joint representations to Angora by conference might possibly have effect of preventing any modifications of status quo as regards allied interests.'

[2] This ran: 'Principal delegates of Great Britain, France and Italy learn that Turkish authorities in Constantinople have invited foreign companies there to register themselves at Commissariat of National Economy before January 1st failing which they will no longer be recognised.

'Delegates point out that law invoked formed subject of conversations before the war between Turkish government and embassies, but that these conversations were inconclusive. Status of foreign companies in Turkey is now under consideration at conference and delegates cannot admit question under deliberation here should be settled in fact and unilaterally by Turkish government before conference has taken decision.

'Delegates therefore request Ismet Pasha to cause instructions to be issued to Constantinople authorities to suspend application of law.'

[3] It was received in the Foreign Office on December 14 at 8.30 a.m.

No. 277

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe (Received December 14, 3.20 p.m.)

No. 118 Telegraphic [E 14059/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 14, 1922, 11.40 a.m.*

Prolonged discussions between allied and Turkish military and naval experts have been proceeding for some days. Former have now agreed upon

a plan[1] which is to be submitted to Turks tomorrow. It provides for demilitarisation of reduced zones on each side of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as well as of islands at entrance to former and in the Sea of Marmora and for Turkish liberty to fortify southern shore of the latter, but absolute prohibition of all military works on the northern shore, passage free from gun fire being thus assured. We propose to insist upon inspection of demilitarised zones both in above areas and in Thrace, but shall encounter great difficulty with Turks.

A question has now arisen on which I must seek instructions from Cabinet. French military and naval advisers, claiming that they were acting on authority of their government, told Ismet Pasha that Allies were not going to put any naval or military clauses into the treaty or in other words that Turkey may have such navy and naval establishments and armament as she pleases and that there will be no limit to her army except in Thrace and Constantinople, which it is proposed to deal with in connection with demilitarisation clauses, and no prohibition of conscription. I have thus been placed in a situation of great embarrassment inasmuch as these declarations neither conform entirely to my own sentiments nor to any instructions that I have hitherto received from His Majesty's Government. As regards navy I realise that it is unnecessary[2] and therefore unwise to insist on restrictions, mainly because Turks will not have money to build a fleet. But I should like to press at this stage for a limitation of submarines even if I have to abandon claim later on in the process of bargaining that will probably ensue. I shall of course claim surrender of the 'Goeben'.[3] As regards army, abandonment of all military clauses will mean two things (a) acceptance of conscription, (b) possible creation of a large Turkish army in Asia Minor. Concerning conscription I have argued difficulty and danger of conceding to Turkey what we have refused to Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria and Germany. To this my military advisers replied that any insistence upon voluntary service will be absolutely rejected by Turks and will be entirely inopportune since any form of inspection or control in Asia Minor is out of the question. I cannot resist this argument and am disposed to give way while endeavouring in minority clauses of treaty to secure exemption by compounding for minorities in Asia Minor. As to future Turkish army in Anatolia while I realise that

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 243–50.

[2] In paragraph 2 (f) of their letter of October 20, 1922, to the Foreign Office (E 1416/10102/44) the Admiralty had stated: 'As far as Great Britain is concerned, no great importance is attached to limiting the naval forces of Turkey, except in those types of vessels which, in the hands of a weak naval Power, would be capable of interfering with the free navigation of the Straits.

'Such types of vessels are submarines, torpedo craft and minelayers.

'There are, however, two other factors which must be taken into consideration:

(a) If no limitation is placed on the Turkish naval forces, other ex-enemy countries, and in particular Germany, may be encouraged to demand a revision of the scale of naval forces allowed to them.

(b) The undesirability of allowing the "Goeben" to remain in Turkish hands.'

[3] See Appendix I, Section I, paragraph (*f*).

this may be a danger to Mesopotamia I do not see how any provisions in treaty could prevent it. I see no alternative therefore, case having been in main given away, but to acquiesce in abandonment of military clauses, European army of Turkey being limited in manner already suggested on lines originally proposed by Marshal Foch.[4] I should be glad, however, to know that in taking this line I shall have the support of His Majesty's Government.[5]

[4] See Appendix I.

[5] To this telegram Sir E. Crowe replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 83 of December 15: 'The Cabinet quite approve of your dealing with [the military and naval clauses] on the lines which you suggest.'

No. 278

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 14, 7.35 p.m.)
No. 120 Telegraphic [E 14061/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 14, 1922, 5.10 p.m.*

Conference resumed this morning[1] to hear reply of Ismet to my speech of yesterday.[2] This had produced startling effect upon the Turks who had been closeted the entire afternoon declining to see anyone until they had prepared their answer. This was in a very different tone from previous Turkish performances. For not only did it reveal a conciliatory attitude as regards minorities but it contained salutory and unexpected announcement that Turkey is prepared to join the League of Nations on the conclusion of peace. When we contrast this announcement with the captious and hostile utterances of two days earlier I cannot doubt that my threat to leave Lausanne brought them to the ground. Ismet also reiterated firm desire of his delegation to conclude peace. I warmly welcomed Ismet's declaration and stated the nature of the problem to be investigated by sub-committee which thereupon commenced its labours.

Outlook is therefore more promising.

As soon as I receive views of the Cabinet[3] I will take military and naval questions and endeavour to finish the Straits.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 216–27. [2] See No. 275. [3] See No. 277.

No. 279

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 16, 12.30 p.m.)
No. 125 Telegraphic [E 14125/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 16, 1922, 11.55 a.m.*

His Majesty's Government may like to know my idea of future procedure here. I have given up all hope of getting home for December 25th and am firmly resolved to stay at Lausanne until I get a treaty or fail. I shall therefore, if my colleagues agree, only adjourn over December 24th and December 25th and then resume. I have hopes that sub-committees may conclude greater part of their work in the forthcoming week and that I can push through the Straits proposals at meeting of my commission on Monday.[1] Meanwhile I am drawing up in the form of a preliminary treaty conclusions at which we shall by then have arrived. I cannot say that the Turks, owing to the tactics which they have persistently pursued, have actually accepted any of them although they must have general idea that from the majority of them we shall not consent to depart. This draft preliminary treaty will then be handed to them and I shall offer to discuss it article by article in Christmas week and shall invite their acceptance (subject to such modifications as may have been found necessary) or reject instrument as a whole.

I have no intention of conceding an adjournment in order to admit of a reference of document line by line to Angora which would I imagine be fatal.[2] If Ismet signs I shall make it quite clear to him that his signature involves acceptance by his government and that latter if they refuse it will lose treaty altogether.

I believe such a preliminary treaty will be a complete innovation in international practice. But I see no other way of concluding a treaty within a reasonable space of time and our legal experts are prepared to grapple with anomaly.

Should this treaty be signed by all parties then it will be put into final shape by draftsmen during January and we should have to meet again to

[1] i.e. December 18.

[2] In Paris telegram No. 666 of December 17, Mr. E. C. E. Phipps, Counsellor of Embassy and acting Chargé d'Affaires, reported: 'M. Poincaré told me to-day that he had received simultaneously information from M. Barrère at Lausanne to the effect that Ismet Pasha was in a conciliatory mood, and from French representative at Angora to the effect that extremists in National Assembly were getting the upper hand. He therefore begged me to urge on your Lordship extreme desirability of signing treaty before Christmas, leaving, if necessary, details to be settled later. He says that Ismet has full powers to sign, but that if he be permitted to return to Angora before signature National Assembly will probably decline to allow him to return with them to Lausanne, and thus wreck work of conference. I observed that our information from Constantinople showed the situation there was improving. M. Poincaré admitted this, but harped on seriousness of position at Angora.

'His Excellency feels grave misgivings with regard to Signor Mussolini, and fears he may renew his blackmail of insisting on agreement on economic questions before consenting to sign treaty.'

sign final treaty later on. It is this instrument which would have to be ratified by governments and parliaments concerned.

Turks will no doubt demand immediate evacuation of allied troops upon signature of preliminary treaty. This will have to be considered when demand is made and degree to which it would be possible to meet it will require most careful examination.

This is merely a general sketch of future as I now see it. Later events may compel revision.

Special Straits convention can probably be completed in time for submission along with draft of preliminary treaty a week hence. It is more than probable that Russia will decline to sign in which case we shall have to do without her.

It is of course possible that in anticipation of discussion of preliminary treaty struggle may be renewed on every point and Turks may break away. Answer to this will depend partly upon extent of powers possessed by Ismet, still more upon their real desire for peace as opposed to renewal of hostilities.[3]

[3] The Prime Minister replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 87 of December 17: 'Am greatly delighted with your proposed programme, and am certain that Cabinet at meeting on Tuesday will warmly approve it.'

No. 280

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
No. 727 [C 17646/13/19]

ATHENS, *December 16, 1922*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that I received this morning a visit from Monsieur George Mercuris, Minister of Supplies in the Protopapadakis-Gounaris Cabinet,[1] with whom I was already acquainted. The object of his visit was to tell me of a conversation which he had had with Monsieur Alexander Zaimis, who, as Your Lordship will recollect, had refused to form a Government just before the executions.[2] Monsieur Zaimis had told Monsieur Mercuris that the Revolutionary Government were discouraged at the general state of affairs both internal and external and that if he himself could count upon some encouragement from England and Italy he believed that he would be able to convince the Revolutionary Government of the need of resigning to him the Government of the country pending the Elections. He did not appear to expect much encouragement from France in any case. He would, he declared, insist as before on having in his hands complete executive power and he would not tolerate any meddling on the part of members of the former Revolutionary Committee.

2. Without mentioning Monsieur Mercuris, I paid a friendly call upon Monsieur Zaimis later in the day. After discussing the general situation

[1] See Vol. XVII, No. 634, n. 12.

[2] See No. 85, n. 11, and No. 203.

since his return to Greece and after explaining to me the reasons, as already reported by Mr. Lindley,[3] why he had been unable to take over the Government of the country whilst the Revolutionary Committee were the real rulers, Monsieur Zaimis referred to the general disappointment at the attitude of the Powers towards Greece. King Constantine, he said, had gone. King George at present counted for very little and had not yet been recognised. The people were generally dissatisfied and burdened with the ever increasing cost of living. They could not understand the attitude of the Powers and drew the conclusion that the latter wanted to see a Republic established in Greece. Some even said that whilst France wanted a Republic, England would like to see King Constantine back. Did we want a Republic, he asked, because the attitude of detachment on the part of the Powers had certainly encouraged the Republican movement in the country.

3. I reminded His Excellency that we had all written our names on King George which we had never done on King Constantine—that we had nothing against King George. But, I asked, how could His Majesty's Government recognise a King without recognising his Government? Since the beginning of the Revolution, Monsieur Krokidas's Cabinet had been merely a makeshift until His Excellency's arrival[4] and I reminded him that by that time the Revolutionary Committee were governing the country, that they had set aside the Constitution and they had gone to the extreme of bringing about the diplomatic rupture with England.[5] If there were another Government which inspired confidence in the Powers and did not persecute one or other party, it might perhaps be a different matter. I reminded him of the rôle consistently played by His Majesty's Legation during the last two years when each party out of power was persecuted by the party in power.

4. Monsieur Zaimis said that if a moderate Government, under his presidency, for instance, were to take the place of the Revolutionary Committee, that Government must be able to count upon the support of the Powers. I thereupon asked him (1) what he meant by the support of the Powers and (2) whether the Revolutionary Committee would be willing quietly to relinquish the power into his hands without more blood-shed.

5. As regards (1) he replied that by support he meant first of all recognition of the King. Then he wanted the Powers to adopt a favourable attitude towards Greece and that they should show some kind of sympathy in connection with the present financial and economic distress. We were standing by and doing nothing whilst the country was suffering. Things had been different in 1897.[6] Lord Salisbury had then given Greece his support and a loan in spite of Germany and even France not being favourable. The Powers could at least withdraw the Note declaring the financial blockade of Greece[7] and grant to her the suspended credits. I referred to the Gounaris agreement of December 22nd, 1921[8] by which the five and a half million

[3] See No. 203. [4] See No. 85, n. 11, and No. 150, n. 6. [5] Cf. No. 272.
[6] In 1897 Greece had been defeated in the Greco-Turkish War.
[7] See Vol. XII, No. 463, n. 4, Vol. VIII, No. 100, minute 6.
[8] See Vol. XVII, No. 493.

pounds sterling credit balance from Great Britain had been given up in the hope of obtaining a loan of fifteen million pounds sterling which had for some reason or another never matured.[9] Monsieur Zaimis said that even if we were no longer bound as regards the credits, we could favour a loan on the London market and France and the United States might re-open their suspended credits.

6. As regards (2) Monsieur Zaimis said that he believed that if he were in a position to assure the present regime that the Powers would support him, he could induce the Revolutionary Government to hand over to him. They would, he added, also require a guarantee for their personal safety for there were many people burning for vengeance against them and they would have reason to fear the same fate as they had meted to others. He would, he declared, be prepared to give them such a guarantee as he would propose to form a Government composed entirely of moderate men drawn from both parties.

7. The Elections, Monsieur Zaimis said, were out of the question at present. There would probably not be a Venizelist majority and the country was not internally in a fit state for elections. He agreed with my summing up of the situation when I said that my impression was that the people were generally tired of internal strife and their main desire was to live quietly and at peace both at home and abroad. They wanted, he added, order and a stable Government. He would do his best to give them this, but he must be able to count upon the support of the Powers.

8. As Monsieur Zaimis did not think the Revolutionary Committee would hand over to him immediately, I have not telegraphed this. He was emphatic in saying that it would never do to await the result of the elections before recognising the King.

9. I should be grateful if I might be authorised, if occasion arise, to hold out some hope to Monsieur Zaimis along the lines indicated, for I consider, and I feel sure Mr. Lindley will agree, that almost all Greece would hail with joy the advent to power of a moderate Government under Monsieur Zaimis's Premiership and our position in this country would then be unassailed.

10. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Lausanne.[10]

I have &c.,
C. H. Bentinck

[9] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 548 and 549.
[10] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on December 27.

No. 281

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 18, 11.40 a.m.)
No. 131 Telegraphic [E 14168/27/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 18, 1922, 10.55 a.m.*

Mr. Henderson's telegram of December 16th.[1]

I earnestly hope General Harington's proposal may not be entertained. I have done my best here, not without success, to make position in Constantinople easier and every report confirms fact that it is now relatively tranquil.

In these circumstances sudden retirement of allied Commander-in-Chief would produce worst possible impression on Turks, might raise difficulties among allies, and would have serious repercussion here. Each of us is playing an allotted part on the stage and none can afford to fall out. Sir H. Rumbold concurs in this view.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 45.

[1] The reference is to General Harington's telegram No. 3243 of December 16 to the War Office, which was repeated to Lausanne. It ran: 'It might be suitable moment to withdraw me and break up the Allied command if agreement is reached at Lausanne on main points before Christmas, as seems probable, and danger is then removed from our troops. This would show evidence of Allied good faith. I have no wish to retain the Allied command which is now of little avail.' The War Office replied, on December 18: 'It is hoped to draft preliminary treaty this week, which Turks will be asked to discuss and accept in Christmas week, without detailed reference to Angora. It is thought that Turks will demand immediate evacuation of Allied troops upon signature of preliminary treaty, and how such demand will be met is now occupying the attention of the Government. Whatever the decision may be it will take something like one month to evacuate British troops, under the Q[uarter] M[aster] G[eneral]'s programme, from the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. At some stage in the programme I hope we shall be able to let you go, but it is probable that the Cabinet will desire to maintain the Allied command, at least until the British troops have evacuated the Bosphorus.

'We fully realise that you have had a trying time, but wish you to remain until it is quite clear our difficulties are over.'

No. 282

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 18, 11 p.m.)
No. 134 Telegraphic [E 14202/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 18, 1922, 8.50 p.m.*

We have had a disappointing afternoon,[1] the result it would appear of concerted action between Russians and Turks. After ten days of careful and friendly examination between allied and Turkish experts of every aspect of Straits question in which we have deferred to their representations or fears on a score of points and had arrived at what was believed to be an agreed

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 228–60.

decision on major . . .[2] I unfolded scheme at meeting of conference this afternoon, Monsieur Barrère following with a statement of its underlying principles and main objects. Turks replied by reviving a number of points which have been raised a dozen times in private or public discussions, and as usual by demanding more time. Then followed a characteristically disagreeable speech from Chicherin rejecting our scheme in toto and attributing to it most sinister motives.[3] He ended by producing an entirely new project of his own covering four or five pages of type[4] and claimed that it should be discussed article by article by a sub-committee. This I declined to allow promising to give views of Allies upon scheme as a whole tomorrow. Then Turks emboldened by Russian manoeuvre and possibly in collusion with it, joined in. They complained that discussions of last ten days, in which they have assisted throughout, have been unauthoritative, and insufficient, they demanded a re-opening of principal issues and they ended by producing two counter-schemes of their own.[5] Their attitude had a strong flavour, not merely obstructive, of bad faith, and I remarked, with strong support of my colleagues, that we declined to defer to these tactics.

If meeting tomorrow is of similar character it will probably be necessary to see Ismet Pasha, and tell him plainly that Straits question is closed, and that he can either take solution proposed or leave it with result that all accompanying concessions will be withdrawn. Now that Russians have realised

[2] The text is here uncertain.

[3] Lord Curzon had conversed with M. Chicherin for over an hour on the afternoon of December 17. In his report of this conversation (Lausanne telegram No. 130 of December 17), Lord Curzon stated: '. . . he [M. Chicherin] complained of Russia being left out in the cold and not permitted to discuss matters in sub-committees, where they could put forward amendments and where, by this process, a mid-way point could be found between British and Russian proposals. . . . I reminded M. Chicherin that we were here not to arrive as he thought, at a compromise between the views of Great Britain and Russia about Straits, which appeared to be diametrically opposed, but to conclude peace between certain European Powers and Turkey, with whom we were still at war. In the course of this discussion, Russia had thought fit to put forward a plan for Straits with which no one, not even the Turks, agreed. To-morrow I should explain to conference the amended proposals in which all the remaining Powers, after prolonged expert discussion, in which the Russians had declined to participate, had concurred. These amendments had been designed to relieve Turkey from the very apprehensions as to her future security which Chicherin himself had expressed on her behalf. Why, then, should we tear up this scheme in order to arrive at an impossible compromise between our own views and the unsupported Russian plan?

'M. Chicherin seemed greatly disappointed at idea that he would not be permitted to assist in search for this phantasmagorical compromise, and complained that Soviet delegation were being presented with an ultimatum, and in that case would have no alternative but to refuse to sign. . . . Cabinet will note with interest the conception of policy openly laid down by Chicherin as applicable to every situation. One party is to be at liberty to indulge in most extravagant action or to put forward most extreme proposals. The other party is regarded as stationary at the opposite pole. An equation is then to be reached by scaling down the proposals or plans of the former 50 per cent., while the latter is to make a corresponding modification or advance in order to produce a happy equipoise.'

[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 250–3. The text is reproduced in Degras (pp. 353–6), in which will be found (pp. 342–68, *passim*) M. Chicherin's statements at, and communications to, the Lausanne Conference.

[5] Ibid., pp. 253–60.

that their own proposals lack any support, they are setting out deliberately to wreck ours, Turks being stalking horse behind whom they advance to the attack.

No. 283

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 138 Telegraphic [E 14253/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 19, 1922, 11.55 p.m.*

Today was a better day.[1]

After careful examination by our experts of various counter-projects[2] for the Straits submitted by Turks and Russians, I delivered this morning full and final allied reply. We had agreed between ourselves that these protracted and dilatory discussions must be brought to an end, and that Turks should be told that we had reached limit of concessions. I first rejected Russian scheme in toto as mere reproduction of Chicherin's original proposal for Mare Clausum in Black Sea remarking that it had not found a friend and was so inconsistent with allied ideas that even consideration was useless. So it perished without a sigh from anyone and with barely a groan from its authors. I then took Turkish counter-schemes both for demilitarized zones and for navigation of Straits, which consisted for the most part of demands already put forward a dozen times in expert discussions, debated ad nauseam, and already rejected and refused them for definite reasons, accepting however one or two of a harmless nature. I closed my remarks by summing up advantages which our proposals secured for Turkey. Ismet Pasha as usual asked to reserve reply but protested strongly against proposed Straits commission and denounced political guarantees as inadequate. Chicherin tried without success to muddy the stream. Two Black Sea states, Roumania and Bulgaria, then declared complete acceptance of allied scheme and repudiated Turkish and Russian proposals. Greece and Serbia took the same line, representative of latter entering a vigorous and timely protest against waste of time in these interminable debates.

I took advantage of this opening to say that allies had meant to end debate on the subject today but would grant one more sitting to hear Turkish reply tomorrow. This was accepted without demur and announced in official communiqué. Russia will thus have no reason for prolonging her stay at Lausanne. Turkey will realize that she must either accept Straits convention as it stands or lose it altogether. Today's proceedings were in reality presentation of ultimatum by allies although the phrase was never employed.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 260–77.
[2] See No. 282.

No. 284

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 20, 10.5 p.m.)
No. 140 Telegraphic [E 14272/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 20, 1922, 8.40 p.m.*

There were rumours this morning of impending crisis, of Turkish intransigence, and inevitable rupture. When we met,[1] however, Ismet Pasha made speech of a conciliatory character in which, after a rhetorical but perhaps pardonable allusion to great sacrifices being accepted by his country, he definitely accepted allied proposals with regard to freedom of the Straits, but reiterated Turkish views on points [of] special importance to them.

First of these was existence of Greek population in islands near Dardanelles and presence of Greek fleet in those waters. I did not reply to this because it is inseparable from geographical conditions. His second point was renewed demand for a Turkish garrison, however small, on Gallipoli peninsula, to which I replied that presence of a regular force is incompatible with demilitarization and that Turks are to be allowed gendarmerie, mounted and unmounted, but, of course, without artillery.

He then asked for abolition of stationnaires at Constantinople to which Bompard and I rejoined that this is an act of courtesy analogous to ambassadorial privileges elsewhere, to which it is surprising that they should object.

Finally came their crowning objection to proposal to entrust Straits commission with duty of inspecting demilitarized zones arising from Turkish anger that such a function should conceivably be exercised by smaller Powers especially Greece. There is some force in this plea although it is largely a question of amour-propre. I had previously gained assent of French and Italians to proposal to entrust this duty, which I described at Conference as sine qua non of demilitarization, to military and naval attachés of great powers at Constantinople and, accordingly, I reserved final answer on this question for conversation with Turks. I think it can be arranged. Last question raised by Ismet was renewed demand for individual and collective guarantee by Powers. This he knows he will not get, so I did not repeat my previous refusal. My general object this afternoon in harmony with my statement of yesterday that today would be last sitting of commission on Straits was to reserve the still disputed points for private discussion with Ismet. At Conference he is obliged to pose for Angora and Turkish world.

Russian delegation, though present, preserved a significant silence and undoubtedly this afternoon's sitting [ma]rked a definite break away by Turks from Russian thraldom, which may have larger consequences.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 278–88.

No. 285

Sir E. Crowe to Mr. Phipps (Paris)

No. 459 Telegraphic: by bag [E 14195/76/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 21, 1922*

Your despatch No. 2886 (December 11th: Export of arms to Greece and Turkey).[1]

Please inform French government that we agree and propose to enforce as from January 1st prohibition against export of war material to both Greece and Turkey. We are urging Italian government to take similar action.[2]

[1] Not printed.

[2] In Foreign Office telegram No. 417 of December 21, to Rome, not printed.

No. 286

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe (Received December 24, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 146 Telegraphic: by bag [E 14370/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 22, 1922*

Since the suspension of sittings of my Commission on Straits,[1] I have had two meetings with Ismet Pasha, in company with my French and Italian colleagues, on the points which still remain unsettled. These are in main:

(1) Future inspection of demilitarised zones.

(2) Nature and wording of general guarantee demanded by Turks.

(3) Sovereignty of islands outside Dardanelles. At these discussions which last for hours, Ismet repeats same propositions over and over again, refusing to budge an inch, while I have to fight solitary battle, my colleagues overflowing with unctuous civility to the Turks and showing an inclination to bolt at every corner from the course. I submitted to-day a formula about inspection to which I procured their assent, and which Monsieur Barrère is to do his best to induce Ismet to accept. If he fails the wrangle will begin again. In my judgment these tactics are condemned to failure; and time will shortly arrive when we must submit Straits Convention to Turks to sign or leave.

All indications from Angora point to desire of Turks for peace; but this finds little reflection in attitude of their delegation here, who are difficult and obstructive to last degree.

Russians, though their raison d'être here has gone, intend to remain, and by working on Turks will do their best to make a treaty impossible.

In sub-committees same tactics are pursued, and on all points of importance such as Minorities, Capitulations and Patriarchate, something like a deadlock is reached, solution of which is then advocated either by a meeting

[1] See No. 284.

of whole Commission at which I am expected to do the frightening business, or by private conversations which would break down the patience of the Prophet Job.

In this melancholy environment I seem fated to pass my Christmas, Barrère and Bompard having found an irresistible lure in the call of Paris, and Garroni intending to join the bosom of his family at Genoa. I shall endeavour to start things again on Tuesday or Wednesday next and mean if possible to bring matters to a head by end of next week. But the further we go the colder become the feet of my colleagues, of whom Barrère is deservedly incensed at the monstrous attacks upon him in columns of 'Temps'.[2] If I were at liberty to deal with Ismet alone, I should be more sanguine of definite result. But this is rendered impossible by conditions of case.

Turks after prolonged gestation have produced a twelve page reply about Mosul[3] which it will be my sole Christmas relaxation to destroy.

[2] The reference is to an article by M. Rollin in the *Temps* of December 20 which stated that the proposals for the settlement of the Straits question were drawn up entirely to the advantage of Great Britain. As reported in his telegram No. 679 of December 21, Mr. Phipps, Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, made representations regarding this article to M. Poincaré, who replied that he would do his utmost to stop the campaign, adding however that he had little or no influence over the *Temps* or M. Rollin.

[3] Of December 23 (see Cmd. 1814, pp. 372–80).

No. 287

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a Conversation with M. Venizelos

[*E 14403/27/44*]

LAUSANNE, *December 23, 1922*

M. Venizelos told me this morning that he was somewhat disturbed by the divergence between the reports which we had received regarding the present condition of the Greek army in Western Thrace and those which had been addressed to him by his Government. He had been told categorically that the army was in good moral condition, that it consisted of 8 divisions, and that Greece would now be able to put 72,000 rifles in the field. Our information apparently was that although the morale of the army was improving, it was not yet established, and that no more than 6 divisions were now available. M. Venizelos felt that it was essential for him to know the present position of the army with absolute certainty, and he had therefore decided to send General Mazarakis, who is his military delegate at Lausanne, by to-night's train to Athens with instructions to proceed to Karagatch and furnish an immediate report regarding the strength and morale of his army.

I showed some surprise at this, and suggested that it would scarcely be worth while sending General Mazarakis off upon this mission and that it would surely be simpler for him to telegraph to Athens and to insist upon definite information. M. Venizelos thereupon embarked upon an explanation

of his present position. He stated that the influx of refugees into Greece would shortly lead to an economic, social and political catastrophe. Public opinion in Greece was being daily inflamed by the sight of these refugees and the stories which they told, and the Government at Athens, faced as they were by a great tide of public opinion at home and by the brutal attitude towards Greece of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne, were evidently tending to adopt a stubborn and recalcitrant position vis-à-vis of his own conciliatory advice.

It was quite clear to me that M. Venizelos himself had been deeply affected, not only by the attitude and demands of the Turks at Lausanne, not only by the reports regarding the present condition of Greek public opinion, but perhaps predominantly by the knowledge that whereas the Turkish army was beginning to melt away, the Greek army was daily becoming stronger and more determined. He told me, in fact, that he was himself beginning to question not only whether there was a point beyond which Greece could not be asked to make further sacrifices to the demands of Turkey, but actually whether this point had not already been reached. The attitude adopted by Riza Nur[1] upon the subject of the exchange of populations, the fixed determination of the Turks to expel the Patriarch,[2] and the desire of Turkey to obtain the Island of Imbros, were all factors which tended to convince him that one of the main objects of the Turks at Lausanne was to humiliate Greece in the eyes of Europe. To a certain point he would himself, in the interests of peace, advise the acceptance of any humiliation. What was troubling him was the question as to the attitude which he should adopt when that point had been reached or exceeded. Should he still, without really knowing the feeling at home or the physical resistance of which Greece was still capable, use all his personal influence with Athens to impose still further sacrifices? Or was he right in thinking that there was a point, and a not very far distant point, where it would be impossible for him in the interests of his country, to feel that any further sacrifices in the cause of peace were legitimate?

I enquired whether he meant to imply that he was thinking of breaking off negotiations with the Turks. He answered that he was not thinking of doing so at this moment, but that if the Turks persisted in their present attitude in all questions affecting Greece, he would in fact be faced with the alternative between a rupture of the negotiations or the acceptance of conditions which were too humiliating for Greece in her present improved condition to admit.

Before he could decide, however, it was essential that he should know for certain what was the strength of the Greek army: he had sent General Mazarakis to Western Thrace expressly for this purpose.

I told M. Venizelos that I presumed he was under no misconception as to the impression which a renewal of war between Greece and Turkey would have upon British public opinion. I assured him that not only would he

[1] Riza Nur Bey, a member of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne.
[2] Cf. No. 252.

obtain no encouragement from the present British Government if he thus broke up the Conference on his own initiative, but that both the Government and people of England would be definitely opposed to any such action. I added that there had been so much misunderstanding in the past on this question that I hoped that on this occasion at least he cherished no illusions whatsoever as to our wishes. Not only would he obtain no practical support from Great Britain, but he would also sacrifice our sympathy.

M. Venizelos stated that he realised this perfectly; that he had himself no desire whatsoever to provoke another war; that up to the last moment his advice would be directed towards peace and conciliation, but that he could not hide from us that he was not now in complete control of his country and that there might come a moment when his advice was disregarded at Athens and when events would be precipitated. He went on to say that he knew perfectly well that English public opinion was, in principle, averse from a renewal of war; but that if the rupture came on such a question as minorities or the Patriarch, English opinion was too just not to feel that Greece, rather than Turkey, was in the right. I told him that here again he was under a misconception, and that English public opinion would not argue the rights and wrongs of the case, but feel only that Greece had provoked another war. He then went on to say that whatever might be the feeling in England, he had reasons to suppose that the feelings in France would be on the side of Greece. In the first place, King Constantine was no longer there, and, in the second place, the French were utterly disgusted with the attitude of the Turks in regard to financial and capitulatory questions. He did not mean that France would as yet be friendly to Greece, but he felt confident that she would adopt an attitude of real neutrality and not, as on a previous occasion, assist Turkey. I told him that here again I thought he was under a misapprehension.

In conclusion M. Venizelos stated that he desired to make it quite clear that he was not saying that Greece wished to renew the war. All that he wished to do was to warn us unofficially that there was a point beyond which Greek public opinion would not follow him. In sending General Mazarakis to Western Thrace, it had been his intention, not so much to convince himself as to the condition of the Greek army, as to obtain reliable information whether the optimism of his Government regarding the condition of that army was justified. If General Mazarakis confirmed that the army was as strong and as ready as was reported, then M. Venizelos would not feel justified in pressing his Government to make extreme concessions to the Turks. If, on the other hand, General Mazarakis told him that the Government at Athens were being too optimistic in their forecast, he would then feel justified in insisting upon further sacrifices and humiliations. He did not wish an impression to be left on Lord Curzon's mind that he was threatening war: all that he wished him to know was that he was taking steps to obtain accurate and reliable information as to the conditions under which he might or might not be obliged to conclude peace.

HAROLD NICOLSON

No. 288

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 24, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 784 Telegraphic [E 14375/13867/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 24, 1922, 6.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 782.[1]

Refet Pasha has also visited General Harington for the purpose of saying good-bye. He used practically identic language to both of us.[2] Following is summary of his remarks:

'He himself had always been a partisan of Anglo-Turkish friendship. (This I believe to be true). But Angora for the moment neither liked nor trusted us and regarded us as only trying at Lausanne to patch up in our own interests a peace which would not be lasting.

Turks wanted to get away from Russia, but though they had been fighting for ten years, they preferred to continue fighting now rather than have to start again in five or ten years' time. Turkey wanted money and he frankly admitted that that was one reason why she wanted British friendship. But money or not, Turkey was a proud nation like ourselves and she could not be a worthy ally unless she were truly independent.

Including North Africa she had lost what he described as nine-tenths of her old empire and whatever happened she was determined that last tenth should be truly Turkey's and free of all foreign interference. Ismet had made a great mistake in not asking Your Lordship straight out whether you wanted peace and friendship with Turkey or not. But Turks wanted no half measure. They must have a clean cut peace with no ambiguities which subsequent governments could take advantage of to contest later. Present conservative government was one thing but without a clear peace anything might happen if and when Mr. Lloyd George's government came back to power.'

Generally speaking he was more pessimistic than usual. He did not believe peace was possible at Lausanne unless you gave Turkey unmistakably to understand that Great Britain wished for friendship with her and would not interfere with her independence.

It is clear from all sources that Turks distrust Your Lordship on account of your connection with former government and regard you as unconvinced of desirability of good Anglo-Turkish relations.

In my opinion it is uncertainty as to our real future intentions which makes them hesitate. Refet mentioned that in 1908[3] and again at the time of Mudros armistice[4] England could have done anything she liked with Turkey. But

[1] Of December 23, not printed. This reported that Refet Pasha had stated that he was leaving Constantinople to organise the administration of Eastern Thrace. Mr. Henderson added: 'I have great opinion of Refet's organising abilities, and he will doubtless use them to the full extent for the purpose of building up Turkish forces in Eastern Thrace.'

[2] See No. 291, n. 3, below.

[3] The year of the Young Turk revolution.

[4] See Vol. I, No. 14, n. 6.

Turks considered they had twice been let down by us and dared not risk a third failure. They must feel certain of British goodwill.

Incidentally in this connection I hear Reouf's influence is largely handicapped by fact of his having signed Mudros armistice as he is regarded as having been once already deceived in his belief in England's good faith.

Sent to Lausanne No. 98.

No. 289

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Phipps (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 10[1] *Telegraphic [E 14372/27/44]*

LAUSANNE, *December 24, 1922, 8 p.m.*

Confidential

My immediately preceding telegram.[2]

Persian government are trying to link up their claim to be heard by conference with promise given by us under entirely different circumstances in 1920[3] as a sequel to Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919.[4]

Persian government have since torn up that agreement and this absolves His Majesty's Government from any such promise. Moreover there is now no question of setting up a Kurdish state or a Kurdish autonomous province under Turkey as was contemplated in Treaty of Sèvres.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 150[5] and Tehran No. 2.

[1] No. 10 to Paris, No. 6 to Rome.

[2] This ran: 'Persian government have asked British, French and Italian governments to admit Persian representative to Lausanne conference as regards Persia's western and particularly Kurdistan frontier. Since French and Italian plenipotentiaries are away for December 25th holiday, please ask government to which you are accredited to instruct their representatives at Tehran to join their British colleague at once in explaining to Persian government that no question of modifying existing boundary between Turkey and Persia, and Irak and Persia will arise during this conference and that allied powers regret, therefore, that they cannot invite any Persian representative to come to Lausanne.'

[3] See Vol. XIII, No. 419, n. 1.

[4] Of August 9, 1919 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 760–2).

[5] It was received in the Foreign Office on December 24 at 10 p.m.

No. 290

Memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam on the Outstanding Points for Discussion in the Minorities Sub-Commission[1]

(Received in the Foreign Office, December 29)

[*E 14575/13003/44*]*

LAUSANNE, *December 24, 1922*

The following are the main points on which discussion with the Turks is still outstanding in the Minorities Sub-Commission:—

I.—*Representative of the League of Nations at Constantinople.*

The article originally proposed by the Allied representatives (really by us, lukewarmly supported by the French and Italians) ran as follows:—

'Le Conseil de la Société des Nations pourra envoyer en Turquie un représentant choisi, après consultation avec le Gouvernement turc, parmi les ressortissants des Puissances demeurées neutres pendant la guerre de 1914 à 1918 et qui aurait pour mission de s'assurer de l'application des dispositions de la présente partie.

'Ce représentant jouira pendant sa mission des privilèges et immunités diplomatiques conformément à l'article 7 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

'Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission.'

The Turks flatly refused to accept this, and there is some reason to suppose that they were encouraged in this attitude by M. Spalaikovitch,[2] the reason being that this particular proposal as a general rule for the European minority treaties was proposed by Professor Gilbert Murray at the first League Assembly, and was turned down after violent opposition from all the European States with minority treaties.

The British delegation then proposed the following formula:—

'Au cas où le Conseil de la Société des Nations proposerait d'envoyer en Turquie un représentant pour se renseigner sur l'application des dispositions de la présente partie, la Turquie se déclare prête à accorder à ce représentant toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission. Le représentant sera choisi d'accord entre le conseil et le Gouvernement turc.'

[1] In transmitting this memorandum to Lord Curzon, Mr. Forbes Adam wrote: '. . . Sir H. Rumbold asked me to draw up a statement on the subject and to obtain your instructions on points I, II, III, and IV, before the next meeting of the sub-commission on Tuesday afternoon, the 26th December. The other points, V, VI, and VII, may still cause difficulty, but, for the present, discussion on them is transferred to the Drafting Committee. The Turks have accepted the other 'stock' articles taken from all the European minority treaties. We have not yet opened a discussion on the Armenian national home, but are to hear the Bulgarians and Armenians on Wednesday—in the absence of the Turks, who refused point-blank to be present when any minority delegations are heard.'

[2] A member of the Serbian delegation at Lausanne.

It was proposed to insert this paragraph as an additional paragraph (No. 3) of the article at the end of the clause which is taken from all the European minority treaties and provides for the general League guarantee for the clauses as a whole and their infraction, &c. M. Laroche[3] informed us that he supported this merely to mark Allied solidarity, but that he himself thought the proposal useless and superfluous, mainly because the immediately preceding paragraph in the article in which our proposal is to be introduced provides that any member of the Council of the League has the right to bring infractions, or danger of infractions, of those clauses to the attention of the Council, and the Council can then proceed 'in such manner and give such instructions as may appear to it appropriate and effective in the circumstances'. M. Laroche thinks that the latter phrase covers the despatch of a League representative. The Italian delegation take more or less the same view, and merely support us on grounds of Allied solidarity.

Our view is that M. Laroche is not quite right in regarding our proposal as superfluous and covered by the previous paragraph about League action in case of infraction or danger of infraction. Our article would enable the League to send a representative to Constantinople at any time, even when there was no danger of infraction of the minority clauses. Secondly, our article is so drawn up as to leave it indefinite whether the appointment of the League representative is to be permanent or temporary.

On the other hand, the head of the Minority Section of the League has informed me from Geneva that he thinks the League can secure this representative later by negotiation with Turkey when she comes into the League, and that the Secretariat themselves do not attach importance to our securing the principle in the treaty itself. There is also the real difficulty that the proposal is not in any of the European minority treaties, is violently opposed by all the European States with minority treaties and was specifically rejected as a general principle at the recent Assembly.

We shall be glad of the Secretary of State's decision as to whether, in these circumstances, we should continue to reserve our proposal for a final decision in the main commission or drop it now, as the French and Italians wish.

II.—*Exemption of Christians from Compulsory Military Service in Return for Payment of an Equitable Tax.*

The Allied proposal ran as follows:—

'La Turquie s'engage à insérer dans sa législation une disposition permettant aux ressortissants turcs non musulmans d'être exemptés du service militaire moyennant le paiement d'une taxe.

'Cette taxe d'exonération devra être modérée et sera la même pour les musulmans comme pour les non-musulmans, au cas où la Turquie accorderait la même exemption à tous ses ressortissants.'

The Turks have opposed a consistent negative to this clause. We have used [? cited] the exemption of the Irish from conscription in the United Kingdom during the war, the case of the conscientious objectors, special

[3] A member of the French delegation at Lausanne. See Vol. XV, No. 6, n. 12.

Moslem battalions formed by France during the war, the past history of this question in Greece and Turkey, &c., but the Turks remain obdurate. At one moment they say that they cannot trust the Christians. When it is then pointed out that they should therefore be prepared either to exempt them or put them into auxiliary service behind the lines, they change their argument and say that in the future, if the Christians are dispersed among the Moslem soldiers, they will get on splendidly together. In the last resort they fall back on the stock argument of interference with Turkish sovereignty and independence.

Finally, the Allies proposed to alter the first two lines of the article to read as follows.

> 'La Turquie est prête à considérer avec le Conseil de la Société des Nations la possibilité de permettre aux ressortissants turcs. . . .'

The Turks flatly refuse to accept this, and the article is reserved. We should like instructions as to whether we should continue to reserve this for a meeting of the main commission.

III.—*The Restriction of the Application of the whole Minority Section to Non-Mussulmans.*

The Turks maintain that all the Moslems of Turkey should be regarded for the purposes of minority protection as Turks, and that the actual minorities to be protected should only be religious minorities. This attitude is, of course, quite illogical, as the basis of the other European minority treaties is the application to all minorities of race, language and religion. The Turkish attitude would lump in together Arabs, Kurds, Circassians and Turks.

In practice, however, and except for the possible indirect effect which Allied acceptance of the Turkish claim might have on our arguments as regards the Kurds in the Mosul Vilayet, the Allied delegations did not consider it important to insist upon a refusal of the Turkish claim.

As a compromise, therefore, the Allies have agreed to accept the restriction to non-Mussulmans in all articles except article 2, which is the only one which takes a general principle.

The final draft of this article as proposed by the Allies runs as follows:—

ARTICLE 2.

> 'Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder à tous les habitants de la Turquie pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langue, de race ou de religion.
>
> 'Les minorités jouiront pleinement de la liberté de circulation et d'émigration sous réserve des mesures s'appliquant, sur la totalité ou sur une partie du territoire, à tous les ressortissants turcs et qui seraient prises par le Gouvernement turc pour la défense nationale ou pour le maintien de l'ordre public.
>
> 'Les minorités auront droit au libre exercice, tant public que privé, de toute foi, religion ou croyance dont la pratique ne sera pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.'

The Turks appear willing to accept the first paragraph of this article, but they wish the word 'non-musulmanes' added after the words 'les minorités' at the beginning of the second and third paragraphs.

The second paragraph relating to liberty of interior movement and emigration does not appear in the corresponding article 2 of the European minority treaties. It is therefore a little difficult to press for the omission of the word 'non-musulmanes' in this paragraph of article 2, and the Allied delegations are inclined to drop their claim for its omission.

Paragraph 3, however, like the first paragraph of the article, exactly corresponds to article 2 of the European minority treaties, and as it is a statement of general principles it should be universal and the word 'non-musulmanes' omitted.

This will come up again for discussion at the next meeting on the afternoon of the 26th December, and the British delegation will be glad of the Secretary of State's instructions on this point.

IV.—*The Reciprocal Treatment of Moslem Minorities in Neighbouring Countries.*

Article 5 of the National Pact reads as follows:—

> 'The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the Allied Powers and their enemies and some of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us, in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights.'

Basing themselves on this article, the Turkish delegation proposed the following article to be added to the minority clauses:—

> 'Les droits reconnus par les stipulations de la présente section aux minorités non musulmanes de la Turquie sont également reconnus par les États balkaniques et les États voisins de la Turquie aux minorités musulmanes vivant sur tout le territoire de ce pays.'

The Allies absolutely refuse to accept this, and have pointed out (M. Spalaikovitch with great vehemence) that corresponding rights for the Moslem, and, indeed, for all religious and racial minorities in the neighbouring States were already guaranteed by the treaties between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria, Serbia, Roumania, &c., and between the League and Albania; that these treaties were already placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations; that they could not be reopened, and that in none of them was there any clause similar to that now proposed by the Turks, which demanded reciprocity for minorities outside the States in question. The Allies also pointed out that the 5th article of the National Pact, even if it were taken into consideration, merely expressed a pious belief, and laid down no absolute demand for reciprocity.

The Allies proposed, however, with the consent of the Greek delegation, the following clause:—

> 'Les droits reconnus par les stipulations de la présente section aux minorités non musulmanes de la Turquie sont également reconnus par la Grèce à la minorité musulmane vivant sur tout son territoire.'

The Turks have not yet formally accepted this draft, but on juridical grounds alone, quite apart from political grounds, no concession is here possible, and, if necessary, the dispute will pass to the main commission.

V.—*Religious, Charitable and Educational Autonomy of the Minority Communities in Turkey.*

The Allies originally proposed the following article:—

'Le Gouvernement turc convient de reconnaître et de maintenir, sous le contrôle de l'État turc, l'autonomie religieuse, charitable et scolaire à toute minorité ethnique de religion ou de langue en Turquie telle qu'elle existait avant le 1er août 1914.

'Le Gouvernement turc maintiendra de même, à l'égard de ces minorités, toutes dispositions nécessaires pour régler, conformément aux usages de celles-ci, les questions de famille et de statut personnel.

'Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder protection aux églises, synagogues, cimetières et autres établissements religieux des minorités précitées. Pleine reconnaissance et toutes facilités seront assurées aux fondations pieuses et aux établissements religieux et charitables des mêmes minorités actuellement existants en Turquie, et le Gouvernement turc ne refusera pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux et charitables aucune des facilités nécessaires garanties aux autres établissements privés de ce genre.'

The Turks absolutely refuse to accept the first paragraph relating to the re-establishment of the rights existing before the 1st August, 1914, and, in order to obtain the second two paragraphs, the Allies agreed to drop this first paragraph.

The Turks even opposed the wording of the second paragraph, because they said it did not enable the Turks properly to ensure the registration of all marriages in Turkey under Turkish law, including those between Christian (or Jewish) Turkish subjects. Basing themselves on the wording of article 10 of the Jugoslav Minority Treaty, the Allies then proposed the following article:—

'Le Gouvernement turc agrée de prendre à l'égard des minorités non musulmanes, en ce qui concerne leur statut familial ou personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions selon les usages de ces minorités et conformément aux mesures qui existaient à cet égard le 1er août 1914. Ces dernières mesures demeureront, à titre transitoire, en vigueur jusqu'à l'adoption des dispositions législatives nécessaires à l'exécution du présent article.

'Les minorités non musulmanes devront, d'autre part, se conformer aux prescriptions de la loi concernant les formalités d'état civil, étant entendu que ces formalités ne devront avoir aucun caractère religieux.

'Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder toute protection aux églises, synagogues, cimetières et autres établissements religieux des minorités précitées. Toutes facilités et autorisations seront données aux fondations

pieuses et aux établissements religieux et charitables des mêmes minorités actuellement existants en Turquie, et le Gouvernement turc ne refusera pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux et charitables, aucune des facilités nécessaires qui sont garanties aux autres établissements privés de cette nature.'

The Turkish delegates, while not formally accepting this draft, have agreed that it should go to the Drafting Committee of the conference.

VI.—*Amnesty.*

The Allies finally proposed that the following declaration should be signed and annexed to the treaty:—

'Les Puissances signataires conviennent des dispositions suivantes:

'1. Aucun des habitants de la Turquie ne pourra être inquiété ou molesté sous aucun prétexte en raison de sa conduite militaire ou politique ou d'une assistance quelconque donnée aux Puissances autres que la Turquie, signataires de ce traité ou à leurs ressortissants postérieurement au 1er août 1914 jusqu'au 20 novembre 1922; tout jugement prononcé, de ce chef, à l'encontre d'un habitant de la Turquie sera intégralement annulé et toute poursuite en cours sera arrêtée.

'La Grèce s'engage à prendre de son côté des dispositions identiques à l'égard des habitants de la Grèce par rapport à la Turquie.

'2. Amnistie pleine et entière sera accordée par le Gouvernement turc, comme par le Gouvernement grec pour tous crimes et délits, même de droit commun, mais se rapportant à des événements politiques, commis dans la période prévue au paragraphe ci-dessus.

'3. Aucun des habitants des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent traité ne pourra être inquiété ou molesté en raison de son attitude politique contraire à la Turquie ou, réciproquement, favorable à la Turquie, depuis le 1er août 1914 jusqu'au 20 novembre 1922, ou en raison du règlement de sa nationalité en vertu du présent traité.'

The Turks, while maintaining a wish that Mussulman subjects of Turkey (i.e., Circassians, Arabs, &c.) should be excluded from the amnesty, agreed to refer this article to the Drafting Committee of the conference, i.e., to the French, British, Italian, Greek and Turkish jurists. They also agreed that the jurists in company with the military experts should add something to the declaration to make it specifically cover prisoners of war. The matter stands there for the moment.

VII.—*Validation of Action of Allied Powers in Turkey since the Armistice in restoring Women and Children, &c., to their Families and Communities, and giving back Property to those Arbitrarily Dispossessed during the War.*

The original article proposed by the Allies provided not only for this, but also for the continuation of this work in the future. In the course of the discussion, the Allies have been forced to drop the latter, and, indeed, it is

generally agreed that it would be hopeless to expect in practice that this work should be continued.

The Turks have throughout maintained a flat refusal to validate previous action, saying that their courts should be allowed to consider any appeals against the decisions of the Allies, in fact, to reopen most of the work that has been done.

Finally, the Allies presented to them the following two alternative drafts:—

'Reconnaissant l'inopportunité qu'il y aurait à revenir sur des questions résultant des déplacements de certains éléments parmi la population de la Turquie entre le 1er août 1914 et le 30 octobre 1918, le Gouvernement turc déclare son intention de ne contester la validité d'aucun acte ni décision faits ou pris entre le 30 octobre 1918 et le 20 novembre 1922, dans le but de rendre à leurs familles ou à leurs communautés des personnes ayant appartenu aux éléments en question ou de remettre des personnes appartenant à ces éléments dans la possession de leurs biens.'

Or:

'Désirant l'oubli complet des événements en Turquie depuis les premiers jours de la grande guerre jusqu'à l'ouverture de la Conférence de la Paix à Lausanne, aussi que le commencement d'une ère nouvelle pour la Turquie, le Gouvernement turc se déclare prêt à se rendre aux vœux exprimés par les autres membres de la conférence et de ne pas revenir sur les décisions prises par les autorités alliées d'accord avec le Gouvernement turc depuis le 30 octobre 1918, pour rétablir les foyers dissous comme suite des circonstances de la guerre et pour restituer des biens.'

It was suggested that whichever of these was accepted by the Turks should be added as the final paragraph of the declaration regarding amnesty dealt with above. The Turks have agreed to allow these to be considered by the Drafting Committee.

No. 291

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)

No. 100 Telegraphic [E 14386/13003/44]

Personal and Secret CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 25, 1922, 9.30 p.m.*

I learn from usual secret sources that Ismet telegraphed to Angora on December 23rd that as allies were still (? insisting on) (? control) in Straits, minorities and other questions, and that as Turkey could not yield in taking steps vital to her independence, a sudden rupture of negotiations has to be expected. Spirit of conference did not point to definite results being secured and allies were trying to cow the Turks. The latter had got their backs to the wall on all questions and could not give in. He accordingly asked for necessary instructions to be sent to Refet.

In a reply dated December 24th Reouf says matter has been reported to Smyrna, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace, that Fevzi Pasha[1] has replied that his army is ready and that he, Reouf, can guarantee that Turkish army is prepared for all emergencies.

Please inform me whether situation at Lausanne is such as to necessitate recall of Commander-in-Chief from Malta where he has gone with part of the fleet for Christmas.[2] General Harington would also be glad of earliest possible information should breakdown seem in any way possible.[3]

Sent to Foreign Office No. 786.[4]

[1] Formerly Minister at Constantinople, Fevzi Pasha had joined the Kemalists in April, 1920.

[2] In Foreign Office telegram No. 104 of December 27 to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople as No. 618, it was reported: 'Commander-in-Chief and all available ships are returning to Constantinople.'

[3] In his telegram No. 3311 of December 25 to the War Office (repeated to Lausanne) General Harington had stated: 'The information contained in my two telegrams Nos. 3307–8 [not printed] shows you that Angora has given orders for Turkish forces to take up position ready to take a decision. It would appear from the above information that a break is possible. This bears out impression Refet gave me which I reported to Acting High Commissioner and which he reported in his 784 [No. 288] to F[oreign] O[ffice]. We are all prepared. If situation [is] considered serious, I presume that portion of Fleet withdrawn to Malta will return. In case of break and if attacked, [I] shall act in accordance with present instructions [see No. 314, below], evacuating Scutari when serious advance [is] made, holding Constantinople as long as I possibly can but evacuating before enemy guns above Scutari make anchorage untenable for Fleet [and] holding Chanak as long as I can. It has been stated by both French and Italians that no troops will be sent by them to Asiatic side which is main defence of Constantinople. French will hold Stamboul and in order to protect Embassies and Nationals will send one battalion to Pera. Will do my best to preserve allied unity throughout. However it must be realized that any internal rising will not be in Stamboul but will be directed mainly against British. Should operations begin I can I presume withdraw N[orth] Staff[ordshire] Reg[iment] from Maritza. Should like to receive earliest information of Lausanne developments.

[4] It was received in the Foreign Office on December 26 at 8.30 a.m.

No. 292

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 26, 9.50 p.m.)
No. 153 Telegraphic [E 14302/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 26, 1922, 3.40 p.m.*

Trend of telegrams received this morning, notably those from Constantinople,[1] is in accord with apprehensions expressed in my recent telegrams and still more accumulated [*sic*] private correspondence of Prime Minister and others.[2] Whether adverse influence brought to bear upon Turks has emanated from Angora or from Russia or has arisen from extravagant deference paid to Turks here[3] it has perceptibly stiffened their attitude which is

[1] See No. 291.

[2] See, for instance, Nos. 261 and 264.

[3] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 935–6, where it is reported that Lord Curzon had expressed to Mr. Child his suspicions of the activities of Admiral Bristol.

becoming increasingly hostile and even insolent. They make scenes in sub-committees and oppose an impenetrable negative to every proposition, even sometimes to those which they have already accepted. Constantinople telegram No. 784[4] reporting a conversation with Refet indicates extent to which he has been, as it would appear deliberately, misinformed by Ismet. Latter knows perfectly well that Great Britain desires peace on basis of an honourable friendship with Turkey. That has been subject of every one of our conversations and I am at a loss to understand how any doubt can exist on the subject.

Ismet has himself said more than once that I am only person who can conclude such a peace and that he is here to assist me to do it.

Ismet's telegram to Angora of December 23rd reported in Constantinople telegram No. 786[5] is palpably untrue.

Surveillance of demilitarized zones has not been pressed to breaking point alleged and is in temporary suspense pending settlement of other issues. Question of minorities is still before sub-committee who are continuing to sit and has not even been referred back to main commission with whom final decision will lie. These excuses, therefore, are unfounded and fictitious.

More probably Turks, finding that we do not yield to them on every point or realizing progressive wastage of their army, are now trying familiar Turkish game of a little external pressure. Hence military orders from Angora reported in General Harington's telegram of today containing his proposals A, B, and C.[6]

I have not unfortunately received his 3307[7] and 3308[7] to War Office which would be very useful to me, and which I understand from War Office that he had orders to repeat to Lausanne. As regards military situation, while I do not regard position here as critical and while I do not believe that rupture is likely within next few weeks or perhaps longer, I yet think that all precautions should be taken and that combined staffs should concert plan of action in the event of this being required.

As to fleet, I was astonished to read in papers of departure of portion of fleet for Christmas at Malta. I protest most strongly against such a decision having been taken without reference to me and must ask for their immediate recall to Constantinople.[8]

As soon as my colleagues return tomorrow from their unseasonable absence, I will consult them as to immediate steps to be taken with Ismet here.

[4] No. 288. [5] No. 291.

[6] The reference is presumably to General Harington's telegram No. 3311 to the War Office (see No. 291, n. 3). His proposals were to evacuate Scutari as soon as a serious advance was made, and to hold Constantinople and Chanak as long as possible.

[7] Of December 25, not printed.

[8] In a telegram of December 25 transmitted by the Foreign Office as No. 102 to Lausanne, the Admiralty informed Lord Curzon: 'The actual numbers of battleships (5), cruisers (5) and destroyers (24) which have been stationed at Constantinople and in the Dardanelles have been maintained. Two battleships, 2 light cruisers and 8 destroyers which have been held in reserve at Mudros have been temporarily withdrawn to Malta for Naval reasons and will return to Mudros next week. They are within two days' steaming of Dardanelles.'

Grave warning will have to be addressed to him, if possible, in conjunction with them; if not, by myself alone. An opportunity may occur this afternoon when he has just asked to see me.

I will do everything in my power to avoid a breakdown and do not yet despair. But, as I have before telegraphed, crisis must arise before long and I will see to it that, if it does, it arises on issues that are clear and will present an unchallengeable case to the world.

I have, throughout, implored press here not to be too sanguine and I wish I could impress a similar attitude upon newspapers at home. It is, of course, possible that, just as there was a period of suspense at Lausanne during recent conference of Prime Ministers in London,[9] so this may be a deliberate device to await results of Paris meeting on January 2nd,[10] failure of which would accelerate rupture here.

[9] See No. 260, n. 7. [10] See No. 304, n. 1, below.

No. 293

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 28, 10 a.m.)
No. 154 Telegraphic: by bag [E 14471/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 26, 1922*

I have just risen from a conversation of more than one and a half hours with Ismet Pasha, the results of which, so far as agreement on any point is concerned, were wholly negative. He is impervious either to argument, warning or appeal, and can only go on repeating the same catchwords, indulging in the same futile quibbles, and making the same childish complaints. One might just as well argue with the Pyramid of Cheops. I read out to him Refet's assertions at Constantinople,[1] doubtless based on information supplied by himself. He once more repeated asse[ver]ation that he wanted to conclude peace, and with myself in particular; but when I came to details and took him point by point through the various questions on which we are at a deadlock, all he had to say in each case was that we were making impossible demands and affronting the sovereign independence of Turkey. I told him that he was rearing up against Turkey the opposition of every state in Europe, that he was turning his back on the chances of peace, and that his policy would mean the ruin of his country. His only reply was that in two days he could settle everything with me, on the basis of course that I would concede every Turkish demand.

I then told him plainly what in my mind was the only solution. I said that I had already spent five weeks here and was not prepared to spend five more. Much less five months, which at the present rate of progress would be a moderate estimate. I said that I should endeavour to bring all matters

[1] See No. 288.

to a head in course of ensuing week and that then it would probably be the duty of Allies to put before the Turkish delegation the draft heads of a Treaty with a time limit in which to accept or to reject.[2] If the Turks rejected then all the papers would be published and the world would be asked to judge where the responsibility lay. What alternative plan, I asked, had he?

It needed many repetitions of this question to extract any reply. His idea then appeared to be the following (1) that we should come to an agreement about the Straits, Great Britain yielding of course on the few points that remain outstanding—the object manifestly being to get rid of our troops as soon as possible from Constantinople and the Straits; (2) that I should then resume the territorial questions as to which he declared that nothing had yet been decided, and on which the entire controversy would be re-opened. At the end of this an agreement on those points might perhaps be reached. Then the Conference should adjourn and at a later date all the unsettled questions of capitulations, finance, debts, minorities, etc. could be taken up and settled independently, Turkey ex hypothesi being then in a position to settle them in her own way or to refuse to settle them at all. I said at once that I could be no party to such a programme, and that unless he could make other suggestions in the interval, I saw no alternative but to advise the Allies to proceed on the lines that I had proposed.

I offered to see him again whenever he desired. But I cannot pretend that I believe any such interview will have the smallest effect, and I regard the time consumed in them as altogether wasted. Nothing will bring matters to a head except the sharp alternative of acceptance or refusal and for this I propose to work.

I do not conceal from the Cabinet that the omens are wholly unfavourable and I can find no solace in any other reflection than that Ismet like all other Turks is doubtless at bottom a true-born son of the bazaars.

[2] See No. 279.

No. 294

Letter from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Ismet Pasha

[*E 14533/13003/44*]

LAUSANNE, *December 26, 1922*

Your Excellency,

I have received this morning your letter of yesterday[1] regarding the hearing proposed to be given this afternoon by the Sub-Committee on Minorities to representatives of the Bulgarian Government and the Armenian Community; and in the absence of my colleagues Monsieur Barrère and Marquis Garroni I hasten to send you this reply.

The decision to hear these persons with regard to their minority claims

[1] Not printed.

was taken by the Sub-Committee on its own responsibility and in the exercise of its undoubted right.

The Turkish representatives on the Sub-Committee were so informed on Friday last, December 22nd, and they signified their intention to abstain while the statements of the Bulgarian and Armenian representatives are being heard.

No objection was raised to this act of voluntary abstention on their part; and the question may therefore be regarded as having been settled.

I have, etc.,
CURZON

No. 295

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
Unnumbered Telegraphic [E 14570/27/44]

Private and Personal FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 27, 1922, 2.25 p.m.*

Following from Prime Minister:—

It is conceivable that Turkish obstinacy[1] may be due to knowledge of possible change of French attitude in consequence of my recent interview with French Ambassador of which you have particulars.[2] If this should prove to be the case my view is that before crisis comes to a point we must put to the French the definite question: 'Will you join us in opposing Turkish advance by force?' If they say no then we will announce that we are not going to war alone and will withdraw altogether even from Gallipoli.

I presume in that case there would be no danger of Turks attacking us in withdrawing and that you might perhaps make good terms also as regards Mesopotamia.[3]

[1] See No. 292. [2] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.
[3] For Lord Curzon's consultation with Mr. Bonar Law in Paris (December 31–January 2, 1923), see Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919/1925* (London, 1934), pp. 324–5.

No. 296

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah)[1]
No. 2[2] *Telegraphic [E 14473/248/91]*

LAUSANNE, *December 27, 1922*

Your telegram No. 55 to Foreign Office.[3]

I am endeavouring to work for early signature of a preliminary treaty with Turkey, which would be elaborated later into a final and more detailed

[1] Major W. E. Marshall, H.M. Agent and Consul at Jeddah since April 22, 1921.
[2] No. 2 to Jeddah, repeated as No. 157 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on December 28.
[3] Of December 25. This ran: 'King Hussein is anxious that statement as to how Arab rights in general, and particularly question of Hedjaz Railway, Haramein Wakf and restoration of loot from Prophet's Tomb at Medina, will be presented and enforced.'

treaty. My present idea is not to insert in preliminary treaty any detailed sections relating to detached territories such as sections 7, 8 and 9 of Treaty of Sèvres, but simply to insert general clause whereby Turkey would renounce her rights and interests over all ceded territories. Thus no specific mention would be made of Hedjaz or Hedjaz Railway in preliminary treaty, although section 8 of Treaty of Sèvres relating to Hedjaz and article 360 relating to Hedjaz Railway might be reproduced in final treaty. On the other hand, member of Turkish delegation recently hinted that Turks were themselves going to raise before conference question of inserting in preliminary treaty special provisions for running Hedjaz Railway by international board of Moslems with Caliph as titular president. I am now considering what attitude should be adopted towards this proposal.

No mention of Haramein Wakf occurs in Treaty of Sèvres, but article 425, providing for reciprocal grant of facilities of access to Wakf documents, &c., would probably be reproduced either in preliminary or final treaty. Similarly an attempt will be made to obtain insertion in preliminary treaty of substance of articles 420 and 422 of Treaty of Sèvres, relating to return by Turkey of objects of religious, archæological, &c., interest carried off from detached territories, but it seems very doubtful whether Turks can be induced to agree to restore articles carried off from Prophet's tomb at Medina.

No. 297

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Phipps (Paris)
No. 11 Telegraphic [E 14457/13303/44]

Very urgent LAUSANNE, *December 28, 1922, 3 a.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 155.[1]

Foreign Office telegram No. 464.[2]

M. Barrère who has just returned today informs me that he has explicit instructions from President of the Council to the desired effect, and I do not think, therefore, that you need trouble President of the Council to repeat them. I would prefer to wait for some sign of hesitation on the part of French delegation here before urging that pressure be applied.

[1] It was received in the Foreign Office on December 28 at 8.30 a.m.

[2] Of December 27. This ran: 'There is every indication that the Turkish attitude at Lausanne is becoming increasingly obstructive. There is obstinate opposition to the most reasonable requirements, and the prospect of agreement on points where it recently seemed in sight is now rapidly receding.

'His Majesty's Government feel that only by the firmest display of Allied solidarity can a breakdown of the conference be avoided, and I require you to see President of the Council and urge him strongly to instruct French representative at Lausanne to seize the first opportunity of making it clear to the Turkish delegation that France and Great Britain continue to stand together, and must insist on the abandonment of tergiversations and on the prompt acceptance of reasonable terms of peace.'

No. 298

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 28, 11.30 p.m.)
No. 160 Telegraphic [E 11529/13003/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 28, 1922, 8.15 p.m.*

This morning was held a meeting[1] of second commission with Marquis Garroni in the chair to receive report of Sir H. Rumbold's sub-committee on capitulations.[2] This committee after six sittings, in which they had made every conceivable concession, suggestion and compromise to meet Turkish views, had broken down irretrievably on the subject of judicial capitulations, in which every proposal made had been categorically refused by Turks as an intolerable infringement of Turkish sovereignty. Marquis Garroni led off with a brief statement of facts and an appeal to moderation and common sense. Sir H. Rumbold followed with a weighty exposition of efforts of his committee and circumstances of their failure. Ismet Pasha then read an absolutely uncompromising declaration intended, no doubt, for Angora to the effect that Turkey would accept neither concession nor compromise, that her judicial system was on a level with that of best governed countries, and that she regarded any proposal to modify it, or to accept foreign judges or to introduce a provisional system as an attack upon her sovereign independence. Conference might well have ended upon this note of open defiance. But it was important to obtain declaration of powers and these were delivered with a firmness and frankness equal to that of Turks, and greater than any hitherto displayed and with a unanimity that was most impressive.

M. Barrère declared emphatically that France could not admit of any surrender and that an agreement on this point was essential to a treaty, and at a later stage his colleague M. Bompard, speaking as an ex-ambassador of pronounced Turcophil leanings expressed his painful surprise at attitude of his former darlings and repeated unshaken resolve of his government.

Baron Ha[y]as[hi] warmed into an unprecedented burst of mingled adjuration and appeal.

American delegate read a philosophical statement of America's interest and international rights.[3]

I concluded discussion with a speech in which I answered Ismet point by point and expounded with some minuteness reasons for which foreigners cannot accept present judiciary system in Turkey with its lack of competence, its oppression and its intolerable delays, and pointed out firstly that British traders would decline to stay and work under such conditions, and secondly, that Turkey, not being an industrial or manufacturing country and being dependent on capital, brains and technical skill of the outsider, must herself be chief loser by their practical expulsion. I concluded by declining to believe that Turks had said their last word and by inviting Ismet, after

[1] Cmd. 1814, pp. 480–500.
[2] Ibid., pp. 500–8.
[3] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 936–8.

studying speeches which had been delivered, to reply on another occasion. He responded in a sentence by accepting invitation and asking for another and early sitting.

Cabinet must not conclude from this that he is likely to give way. He is probably merely waiting for orders from Angora and latter in its stupid isolation is so entêté on the subject that it would probably lose half its kingdom sooner than yield. I am told that at least half Turkish delegation here would like to surrender. But they are not their own masters.

Advantage of this morning's sitting has, however, been three-fold. Firstly, it has demonstrated absolute unity of world opinion as represented by powers. Secondly, it has committed French government to a position from which they cannot recede. Thirdly, it has shifted possible or probable cause of rupture to a ground, which no one can claim to be a specifically British interest, as might be the case with Mosul or Straits, but which is a world interest equally affecting every foreign state, whose nationals live or trade in Turkey.

This afternoon Turks have suspended all participation in sub-committees and are probably considering their next step.

Should they adhere to this morning's position, we shall have to consider whether it is desirable to present whole draft treaty in our own form. I think it will be advisable to do so, both because every day that passes is a day gained for peace and because it will be well to let the world realise vast generosity of what we shall propose and Turks refuse. I may add that this morning I mentioned to M. Barrère chance of trouble in Constantinople and that he absolutely scouted idea that we should not stand together to the point of common armed resistance, if attacked.

No. 299

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 762 Telegraphic [*E 14543/27/44*]

ATHENS, *December 28, 1922, 10 p.m.*

My telegram No. 755[1] and No. 760.[2]

With departure of General Pangalos for Thrace I think possibility of an attempt on Constantinople should not be lost sight of.[3] Present régime feel

[1] Of December 22, not printed.

[2] Of December 27. This stated that General Pangalos had resigned from the Greek Ministry of War.

[3] In his telegram No. 3303 of December 24 to the War Office, General Harington had reported: 'Major Johnston liaison officer with Greek Army at Dedeagach wires as follows. (Begins). Greek Chief of Staff said to me to-day: "Speaking with all responsibility as C[hief] of S[taff] of Greek Army to British representative I state definitely that Greek Army will have in Western Thrace within a month 3 armies of a total ration strength all ranks of 100,000 men. Force will be formed of divisions fully equipped for war and further the morale will be good. I guarantee that if by diplomacy England can keep Bulgaria and

the need of doing something to consolidate their position. Prime Minister and Minister of War have declared emphatically that Greece will never yield on question of Patriarchate.[4] Press states that Colonel Plastiras is proceeding to Thrace tomorrow via Thessaly.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 444 and Lausanne No. 44.

Serbia quiet . . ., not only will this Army be able to resist all Turkish attacks from Eastern Thrace but it will be able to advance and take Constantinople. I desire British Government to take this into consideration in its attitude at Peace Conference."'

[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 317–37. In a memorandum of December 26, 1922 (*E 14576/53/44*), Mr. Ryan, having outlined events concerning the Greek Patriarchate since 1918, continued: 'The present question of the removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople is an outcome of this immediate past. It arises as follows: In the Exchange of Populations Sub-Commission the Turks at first insisted strongly that the Greek population of Constantinople should be included in the proposed compulsory exchange. The Allies, supported by the Americans, unanimously opposed this. The Turks eventually agreed to exclude the Greek population of Constantinople from the exchange, but attached to this concession certain conditions. It was possible in the sub-commission to bring about an agreement on all of these conditions except one, namely, the removal of the Patriarchate. The Turks insisted that any agreement on the subjects referred to the sub-commission must comprise a clause definitely providing for the removal of the Patriarchate. The Greeks declared that they could not subscribe to such a clause. They not only objected to the removal of the Patriarchate in itself, but they argued that, even if they wished to sign such a clause, the Greek Government had no authority to dispose of the future of the Patriarchate. The sub-commission has reached a deadlock on this question. The chairman, M. Montagna, is very anxious to find a way out. He appears to regard the attitude of the Greek delegates as unreasonable, and to think that the removal of the Patriarchate would not be too high a price to pay for the conclusion of an agreement in other respects satisfactory to both sides. He further argues that, if the Greeks persist in their refusal, the Turks will expel the whole Greek population and the Patriarchate as well, and that in the end the Greeks will be worse off than if they accept the Turkish conditions. There is some force in this argument, but it is very clear from M. Montagna's attitude that he has strong reasons for backing the Turks in their effort to get rid of the Patriarchate. I suspect him of having already committed himself pretty completely to them in private conversations, and I believe he regards it as a matter of interest to Italian policy as such that the Patriarchate should leave Constantinople. . . . What has now to be decided is whether we are to take an active part in bringing the Turks and Greeks together, which in practice means, I fear, urging the Greeks to consent to the Turkish demand in one form or another, or whether we are to remain passive, even at the cost of letting the exchange of populations proposal break down. My own view is that having stated our strong opinion that the Turks are making an unjustifiable demand, and that their proper course would be to keep the Patriarchate, subject to its composition being reorganised in accordance with the pre-war law (this I urged in the sub-commission a few days ago), we should remain as passive as we can, even if it means no exchange of populations. If Lord Curzon prefers to take an active part, the following alternatives (each of which may have variants) present themselves for consideration:—

(i.) To attempt to promote an arrangement by which the Patriarchate would leave Turkey and function through a vicar in Constantinople. This is more or less what the Archbishop of Canterbury suggests as a *pis aller*, but I do not think the Turks would look at it.

(ii.) To urge the Turks to let the Patriarchate stay in Constantinople on condition that the Greeks accept a clause in the Exchange Agreement recognising that the Patriarchate is an institution solely concerned with the Greeks of Turkey, that it and its subjects must remain Turkish subjects, and that no communication must pass between the Patriarchate and the Greek Government as such, except for temporary

purposes connected with detachment from the Patriarchal jurisdiction of dioceses no longer in Turkish territory, which detachment shall be arranged as quickly as possible. This is a solution I should like best, but I doubt whether it would satisfy the Turks, and the question of dioceses in Western Thrace would give rise to an awkward question under such formula.

(iii.) To urge the Greeks to accept a clause recording the fact that the Turkish Government intended to expel the Patriarchate from Turkish territory, and promising to accommodate it in Greek territory, and agreeing, so far as Greece is concerned, to the creation of a new autocephalous ecclesiastical system for the Greeks in Turkey. Some such formula as this would meet the Greek objection that they are not competent to sign away the rights of the Patriarchate, and it would give the Turks the substance of what they want. It would, however, please neither the Greeks nor the interested circles in England.'

No. 300

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 793[1] *Telegraphic [E 14583/27/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 28, 1922, 11.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 100 to Lausanne.[2]

French High Commissioner informed me to-day that his news from Angora through Colonel Mo[u]gin was very disquieting and that extremists seemed to have got the upper hand there.

Reouf Bey also appears to have made most truculent speech in the assembly concluding with statement that Turkey could only attain her legitimate aspirations by resort to her army.

Acting Consul General at Smyrna reports concentration of troops on Balikessar line northwards.[3] He is informed that sixth division is under orders to march at a moment's notice and registration of men of military age in the district is being carried out. He also reports rumour that some troops are complaining that their demobilisation orders have been cancelled and that they are being sent to Mosul.

All information here in fact shows serious military measures to be in preparation. There is in my opinion considerable element of bluff in them but not to the extent of excluding possibility of resumption of hostilities. I am still convinced that leaders sincerely desire peace. Their principal means of pressure is Turkish army and they may be only using it for what it can get for them at critical stage of negotiations. But there is risk lest once movement gets started leaders may no longer be able to control it. This is

[1] Sent to Lausanne as No. 110. [2] No. 291.

[3] This was confirmed in Smyrna despatch No. 2 of January 3, 1923, a copy of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Constantinople despatch No. 21 of January 9, 1923, not printed.

particularly dangerous owing to numerous points of contact and delicate situation in Constantinople with its internal nationalist organisation.

On the other hand my information is that morale of troops has greatly deteriorated since defeat of Greeks and that there has been much desertion.

No. 301

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 29, 2.15 p.m.)
No. 794 Telegraphic [E 14591/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 29, 1922, 12.30 p.m.*

Representative of Grand National Assembly has communicated three notes[1] to allied High Commissioners:

(a) complaining that certain foreign merchant vessels enter port of Smyrna without flying their flag and asking that they be instructed to do so,

(b) enclosing for information text of regulations for foreign men-of-war entering Turkish ports in general, and

(c) informing of special regulations for port of Smyrna in its capacity of fortified place.

Regulations in (b) are those communicated by Hamid on November 5th[2] (please see Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 989[3]) when reply was sent to the effect that in view of Mudros armistice allies could not conform to them.

Regulations in (c) lay down (1) no men-of-war except smallest kind can stop (stationner) in port, (2) no two men-of-war can be in port at the same time, (3) full details of each man-of-war entering or leaving must be communicated twenty-four hours in advance to Commandant, (4) no man-of-war can enter port before receipt of confirmatory signal from Kensten Island, (5) landing parties must be notified to Commandant in advance.

My colleagues and I agreed in principle to return similar answer as before but are communicating notes to allied Admirals for observations in the first instance.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 794, sent to Lord Curzon No. 111.

[1] Not printed. Copies of these notes dated December 26, were communicated to the Foreign Office in Constantinople despatch No. 1153 of December 29, not printed.

[2] Not printed. See, however, No. 157, n. 2.

[3] Of November 7, not printed.

No. 302

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 30, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 796 Telegraphic [E 14649/27/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 29, 1922, 8.5 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 672 [*sic*][1] to Foreign Office.

Representative of Grand National Assembly referred today to Greek military preparations in Thrace. I told him I considered it out of the question that Greeks should make move on their own. I did not doubt however that they were preparing against possible breakdown of conference and were hoping, in that event, through folly of Turks themselves, to recover something of what they had lost. I added that Turkish attitude at Lausanne was certainly encouraging for Greeks.

Sent to Lausanne No. 114. Repeated to Athens No. 273.

[1] The reference is to Athens telegram No. 762 of December 29, which stated: '. . . Colonel Plastiras left for Salonica last night to consult with Serbian military authorities, presumably with a view to possible joint action in the event of breakdown of Conference.'

No. 303

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 904[1] *[C 17748/13/19]**

Sir, LAUSANNE, *December 29, 1922*

I transmit to you herewith a record of a conversation that took place on the 21st December between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador regarding the question of the recognition of the King of Greece.

2. Apart from the reasons against immediate recognition touched upon in that conversation, it would clearly be inopportune at the present moment for His Majesty's Government to agree to the recognition of a sovereign with whose existing Government they have just been obliged to suspend relations because of a series of atrocious judicial murders.

I am, &c.,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 303
Note by Sir Eyre Crowe.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *December 21, 1922*

The French Ambassador enquired to-day what were the views and intentions of the British Government as regards the recognition of the King of Greece. According to the information at the disposal of the French Govern-

[1] As explained in Foreign Office telegram No. 2, of January 1, 1923 to Athens, not printed, this despatch was a reply to No. 280.

ment, partly derived from M. Veniselos himself, it was a doubtful question whether the general elections about to be held in Greece would lead to the establishment of a republic. Although this question would not itself be made the issue at the elections, it was almost certain to be raised by the Chambers when elected. M. Veniselos had expressed the opinion that, if there were an overwhelming majority in favour of setting up a republic, it would have to be done; but he personally would deprecate such a change if there were only a comparatively small majority in favour of it. In fact, so long as a respectable minority, even if it attained to no more than one-fourth of the Chambers, were in favour of retaining the monarchy, he strongly hoped it would be preserved—of course, on the understanding that the monarchy in future was run on really constitutional lines.

This being the situation, the French Government were hesitating as to the possible advantages of attacking the question of the King's recognition before the election, or postponing it until after the elections. In favour of the first alternative was the consideration that Allied recognition would strengthen the monarchical element and increase the chances of maintaining the King, which, in the general interests of the stability of the country, might be preferable. On the other hand, the Allies might think they would look foolish if they recognised the King, only to see him dethroned immediately afterwards by the popular vote.[2]

I said that these considerations had been before Lord Curzon for some time, and he had so far decidedly inclined towards postponement of recognition on account of the very reason to which the French Ambassador had just alluded. I would not say whether considerations arising out of the probable conclusion of a definite treaty of peace at Lausanne might affect the decision. In a certain sense a technical difficulty might be said to arise if the Allies refused to recognise a King whose plenipotentiary, acting on His Majesty's full powers, would sign the treaty; for it might be argued that it would be not only illogical, but possibly formally incorrect, to accept the signature of the representative of a régime which we did not recognise.[3] I could not, however, at this moment express any definite opinion, and I should have to refer the matter to the Secretary of State.

E. A. C.

[2] Cf. No. 122.

[3] Lord Curzon made the marginal comment: 'Surely there is no force in this.'

No. 304

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 1, 10.30 a.m.)
No. 167 Telegraphic: by bag [E 2/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 30, 1922*

Sub-committees continue to meet and are drawing near to end of such questions as minorities and exchange of populations. On my return from

Paris next week[1] I shall take their reports in Main Commission. Question of capitulations is also in abeyance pending the production of some Turkish counter-proposal which is said to be in incubation. French decline to proceed with financial questions which have also come to a standstill in subcommittees, hoping, I believe, to have a private deal with the Turks on the matter. It is in this light that I interpret a sudden proposal of the French government in connivance with Monsieur Barrère to send the French High Commissioner, General Pellé, on an urgent mission from Constantinople to Angora, accompanied by one of their financial experts here. I have dissuaded this proposal as [has] also my Italian colleague, because I am convinced that it is designed much less in the interests of a general peace, than of the private concerns of the French, about which they are intensely disturbed, and because I think that for a French High Commissioner to gallop off to Angora at this moment could only encourage idea that we are suppliants at feet of Turkey.

Should a really serious rupture impend later on, there might be more to be said for the suggestion.

I have been very much concerned at quite unnecessary and unfortunate publicity given to the recall of the ships from Malta.[2] The more their departure had been explained as due to routine movements the less justification was there for exploiting their return as a political move of first importance. If it had been made as a matter of course, its full significance would have been sufficiently realised by Turks upon re-appearance of vessels in Turkish waters.

[1] Lord Curzon travelled to Paris on December 31 for talks with Mr. Bonar Law, who was in Paris for the Reparation Conference, January 2–7, 1923 (see *Survey of International Affairs 1920–23*, pp. 193–201).

[2] See No. 291, n. 2, and No. 292, n. 8.

No. 305

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received December 30, 11 p.m.)
No. 168 Telegraphic [E 3/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *December 30, 1922, 10.10 p.m.*

Following for Colonial Office.

Ismet Pasha has accepted my proposal for a meeting of our respective experts to discuss Irak frontier question. My proposal was confined to northern boundary alone. He uses word frontiers in plural and clearly intends, having been worsted in paper encounter, to raise whole question anew in proposed meeting. At same time I do not think I ought to refuse and shall therefore be obliged if Bullard[1] can be sent out on Monday or Tuesday at latest to help me.

[1] See No. 257, n. 2.

No. 306

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 173 Telegraphic [E 184/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 4, 1923, 12.5 a.m.*

According to French, Turks are arguing that if detached territories are to be responsible only for pre-war Turkish debt which is the view hitherto insisted upon by the Allies, such territories are regarded as detached from August 1st, 1914, and should therefore take over from that date the Turkish liability to settle all claims for damage since that date within their borders other than war damage but including requisitions, whether such are made by Turks, natives locally or Allies. If this were agreed to Turks would drop any claim for compensation in territory not detached but occupied by Allies other than Greece since the armistice.

On the other hand if our demand that claims are only to be met since the armistice were admitted then detached territories should be liable for their share of all debt up to the armistice. This would certainly involve much heavier financial burden on Irak and Palestine whose share of debt would probably be at least double.

French are disposed to give way in the matter in the last resort. They consider claims that Syria will have to meet will much exceed claims on Palestine and Irak. As, however, French claims in Syria are mainly in respect of injury to railway property such claims would probably be settled by modifications of concessions rather than in cash whereas claims against Irak and Palestine would probably have to be settled in cash.

There is reason to believe that French have received certain assurances as to recognition of maintenance and adjustment of pre-war concessions if Turks can secure financial adjustment on these lines.

In my opinion even if any concessions of this nature which involve payment to Turkish subjects for damage done by Turkey were to be made this is not the moment to make it but question should be reserved until time comes for striking a final bargain on the whole treaty and satisfaction should then be obtainable on other important contested financial points such as:

1. Date of March 1920 for commencement of payment of annuities by detached states.
2. Waiver of claim by Turks for ships.
3. Retention of (?5),000,000 gold by Allies.

Please ascertain from Treasury and Colonial Office what would be magnitude of resultant charge on territories concerned and their views generally on proposal.[1]

[1] See No. 320, below.

No. 307

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with M. Venizelos
[*E 316/6/44*]

LAUSANNE, *January 4, 1923*

I went to see M. Venizelos this morning and showed him a copy of your telegram No. 3 to Athens[1] instructing Mr. Bentinck to warn the Greek Government that a renewal of hostilities by Greece would be universally condemned in England.

He asked me to assure you that in no circumstances would he advise his Government to take military action against Turkey, unless it were with the full concurrence and support of the French and British Governments.

I asked him whether he felt sure that the Government at Athens would adopt an equally reasonable attitude. He said that he was confident that they had control over the situation and would abide by his advice. He had about a fortnight ago instructed them to do everything possible to reconstitute the army as an efficient and disciplined body. It was his right, and indeed his duty, to take these precautions in view of the possibility of the Conference breaking down, of the Allies evacuating Constantinople, and of the bulk of the Turkish Army crossing into Thrace.[2] These precautions

[1] Of January 1, not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 9 of January 4, Mr. Bentinck reported: 'Italian Chargé d'Affaires informs me confidentially that Turks have sent 25,000 troops into Thrace under guise of gendarmes and that in the event of war they will at once attack Constantinople.'

The War Office, in a letter of January 29 to the Foreign Office, stated, '. . . 3. The General Staff now consider that the number of *regular* Turkish troops transferred from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace since the conclusion of the Mudania Agreement may amount to anything up to 20,000. Of these about 2,000 are actually employed as Gendarmes under the Civil Government. The remainder, which includes 6,000 out of the 8,000 Gendarmes allowed under the Mudania Convention, being directly under the orders of Refet Pasha, the Military Governor, by whom they are being secretly organised into three groups, the total *rifle and sabre* strength of which is believed by General Headquarters, Constantinople, to be about 14,000. The Headquarters of these groups are at Adrianople, Hairobolou and Chorlu. The balance of 4,000 consists mainly of artillery, engineer and signalling personnel.

'4. It is believed that the three groups referred to above are organised with a view to expansion, and it should be noted that, as indicated on General Staff Map No. 10 of December 30th, the Turkish mobilisation scheme allows for five groups (or divisions) organised on a territorial basis.

'5. Artillery units have also been transferred from Anatolia during the past three weeks, being landed at Midia and Rodosto, and the General Staff estimate that the Turkish artillery in Eastern Thrace may now amount to as much as 60 mountain and field guns, and howitzers.

'6. The General Staff have no confirmation of Monsieur Venizelos's statement that men of 18 to 42 years of age have been called to the colours in Eastern Thrace. It is known, however, that machinery exists for complete mobilisation and that, early in December 1922, orders were issued to all males of military age to present themselves for embodiment when called upon, bringing with them six days' ration.

'7. Should mobilisation take place, it is estimated that the 20,000 regulars, mentioned in paragraph 3 of this letter, would be augmented by an additional 25,000 to 30,000 Turks,

did not mean, however, that he or his Government had the slightest intention of acting against the wishes of the Allied Powers.

I asked him whether there was any danger of public opinion in Greece becoming excited and forcing the Greek Government into a dangerous line of policy. He said that that danger would certainly arise if further Greeks were expelled from Turkish territory; the arrival of 600,000 more refugees might well drive Greek people to desperation and render it difficult for prudent counsels to prevail. It was for this reason that he attached such importance to some reasonable solution being found for the exchange of populations.

all of whom might be expected to have arms of sorts, thus making a grand total of from 45,000 to 50,000 men. These figures do not include the forces organised under Selaheddin Adil Pasha in Constantinople itself, estimated at from 9,000 to 12,000 men.'

No. 308

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)

No. 7 Telegraphic [E 260/35/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 5, 1923, 12.30 p.m.*

Following from General Officer Commanding.

Your telegram No. 60.[1]

No British act contrary to Mudania convention has been taken by any troops under my command. Several reports of this nature have been received. My troops on Asiatic side are less in numbers than at the time of Mudania. Nothing except erection of huts, ordinary trench drainage and maintenance and road repair has taken place. Official communiqué in Turkish press recently made charges against us together with complaints that we had sent extra artillery to Chanak and 8,000 Greeks and Armenians disguised as labourers.[2] This is totally untrue and I have issued the following démenti.

Begins.

Reference to Turkish official communiqué of December 27th, 1922.

It is to be officially denied that any new trenches have been dug or any new barbed wire erected on Biyouk Chamlija Hill, neither have any trenches been dug on slopes south of Merdiven Keuy or in neighbourhood of Bekiar

[1] Of January 4. This ran: 'French President of Council at Paris has shown British Prime Minister a telegram from Constantinople according to which Turks complain that we are entrenching ourselves at Chanak in contravention of Mudania convention and they may use this as a pretext for rupture. Please telegraph facts to me at once and repeat to Paris and London.'

[2] This was reported in Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 788 of December 25, which stated: 'Allegation is entirely unfounded and in replying to that effect I have furnished full information as to number and employment of all civilians transported to the Dardanelles by military authorities who amount to less than two thousand five hundred.'

Dere or at Chanak. The only military work of this nature which has been carried out at above mentioned places is that of maintenance and drainage of existing works which is in no way contrary to Mudania convention.

Ends.

In my opinion these charges are being made to counteract fact, when it comes to light, that Refet is busy organizing an army in Eastern Thrace which now amounts to some 18,000 in place of 8,000 gendarmes allowed by Mudania convention.[3] Only today we have stopped a gun on its way to Thrace.

Repeated to Paris telegram No. 1, repeated to Foreign Office telegram No. 4.[4]

[3] Cf. No. 307, n. 2. In his telegram No. 3371 of January 5 to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'I consulted Generals today. Approximately their information of Turkish numbers and movements is the same as mine.'

[4] It was received in the Foreign Office on January 5 at 2.05 p.m.

No. 309

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 118 Telegraphic [E 291/35/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 5, 1923, 6.30 p.m.*

The following has been sent by War Office to General Harington. Begins:—

Your 3366 of [January] 4th.[1] Your action and plans are entirely approved and there is no intention to change your instructions.[2] As regards mobilization that is a matter for possible future consideration as to which no forecast can be given now. In any case the possibility cannot affect your immediate action and plans, and need not be taken into consideration now.

[1] This ran: 'I consider reinforcements should now be sent to Bulair lines and hope to get General Charpy to reinforce tomorrow. . . . I trust that I shall get no change in my present cabinet instructions [see No. 314, below] and in your own if there is a breakdown at Lausanne, as all my plans, including detailed shipping, are now complete and can not well be changed. We are now practically based on Kilia, and . . . all my heavy artillery is in position at Chanak and on (?Gallipoli). .... I shall of course stay here as long as I can without the force becoming endangered. Can I take it that there is no intention to mobilize. It is very difficult for me to give my Commanders here and at Chanak instructions as to extent of resistance to be offered without knowing whether and when to expect further help.'

[2] See No. 314, below.

No. 310

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 5, 9.10 p.m.)
No. 177 Telegraphic [E 262/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 5, 1923, 7.45 p.m.*

I held a meeting of my colleagues this morning in order to get quit of stagnation which seemed to have settled down on everything here and to bring matters to a head within reasonable period of time.

I began by arguing that breakdown at Paris,[1] so far from reacting upon our unity here, ought to reinforce it with the view to reaching some settlement somewhere, and this reasoning was warmly endorsed by Monsieur Barrère, who is going again to Paris on Sunday in order to keep President of the Council up to the mark. We then settled procedure under which subcommittees are all to report in next few days and main commissions to meet day after day next week to receive their reports and to indicate final opinions of allies. This will take us till middle of the week. By then our draft treaty should be ready and we shall hand it to Turks with a covering letter indicating the numerous points which we might have inserted in draft but upon which we decided not to insist in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement.[2]

In view of reports from Angora and Constantinople and of almost incredible mixture of ignorance and pride that prevails at former place, I cannot hold out much hope of Turkish acceptance. On the other hand is to be set alleged personal desire of Ismet and some of his men to conclude a treaty. Interview between my experts and his about rectification of northern Mosul boundary had no effect. Questions of Patriarchate which has been badly handled by Greeks,[3] of capitulations, and of debts, are also at a deadlock and I do not at present see an exit from these difficulties.

[1] The reference is to the breakdown of the Reparation Conference (see No. 304, n. 1).
[2] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 305.
[3] Cf. No. 299, n. 4.

No. 311

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 8, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 181 Telegraphic: by bag [E 305/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 6, 1923*

At meeting of Commission for Capitulations[1] this afternoon the usual etiquette was faithfully observed. The President in gentle accents advocated conciliation and repeated the Allied terms. Ismet Pasha delivered what he termed a reply to our speeches a week ago,[2] but failed to recede in slightest

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 508–20.
[2] See No. 298.

degree from either the formulas or the facts of his previous position, the Turkish plan as expounded by him being to refuse all concessions here, and to offer negotiation of separate treaties with individual Powers later on. I replied to Ismet and pointed out the consequences of a failure to settle the matter now, namely large exodus of commercial communities if deprived of protection of Capitulations, and constant friction between foreign governments and Turkish authorities over complaints of those who might remain. M. Barrère cordially supported me. The meeting closed with familiar adjurations for harmony and settlement in short space of time now left to us. In my view the sitting was both futile and fruitless. But the Italian Delegation persist in detecting symptoms of Turkish relentment[3] and declare that, having once again tested the unity of the Allies, they will presently propose or agree to some compromise. As the Italians are always working below the surface they may know more than I do. But I remain sceptical.

At one of the Sub-Committees this morning the 2nd Turkish Delegate behaved with such studied insolence that Barrère, Garroni and I have felt obliged to address a letter of remonstrance to Ismet.[4]

Barrère goes to Paris till Tuesday when I take report of Minorities Commission, and trouble may be expected.

[3] According to a memorandum of January 2, 1923 by Mr. Phipps, Counsellor of H.M. Embassy at Paris and acting Chargé d'Affaires, Count Vannutelli, Counsellor of the Italian Embassy in Paris, had asked 'whether Lord Curzon would authorise some British expert to begin negotiations in Paris with French and Italian expert[s], with a view to negotiating for an economic understanding between the three Powers in Turkey'. Lord Curzon, who was about to return to Lausanne (see No. 304, n. 1) instructed Mr. Phipps to reply that 'any such negotiations would be out of the question at any rate until the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference'. Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 312, 314, 316 and 317.

[4] Of January 6, not printed. Foreign Office telegram No. 68 to Constantinople, of January 11, described the incident as follows: 'In Minorities Sub-Commission Riza Nour created serious incident. After Italian and British Delegates had made very moderate statements in favour of Armenian National Home and resettlement of Assyro-Chaldeans he insisted on speaking before French Delegate and then refused in most offensive terms to accept any discussion of these questions and left room abruptly.'

No. 312

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 7, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 7 Telegraphic [E 302/35/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 7, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Result of failure of Paris meeting[1] has been to give rise to greater optimism both at Angora and Constantinople as to outcome of Lausanne conference.

It is clear that Turks consider allied front to be broken and their task thereby facilitated. They think France will now be willing to show more

[1] See No. 310, n. 1.

open friendship for Turkey and be less inclined to follow Your Lordship's lead. Also that French will no longer insist on anything outside financial and economic questions. Though this would seem to be prevalent view there are indications also of a certain nervousness lest as a result of France's independent action in the west[2] Great Britain may resume her liberty of action in the Near East.

Sent to Lord Curzon No. 13.

[2] The reference is to the proposed Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr, which began on January 11.

No. 313

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 8, 8.30 p.m.)
No. 9 Telegraphic [E 406/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 8, 1923, 4 p.m.*

I called on representative of Grand National Assembly[1] yesterday and met Hassan Bey[2] there.

I asked the latter about his visit to Angora and said that I hoped that Grand National Assembly had been more reasonable than press[3] made out as otherwise I saw faint prospect of much progress being made at Lausanne.

He professed to be fairly optimistic though he was not particularly communicative. He mentioned two points which Grand National Assembly would never agree to viz. an Armenian home and exemption from military service for Christians. He gave me impression that Turks would ultimately make some arrangement respecting judicial guarantees for foreigners. He regarded Straits question as settled. Both he and Adnan laid great stress on peaceable intentions of Turkey and her real desire for peace. But both

[1] Dr. Adnan Bey, who had succeeded Refet Pasha.

[2] A former Minister of Economics and Public Works in the Angora Government, and a member of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne.

[3] In his telegram No. 3 of January 4 to the Foreign Office, Mr. Henderson summarised press accounts of Reouf Bey's speech in the Grand National Assembly as follows: 'Allies will end by recognising justice of Turkish claim to Karagatch and to plebiscite in Western Thrace. Customs question can be settled by arbitration and that of indemnities on basis of reciprocity. No Armenian home can be recognised outside present Armenian republic. Freedom of Dardanelles is subordinate to security of Constantinople and Sea of Marmora. Turks can agree to no treaty without adequate guarantees. No control of Straits zone can be admitted. Mosul is included in national pact and cannot be separated from Turkey. Threats cannot intimidate Turks who must wait till the end of negotiations to see who are her true friends and enemies. With regard to capitulations Turks are determined to keep within national pact. Turkey requires payment for men-of-war requisitioned in 1914 and reparation for devastations in Anatolia. Speech concludes with reference to Paris conference [see No. 310, n. 1] result of which Turks must await with confidence relying on God, their faith and will, and finally their force.'

repeated in unison the wearisome refrain of Turkey's independence. I do not believe their heads are capable of holding more than one idea and everything is subordinate to it and it covers everything.

Both showed considerable anxiety to hear my views as to result of failure of allies to agree in Paris. Turks obviously hope to gain some advantage for themselves thereupon. I made it quite clear that allied front at Lausanne in respect of Turkey would remain unaffected by what was merely a difference of method and not of principle on the subject of German reparations.

Hassan assured me that Turkish delegation had full powers and that what was signed at Lausanne would be ratified without delay at Angora. He paid unaffected tribute to your good-will and efforts for peace.

Sent to Lausanne No. 16.

No. 314

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 123 Telegraphic [E 378/35/44]

Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 8, 1923, 11.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 184 (of January 8th.[1] General Harington's instructions).

Following are War Office telegrams containing instructions to General Harington which were in force on December 25th:

1. (War Office telegram to General Harington No. 91440 of October 30th).[2]
2. (War Office telegram to General Harington No. 91465 of November 10th).[3]

[1] Not printed. In this telegram Lord Curzon stated that he had no copy of General Harington's instructions (see No. 291, n. 3).

[2] This telegram (despatched on October 31) ran: 'Following are your instructions. (1) Hold to be kept on Gallipoli in any event: (2) Scutari and Constantinople to be evacuated to reinforce Dardanelles at your discretion, i.e. either when forced to go or as soon as it becomes evident that you will be forced to go: (3) Chanak to be held as outpost position only; its retention not worth any sacrifice of life. The policy may be summed up as follows:—We do not want to become seriously committed anywhere single handed with the one exception that Gallipoli must be retained both as a rallying point for your force and as a base for future possible action.

'These instructions are on the supposition that action may have to be taken so quickly that it would not be found possible for His Majesty's Government to consult the French as to Constantinople position, otherwise of course the Government would like to be consulted in advance.'

[3] This stated: 'The maintenance of Allied solidarity is regarded as paramount. The Cabinet wish to repeat their assurance that you have a completely free hand in dealing with the military situation as it arises. They wish to draw your attention, without in any way fettering your discretion, to the great importance attached to the retention of Chanak by the combined staffs of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. Your policy with regard to this should be settled in consultation with the Naval Commander-in-Chief and you need *not* act upon instruction three of telegram 91440 [see n. 2].'

3. (War Office telegram to General Harington No. 91492 of November 17th).[4]

4. (War Office telegram to General Harington No. 91567 of December 9th).[5]

[4] This ran: 'We have fullest confidence in your judgement. An absolutely free hand having been given you within limits laid down in our 91440 D.D.M.O. and I. of 31st October as modified by 91465 D.D.M.O. and I. of November 10th and having regard to Foreign Office telegram 560 of November 11th [No. 177], such action as you take will be fully endorsed. There are two considerations as regards question of mobilisation—(1) That as Turks must get first run no reinforcements could possibly arrive in time to be effective: (2) That Allied or British mobilisation would only precipitate crisis which it is hoped may be averted by the Lausanne Conference.'

[5] This ran: 'Reference your telegram No. 3163 of 6th December [see No. 259, n. 6]. Your difficulties are fully appreciated by Secretary of State and Cabinet who sympathise with the position in which you find yourself placed.

'News continues favourable from Lausanne. You have a free hand to exercise discretion and from previous messages you know that it is desired in the event of threatened trouble that you should continue at Constantinople as long as you can do so without danger of disaster and the view of the Government as regards your question (a) in Part 5, is that you should make the best of the present position.'

No. 315

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 10, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 188 Telegraphic [E 435/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 9, 1923, 11.25 p.m.*

I presided over meeting of my commission this afternoon[1] to take report[2] of sub-committee on minorities. This committee has done very useful and conscientious work and have arrived at friendly solution of many questions while meeting with immovable opposition on the part of Turks to those solutions which will principally affect sentiment of the world.

In category of agreed subjects may be included general provision for protection of minorities as in European treaties under guarantee of League of Nations stipulations affecting family law and personal status of non-Mussulman minorities and provisions for recovery of Islamized women and children.

Allies have further made two considerable concessions:

(1) Restriction of demand for protection to non-Mussulman minorities and,

(2) Abandonment of claim for representation of League of Nations at Constantinople: although in my speech I pointed out that this was a concession which in their own interests Turks would probably be willing to grant before long, after they have joined League of Nations.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 289–302. [2] Ibid., pp. 303–13.

Two questions had been referred back to my commission viz. concession of a wide amnesty and exemption of minorities from military service. Allies had pressed strongly for both and Turks had refused both. There were indications that if we yield on latter, Turks will meet us on former; and I think this can be arranged.

I once again pleaded cause of Armenian, Assyro-Chaldeans and Bulgarian refugees. But Ismet Pasha once more refused categorically even to consider the idea of a national home either for Armenians[3] or any other minority and as we have no means of forcing Turks to accept and cannot introduce such a clause in treaty there remain no means of influence or pressure but world opinion to which in their present frame of mind they attach not the smallest importance.

Nevertheless I have fought, on this as on two previous occasions in this conference, a sincere and strenuous battle for all these unhappy peoples who will at least gain this, by publicity attached to their case, that it will be more difficult for Turks in future, in view of their protestations of a moral equality to that of most civilised states, to repeat their crimes and cruelties of the past.

I cannot pretend that section in treaty that will deal with minorities will redound greatly to our credit. But it is probably most that could have been extracted from an enemy swollen with pride and in a position to dictate rather than to accept conditions.

[3] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 948.

No. 316

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)[1]

No. 139 [E 212/6/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 9, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 1 and 2 of the 1st instant[2] regarding the warning which the British Chargé d'Affaires at Athens was instructed[3] to convey to the Greek Government against any resumption of hostilities, I request that Your Excellency will take an opportunity of informing the French Government of the result of Mr. Bentinck's representations.

2. The warning was delivered by a member of the Legation staff to the Secretary General of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd instant who took due note thereof at the time. Two days later the Secretary-General called on Mr. Bentinck and assured him on behalf of the Greek Government that Greece had no aggressive designs and absolutely no

[1] The Marquess of Crewe had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris on December 31, 1922.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See No. 307.

intention of acting alone. He added that the necessary military precautions had of course been taken in view of the existing situation.

I am, &c.,
(for the Secretary of State)
D. G. OSBORNE

No. 317

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 10, 7.50 p.m.)
No. 14 Telegraphic [E 457/6/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *January 10, 1923, 4.40 p.m.*

My telegram No. 12.[1]

French Minister told Italian Chargé d'Affaires and me last night that he had received disquieting news from Constantinople regarding warlike preparations of Greeks on Maritza. They are reported to be preparing to cross river south of Karagatch.

We therefore decided to renew representations[2] and I have just given serious warning to private secretary to Minister for Foreign Affairs who called to see me.

French Minister tells me that on January 1st, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Colonel Plastiras told him that if only allies would allow Greeks to advance, they would be in Constantinople within six days.

Postponement of settlement at Lausanne is having depressing effect in Greece, where outside influence, especially that of His Majesty's Government, is no longer as powerful as it was last summer.

Repeated to Lausanne and Constantinople.

[1] Of January 8, not printed. [2] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 327.

No. 318

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 10, 9.25 p.m.)
No. 192 Telegraphic [E 462/1/44]

Most Secret LAUSANNE, *January 10, 1923, 6.40 p.m.*

This morning took place sitting of my commission[1] to receive report[2] of sub-committee on exchange of prisoners and populations which had reached deadlock owing to refusal of Turks to agree to retention of Greek population of Constantinople except at price of abolition of Greek Patriarchate.[3] I

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 313–28. [2] Ibid. pp. 328–37. [3] See No. 299, n. 4.

had sent Mr. Nicolson last night to see Riza Nur Bey, who had represented Turkish delegation in sub-committee, to inform him that this was a point on which I could not give way and to propose settlement by which Patriarchate should be allowed to remain at Constantinople in enjoyment of its spiritual and ecclesiastical functions while surrendering civil and political rights and powers. I had simultaneously urged M. Veniselos to accept this solution if Turkish assent could be obtained. This morning half-an-hour before sitting, Ismet Pasha came down to see me and after arguing whole case with familiar but good-tempered obstinacy until last second of last minute gave way after the clock had already struck, thus bearing out my description of his methods as given in a previous telegram.[4] At meeting I concluded my speech by proposing (? above) solution on behalf of allies and it was forthwith accepted by Ismet. I think this may legitimately be regarded as a not inconsiderable achievement in view of its effect upon opinion of the world.

Furthermore impression is beginning to grow in my mind that Turks will be very reluctant to leave Lausanne without a general agreement and that their efforts will be increasingly directed not to rupture but to obtaining by relentless pressure applied to very last second of maximum that anxieties or fears of powers may be persuaded to concede.

Procedure which I now contemplate is as follows:—

Work of commission and sub-committees should end this week if only I can hurry up French who are incurably dilatory and addicted to subterraneous methods and secret conversations.

I have now reduced draft treaty, which is necessarily so detailed and diffuse as to be unintelligible to the ordinary mortal, to a number of headings explained by appended annexes which I have handed to M. Barrère. I want to present these to Ismet in a plenary session of conference next week together with a letter enlarging upon concessions we have made and to invite acceptance of Turks as our last word, simultaneously publishing text and letter to the world. I would give him time, if he demands it, to consider and reply without holding out any hope of modification of contents. This should bring matters to a head some time during the week. Whether he will accept or refuse or refer to Angora I cannot predict. But even in case of refusal or reference, it may perhaps be desirable to adjourn rather than to break conference since, if Angora be really set upon peace, a slight delay might bring them to reason.[5]

[4] See No. 293.

[5] In his telegram No. 69 to Constantinople of January 11, Lord Curzon instructed Mr. Henderson: 'You should endeavour to counteract any local propaganda suggesting that Mosul is only important question outstanding or that His Majesty's Government attach importance to emissaries sent to London. Meeting of experts here produced no results; and question stands where it did. It is possible that it may not be necessary to mention it in Treaty.'

No. 319

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 11, 2.30 p.m.)
No. 15 Telegraphic [E 503/6/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *January 11, 1923, 12.15 p.m.*

My telegram No. 14.[1]

Minister for Foreign Affairs told French Minister yesterday that as Turks had mined bridges Greeks were preparing boats with which to cross Maritza if necessary. Minister for Foreign Affairs showed French Minister telegram from General Pangalos despatched after conversation with a British colonel at Kuleli Bourgas and asking leave to attack the moment he heard of the break up of Lausanne conference. Greek government refused permission. Minister for Foreign Affairs however told French Minister that Turks might render situation so impossible for the Greeks that latter would be obliged to attack in which case he would give French Minister previous warning.

French Minister and I feel that Greeks are always inclined to place another interpretation on words and that it is necessary to make clear to them that warning is really meant by our governments.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 9, Constantinople No. 11.

[1] No. 317.

No. 320

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 129 Telegraphic [E 461/1/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 11, 1923, 5.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 173[1] and 190[2] (of 4th and 10th January. Liability of detached territories in regard to Turkish pre-war debt).

Treasury and Colonial Office regard proposed concession as entirely unjustifiable in principle. Allied view that detached territories should take share of pre-war debt only, is based not on the manifestly untrue assumption that territories were detached in 1914, but on the consideration that result of war was to free those territories from Turkish yoke and that it is unjust that they should share war expenses of Turkey who, if victorious, would have kept them subject to this yoke against their will.

Treasury wrote to Block[3] on the 6th instant[4] to ask him if a maximum

[1] No. 306. [2] Not printed.

[3] Sir Adam Block, British representative on the Provisional Financial Commission of Control in Constantinople.

[4] Not printed. According to Foreign Office minutes (*E 184/1/44* and *E 461/1/44*), this letter was sent following an informal meeting of representatives of the Treasury, the Colonial Office, and the Foreign Office.

figure of liability could be ascertained and proposed to give their final views on receipt of his reply which has not yet arrived. They were anxious not to reject a concession, however unjustifiable in itself, if liability involved was inconsiderable and grant of concession likely to facilitate peace.

For reply to last paragraph of your telegram No. 173 please see Treasury letter to Block. Copy follows by bag in case it has miscarried. Briefly, Treasury and Colonial Office have no knowledge of magnitude of claims which might be made under proposed concession.

No. 321

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
*No. 17 [C 1318/362/19]**

ATHENS, *January 11, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 749 of the 28th ultimo,[1] I have the honour to report that the situation in the country has continued to be tranquil during the last fortnight. In spite of many reports to the contrary, the revolutionary government appear to have no immediate intention of handing over to M. Zaimis[2] or to anybody else. No doubt the unaccustomed power which they now wield is pleasant. On the other hand, however much one may disapprove of some of their actions, it must be admitted that they have maintained order in the country and, according to all accounts, restored the discipline and *moral* of the army. In view of the critical situation at Lausanne and the consequent effect on the Maritza, the present is hardly the time at which to change horses and to call for a general election, for which they are unprepared. Efforts are, however, being made to prepare the people to favour the revolution, and the statutes of the 'Leagues of National Safety', which are about to be created all over Greece, have been published. The object of these leagues is said to be to reinforce, to continue and to accomplish the work and the principles of the revolution, and for this purpose they require: (*a*) the death of the Constantinian policy, to which is due the great national disaster; (*b*) abolition of personal parties and factions; (*c*) the end of internal dissension and the re-establishment of internal peace; (*d*) a revival of the national and moral sentiment of the nation; finally, the creation of a new and healthy political life by the organisation of parties of principles rather than of persons. The leagues are not to constitute a party, but the members may belong to any party provided they accept loyally the objects of the leagues.

2. Referring to these leagues, Colonel Plastiras told the press that the national safety had been pursued both from the diplomatic and military standpoint. Diplomatically, Greece was now represented abroad by her best men. From the military point of view, an army worthy of Greece and

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 280.

capable of guarding the frontier of Thrace had been created from the ruins left by the former régime. The Government aimed at bringing about internal peace by limiting the responsibility for the disaster to the principal culprits and by giving an amnesty to the rest (Colonel Plastiras conveniently forgets that M. Calogeropoulos is still in prison without even knowing of what he is accused); by reorganising all the branches of the State—administrative, judicial and military—on the basis of a general purification made not for party sentiments, but simply in the interests of the service (the fact being that many not favourable to the revolution are now losing their posts as everybody not favourable to the Constantinist régime lost his job two years ago); by the application of equal laws for all.

3. To bring about an economic revival, Colonel Plastiras continued, had been one of the principal duties of the revolution. It was unfortunately true that the revolution had been the heirs of defeat, and, as happens in the case of the losers, the consequences of the catastrophe did not show themselves at once, but they grew heavier with time. As far as was possible, and in spite of present circumstances, which were difficult, the revolution which was of the people, would naturally do its best to satisfy the interests of the people to ensure social justice.

4. Finally, as regards political revival, the revolution would not consider that its work had borne fruit until it had been replaced by a better political world, which would continue and complete its labours. There were certain general principles which must guide the people; political death to the enemies of the country; re-establishment of laws and internal peace; economic revival; purification of the political life of the country. It would rest with the press, politicians and political parties to conduct this campaign, but the revolution considered it to be its duty to exert all its moral force in order to restore the enthusiasm and faith of the country which had unfortunately been sapped by long military efforts.

5. Dr. Doxiades, the Minister of Relief, is making a tour of the Peloponnessus in connection with the refugees. At Patras, according to a Piræus journal, he made a speech, saying that the elections could not take place until the people had adopted the principles of the revolution, even if they had to wait two or three years for the elections.

6. Meanwhile, M. Rentis has resigned from the Ministry of Justice. This, as your Lordship will have gathered from my despatch No. 749 of the 28th ultimo, was not altogether unexpected.[3] I am told that he, in common with

[3] In this despatch, Mr. Bentinck had reported as follows: 'M. Rentis's "eleventh hour" conversion by Mr. Lindley appears, according to all I hear, to have been sincere. He has, in consequence, forfeited much of the influence which he may have possessed with his revolutionary colleagues. He is greatly disappointed at not remaining in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but he would appear to be too dangerous a factor for the Government to remove altogether. He is said to know too much, and he has, besides, the backing of the "Eleftheron Vima", now the most important newspaper in Greece. A Greek friend of mine was recently at the Ministry of Justice, where M. Rentis called him into his room and showed him letters which he had received from MM. Diomedes and Carapanos from abroad. They both told him that everything possible must be done to get rid of the revolutionary

the group represented by the leading newspaper—the 'Eleftheron Vima'—disapproves of the formation of the above leagues. It remains to be seen whether he, with his friends, will be able to fuse with the moderate element and support M. Zaimis (see my despatch No. 745 of the 27th December).[1] General Metaxas thinks it will be difficult for the latter to obtain the support of any Veniselists of weight, and that if a Cabinet under him were to embrace anti-Veniselists as well as Veniselists, the former would be discredited in the country. (The wish may here be father to the thought, for such a combination would no doubt effectively dish General Metaxas). At most he thinks M. Zaimis would merely be able to form a Cabinet d'Affaires, composed more or less of non-politicians, to carry on until the elections. Many officers in the army who began the revolution are, according to the general, very dissatisfied at the turn of events, and they may attempt to bring about a counter-revolution. If they do not do so, he says, then one day the people, whose sufferings are continually increasing, may rise, and that, he thinks, would be worse than a military revolution.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Lausanne.[4]

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

government. Private letters received from M. Diomedes from Lausanne are, I gather, written in a very despondent tone about the present situation in Greece. He was, as your Lordship will recollect, one of those who, with MM. Canellopoulos, Calligas and Carapanos, left Greece before the recent tragic events. M. Rentis is, I am told, shortly proceeding to Lausanne on a special mission.'

[4] The despatch was received in the Foreign Office on January 23.

No. 322

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 131 Telegraphic [E 562/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 12, 1923, 4.15 p.m.*

Following for Forbes Adam from Shuckburgh:[1]

Private. I received yesterday a private letter from Bullard enclosing copy of his minute to Lord Curzon of 9th January on frontier question.[2] I showed letter to Secretary of State for the Colonies. He is very favourable to suggestion of settlement by reference to League of Nations and you may be sure that proposal on these lines would receive support at Colonial Office. Please inform Lord Curzon accordingly if you think it desirable.

[1] Sir J. E. Shuckburgh, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office.
[2] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 323

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 198 Telegraphic: by bag [E 587/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 12, 1923*

Matters are still going very slowly and I find utmost difficulty in inducing my colleagues to make an advance. Although French and Italians have persisted in view that if question of capitulations were left to them, they would persuade Turks to come to terms, and although a fortnight has been allowed to elapse in order to give them the desired chance, nothing has happened, and at a meeting yesterday between Rumbold, Bompard, Garroni and Ismet, the last named was as intransigent as ever and declined to make smallest concession. I foresee that they will now come to me and ask me to apply rather more strenuous methods, and I am considering whether an arrangement cannot be effected that will give ostensible satisfaction to both sides. M. Barrère, who is much perturbed at criticisms passed on his alleged subservience, and not least by his chief in Paris, has asked: (1) that my draft heads of a treaty shall be reduced to a French idiom in order to sustain the illusion of a French origin, and be introduced as a Franco-British project, (2) that he should refer the whole matter to Paris, where M. Poincaré has insisted on having everything transmitted to him before he will give the requisite authority. I have agreed to (1) provided that the draft heads are handed to the Turks, with the requisite speech of explanation at a plenary conference by me as Secretary of State, instead of as proposed by M. Barrère, by himself. As regards (2) I could not refuse to M. Barrère the right to hear his master's voice. But I have reminded him that M. Poincaré more than once assured me at Paris that French plenipotentiaries would have full powers,[1] without necessity of reference; and I have said that I shall not be prepared to accept at the last moment any substantial modifications or alterations dictated by Quai d'Orsay.

Meetings of M. Barrère's commission[2] are again postponed at his request and will not be completed till next week.

Garroni's commission[3] is in a similar plight for similar reasons, and I often wonder whether my colleagues will ever be induced to bring affairs to a head. These delays are profoundly unsatisfactory and humiliating, since they only encourage the Turks to fresh resistance and further demands. In the meantime the French press reciprocates the extreme generosity with which we and the British press have always treated M. Barrère, with daily attacks upon the British delegation and myself, and with attribution of any success that we may obtain, e.g. on Patriarchate, to French initiative and French influence. Altogether the atmosphere is becoming very trying and nerves are apt to show frayed edges. Barrère, whom I saw this morning, is even

[1] See No. 108. [2] The Third Commission (Economic and Financial Questions).
[3] The Second Commission (Régime of Foreigners).

weakening on subject of treaty and suggested that I should make some further concessions on substantial issues where the allies have hitherto stood firm, and where solutions proposed in open conference by me were only put forward as result of complete allied agreement. I think that both French and Italians are bitterly disappointed at their failure to secure Turkish acceptance of the points that interest them most, leaving me to fight forlorn and solitary battle about Straits, Mosul, etc., and their passion for delay is due to the still unsurrendered idea that by further secret palavers they may bring this about. This of course is an additional reason for pushing on, but Sisyphus and his stone were tame performers compared with my daily task.

I have insisted on Barrère sending the draft heads to Paris not later than tomorrow and I shall then communicate them confidentially, though of course with French knowledge, to the other delegations, who are aflame with curiosity. All this may tend slightly to expedite progress. But the Cabinet must not fail to remember that the tortoise is a far more popular animal here than the hare and must make the requisite excuses.

Questions of amnesty and military service have been settled. But the rock of finance still rears its head unshattered by the storms, and the allied proposals lie like wrecks around its base.

No. 324

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
*No. 49 [C 261/153/19]**

LAUSANNE, *January 12, 1923*

Sir,

With reference to your telegram No. 10 of the 5th instant,[1] relative to the conditions on which His Majesty's Government would be prepared to resume relations with the Greek Government, I would observe that there are two cognate but really separate aspects of this question:—

(1.) The recognition of the King, and

(2.) The resumption of relations with the present Greek Government.

2. In regard to the first, you were informed in my despatch No. 904 of the 29th ultimo[2] that 'it would be clearly inopportune at the present moment for His Majesty's Government to agree to the recognition of a Sovereign with whose existing Government they have just been obliged to suspend relations because of a series of atrocious judicial murders'.

3. As regards the second, were His Majesty's Government to adopt the conditions proposed in your telegram under reference, they would be brought far too intimately into Greek domestic politics; nor can the question of resuming relations be regarded at present as one of any urgency. The very

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 303.

fact that the Greeks are so anxious to resume relations proves the efficacy of the policy adopted by His Majesty's Government.

4. Apart from these general observations, it is undesirable for His Majesty's Government to make the disappearance of this or that politician or body of politicians from the arena of Greek politics a condition of resumption of relations. Moreover, it is of importance that they should not become associated in the eyes of the Greek people with the formation of a Government under a particular statesman, be he Zaïmis or another. Both recognition of the King and resumption of official relations should rather be coupled with the question of the confirmation both of the King and the Government by popular election.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 325

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 13, 4.35 p.m.)
No. 202 Telegraphic [E 589/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 13, 1923, 2.45 p.m.*

Following for Prime Minister.

Rickett,[1] . . .[2] has returned here and has told Ismet Pasha that he saw Lord Long and yourself about Mosul question in London and that you were contemplating transfer of peace conference to London, McNeill[3] to be sent out here to replace me, and Sir W. Tyrrell having already been recalled. This childish farrago of lies is only of importance here because of unfathomable credulity of Turks and intrigues of Russians with whom, especially with Chicherin, Rickett is familiar. I shall be glad of your repudiation for use if required[4] and I do implore everyone at home from Long downwards to keep clear of this dirty mess of Mosul oil[5] which is fouling everyone's hands and will end by spoiling [*sic*] mine. Rickett in London also saw Townshend.[6] . . .[2]

[1] Presumably Mr. F. W. Ricketts, who later became a member of British Oil Development Ltd.

[2] A personal reference is here omitted.

[3] Mr. Ronald McNeill, M.P., Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from November 17, 1922.

[4] Foreign Office telegram No. 134 of January 15 transmitted to Lord Curzon the following message from the Prime Minister: 'There is of course not a word of truth in statements you report as being made by Rickett. They are on the face of them absurd and I have never seen Rickett and know nothing about him.'

[5] In a minute of January 11, addressed to Sir E. Crowe, Lord Curzon had written: 'Ismet Pasha has been endeavouring without success to persuade, threaten or force me to surrender to Turkey the Mosul Vilayet including of course the oil-bearing region. I have, acting

upon the advice and authority of the Cabinet resolutely and persistently declined. Recognising his failure here, he sends behind my back some wholly unscrupulous and untrustworthy agents to London to try and effect a deal either with His Majesty's Government or with private persons in London, so that I may, by this perfidious manoeuvre, be confronted with an agreement or arrangement or understanding of which I knew nothing, and which is in direct opposition to the policy which I am pursuing here.

'These agents enter into communication with two Members of Parliament [Sir W. Watson Rutherford and Major Barnett] who actually discuss with them a concession for oil in an area under the British Mandate, and which I have declined to yield—both parties apparently acting on the assumption that I am about to surrender this area to the Turks, and that the latter are consequently at liberty to dispose of its contents. This draft agreement, it would appear, has actually been agreed and initialled. Further the Turkish agents explicitly inform the two Members of Parliament that they are acting behind my back and with a view to ascertain whether proposals can be made in London which will compel me to change my attitude here.

'Thereupon the two Members of Parliament, usurping the functions both of the Foreign Office and of myself as chief British Delegate here, actually proceed to suggest conditions about the Straits, Minorities, Capitulations, the Patriarchate, and indeed are good enough to volunteer to take my work entirely out of my hands and to conclude a treaty for me in London, instead of allowing me to do it at Lausanne.

'I am also at once informing Ismet Pasha of my extreme surprise at his conduct in despatching these agents to London, and am telling him that the gentlemen with whom they have dealt are destitute of any authority, and are altogether repudiated by His Majesty's Government.'

[6] See Vol. XVII, No. 248.

No. 326

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 15, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 204 Telegraphic: by bag [E 589/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 13, 1923*

This afternoon was held meeting of Commission[1] to receive report[2] of sub-committee on Ottoman Debt, cost of military occupation, and reparations. This sub-committee has been presided over by Monsieur Bompard who in absence of Monsieur Barrère owing to temporary indisposition, occupied the chair to-day, and gave an exhibition of mismanagement without precedent in my experience. Eight weeks have passed since his sub-committee was set up and every question involved has been discussed *ad nauseam* with the Turks both at the committee and outside it. Indeed Monsieur Bompard prefers the latter method, and at one time abstained, in spite of our protests, from summoning his committee for nearly a fortnight while he was holding secret conversations with the Turks to which our delegates were not invited. These conversations have had no result but to encourage the Turks in their opposition. Finally when we came this afternoon to the meeting of the commission whose duty it was to receive the report of the sub-committee, to hear from the Turks an explanation of their grounds of dissent and then

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 563–74. [2] Ibid., pp. 575–86.

to give the decision of the allies, Monsieur Bompard, instead of adopting this course, proceeded to ask for the opinion and therefore to invite the renewed refusal of the Turks on each individual issue; and, when no agreement was arrived at on a single one, to suggest that the matter should be referred back again to the sub-committee and resume the labours of the past two months all over again. At this point I asked for an adjournment of the conference and proceeded to have a private conversation with Monsieur Bompard and Garroni in an adjoining room. I there learned from them that in their view at least another fortnight should be devoted to the private conversations which they love, and that at the end by a process of mutual concessions, which means in practice the surrender by the allies on every point in turn, some sort of agreement should be arrived at. Then and not till then, are any final terms to be presented to the Turks. I said at once that I could be no party to this dilatory and humiliating procedure which would not only cover the allies with ridicule but would keep us sitting here till the middle of February and very likely much longer, in the vain hope of catching a phantom that is always vanishing into the distance. If such were the plan adopted I said I would prefer to go home and leave these desultory and useless talks to proceed in my absence. I declined to agree to more than one additional sitting of Monsieur Bompard's sub-committee which should meet on Monday[3] and report to us their agreement or the reverse on Tuesday morning. This decision was then announced to the waiting conference and we adjourned. In the course of the conversation Monsieur Garroni, who is the most confirmed and expert protagonist of delay, announced his ideas of our future procedure—namely to spend a fortnight in the manner described and then to invite Ismet to a private conference with ourselves at which, after already making concessions at the magnitude of which I know the Turks themselves are amazed, we are to advance another fifty paces provided they will recede fifty paces from their present demands. The fact is my colleagues are willing to go on here indefinitely. They have no other duties or responsibilities and are quite as happy here as anywhere else. Similarly the Turks, who receive an exorbitant entertainment allowance, greatly prefer the fleshpots of Lausanne to the austerities of Angora, all the more if by hanging on here they can realise their extreme demands. I endeavour to point out that my own position is rather different but am powerless against the *vis inertiae* of commissions and sub-committees of which I am not a member, and of whose proceedings I only hear at second-hand. I will see Barrère tomorrow and try to apply the spur. But I think it would help me if I could receive from His Majesty's Government an expression of their disappointment at tardy progress, and an intimation that I cannot be spared much longer from home duties for the interminable impotence of Lausanne.[4]

[3] i.e. January 15.

[4] In Foreign Office telegram No. 135 of January 15, Sir Eyre Crowe transmitted to Lord Curzon the following message from the Prime Minister: 'At meeting of cabinet today there was a unanimous expression of opinion that while they greatly appreciated the work

you are doing at Lausanne, they are much disappointed at the delay and fear that your other duties in the cabinet and at the Foreign Office will make it impossible for you to remain much longer at Lausanne. It is hoped, therefore, that before long you may be able to name a definite time when we can expect your return.'

No. 327

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Sir E. Crowe
(Received January 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 210 Telegraphic: by bag [E 726/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 15, 1923*

I saw M. Fromageot this morning. He put forward every conceivable objection that an ingenious legal mind could suggest to the scheme, proposed by me and hitherto agreed upon by allies, for heads of treaty to be submitted at an early date to the Turks and either accepted or rejected by them. Evidently the French delegation is going back upon its word and intends to play for time and to keep things going until the final draft of treaty is ready weeks hence, when, all our points having been conceded or whittled away, agreement will be reached by sheer exhaustion. Whole attitude of M. Barrère has changed since his last visit to Paris and his severe handling by M. Poincaré. French position now is that trouble in Ruhr[1] necessitates an agreement here at whatever sacrifice, even of French interests; and I truly believe that there is not a point on which they will be prepared to stand.

I have just returned from hour and a half with Ismet and Child over capitulations. I told Ismet plainly that the matter could not be settled by a mere repetition of the old assertions and denials which we have heard for eight weeks; that while we are willing to abolish the fiscal capitulations and to insert in the treaty the surrender of all capitulations, we must have a provisional judicial system approved by the Powers for the intervening years before necessary reform of the Turkish codes can be completed, and that it is for the Turks, having rejected all our suggestions, to make proposals themselves and to embody them in a protocol to the treaty.

I even made suggestions to Ismet as to the lines on which it might be possible for them to proceed. Otherwise I said we should have no alternative but to insert our own provisions in the treaty, adhere to them, and leave if they were not accepted. But in that case both Child and I reminded him that not an American dollar nor an English shilling would be forthcoming for the economic restoration of Turkey.[2]

After repeated appeals to us from Ismet to trust to the good faith and splendid intentions of the Turks, we left him to take away this pill and

[1] See No. 312, n. 2.

[2] It would seem that these conversations were arranged by the American Special Mission, who on January 17 had a further private interview with Ismet Pasha (see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 951–3).

consider with his colleagues how far they can swallow it. I entertain little hope except on the last moment theory which is practically becoming our sole chance with these impossible people, who seem to combine the intelligence of an undeveloped child with the indurated obstinacy of the mule.

No. 328

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)

No. 31[1] *[E 891/27/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 15, 1923*

My Lord,

The situation in Constantinople has been considerably easier since the middle of December. At the beginning of that month the official intimation conveyed to foreign Companies here that they must immediately conform to the Angora Foreign Company Law[2] induced one to believe that a series of measures contrary to capitulatory privileges and in anticipation of the decisions of the Lausanne Conference were about to be imposed in Constantinople regardless of Allied opposition.

2. I am inclined to attribute the renunciation by the Turks of their original intentions in this respect to the joint protests addressed to Angora by the Delegates of the inviting Powers at Lausanne against the premature application of that law and against the excessive zeal being displayed here by Refet Pasha.[3] It is certain at any rate that the improvement in the situation here coincided with the appointment of Dr. Adnan Bey to succeed Refet Pasha as Representative of the Grand National Assembly in this city. The official announcement in the press to the effect that a delay of three months, dating from December 18th, was granted in respect of the registration of foreign Companies in Constantinople, was published shortly after Adnan Bey's arrival here and since then no organised attempt has been made to interfere with the capitulatory privileges of foreigners in other respects.

3. The personality of Adnan Bey is in fact very different to that of Refet Pasha. Though more educated than Refet, the former's intelligence is far less acute. Moreover he is an invalid and appears to shrink from decided action and from the assumption of serious responsibility. Refet Pasha was deterred by the fear neither of the one nor of the other. Refet Pasha's activities were displayed principally in action, whereas Adnan Bey's activities have hitherto been chiefly confined to verbal and written communications. I have received a large number of these since the arrival of Adnan Bey in Constantinople. Many of them, it is true, make requests for the modification of the Allied régime as set up under the Armistice, such as in respect of pilotage, the assessment by the Turkish customs of postal parcels arriving

[1] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on January 23.

[2] See No. 259, paragraph 11.

[3] See No. 268.

at the foreign post offices, restrictions on foreign war-ships in Turkish ports, the reversion of the Eastern Telegraph Company to its pre-war procedure, etc. These requests have all been ignored or refused and Adnan Bey has hitherto shown no inclination to insist upon them.

4. Generally speaking, after the initial friction which was probably inevitable, the dual administration of Constantinople would appear to have been accepted here as a normal situation.[4]

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

[4] In his telegram No. 3434 to the War Office, of January 13, General Harington reported: 'Both here and at Chanak the changed demeanour of Turks referred to in my telegram No. 3396 January 8th [not printed] still continues. The attitude has altered from the day Hassan passed through here. Mutessarif at Chanak has even become polite, and the police salute me again. I think that our measures for evacuation frightened the Turks and they thought we meant to go to Gallipoli to commence business therefrom and would help Greeks to sweep them out of Eastern Thrace. They are evidently frightened of Greek activities; to-day Refet sent me a strong protest that Greek attitude is contrary to Articles 3 and 4 of Moudania Convention. Greek attitude is also causing concern to the French. In the Turkish press the transfer of our base to Kilia has also given rise to reports that stores are being sent to Greeks. This, and reports that we are erecting fortifications and breaking Moudania Convention, in spite of my dementi, might be suitably denied in press. These reports are only propaganda. Report is also incorrect of British officer, Lieutenant Chapman, having been murdered. Court still sitting but fear there is little doubt he took his own life. The people [are] more hopeful of future and City is much steadier now.'

No. 329

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with M. Venizelos

[*E 747/6/44*]

LAUSANNE, *January 15, 1923*

M. Venizelos came here this morning and brought with him the annexed reply to your letter of January 13th.[1]

M. Venizelos stated that the point which he wished to make clear was the following. If, in spite of the enormous concessions which were being made by the Allies to Turkey, the Turks refused to make peace, it could only mean that they hoped to gain by the prolongation of the present position. He

[1] This ran: 'I have received information that the Greek Commander-in-Chief in Western Thrace recently stated to a British officer that "in the event of the Lausanne Conference breaking up without a settlement" the Greek Army would cross the Maritza and advance as far as Chatalja. . . . I cannot hide from you . . . that the statements attributed to the Greek Commander-in-Chief, taken in conjunction with certain rumours which have reached me as to your own negotiations with the Yugo-Slav representative at Lausanne in the direction of some form of joint military action for the recovery of Eastern Thrace, have caused His Majesty's Government considerable anxiety. . . . I rely upon you therefore to see that the Greek Government will impress upon their Generals the necessity of maintaining an attitude of the utmost moderation and restraint in the contingency above predicated, which however I continue to hope that we may still avoid.'

suspected that the present rulers at Angora realised that the internal problems which would arise once peace was concluded would be of so far-reaching a nature that their present control over the country would be seriously shaken. We must, he said, never forget that Mustapha Kemal and his associates owed their present position entirely to a state of war: it might well be that they realised that their continuance in power depended upon a perpetuation either of war or a menace of war. If, therefore, the Turks refused to sign a treaty of peace it would mean (however much the Allies endeavoured to mitigate the situation by calling it 'an adjournment of the Lausanne Conference') a reversion to the situation which had existed immediately before Mudania. It would be Greece who would have to bear the brunt of this and it was his right and his duty to be prepared.

M. Venizelos indicated that it was somewhat unfair that we should make representations to him when he was only taking ordinary measures of precaution, and that we should *say nothing to the Turks*[2] who were violating the Mudania Armistice by systematically forming a large regular army in Eastern Thrace.

M. Venizelos reiterated his desire for peace. Even if no treaty could be signed between the Allies and Turkey, he hoped sincerely that the Great Powers would not leave Lausanne without negotiating a peace between Greece and Turkey. What greater proof could he give of his desire for peace? Greece had loyally obeyed the Allies by giving up Eastern Thrace at their request; although they [*sic*] felt strongly that it was a mistake to have abandoned so important a pawn before the final peace negotiations had been opened. She had shown herself very moderate during the course of these negotiations. She was prepared and even anxious to secure a separate peace with Turkey under Allied auspices in the event of a general peace being found impossible. But she could not abandon her right to take all precautions against the Turkish attack or pledge herself at this stage to do nothing in the event of the breakdown of the Lausanne Conference. How could we expect Greece whose army was strong and ready to contemplate another prolonged period during which the Turks would be rapidly arming themselves in Thrace preparatory to an attack upon Western Thrace? He did not see how any impartial person could consider that the present policy of Greece could in any way be described as one of provocation.

I told him that there was one thing which I wished him clearly to understand, namely that British public opinion was unanimously opposed to a renewal of war and that you were yourself determined to do all you could to prevent a resumption of hostilities. It was not a question as to who was in the right or who was in the wrong: it was merely the fact that England did not want war in any circumstances and would blame whatever Power began it. He said that he fully realised the position.

I feel that there is great force in M. Venizelos'[s] contention that it would be unfair if the Powers were to leave Lausanne in the event of a breakdown

[2] Note on the filed copy: 'This is not true (Lord Curzon's comment).'

in the general negotiations without making a serious effort to conclude a direct peace between Greece and Turkey.[3] It would obviously be wrong and dangerous to leave Greece fully mobilised but under an interdict in any circumstances to take military action or to forestall a Turkish concentration in Eastern Thrace. We may be right in urging M. Venizelos in no circumstances to make war, but he is also right in urging us to help him to make peace.

Incidentally also the growing strength of the Greek army, while it must make a serious impression upon the Turks themselves, is a very strong argument against the present French methods of procrastination.[4]

[3] Note on the filed copy: 'Do you mean that we are to sit down after our own failure to make a peace between Greece and Turkey? Someone else must do it—not I (Lord Curzon's comment).'

[4] In a private letter of January 24, the Foreign Office informed Mr. Bentinck as follows: 'You will be interested in the following information (from a secret but unimpeachable source) which shows that we have at last apparently succeeded in discouraging the Greeks from a fresh military enterprise—at any rate temporarily. On the 15th Veniselos telegraphed to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs urging that for Greece to start hostilities again would be nothing less than suicide. He explained that the three Allies are set against any renewal of hostilities and that even if Greece avoided a clash with them on the Maritza line, she certainly could not do so on the Chatalja line. He further expressed the view that as Serbia had given no precise undertaking and as the Bulgarian attitude was uncertain, Greece would in all probability have to appeal to the Allies to intervene after a short time, and that the Allies' answer to this appeal would be to abolish the Treaty of Neuilly and establish an autonomous Western Thrace. All this, Veniselos urged, could lead only to financial chaos and finally general ruin. He exhorted the Revolutionary Government to remember on the other hand that no one ten years ago could have imagined that Greece would be so great as she is even to-day, and to realise that provided rulers and people exercised moderation she has still every chance of becoming a prosperous country.'

No. 330

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay[1]
(Received January 18, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 211 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 743/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *January 16, 1923*

I am greatly obliged for prompt response[2] of Cabinet to my appeal which will be useful to me in impending struggle to bring matters to a head. Position to-day is as follows. Monsieur Barrère under orders of his doctor eludes equally business and capture. I have discussed limit of financial concessions with our experts, of whom Waley[3] goes to Paris with Bompard tomorrow. After their return on Saturday, I propose to put financial clauses into final shape on Monday for inclusion in Treaty. I shall then endeavour

[1] Mr. Lindsay was in charge of the Foreign Office, during the absence of Sir E. Crowe, who joined Lord Curzon at Lausanne on January 17.

[2] See No. 326, n. 4.

[3] Mr. S. D. Waley (Treasury).

in succeeding two days to reduce all other clauses to final form i.e. the form which, whether they have or have not been accepted by the Turks, they must assume in the Treaty to be presented to the latter.

I speak of the Treaty because, owing to the French tactics which I have described in previous telegrams, my plan of presenting principal heads for immediate acceptance or refusal, which has now been sent by Barrère to Paris,[4] has been so repeatedly delayed, that difference in time between presenting it and presenting final Treaty itself, will be relatively insignificant.

I shall then press for the Treaty, so completed, to be presented to the Turks as I hope at end of next week or at latest on Monday, 29th. It may be necessary to meet probable demand of Russians for a day to discuss Straits Convention which will be annexed to the Treaty. I should then like to adjourn the entire Conference and arrange for French and Italian plenipotentiaries to leave with myself, promising to return to sign the Treaty if the Turks, after they have taken time to consider it, are ready to do the same. They are said to be preparing an entire counter project or treaty of their own which they intend to submit as their alternative to ours. But this I shall have to bow out of the door with as much politeness as I can command.

I send you these messages nightly by bag in order that without cost to the taxpayer my colleagues may be able to follow varying phases of this almost transpontine drama, and may understand the varying moods of hope, amusement, fury and despair, through which we pass from day to day.

[4] See No. 323.

No. 331

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 18, 5.35 p.m.)
No. 25 Telegraphic [E 775/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 18, 1923, 4.40 p.m.*

My telegram No. 35 to Marquess Curzon.[1] I have received telegram from Adnan Bey at Ismid[2] stating that Mustapha Kemal is much concerned at violation of Mudania convention through occupation of Karagatch by Greeks and by retirement of allied forces to eastern bank of the Maritza. Adnan also begged that urgent steps be taken to avoid all incidents.

[1] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives. This telegram presumably transmitted to Lord Curzon the text or substance of General Harington's telegram No. 3443 to the War Office, of January 15, not printed.

[2] As reported by Mr. Henderson in his despatch No. 38 of January 16 to Lausanne, Adnan Bey had on January 16 gone to Ismid to meet Mustafa Kemal. Mr. Henderson had taken the opportunity on January 15 to speak to Adnan Bey in the sense of Lord Curzon's telegram No. 69 of January 11 (see No. 318, n. 5).

Allegations which are of course entirely without foundation are I fancy based first on presence of Greek detachment at Karagatch and secondly of British sentry on east bank of Kuleli Bourgas bridge. In my reply I have consequently denied both statements remarking in first case that Karagatch is occupied by French troops and that presence of Greek detachment there is not contrary to Mudania convention and secondly that General Harington has given instructions for every single British sentry to be withdrawn to west bank.

I have expressed my surprise at these unfounded rumours adding that allies are scrupulously respecting all provisions of Mudania convention, that they intend to maintain themselves their attitude of perfect loyalty to prevent violation of that convention by others and to do all that depends on them to prevent incidents.

Sent to Lausanne No. 37.

No. 332

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 18, 10.50 p.m.)
No. 29 Telegraphic [E 800/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 18, 1923, 8.35 p.m.*

My telegram No. 25.[1]

Turks are undoubtedly greatly perturbed at Greek activity in Western Thrace.

French think that repeated allegations in press and representations made to me by Turkish authorities here on the subject are based either on desire to justify Turkish breaches of Mudania convention or possible eventual attack on us. I am more inclined to believe Turks are really alarmed at possibility of Greek hostilities and at the same time irritated at seeing pressure which they hoped to exert through Turkish armies at Ismid and Chanak and through Refet's organization in Thrace diminished by counter effect of Greek threat on Maritza.

French High Commissioner, supported probably by Italian, is recommending to his government that, in order to avoid dangerous incidents, Greeks be requested to withdraw two kilometres from western bank. French High Commissioner . . .[2] argues that this suggestion would be in accordance with the spirit of Article 3 of Mudania convention which stipulates that right bank of river will be occupied by Allied contingents though presence of Greeks on that bank is not actually excluded. I told French High Commissioner that I could not myself support his proposal in view of objections formulated thereto by General Harington to whom I had mentioned it some days ago and which I share, namely, that it would be unjust to ask only Greeks to withdraw, that Turks would refuse to do so since by Mudania

[1] No. 331.

[2] The text is here uncertain.

convention they were entitled to hold up to left bank, that it was a military measure which could not be enforced, that neutral areas could not be controlled owing to numerical weakness of Allied forces in Thrace and generally speaking that there was no ground for alarm.

French High Commissioner recognises force of these objections and said that he would put forward proposal as a personal suggestion. He does not himself believe that there is any real danger of a Greek attack. He states in this respect he is far less anxious than French representatives in Athens who regard General Pangalos as ambitious and irresponsible enough to commit any folly.

He is nevertheless apprehensive of incidents occurring as result of raids or shooting which occasionally take place across the river and thinks neutral zone might obviate that danger.

There is something to be said for this argument though British reports in general and colonel commanding British battalion on Maritza in particular indicate that danger of incidents in British zone at any rate is small.

Sent to Lord Curzon No. 38, repeated to Athens No. 7.

No. 333

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Mr. Lindsay (Received January 19, 1.25 p.m.)
No. 29 Telegraphic [E 804/6/44]

Most urgent ATHENS, *January 19, 1923, 1 p.m.*

My telegram No. 14.[1]

Italian Chargé d'Affaires informs me that French government have approached our two governments suggesting that three representatives here should make joint démarche requesting withdrawal of Greek forces from Maritza. My Italian colleague has been instructed to associate himself with us in the event of such action being taken.

I venture to hope that I may not be instructed to take any further action as suggested.

Greek press already complains that whilst warning Greeks not to advance Powers do nothing to prevent Turks pouring troops into Eastern Thrace in violation of Mudania agreement. Last summer we asked Greeks to retire from Chatalja lines.[2] They complied and abandoned Constantinople project in consequence of our threats. Smyrna disaster[3] followed. I trust that we shall not take responsibility for similar concealment (*sic*) in present circumstances (see my despatch No. 18 sent by last bag).[4]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 17, repeated to Lord Curzon No. 14.

[1] No. 317.
[2] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 695, 707, 713, 716, and 721.
[3] See ibid., Nos. 754, 755, and 756.
[4] Of January 11, not printed.

No. 334

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 21, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 215 Telegraphic: by bag [E 830/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 19, 1923*

I have now decided upon final course of action to be taken about Mosul. Inasmuch as complete treaty is to be presented to Turks and as this must contain either definition of or reference to southern frontier of Turkey in Asia, and as it would not do to give treaty recognition to Turco-French frontier which was settled by Franklin-Bouillon agreement[1] behind our backs, but at the same time to leave in air or to make no mention of Iraq frontier, it is necessary to bring the matter before the full commission over which I preside. I have accordingly informed the Turkish and allied delegations that I propose to take the case on Tuesday[2] next. Advantage of this procedure will be that Turkish case for Mosul will be stated, in its full weakness, to world, and that I shall have the opportunity of summarising the arguments contained in my various printed memoranda[3] in a concise and I hope effective reply. I shall hope also to dissipate the fumes of suspicion that have arisen in such noxious abundance from the still untapped oilfields on the Mosul area.

The Turks will probably have asked in their opening declaration either for a complete or a partial restitution of the vilayet or conceivably for a plebiscite of its inhabitants.

I shall refuse all these demands on the grounds previously submitted to and approved by His Majesty's Government.

I propose then to say that since it has been found impossible to find a common point between the widely divergent views of the two parties, His Majesty's Government, relying upon the strength of their case, are quite content to refer the determination of the frontier to independent enquiry and decision: and that in view of the fact that the area in dispute is a portion of mandated territory, over which we exercise mandatory powers in response to an invitation from the League of Nations in October 1921,[4] and that we could not surrender or modify that obligation without reference to the League—it is the latter body that we propose to invite to undertake the task. I shall ask the Turks to concur in this reference, both for the reasons already given, and because, if a treaty be signed, they will shortly be members of the League themselves.

They may respond either by a refusal or by a request for time to consider, or by a suggestion for arbitration outside the League.

It might be difficult to decline the second request straight away. The third should, I think, be refused.

[1] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2. [2] i.e. January 23. [3] See No. 273, n. 2.
[4] See *League of Nations, Report to the Third Assembly of the League on the Work of the Council and on the Measures taken to execute the Decisions of the Assembly* (A.6. 1922), p. 51.

The case does not unfortunately come under article XII of the Covenant, Turkey not being as yet a member of the League. If, however, she signs the treaty and becomes a member before the enquiry takes place, article XII and the succeeding articles will apply.

In the opposite case, either of Turkish refusal or Turkish delay, it is still open to me and I am disposed to invoke article XI of the Covenant seeing that the rumours and even threats of Turkish military advance upon Mosul are undoubtedly sufficiently definite to constitute a menace to international peace and to the good understanding between nations. In that case Turkey would be invited under article XVII to accept membership for the purposes of the dispute. If she accepted, she would fall under the operations of article XII to XVI. If she refused and invaded Iraq, the stringent sanctions of article XVI would then be applied to her with the united power of the League.

Proceeding upon the above lines it seems to me that I have the Turkish delegation in a cleft stick and that whatever attitude they may adopt, I ought to have the advantage of them both in the effect upon public opinion, and in the practical solution of the problem.

France and Italy who are bound by the pledges which I exacted before opening this conference will be committed not merely to support any such solution at the meeting here, but to support the vindication of our full territorial claims, should the League decide after enquiry that they are just.

As regards other matters, my representations to Ismet about capitulations, as reported in my telegram No. 210,[5] proved ineffective, although there appears to be some slight reason for believing that his written reply of refusal was only a repetition of the stereotyped formula, and that what he will neither propose himself nor accept at this stage if proposed by others, the Turkish delegation may ultimately be content to swallow if imposed as part of a dictated treaty. Anyhow, realising that nothing more can be expected from private conversations, an allied committee has been sitting since then to draw up the judicial scheme most likely to accord with Turkish susceptibilities while safeguarding the due interests of foreigners, and this will be embodied in a convention attached to the treaty, and presented with it, accompanied by a unilateral declaration from the Turks as to the action required from them.

English press which not unnaturally frets at the inordinate length of these proceedings and is apt to speak of the conference as degenerating into a farce, is hardly aware of the enormous and hourly difficulties that confront every attempt on my part to go ahead. Nor is it any great consolation to me to know that I am being simultaneously abused by the French press for the abrupt and tempestuous manner in which I am supposed to be interfering with the stately goose-step of the French delegation.

[5] No. 327.

No. 335

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 71 Telegraphic [E 833/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 20, 1923, 10.45 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 19.[1]

Ismet Pasha having sent me memorandum[2] accusing Greeks of outrages on Moslems in Greece and of violations of Mudania convention with the alleged countenance of the allies, I have sent strong reply[3] in which I have drawn attention to the manner in which Turks are disregarding their own obligations under that convention[4] and have energetically demanded release of the two British airmen detained since December 14th.

Repeated to Foreign Office.[5]

[1] Of January 8, not printed.

[2] Of January 15, not printed, transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 68 of January 21, not printed.

[3] Of January 19, not printed.

[4] See No. 307, n. 2.

[5] As No. 220 (received January 2, 9 a.m.).

No. 336

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay (Received January 23, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 221 Telegraphic: by bag [E 871/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 21, 1923*

When M. Barrère excusing himself from seeing Sir Eyre Crowe[1] today, asked me to see M. Bompard this evening, to report results of latter's journey to Paris,[2] I scented at once that he had brought back instructions on issues far wider than those of finance, and I foresaw a complete French climb down. My worst expectations were more than realised. Producing a paper on which were written some 24 headings, M. Bompard explained that on each of these points upon which the allies at Lausanne after two months of concession have felt obliged at length to stand firm, M. Poincaré was prepared for unconditional surrender. They included inter-alia the abandonment of the Maritza frontier, the admission of a Turkish army to Gallipoli, the omission from treaty of limitation of Turkish army in Thrace, though this had been the proposal of Marshal Foch;[3] the concession of every financial point hitherto insisted upon, including surrender of the five millions and of the value of the two Turkish warships; practical abandonment of provisions for future judicial régime, in place of capitulations, concessions of Turkish demands for reparations, and agreement not to present treaty to Turks in plenary session of conference, for fear of its rejection, but to hand it to them in some humbler

[1] See No. 330, n. 1.

[2] See No. 330.

[3] See Appendix I.

and more surreptitious fashion. In fact if M. Poincaré's advice be followed, we might as well not have been here at all, or at least we might at once tear up our treaty and offer to sign the counter treaty, which it is understood that the Turks have prepared. Finally, M. Poincaré revived his proposal to send General Pellé to Angora to consume a few more weeks in the persuasion of despair, and to oil the wheels of final and complete surrender.

Rumbold, Crowe and I listened to this exposition with as much composure as we could command, and I indicated to M. Bompard quite clearly that the British delegation would find the utmost difficulty in accepting any of these eleventh hour proposals, which were not merely destructive of most of our work, but were inconsistent with M. Poincaré's personal assurances to me at Paris that his representatives at Lausanne had full powers and that no reference to Paris or over-ruling by the French government, as at Genoa, would be permitted.[4] M. Bompard replied that what he had submitted were suggestions rather than orders, and he felt I think some shame at the task entrusted to him, the more so as some of the concessions now proposed were points which he had all along vigorously contested here, and with which he did not pretend to agree. When I remarked that this seemed to me to be the direct repercussion of the Ruhr he did not pretend to deny it. On the contrary he said frankly that as the treaty which we were about to propose was one which the Turks could not and would not sign, we must submit another, at whatever cost, which they could. M. Poincaré was in terror lest, if there is a breakdown here, the Greeks of whose military preparations both the French and the Turks entertain the liveliest apprehensions, would advance into Thrace; and no price was, in his opinion, too great to avoid such a catastrophe.[5]

This sudden, though not unexpected change of attitude on the part of the French will greatly complicate the difficulties of my task. For not merely does it re-open the whole field of debate at the last moment, but I entertain no doubt that by tomorrow the Turks will be in possession of all M. Poincaré's proposals which the Italians will probably not resist,[6] and that I shall be represented as the solitary opponent to a reasonable settlement.

Cabinet will recognise that the new French plan rests upon the conception, which is no doubt true, that a treaty is necessary at whatever cost, to

[4] See No. 108.

[5] Mr. Lindsay minuted on January 23: 'It is difficult to conceive how M. Poincaré expects capitulation to the Turks to avert a Greek military advance. The Greeks already talk of refusing to sign the treaty now drafted; if this is to be generously modified in Turkish favour—and therefore against Greece (Maritza, Turkish troops in Gallipoli, non-limitation of E. Thrace army, etc.)—they will certainly prefer to fight, especially as they regard the reacquisition of E. Thrace as the only chance of avoiding ruin by an inundation of refugees. But the French have never been able to see that there is a point beyond which the Greeks will not go.

'If the French action is an argument from the Ruhr, we can invoke that precedent also in the form of separate action and a separate settlement. And if the Turks are already frightened of the Greeks they would be still more frightened if we withdrew to Gallipoli and threatened support of Greece from there.'

[6] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 389.

the French. Our plan has proceeded upon the rival assumption, in which the French here have hitherto concurred, that peace is necessary to the Turks and that while proceeding to the extreme limit of concession a point must ultimately be reached at which we should show that Europe is not altogether vanquished, and that we cannot weakly abandon the whole of our interests in the future.

I fancy that America[7] and all the other powers represented here will rally to this view; and that the policy of abject surrender when it is made known will excite little sympathy and no small contempt.

But the hopes which were rising in my breast and which I have confessed in recent telegrams have been rudely dashed by this culminating effort at desertion, for which our experiences at Chanak and Ismid had in part prepared me, but which could hardly have been launched at a moment more dangerous or inopportune.

[7] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 953 ff.

No. 337

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Mr. Lindsay (Received January 23, 8 a.m.)
No. 34 Telegraphic [E 873/6/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *January 22, 1923, 7 p.m.*

My telegram No. 29.[1]

French Minister told Italian Chargé d'Affaires and me today that our governments were agreed to suggest both to Greeks and Turks desirability of both forces retiring from Maritza. I said in view of opinion expressed in my telegram, I must await your instructions. Italian Chargé d'Affaires had not understood that suggestion was to be made to Turks as well as to Greeks and this latest fact somewhat alters the case. French Minister said that although Turks had in Eastern Thrace more than the eight thousand gendarmerie stipulated at Mudania, their force there, without artillery, was not large enough to constitute any danger to Greeks.

Chief of General Staff, however, told Military Attaché today that Turkish force in Thrace amounted to thirty thousand men including gendarmerie with some artillery. This did not constitute serious danger at present but reinforcements were continually arriving via Midia and force would soon be formidable.[2]

Repeated to Lord Curzon and Constantinople.

[1] No. 333.

[2] In his telegram No. 3488 of January 22, General Harington stated: 'On 24th instant I shall be sending by bag to Lausanne a report on organisation which Turks have made in Eastern Thrace, contrary to Mudania Convention, which went to War Office last week. This, I think, could be used to refute charges which the Turks are making against Greeks

and which I consider exaggerated. Major Johnston my liaison officer with Greek Headquarters has just come back. He is of opinion that in Western Thrace the Greeks have some 100,000 men. They are busily engaged in equipping and training but are disappointed that the Allies do not appear likely to require their services. He thinks their enthusiasm is dying down in consequence and will go on decreasing. He does not think their action on Maritza is provocative. Accusations of contravening the Mudania Convention are still being levelled against us by Turks but these are easily refuted. Meanwhile, in spite of their knowledge of my strict orders to avoid incidents, they have not released airmen [see No. 335].'

No. 338

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 22, 10.40 p.m.)
No. 222 Telegraphic [E 868/1/44]

Urgent LAUSANNE, *January 22, 1923, 9.10 p.m.*

Cabinet will scarcely be surprised to hear that Monsieur Barrère finding situation, which I have described in recent telegrams notably my telegram No. 221[1] sent by bag yesterday, too much for him, and seeking an excuse in what he terms a nervous breakdown has obtained permission from his government to retire from Conference for ten to fifteen days and leaves tomorrow for Rome. We shall, of course, not see him again. Whether this is tantamount to voluntary resignation on his part because of a situation which he can no longer control or whether President of the Council thinks he can find a more supple instrument in Monsieur Bompard I cannot say. I incline to former hypothesis. Bompard, who has little authority here, is to replace M. Barrère as chief French plenipotentiary. Sir E. Crowe has informed M. Barrère's private secretary who came with the news, that this will make no difference in our attitude, that I propose to proceed with remaining business of Conference without modification and that it is impossible at the last moment to open up an entirely new field of discussion.

It is deplorable that reactions of French internal politics should thus be allowed to imperil our work here and that timidity of President of the Council coupled with inadequacy of his lieutenants should have brought us to this impasse. But I do not mean to be dismayed and will recover as many brands as it is possible to pick out from the burning.

Since the above was written Bompard and Garroni have both been here and I am now faced with anticipated (? allied) surrender. Garroni wants a discussion amongst ourselves of full text of treaty already prepared by our joint experts in order to offer opportunity for further concessions.[2]

Bompard acting upon direct instructions from President of the Council wants to cut treaty into three slices and serve up each separately with a savoury garnish to commissions in separate sessions of three commissions with view of allowing them to masticate each in turn. I need hardly point out that these tactics involve both a recommencement of entire conference and a further

[1] No. 336. [2] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 389 and 400.

postponement of the end, if indeed they ever contemplate an end at all. I shall resist these manoeuvres at each stage, but can quite conceive that I shall have to fix a definite date for departure of British delegation. It is in my view intolerable that head of one of three Allied governments should be permitted thus to upset our agreed procedure at the last moment.

No. 339

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 72 Telegraphic [E 919/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 23, 1923, 10.50 a.m.*

Athens telegram No. 29.[1]

French government propose joint allied representations to Greek government at Athens and to Ismet Pasha here requesting withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces to a distance of 5 kilometres from Maritza on either side in order to avoid danger, alleged to be imminent, of serious collision.

According to reports received by French government General Harington not only acknowledges reality of this danger but has himself submitted to his allied colleagues draft note to be addressed by them jointly to Greek Commander-in-Chief complaining of provocative proceedings of Greek troops, and demanding their withdrawal from Maritza line.

Please ask General Harington immediately for full report of his view of the situation and action which he is taking or proposing.

We have, hitherto, believed Turkish complaints of alleged Greek provocations to be greatly exaggerated and were inclined to consider that, in view especially of undoubted infraction of Mudania armistice by Turks by surreptitious introduction of large bodies of unauthorised troops into Eastern Thrace, it was not for us to make Greeks withdraw from Maritza line seeing that, even if similar demands were made to, and ostensibly agreed to, by Turks, allies would probably not be in a position to ensure its observance.

In forwarding General Harington's report please add any observations you may wish to offer on your part.[2]

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 223,[3] to Athens No. 23, and to Paris No. 19.

[1] No. 333.

[2] General Harington replied, in his telegram No. 3492 of January 23: 'Your telegram 72 arrived just after Allied Generals had reached agreement with regard to my proposed letters to Refet and Pangalos. These and copies to High Commissioners have since been despatched. Copies will be sent you in tomorrow's bag. The Turkish charges of Greek provocation and increase of their forces at Karagatch are refuted in them. It was agreed last December that Greeks could (? maintain) at Karagatch (? up to) one battalion under French control as a guard for supplies. British uniforms are worn by both Greeks and Turks; these uniforms were presumably purchased in open market. I have reminded Pangalos in my letter to him that mission of Allied detachments is to control Western bank of Maritza and for Greek troops to advance up to river is, therefore, quite unnecessary, especially as this may be interpreted as provocative action.

'It also requests that Greek training and exercise be carried out at a distance from Maritza and urges necessity for avoiding incidents. It further requests that the Greek posts on western extremity of Kuleli Burgas bridge be withdrawn and that no Greeks be allowed to wear British head-dress. Strict orders have been issued to my British Commander to make such arrangements as will avoid incidents. Measures taken should suffice. Colonel Cornwall who has just returned from Marizta reports everything perfectly quiet. General Charpy leaves for Adrianople tomorrow. We consider the Turks to have (? 13,000) regular troops, including gendarmerie, and total of 30,000, including those registered, but probably who are not yet armed, [and] also something between 6 and 15 (? batteries). Turkish complaints are, in my opinion, intensive propaganda to cover this action.

'Allied Generals do not agree to proposal of French High Commissioner to request both sides to withdraw five kilometres from Maritza. Turks will certainly not agree and we have no forces with which to enforce it and can spare no more troops from here. Eastern Thrace up to river was given to Turks by Mudania Convention and they will not withdraw from crossings. As our measures should keep Greeks away there is in my opinion no (? need) to bother Governments or Lausanne. There is no foundation for the reported incident of Greeks crossing and killing Turks. [One] Turk was found dead on Turkish bank and Greek cartridges found near; but Turks possess plenty of captured rifles.

'Strongest argument is that everything is quiet but it is necessary to do all we can so as not to give Turks and French opportunity of interpreting all Greek actions as provocative. Franco-Greek feeling is bitter. I am sending General Anderson to Maritza to report on situation. Yesterday I despatched an officer by destroyer to Midia where there were no ships and no sign of life. To-day I saw Salahad[d]in who hopes to obtain favourable reply and the release of our airmen in two days [see No. 335] on my assurance that orders have been given by me that no aeroplanes are to go within three miles of neutral boundaries.'

Mr. Henderson commented, in his telegram No. 36 of January 23: 'My own view is that no serious collision is in the least likely and that (? at the) most (? with a view to) avoiding minor incidents both parties might be requested to withdraw from river bank. I do not anticipate that Turks will agree to do so any more than I believe that measure, even if accepted by both, would either be particularly practical or capable of enforcement. On the other hand Greek military preparations are [in] general on a considerable scale and refusal to join in French proposal which is harmless would be misinterpreted.'

[3] It was received in the Foreign Office on January 23 at 11.45 a.m.

No. 340

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 25, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 224 Telegraphic: by bag [E 959/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 23, 1923*

In this morning's discussion,[1] I began by asking Ismet Pasha to state the Turkish claim to Mosul. In reply he gave a re-hash of the Turkish case as stated in the memoranda[2] which have already been circulated in print to the Cabinet, very often reading out entire passages. He did not employ a single new argument, but reiterated the old fallacies, ethnic, geographical, economic, strategic, etc., and laid unexpected stress on the contention that we are not justified in holding any part of a vilayet of which we were only in partial occupation at the exact hour when the Mudros armistice, which he has consistently decried and derided during our discussion here, [and

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 337–63.

[2] See ibid., pp. 372–80, and 389–93.

which] was signed hundreds of miles away. In reply I made the speech which the papers will probably have reported,[3] basing my case upon (a) the obligations of treaty or of honour into which we have entered, (b) the juridical position which we occupy in Irak, (c) the interests and views of the various racial or religious groups in the Mosul vilayet. I also rebutted the armistice contention which has no validity, and gave a brief exposé of the oil situation which I declared to have no connection with the British case. I ended, as I had proposed, by saying that, inasmuch as the Turks and ourselves found it impossible to agree, His Majesty's Government were quite prepared to refer the determination of the disputed frontier between Turkey and Irak to the League of Nations and to abide by the result. Finally I earnestly pressed the Turkish delegation to join in this invitation and to participate in the enquiry.

My proposal was strongly and loyally supported by Monsieur Bompard and Marquis Garroni, and Ismet asked for an adjournment till 6 p.m. to prepare his reply.

When we resumed[4] Ismet read out his response. After first answering some of the points in my speech of the morning, he then refused arbitration in any form, including, apparently, reference to the League of Nations, persisted in describing Mosul as part of the mother-soil of Turkey and demanded a plebiscite of the inhabitants.

This demand enabled me to point out with exactitude how futile and dangerous an instrument a plebiscite must be in a country with a partially nomadic population, presenting no unity of descent or interest, largely illiterate, possessing strong racial or religious prejudices, and suddenly called upon to pronounce by their votes, not upon a single defined issue, but upon such a question as the tracing of a disputed frontier in areas inhabited by turbulent and hostile tribes.

I cited the examples of Teschen[5] and Upper Silesia[6] and asked who were to vote, who was going to keep order while the voting was going on, and who was to enforce the result. I then asked Ismet to explain whether he had really declined the reference to the League of Nations, which I refused to believe; and proceeded to explain with minute precision how the enquiry would be held, how under Articles 4, 5 and 17 of the Covenant, Turkey would be admitted not only to membership of the League but to the Council, how she would become a party to every discussion, every proposal, every decision, how unanimity was required for every such decision, and how therefore she would have a powerful voice in determining the character, personnel, and objects of the enquiry.[7] I pointed out what a deplorable impression would

[3] See *The Times*, January 24, 1923, p. 9.

[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 393–404.

[5] See Vol. X, Chapter VII.

[6] See Vol. XVI, Chapters I and II.

[7] Lord Curzon's words were: 'Further, article 5 of the covenant provides that the decision of the council upon which the Turkish Government will be represented will have to be unanimous so that no decision can be arrived at without their consent [see Cmd. 1814, p. 401].' Article 5, however, began with the words: 'Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, . . .' and should be read in conjunction with Article 15.

be produced upon world-opinion, if the Turks were to refuse the offer now made to them with the approval of all the powers. But I ended by saying that if they declined to act I could not adopt a similarly negative attitude. I was here not to run the risk of war but to make peace, and my government could not refuse any precaution that might avoid a possible rupture of peace in the future, such as might result from military movements in the direction of Mosul and a conceivable collision in that quarter. The British government would accordingly have no alternative but to address the League under Article 11 of the covenant and to invite their intervention in the interests of peace. This appeal, which I am told made a great impression upon everyone but the Turks, was then cordially supported by Monsieur Bompard, Marquis Garroni and Baron Hayashi, the first of whom especially entreated the Turks not to reject the advice of so old a friend of Turkey as himself and thus to put themselves wrong with the world. I then offered to let Ismet defer his final reply till tomorrow morning. I might as well have appealed to the Sphinx of Egypt or apostrophised the mummy of Tuthankamen. Ismet, surrounded by an unusually large Praetorian guard of the deputies from Angora, who evidently meant to tolerate no nonsense, merely replied that his arguments remained unanswered and unanswerable, that Mosul was a part of the motherland, that he had no doubt that I was about to give it up, and that reference to the League of Nations was out of the question.

I took notice of his reply, and announced my intention to make the reference to the League which I had foreshadowed.[8]

The sitting then terminated.

[8] In his telegram No. 225 of January 23, summarising these proceedings, Lord Curzon commented: 'I think Mosul difficulty has been so steered by proceedings today that public opinion will be unanimously on our side in dispute, and that Turks can hardly now contrive to make it sole or even main cause of rupture.'

No. 341

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 24, 1.45 p.m.)
No. 226 Telegraphic [*E* 955/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 24, 1923, 12.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 154.[1]

Following for Prime Minister:

Situation is difficult but I do not think there is any fear of crisis arising in manner that you suppose. Nor will Cabinet be required to take any vital decision before I have come home to advise it. I will answer second question by bag tonight.[2]

[1] This telegram of January 23 referred to Nos. 336 and 338, and continued: 'I know that you fully realise that a crisis must not be allowed to arise so suddenly that there will not be time for the Cabinet to determine definitely what our policy is to be. Do you still expect to submit Treaty in name of Allies and if so on what date?'

[2] See No. 345, below.

No. 342

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 24, 10.15 p.m.)
No. 229 Telegraphic [E 961/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 24, 1923, 7.10 p.m.*

In pursuance of action taken by me at Conference yesterday, I have consulted Sir E. Drummond[1] today as to right method of bringing Mosul case under Article 11 before Council of the League. We have agreed upon following procedure.

I will write and despatch tomorrow an official letter to council stating in briefest terms ground of appeal of His Majesty's Government and ask for case to be put on agenda for meeting next week. We should then ask Lord Balfour to make an explanation to Council at its first meeting as to what passed here. I will send him full account of this tomorrow night by Major Young[2] who will give him any further explanations and will return with him to Paris. No discussion need or will arise on Lord Balfour's statement at this stage and he will conclude by saying that should matters develop in the near future in a serious manner either owing to a rupture here or to Turkish military movements against frontier of Irak, His Majesty's Government will then feel it their duty to ask for a special meeting of the Council in order to take requisite steps by inviting Turks to attend and state their case. Entire matter should not, therefore, occupy meeting of next week more than an hour. Please show this to Lord Balfour and say how grateful I shall be if he will act on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the above sense.

Cabinet will appreciate necessity of taking immediate action for which impending meeting of council at Paris affords an excellent reason. Otherwise, Turks who are already spreading rumour that my speech was a *brutum fulmen*, will be convinced that we mean to do nothing.

[1] Secretary-General to the League of Nations.

[2] See No. 257, n. 2.

No. 343

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 26, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 231 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1009/1/44]

Private LAUSANNE, *January 24, 1923*

Part I (For Cabinet but not for print).

I will attempt to depict situation. Bompard having come back with instructions which I described in an earlier telegram,[1] Barrère affected an illness which had no real foundation, declining to be a party to concessions

[1] See No. 336.

which he thought disgraceful. Whether this was a display of conscience or of cowardice on his part is immaterial. Anyhow it left in command Bompard, a confirmed partisan who years ago bowed his head in the temple of Rimmon[2] at Stamboul. His tactics are plain. He thinks we ought to remain here for another fortnight, reopening every discussion, and gradually whittling away every point for which we have hitherto stood out in order to obtain signature of a treaty which would constitute an allied humiliation. With this object in view meetings of commissions or sub-commissions for which he is responsible are spun out or delayed on various pleas, and some fresh excuse is invented daily for postponement. Meanwhile the French and Turks who live in same hotel fraternise.

Everything that passes or is in contemplation is disclosed to latter; and at night there is abundant hob-nobbing over champagne. The custom of entertaining the Turks which was started by the French, has been pursued by other delegations, and the spectacle may be witnessed nightly of the French and Italian delegates joking and clinking glasses with the men by whom the allies were openly affronted in the conference chamber only an hour or two before. Having done my duty by giving one such entertainment to all the delegations, I have for some time desisted from these amenities, which disgust our people and can only give the Turks an impression of complete allied hypocrisy. Meanwhile text of treaty[3] is much advanced and should be ready for presentation.

Bompard has not yet attempted to introduce into it the various forms of capitulation proposed by Poincaré and I have told him plainly that I cannot accept them. Italians wobble from one side to the other with an invariable preference for retreat. Thus the British are in a constant minority, for the two other allies and the Turks may be said to constitute a working alliance.

Next as to presentation of treaty. It had been definitely agreed to present this at a plenary meeting of the conference and I had told Barrère that as senior foreign delegate I claimed the right to do it.

Barrère thereupon, resting his case upon a technical interpretation of the rules which lay down that the plenary sittings of the conference shall be presided over by the three presidents in turn, claimed that I had exhausted my right by having been put in the Chair at the preliminary meeting which laid down the order of procedure, and declared that the honour of France would be fatally impaired unless he adhered to his claim. I did not in the least care about *amour propre*—though I confess that the spectacle of the Peace Treaty being presented by an ambassador while a Secretary of State is present struck me as both invidious and improper. But I was afraid of what might happen if the French or Italians were in the Chair and the Turks made a demonstration or raised some fresh issue which I knew that my colleagues, from their inexperience of public meetings, would be powerless to cope with.

Barrère's claim was supported by Poincaré and is clung to with even

[2] The reference is to *II Kings*, Chapter V, verse 18.

[3] For the text of draft treaty as presented, see Appendix III.

greater desperation by Bompard, in proportion to his own inferior status. His method of escaping the difficulty and making a final kowtow to the Turks was accordingly to have no plenary meeting of the conference at all, but either to have three separate sittings of the three commissions, at which each president in turn would offer his slice of the truncated treaty with the proper supplicatory gesture, or to send round the treaty in an envelope. That an international conference after sitting for over two months should not dare to meet to present the result of its labours, or that the final attitude of the Turks would be determined by the difference between the two methods of presentation did not strike M. Bompard as considerations of the least moment compared with the necessity for a crowning display of allied humility.

Part II (*For circulation in print*).

In view of the situation I convened a meeting with M. Bompard and Marquis Garroni this afternoon, in order to bring matters to a head. Rumbold and Crowe were also present and the meeting lasted 2½ hours.

I began by recapitulating various stages of postponement to which I have been forced by proceedings of the French and Italian delegations, and said that orders of His Majesty's Government did not permit me to continue this process indefinitely. It would therefore be necessary for me to leave next week and when I went I should not go alone but should take entire British delegation with me. Treaty must therefore be presented before that date. For this I proposed following time-table. All meetings of commissions and sub-committees to be concluded by Friday[4] evening. The text of treaty, which is far advanced, to be completed on Saturday,[5] to be read or reviewed if thought necessary by the principal allied delegates on Sunday[6] and to be handed confidentially to the remaining allies on that evening, and to the Turks on the following day. The meeting at which the formal presentation to the Turks shall be made, to take place on Wednesday,[7] discussion of Straits convention, if demanded by the Turks or Russians to be held on Thursday,[8] departure of British delegation Friday.[9] This will admit of an extra day should I be driven to it, but will mean, unless unforeseen obstacles occur, my return at latest on Sunday, February 5th [4th]. I told my colleagues that unless this plan were adopted I should have no alternative but to publish a full statement of our recent deplorable procedure, and to place the responsibility on the right shoulders.

After many protestations of injured innocence this time-table was accepted by the allies, and I propose at once by making tentative enquiries of the railway company to let the plan leak out. I then said that our departure must involve the retirement not of a single delegation but of all, in order to avoid on the one hand the appearance of allied disunion, and on the other the risk of a Turkish attempt to reopen discussion with the party or parties left behind. This was received with enthusiasm by Marquis Garroni,[10] who

[4] i.e. January 26. [5] i.e. January 27. [6] i.e. January 28.
[7] i.e. January 31. [8] i.e. February 1. [9] i.e. February 2.
[10] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 408 and 409.

has strong domestic propensities, and with chastened satisfaction by Monsieur Bompard. The allies will leave behind one or two competent officials of the Fromageot type, to give such explanations as the Turks may require.

We next discussed the manner of presentation. I said it was almost incredible to me that Monsieur Poincaré or anyone should be so nervous as to be afraid of holding a plenary session of the conference, which would in these circumstances adjourn without ever having met at all except to fix our procedure ten weeks earlier. Monsieur Bompard wanted the text of treaty to be sent by the three presidents in a letter. Marquis Garroni suggested three meetings of the three commissions to present the treaty in three parts, and then a fourth or plenary meeting to dispel the illusion that we were not united.

I ended by proposing, nominally to oblige Monsieur Bompard, but in reality in order to escape a plenary sitting presided over by him with its perilous possibilities, that as the conference and the commissions consist of exactly the same persons under a different name, we should convoke the three commissions at the same time on Wednesday next for the presentation of the treaty. I would preside over the first and explain the treaty from my point of view, then ceding the Chair to Garroni who would explain his clauses, and he to Bompard who would explain his. In practice it will be found that any reply would have to be made by me. Even this simple but rather childish arrangement which after all concerns nobody but ourselves was not accepted by Monsieur Bompard who said he could not agree without the permission of Monsieur Poincaré. I could not refrain from asking how His Excellency came to be described as a plenipotentiary at all and added that my government could not consent that the procedure of the conference should be dictated from Paris, and that I intended to act in the manner proposed. Another difficulty was raised when both Bompard and Garroni said that they could not sign the treaty without sending the full text to Paris and Rome for examination and approval by their respective governments—an operation which would necessarily waste another week or more of time. I pointed out that there was nothing to prevent them from sending the text in sections, as I was sure that they had already done; but said that if the whole treaty was either to be delayed by the above procedure or to be returned with suggestions for amendment, there would be no British delegation to sign it when it arrived.

I also told Monsieur Bompard as regards the capital concessions suggested by Monsieur Poincaré, that I could not admit that the head of any of the three allied governments was justified in proposing a re-casting of the whole instrument at the last moment and that I could not accept any of them. He then dropped the matter.

The treaty to be thus presented will contain at least twenty provisions, affecting France and Italy equally with, if not more than, ourselves, which Turks, if we may judge from their protestations, will refuse to accept. Question of Mosul will only appear in the form of a clause to the effect that that section of the Turkish frontier is referred for decision to the League of

Nations. Thus I think I shall have carried out my promise to the Prime Minister, that if we split, it will not be on that rock either primarily or alone. As to attitude of Turks I regard immediate or early signature by them as out of the question. But it is certain that between now and next Wednesday French and Italians will be busily at them to prevent abrupt refusal. Indeed it is more than probable that Bompard will tell them of the tender heart of Monsieur Poincaré and will ask them to believe that if they wait awhile its friendly pulsations will awake a corresponding beat in London and Rome and that Turkey by being patient will end by obtaining all that she desires. I anticipate therefore that after expressing profound disgust and indignation Ismet will state his intention either to consult Angora or to defer his final decision. He may even try to start fresh colloquies which of course my plan will defeat. We should, however, declare our willingness to meet them again for signature whenever they desire and after all the future will be in our own hands, since His Majesty's Government if they require me to come out again to this detestable place can formulate the conditions on which I am to do so.

There remains of course the contingency that whether Turks refuse at once, or delay refusal, they may have recourse to military movements of a menacing character, which might lead to resumption of hostilities. I think that the omens on the whole are against such a course both because the French will strain every nerve to keep them quiet, knowing that a Franco-British rupture in the East will mean the disappearance of the last shred of our toleration in the Ruhr, and because the Turks are in deadly terror of the revived Greek army, which might seize any such occasion for pushing its claims. But here on the threshold of the region of speculation, I desist.

No. 344

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 25, 9.20 p.m.)
No. 41 Telegraphic [E 997/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 25, 1923, 7 p.m.*

According to telegram from Colonel Mougin, Angora government have appealed to France to support their proposal for plebiscite for Mosul and have expressed wish to have reply before January 27th.

French High Commissioner said that he did not understand reason for fixing date. It is, however, possibly in connection with discussion which, as I hear from usually well-informed source, is said to be proceeding between Council of Ministers and Avaloff [*sic*][1] in regard to Russian treaty of alliance.

Nevertheless it is difficult to believe that Turkey, if she managed not to compromise herself with Russia during three years of isolation, will lightly do so now, when she is returning to Europe on practically her own terms.

[1] Monsieur S. I. Aralov, Soviet Ambassador at Angora.

(? She) has two means of pressure, her army and Russia, and doubtless means to make full use of both.

Sent to Lausanne No. 49.

No. 345

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 149 Telegraphic [E 1090/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 27, 1923, 5.00 p.m.*

Following from Lord Balfour.

I gather from your letter sent by Young[1] that what you principally desire is that at the earliest possible moment I should make a public declaration that, in the event of no arrangement being come to at Lausanne about the Irak frontier, the British government will formally require the League to take action under Article 11. This seems to me an admirable scheme and I will do my best to carry it out. But it has the defect of being purely hypothetical. No substantive action can be taken unless and until the Turks finally refuse an arrangement. I am not sure that the procedure of the Council easily lends itself to action of this sort; but I have little doubt that with Drummond's help I shall be able to manage it. I fully appreciate undesirability of giving impression that Mosul is the only or even the main obstacle to conclusion of peace. Do you see any objection to my referring to Turkish obduracy on other questions and stating that the reason for my calling the Council's attention to the Irak frontier question at this stage is [that] the Turks have already refused the good offices of the League and there is no indication that on this point they are prepared to change their policy?

Please send your reply via Embassy Paris.

[1] See No. 342.

No. 346

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 27, 9.15 p.m.)
No. 240 Telegraphic[1] [E 1072/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 27, 1923*

This morning were held meetings of my commission[2] to receive final reports of sub-committees on exchange of prisoners of war, exchange of populations, and war graves, and later on of Marquis Garroni's commission[3]

[1] The time of despatch of this telegram is not recorded.
[2] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 406–26.
[3] Ibid., pp. 521–35.

to receive reports of sub-committees on judicial and economic régimes, nationalities, and antiquities.

Two draft agreements had been concluded between Greeks and Turks relating to double exchange above referred to and Signor Montagna, the chairman, deserves much credit for successful result of his labours. With regard to exchange of Greek and Turkish populations on a compulsory basis I repeated my expression of profound regret that this principle, which would produce much suffering in its operation, had been adopted by both parties,[4] but hoped that it would be compensated by removal of deep rooted causes of quarrel between them and greater future homogeneity of populations. These agreements will be signed early next week.[5]

As to prisoners of war we insisted on a proviso to guard against release without due punishment of murderers of allied, i.e. British soldiers and sailors since November 20th, 1922.[6]

A rather heated debate then ensued on war graves, in which I absolutely declined to yield to Turkish contentions in respect of two points named in my telegram No. 230.[7] I insisted on outrage to general sentiments of piety and humanity and particularly to feelings of British, Australian and New Zealand soldiers in proposed restrictions, and said that we could not withdraw our forces from Gallipoli until this question was satisfactorily settled. Ismet missed opportunity of making a concession that would have cost him nothing and indulged instead in usual display of mingled stubbornness and stupidity. Papers will report debate, which will produce a lamentable impression upon public opinion in England and dominions, and will confirm belief that Angora Turks are really outside the pale.

Marquis Garroni explained allied proposals about judicial régime, but Turks, who had not yet received text refrained from commenting upon them. On the subject of antiquities I impressed upon Turks desirability of returning to Medina relics and treasures which their army had snatched from tomb of the Prophet and carried off to Constantinople in 1917. My appeal, properly advertised, should awaken much sympathy in Moslem world, notably in India. But it failed to move stony impassivity of Turks and meeting did little but confirm their already too painfully familiar psychology.

[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 316 and 318.

[5] Lord Curzon reported the signature of these agreements in his telegram No. 249 of January 30, which ran: 'Greek and Turkish delegates signed this morning an agreement relative to exchange of civilian hostages and prisoners of war and a convention relative to exchange of populations. Former comes into force at once. Latter forms integral part of general peace settlement and will come into force when Greece and Turkey have ratified peace treaty.

'Agreements as signed are practically identical with texts forwarded in my despatches [not printed] subject to slight drafting alterations, most important of which is that second paragraph of article 4 of agreement for exchange of populations has been transferred to separate protocol, as stipulation contained in it is to come into force on signature of peace treaty without awaiting ratification.'

For the text of these agreements, see Cmd. 1814, pp. 817–27, and 828–31 (or *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53, and 1054–6).

[6] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 414 and 771.

[7] Of January 24, not printed.

No. 347

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 241 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1074/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 27, 1923*

At afternoon sitting today M. Bompard, replacing M. Barrère as chairman of Third Commission, took the reports of the four sub-committees attached to that commission.[1] They were (1) Sanitary, (2) Economic, (3) Commercial régime, (4) Financial. Upon each of these the allies submitted the text of articles to be inserted in draft treaty. Some of these were new, the result of the latest concessions agreed to by the allies under the remorseless pressure (a) of the French and Italian delegations (b) of time. The rest were matters that had been debated scores of times in the sub-committees and in many cases agreed to by the Turks. Nevertheless on each they pursued the invariable tactics—reservations, protests, refusals, appeals. It would be futile to describe the course of the discussion which lasted for three and a half hours. The only result was to confirm opinion of everyone present including even the French that debates and even conversations are useless; and that we must put what we think best in the text and hand it in for acceptance or refusal. For the mentality of the Turks is such that even at the last moment they prefer to argue and refine upon the minutest detail sooner than appear to yield. Those who know them best, including themselves, regard this as a stereotyped feature of the game which must be played according to rule. The result can only be to multiply a hundredfold the contents of the treaty which according to all logic they will be compelled to reject with scorn, but which nevertheless many people here, including probably a section of their own delegation, think they will ultimately be found to accept.

In this fantastic fog of make-believe and pretence is being spent the last week of my melancholy sojourn at Lausanne.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 592–682.

No. 348

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 54 Telegraphic [E 1147/35/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 28, 1923, 11.25 p.m.*

General Officer Commanding's telegram to War Office[1] repeated to Lausanne in my telegram No. 53.

[1] No. 3515 of January 28. This ran: 'I hope that before Lausanne conference breaks up instructions may be given me as to military policy the Government wishes [to be] pursued here. If Turks refuse to sign treaty it would be quite wrong to suppose that British force will

From a military point of view it seems undoubtedly true that our best policy in the event of rupture at Lausanne would be to withdraw to Gallipoli as General Harington suggests. I cannot but regard our position here, with the allies, on whom we cannot count in an emergency, as fundamentally weak. In the Straits we would be building on a rock and in Constantinople we are building upon sand.

Threat of our departure from Constantinople in order to settle down more solidly in Gallipoli might even bring Turks to reason. It might moreover forestall demand for evacuation from Turks, which we would have to refuse, and which, since Turks in their turn would probably have to try and enforce it, would seem prelude to war.

If serious hostilities break out we retire in any case to Gallipoli and we should be doing under force what we would now be doing voluntarily. Moreover if we remain here and are attacked Greeks will move to our assistance and we should be placed under awkward and regrettable obligation unless the whole Near East settlement is to be again completely revised.

Withdrawal to Gallipoli would leave us free hand independent of our allies and thereby strengthen our initiative and force of our arguments with Turks.[2]

Risk of incidents leading to hostilities which could otherwise be avoided is largely diminished by reduction of main points of contact in this town and Ismid peninsula, whereas from Gallipoli, whence we could not be driven, we

be able to remain as at present. It has only been by exercise of greatest restraint and conciliation that both Mudania and Lausanne conferences were reached without conflict and during last two months it has only been fact that both sides were waiting on end of conference that has enabled us to avoid incidents. . . . I have definite evidence of Turkish plan to surround us here accompanied by plan of destruction of certain places by explosives. Angora has now been informed that everyone concerned knows his task and that all these plans are complete.

'We are in a thoroughly unsound military position here as I have often pointed out, and our position on Ismid peninsula invites attack. Delay is all in favour of the Turks who have initiative and time to perfect their plans while we, under the Mudania Convention, have to refrain from fortification and merely await a blow. To think that we still occupy Constantinople in a military sense is a farce. Constantinople cannot be effectively controlled by us unless we are prepared to seize reins of Government and arrest Turkish officials and put in our own, and this would be a very large undertaking and impossible unless you are prepared to provide sufficient troops and guns to enable Ismid side to be held against Kemalist Army which would certainly be put in motion.'

[2] In his telegram under reference (see n.1), General Harington had continued: 'There is no danger to French and Italians. They have their agreements and know quite well that Turks will direct all their energies against British. My considered military opinion, if we are going to have definite break or war with Turkey, is that our military force should be withdrawn from Constantinople and Ismid to Gallipoli peninsula, Chanak being held as an outpost to cover our concentration on Gallipoli. From there we could sweep Turks out of Europe if necessary which is what they fear most, as is evident from their anxiety the other day when they thought we were going. It appears to me that to hold on in here with three Guards battalions and one Marine battalion, which must be forced to evacuate if my three battalions on Ismid side are attacked by 50,000 Kemalists opposite them, gives Turks every chance of securing an initial success, which would be deplorable, and also necessitate keeping necessary shipping handy and consequently great expense.'

could remain indefinitely and dictate our terms. It is position whence blockade which might result from appeal to League of Nations could be most easily exercised.

Threat of withdrawal might also be used effectively with regard to our allies neither of whom would appreciate remaining here without us and who to avoid this alternative might support us more whole-heartedly.

Importance from point of view of minorities and British prestige of remaining in Constantinople though doubtless very great appears less now than a few months ago. Massacres are less likely if we withdraw quietly than if we withdrew after fighting had taken place in the town.

Moreover Turks may shrink from action calculated to precipitate advance of Greeks across Maritza on the grounds of humanity which the allies could not disapprove.

Withdrawal only to take up more advantageous position whence we can speak with greater force and authority does not seem to me altogether derogatory to our prestige. I do not believe that French could make capital out of such withdrawal as hollowness of such manoeuvre would be too obvious to gain credence with anyone. It would be clear that we had withdrawn because we could not count upon French.

For above reasons I admit that General Harington's proposal offers the best prospect of ultimate peaceable solution if and when Lausanne negotiations are broken off. I recognise however seriousness of abdication which such decision would appear to indicate and obvious objection which will be raised thereto. But if hostilities are to be feared it would be preferable that British forces should be withdrawn to Gallipoli before they actually break out.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 43.[3]

[3] It was received in the Foreign Office on January 29 at 8.30 a.m.

No. 349

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
No. 213 [E 1077/1/44]

PARIS, *January 28, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to your despatch No. 321 of January 26th,[1] I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I attended the Diplomatic Dinner at the Quai d'Orsay yesterday evening, and was able to have some informal communication with the President of the Council on the subject.

2. I told Monsieur Poincaré that in the unfortunate event of a complete break-down of the negotiations with Turkey, and the consequent failure to secure the signature of the Treaty, it was probable that your Lordship might

[1] Not printed.

address the French Government with a reminder of the Declaration signed in London on November 30th, 1915,[2] providing that no separate Peace would be signed without agreement between the Allies. Happily no such stage had yet been reached, but, in view of all the possibilities, you were anxious to let the French Government know in good time of the step which you might find it necessary to take. Of course I did not expect him to give any immediate reply, or even to express any opinion in this purely preliminary conversation.

3. The President of the Council expressed himself as greatly obliged by your Lordship's consideration in indicating thus early what might possibly occur. I had suggested that you did not entirely despair of the signature of the treaty after some delay, and he was in the same position, though the situation was certainly serious. He had telegraphed that day to the French representative at Angora, in order to urge the Turks not to come to any hasty conclusion. You had thought, earlier, that there would be no particular advantage in sending General Pellé to Angora,[3] and I gather, though he did not say so explicitly, that he would be prepared to arrange for such a mission now if the Turks engaged in a discussion of the terms of the Treaty.

4. On the question of repeating the declaration of November 30th, 1915, he clearly could say nothing without consulting his colleagues, but he would just observe that the Convention of Angora[4] placed the French Government in a somewhat different position from ours, though it must be borne in mind that that convention was in no sense a peace. I thought it better not to make any observations about the convention, so merely said the important fact at this moment is that the convention is not a peace.

5. Monsieur Poincaré went on to say that he did not anticipate any rapid developments, as he believed that the Turks would begin by asking for time to consider the proposals. If they should remain obdurate, and end by complete refusal, he would wish to discuss the then situation with your Lordship or with myself, and he would certainly not take any steps without full warning.

6. I hope that I may be wrong, but my prognosis of the probable attitude of the French Government in the event of an entire collapse of the treaty is distinctly unfavourable. Monsieur Poincaré seemed to imply that the declaration had been made a long time ago, and it may be expected that the French will point to the phrase 'au cours de la présente guerre', and say that we are now in the fifth year since the conclusion of the armistice with Turkey, thereby implying that the declaration has lost much of its force.[5] This would

[2] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 109, pp. 850–1.

[3] See No. 304.

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

[5] M. Poincaré embodied these views in a Note of January 30, the text of which Lord Crewe transmitted to Lord Curzon in his telegram No. 122 of January 31. Having reviewed developments of the Near Eastern question since the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, M. Poincaré went on to say: 'Le gouvernement français n'a cessé de blâmer la politique aventureuse de la Grèce, dont les ambitions agressives, en exaltant le patriotisme des Turcs, ont eu pour résultat de renforcer l'autorité et le prestige du gouvernement d'Angora, considéré comme le défenseur de l'intégrité nationale contre l'ennemi héréditaire. Il a, par conséquence, déploré l'appui que cette politique a reçu du gouvernement britannique.

be a departure from the purely logical habit to which we are so much accustomed, but it might be taken. Moreover, even without going the whole length of engaging in a separate peace, it would be possible for the French to engage in arrangements with the Turks which would amount to something of the same kind, and be very prejudicial to us. But it is only right to add that the President of the Council volunteered the observation that, after our failure to agree about the French advance on the Rhine, it would be a serious misfortune should we find ourselves also apart on the Turkish question.[6]

I have, &c.
CREWE

Cet appui a été donné d'une part publiquement par Monsieur Lloyd George, alors premier ministre, dans ses discours, notamment dans celui qui déclencha la phase finale de la campagne en exaspérant les Turcs, d'autre part par la voie diplomatique, ainsi que témoigne la correspondence de Lord Curzon avec Monsieur Gounaris [Vol. XVII, No. 549] publiée récemment.

'Bien qu'il ait désapprouvé l'action de la Grèce, le gouvernement français, désireux de maintenir l'unité des trois grandes puissances, en vue de la paix, n'a cessé de poursuivre la conclusion de cette paix, aux côtés de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie. . . . A Lausanne encore, l'union des trois gouvernements alliés s'est affirmée dans une collaboration cordiale, et le gouvernement français a fait ce qui dépendait de lui pour arriver à la signature de la paix. Si la conférence devait échouer, le gouvernement français pourrait-il écarter délibérament toute idée de reprendre de son côté des négociations dont les intérêts de premier ordre lui font une nécessité. Il a donné, donc, la preuve de son désir d'aboutir à une solution commune et il a conscience d'avoir fait ce qui dépendait de lui, conformément à ses engagements, pour maintenir la solidarité des trois puissances

'Par l'accord du 4 septembre 1914, les gouvernements alliés s'étaient engagés mutuellement à ne pas conclure d'accord séparé au cours de la guerre et à ne pas poser, au cours de la discussion des termes de la paix, séparément des conditions de paix, sans accord préalable avec chacun des autres alliés. Cet engagement a été tenu; il était pris pour la durée de la guerre et pour le temps nécessaire aux négociations de la paix.

'En ce qui concerne la Turquie, ce temps est passé. Bien que les efforts communs n'aient pas aboutis au résultat désiré, il serait déraisonnable de prétendre, si un traité de paix collectif n'était jamais conclu entre les alliés et cette puissance, qu'aucun traité particulier ne pourrait être signé avec elle par l'une quelconque des puissances alliées.

'La situation actuelle résulte bien moins de la guerre de 1914 que de la guerre greco-turque qui a modifié à notre détriment les conditions dans lesquelles nous pouvions créer un état de choses nouveau, qui n'est plus celui en vue duquel a été signé l'accord du 4 septembre 1914 [*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 108, pp. 365–6]. Chaque jour qui passe aggrave ces conséquences.

'S'il constatait l'impossibilité d'arriver à une paix commune, le gouvernement de la République pour sauvegarder les intérêts essentiels français, qui se trouvent menacés du fait de la situation créée par la guerre greco-turque, peut-être amené à négocier séparément avec la Turquie. Il croit devoir, dès maintenant, se réserver le droit, qu'il croit fondé.

'Il ne le ferait pas d'ailleurs sans en aviser ses alliés. Désireux, en particulier, de donner en cette circonstance, comme en toute autre, un témoignage de confiance, dont sont empreints les accords avec le cabinet de Londres, non seulement il informerait préalablement celui-ci, mais le tiendrait au courant des pourparlers qui s'ensuivraient.

'Je veux du reste fermement espérer que le gouvernment français n'aura pas à envisager cette éventualité. Si même l'accord ne pouvait se faire à Lausanne j'ai la conviction qu'il pouvait être poursuivi ailleurs. Et sans doute aurait-on plus de chance de réussir si, tenant compte des enseignements de la conférence actuelle, on évitait les réunions où la solennité

des débats et le nombre des participants favorisant les indiscrétions, donnent malgré tous les efforts un caractère de polémique aux discussions, d'ultimatum aux déclarations, et renforcent les intransigeances réciproques par le désir souvent inconscient, qu'ont les plénipotentia[i]res, de justifier leur attitude. En prenant le projet du traité élaboré à Lausanne comme base d'une négociation diplomatique et en abordant cette négociation nouvelle avec une ferme volonté d'aboutir, je suis certain que les gouvernements alliés pourraient encore agir en commun avec des chances réelles de succès.'

[6] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on January 29.

No. 350

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to Mr. Lindsay (Received January 29, 6.30 p.m.)
No. 50 Telegraphic [E 1156/6/44]

ATHENS, *January 29, 1923, 3.15 p.m.*

Mr. Harold Spender,[1] who has seen almost all the leading personages, received promise from Minister for Foreign Affairs that Greeks would not attack Turks without sanction of Allies. General Pangalos is, however, uncertain factor.

Extreme depression exists at idea of Lausanne conference breaking up without a decision. Greeks must have peace or war; an armed peace would be intolerable. Colonel Plastiras'[s] visit reported also to be connected with this question (see my telegram No. 43).[2]

Repeated to Lausanne.

[1] Mr. E. Harold Spender, author, journalist and lecturer.

[2] Of January 25, not printed. This reported that Colonel Plastiras, accompanied by Captain Karapanayotis, was leaving for Salonika on his way to Lausanne to consult M. Venizelos about the situation.

No. 351

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 57 Telegraphic [E 1171/35/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1923, 6.10 p.m.*

In the event of His Majesty's Government deciding, as result of deadlock at Lausanne and in view of military considerations to adopt General Harington's proposal for withdrawal of military forces to Gallipoli,[1] I would propose to evacuate simultaneously British colony here on the ground that if hostilities broke out it would probably be impossible to evacuate it later.

If French and Italian High Commissioners remain after departure of British forces would you approve of my stopping in Constantinople with small nucleus staff?

[1] See No. 348.

In spite of risk involved I am personally inclined to think that provided war be not certain it is worth taking, in view of importance in the interest of peace of retaining link here. Presume some British warships would remain after departure of troops and I should be able to arrange to get away if . . .[2] broke out.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 44.[3]

[2] The text is here uncertain.

[3] It was received in the Foreign Office on January 29 at 7.45 p.m.

No. 352

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)

No. 59[1] *Telegraphic [E 12731/1/44]*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 29, 1923, 8.50 p.m.*

French High Commissioner read to me today text of President of the Council's telegram to Mustapha Kemal Pasha, which was communicated to the latter by the French Consul, Smyrna, on January 27th, as well as telegram from Colonel Mougin who had similarly communicated it to Reouf Bey.

Judging from Mougin's telegram President of the Council's appeal had met with somewhat discourteous reception by Reouf Bey, who referred to Franklin-Bouillon's assurances for which he said there was nothing to show. He hinted that President of the Council's fine words did not amount to much more. He said that Grand National Assembly, even if it wished, had no power to accept judicial capitulations. He took exception to various financial clauses of the proposed treaty and accused French of serving capitalist interests. He also, of course, referred to Karagatch and Mosul as being points on which Turks could not make concessions, and observed that object of British was to detach French from Turks.

Finally he complained of delay involved in asking Turkish delegates to bring Treaty to Angora, and said that they had no need to leave Lausanne, as they had full powers and instructions.

Generally speaking Reouf's declaration was depreciation of value of President of the Council's intervention, and French High Commissioner was clearly dissatisfied with it.

[1] This telegram was repeated to the Foreign Office, where it was received on January 30 at 9.30 a.m.

No. 353

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 30, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 246 Telegraphic [E 1160/35/44]

Very urgent LAUSANNE, *January 30, 1923, 12.25 a.m.*

Following for Prime Minister and War Office:

I hope no action will be taken for moment on General Harington's and Mr. Henderson's telegrams from Constantinople 53[1] and 54,[2] which are written on an imperfect appreciation of events here. It is possible but unlikely that Turks will absolutely refuse and that rupture with consequent resumption of hostilities will forthwith ensue. We have reason to believe that Ismet Pasha is much perturbed as to situation into which mistaken tactics of his delegation have forced him, and it may very well be that before I leave on Friday night situation may change. In any case he is more likely to leave with a view to further consideration than to declare immediate breaking off. In these circumstances, I see no need to dissociate ourselves from our allies at Constantinople or to arrange for a solitary and abrupt departure from that position. If further attacks are made upon British soldiers it is always open to Harington to declare martial law. Present is not the moment for a display of nervousness or for premature retreat.

I shall be in a position to give His Majesty's Government fully considered advice in three days' time, but meanwhile I would deprecate either hasty judgment or precipitate action. Sir H. Rumbold concurs in this telegram.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 83.

[1] No. 348, nn. 1. and 2. [2] No. 348.

No. 354

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 30, 2.15 p.m.)
No. 47 Telegraphic [E 1194/35/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *January 30, 1923, 1.30 p.m.*

I hear from a sometimes well-informed source that after final secret session held yesterday morning Grand National Assembly decided that war must at all costs be avoided, that Kemal has been advised that he need not return to Angora[1] and that Ismet has been instructed to ask for adjournment rather than accept rupture of conference and to give undertaking if necessary to refrain from military action of any sort during adjournment.

This information is borne out by what would appear to be inspired communiqué in semi-official 'Vakit', this morning's issue apparently reassuring public, which states that in spite of reports to the contrary Kemal is con-

[1] Mustafa Kemal Pasha had gone to Smyrna (see No. 352).

tinuing his journey according to original programme. This is regarded as clear indication that even if conference comes to an end peace will be preserved by other means. Communiqué refers to above-mentioned secret session and . . .[2] telegram to Kemal and states that new situation has arisen as a result of reported willingness of Your Lordship to submit Mosul question to arbitration rather than to League of Nations.[3]

Sent to Lausanne No. 61.

[2] The text is here uncertain. [3] Cf. No. 356, below.

No. 355

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 155 Telegraphic [E 1203/35/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 30, 1923, 9.55 p.m.*

The Cabinet had under discussion today Harington's telegram No. 3515 of 28th,[1] Henderson's No. 43 of 28th[2] and your own No. 246 of 30th.[3]

They are much impressed with the danger that may immediately arise to our troops in Constantinople in case of the non-acceptance by the Turks of the Treaty. Your proposal that Harington might impose martial law on Constantinople [is] not practicable as sufficient number of troops [is] not available in view of holding of Ismid and Chanak.

They desire to send following telegram to Harington, but will withhold despatch until hearing from you but time presses and telegram ought to be sent Harington tomorrow.[4]

Telegram to Harington begins:

The Cabinet have decided that if the Turks refuse to accept the Treaty to be presented to them at Lausanne on the 31st January and Lord Curzon breaks off negotiations, they will order the British forces at Constantinople and on the Ismid Peninsula to be withdrawn to Gallipoli and Chanak; the evacuation to be carried out in accordance with a programme to be drawn up by yourself in co-operation with the Naval Commander-in-Chief. You will, of course, time your evacuation to cover embarkation of British Colony, consulting the Acting High Commissioner as to this part of the programme.

On arrival in the Dardanelles your task will be to hold both the peninsula of Gallipoli and Chanak pending further instructions and a decision by the government as to future policy. Instructions as to one battalion on the Maritza will follow.

French and Italian governments have been informed[4] of the decision made by the Cabinet and you will receive the earliest possible information as to the action they propose to take in order that you may co-operate with them, if their course of action renders it possible. This telegram is to be treated as a

[1] See No. 348, nn. 1 and 2. [2] No. 348. [3] No. 353.
[4] See, however, No. 359, below.

warning order for your information; executive action being deferred until you receive instructions to begin the evacuation. It is presumed that your 'break off' scheme[5] will be followed generally. Wire any changes. Ends.

[5] This would seem to refer to General Harington's telegram No. 3383 of January 7 to Lord Curzon, repeated to the War Office. This ran as follows: 'In accordance with plan submitted to me by Charpy, I approved and incorporated in Allied plan that French will be responsible for Stamboul by holding with 3 battalions 3 centres of resistance round Ottoman War Office, French General H.Q., and Seraglio. They will have at Makrikeui, 5 miles west of Stamboul on Sea of Marmora, one battalion protecting their artillery park and aerodrome and to assist in defence of my aerodrome. One battalion Ramis Barracks also outside Constantinople to prevent mobs leaving Stamboul coming round by head of Golden Horn to Pera.

'They will send to Pera to cover withdrawal of French Nationals to Stamboul one battalion which will withdraw to Stamboul on completion of this duty. One French battalion is at Gallipoli, and would be reinforced by one battalion now at Karagaban. The remaining battalion is watching Chatalja area. These are dispositions of the French while British are fighting rearguard action and evacuating if forced from Ismid Peninsula and from Constantinople before fleet has to leave. Probable time limit 6 or 7 days. Primary objective of French is protection of their nationals, some 10,000. Charpy thinks all these would be evacuated from Stamboul before we leave. It is improbable the Turks would shell Stamboul round St. Sophia and other Mosques. His position in no way dominates Constantinople. . . . Charpy says his then withdrawing from Stamboul and concentrating whole force around Makrikeui and San Stephano has been approved by his Government, and he is preparing to defend these places from which he could embark.

'Italians will accompany him he says. He has no orders to withdraw with us to Gallipoli. This second phase is in my opinion a camouflage of Foch–Weygand idea of holding the exits but its military significance is nil. The force merely sits five miles outside Constantinople on Sea of Marmora. After their relations with Angora they know they are in little danger, and that we are main object. They probably rely on us to keep Straits open for their commerce, but in any case Turks would grant them privileges by sea or rail. My orders are clear that Straits are my primary objective, whereas Constantinople is theirs, and it is impossible for me to do more to reconcile these two views. I am sure there is no intention on part of either French or Italians to fight unless they are attacked, which I do not think will happen.'

No. 356

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 31, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 251 Telegraphic [E 1214/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 31, 1923, 1 a.m.*

Very urgent

Plan of action for tomorrow[1] sketched in my telegram No. 231[2] and approved by my French and Italian colleagues was already being pursued and I was engaged in preparing my speech when at 7.30 this evening Bompard and Garroni[3] asked to see me. Sir H. Rumbold and Sir E. Crowe were

[1] i.e. January 31. This telegram was drafted on January 30. [2] No. 343.
[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 428 and 430.

both present and endorse this account of what passed. Bompard had just seen Ismet who had declared his inability to accept treaty now submitted but had also announced his unwillingness to return to Angora without a treaty. The immense significance of this admission to which I shall presently revert did not appear to have struck my colleagues. Ismet had then said he would reply to our statement tomorrow of great concession which Powers are prepared to make with a counter-statement of wonderful concessions made by Turks. He does not apparently intend to submit a counter-project but on the ground for which there is little or no foundation that much of treaty is new he intends to ask for eight days' delay in which to submit his response. At the end of this time which is to be spent in friendly conversations with allies formal reply of Turkish delegation is to be forthcoming and conference is to resume. Bompard went on to explain that points to which Ismet takes exception and on abandonment or modification of which Turks will insist are:

1. Capitulations.
2. Finance and reparations.
3. Mosul.

Both he and Garroni are entirely willing to give way to any depths of humiliation about first two and look forward to leaving me in the cart with the third. They urged me to remain on here to await Turkish reply and resumption of negotiations on the ground that any other attitude would be discourteous and if I was unable to do so they urged that I should leave Sir H. Rumbold or alternatively Sir E. Crowe to represent His Majesty's Government.

Cabinet will realise this is a complete violation of agreement arrived at between three allies not a week ago as we did not fail to point out and that it means a recommencement of our entire labours with no better promise of result but with certain[t]y that Ismet confronted with this further surrender will not be content except with the whole.

In reply we pointed out:

1. That we were quite willing to let Ismet have a week or more to reply but that we could neither remain here to take part in discussion nor await result.

2. That there was no reason for him to waste a week in replying when he could perfectly well do so before my departure on Friday.[4]

3. That his reply could very well be sent by letter to various governments.

4. That we could not consent to re-open entire discussion on proposed basis.

5. That question of Mosul was out of our hands and that no alteration was possible matter having been referred to the League of Nations.[5]

[4] i.e. February 2.

[5] See Nos. 340 and 342.

6. That upon judicial régime and finance the allies had already gone to the limit of concessions.

7. That my colleagues were openly throwing over agreement of last week in respect of our common decisions both to terminate discussion and to depart together.

8. That I did not conceive it possible that His Majesty's Government would allow me, Sir H. Rumbold or Sir E. Crowe to stay which could only be an incitement to further demands and more humiliating concessions.

I undertook to telegraph to the Cabinet what had passed but declined to abate in any particular the programme fixed for tomorrow[6] and reserved to myself the right to reply to Turkish contentions if I thought fit.

I do not ask for any immediate decision from His Majesty's Government since I shall be in a better position to advise after tomorrow. But I cherish the hope that I shall be supported in resisting the pitiable weakness of my colleagues.

Their complete abandonment of all that we have hitherto agreed to may indeed call for full divulgation at a later date and may precipitate that dissolution of the Entente which seems to loom in the future. But for the present I mean to preserve the façade if I can and surest method of doing so will be not to yield now but to show Ismet that Great Britain is not to be frightened or cajoled into surrender. I think he will come and see me before I leave as I still propose to do with the delegation on Friday.

In our view Ismet's refusal to return to Angora is conclusive proof both that he has powers to sign and that he does not mean to go without a treaty. We should indeed be ill-advised if we did not take advantage of this discovery.

[6] See n. 1.

No. 357

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received January 31, 7.10 p.m.)
No. 252 Telegraphic [E 1240/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *January 31, 1923, 6.10 p.m.*[1]

Most urgent

Part 1.

I commenced meeting[2] this morning by speech of some length introducing treaty,[3] explaining its general character and object, and indicating immense concessions which have been made to the Turks in respect of subjects dealt with in my commission. Text has been telegraphed to British

[1] Parts 2 and 3 of this telegram were despatched at 6.55 p.m. and 7.55 p.m. and were received at 7.50 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. respectively.

[2] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 426–47.

[3] See Appendix III.

press. Garroni followed by expounding quite fairly judicial provisions of treaty. Bompard then explained financial concessions and drew an impassioned picture of Turkey's perfidy in entering the war and her treachery to France. All three speeches concluded with appeal to Ismet to accept treaty and were based on assumption that treaty is our last word. I then resumed the chair in order to hear speeches of remaining delegations. American delegate joined in general appeal in a somewhat involved and nebulous oration ending with declaration that refusal of Turkey to sign would be an irreparable disaster to herself.[4]

Japanese,[5] Roumanian,[6] and Serbian[7] delegates then spoke shortly in similar sense. Ismet Pasha replied with a brief declaration taking note of what had been said, complaining of novelty of certain demands made in treaty, and concluding with request for eight days' delay before giving official reply of Turkish delegation, this period to be consumed in private negotiations, at end of which commissions were to re-assemble to hear results or as is more probable to resume their labours. Cabinet will observe that this was precisely the demand for[e]shadowed in my telegram No. 251 of yesterday.[8] I then adjourned conference for ten minutes to admit of my delivering reply on behalf of the Allies.

Part 2.

Retirement of French and Italian delegates with our own to an adjoining chamber lasted for fifty minutes and was scene of violent discord and even recrimination. Bompard and Garroni, in the spirit of their private conversations of yesterday, repudiated previous agreement with me declaring that Ismet's request was entirely reasonable and could not be refused without discourtesy, announced their intention to stay on here and conduct proposed conversations and said that if I refused that I should be responsible for breaking up conference and wrecking treaty. I declined to recede from my main position pointing out complete tergiversation of my colleagues in which I declined to participate and which I threatened to expose, insisting that Ismet's terms meant re-opening whole case which we had unanimously declared to be closed, and if suggested conversations were to fail, revival of conference a week hence. I refused either to agree to this or to leave any member of British delegation [behind][9] me or to allow any resumption of public debates. Utmost that I would concede, and that with a reluctance that I cannot exaggerate, was to postpone my departure until Saturday,[10] or at the latest Sunday night, in order that Ismet who had already had treaty in his possession for three days and knows every article in it by heart might have his stipulated week for consideration and private discussion before giving his final reply. I stated my intention to make this announcement to

[4] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 962–4.
[5] Baron Hayashi.
[6] M. Diamandy.
[7] M. Rakitch.
[8] No. 356.
[9] This word has been supplied from Lord Curzon's draft in file No. 47 of the Lausanne Delegation archives (F.O. 839).
[10] February 3.

conference forthwith on my own responsibility whether my colleagues agreed or not and from it I declared my inability to recede.

Upon our return to conference chamber I accordingly announced that I would out of compliment to Ismet Pasha and Turks consent to postpone my departure until Sunday[11] night at latest and that I was at his disposal in the interim. Ismet replied that he would do his best to accommodate me.[12]

Part 3.

Above dénouement is regretted by no one more than myself but in view of President of the Council's treacherous declaration which I had just received of his intention to conclude a separate treaty with Turks[13] and of Garroni's obvious willingness to take same course with consequence that responsibility for rupture would be thrown exclusively upon me and that I should be represented as throwing away peace for a matter of three days, I felt I had no alternative. I have now written to Ismet asking that conversations for which he begged may begin without delay. Inasmuch as secret telegrams received this morning confirm forecast contained in my telegram No. 251[14] of yesterday and show that Ismet not only has authority but means to sign, I beg that instructions to General Harington contained in your telegram No. 155[15] just received be not sent for the present and that French and Italian governments be not warned as proposed. It is to my mind clear that Turks do not mean fighting and must have a treaty, and that enemies whom I have to contend with and defeat are not at Angora but at Paris and Rome. I am reporting in another telegram[16] about President of the Council's attitude but in the meantime I ask for four days' additional (? delay) which will result, it is true, either in a treaty or in rupture but more probably former, while if there is rupture it will be in a wider field than the Near East. Cabinet have doubtless observed rising tide in French press against Poincaré's pusillanimity in which he finds a faithful adherent in M. Bompard.[17]

[11] February 4. [12] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 435. [13] See No. 349, n. 5.
[14] No. 356. [15] No. 355. [16] See No. 358, below.
[17] In a telegram, No. 157, despatched at 10.15 p.m. on January 31, the Prime Minister replied: 'Telegram received too late for consideration by Cabinet, but am disposed to give you the time you ask. Rechad is here. Do you think it would be worth while for me to see him to find out exactly what he wants?' Replying to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 254 of February 1, stated: 'It would only increase our difficulties here if you were to allow any emissary to negotiate with you direct. Matter is being dealt with in personal conversations between Ismet and myself and any outside intervention would only weaken my position and destroy my chances.'

No. 358

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 1, 1.10 p.m.)
No. 253 Telegraphic [E 1284/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *February 1, 1923, 10.30 a.m.*

Two incidents have occurred in last 24 hours which seem to me to throw a very serious light upon views and intentions of French government in relation to settlement of Turkish question and to call for immediate and grave remonstrance at Paris. The first of these was appearance in press yesterday evening[1] of astonishing communication sent by Monsieur Poincaré on Monday[2] to Angora without previous reference either to His Majesty's Government or to allied delegations here. In this communication President of the Council contemptuously brushed aside the labours on which we have been engaged for nearly three months at Lausanne and ignoring both solemn engagements as to allied unity which he entered into with me at Paris on November 18th[3] last and pledges as to common action which have been exchanged by allied plenipotentiaries here, thought fit to announce to Angora and to the world on very eve of presentation of treaty by the allies that it had no finality, that it simply marked a stage in discussions which have now been proceeding for so long and that it might be replaced by further negotiations either here or elsewhere which would result in yet further concessions.

In the same note President of the Council in flagrant violation of an agreement arrived at between principal allied plenipotentiaries here announced his willingness to leave entire French delegation at Lausanne to conduct these further negotiations and to make these further concessions. Indeed his words seem to imply that they might be undertaken by French delegation independently of their allies and alone thus ignoring not merely entire basis upon which we have been proceeding with President of the Council's explicit assent for the last three months but manifest fact that it is neither for France nor for any individual allied power to promise or to make concessions at Lausanne or anywhere else on matters which equally concern remainder of allies.[4]

[1] A note on the original in Mr. Oliphant's hand runs: 'This telegram must have been drafted by Lord Curzon the night of January 31st, and "yesterday evening" would therefore be January 30.'

[2] i.e. January 29. For the text, see No. 382, Annex I, below.

[3] See No. 204.

[4] In his telegram No. 127 of February 1, Lord Crewe reported: 'The Lausanne bombshell which was, so far as I can gather, manufactured in the Quai d'Orsay laboratory, caused so loud an explosion in Paris, that Monsieur Poincaré now sees fit to deny all knowledge thereof. Monsieur Peretti [de la Rocca] spontaneously telephoned the following "explanation" to Mr. Phipps this morning:

'Monsieur Jean Herbette, who is very pro-Turk, and whose views do not in the least represent those of the Quai d'Orsay, published in his leading article in the "Temps" on January 30th the announcement (of which the substance was given in the last paragraph

This communication would by itself have called for immediate notice by His Majesty's Government involving as it does a breach of most definite pledges and understandings by which we have hitherto held ourselves bound and believed French government to be bound also. But it has now been followed by a further communication from President of Council to British Ambassador at Paris[5] in which with reference to a recent representation made by the latter under instructions from me President of the Council gives his opinion upon declaration signed at London by allied governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan on November 30th, 1915.[6] By this declaration above-named powers bound themselves solemnly not to conclude a separate peace in the course of war which had broken out in previous year. In view of possible failure of negotiations at Lausanne and extreme undesirability, if not worse, of independent transactions between Turkey and any single power it was not unnatural that His Majesty's Government should have called attention of French government to its obligations and should have invited a renewal of former assurance.

It did not occur to me that any reply but one was possible. Nevertheless to-day, very day on which treaty drawn up by allied representatives at Lausanne was in the course of being presented to the Turks, I received with an astonishment that was only mitigated by my knowledge of message to Angora of yesterday, telegram from Paris containing President of the Council's reply to representations of His Majesty's Ambassador. This note contains remarks not only offensive but insulting to His Majesty's Government and it gives a presentation of historical facts with which it is impossible to concur. With this part of document it will be necessary to deal at greater length in a despatch which may call for subsequent publication.

But outstanding feature of note is that it contains a formal repudiation by France of engagement entered into by her in common with other principal allies in November 1915 and an expression of intention of French government to negotiate separately with Turkey (with whom France like Great Britain

of my telegram No. 121 [of January 30, not printed]) respecting the supposed communication made on the 29th instant by the French government to Angora. The Havas agency in transmitting this announcement to Lausanne and London, omitted to precede it by the following words "the 'Temps' says", and hence the misunderstanding due entirely to Monsieur Herbette's lively imagination. Mr. Phipps enquired how it was that Monsieur Herbette had evolved so important a statement out of his own brain but Monsieur de Peretti failed to enlighten him.

'What exactly happened it is difficult to say, but meanwhile certain organs of the press try to make out that I was shown the text of the famous communication by Monsieur Poincaré, and that I congratulated him on its terms. This is of course an invention merely confusing the issue, for I have not seen the President of the Council since dining with him on January 27th when he merely told me that he had telegraphed to Mustapha Kemal urging him to sign the treaty [see No. 349]. I consider, however, that this incident has only harmed Monsieur Poincaré himself, Monsieur Peretti de la Rocca and Monsieur Jean Herbette, both of whom have, I understand, been severely reprimanded by the President of the Council. I do not therefore propose to issue any démenti in the matter.'

[5] See No. 349, n. 5.

[6] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 109, pp. 850–1.

is still at war) in order to safeguard French interests in cases where the allies have been unable to conclude a common peace. Nor is this declaration of independence rendered any more acceptable by kindly expressed intention of French government to inform British Cabinet in advance, as a proof of its friendly confidence, of any such breach of faith which it may have in contemplation.

If these two pronouncements on the part of Monsieur Poincaré be taken in conjunction it appears impossible to doubt conclusions of which alone their form and their language admit; and it becomes in my opinion necessary to bring these without any delay in most formal manner to the notice of French government. For the latter have in this case both publicly and officially claimed right to sever themselves from their allies, to violate their solemn engagements, and to enter upon an independent course of action in the interests of France alone, in solving Turkish problem.

It will be duty of Lord Crewe in calling attention to these announcements to point out that French government must obviously have realised their necessary implications. If entente, to which it has hitherto been believed that Monsieur Poincaré attaches an importance not inferior to that which is felt by His Majesty's Government and of continued recognition which His Majesty's Government have lately given such conspicuous proof, is to be torn to shreds at Lausanne it can with difficulty exist elsewhere. If France is to throw over Great Britain in her dealings with Turkey she cannot expect to rely on British friendship and British support either in this or in any other field of action. In fact a vista is open of which it is hazardous to explore the recesses and difficult to foresee the end. The French government must be presumed to have calculated the inevitable consequences of its action.

It is not possible for Monsieur Poincaré to justify his recent proceedings by minimising either their importance or their practical effect. At very moment when it was clear that Turks had recognised necessity of coming to terms because they could not afford to return to Angora without a peace treaty when Ismet Pasha had full powers to sign and when he was about to accept in all essential particulars allied terms, President of the Council's sudden and apparently calculated intervention could have no other result than to encourage Turks to expect that they need only remain recalcitrant on any point to obtain official support of France apart from and in opposition to the powers who have hitherto stood by her side as faithful allies and never more so than here.

Whether Monsieur Poincaré's action will prove fatal or not next few days will show. But it is impossible to doubt that it has most gravely jeopardised chances of peace and should Turks now definitely refuse terms elaborated with so much patience and in so liberal a spirit by the allied delegations acting hitherto in complete concord responsibility for this disaster and for its inevitable reaction on relations between Great Britain and France will rest entirely with French Government.

I submit to His Majesty's Government that British Ambassador should be instructed at once to make a formal representation to President of the

Council in the sense of this telegram and to read to him such portions of it as he may find necessary for the purpose.[7]

[7] See No. 361, below.

No. 359

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 164 Telegraphic [E 1299/35/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 1, 1923, 6.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 252.[1] Following from Prime Minister.

I have consulted several members of the Cabinet and in view of your representations, we are agreed for the present not to send General Harington the instructions contained in our No. 155[2] and not to warn French and Italian Governments. We trust however that you will keep carefully in mind the views of the Cabinet and that in the event of anything happening at Lausanne which might affect the safety of the British forces at Constantinople you will at once communicate with the Cabinet and not necessarily await a final break before doing so.

[1] No. 357. [2] No. 355.

No. 360

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 2, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 256 Telegraphic [E 1315/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *February 2, 1923, 12.5 a.m.*

First commission met this morning[1] to consider Straits convention[2] attached to treaty. Turks made their adhesion conditional upon admission of Turkish garrison to Gallipoli and withdrawal of limitation placed upon Turkish military forces in Thrace. This, however, must not be taken too seriously.

Chicherin then made a series of speeches complaining that Russia had been ignored in preparation of convention, that an attempt was being made to impose it upon her and that her counter proposals had never even been examined.

I replied that this was because not one of the ten powers represented at the table had had a good word to say for them and that Russia's acceptance of convention was voluntary and we all hoped it would be given.

[1] February 1. See Cmd. 1814, pp. 447–57. [2] Ibid., pp. 772–85.

Chicherin retorted formal refusal to append Russian signature which, however, I expressed a hope might be given at a later date. His Majesty's Government must not be surprised at this dénoument which in the circumstances was inevitable.

This afternoon, as foreseen in my telegram No. [2]51,[3] Ismet came to see me alone and spent two hours in conversation.[4] I told him plainly that the time for public argument was past, that a treaty had either to be signed or not signed by Sunday[5] next, beyond which I refused in any circumstances to stay and that we had better settle down not as rival disputants but as good friends to discuss whether there were any points still (?unresolved) upon which I could aid him in arriving at solution. A Turk up to the end, he then put me seriatim through all the territorial points upon which we have fought for months, and which have been decided against him, Karagatch, Maritza railway, autonomy in Imbros and Tenedos, Gallipoli garrison, war graves, Turkey's military forces, Mosul. I declined to give way in any of these respects, pointing out that concessions had been carried out in my commission to point of weakness, if not almost of humiliation. He then broached capitulations and finance. As to former, I declared that we must insist as to judicial guarantees in a transitional period but that I was already drawing up a formula which might perhaps be more acceptable to Turkish susceptibilities than words hitherto proposed. This formula, which goes to very limit of concession thought by our authorities to be safe, will be shown to Bompard and Garroni tomorrow and, if accepted by them, will be sent to Ismet. As to finance, we went through various points on which Turks still plead for concessions but which really concern French more than ourselves; and I have since consulted Bompard as to possibility of any way of meeting Turkish views. Something may be possible in this respect.

I then asked Ismet whether, if he signed, he could guarantee ratification by Angora Assembly. He answered that provided he could get additional assurances or concessions that would justify his signature, he could guarantee immediate ratification; but that if proposed treaty were sent to Angora without his signature, it would be torn to pieces. I can hardly say whether interview was satisfactory or reverse. The odds are about evenly balanced; but more encouraging symptom is that Turks are discovered to have gone to a local engraver and ordered a first class seal. In any case I leave on Sunday[6] and shall arrive in London Monday[7] afternoon.

[3] No. 356. [4] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 966. [5] February 4.
[6] February 4. [7] February 5.

No. 361

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 2, 3 p.m.)
No. 132 Telegraphic [E 1331/1/44]

PARIS, *February 2, 1923, 1.25 p.m.*

Urgent

Lausanne telegram No. 253.[1]

As reported in my telegram No. 127[2] situation was altered yesterday by démenti given out by French government to the effect that they knew nothing of any communication to Angora in the sense referred to.[3] In these circumstances I do not think it advisable to say anything more to French government in the sense outlined in Your Lordship's telegram beyond reply which you will doubtless consider necessary to French government's note of January 30th (see my telegram No. 122).[4] That note was a resumé of substance of President of Council's observations to me at interview reported in my despatch No. 213[5] and while I feel a reply is called for I would point out that situation has been considerably modified by yesterday's denial of communication to Angora.

Repeated to Lord Curzon.

[1] No. 358. [2] No. 358, n. 4.

[3] The following message from the Prime Minister, referring to Lausanne telegram No. 253 (No. 358), was transmitted to Lord Curzon in Foreign Office telegram No. 166 of February 2: 'As regards first incident there is no proof of French government having sent any official message to Angora in sense complained of and it seems better to avoid representations to which French can return an ostensibly complete answer.

'In these circumstances you had better telegraph direct to Paris indicating form in which you wish remonstrance to French government to be made.'

[4] No. 349, n. 5. [5] No. 349.

No. 362

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 24 Telegraphic [E 1340/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *February 2, 1923, 7.5 p.m.*

Repeated to Foreign Office[1] No. 258.

I am a good deal concerned at not having heard that communication to President of the Council in my telegram No. 253[2] has been authorized by His Majesty's Government. Explanations given in French press[3] do not in

[1] Where it was received on February 2 at 9.35 p.m. [2] No. 358.

[3] See No. 358, n. 4.

the least affect substance of the case. Whatever may have been contents of President of the Council's telegram to Mustapha Kemal and whether or not communication published in 'Temps' and alleged to have been sent to London, Rome, and Lausanne was correct, it is evident from official instructions given to French High Commissioner at Constantinople and reported in Acting High Commissioner's telegram No. 64 to me,[4] that President of the Council did act in exact way described in 'Temps' and in my telegram; i.e. he officially informed Angora representative

1. That treaty submitted by common consent of allied Powers here was not last word,

2. That French government as distinct from Allies were prepared to discuss modifications in it, and

3. That French delegation as distinct from Allied delegations had been instructed to keep in touch with Turkish delegation.

These instructions are precisely those to which I called attention of His Majesty's Government and they constitute a deliberate and unpardonable attempt on the part of France to jettison treaty presented at Lausanne, to sever herself from her Allies and to enter upon separate negotiations with Turks. As such these instructions appear to me to be an act of treason not only to understanding upon which I have been acting here in circumstances of greatest difficulty for the last ten weeks, but also to general entente between France and Great Britain which is openly betrayed by such an act, and they have been very generally interpreted in this sense in French press.

It seems to me impossible, therefore, to pass over such a proceeding in silence and unwise to indulge in any delay in making necessary protest.

Since above telegram was put into cypher I have received your telegrams Nos. 127[5] and 132.[6] You probably have not seen Acting High Commissioner's telegram[4] which I am repeating to you and . . .[7] still renders representation necessary. Situation, so far from being altered, seems to me on the contrary to have been confirmed. In these circumstances I request you to ask for full explanation from President of the Council in the light of High Commissioner's

[4] This telegram, the date of which is not recorded, ran: 'French High Commissioner informs me that under instructions from his government he made communication yesterday to Adnan Bey to the effect that present treaty in no way constituted ultimatum, that French government were prepared to discuss modifications of it, and that French delegation had been instructed in the interest of peace to keep contact with Turkish delegation.

'I gathered that while laying stress on extent of concessions made French High Commissioner's instructions included an expression of readiness of France to examine any further claims made by Turkey in spirit of benevolence.'

In his telegram No. 53 of February 5, Mr. Henderson reported: 'I notice that French press in explaining away recent French communications to Turks in regard to peace treaty, states that French High Commissioner here notified my Italian colleague and myself of communication referred to in my telegram No. 64 to Lausanne and that we raised no objection.

'Version is tendencious as French High Commissioner only notified us twenty-four hours after he had made communication when it would have been useless to formalize objections. As a matter of fact, I made it clear at the time that I disapproved of it.'

[5] No. 358, n. 4. [6] No. 361. [7] The text is here uncertain.

telegram.[8] Larger issues raised by his note will be dealt with in our promised despatch.

[8] In Foreign Office telegram No. 56 of February 3, the Prime Minister sent the following message to Lord Crewe: 'I think it desirable that you should at once demand explanation asked for in Lord Curzon's telegram No. 258.'

No. 363

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 2, 9.35 p.m.)
No. 259 Telegraphic [E 1341/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *February 2, 1923, 8 p.m.*

This morning a prolonged and, at times, heated discussion took place in my room between allied delegations to settle upon final concessions which it is permissible to make to Turkish delegation in order to secure, if possible, their signature to the treaty. Most difficult is that of judicial capitulations, upon which any formula containing real guarantees is almost certain to be rejected by Turks while a camouflaged surrender will deceive no one. After a protracted debate the matter was referred to the drafting committee, who are sitting now to consider whether any modifications in existing draft can be proposed. On financial clauses it was agreed to divide capital of Ottoman public debt without requiring consent of bond-holders, although latter would probably not have been refused, and to reduce allied claims for reparations from £15,000,000 to £12,000,000. Monsieur Bompard was very solicitous that I should surrender £5,000,000, estimated value of two battleships, in further reduction of this claim and that I should consent to antedate annuities to October 1918, a concession which would have involved an additional burden on Irak of £30,000 per annum; I declined to agree to either of the concessions. Further it was proposed to find a formula which would exclude from treaty specific mention of Turkish claims for Greek reparations estimated at the absurd figure of £160,000,000. We also agreed to reduce from five years to one year period during which commercial convention concerning tariff shall remain unaltered as affecting signatory states bordering on Turkey. I also offered with approval of my military advisers to abandon restrictions on numbers of Turkish army in Thrace, a point to which Turks attach much importance.

These various concessions are to be embodied in a letter which Bompard, Garroni and I will present to Ismet Pasha personally tomorrow morning.[1]

Repeated to Paris.

[1] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 455.

No. 364

Mr. Lindsay to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 169 Telegraphic [E 1349/35/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 2, 1923, 8.30 p.m.*

French counsellor[1] of Embassy has made following verbal communication.

French High Commissioner at Constantinople telegraphed that if Lausanne Conference breaks down it is highly probable that Turks may request Allies to withdraw their troops from Constantinople. He himself would be in favour of maintaining them there on political grounds unless military reasons made withdrawal imperative and unless other Allies withdraw.

French President of Council is of same opinion. He points out that this question reinforces his thesis that presentation of draft treaty does not mark end of negotiations and that possible refusal of Turks to sign does not necessarily involve rupture. Withdrawal would in his opinion be unnecessary and unsuitable; maintenance would avoid panic of local Christians and would afford leverage for further negotiations with the Turks. He enquires what answer His Majesty's Government would return to the possible Turkish request for withdrawal if Conference terminates without a settlement.

[1] Monsieur de Montille.

No. 365

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne)
No. 121 [E 1471/1/44]

ROME, *February 2, 1923*

My Lord,

I have had the honour to report in my despatch No. 116 of to-day's date,[1] the opinions of the Italian press on the recent developments at Lausanne.

At an interview with the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning the conversation turned upon this subject and Senator Contarini read out to me a telegram received from the Italian Ambassador in Paris with regard to the French attitude and the misunderstanding which had arisen owing to the 'Temps' article and a Havas communiqué. Baron Romano Avezzana's message did not throw any new light upon the matter, or make it clearer to me, but seemed to indicate that the French Government reserved the right in certain eventualities to negotiate separately with the Turks.[2]

[1] Not printed.

[2] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 451 (see ibid., Nos. 437, 447, 448).

I thought it advisable to take the opportunity to speak to Senator Contarini in the sense of Your Lordship's despatch No. 151 of the 26th ultimo.[3] I said that, in the event of the Turks refusing their signature to the proposed Treaty, His Majesty's Government intended to remind the French and Italian Governments of the declaration signed at London on November 30th 1915,[4] and I read out the terms to him. I requested him to take note of this intimation.

Senator Contarini thanked me for my communication and said that he was glad to receive it as it would strengthen the hands of the Italian Government. So far as he was concerned, and he was convinced that Signor Mussolini shared the same view, he felt sure that Italy would not sign a separate peace with Turkey. Throughout the Lausanne Conference the Turks had been throwing out feelers to see if they could not induce the Italians to come to separate terms, and had offered most of the advantages which would have been secured to Italy under the Tripartite agreement. But all such offers had been firmly repudiated. Senator Contarini considered that Your Lordship ought to be very satisfied with the attitude and behaviour of the Italian Delegation at Lausanne, as they had sacrificed what were generally regarded here as Italian interests in order to give you a wholehearted support.[5]

I said that I was glad to receive Senator Contarini's assurance, and took due note of it. In so far as Italian support to Your Lordship was concerned there appeared to have been moments when French and Italian Delegations showed preference for the protraction of useless negotiations when a firm take it or leave it attitude might have led to more satisfactory results. Moreover, a natural resentment had been created in British circles by Signor Garroni's attempt to make Italian support dependent upon concessions to Italy in connection with the mandated territories and a consortium in Turkey. But Italian support, whenever rendered, had been useful, and had, I knew, earned Your Lordship's appreciation. Moreover, it was especially important that it should be continued at the present juncture. Senator Contarini took exception to my reference to Signor Garroni's proposal which, he said, had been entirely misunderstood. As I would have observed, the proposal had led to nothing and there had been no satisfaction of Italian demands, nevertheless the Italian Delegates had not changed their attitude or with[h]eld their support.

Finally Senator Contarini told me that he had had an interview on the previous day with Jellal ed Din, the Angora envoy to Rome, and had impressed very strongly upon him that it was greatly to the interests of Turkey to sign the proposed moderate and fair Treaty offered to her.

He had sent for Jellal ed Din because he had been informed that the latter had booked a berth for himself and his staff on a steamer leaving Brindisi on the 8th instant for Constantinople. From enquiries which he then addressed to an official of the Ministry it did not seem quite clear whether

[3] Not printed. This was identical with the despatch No. 321 to Lord Crewe under reference in No. 349.

[4] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 109, pp. 850–1.

[5] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 143, 231, and 291.

these berths were in fact booked for Jellal ed Din and his staff or for some other Turks.[6] Senator Contarini said that Jellal ed Din had shown himself very unaccommodating and had said that Turkey could never give way on the question of Karagatch or Mosul. He had indeed expressed his conviction that the Lausanne Conference would break down and that war would result. But throughout these last months Jellal ed Din has always shown himself to be particularly difficult and intransigent, and too much weight need not therefore be attached to his views.[7]

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM

[6] Sir R. Graham deleted this sentence and added in handwriting the words, 'This has since been confirmed.'

[7] This despatch was received in the Foreign Office on February 6.

No. 366

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Lausanne) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 5)
No. 118 [C 2349/58/7]

LAUSANNE, *February 2, 1923*

Sir,

The presence at Lausanne of the Bulgarian and the Greek Delegates has furnished a convenient opportunity of examining whether the provisions contained in the treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, relative to Western Thrace, which was signed at Sèvres on August 10th, 1920,[1] could be amplified in such a way as to render them more acceptable to the Bulgarian Government, and to absolve the Allied Governments from the reproach of having evaded the promise given by them under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly[2] to secure to Bulgaria an economic outlet to the Aegean Sea.

2. It has often been suspected that the insistence by Bulgaria upon this outlet was inspired by political rather than by economic considerations, and I have myself always realised that the natural economic outlet for Bulgaria was neither at the port of Dedeagatch nor at that of Kavala, but rather through the main artery connecting Salonica with the Western Balkans. My original impressions in regard to this question have now been fully confirmed.

3. At an earlier stage of the present Conference an opportunity was given to Bulgaria to state the reasons for which, and the limits within which, it was necessary for her to obtain an economic outlet to the Aegean Sea.[3] The general trend of the arguments thereupon presented by the Delegation, and subsequently reinforced by the statements made by their experts in Sub-

[1] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 652–776.

[2] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 781–896.

[3] See Nos. 215 and 222.

Commission, was that the port of Dedeagatch was, owing to its physical and geographical disabilities, wholly unsuitable for a commercial harbour, and that the ideal site for a Bulgarian port was at a point some six kilometres to the west of Dedeagatch and in the vicinity of Makry. Great stress was also laid by the Bulgarian Delegation on the fact that it would not be possible for Bulgaria to construct a port either at Dedeagatch or even at the point which they had themselves indicated, unless the administration of the port was placed entirely in Bulgarian hands.

4. In order to test the sincerity of the Bulgarian claim, I asked M. Venizelos confidentially whether he, for his part, would be prepared to meet the Bulgarian wishes as explained to the Conference. He readily assented, and the French and British experts thereupon produced a series of Articles[4] by which Bulgaria was to be given full possession of the site which they had themselves demanded and all possible provision was to be made to secure effective Bulgarian administration of the harbour. Moreover, the railway connecting this Bulgarian port with Bulgaria proper was to be placed under the control of an International Commission who would have full powers to guarantee free and rapid transit between this Bulgarian outlet and the markets of Bulgaria. This project was communicated unofficially to the Bulgarian Delegation, who at once despatched their commercial expert to Sofia to obtain the views of the Bulgarian Government. It was at the same time explained to the Bulgarian Delegation that the proposals were not to be considered in any sense as a final draft, but that it was useless for the Allied Delegations to expend further trouble upon the detailed elaboration of the necessary clauses, unless they were first assured that the principle of the whole scheme would be accepted by the Bulgarian Government.

5. The Bulgarian expert, who had been despatched to Sofia, returned within a few weeks with the news that his Government were unable to accept the proposal. In order to regularise the situation the Sub-Commission of the [First] Commission was therefore summoned[5] for the purpose of communicating officially to the Bulgarian Government the offer of the Allies and of informing them that unless they accepted it the offer would be withdrawn. The Bulgarian Delegation again rejected the project, and this rejection was recorded in the procès-verbal of the meeting, a copy[6] of which is enclosed herein. Monsieur Venizelos himself at the final meeting of the Sub-Commission pointed out to the Bulgarian Delegation that the natural economic outlet of Bulgaria was at Salonica, and that he made a formal and public offer to guarantee to Bulgarian commerce the same privileges and rights at that port as were accorded to Yugo-Slavia under his treaty with that country. This generous offer was also rejected by the Bulgarian Delegation.

6. I have thought it well to record the above proceedings because they demonstrate finally that the desire of Bulgaria to obtain an outlet to the Aegean Sea is inspired solely by political and territorial ambitions and has no relation to their economic needs.

[4] Cmd. 1814, pp. 461–4. [5] On January 26.
[6] Not here printed: see Cmd. 1814, pp. 458–61.

7. It is evident that nothing further can be gained by pursuing the negotiations which have been conducted between Bulgaria and the Principal Powers. If Greece decides that it will be to her interest to negotiate directly with Bulgaria, she will, so soon as she obtains legal possession of Western Thrace, be at liberty to do so. All that the Principal Powers can do for the moment is to ratify the previous Treaty concluded on August 10, 1920, and I have reason to hope that the obstructive attitude adopted by the Bulgarian Delegation in the face of the very generous offers which have here been made to them will have convinced the French Government that such ratification must now be proceeded with.

I am, &c.
(for the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston)
HORACE RUMBOLD

No. 367

Minute by Mr. Ryan on a letter[1] *from M. Venizelos*
[*E 1580/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *February 3, 1923*

The attached letter from M. Venizelos[2] ignores a good deal of Lord Curzon's letter of February 1st. It is quite true that the Turks had no objection to the exclusion of members of the Greek Army from the amnesty. When the question was discussed in the Sub-Commission, however, the proposal of M. Venizelos was that this exception should be provided for by a modified wording of the text applicable both to Greece and to Turkey.[3] This modified wording would have suited the Turks very well, because on their side it would have enabled them to except from the amnesty Moslems in the Turkish Army. To this there would have been a strong objection from the Allied point of view, as we do not wish the Turks to persecute officers who took the side of the Constantinople Government as against the Kemalists. The proposal on which M. Venizelos now wishes to insist is that there should be a discriminatory formula.[4] The line we have taken is that the Turks

[1] Dated January 2, presumably in error for February 2, not printed.

[2] See n. 5, below.

[3] See Cmd. 1814, p. 306; and *Recueil* (*1*), vol. i, p. 531.

[4] This was presumably contained in M. Venizelos's letter of January 27 to Lord Curzon, not traced in the Foreign Office archives. In his letter of January 29 to Lord Curzon, commenting on the draft treaty, M. Venizelos wrote: 'La délégation hellénique, par sa lettre en date du 27 janvier 1923, adressée aux délégations des Puissances invitantes, a eu l'honneur d'exposer à celles-ci le point de vue du Gouvernement hellénique sur la question de l'inclusion dans la déclaration d'amnistie des délits se rapportant à la conduite militaire des habitants non musulmans de Grèce. Comme la délégation hellénique a eu l'honneur de l'exposer par cette lettre, le Gouvernement grec se trouve dans l'impossibilité de donner une amnistie pour les crimes et délits d'ordre militaire, si ce n'est pour ceux commis par des musulmans.

'La délégation hellénique, considérant inutile de répéter les arguments, déjà exposés dans sa lettre précitée, renouvelle la déclaration du Gouvernement hellénique et a l'honneur de demander, en conséquence, une modification de l'article 1er du 'projet de déclaration relative à l'amnistie' à annexer au traité de paix, dans le sens indiqué dans cette lettre.' Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 482.

would almost certainly object to a formula which set up one rule for Turkey and another for Greece. We cannot be perfectly certain that the Turks would raise this objection if there were time to negotiate with them, but even if time admitted, we should certainly be running a risk by asking them to accept such a formula.

Apart from this, our own interest in resisting the view of M. Venizelos is this:

(*a*) We should not wish an indefinite number of officers and men of the Greek Army to be prosecuted for alleged military offences if the allegations against them were made in reality from political motives and if a certain number of them were likely to be condemned to death; and

(*b*) M. Montagna, who served us very well in the Sub-Commission, feels very strongly about the question and made it a personal matter. He claims that Lord Curzon promised to see him through.

I cannot see why M. Venizelos should insist on the amnesty declaration being redrafted, and should even threaten not to sign the Peace Treaty unless he gains his point, when a reasonable alternative is open to him, namely, to formulate a reservation, as suggested in Lord Curzon's Note of February 1st.[5] If he thinks that a reservation in the form suggested by us would give the Greek Government insufficient latitude, I think he might legitimately ask to be allowed to make a reservation in wider terms, e.g. he might reserve the right of the Greek Government to try members of the Regular Army for military offences without limitation of number, provided that any penalty inflicted would be commuted to a discharge from the Army with or without punishment; or he might go still farther and reserve the right to try them in unlimited numbers, provided that no death sentence should be executed.

If we got M. Venizelos to accept a solution on these lines, it would not satisfy M. Montagna, but I think we might be satisfied with it ourselves, and I am inclined to think that M. Montagna exaggerates the extent to which Lord Curzon pledged himself to uphold his view.[6]

[5] Lord Curzon had written: 'I recognize the right of Your Excellency to follow up the reservation which you made on January 11 [see *Recueil* (*1*), vol. i, p. 554]. I feel, however, that it is most desirable in the common interest that any action which you may take should be analogous to the action contemplated in the Turkish reservation. I would therefore urge you most strongly to accept the suggestion made on my behalf yesterday, namely that you should be content to formulate in an official letter a reservation enabling the Greek Government to except from the amnesty a limited number of military officers, the action against whom would be confined to dismissal from the Greek army with or without banishment from Greek territory.'

[6] Mr. J. Morgan, a clerk in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, minuted on this file on January 19, 1924: 'Mr. Venizelos's view, ultimately, did not prevail and the 1st para[graph] of the Amnesty declaration to which he objected remains practically unchanged in the Peace Treaty signed on July 24, 1923.'

No. 368

The Marquess of Crewe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
No. 280 [E 1384/1/144]

PARIS, *February 3, 1923*

His Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum which it is proposed to address to M. Poincaré, protesting against his note of the 30th January to Angora.[1]

ENCLOSURE IN No. 368.

Memorandum

PARIS, *February 3, 1923*

On the 30th January a report appeared in the 'Temps' that a communication had been sent by M. Poincaré to Angora intimating that the French Government regarded the treaty then on the eve of presentation to the Turks, not as the definitive offer of the Allied Governments and as representing the maximum of concessions to which they were prepared to go, but merely as a basis of discussion; the French Government would not refuse to make such further concessions as seemed reasonable, and were prepared to leave their delegation at Lausanne or to renew negotiations elsewhere. The report added that this message had been communicated to London, Lausanne and Rome as well as to Angora. In spite of the fact that it was accepted as authentic in the various comments to which it gave rise in the French press, credit was not at first attached to it by His Majesty's Government. On the 1st February a communiqué issued by the Havas Agency was published in the French newspapers, including the 'Temps', contradicting the report, and pointing out that M. Poincaré's telegram had, on the contrary, been designed to urge the signature of the draft treaty by the Turks. Nevertheless, the original reports have been reiterated in the Paris press of the 3rd February, more than one organ of which contains a statement that on the 29th January instructions were sent to General Pellé to inform the Government of Angora that the draft treaty was not an ultimatum, that France would not consider an adjournment of the conference as a rupture and would not refuse further conversations, either at Lausanne or elsewhere. It would perhaps still have remained unnecessary to give complete credence to these newspaper reports, were it not for two facts. In the first place, the French delegate at Lausanne informed Lord Curzon on the 30th January that Ismet Pasha had declared his inability to accept the treaty to be formally presented to him on the morrow, and of his intention of asking for eight days' delay for discussion before returning a reply. M. Bompard urged Lord Curzon to abandon the plan formally agreed on and to remain for a further period at Lausanne.[2] In the second place, His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner

[1] See No. 358 and No. 362, n. 4. [2] See No. 356.

at Constantinople has been informed by the French High Commissioner of a communication made by the latter to Adnan Bey on instructions from the Government of the Republic. This communication was to the effect that the French Government did not regard the draft treaty as an ultimatum, that they were prepared to discuss modifications, and that for the sake of the maintenance of peace they had instructed their delegate at Lausanne to remain in touch with the Turkish representatives.[3]

For these reasons it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to draw any conclusion other than that the French Government have officially intimated to the Government of Angora their willingness to depart from the procedure agreed upon with the delegations of the Allies at Lausanne in regard to the presentation of the draft treaty, and that as distinct from their Allies they are prepared to discuss modifications in this treaty.

His Majesty's Government find it impossible to pass over in silence the action of the French Government, which they cannot but regard as calculated to undermine the joint efforts of the Allies and to jeopardise the prospects of the treaty elaborated during the past months at Lausanne. The responsibility for such a disaster and for its inevitable reactions on relations between France and Great Britain would rest entirely with the French Government.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that they would be failing in their duty to the cause of the Entente if they delayed in approaching the French Government in the matter.

His Majesty's Ambassador has therefore received instructions[4] to approach the French Government with a request for a full explanation of the reason leading to the despatch of the instructions outlined above to the French High Commissioner at Constantinople.[5]

[3] See No. 362, n. 4. [4] See No. 362, n. 8.
[5] A copy of this despatch was received in the Foreign Office on February 5.

No. 369

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston[1]
(Received February 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 141 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1376/1/44]

PARIS, *February 4, 1923*

As reported briefly in my telegram No. 139,[2] I saw the President of the Council yesterday afternoon on the subject of your telegram No. 56[3] and Lausanne telegrams Nos. 253[4] and 258[5] and said that I was instructed to point out the serious contradiction which you observed between his telegram

[1] Lord Curzon had left Lausanne on February 4 (see No. 370, below).
[2] Of February 3, not printed. [3] No. 362, n. 8. [4] No. 358.
[5] No. 362.

to Angora of January 27th, and the instructions which he had sent to Constantinople on the 29th. After stating the case in general terms, I handed him the memorandum of which I am sending a copy.[6]

Monsieur Poincaré, after reading the memorandum, said that he would send me a full written reply as soon as possible,[7] but meantime he wished to say that the statements contained in it were in many respects inaccurate. First and foremost, the instructions sent to General Pellé were neither more nor less than what he had said here to Lord Curzon and what Monsieur Bompard had publicly stated at Lausanne. I said that the 'Temps' had had a categorical account of the message before we had been told anything about it, and I understood that the 'Temps' was supplied with special information by the Quai d'Orsay, to which he replied that it did not get more information than other newspapers. He had never agreed that the proper way to treat the Turks was to present them with an ultimatum, as Your Lordship desired, but to set a complete treaty before them while saying that some days would be available for considering objections in detail. I said that this was precisely what Your Lordship had done in remaining on at Lausanne, and giving Ismet Pasha some days to examine the treaty as a whole, but the instructions sent to General Pellé might equally mean a delay of weeks or months.

Monsieur Poincaré seemed to have forgotten several things, the months that had already been spent over the treaty, the enormous concessions made to the Turks on finance, on the subject of the Straits, and many others, and in particular the astonishing patience which Your Lordship had shown throughout. It was quite true that you had always been convinced that at last it might be necessary to confront the Turks with a short sharp stroke if they were to be got to sign. The business must come to an end sometime, and the time had arrived.

Monsieur Poincaré repeated that he had always held a different view about the Turks of the present day, who required different treatment, but he was full of admiration for the patience you had displayed in dealing with them. His sole object had been to avoid renewal of war in the East, of which he was profoundly afraid. He had absolutely certain secret information that Monsieur Veniselos was trying to create trouble at Karagatch in hopes of bringing about conflict. I said that he knew quite well that His Majesty's Government were not encouraging any further Greek pretensions. They were equally averse from war, and I hoped it was true that the Turks were likewise. The President of the Council said that he could only regard the tone of the memorandum as distinctly unfriendly. I replied that Your Lordship had been greatly disturbed and annoyed by what had passed. He said that he trusted that the terms of the memorandum, and indeed that fact of its having been presented, would in no way be made public. If it were, he would regard it as a most serious matter. The French were making every effort in the occupied districts to avoid any possible cause of friction with us, but if the Germans knew that

[6] Enclosure in No. 368.

[7] See No. 373, n. 3 and No. 382, below.

you had written of danger to the Entente, they would regard it as a direct encouragement. I answered that I had no intention of making any communication to the press, and from what he had just said I assumed that he did not mean to do so. I would inform Your Lordship and the Prime Minister of his desire that nothing should be made public.

No. 370

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Paris) to Mr. Lindsay
(Received February 7)
Unnumbered Telegraphic [E 1509/1/44]

February 5, 1923

The concluding phases of the Lausanne proceedings[1] were as follows:

After the private conversations between Ismet Pasha and myself on Thursday,[2] which were followed by similar meetings between him and the principal French and Italian delegates, in the course of which he attempted to reopen the whole field of discussion and demanded different things of each interlocutor, my colleagues and I met to consider on what points it would still be possible to meet him. We drew up an entirely new formula as regards the future judicial régime,[3] proceeding to the extreme limit of concession and on a number of other points partly military such as the withdrawal of any limit upon the number of the Turkish army in Thrace, but mainly financial, we made a considerable advance towards the Turkish contentions. These proposals were summarised in my telegram No. 259.[4] After they had been communicated to the Turkish Delegation, at a personal meeting in which Ismet Pasha appeared to find the greatest difficulty in understanding the simplest financial propositions, I went further. In my anxiety to leave no conceivable excuse for the plea that it was the British Government that stood in the way of peace, I intimated my willingness to assist the Turks in wiping out the 12 millions to which we had already brought down the 15 millions demanded for reparations, in itself an almost incredible reduction from the 100 millions demanded under the same heading in March 1922.[5] This I proposed to do by surrendering the value of the two battleships seized by Great Britain in August 1914, and estimated at 5 millions, and by allowing this to go into a pool for the satisfaction of Allied claims. The remaining 7 millions would be met by the similar use of the 5 millions gold sequestered from Germany and Austria.[6] In this way I calculated that one of the main outstanding objections of the Turks to our terms would be removed, even if it were at the cost of relieving Turkey of an obligation, just in itself and almost extravagantly lenient in its operation, and of treating her in a manner different from that accorded to any other beaten nation in the Great War.

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 832–53.
[2] February 1. See No. 360.
[3] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.
[4] No. 363.
[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 570, section 7.
[6] See Vol. XVII, No. 52.

The Turkish reply[7] to these proposals, and indeed their final answer to the Allied terms, which it was understood that they had spent the greater part of Saturday[8] night in preparing, was not delivered till 1.30 p.m. on Sunday,[9] on which evening the British Delegation was due to leave. As a matter of fact the whole of that day from 10.30 a.m. till 9.30 p.m., as will presently be shown, was spent in meetings of the Allied Delegations, or between them and the Turks, in my room at the Beau Rivage Hotel. The Turkish answer was found to be a complete acceptance of the terms, relating to territorial matters, frontiers, Thrace, the Islands and the Straits, which had been the subject of the work of my Commission. The Turks yielded to the Allied decisions about Karagatch, the Maritsa Railway, Imbros and Tenedos, the Gallipoli garrison, and the Anzac graves, but they asked that the decision about Mosul should be postponed for a year to admit of discussion between the British and Turkish Governments. On the other hand they rejected the formula[10] as regards the future judicial régime for foreigners and submitted a substitute[11] which eviscerated it altogether and practically left the foreign resident without protection; and they asked for the postponement of the economic clauses of the Treaty en bloc for discussion at a later date.

The Allied Delegates met immediately[12] to consider their reply. I said that while declining to withdraw the Article in the Treaty which referred the question of the Iraq frontier to the League of Nations, I would be willing to make a declaration to be attached to the Treaty,[13] to the effect that His Majesty's Government would consent not to pursue the invitation to the League for the space of a year in order to admit of discussions with the Turkish Government in the interval. Upon the judicial question we decided, and were indeed bound, to stand firm. The economic question mainly concerned the French, and I said that I would support Monsieur Bompard in any decision that he might take. After a careful examination he decided to postpone the question of certain of the economic articles for a period of 6 months in order to admit of further examination.

This renewed and final attempt at conciliation was followed by the entry of the Turkish Delegation to receive the Allied reply.[14] So inconceivable was it thought to be that they should refuse, that every arrangement had been made for signature of a protocol accepting the Treaty as amended, and the requisite documents and materials were at hand.

On behalf of the Allies I made the necessary statement to Ismet Pasha who was accompanied by Riza Nour and Hassan Bey. After a brief retirement for reflection he accepted my declaration about the Iraq frontier. But upon the two other issues he stood firm.

[7] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41.
[8] February 3.
[9] February 4.
[10] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.
[11] See ibid., pp. 852–3.
[12] See ibid., p. 842.
[13] See ibid., p. 851.
[14] See ibid., pp. 842–51. As is explained in Cmd. 1814, p. 842, the meeting held on February 4, 1923, at 5.40 p.m. was of 'a purely informal nature'. No official minutes were kept, the record in Cmd. 1814 being based on the British Secretary's notes.

Then ensued for an hour and a half a scene such as can rarely if ever before have been seen in a conference chamber and such as would have been incomprehensible in any company but that of the Turks. Ismet Pasha seemed incapable of understanding the simplest proposition, or of realising the position in which he was about to place his country and himself. I described his refusal of the terms offered to him as incredible. Monsieur Bompard, aroused to unusual passion, denounced it as a crime. Every form of argument, adjuration, warning, request, appeal was addressed to Ismet without producing the smallest effect. To M. Bompard's reasonable attitude about the economic clauses he would only respond by the assertion that Turkey was being placed in a condition of economic slavery. About the judicial formula he could only repeat with stereotyped monotony the familiar catchwords about Turkish sovereignty and Turkish independence. He presented the appearance of a man hardly responsible either for what he said or did, but kept up to the mark by the forbidding proximity of Riza Nour Bey.

This painful and almost unbelievable scene continued until the time for my departure drew near and a message had to be sent to the station asking that the Orient Express should be delayed for half an hour in the station. The Turks had now retired in sombre silence, but with a still unbroken obstinacy, to their hotel. They were followed there by M. Bompard and by the Italian and American delegates who could not believe that such monumental folly could exist in the world or that peace could be destroyed for so petty a stake, and who were resolved to make a final and desperate effort for settlement.[15] I was already on the platform when my colleagues came to tell me that their endeavours had failed, and the train, containing the British delegation then steamed out. Perhaps the most characteristic sequel was that within the next hour Ismet Pasha twice telephoned to find out whether I had really gone.[16] Like a true Turk he thought that he could still catch me before I turned the corner of the street in order to have a final transaction over the price of the carpet.

His Majesty's Government will recognize that in the end the result they so much feared viz., that the break, if it occurred, would take place upon issues for which I was responsible or in which Great Britain was principally concerned, was successfully escaped. All the points for which I had fought had been secured and the methods pursued in the first commission had been triumphantly vindicated. It was upon matters of greater importance to the French and Italians than to ourselves that the rupture took place; and there, with a loyalty in marked contrast to that which I had met with at the hands of M. Poincaré and the French, I stood by my colleagues to the end, choosing to return without a Treaty sooner than sacrifice the cause of allied unity to which I had pledged my faith. Furthermore, when during the conversations

[15] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 464, 465, and 466; and *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 968–9.

[16] This was reported, in an unnumbered telegram of February 5 to Lord Curzon in Paris, by Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, a second secretary in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office who had remained in Lausanne to complete the accounts of the British delegation.

of the last few days at Lausanne, Ismet Pasha more than once intimated to me that it was with Great Britain that he would like to conclude a separate Treaty, inasmuch as we were the one Power whose friendship he desired, I resisted any such appeal on the ground that I was at Lausanne to conclude an allied and not an individual peace. Had France adopted a similar attitude instead of deserting us at a critical juncture the result might have been very different.

Nevertheless in closing this series of telegrams, I record the opinion that it will presently be found that the Lausanne conference has not failed and that the Treaty will still be signed.

It remains only for me to add that throughout the eleven weeks of our labours, I received the most loyal and able assistance from my fellow Plenipotentiary Sir Horace Rumbold, whose great local knowledge and experience were invaluable, from Sir William Tyrrell and Sir Eyre Crowe who successively acted as my chief advisers, and from the entire staff of the Foreign Office and other departments represented at Lausanne whose industry and efficiency were the subject of as much general admiration as they were helpful to myself. Nor were our relations with our colleagues less agreeable. For although the tactics of the French and Italians, which I have frequently described, were in my opinion fundamentally mistaken, and ended, as I had all along predicted, in total failure, the British delegation never wavered in its loyalty to the common cause, nor, while endeavouring to curtail the speed of M. Bompard's too eager movements to the rear, did I ever reproach him with the unpardonable impulse to that strategy which had been communicated by his chief.

CHAPTER III

Correspondence and Memoranda February 6–April 22, 1923

No. 371

Mr. Cavendish Bentinck[1] *(Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received February 6, 8.30 a.m.)*

Unnumbered Telegraphic [E 1459/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *February 6, 1923, 1.30 a.m.*

Monsieur Massigli informs me that Monsieur Bompard had a long interview with Ismet Pasha this morning[2] at which latter accepted formula for régime relating to foreigners in Turkey prepared yesterday by Monsieur Montagna[3] and agreed that economic clauses in dispute should be discussed later. He added that he would leave for Angora to obtain the assent of his government to draft treaty subject to above modifications.

I hear that Monsieur Bompard on departing stated that peace was as good as signed and that he hoped that the Marquis Gar[r]oni would dissuade Ismet from proceeding to Angora.

Marquis Garroni spoke to Ismet[4] for an hour and a half but has neither been able to persuade him to confirm in writing his statement to Monsieur Bompard nor to delay departure which is to take place via Bucharest on February 7th.

Mr. Child has also had two interviews with Ismet with no apparent result.[5]

The Italian, Greek and Roumanian plenipotentiaries are to leave tomorrow and remainder of Italian delegation will depart on February 7th.

Monsieur Massigli understands that Ismet is about to address him a note enquiring whether conference is broken off or merely suspended and he has requested me to ascertain Your Lordship's views.[6] I have replied that I

[1] See No. 370, n. 16. [2] February 5. [3] See No. 397, n. 3, below.

[4] On February 5 (see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 467). For the subsequent conversations of Signor Arlotta, Secretary General of the Italian delegation, with Ismet Pasha, see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 477.

[5] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 969–70.

[6] In his report on the events which took place in Lausanne after the departure of the British delegation, written in London on February 7, Mr. Cavendish Bentinck stated: 'Before I left at 1.15 on Tuesday, the 6th February, Ismet Pasha had not yet addressed a note to M[onsieur] Massigli enquiring whether the conference was broken off or merely suspended . . ., and I am inclined to believe that the Italian Delegation have prevented him from making this question, fearing that the reply of His Majesty's Government on this subject might not encourage the Turks to remain on at Lausanne in the hopes of obtaining further concessions.' (Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 967.) According to the report of the American Special Mission, Monsieur Massigli, acting under instructions from Paris, pro-

cannot do so as I am only here to liquidate accounts of this delegation and must leave for London tomorrow. When note arrives he will therefore request instructions through Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

posed to Ismet Pasha on the night of February 6, that 'if the Turks would state in writing what they were willing to concede on capitulations and on economic clauses, as indicated in their personal conversations with Montagna and others, the Allies were prepared to sign the Treaty'. The report adds that the Turkish delegation informed Monsieur Massigli that they had made their reply on February 4 (see No. 370), and that 'it was now up to the Allies to inform the Turks in writing of the present Allied point of view . . .'.

No. 372

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 7, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 61 Telegraphic [E 1508/16/44]

Most urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 6, 1923, 11.55 p.m.*

My telegram No. 58.[1]

I have just received from Adnan Bey copy of telegram from Reouf Bey confirming demand that all foreign warships of more than a thousand tons must leave Smyrna before midnight February 7th. Covering note does not state whether telegram was sent for communication to High Commissioners or merely for Adnan's information.

In the meantime Turkish authorities at Smyrna have informed Senior Naval Officer there that arrival of light cruiser[2] despatched today from Constantinople will be resisted. Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has proposed to Admiralty to warn Smyrna authorities that if British warships are interfered with town will be bombarded.

French Admiral is also sending additional ship from here to Smyrna but it is under a thousand tons and will not arrive till tomorrow afternoon. The intention possibly is to be on the safe side, with a view to replacing existing French warship by one of category authorised to remain in harbour.

[1] Of February 6. This ran: 'Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean informed me today that in accordance with Admiralty instructions he was sending additional light cruiser to Smyrna as suitable reply to intimation made by Turkish authorities there that no allied warships over 1000 tons would be allowed within the harbour after February 7th.

'Allied High Commissioners had already made this morning joint protests to Adnan Bey through dragomans against action of Turkish authorities at Smyrna. On learning however of Admiral Brock's instructions I visited Adnan myself this afternoon, and warned him of despatch of further British warship. I told him that allied powers maintain position under Mudros armistice and could not submit to restrictions on movements of their warships, and urged him to notify immediately Turkish authorities with a view to avoiding incidents.'

[2] H.M.S. *Curaçao.*

No. 373

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with the French Ambassador

[*E 1514/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 6, 1923*

The French Ambassador, having addressed a short note[1] to Lord Curzon, in which, on instructions from his Government, he asked for the consent of H[is] M[ajesty's] Government to a formula, under which the allies would express their willingness to continue the discussions with Ismet Pasha, terminated on Sunday[2] owing to the Turkish refusal to sign the treaty of peace, asked for a personal interview, at which he desired to discuss this French proposal.

Being unfortunately confined to bed by illness, Lord Curzon requested me to receive the Ambassador in his place, and gave me his directions as to the statement which I should make to him.

The Ambassador accordingly called early this afternoon. I expressed to him Lord Curzon's regret at his inability to receive him, but said that I was in a position to tell him exactly what Lord Curzon would have said to him, if he had not been prevented by his illness. I informed him that neither H[is] M[ajesty's] Government, nor Lord Curzon, felt any particular inclination to agree to a proposition from M. Poincaré for the further continuance of the conference, because, in the first instance, they attributed to M. Poincaré's recent inopportune and uncalled for intervention the apparent rupture which had taken place at Lausanne; and, secondly, because M. Poincaré had thought fit, in his memorandum of the 4th instant,[3]

[1] This note has not been traced in the Foreign Office Archives. However, a memorandum by Mr. Lindsay, dated February 5, states: 'The French Ambassador called urgently this morning in obedience to telephonic instructions from Paris. M. Poincaré was apprehensive of the situation that might now arise on the termination of the Lausanne Conference. He feared that Turk or Greek might argue that the Mudania convention having been concluded expressly in order to bring about a Conference and a Peace, these latter having failed, the convention too must lose its force and the pre-Mudania situation return. Such a situation, M. Poincaré thought, must be fraught with the gravest peril and a recommencement of hostilities must be probable.

'He was anxious therefore in the first place that the continued validity of the Mudania convention should be upheld, and so a new outbreak of hostilities prevented. The French Government had already signified that they did not consider the termination of the Lausanne negotiations as a rupture, but this declaration by one power only would be ineffective. The Ambassador had therefore been instructed to see Lord Curzon immediately and ask whether some formula could be found by which H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] might be associated with the line of policy indicated in this declaration.

'He hardly dared ask for an interview today, but earnestly hoped he could see the Secretary of State tomorrow on the above subject.'

Lord Curzon minuted on February 5, 'I have strong views which I will put before him tomorrow.'

[2] February 4. See No. 370.

[3] Not printed. A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Lord Curzon in Paris despatch No. 284 of February 4, not printed. See No. 369, and No. 382, below.

communicated to Lord Crewe, and by him handed to Lord Curzon in Paris yesterday morning, to address the latter in language, of which His Lordship had never before been the recipient as Secretary of State, and which he would tolerate neither from M. Poincaré, nor from any one else. To that memorandum, which, apart from its rudeness, contained a gross travesty of the course of events at Lausanne, Lord Curzon would reply in due course. For the moment, all that he would say in this connection was that, whilst M. Poincaré had, at the most critical moment, broken away from the allied unity of action, to which he had been pledged, Lord Curzon, on the contrary, had strictly adhered to it to the end, and that it was because of Lord Curzon's unflinching loyalty to the French cause and to M. Bompard, in the face of the most extreme provocation to take an opposite course in respect of matters which concerned the French even more than they did ourselves, that the failure to conclude peace had been due.

Almost at the very moment when M. Poincaré was claiming the right to enter into separate negotiations with the Turks, Lord Curzon had received overtures from the Turks to enter into separate negotiations with them.[4] These facts were already widely known in Paris, and were commented on in the French press;[5] it would not be long before they would equally be known to our countrymen.

As regards M. Poincaré's particular request, I explained that H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were unable to agree to any formula, which would imply that the conference would be resumed on the basis of further allied concessions. The next step now clearly lay with the Turkish delegation. It could not be taken by the allies without suggesting that a further process of concession was about to begin. H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were of opinion that Ismet Pasha should be informed that any statement or representation which he cared to make to the secretary-general of the conference (still at Lausanne) for communication to the allied Powers, would be officially received by M. Massigli, and by him forwarded to the Powers concerned, at whose hands it would receive due consideration.

I added that, according to the statements which had appeared in the press, on the authority of M. Bompard, Ismet Pasha had accepted the allied terms.[6] If this were so, nothing would be easier than for Ismet Pasha to make the suggested declaration. I was, however, not at all clear on this point. The French Counsellor of Embassy had this morning made a verbal communication at this office,[7] which left me in considerable doubt as to

[4] See No. 370.

[5] In his telegram No. 144 of February 5, Lord Crewe had reported: 'Consternation prevails in Turcophil circles here at breakdown of conference over capitulations question, as admitted by Monsieur Bompard in a declaration to the press.

'Monsieur Tardieu declares that Turkish arrogance has saved France from the effect of her own Turco-mania and that Monsieur Poincaré's astonishing policy of weakness has been punished by this startling failure.'

[6] Cf. No. 371.

[7] In a telephone conversation with Mr. Lindsay, who reported the substance in a minute to Lord Curzon, dated February 6 (E 1459/1/44).

what exactly was the view of the French Government as to Ismet Pasha's disposition, and as to the course which they proposed should now be pursued by the allies. According to M. de Montille, the French Government had ascertained that Ismet Pasha had decided to leave Lausanne to-morrow morning at seven o'clock, but that he would not go if he could be assured that the allied Governments were prepared to sign the treaty which he refused on Sunday.[8] The French Government therefore begged to be informed at once that H[is] M[ajesty's] Government were ready to sign the treaty. This would enable the French Government to tell Ismet Pasha, in time to stop him from going off to Angora. I did not foresee that any of the allied Governments would refuse to put their signature, even now, to the treaty in the form in which the Turks had finally rejected it; although Lord Curzon had, at the moment of that refusal, declared that in view of it he withdrew all the concessions[9] he had made.

But the rest of the communication made by M. de Montille was in absolute contradiction with the above suggestion, for he proceeded to specify the actual instruments which would accordingly have to be signed. He enumerated them as follows:

The text of the general conditions of peace as settled on Sunday last, including the last concessions made by the allies; (with the omission, however, of articles 71–117, constituting Part 3 of the treaty,[10] and comprising the economic clauses, which were to be the subject of a separate negotiation later on); special conventions respecting the straits,[11] the frontiers, Greece and Thrace,[10] commerce and navigation,[10] and accessory acts.[10]

The Judicial Declaration to be made by the Turkish Government in the form in which the Turkish delegates had finally presented it,[12] with certain amendments proposed at the last moment by Signor Montagna,[13] the second Italian plenipotentiary, which Ismet Pasha had now agreed to accept.

The convention respecting the status and position of foreigners,[10] with certain slight amendments, with which it was suggested that the Legal Adviser to the British delegation was familiar, but of which, in fact, Mr. Malkin had since told me he knew nothing.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that this description of the documents to be signed was not compatible with the previous statement that the Turks would sign the treaty in the form in which they had on Sunday last refused it. The omission of the economic clauses had been demanded by the Turks, but had been refused by the unanimous decision of the allies. M. Bompard and the Marquis Garroni, supported by all their experts, having declared it to be absolutely impossible to concede the point, all that it was found possible to offer to the Turks by way of concession was a stipulation that a certain specified number of the articles in Part 3 of the treaty should be declared to be open for revision within a period of six months. What therefore was now proposed was that the allies should sign, not the treaty in the form

[8] February 4. [9] See Cmd. 1814, p. 849. [10] See Appendix III.
[11] See Appendix III, n. 12. [12] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 852–3.
[13] See No. 397, n. 3, below.

in which the Turks had refused to sign, but in the form in which they insisted it should be signed—in other words, a complete surrender to the Turks on matters held to be vital by the unanimous opinion of the allies. As regards the Judicial Declaration, the allies had gone to the extreme of concessions in the draft finally presented to the Turks.[14] The Turkish answer had been that they would sign a Declaration, from which every single point of importance in the allied draft had been eliminated. It is this latter truncated Declaration which we are now asked to express our readiness to accept, subject to certain amendments, stated to have been made by the Italian plenipotentiary, but respecting the scope or the text of which the British Government have no information whatever. In the same way, they are asked to agree to amendments in the convention on the status and position of foreigners, of which they do not know the purport. I asked the Ambassador whether he could explain these discrepancies and contradictions.[15]

He was unable to do so, and produced a paper, from which he proceeded to read to me merely a repetition of the above communication made by his Counsellor this morning. He said that, in his opinion, the essential factor was that the French Government were prepared to make the further concession asked for by the Turks, both as regards capitulations and as regards the economic clauses, and he urged that, as these parts of the treaty concerned French interests very much more nearly than British interests, the British Government ought not to place themselves in the position of wrecking the treaty by obstinately holding out on points of comparatively minor importance to ourselves, when France was ready to yield. He felt sure that the world would not understand how Great Britain could adopt such an attitude. I said I must take the strongest objection to this statement, which sounded to me like a menace, and of a very unfriendly character. I must ask him to allow me to say that our interests in these matters were by no means negligible, and, if we held that the vital interests of British subjects involved ought not to be sacrificed, we had taken this line in absolute reliance on the most positive and categorical assurance from the French and Italian delegations that they, on their part, and their Governments, considered it absolutely impossible to give way in this matter. Lord Curzon had gone out of his way to put it to those two delegations before the final interview with the Turks, whether this was their last word, pointing out that it would not do, at this concluding stage of the negotiations, to tell the Turks that, on this point, further concessions were out of the question, unless he could rely on this declaration being upheld by all the allies acting together. It was on their assurance that no other course was possible, that the Turks were finally informed that, on the subject of capitulations and the economic clauses, the last word of the allies had been spoken. In these circumstances, for the French Government to intimate that, if the British Government adhered to so solemn an engagement entered into with the French and Italian delegations, they would be denounced to the world as thereby jeopardising

[14] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.

[15] For M. Bompard's account, see No. 451, n. 16, below.

peace, in opposition to the conciliatory attitude of France and Italy, was adopting a position which could hardly be described as anything else than a determination, whatever happened, to throw the blame for the failure of the treaty on Great Britain. It was a most unfriendly manoeuvre, and a very peculiar reward for the steady and unwavering support which the British delegation had throughout the conference given to the French delegation, and in no matters more faithfully than in these very questions in which French interests were said to predominate. As the French Ambassador reiterated both [*sic*] his suggestion that we should yield and again spoke of the bad impression which would prevail if we did not yield, I said that, if the French Government were to make or inspire attacks on the British Government, as regards our attitude in this question, H[is] M[ajesty's] Government would know how to defend themselves. They would not hesitate to tell the British Parliament and the British public exactly what had happened, not only on this particular point, but as regards many other things at the Lausanne conference.

For the present, however, I said the important thing was that we should know with greater precision what the French Government proposed; and, at my request, the Comte de Saint-Aulaire promised to ascertain, if possible by telephone, from Paris particulars on the several points to which I had called his attention.[16]

[16] This record was initialled by Lord Curzon on February 6.

No. 374

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 7, 2.40 p.m.)
No. 63 Telegraphic [E 1541/16/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 7, 1923, 2.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Acting Consul General Smyrna telegraphs that allied and American representatives there are protesting to Governor General this morning against demand which must be regarded as hostile act which cannot be complied with without sanction of respective governments.

[1] Of February 7. This referred to No. 372 and reported: 'Allied High Commissioners decided to request allied admirals to join in following identic message to our naval and civil authorities Smyrna. Inform Turkish authorities.

'1. That allied High Commissioners are in relations with government at Angora on the subject of incident that has arisen.

'2. That pending instructions which they will receive as a result of these pourparlers Turkish authorities must be held responsible for consequences of any act of hostility and,

'3. That no movement of ships will take place before allied authorities have received fresh instructions.'

Adnan Bey was in communication last night with Reouf Bey who appears to have fully concurred in undesirability of precipitate action but to have been unable to get into touch with chief of staff on tour at the front by whose orders demand was made. Adnan insisted however on necessity of the allies ultimately complying with demand.

French High Commissioner has given instructions for French colony at Smyrna about 2,000 to be embarked. Size of Italian colony of 12,000 alone precludes Italians from taking similar action.

French High Commissioner informs me Colonel Mougin reports Angora to be in state of great exaltation and excitement. There is no doubt feeling in Anatolia is very different from here and risk of incident as a result of extremist action cannot be discounted.

On the other hand any yielding to Turkish demand would merely encourage Turks to go one step further and request evacuation of Constantinople.

It would be desirable to have definite instructions as to whether if French and Italian warships leave Smyrna British warships should leave also or remain.[2]

[2] Lord Curzon replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 30 to Constantinople, of February 7: 'By agreement with French government naval authorities of both countries are being instructed that Turkish summons cannot be accepted and that ships are not to withdraw tonight. If attacked they are to defend themselves.'

No. 375

Record by Sir E. Crowe of a Conversation with the Italian Ambassador

[*E 1597/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 7, 1923*

The Italian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon. After beating about the bush in a general and rather incoherent way, he came to what was evidently the point of the communication he was instructed to make, by saying that he had noticed in the English press various indications of dissatisfaction felt in England with Italy's attitude at the Lausanne conference. He said Monsieur Mussolini was somewhat disturbed at what he could only attribute to a complete misunderstanding of Italy's attitude towards the Turkish question. The Italian delegation at Lausanne had throughout acted with the strictest loyalty to the programme of united allied action, which had been settled at the meetings in Paris. The Marquis Garroni had consistently pursued the policy of close co-operation with the allies, which had been prescribed, and it was inconceivable that there should be any ground for complaint against the Italian delegation on this score.

The Ambassador continued to expatiate on this subject for a considerable time, growing more and more emphatic as to Italy's scrupulous adherence

to the policy which the allies had decided to pursue in common, and finally asked whether there were any particular matters in which we thought we had a complaint to make against his Government, in relation to the Lausanne conference.

I asked the Ambassador why he put these questions to me. I said that, so far as I knew, we had formulated no complaints against Italy's attitude. Lord Curzon and the British delegation at Lausanne had made every effort to preserve, in face of the Turks, a united allied front. The failure to arrive at a definite settlement last week was immediately due to the Turkish refusal to agree to the terms respecting capitulations and economic arrangements, in the negotiation of which the Italians and French had taken the leading part, and in which they received the full and invariable support of their British colleagues. It was true that, in all the subjects dealt with in Lord Curzon's commission, the Turks were finally induced to come to terms acceptable to the allies. I was revealing no secret if I observed that the methods adopted in the two other commissions were very different from those by which Lord Curzon, in the First Commission, brought things to a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the British plenipotentiaries never failed to give their most unvarying support to their Italian and French colleagues, regarding matters specially dealt with by them. In so far as Lord Curzon had at times criticised the views of his Italian and French colleagues as regards the methods of dealing with the Turks at the conference, he had done so quite openly. He had sincerely deplored what he thought were instances of unnecessary weakness, shown by his colleagues, and reluctance to stand by arrangements arrived at between the allied delegations, in dealing with the dilatory tactics of the Turks.

I added, as coming from myself, that I could not personally but feel deeply shocked by the degree of, to my mind, almost indecent fraternization, which went on day by day between the Italian and the Turkish delegations. But we had never made any complaint about it, and it was not for me now to make any complaints. Outwardly, at least, the complete unity of the allied delegations had been maintained up to the end. I did not feel called upon to say anything more.

It was quite evident that the Marquis della Torretta had an uncomfortable feeling that there was a good deal that I might have said, which I did not say, and I carefully refrained from doing anything which would set his mind at ease on the subject.

The Ambassador then passed on to the subject of the proposed conclusion of an agreement between Italy, France and Great Britain, which would in some way fill the place left vacant by the disappearance of the old Tripartite Agreement. He said Monsieur Nogara had come to a definite understanding with the French, and the terms so agreed upon would be shortly communicated to us, with an invitation that we should join in.[1] I said that I must reserve any observations on the subject until we saw exactly what was proposed.

[1] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 460–2 and 474.

The last subject touched upon was the French action in the Ruhr. The Ambassador said that his Government felt drawn more closely to our point of view than to that of the French,[2] and they hoped that the moment would soon come when Great Britain and Italy would be able, by action whether at Berlin or at Paris, to help to bring about a solution. I said that this remark filled me with some astonishment, for it was not many weeks ago that I sat with the Marquis della Torretta at the conference table in Paris,[3] when very ostentatiously, and contrary to what I had been led to expect from assurances he had given me, Italy declared herself solidly with France, and indulged in what seemed to me a most unfriendly criticism of the attitude of the British Government. I therefore found it difficult to understand in what way Italy and Great Britain were now to co-operate in this matter. Italy had chosen very deliberately to place herself at the side of, and to encourage, French policy in the Ruhr, which, as we explained at the time in the most friendly but also the firmest manner, was, in our opinion, fraught with the most disastrous consequences. It was a little late in the day now for Italy to try to dissociate herself from what she had then so fatally embraced but I said I had, owing to my absence at Lausanne, not followed the events in the Ruhr of late, with the same attention which I had formerly given them, and I felt unable at the present moment to express any opinion as to what might now be open to Powers to do, which found themselves placed in the position in which my country and Italy stood.[4]

E. A. C.

[2] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 478.
[3] At the Reparations Conference, January 2–7, 1923 (see No. 304, n. 1).
[4] Lord Curzon commented: 'A very sagacious and timely utterance.'

No. 376

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 8, 2.20 p.m.)
No. 66 Telegraphic [E 1590/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 8, 1923, 1.25 p.m.*

My telegram No. 65.[1]

H.M.S. 'Curaçoa' anchored in Smyrna apparently without incident at 10.30 this morning.

I saw the French High Commissioner and Admiral this morning and they agreed to request of French senior naval officer, Smyrna, to associate himself

[1] Of February 8. This referred to No. 374, and continued: 'I received at midnight a written communication from Adnan Bey informing me by order of his government that Turkish general staff had decided to close port of Smyrna by barrage of mines as from February 7th.

'I sent message to Adnan last night warning him that His Majesty's Ship "Curaçoa" would enter Smyrna this morning.

'Commander-in-Chief is keeping Admiralty fully informed of developments.'

in declaration which Admiral Nicholson has been instructed to make to Turkish authorities there that the Allies cannot recognize any restrictions on free movement of their warships until peace is signed.[2]

Allied High Commissioners are also addressing further written communication[3] to Adnan Bey on the above lines pointing out that in addition action of Turkish authorities is contrary to all habitual usages and insisting on withdrawal of demand.

Communication will be based on instructions which French High Commissioner has received from Paris and in which I unreservedly agreed to join.

Italian High Commissioner will also join subject to [no] contrary instructions from his government, from whom he has heard nothing, arriving before note can be presented.

Colonel Mougin has telegraphed to French High Commissioner corroborating information in second paragraph of my telegram No. 63.[4] He . . .[5] that Reouf Bey is powerless against ('debordé par') Fevzy Pasha and military party.

Even if this is so, it merely confirms necessity for resolute and united action.

[2] See No. 372, n. 1.

[3] Of February 8, not printed. A copy of this was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Constantinople despatch No. 100 of February 13, not printed.

[4] No. 374.

[5] The text is here uncertain.

No. 377

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 8, 10.40 p.m.)
No. 68 Telegraphic [E 1624/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 8, 1923, 8.10 p.m.*

My telegram No. 62.[1]

Adnan Bey came to see me after receipt of joint note. He said he had been in communication again with Reouf by telegraph and hoped that his efforts had been instrumental in preventing an incident on arrival of His Majesty's ship 'Curaçoa' this morning. He said he could give me Reouf's formal assurance that demand for withdrawal of warships had not been inspired by any hostile intentions particularly against British. He added that he could inform me confidentially whatever Turkish attitude previously had been towards Great Britain, Turkey was now sincerely anxious for British friendship. He laid stress on the fact that change had occurred since interruption of conference and that instructions had been given to all concerned to that effect. (This is confirmed from secret sources.)

[1] No. 374, n. 1.

In spite of above assurance, he could not satisfactorily explain coincidence of demand for withdrawal having been made at precise moment that negotiations at Lausanne were broken off.

Bekir Samy Bey,[2] who also came to see me today, attributed action of local authorities at Smyrna to belief that breaking off of conference meant rupture instead of interruption. I believe this interpretation to be the correct one.

Adnan Bey endeavoured to explain away, if not coincidence, at least charge of abruptness of demand, by saying that it was mere repetition of demand made at end of December (see my telegram No. 794).[3] He blamed High Commissioners for not having replied at the time to that communication. In this respect I admitted that I regret decision of High Commissioners reported in my telegram No. 27.[4]

Adnan Bey said that he had already telegraphed joint note of High Commissioners to Angora but that he did not believe military party would withdraw demand. I told him that there was nothing to be done if Turkey was bent on committing suicide. He asked me whether I could propose any solution and enquired whether at least it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw second warship. I told him most I could say as an entirely personal suggestion, was that if Turkish government sent conciliatory reply to joint note assuring the allies of peaceful intentions and withdrawing demand pending amicable arrangement of difficulty between it and governments concerned, I would recommend to His Majesty's Government that second cruiser be withdrawn.

Adnan said that he would urge Angora to reply in the form indicated.

For my part I trust that if conciliatory reply be returned, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to adopt latter part of suggestion.

[2] See Vol. XVII, No. 4. [3] No. 301.

[4] Of January 18. This reported: 'Turkish authorities at Smyrna are not attempting to enforce regulations and allied High Commissioners considered it as well to allow matter to drop.'

No. 378

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 19)
No. 93 [C 3046/362/19]

ATHENS, *February 8, 1923*

My Lord,

As reported in my telegrams Nos. 43,[1] 50[2] and 52[3] of the 25th, 29th and 30th ultimo, Colonel Plastiras, 'Chef de la Révolution 1922', as he is styled on his visiting cards, paid a flying visit to Lausanne for the purpose of consulting with M. Veniselos on matters connected both with the external

[1] See No. 350, n. 2. [2] No. 350. [3] Not printed.

and internal situation of Greece. Though the visit gave rise to a great deal of speculation in Athens generally, one of the principal inducements appears to have been the decision of the 'Eleftheron Vima' group of politicians to secure the early disappearance of the revolution and the holding of elections as soon as the military situation would permit. As already reported,[4] this powerful group disapproved of the political leagues which the present Administration were forming all over the country for electioneering purposes, and were prepared to support a Government under M. Zaïmis. Colonel Plastiras returned to Athens last night, having stopped at Salonica, where he made certain statements to the press, a summary[5] of which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

2. M. Veniselos would appear, from the press article, to have exercised a moderating influence upon Colonel Plastiras, and to have convinced him that the revolution could not continue *ad infinitum*, and that the elections must be proclaimed as soon as possible. In this connection I have the honour to refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 69 of the first instant,[5] in which I reported that M. Lagoudakis[6] (apparently with the authority of the Government) impressed upon me that there would be a general election as soon as possible after peace had been signed. Colonel Plastiras now says that, as soon as the revolution has finished its work, he will retire. He emphasises the fact, which has so often been emphasised by M. Veniselos himself, that the latter will never again enter the political arena in Greece.

3. I would call your Lordship's attention to Colonel Plastiras's remarks that the revolution favours what M. Veniselos has always called the 'Crowned Democracy'. In this, I think, he expresses what is generally admitted to be the desire of the bulk of the Greek people, namely, a constitutional monarchy such as exists in our own country. In the early days of the revolution certain extreme Veniselists, including many of the chief members of the so-called 'Eleftheron Vima' group, talked about a republic, but it soon became evident that they would lose ground if they pressed the point, and that the Veniselist Party would probably split over it. The question has therefore fallen into the background, and, as reported in my despatch No. 695 of the 4th December,[7] the leaders of the revolution emphasised the fact that so long as King George II acted within the limits of the Constitution they intended to retain him as their King.

4. The latter, with the best intentions in the world, has up till now, however, had little chance of fulfilling even the functions of a constitutional monarch. At present the rôle of a puppet is assigned to His Majesty. It is probable that this will change with the change of Government, and that when His Majesty becomes better known to his own people they will readily respond to his charm and unaffected manner. However, in an ever-changing situation, and amongst the most fickle of people, it is dangerous to speculate as to what a day may bring forth. Certainly the death of King Constantine would seem to have strengthened King George's position.

[4] See No. 321.
[5] Not printed.
[6] Director-General of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[7] No. 254.

5. The hopes of the Liberal Party, in the event of an election, appear to have revived of late, but General Metaxas's Party, I am told, is also gaining ground since the fear of the return of King Constantine has been for ever removed. At the same time the idea appears to be general that M. Zaïmis is the one and only man who could replace the revolution with any prospect of internal peace and a cessation of internal dissensions.

6. Your Lordship will observe that, according to Colonel Plastiras, M. Veniselos has promised to do what he can with the Allies for the financial improvement of the country. In this connection I may mention that the Paris correspondent of the 'Estia' telegraphs that M. Veniselos is about to endeavour to persuade the Governments of England, France and the United States of America to accord to Greece the credits which ceased on the return of King Constantine in December 1920.[8] It is added that M. Veniselos, with this object, will ask His Majesty's Government to annul the convention signed with the late M. Gounaris on the 22nd December, 1921,[9] in which all claim on His Majesty's Government in connection with this credit was abandoned. I see, however, from your Lordship's despatch No. 92 of the 25th January,[10] that the Greek Legation in London have been told that His Majesty's Government are prepared to regard this arrangement as still in force.

7. Colonel Plastiras professes to be satisfied on the whole at the result of the Lausanne Conference. I fear, however, that there is disappointment that peace has not yet been signed, for, as I have already had the honour to point out, the continuance of an armed peace, which would mean the maintenance of a large standing army on the Maritza, would be an intolerable situation for Greece, to which war would be preferable, and would end by bleeding the country to death.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

[8] See Vol. VIII, No. 100, minute 6, and Vol. XII, No. 463.
[9] See Vol. XVII, No. 493.
[10] Not printed.

No. 379

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington)
No. 55 Telegraphic [E 1525/1/44][1]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1923, 2 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 59 (of February 6th).[2]

H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] are more than grateful for kind enquiry of American government which is entirely in accord with friendly and valuable part played by the chief American delegate at Lausanne. For the moment

[1] The draft only of this telegram is preserved in the Foreign Office archives.
[2] Not printed.

mediation does not seem to be required, partly because in respect both of the Straits and Asia Minor mutual agreement was arrived at, and still more because any such overtures now would only be mistaken by the Turks for prelude to further concessions. The best assistance that United States government can proffer is to follow the sound line taken by Mr. Child more than once in my presence with the Turks, namely to tell them that unless and until they sign the treaty American sympathy is arrested and American aid will not be forthcoming.

No. 380

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 31 Telegraphic [E 1644/1/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1923, 6.50 p.m.*

As General Harington or yourself are almost certain to see Ismet Pasha when passing through Constantinople tomorrow it may be helpful to you to know line that you should adopt. A good deal turns on question whether he still has power to sign treaty as presented, as he always declared at Lausanne, or whether he means or is bound to go to Angora before a final decision is reached. Our point of view is

(1) that Turks made a gross mistake in not signing at Lausanne before my departure last Sunday,[1] after immense concessions that had been made;

(2) that Ismet would have done well to rectify that error next morning before leaving Lausanne, as Monsieur Bompard reported his intention to do;[2]

(3) that we are still willing at any time to sign treaty in that form;

(4) that we can offer no opinion as to additional concessions believed to have been offered by Bompard and Montagna[3] at last moment after I had left because we have never been told what they were, and because it seemed to us that we had already reached limit and that no further concessions were possible without seriously jeopardizing interests of allies.

His Majesty's Government found with great relief at Lausanne that great bulk of questions at issue between the allies and Turkish government were satisfactorily resolved, and they are gratified at friendly sentiments that prevailed between His Majesty's Government and Turkish delegation after eleven weeks' association. I desire to be personally remembered to Ismet Pasha, and to renew my advice to him, so frequently given, to take what he has secured while he can still get it. As I warned him public opinion outside Turkey is turning against Turkey in consequence of breakdown at Lausanne, and it is not allies but Turkey who will suffer by prolongation of suspense. Nor can he hope to profit by any divergence between allies. He has only to read French newspapers to realise that fact. I should like to

[1] February 4. See No. 370. [2] See No. 371. [3] See No. 373.

receive a friendly message from him that he will duly consider my advice, and that the handshake will be possible in the near future. He knows that once the treaty has been signed the help of England will be given.

No. 381

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received February 9, 8.10 p.m.)

No. 71 Telegraphic [E 1639/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 9, 1923, 7.30 p.m.*

Following is joint appreciation of situation out here as viewed by Admiral Brock, General Harington[1] and myself.

Smyrna incident[2] has created another point at which at any moment precipitate action of Turkish, possibly subordinate authorities might lead to outbreak of hostilities.

A policy of drift which leaves initiative to Turks is entirely to allied and particularly, since we are most exposed, to British, disadvantage. In a month's time weather conditions will have greatly improved military position and striking capacity of Turks, who it is conceivable are merely awaiting more favourable opportunity. We therefore strongly recommend that present occasion be taken to terminate uncertain situation here which has lasted for five months and which from military point of view is progressively deteriorating.

There is no doubt that feeling is running very high at Angora at present moment. Extremist military party is said to have upper hand and is certainly having loudest say. How far this bellicosity can be checked or fostered at will by Kemalist leaders must necessarily be matter of some conjecture but though it is more likely that leaders whom we believe to wish to avoid war still have control this does not prevent serious risk of irreparable incidents at Chanak, Ismid, Smyrna or elsewhere.

French and Italians, especially former, are excessively irritated with Turks at present moment and apparently more prepared than at any previous time during past five months to support decided action though it is improbable that if such action were to result in war their subsequent support in men, ships and money would be particularly effective. Nevertheless present instance of allied unity at Smyrna affords if . . .[3] opportunity to attempt to achieve peace by united policy of firmness and resolution.

If His Majesty's Government and our allies are prepared to take risk which such definite action necessarily involves advantage might well be

[1] General Harington's latest instructions, contained in War Office telegram No. 91691 of February 6, were: '. . . the Mudania Convention is still in force and you should be careful to avoid anything being done which would enable Turks to say that we were the first to break the Convention at this stage.'

[2] See Nos. 372, 374, 376, and 377.

[3] The text is here uncertain.

taken of passage of Ismet Pasha through Constantinople where it seems probable now that he arrives on February 11th, to force such a decision.[4]

Before Ismet leaves Constantinople he might therefore be informed that allies regard negotiations as adjourned, in order to enable him to consult his government. In view however of generous terms offered by them, treaty conditions cannot indefinitely remain open, and unless allies learn by some fixed date, say ten days or at most a fortnight, that Turkey is prepared to sign treaty, allies must regard conference as having ended in definite rupture, and Mudania convention as having lapsed. They consequently will consider themselves from that date as free to take all measures that they may consider necessary to meet new situation that has arisen as result of rupture.

We consider that even if joint action by allies be not taken in that sense, it might be desirable that I should see Ismet while he is here and would be grateful in that case for indication of views of His Majesty's Government.

It is possible that he will call on General Harington whom he knows.

[4] See No. 380, which had crossed this telegram.

No. 382

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 473 [E 1386/1/44]

My Lord, FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 9, 1923*

1. His Majesty's Government have carefully considered the memorandum[1] communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris on the 4th February by the French President of the Council explaining the reasons which led M. Poincaré to make certain representations to the Angora Government through the French High Commissioner at Constantinople on the 30th January.[2] His Majesty's Government regret their inability to accept these explanations as satisfactory, for reasons which I will now proceed to state.

2. I request your Excellency to read this despatch to M. Poincaré and to leave a copy with him, should he desire it.

3. It was on the 24th January, after proceedings which had already lasted for nine weeks, and in spite of great concessions made in almost every field to the Turks, had revealed but little inclination on their part to arrive at a final settlement, that I discussed the whole situation with my colleagues, M. Bompard and the Marquis Garroni.[3] We then agreed upon a plan which would materially hasten the conduct of business and serve to intimate to the Turkish delegation that a limit must be set to the apparently endless debates which were gradually whittling away all the advantages which the Allies might hope to obtain from a treaty of peace. This procedure gave the Turkish delegation five days in which to examine the treaty as a whole—a document with which, in fact, on every question of importance or principle

[1] Not printed; see No. 373, n. 3. [2] See No. 362, n. 4. [3] See No. 343.

they had already long been acquainted and which they had discussed in detail. On the third day they were to be offered the opportunity of stating their case once again at a meeting of the three main commissions, and it was to be clearly explained to them that, while the Allies were prepared to hear the Turkish observations and to consider alterations of the draft treaty on points of detail, there could be no question of reopening debates on points of principle. In the unhappy event of a refusal to sign the treaty, it was to be made clear that no further discussion could be allowed to take place at Lausanne, whence the Allied delegations would depart at the end of the week, except for one or two subordinate officials capable of giving to the Turkish delegates any explanations or details of the draft that might be required.

4. In discussing this plan with my Allied colleagues in the presence of several witnesses, I fully explained that this procedure was not to be regarded as an ultimatum to Turkey, and that I would be careful to say so to the Turkish delegation at the official presentation of the draft treaty. The Turks would be free to ask for an adjournment, and either stay at Lausanne to consider the draft, or refer for instructions to Angora, or to proceed thither in person. The departure of the Allied plenipotentiaries and the main body of experts would, however, preclude further discussion of points of principle or further concessions upon them. We could at any time reassemble for the signature of the treaty if the Turks agreed to sign.

5. This plan, formally agreed by the French, Italian and British plenipotentiaries, was in course of being carried into effect. Its chances of success seemed assured when the Allied delegations found, as they did, good reason to believe that the Turks had recognised the necessity of coming to terms because they could not afford to return to Angora without a peace treaty, that Ismet Pasha had full powers to sign, and that he was about to accept in all essential particulars the Allied terms.[4] On the 30th January, however, there appeared on the sheets of the Swiss Telegraphic Agency at Lausanne a Havas Agency telegram,[5] the text of which is so important that I give it in full in the first annex to this despatch. In spite of the semi-official character of the French agency in question, no credence was attached to the alleged contents of this surprising communication by the British delegation at Lausanne, and, in order to dissipate the unfortunate effect which it was producing in the circles of the conference, they so informed the press. On the 31st January, however, confirmation appeared to be given in Lausanne to this report by the appearance practically of the text of the first five paragraphs of this communication in the 'Bulletin du Jour' of the 'Temps' of the 30th January. The apprehensions aroused by the Havas communication at Lausanne were unfortunately aggravated when on the same day, the 30th January, the French plenipotentiary came to me[6] in order to urge me to abandon the plan upon which I understood that the three Allied delegations had agreed a few days before in order to meet what M. Bompard reported

[4] See No. 356. [5] See No. 358. [6] See No. 356.

to be the intention of Ismet Pasha, namely, to ask for eight more days for discussion of the treaty.

6. The apprehensions thus excited were no more than confirmed when the British Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople telegraphed,[7] that, under instructions from his Government, General Pellé had informed Adnan Bey the day before that the draft treaty to be presented to the Turks in no way constituted an ultimatum, that the French Government were prepared to discuss modifications of it, and that the French delegation had been instructed, in the interest of peace, to keep contact with the Turkish delegation—apparently indefinitely. Mr. Henderson understood from General Pellé that, while emphasising the extent of the concessions already made, his instructions included an expression of France's readiness to examine any further plans made by Turkey in a benevolent spirit. As this information was conveyed to Mr. Henderson twenty-four hours after the communication had been made to Adnan Bey, the former felt it useless to protest against, or to comment upon, it.

7. In vain I waited for some explanation from the French Government of this unexpected step. It was true that on the 1st February an apparently inspired communiqué from the Havas Agency, the text of which I again quote in full in the second annex to this despatch, appeared in the French press. This communiqué purported to explain the previous Havas report, quoted in the first annex to this despatch, by a reference to a telegram from M. Poincaré to Mustapha Kemal of the 26th January.[8] To this, since attention is again drawn to it by M. Poincaré in his present memorandum, I will return below. I need only here say that it contained no mention whatever of the instructions, admittedly sent on the day before the original Havas report, the 29th January, by M. Poincaré to General Pellé.

8. It was, however, only upon the receipt of the above-mentioned official information from Mr. Henderson—as to the action of the French Government, although not as to the reasons for it—that I felt it necessary to ask for the explanation which M. Poincaré has now been good enough to furnish. My request was not based upon the alleged communication from M. Poincaré to the Angora Government referred to in the Havas communiqué of the 30th January, and by the 'Temps' on the 31st January, and I take note of his denial [*sic*] that the French Government did not [*sic*] divulge the purport of this communication to the French press. I also take note of his declaration that there are no semi-official papers in France. The actual relations between the French press and the Quai d'Orsay are fully understood by His Majesty's Government.

9. Quite apart, however, from the question of any such leakage, the action of the French Government in itself was serious enough. For to what did it amount? At a moment when the Allied plenipotentiaries at Lausanne, at the close of a long drawn and difficult negotiation with an enemy State, had agreed upon a procedure, which, while giving the Turkish delegation every

[7] In Constantinople telegram No. 64 to Lausanne, i.e. No. 362, n. 4.

[8] See No. 352.

opportunity to state its case, clearly showed that the period of discussion and concession was drawing to a close, and that the time for decision had come, at a moment when a display of Allied unity was imperative, the head of one of the Governments concerned, acting at a distance from the scene, without consulting or even informing the other two Governments, without apparently consulting even his own plenipotentiary, informed the enemy Government in unmistakable terms that there was no Allied agreement as to procedure, and that, as far at any rate as his Government was concerned, the limit of discussion and concession had by no means been reached.

10. The effect of this action was as instantaneous as it was unfortunate. The Turkish delegation immediately asked for eight days' delay for further discussion.[9] My French colleague at Lausanne, presumably acting on M. Poincaré's instructions, and notwithstanding the arrangement arrived at a few days before, insisted that this delay must be granted. In consequence, in the conference building itself a public display of Allied disunity was on the verge of being given to the Turks. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the accord with my colleagues which their action had compromised, I deferred, so far as I could, to their representations. The Turkish delegation, however, encouraged by these symptoms of a rift in the Allied ranks, and by the obvious readiness of two of the Allies to offer further and indefinite concessions, proceeded at once to put forward demands for concessions on nearly every point of importance in the treaty. Once more, in order to preserve a united front and to make a last effort for peace, I yielded on a number of important points, only to find the Turks obstinately refusing to the last to sign what had already become for the Allies a peace in many respects of surrender. This was the attitude on the part of the chief British plenipotentiary, which M. Poincaré is good enough to describe as intransigent and menacing.

11. I now turn to M. Poincaré's defence of his action. He refers in the first place to his telegram to Mustapha Kemal of the 26th January. I do not doubt that that telegram was fully intended to hasten the conclusion of peace, although at that juncture it might have been held wiser for the heads of the three Allied Powers to concert in any joint representation to the head of the Turkish Government. That telegram, however, is not now under discussion. In the second place, reference is made to the unsolicited representations made by Adnan Bey and Reouf Bey to General Pellé and Colonel Mougin regarding their fears of a rupture and an Allied ultimatum. As I have already explained, His Majesty's Government have never considered or advocated an ultimatum, and the procedure agreed upon at Lausanne by the three heads of the Allied delegations explicitly excluded it. If, however, M. Poincaré regarded this expression of Turkish apprehension as well founded, he might surely have been expected to make representations accordingly to His Majesty's Government. The latter could not possibly anticipate that he would have taken the particular step which he actually

[9] See No. 357.

did take, and that the British delegation at Lausanne would have been left to discover it nearly two days later from the British representative at Constantinople, who had himself only been informed twenty-four hours after the communication had been made.[10]

12. Thirdly, M. Poincaré claims that, not only had his action a most favourable result for the cause of the Allies, but that it was in conformity with his original intentions, as explained to me at the several Allied meetings at Paris since March 1922.[11] As regards the first claim, I have already shown that the results, so far from being favourable, were very nearly calamitous to all the Allies alike. As regards the second claim, I cannot recall that the idea of separate communications to the Turkish Government, without prior consultation and agreement between the Allies as to their terms, was ever either mooted or approved at any meeting in Paris.

13. It is impossible to pass altogether without notice the comments which M. Poincaré has thought fit to make upon my share in the proceedings at Lausanne. It is not clear what opportunites can have been enjoyed by the French Président du Conseil of forming a personal judgement of those events; and assuredly no one who was present could have drawn so unkindly a picture of them. The suggestion that the treaty should be presented at a plenary sitting of the conference with a speech by one of the leading Allied representatives was concurred in by the first French plenipotentiary, then M. Barrère; nor did any disagreement manifest itself on the subject, except when M. Barrère, insisting that I had exhausted my right by presiding ten weeks earlier at a meeting of the conference which dealt exclusively with the question of procedure and bore no relation to the treaty at all, claimed the right for the French representative to occupy the chair for the purpose of presenting the treaty in the name of the Allies, even although Great Britain happened to be represented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I had already spontaneously offered to accept the French text as the official text of the treaty.[12] In deference to M. Barrère's request, I had further agreed to allow a project which I had put forward at one stage for the conclusion of peace, to be described as a Franco-British plan.[13] No note of either of these concessions, or of the spirit of cordiality which inspired them is taken by M. Poincaré. Nor does he mention that the proposal which was finally acted upon, that the three commissions should meet simultaneously, and that the British, French and Italian presidents should each explain that part of the treaty for which his commission was specially responsible, emanated from myself.[13] Neither, again, does he draw from the entire proceedings at Lausanne the conclusion which has elsewhere met with all but universal recognition, namely, that the methods for which he can find nothing but condemnation succeeded in procuring the Turkish assent to all those parts of the treaty to which they related, while the tactics which were practised, even up to the last moment, by the French delegation, resulted in complete disappointment. These are, after all, only trivial and ephemeral aspects of

[10] See Nos. 352 and 369.
[11] See Nos. 41, 42, 48, 51, 106, 107, and 108.
[12] See No. 323.
[13] See No. 343.

the case, which it would have been unnecessary to mention but for the description of them given in the note under reply.

14. But there remains one charge in this part of M. Poincaré's note which cannot be so lightly dismissed. This is the insinuation that, at the risk of relighting a disastrous war, Great Britain, while the Lausanne Conference was proceeding, has kept up the aggressive spirit of the Greek Government and the Greek army on the Maritza. It would be unusual in any case for such an insinuation, unsupported either by facts or by evidence, to find a place in an exchange of diplomatic notes between Allies. Had M. Poincaré consulted his own representatives at Lausanne as to what actually passed there, he would have learned that by no party were counsels of moderation and warnings against the folly of a renewal of hostilities more consistently and, as it is believed, more successfully pressed upon the Greek Government than by the British delegation.[14] For any suggestion to the contrary there is no justification.

15. M. Poincaré terminates his memorandum with the final insinuation that it is the custom of the Foreign Office to communicate confidential notes exchanged between the two Governments to the press. That such an insinuation should emanate from the Quai d'Orsay is indeed surprising. But small research is required to show that there has hardly been a single inter-Allied conference at Paris or elsewhere since the armistice of 1918 at which, contrary to agreement between the heads of the Allied delegations, there has not been an incessant leakage of information from the French Foreign Office or the French delegation to the French press, and also to British newspapers notorious for their systematic hostility to His Majesty's Government. Such leakage has, moreover, not only taken place at conferences. On the 24th August last an official reply[15] from the Quai d'Orsay to the British Embassy regarding certain proposals of His Majesty's Government for the holding of a conference at Venice was outlined by the 'Temps' on the 24th August, although it only reached Lord Hardinge on the 25th August. A similar divulgation took place in the 'Temps' on the 4th September of the contents of a note[16] which had not then reached Lord Hardinge about the Venice Conference. Again, it is clearly more than a coincidence that the 'Temps' of the 29th January in its leading article outlined the whole line of arguments of M. Poincaré's note of the 30th January to Lord Crewe regarding the validity of the pact of the 4th September, 1914.[17] Other examples could without difficulty be found. In the circumstances, and in view of this continual practice of French authorities, His Majesty's Government may be driven to consider whether they will be able to maintain in the future the long-established tradition of regarding such documents as confidential. In particular if, unhappily, during the next few weeks the Turkish delegation should definitely and finally refuse the generous terms of peace offered by the Allies, and should it become necessary to explain this failure to the world,

[14] See, for instance, Nos. 287 and 307.

[15] Of August 23, not printed.

[16] Of September 4, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[17] See No. 349, n. 5.

His Majesty's Government may find it necessary to publish the present exchange of notes in order that public opinion may be aware of the grounds on which the French President of the Council has justified the part played by him in the recent negotiations at Lausanne, and the reasons for which His Majesty's Government believe this intervention to have unfavourably affected the chances of peace.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ANNEX I.

The following is the text of the Havas communiqué as it was published at Lausanne on the night of the 30th January through the Agence télégraphique suisse, and was replied to by the British delegation.

It appeared in the 'Journal des Débats' of the 1st February, which stated that it received it by telephone from its correspondent at Lausanne:—

'Par l'entremise de son Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople, le Gouvernement français a adressé hier, à Angora, une communication importante dont le texte a également été transmis à Lausanne, à Londres et à Rome.

'Il ressort de cette communication que le projet de traité remis à la délégation turque ne constitue pas, aux yeux de la France, une rédaction définitive dont il serait interdit de discuter les termes, mais que ce projet marque simplement l'état actuel des pourparlers et que rien ne s'oppose à des négociations ultérieures.

'Le Gouvernement français a conscience d'avoir déjà accordé, en ce qui concerne les intérêts de la France, plus de concessions qu'il n'en a obtenu. Toutefois, il ne refuserait pas de faire telles autres concessions qui lui paraîtraient raisonnables, si on lui donnait des motifs suffisants pour qu'il ait lieu d'y consentir.

'Pour le cas où la délégation turque manifesterait l'intention de contiuner les négociations à Lausanne, le Gouvernement français est prêt à laisser dans cette ville sa délégation tout entière. Si, au contraire, la délégation turque se croyait obligée de rentrer à Angora pour soumettre le projet de traité à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, le Gouvernement français serait disposé à reprendre les pourparlers à l'endroit et à l'époque dont on conviendrait.

'En précisant ainsi son attitude, avant même que la délégation turque ait répondu au projet qui lui a été remis, le Gouvernement français montre qu'il souhaite sincèrement la paix en Orient, qu'il ne négligera aucun effort pour y parvenir, et que, si pour le malheur de tout le monde, la guerre recommençait, la responsabilité en retomberait sur ceux qui n'auraient pas voulu suivre la France, ou venir au-devant d'elle.'

ANNEX II.

The following is a note sent on the 1st February from Paris to Lausanne by the Havas Agency:—

'*Paris, le 1er février 1923.*

'Le rédacteur diplomatique de l'Agence Havas a fait une enquête

approfondie dans les milieux français les plus autorisés au sujet de la communication faite lundi au Gouvernement d'Angora par le Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople de la part du Gouvernement français. Le journal qui, mardi après-midi, annonçait à Paris la nouvelle de cette démarche, déclarait qu'il ressort de cette communication que le projet de traité remis à la délégation turque à Lausanne ne constitue pas, aux yeux de la France, une rédaction définitive dont il serait interdit de discuter les termes, mais que ce projet marque simplement l'état des pourparlers et que rien ne s'oppose à des négociations ultérieures. Le même journal ajoutait que le Gouvernement français était disposé à de nouvelles concessions envers la Turquie. D'où le vif émoi de la délégation britannique à Lausanne, qui se traduisait par un communiqué officiel se refusant à accepter pour exacte l'information en question. De là aussi une explosion de mécontentement dans la presse britannique en raison de l'attitude attribuée ainsi à la France. Cette surprise et cet émoi seraient bien légitimes, s'ils étaient justifiés, mais il n'en est rien, heureusement pour la continuité des bonnes relations entre les deux pays.

'Le rédacteur diplomatique de l'Agence Havas, en effet, est en mesure d'affirmer de la manière la plus catégorique que le télégramme de M. Poincaré à Moustapha Kémal Pacha ne contient aucune des idées que lui prête l'organe parisien. Le télégramme du Président du Conseil français est un appel à la haute confiance du chef du Gouvernement d'Angora, pour l'inviter à signer le traité de paix préparé par les Alliés. Au moment où les négociations entrent dans la phase finale, dit en substance M. Poincaré, tout retard dans la signature du traité compromettrait l'œuvre de paix si laborieusement échafaudée. Les Alliés ont conscience d'avoir fait, en ce qui les concerne, tous leurs efforts pour donner à la Turquie une paix équitable, qui sauvegarde à la fois son indépendance territoriale, sa souveraineté politique et son intégrité financière. La Turquie peut donc accepter sans regret les conditions des Alliés, même si ces conditions comportent pour elle quelques légères concessions. Ainsi, la Turquie agira dans son propre intérêt et servira la cause de la paix.

'Ainsi peut se résumer l'analyse très fidèle du télégramme de M. Poincaré à Moustapha Kémal Pacha. Donc, loin d'offrir à la Turquie des concessions nouvelles et de l'encourager ainsi indirectement, pour les obtenir, à ne pas signer le projet préparé par les Alliés, M. Poincaré, en faisant cette démarche personnelle auprès de Moustapha Kémal Pacha, en accord complet avec le Général Pellé, Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople, n'a eu pour préoccupation que de mettre au service du maintien de la paix l'influence particulière que la France serait en droit d'escompter de la reconnaissance de la Turquie, et c'est pourquoi le télégramme de M. Poincaré à Moustapha Kémal Pacha, communiqué aussitôt à Londres, a reçu l'approbation très sympathique du Cabinet britannique.'

No. 383

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 10, 8 p.m.)
No. 73 Telegraphic [E 1676/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 10, 1923, 5 p.m.*

My telegram No. 69 [*sic*][1].

Adnan Bey has communicated to my colleagues and myself verbal message from Reouf Bey in reply to joint note of February 8th[2] respecting Smyrna. Substance was that Angora government could not permit unconditional presence of warships in Turkish ports, and especially fortified ports, that Turkish government were ready to discuss issue on basis of equality but that reciprocal goodwill was necessary if solution was to be found. General tone except for refusal to admit unrestricted movements of foreign warships and non-recognition of Mudros armistice, thereby implied, was conciliatory.

I told Adnan that I put forward to Your Lordship suggestion as to possible compromise reported in my telegram under reference, that I had made it in sincere desire to enable Turkish government to climb down from regrettable and inadmissible position they had taken up but that I could hold out no hope of Allied governments waiving principle laid down in joint note and that I doubted even whether my government would approve of suggestion I had made.

Adnan gave me to understand that Reouf would not give for the moment any written official reply and that things would remain as they were and where, as I told him, I wished Turkish government had been wise enough to leave them, i.e. Turkish government maintaining regulations and allies maintaining refusal to be bound by them. Nevertheless I would welcome, if it were possible, a certain measure of satisfaction for Turks. It is undoubted fact that they are, not without cause, particularly sensitive on the subject of Smyrna. The wound is still very raw and I am inclined to believe that fact that Reouf has not sent written proposals is because he is unwilling officially to adopt standpoint which is the only one possible for him in present temper at Angora but which at the same time would, as he realizes, court rebuff from allies. Action of allies and especially Great Britain at Smyrna, where arrival of additional warships created great impression, has vindicated principle affirmed by them.

I think we can afford to show a certain magnanimity and would be inclined now to withdraw British warships again with the exception of one light cruiser provided Turkish government give assurances that safety of His Majesty's ships will be in no way impaired by any future regulations and that they are free to enter and leave after giving due notice to local authorities.

I believe we would gain more than we would lose by a certain consideration

[1] The reference intended is Constantinople telegram No. 68 (No. 377).
[2] See No. 376, n. 3.

for Turkish point of view as regards Smyrna and it might strengthen Ismet Pasha's hands at Angora when he gets there with treaty. There is no doubt that there has been great excitement at Angora where break up of conference was regarded as definite rupture with the consequences which such a termination would involve. Hence in my opinion precipitate action taken by local authorities at Smyrna.

I have shown this telegram to Admiral Brock who concurs generally in it.

No. 384

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 11, 9.45 p.m.)
No. 75 Telegraphic [E 1705/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 11, 1923, 9 p.m.*

My telegram No. 73.[1]

Colonel Mougin has telegraphed to Paris account of interview with Reouf Bey on February 10th in regard to Smyrna incident. Latter stated that it was only on his personal intervention and responsibility that H.M.S. 'Curaçoa' was not fired on when entering Smyrna, that if allied warships were not withdrawn within three days Mudania convention would be regarded as having been broken and that his personal influence would be powerless to resist demand of military party for forcible action.

Verbal message to Colonel Mougin, which is in the form of ultimatum, is very different from that conveyed to three High Commissioners as reported in my telegram under reference. Neither French High Commissioner nor I consider it possible to recommend to our governments any greater measure of regulation [*sic*] than that outlined in my above mentioned telegram. Reouf's language to Mougin has all the appearance of having been used as pressure.

[1] No. 383.

No. 385

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 167 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1681/1/44]

PARIS, *February 11, 1923*

The President of the Council told me this morning that he had received serious news from Constantinople,[1] and that he had telegraphed to M. de Saint Aulaire to consult with His Majesty's Government on the first step to be taken. The Angora government had demanded that the allied ships

[1] See No. 384.

should be withdrawn from Smyrna within three days, and if this were not done they would regard the armistice of Mudania and that of Mudros as at an end. This of course was an impossible demand, and the reply must be in the negative, but he thought that at the same time an offer should be made to discuss, through diplomatic channels, the presence of the ships at Smyrna, together with other questions. He did not himself think that, diplomatically speaking, there was a very strong case for leaving the fleet at Smyrna once the position of our nationals was safeguarded, so that it was not unreasonable to discuss the reasons that made us retain them there. In reply to a question, I said that my own opinion was that there could be no question of bowing to a threat from Turkey, and I had little doubt that His Majesty's Government would think the same. The President of the Council said that war must be avoided if possible, and that we also were deeply interested in doing so because, according to Marshal Foch, it was practically impossible to drive the Turks out of Mosul, if that became the main object of attack, owing to the difficulties of a line of communication, etc. I said that we were equally anxious to maintain peace if it could be done without humiliation, but there was a point beyond which conciliation could not go.

Reverting to Lausanne, M. Poincaré said that he could not understand how it came to be supposed that he was thinking of a separate peace, which had never crossed his mind.[2] It was quite true that the Turks were prepared to make a separate peace with anybody, and at one time thought that the French might engage in such a transaction. The Angora convention[3] was strictly limited, but it could not be doubted that M. Franklin-Bouillon had said a good deal more to the Turks than he had ever put on paper, and had given them the impression that the French were almost as good as their allies. Consequently, whenever during the conference the French delegates would not act with the Turks, they were looked on as something approaching to traitors. Now the Turks could hardly understand that the two governments were acting in concert at Constantinople, and on the question of Smyrna. As to the latter, he wished to say that if the attitude of the British government in framing a reply to Turkey went a little beyond what that of his government would, he would desire, if possible, to agree to what may be proposed in London.

[2] Cf. Nos. 358 and 362. [3] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

No. 386

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 168 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1682/1/44]

PARIS, *February 11, 1923*

I understand your reply[1] to Monsieur Poincaré's note of February 4th[2] is on its way. I presume that its terms are severe and in view of the critical

[1] See No. 389, below. [2] See No. 373, n. 3.

situation at Smyrna I hope you will suspend its presentation until the future is somewhat clearer. As you will see from my telegram No. 167 of today,[3] the French government wish to act closely with us in this particular matter, and complaints, however justifiable, arising out of what passed at Lausanne would introduce an unfortunate complication at a dangerous moment.

[1] No. 385.

No. 387

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 12, 2.10 p.m.)
No. 79 Telegraphic [E 1749/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 12, 1923, 12.45 p.m.*

Kemal has gone to Smyrna. Previous intention had been to go to Ismid to meet Ismet Pasha but delay in latter's journey has probably induced Kemal to take an opportunity of taking stock himself of the situation at Smyrna and of conferring with Fevzi Pasha, leader of military party which is said to be pressing for war.

Rôle of Fevzi seems increasingly important and somewhat ambiguous. Adnan Bey, who is a convinced pacifist, and worked for two years in the same office with him at Angora, assured me recently that while a typical warlike soldier he is not a blind extremist but fundamentally sound and sensible. On the other hand, Reouf Bey told Colonel Mougin that Fevzi was furiously angry at his orders for batteries to fire on British man-of-war entering Smyrna being countermanded by Reouf on latter's own responsibility.

No. 388

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 33 Telegraphic [E 1639/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 12, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 71[1] (of February 9th; situation in Turkey).

I deprecate suggested course of action. At the moment there are indications that at any rate one party among the Turks wishes to follow a friendly and conciliatory policy towards Great Britain and it is indeed possible that Ismet may still wish to sign the treaty on the terms finally offered him and may persuade Mustapha Kemal and Angora that this should be done. Situation in this respect should be clearer when you or General Harington have seen Ismet Pasha and given him the friendly message outlined in my telegram No. 31.[2]

[1] No. 381. [2] No. 380.

Meanwhile an ultimatum such as you propose would incur risk of stirring up the hornets' nest, the existence of which at Angora you appear from the opening paragraphs of your telegram to fear. Just now it would appear to be more than ever important to pursue cautious policy and to avoid anything calculated to precipitate a crisis.

In the circumstances you should follow the line of policy given in my telegram No. 31 and await developments.

No. 389

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 64 Telegraphic [E 1682/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 12, 1923, 7 p.m.*

Your Lordship's telegram No. 168 (of February 11th).[1]

My despatch No. 473[2] will now have reached you. The reply[3] which I am making to the French Ambassador's note[4] on the Smyrna affair, and of which a copy will go to you by tonight's bag, will show that we are in general agreement with the French government as to the line of action to be taken in this question. Foreseeing no disaccord on this point, I do not imagine that Monsieur Poincaré's attitude is likely to be unfavourably affected by my reply[2] to the charges contained in his note of February 4th.[5] Further the reply itself is couched in language more moderate than you may have been led to expect by the terms of my original protest delivered by Sir E. Crowe to the French Ambassador.[6]

[1] No. 386. [2] No. 382.
[3] No copy of this reply, dated February 12, has been preserved in the Foreign Office archives. However, it is printed in the Confidential Print (123590) *Further Correspondence respecting Turkey*, Part III, January–March, 1923, p. 549.
[4] See No. 391, n. 3, below. [5] No. 373, n. 3.
[6] No. 373.

No. 390

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 12, 7.25 p.m.)
No. 80 Telegraphic [E 1754/16/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 12, 1923, 7.25 p.m.*

My telegram No. 73.[1]

Adnan Bey begged most earnestly today that some action might be taken by Allies, and especially England, to liquidate Smyrna difficulty which was complicating whole situation.

[1] No. 383.

He read me further message from Reouf to that effect and giving at length reasons for which present Turkish government was unable to recognise Mudros armistice. He told me he had also received telegram from Mustapha Kemal from Smyrna on lines of Reouf's previous message reported in my telegram above-mentioned.

I told Adnan that I had not yet received reply from Your Lordship to my previous suggestion and that Allied governments were not likely to give way in question of principle. He said situation was now six days old and that Turks had taken first step towards legitimising situation by showing both by assurances and in fact that they had no hostile intention. Adnan begged, therefore, that England should show some sign of goodwill and of wish to smooth over difficulties by withdrawing again all her warships except one light cruiser originally in Smyrna. He said for his part he would suggest to his government propriety of increasing tonnage stipulated in Turkish regulations.

I am of opinion that we can afford to do this much now. In addition to original warship French have only sent to Smyrna two or three small craft of less than one thousand tons.

It would be desirable if possible to find solution before opening of Turkish economic congress at Smyrna on February 15th and before Ismet, who arrives here about noon tomorrow February 13th, leaves again. If I were authorised to tell him that His Majesty's Government, relying on Turkish assurances of absence of any hostile intentions, were withdrawing British warships with single exception mentioned it would, I think, have good effect without encouraging military bluffers.

No. 391

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
Nos. 34 and 35 Telegraphic [E 1753/16/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 12, 1923, 11 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 73[1] and 75[2] (of February 10th and February 11th: warships at Smyrna).

French Ambassador here has given us substance of declarations made by Reouf Bey to Colonel Mougin at Angora on February 10th.[3]

Monsieur Poincaré suggests identic action at Constantinople comprising a refusal of the Turkish ultimatum but an offer to examine the question of

[1] No. 383. [2] No. 384.

[3] In a Note of February 11 enclosing the text of the declarations, not printed (see however, No. 384).

the ships as soon as possible by the diplomatic channel with a view to negotiate an early arrangement. He wishes apparently to avoid any discussion of the validity of the armistices of Mudros and Mudania, this question being settled in fact, provided the Smyrna instance can be concluded by some ad hoc arrangement. He suggests recalling to the Turkish government that the Allied warships at Smyrna are there to protect Allied nationals and to fulfil the mission of humanity.

I am in agreement with him regarding necessity of joint action and refusal of ultimatum. I am also prepared to discuss some arrangement through diplomatic channel, but I do not consider that Turkish refusal to recognise armistices can be completely passed over in silence.

I am therefore suggesting to M. Poincaré that allied High Commissioners at Constantinople should be instructed to despatch note to Adnan Bey on the following lines:

'The allied governments continue to regard the armistice of Mudros as governing the relations between Turkey and the three allied governments. The armistice of Mudania, which of course continues equally in force, was framed for the purpose of terminating hostilities between Greece and Turkey, and for the three specific objects stated in the opening paragraphs of the Mudania convention of 11th October itself.[4] In particular that convention contains no clause which has any bearing upon the position of allied ships at Smyrna.' The note might continue by pointing out that throughout the peace conference the Turkish delegation had continually invoked the date of the armistice of Mudros when it suited their purpose, notably as concerns the division of the debt in the financial commission and in putting forward their claim to the town of Mosul on the basis of the first article of the National Pact. In these circumstances the allies regard themselves as having full liberty to send ships to Smyrna to protect their nationals, the property of their nationals, and the carrying on of peaceful commerce between the allies through this port. In a desire, however, to show every legitimate consideration for the views and susceptibilities of the Turkish government, the allied High Commissioners are prepared, in consultation with the allied naval authorities, to discuss with the Turkish government the possibility of limiting the number of allied vessels at Smyrna required for the purpose of protecting allied nationals, their property and their commerce, on the understanding that the controversy concerning the armistice is not further pursued and that assurances will be given by the Turkish government that the safety of any allied warships will in no way be impaired by any future Turkish regulations, and that such warships will be free to enter and leave Turkish ports after giving due notice to the local authorities, in accordance with the usual practice followed by all maritime states.

The note might conclude by expressing the hope that an early signature of the terms of peace offered to Turkey at Lausanne[5] will provide a speedy return to normal conditions in this and other Turkish ports.

[4] See No. 119, n. 1. [5] See No. 370, and Appendix III.

You should draft a note on the above lines to Adnan Bey, as soon as your French and Italian colleagues receive similar instructions.

Repeated to Rome No. 44.[6]

[6] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 46 of February 12 to Rome, instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please inform Signor Mussolini and ask him to instruct Italian representative at Constantinople to join his French and British colleagues at as early a date as possible in despatch of note to Adnan Bey.'

No. 392

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 21)
No. 103 [E 2047/6/44]

ATHENS, *February 12, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 64 of the 10th instant,[1] I have the honour to transmit an interesting report[1] which I have received from Colonel Hoare Nairne, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Legation, giving an account of the recent visit paid by the French Military Attaché to the Greek Army in Thrace and Macedonia.

2. In this connection I may mention that the French Minister, no doubt out of loyalty to his colleagues, had made a personal suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the three Military Attachés should visit the Front together. It appeared to me at once, as I had the honour to report to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 22 of the 12th ultimo,[1] that, as we could have no relations with General Pangalos, the presence of Colonel Nairne at the Front would be most embarrassing to us and I did not at all favour the suggestion. I was glad to see that Your Lordship upheld my view.[2] The Italian Chargé d'Affaires and the Italian Military Attaché, on the other hand, appeared somewhat hurt at Monsieur Alexandris's refusal and seemed anxious to press the point, but on hearing from me that His Majesty's Government had no wish for Colonel Nairne to proceed thither, the Italian Government decided to conform their attitude to that of His Majesty's Government.

3. I have the honour to draw Your Lordship's attention to what Captain de Colombel says about General Pangalos's confidence in being able to defeat the Turks. I fear that exaggerated confidence is characteristic of the Greeks, as has been proved more than once in the course of the recent campaign in Asia Minor. Captain de Colombel is not sanguine, but here again we have found the French wishes father to their thoughts and they have all along been anxious to discount the ability of the Greek Army to effect anything. They appeared to be wrong when the Greeks won

[1] Not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 13 of January 18, not printed.

their brilliant campaign in July 1921 at Afium-Karahissar, Koutahia and Eskishehr,[3] but they of course will maintain that after the recent collapse in Asia Minor they were right in their estimate of the Greek Army.

4. As regards General Pangalos's statement that Greece had no further use for the King, I may here mention that when the Revolution began, and immediately after the abdication of King Constantine, before the arrest of the ex-Ministers, General Pangalos told me that it was the 'present' policy of the Revolutionary Committee to place King George on the throne. The only other occasion on which I saw General Pangalos was December 3rd, on the day of Prince Andrew's departure, when, acting as spokesman for his colleagues, he stated emphatically to me that the Revolutionary Government had placed King George on the throne and intended to keep him there so long as he kept within the limits of the Constitution. (See my despatch No. 695 of December 4th.)[4] On that occasion Monsieur Rentis, who had been an avowed republican, referred in the course of conversation to the burden of monarchy for a small country. I remarked on the happy situation prevailing in the Netherlands, also a small country. Monsieur Rentis replied that the Greeks were not as advanced as the Dutch—the type of excuse, I may remark incidentally, which is given repeatedly in justification of the recent murders. As reported in my despatch No. 93 of the 8th instant,[5] it has been found necessary to keep the republican question in the background. But this need not affect General Pangalos who, though no doubt anxious to say what he thought would please the French, would, from all one hears, be unlikely to act in accordance with the will of the people if it did not suit his programme, and I agree with Captain de Colombel that he cares little for the opinions of the present Government at Athens or for Colonel Plastiras himself. General Pangalos is an uncertain and dangerous factor, and I do not imagine that he will be willing to retire into oblivion as Colonel Plastiras declares himself ready to do as soon as his work has been accomplished. My Czecho-Slovak colleague[6] recently informed the King that if General Pangalos did not march on Constantinople he feared that he would turn and march on Athens and declare himself Dictator. Although I hope he exaggerated the situation, yet I feel that this ambitious and unscrupulous General is a danger with which we may have to reckon in the future.

5. In conclusion I would refer Your Lordship to the account[7] of the interview between Colonel Hughes of the Imperial War Graves Commission and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Agriculture. The British attitude, not only in regard to the Greek warships passing through the Dardanelles, but in regard to the whole question of relations with Turkey and Greece, is a factor which continues to provoke much speculation.

I have, &c.

C. H. Bentinck

[3] See Vol. XVII, Nos. 313 and 319.

[4] No. 254.

[5] No. 378.

[6] Monsieur Mecir.

[7] In Colonel Hoare Nairne's report, not printed, which was enclosed in this despatch.

No. 393

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 13, 3.40 p.m.)
No. 82 Telegraphic [E 1784/16/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 13, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 33.[1]

There are certainly indications that policy of good relations with Great Britain is gaining ground here. But party in favour of it is timid and afraid lest its advances meet with the same rebuff as in its opinion similar advances have encountered in the past.

A little encouragement would, in my opinion, be undoubtedly helpful. It is for this reason that I earnestly beg that having shown all requisite firmness in respect of Smyrna incident we may now give proof of our own conciliatory attitude by withdrawing again all additional warships recently sent to Smyrna. I regard assurances given as to absence of hostile intentions as the most obtainable at present and as proved by facts.

I am most anxious on political grounds that ships should withdraw before economic congress at Smyrna opens[2] and before Ismet Pasha, whose departure from Roumania is reported to be again delayed, leaves Constantinople. Moreover such an attitude would appear in entire conformity with policy outlined in penultimate paragraph of your telegram under reply.

[1] No. 388. [2] See No. 390.

No. 394

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 36 Telegraphic [E 1717/1/44]

Confidential FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 13, 1923, 5.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 77 (of February 12th)[1] and General Harington's telegram No. 3611 (of February 10th) to War Office[2] (Admiral Bristol and Ismet Pasha).

[1] This ran: 'According to Admiral Bristol who has returned here and who travelled part of the way with Ismet [see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 969–70] only reason for non-signature of treaty by Turks was inability to understand exact meaning of economic clauses and unwillingness to sign 'blank cheque'. This appears specially to be the case in respect of confirmation by present Turkish government of all contracts and agreements made by old government since 1918. (? articles 70, 87 and 94 in treaty as communicated January 31st [see Appendix III].)

'According to Bristol insistence on immediate signature of imperfectly understood economic clauses revived all Ismet Pasha's doubt as to sincerity of British desire for peace. He kept repeating this doubt to Bristol who apparently tried his best to explain that while England would undoubtedly fight if attacked she was honestly seeking peace. . . .

'Would it be possible to tell Ismet that, while further discussion is otherwise out of the question, if Grand National Assembly accepts all points of treaty to which he has already signified agreement His Majesty's Government would be prepared to resume "on basis of remodelling economic clauses only"?' [2] Not printed.

Unfortunately there is good ground for believing that Admiral Bristol and his economic experts, Messrs. Gillespie and Wheeler, may have played some part in inciting the Turks to reject economic clauses as a whole at the last minute. For instance American experts expressed themselves strongly in private regarding wording of article 94 (which might be held to validate such concessions as those of the Turkish Petroleum Company) and articles 80 and 97 as inimical not to Turkish but to American interests.[3] Ismet Pasha himself seemed never to understand, nor, until the last day, to care much about the economic clauses. It is therefore quite probable that Admiral Bristol is informing you and General Harington of what he wished Ismet Pasha to say, or of what he encouraged Ismet Pasha to think and say.

As you know, economic clauses and in particular article 94 are of importance to British as well as to French and Italian interests, although it may be true that, as a whole, the economic clauses are more essential to two latter. In any case, on the last day of the conference we went as far as the French and Italians were willing to go in agreeing that articles 82, 84, 91, 92, and the annex to article 83 in the economic clauses should not come into force for six months, and should be open to examination and revision by Turkey and the Allies during this period.[4] I see no reason at this moment to offer Ismet Pasha any further concession on this point, and you should be careful not to give any Turk or Admiral Bristol reason to believe that such a course is under consideration.

[3] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 967–9, 972–4.

[4] See No. 370.

No. 395

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 13, 9.15 p.m.)
No. 84 Telegraphic [E 1788/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 13, 1923, 8.10 p.m.*

I received Your Lordship's telegram No. 34[1] after despatch of my telegram No. 82.[2]

I do not regard 'ultimatum' made by Reouf Bey to Colonel Mougin as having been intended to be in any way official. As stated in my telegram No. 75[3] I believe it to have been meant as pressure on French. Official communication was that reported in my telegram No. 73.[4] Turkish attitude

[1] No. 391. [2] No. 393. [3] No. 384.

[4] No. 383. In his despatch No. 100 of February 13, Mr. Henderson explained: 'The tone of his [Reouf Bey's] communication to us, which I regard as the only official one, was entirely at variance with the language used by Colonel Mougin. That officer is notoriously a pliant tool in the hands of the Turks. General Pellé has more than once referred to his lack of critical judgement and both General Pellé and I were in agreement that Reouf's language on that occasion was merely a form of bluff intended to impress the French Government. Moreover a further verbal message from Reouf Bey which was communicated

since February 10th had been one of endeavouring to back down without abandoning pretentions to impose restrictions on foreign warships in Turkish ports. Angora will not abandon this claim. At the same time they do not mean to try and enforce it unless they regard themselves as seriously threatened which they did on February 5th. They are looking for excuse to get out of situation without losing too much face.

Text of proposed communication in your telegram No. 35[5] will afford this though I deprecate too much insistence on (? Mudros) since though Turks may tacitly submit to our view they will not admit it.

to the High Commissioners on the 12th instant, while giving at some length the reasons which prevented the Turks from recognising the validity of the Mudros Armistice, contained no sort of menace. On the contrary Adnan Bey, in communicating to me that message, [see No. 390] gave me once more the most formal assurances in regard to the absence of any hostile intention. He argued in fact, and not unjustifiably, that the Turks by their subsequent actions, or rather inaction, had proved their pacific intentions. He begged however that the situation might be legitimised as its prolongation was of a nature, particularly in view of Ismet Pasha's imminent arrival in Constantinople and apart from the constant risk of an incident, to prejudice the course of the general peace negotiations.'

[5] No. 391.

No. 396

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 14, 6 p.m.)
No. 85 Telegraphic [E 1817/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 14, 1923, 5 p.m.*

Judging from press and other indications at Constantinople there is increasing tendency in favour of immediate signature of peace. Attitude at Angora is of course quite different but in a telegram dated February 12th Colonel Mougin reports strong reaction headed by Reouf and Fethi Bey against extremists. He is of opinion that much depends on whether Mustapha Kemal is prepared to come forward definitely in favour of peace.[1]

[1] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 970–1.

No. 397

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 15, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 32 Telegraphic [E 1845/1/44]

ROME, *February 14, 1923, 9.25 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 47.[1]

My immediately following telegram[2] contains text[3] required, in French. Ministry of Foreign Affairs state that original Turkish draft was amended

[1] Of February 13; this ran: 'French government informed us on February 6th [see No. 373] that Ismet Pasha had expressed on February 5th willingness to accept the Turkish

by M. Bompard and Signor Montagna whilst Your Lordship was preparing to leave by train.

draft declaration regarding judicial régime for foreigners in Turkey [see Cmd. 1814, pp. 852–3], as strengthened by amendments inserted in it by Signor Montagna [see n. 3, below] on February 4th and 5th. We are entirely in the dark as to what Signor Montagna put into the draft. Please obtain full text, as amended, from Signor Montagna as soon as possible and telegraph it.'

[2] No. 33 of February 14.

[3] This amended text (parentheses have been added to indicate the amendments) ran as follows: 'La délégation turque a déjà eu l'occasion de faire connaître que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est en mesure d'assurer aux étrangers devant les tribunaux toutes les garanties d'une bonne justice et qu'il est à même d'y veiller dans le plein exercice de sa souveraineté et sans aucune intervention étrangère. Il n'en est pas moins disposé à faire procéder à des enquêtes et études pour introduire telle des réformes que justifierait le progrès des mœurs et de la civilisation. Dans cet esprit la délégation turque tient à faire la déclaration suivante: le Gouvernement turc se propose de prendre incessamment à son service, pour la période qu'il jugera nécessaire et qui ne sera pas inférieure à cinq années, des conseillers légistes européens qui seront choisis (sur une liste dressée par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de La Haye) parmi les jurisconsultes ressortissants des pays n'ayant pas participé à la guerre de 1914–18, et qui seront (engagés comme) des fonctionnaires turcs. Ces conseillers légistes dépendront du Ministère de la Justice où ils participeront aux travaux des commissions et réformes législatives et seront spécialement chargés de suivre dans les villes de Constantinople et Smyrne le fonctionnement des juridictions civiles, commerciales et pénales turques, et de recevoir toutes plaintes auxquelles pourraient donner lieu soit l'administration de la justice civile, commerciale ou pénale, soit l'exécution des peines, soit l'application des lois (ainsi que les visites domiciliaires, perquisitions ou arrestations) avec mission d'en rendre compte au Ministère de la Justice à l'effet d'assurer la stricte observation de la législation turque. Dans les matières correctionnelles la mise en liberté sous caution devra toujours être prononcée à moins que la sécurité publique n'en fût de ce fait compromise, ou que la mise en liberté provisoire n'entravât la bonne marche de l'instruction de l'affaire. Tous compromis et clauses compromissoires en matière civile ou commerciale sont permis et les décisions arbitrales ainsi rendues seront exécutées sur le visa du président du tribunal de première instance, qui ne pourra refuser son visa qu'au cas où la décision serait contraire à l'ordre public. La présente déclaration sera valable pour une durée de cinq ans.' (An English translation of this text, showing in parentheses Signor Montagna's amendments, is printed in *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 995–6.)

No. 398

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 527 [E 1245/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 14, 1923*

My Lord,

It was with much surprise that I received at Lausanne on the 31st ultimo, at the very moment when the treaty drawn up by the allied Representatives was being presented to the Turkish delegation,[1] your Lordship's telegram No. 122,[2] giving the text of a note addressed to you by M. Poincaré, which

[1] See No. 357. [2] No. 349, n. 5.

contained a formal repudiation, on the part of France, of the engagement entered into by her on the 5th September, 1914,[3] and an expression of the intention of the French government, in the event of the allies being unable to conclude a common peace, to negotiate separately with Turkey, in order to safeguard the special interests of France.

2. In justification of this threatened breach of a solemn compact entered into at one of the gravest moments in the history of our respective countries, M. Poincaré, in his note, contends that the agreement of the 5th September, 1914, applied only to the duration of the war and to the period necessary for the negotiation of peace, a period which, so far as Turkey is concerned, he declares to be at an end, the recent Græco-Turkish conflict being, in his view, a separate war which has modified the position of the allies to their disadvantage, and created a new situation altogether different from that in which the Declaration of 1914 was signed. M. Poincaré further defends the position he had taken up by arguing that the prolongation of the war with Turkey was the fault of Greece, supported by Great Britain.

3. I will deal presently with the first of these arguments. As regards the second, it is not necessary to enter here into the vexed controversy as to the responsibility for the hostilities which have for so long continued in Anatolia. I need only recall that they were the direct outcome of the despatch of Greek forces to Asia Minor in May 1919 on a mandate from the Supreme Council in Paris.[4] For this mandate the French government shared full responsibility, and at a later date it was solemnly confirmed by the allocation of Smyrna to Greece under the terms of the treaty of Sèvres—a treaty that also bore the signature of France. The stimulus which the presence of the Greek army of occupation in Asia Minor undoubtedly gave to the Turkish nationalist movement, and the extent to which this movement rendered it increasingly difficult to obtain acceptance of the treaty of Sèvres, may well be adduced as showing that the original decision of the Supreme Council represented a policy incapable of practical realisation. The question now at issue, however, is not whether the decision was wise or the reverse, but whether the responsibility for the trouble that arose in its train was not incurred by France in an equal degree with Great Britain and her other allies. To this question, there can be but one answer.

4. The contention that the British government afforded assistance to Greece in money and material has been repeated in almost every country, except in Greece itself. It rests on no foundation. The Greek government obtained no money from His Majesty's Government, and no munitions. But, according to the Greeks themselves, it was largely from France that they obtained such material as they were able to acquire. At the same time it is notorious that no inconsiderable portion of the armament and the munitions which enabled the Turkish army ultimately to win the victory over the Greeks and to expel them, root and branch, from Asia, came from French sources and, in part, after the French retirement from Cilicia,[5] from French government

[3] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 108, pp. 365–6.
[4] See Vol. I, No. 10, n. 8.
[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 6, n. 3.

stocks. Thus did France make a not insignificant contribution to the progress and the result of that warfare which M. Poincaré so justifiably deplores.

5. Not content with wrongly charging the British government with a special degree of responsibility for the continued Greek resistance to the forces of Angora, M. Poincaré, in his note, bases a none too friendly attack on myself on the correspondence which passed between M. Gounaris and me last spring. If he will re-read the note[6] which I addressed to M. Gounaris on the 6th March last, he will find that I expressly stated that the only hope for Greece was to place her case in the hands of the allied Powers and to trust to their diplomatic intervention to secure peace. My note was couched in terms of courtesy in reply to the frank statement which M. Gounaris had given me of the unfavourable military position in which the Greek army then stood. It would have been singularly ungracious to answer such a note with any harsh and unsympathetic language. But the purport of my answer was in no sense equivocal, in that it informed the Greek government, as, indeed, I had personally informed M. Gounaris four months earlier, that the moment had arrived when they must submit to the diplomatic mediation of the Powers rather than invite further military disaster. No one should be better aware of this than M. Poincaré himself, since on my return in January 1922 from Cannes, where I had arranged for an almost immediate conference at Paris in order to press Allied mediation equally upon Turkey and Greece, with the view of securing the prompt but peaceful retirement of the Greek armies from Anatolia, I had the pleasure of seeing M. Poincaré, who had just become Président du Conseil, and of concerting with him an early meeting of the proposed conference—a meeting which was in fact only delayed till the latter part of March[7] owing to the retirement of the Italian Premier, Signor Bonomi, who was to have represented Italy at it. The suggestion therefore, which is directly made in M. Poincaré's note, that the adventurous policy of Greece received support from me, is not only contradicted by the known facts of the case, but is wholly without justification.

6. The essential importance of M. Poincaré's note lies, however, not so much in the recriminations which he has chosen to address to His Majesty's Government in respect of the past, as in the warning which he utters regarding the future. His language appears to admit of no other interpretation than one which implies a formal repudiation by France of the pact of September 1914. It is difficult to follow the reasoning by which he arrives at the conclusion that this pact no longer applies.

7. The stipulations contained in the agreement of the 5th September, 1914, were absolutely precise; and it is to be noted that they were textually re-affirmed, subsequently to the entry of Turkey into the war—at the time when Italy had joined the allies—by the Declaration of the [3]oth November, 1915.[8] By these stipulations, the allied governments mutually engaged 'not to conclude peace separately during the present war', and agreed 'that when

[6] See Vol. XVII, No. 549.

[7] See Vol. XVII, Chapter IV.

[8] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 109, pp. 850–1.

terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other allies'.

8. There is no question here of a 'period necessary for the negotiation of peace', which M. Poincaré now categorically announces, on his own authority, to have terminated—'Ce temps est passé'. How 'the present war', which, according to the agreement, is the period during which no separate peace is to be made, can be declared to have ended before peace has in fact been concluded, is not understood. At none of the numerous allied conferences at Paris between the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy, which I have had the honour to attend in the time both of M. Poincaré and his predecessors, has it ever been suggested that the war with Turkey was over, or that the period necessary for the negotiation of peace had passed. On the contrary, every one of those conferences was directed to bringing the unterminated war to a termination and to adapt the allied conditions of peace to the altered circumstances of the hour. Why were the three great allies thus continually and earnestly collaborating, except upon the assumption that peace could only be concluded by them in common? If all the while the fatal hour was approaching when collective responsibility was to cease and individual initiative was to take its place, why was no hint of the impending revulsion ever given? It cannot, surely, be argued that the words 'the present war', in the Declaration of 1915, do not cover the war between the allies and Turkey, and that we are now dealing only with what M. Poincaré terms the separate war ('guerre particulière') between Greeks and Turks. No doubt the treaty which the allies have been endeavouring to conclude at Lausanne was to put an end to the war between Greece and Turkey. But much more was it intended to establish peace between Turkey and the allies and to substitute for the unratified Treaty of Sèvres an instrument which should definitely terminate the state of hostility still existing between the Turkish State and the Powers who declared war against Turkey in 1914. How then can it be maintained that the Declaration of 1915 does not preclude France from entering into a separate peace with Turkey?

9. Furthermore, to revert to the explicit proviso that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other allies: when M. Poincaré now says that the time necessary for the peace negotiations has passed, it is not understood how this position can possibly be sustained. Has not M. Poincaré himself insisted with great force, in another note, to which I have already had the honour to reply—in my despatch to your Excellency No. 473 of the 9th February[9]—that there has been so far no break in the negotiations, that they continue, and that it is of the utmost importance to resume the discussions with the Turks at the point where they were left at the moment of the temporary adjournment of the Lausanne Conference? In the note now under reply it is said that when it becomes impossible ever to arrive at a collective peace between the allies and Turkey, it would be unreasonable to contend that no separate treaty might be concluded with that Power by

[9] No. 382.

any one of the allies. The contingency so contemplated must be assumed to be a failure on the part of the allies to agree among themselves as to the conditions of peace to be put forward in common, the implication being that it ought not to be left in the power of one recalcitrant ally, or group of allies, to prevent the conclusion of peace by holding out against conditions considered acceptable by the others. Without here entering on a discussion of the juridical value of this argument in the light of the very precise language of the Declarations of 1914 and 1915, I would observe that the above is not the contingency which has actually arisen, or which is threatening to arise. It is a very different situation with which the allies are at present faced. There is no disagreement between them as to the conditions of peace. On the contrary, they have with complete unanimity presented to Turkey a draft treaty which they have all declared to represent their common views and aims. If there is a danger of a breakdown of the present negotiations, it can only be because the enemy may refuse the terms on which the allies are agreed. Whatever juridical interpretation might be placed upon the wording of the Declaration of 1914, it is to be doubted whether even by the most ingenious casuistry the terms of that covenant could be twisted in such a way as to justify one of its signatories in concluding a separate peace with an enemy Power after joint allied terms had been presented to and rejected by that Power.

10. Nevertheless, these are the circumstances in which M. Poincaré now officially proclaims the right and the intention of France to sever herself from her allies, in contravention of the solemn engagement which formed the basis of Anglo-French co-operation throughout the war and during the critical years that followed, and to enter upon an independent course of action in the interest of France alone. The language of his note, and the form which he has given to it, leave no apparent doubts as to his resolve. Nor is that resolve deprived of any part of its precision by the assurance which he has been good enough to add that, when he proposes to act in the manner described, he will, as a special mark of his confidence and friendship, inform His Majesty's Government in advance of his intention.

11. M. Poincaré's announcement seems in reality calculated to endanger the continuance of the Anglo-French alliance which has rested on the pact of 1914 as its foundation. It can hardly be interpreted in any other sense. And yet it is difficult to believe that the French government can have taken into full consideration the consequences that might be expected to ensue from the plan of action foreshadowed by M. Poincaré, if carried into effect. In the eyes of His Majesty's Government, no issue more grave could have been raised. It is therefore important that they should be authoritatively informed whether the significance of M. Poincaré's pronouncement is meant to be such, as in their view, his words imply.

12. Your Excellency will read this despatch to M. Poincaré and hand him a copy of it, should he so desire.

I am, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 399

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 15, 10.55 p.m.)
Nos. 86 and 87 Telegraphic [E 1867/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 15, 1923, 8.25 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 38.[1]

I trust we shall not need to resort to suggestion of my colleague.

In the meantime latter has at last received instructions[2] and we are addressing note to Adnan Bey based on French High Commissioner's instructions and those in your telegrams Nos. 34 and 35.[3]

After preliminary paragraphs terms of note are briefly as follows:

Without entering into detailed discussion of legal points raised by Reouf's communication and as to whether Mudros armistice, which closed great war, or Mudania convention, which terminated Greco-Turkish hostilities, is to be invoked, it is absolutely firm opinion of allied governments that during existing situation, which is legal and de facto one of armistice, and until peace is re-established, they are entitled to maintain warships at Smyrna, etc.

Rest of note is almost textually that in your telegram.

[1] Of February 14. This ran: 'Italian Embassy state that Signor Mussolini agrees to proposals for reply to Angora regarding Smyrna embodied in my telegram No. 34 to you [No. 391]. He further wishes to support proposal of your Italian colleague for a conference of High Commissioners, Admirals, Adnan Bey and a Turkish naval officer to attempt to find a solution of whole question. I regard this proposal as somewhat fatuous but I have no objection if the three Allied representatives agree on its necessity.'

[2] In his telegram No. 35 of February 14, not printed, Sir R. Graham reported the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as stating that instructions had been sent to the Italian High Commissioner to the effect that, provided the French Government agreed, he should join in addressing the proposed Note to Adnan Bey (see No. 391). This statement was subsequently confirmed in an Italian Note Verbale of February 15, a translation of which was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Sir R. Graham's despatch No. 162 of February 15, not printed.

[3] No. 391.

No. 400

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 16, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 190 Telegraphic: by bag [E 1869/1/44]

PARIS, *February 15, 1923*

Your despatch No. 473 of February 9th.[1]

I called on the President of the Council yesterday evening and left a copy with him after reading it. M. Poincaré said that he did not wish to engage in

[1] No. 382.

any recriminations over the policy followed by either government at Lausanne, especially now that both were working in complete accord on the Turkish question. On particular points raised by the despatch, he wished to say that no doubt some leakage of confidential information had from time to time occurred here, but he thought there were faults on both sides, as for instance when the sense of his memorandum, sent to me on February 4th,[2] had appeared in the London papers[3] when nothing whatever had been said to the Paris press on the subject.

As regards the so-called insinuation to which Your Lordship objected in paragraph 14 of the despatch on the encouragement of Greece, he never made insinuations, and these words did not refer to anything that happened at Lausanne, but to the encouragement given to M. Gounaris last year for military operations in Asia. That encouragement he knew was the work of three members of the late government, Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Birkenhead, and Mr. Churchill. But Your Lordship was a member of that government, and in any case its policy was the policy of England at that time, and could not be entirely disavowed.

The President of the Council said he was sorry that, when Lord Grey said on Tuesday night in the House of Lords[4] that the French government had not explicitly denied that they might be prepared to enter into separate negotiations if the Turks did not sign, Your Lordship had not told the House that he had given to the British government a categorical denial of the suggestion that he had ever thought of making a separate peace. Having done this he had not thought it necessary to deny it in the newspapers as well. He showed me a passage from a speech made by a Radical deputy in the Chamber on the previous day, when he was accused of having followed Your Lordship's lead *à la remorque* at Lausanne instead of acting independently on behalf of French interests. He thought that this proved how points of view might differ.

As to possible publication of the correspondence, as stated in paragraph 15 of the despatch, if there was any publication he would be obliged to state his case at greater length, and with additional facts, and there would, no doubt, be an end of the cordial relations now existing. I pointed out that the mention of publication was purely hypothetical, and I hoped that no occasion for it would arise. If I might state my personal opinion, I hoped he would not think a long reply to this despatch necessary, because such rejoinders might be continued until the Greek Kalends. M. Poincaré did not seem to differ from this view.[5]

[2] See No. 373, n. 3.

[3] In a minute of February 16, Mr. Forbes Adam wrote: '. . . the News Dep[artmen]t know for certain from American journalists here that the leakage of the Poincaré note of Feb[ruary] 4th to the American press (New York) came from French sources and apparently the French Embassy! It was never referred to in the London press, as far as we know.'

[4] See *53 H.L. Deb. 5 s.*, col. 24.

[5] M. Poincaré replied to Lord Curzon's Note of February 9 (No. 382) in a Note of February 17, a copy of which was transmitted in Lord Crewe's despatch No. 407 of February 18. To this Note Lord Curzon, in his despatch No. 683 of February 26, replied as follows:

'The note from the Président du Conseil dated February 17th and enclosed in your despatch No. 407 of February 18th, regarding Monsieur Poincaré's intervention at Constantinople during the final stages of the Lausanne Conference appears to me to consist in the main of a series of misstatements and mis-representations, which could without difficulty be refuted or contradicted at each point. I am, however, unwilling to continue a controversy on such lines. The facts of the case are well known to everyone who was present at Lausanne and they admit of only one interpretation.'

No. 401

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 17, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 67 Telegraphic [E 1928/6/44]

ATHENS, *February 17, 1923, 2.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 66.[1]

British intelligence officer from Constantinople met Pangalos at dinner at Plastiras's house last night; many of Cabinet arrived later. They made it clear to him that they had no intention of acting independently of England. They hoped most for war side by side with England. Another alternative was, General Pangalos said, benevolent neutrality on the part of England which would allow Greek fleet to go up the Dardanelles.

They could hold out in present situation for a month and a half. After that further taxes would they said be necessary, and this the people would not stand.

They also said they had given up Eastern Thrace for peace. If allies could not assure peace they would be free to retake Eastern Thrace. This point has also been given prominence in the press lately.

It was evident to my informant that General Pangalos was the ruling factor.

I hear that in another conversation with an English lady yesterday General Pangalos expressed conviction that war was inevitable in the spring.[2]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Of February 14, not printed.

[2] In his telegram No. 3637 of February 16 to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'I have received a reply from General Pangalos. He has issued orders that any action by Greek troops in vicinity of Maritza which could be in any way considered provocative, is to be avoided.'

No. 402

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 17, 10 p.m.)
No. 90 Telegraphic [E 1929/1/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 17, 1923, 9.15 p.m.*

I saw Ismet Pasha this morning.

His first remark was to ask for advice. I replied that except to advise him to sign treaty which he made a great mistake in not signing at Lausanne I had no other instructions as to his best course of action. I presumed however that first thing for him appears to be to get Grand National Assembly to approve everything that he had done at Lausanne and to send him back with full powers to conclude treaty. All that he would then need to do would be to notify secretary-general of conference.

I then delivered personal message in your telegram No. 31,[1] and described to him British point of view as indicated in first part of that telegram. Ismet begged me to convey to you a most friendly message in response to yours. He said that though you and he had disagreed on many points he had great admiration for and confidence in you, and that at Lausanne your opinion had been the only one that counted for him. I said that you had equally great sympathy and confidence in him. He added that he had always paid greatest attention to your advice.

He complained that Great Britain after all the points which especially interested her had been settled, was showing herself more uncompromising than France and Italy. Both the latter, he said, were willing to reserve economic clauses whereas England was insisting on treaty being signed as a whole. He said that he would find greatest difficulty in getting Grand National Assembly to approve of what he had already accepted unless he could hold out to them a hope of better terms for Turkey in respect of economic clauses. He said that his task would be greatly facilitated if he could receive an assurance from you of British goodwill in respect of a modification of economic clauses. He had counted on that goodwill at Lausanne at the end, and had been disappointed not to get it. I told him that though in certain respects Great Britain was less interested than other countries in that portion of the treaty, it was also of the greatest importance to her, that my government was of opinion that any further concessions would not only seriously compromise allied interests but also be to disadvantage of Turkey by discouraging foreign capital and serious business undertakings and that England was far too loyal a country even if majority of points which especially interested her had been settled to go back on the allies in regard to points which especially interested them.

Ismet again said that both those allies were now willing to go farther than England was prepared to go. I told him that I could express no opinion on any further concession that they were prepared to make but that view of my

[1] No. 380.

government was that allies had gone far enough. Ismet repeated that it was Great Britain's word which carried weight and that if he could meet Assembly with an assurance of British goodwill in settlement of outstanding points he was convinced that he could get its approval of all that he had himself accepted and that treaty could be signed within a week or a fortnight after reunion of conference. He complained that treaty had been drawn up unilaterally and that no Turkish legal expert had been invited to co-operate. He took particular exception to what he described as explanatory note in regard to payment in sterling of interest on existing debt.[2]

Generally speaking he was friendly and pacific and gave me impression of being most anxious to have your advice as to best course to pursue. He was obviously disappointed that my advice did not go beyond a recommendation to sign treaty in form in which it stood at the time of your departure from Lausanne. Though I was careful to avoid giving any indication that you would be able to accept any further modification I told him I would inform you of his request for assurance above-mentioned.

I consider it most desirable that you should if possible send him some message in reply.[3] He told me he was being very frank with me and I do not think that it was assumed. His references to you were clearly sincere and I have reason to believe that Adnan Bey who was present during our interview and who is undoubtedly well disposed both to British and to me personally had told him beforehand that he could afford to be frank. I am convinced therefore that a message of encouragement from you would be both appreciated by and a help to him and be in the interest of peace.

Ismet Pasha, who saw other High Commissioners[4] before me and General Harington afterwards, is leaving tonight for Angora and proposes to meet Mustapha Kemal at Eskishehr.

[2] See Appendix III.

[3] In his telegram No. 45 of February 20, Lord Curzon replied: 'Please thank Ismet Pasha for his friendly sentiments towards myself, and express my confident belief that he will use all his influence in the cause of peace.' Ismet's reply to this message was transmitted to Lord Curzon in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 117 of February 25; it ran: 'I present to Your Excellency my best respects and thanks for message received on my passage through Constantinople and for good wishes which you have just sent me. Allow me to say that I still entertain conviction that mere knowledge of humble claims of Turkish people, which like every people asks only to live free and independent, is conducive to, and sufficient to assure, world peace.'

[4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 521.

No. 403

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 206 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 1933/1/44*]

PARIS, *February 17, 1923*

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in Your Lordship's despatch No. 527 of February 14th,[1] I gave the President of the Council a copy of it

[1] No. 398.

today after reading it. M. Poincaré said he would send a short reply on one or two points, which he would couch in as moderate language as he possibly could, as he was anxious to avoid a continued controversy on paper. He could not entirely accept Your Lordship's disclaimer of the encouragement given to Greece by the late government, mainly on account of Mr. Lloyd George's speech.[2] I said that the point at issue was not that speech, but the correspondence with M. Gounaris, and on this you made a complete reply in the despatch. The President of the Council said that he would also make some observations on the pact of September, 1914,[3] and I gathered that he still is prepared to argue that the Turko-Greek war had given a new colour both to that pact and to the declaration of 1915.[4]

He went on to say that the terms of the last two paragraphs of the despatch seem to be needlessly wounding and unfriendly. He particularly objected to the phrase that his announcement 'seems in reality calculated to endanger the continuance of the Anglo-French Alliance, &c.' It was utterly untrue to charge him with such an intention. I pointed out that there is a distinct difference between the meaning of the French word '*calculé*' and the English 'calculated'. I did not understand that Your Lordship was charging him with deliberately setting to work to destroy the Alliance; if I had to paraphrase the sentence I should write 'M. [P]oincaré's announcement seems to be so worded as to have the result of endangering &c.', going on to state that it is hardly possible to read it otherwise. M. Poincaré said he would take note of my interpretation of the words in replying to the question at the close of the despatch.

[2] Of August 4, 1922 (see Vol. XVII, No. 727).
[3] See No. 398, n. 3.
[4] See No. 398, n. 8.

No. 404

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)[1] *to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received February 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 96 Telegraphic [E 2024/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 19, 1923, 10.50 p.m.*

French High Commissioner read me today various telegrams which had been repeated to him from Lausanne or which he had received from Colonel Mougin. Among former was a telegram from Monsieur Bompard giving an accurate description of final meeting with the Turks in your room on February 4th.[2] From another telegram it appears that French government were prepared to accept Ismet's request that whole economic section of treaty should be (? reserved) for subsequent discussion. I was unaware that French government had gone so far and French High Commissioner is certain to

[1] Sir H. Rumbold had resumed charge at Constantinople on February 19.
[2] See No. 370.

have informed Ismet of French readiness to meet latter's request on this point when Ismet passed through Constantinople.[3] The action of French government in this matter seems as unfortunate as it is disloyal and fully accounts for Ismet's remark to Mr. Henderson.[4] In this connection please see point 4 in your telegram No. 31.[5] I explained to French High Commissioner Allied point of view with regard to economic clauses as communicated to Ismet on February 4th[6] and said that it was absolutely important at this moment that allies should speak with one voice to Turks. But I am afraid my remarks come rather late. The French High Commissioner mentioned points in financial clauses raised by Ismet in conversation with him such as restitution to Turks of civil list property in detached territories and proportional distribution of note issue among these territories. As I gathered French High Commissioner seemed to think it might be possible to meet Turks on these points, I informed him that when Monsieur Bompard returned from Paris it transpired that one of the few points on which President of the Council refused to give way was return to Turkey of civil list property and that allies had unanimously rejected proposed distribution of note issue.

Colonel Mougin's telegrams continued to dwell on hostility to France now prevailing at Angora where it is being freely said that if war results French will be to blame as their main concern has been to protect the pocket of Jews who are interested in debt of Ottoman Bank and Régie.

Mougin also reported that National Assembly would again raise questions of Mosul and Karagatch besides insisting upon reservation of economic sections of treaty for further discussion.

I am informed that my return here has had a good effect and sent value of Turkish pound up by four points today. It has been interpreted as a further indication that His Majesty's Government wish for a pacific solution of present situation.

[3] See No. 402.

[4] In his telegram No. 92 of February 18, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'French high commissioner appears to have expostulated at some length yesterday with Ismet Pasha against attacks on French in Turkish press.

'He tells me that his impression of his interview was favourable but that Ismet had shown great anxiety lest Powers by refusing to consider any alternative in treaty, as submitted, intended to present Turkey with an ultimatum which she could not accept.

'I personally believe he assured Ismet that France would be ready to take into consideration any Turkish proposals for modifications.

'As French high commissioner's interview preceded mine, I fancy this was reason for Ismet's insistence on the, to him, incomprehensible attitude of His Majesty's Government in showing even less conciliation than French and Italian governments in regard to matters which specially interested latter.

'Prior to interview French high commissioner assured me that he had no instructions from his government as to line to follow with Ismet. If this is in fact the case it is possibly due to pressure from London which induced French government to leave French high commissioner to say to Ismet what he knows French government would prefer rather than what His Majesty's Government recommend.'

[5] No. 380.

[6] See Cmd. 1814, p. 833.

No. 405

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 20, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 97 Telegraphic [E 2051/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 20, 1923, 7.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 96.[1]

As it was important to know exactly what Ismet had said to French High Commissioner with regard to judicial régime for foreigners, I have obtained from latter Ismet's exact words:

'Je suis d'accord sur le texte de la déclaration relatif aux garanties judiciaires qui m'a été proposé; il reste à régler des détails d'application sur le compétence judiciaire, par exemple.'

I have informed French High Commissioner that declaration referred to by Ismet must be one drawn up by Monsieur Montagna after our departure and that His Majesty's Government were in no way committed by this declaration, text of which they had only received five days ago.[2] I have now seen declaration drafted by Monsieur Montagna which in practice merely reproduces Turkish declaration with a small addition and appears to me to be valueless.

As it is important that there should be no misapprehension in the minds of Turks with regard to declaration which Ismet says he has accepted, I would propose to inform Adnan that I had heard of Ismet's statement on the subject and that I was glad to learn that Turkish delegation had after all accepted declaration submitted to them by Allies on February 4th [*sic*].[3] If Adnan states that declaration to which Ismet referred is declaration submitted by Monsieur Montagna, I would say that His Majesty's Government had no knowledge until a few days ago of its text and were not in any way committed by it unless you consider that point is sufficiently covered by statement made by you to Ismet at final meeting on February 4th and given at the bottom of page 162 and top of page 163 of white paper[4] containing draft terms of peace.[5] There is always danger that unless position is made clear to Turks they may consider we have gone back on them with regard to declaration. I do not know whether Monsieur Montagna submitted his declaration on his own account or on behalf of Allies.[6]

[1] No. 404.
[2] See No. 397.
[3] This declaration was submitted on February 3 (see Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6).
[4] Pages 844–5 in the pagination of Cmd. 1814.
[5] See Appendix III.
[6] Lord Curzon replied in Foreign Office telegram No. 49 of February 22: 'Please see my telegram No. 46 (of February 20th [No. 406]) and my telegram No. 81 to Paris and Rome [No. 407]. I would prefer to await result of your consultation with your allied colleagues before embarking on what might amount to a separate correspondence with Angora regarding declaration in question. Doubtless, however, you will be able to make our position quite clear verbally to Adnan Bey.'

No. 406

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 46 Telegraphic [E 1995/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 20, 1923, 10 p.m.*

Mr. Henderson's telegrams Nos. 90[1] and 91[2] (of February 17th and 18th) and your telegram No. 95[3] (of February 19th. Ismet and Lausanne treaty).

Note from French Ambassador[4] here shows that Ismet Pasha explained to General Pellé that he regarded as still outstanding the same points as those given by Adnan Bey in Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 91. Ismet gave it as his opinion that the Grand National Assembly would probably exhaust their discussions in a week and that he calculated being in a position to address his proposals to the secretary general of the Lausanne conference after about that interval.

I do not think that any communication regarding re-discussion of or concessions in treaty should be made to Adnan or to Ismet during this period, which the allies should, however, utilise to decide on what points and on what terms they are really ready to re-open discussions, and what concessions they are prepared to make on the points to be re-discussed.

My present opinion is that re-discussion should only be permitted on those points which were really outstanding when the British delegation left Lausanne, namely,

(1) Turco-Greek reparation formula.[5]

(2) Declaration regarding judicial safeguards for foreigners in Turkey,[6] and

(3) Economic clauses.[5]

As at present advised, I would reject any proposal to re-open discussion on other points mentioned in Adnan's letter or which may still be raised by Angora Assembly.

As regards Turco-Greek reparation article, it is really a question of drafting and procedure which remains open.[7] Turks wish that proposed commission should only consider Turkish claims against Greece and not Greek claims against Turkey. It is impossible for the allies to refuse right

[1] No. 402.

[2] This referred to No. 402 and continued: 'I have received a private letter from Adnan Bey referring to my conversation with Ismet yesterday [see No. 402] and mentioning following questions as those in regard to which Ismet seeks an assurance of Your Lordship's goodwill with a view to final settlement.

'The suppression of note of explanation to annexe one [following Article 56], reservation of economic clauses, régime for foreigners apart from judicial system, property of civil list and private property of state and distribution of note issue among debtors to be distributed.

'Adnan adds that were Ismet to have such an assurance he could defend with more force concessions made by him in other respects.'

[3] Not printed.

[4] Of February 19, not printed.

[5] Article 58 (see Appendix III).

[6] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.

[7] Ibid., p. 833.

of Greece to make counter claims, but this right might perhaps be left to reservation by Greek delegates when they sign treaty and not appear in the body of the treaty. This or some re-drafting of clauses covering the same point would probably allow of an agreement being reached with Turks.

As regards judicial declaration, departmental views on the Ismet draft with the Montagna amendments[8] are on their way to you, Rome and Paris by despatch.[9] I should be glad to receive your considered opinion as to the maximum concession which we could safely offer in this matter.

You took with you a copy of the minutes of a meeting which you attended here on February 7th[10] giving the considered opinion of the Board of Trade and Foreign Office on the extent to which the economic clauses might be taken out of the treaty for subsequent discussion. The minutes in question also showed generally what points are essential to us and on what we can give way.

I understand that M. Bompard's proposal to take out all economic clauses (71–117)[11] from treaty and deal with them separately and subsequently was a thirteenth-hour attempt to have treaty signed before Ismet left Lausanne. View of Quai d'Orsay is now believed to be to agree to re-discussing of all economic clauses but to keep them, if and as modified, in the treaty. If so, Italians will probably support them and we could hardly stand out.

As regards procedure, my idea is that when Ismet after the Assembly's discussion makes his written proposals to the secretary of the conference, the three allied governments should reply to these proposals stating precisely, as stated above, what they are prepared to discuss and on what conditions. It would be suggested to Ismet that such discussions as the allies are prepared to re-open should take place not at Lausanne but at Constantinople between the three allied High Commissioners and Ismet Pasha or Adnan Bey, either formally or informally. The results of that discussion would be put into the form of draft articles to take their place in the draft treaty prepared at Lausanne.

It may become necessary to consider whether any time limit should be set to these discussions.

As soon as articles have been agreed upon, they should be forwarded at once to the secretary general at Paris in order that a final draft treaty may be prepared for signature. When a suitable short interval has elapsed after the conclusion of the discussions at Constantinople, final signature could be arranged at some suitable place.

Unless you wish first to consult me further regarding above procedure or line to be adopted regarding fresh concessions, you should at once broach

[8] No. 397, n. 3.

[9] Foreign Office Despatch No. 121 to Constantinople, No. 589 to Paris, and No. 271 to Rome, of February 19, not printed. See No. 418, below.

[10] This meeting, held in Sir E. Crowe's room in the Foreign Office, was attended by Sir E. Crowe, Sir H. Rumbold, and Mr. Forbes Adam from the Foreign Office, and Mr. Fountain and Mr. Waley from the Board of Trade. The minutes of this meeting (*E 1599/1/44*) are not here printed.

[11] i.e. Part III, Section I, of the Draft Treaty (see Appendix III).

question in above sense with your French and Italian colleagues and ascertain whether they agree.

Repeated to Rome No. 53 and Paris No. 80.

No. 407

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 81[1] *Telegraphic [E 1995/1/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 20, 1923, 10.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 46 to Constantinople.[2]

Constantinople telegrams to which this is a reply showed generally that Ismet Pasha wished to re-open discussions on (1) economic clauses; (2) three separate clauses in the financial section (currency in which interest on debt is to be paid by Turkey, transfer of civil list and Turkish Government property to governments of detached states without compensation, and inclusion of Turkish war debt in debt to be distributed among succession states); (3) certain points in special convention regarding régime for foreigners in Turkey. Apparently this refers to such articles as that relating to import of stores for foreign missions and institutions without payment of customs duties.

Ismet apparently regards question of judicial declaration as settled by his agreement with Signor Montagna and Turco-Greek reparation formula as decided in his favour by omission of reference in relevant article to Greek claims against Turkey.

Sir H. Rumbold is in possession of views of His Majesty's Government regarding economic clauses and judicial declaration. As regards latter, our main contention is that the Ismet–Montagna declaration[3] could only be accepted if paragraph in allied declaration,[4] relating to necessity of foreign advisers' consent to domiciliary visits and arrests by Turkish police, were inserted in Turkish declaration.

Please convey substance of my telegram to Sir H. Rumbold to Government to which you are accredited and inform them that we are instructing him to consult his colleagues at Constantinople as to desirability of proceeding on above lines.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 47.

[1] No. 81 to Paris, No. 54 to Rome. [2] No. 406. [3] No. 397, n. 3.
[4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 835–6.

No. 408

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 21, 6.10 p.m.)
No. 100 Telegraphic [E 2065/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 21, 1923, 4.20 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 40.[1]

Following is summary of General Harington's observations.

1. (? No) cavalry have entered Eastern Thrace via Midia.

2. Four batteries were landed at Rodosto in January and seven reliably reported to have been landed later. Most of the men and material probably go to these ports. The Navy cannot stop this without having right of search.

3. Numbers have arrived in plain clothes. There are probably 20,000 organized soldiers now in Constantinople. Incidentally Turks offered this number to General Harington for defence of Constantinople in August last.

4. Untrue.

5. Untrue. This was verified by recent visit of destroyer.

6. No Turkish aeroplanes are known to be in Thrace.

7. In addition to probably 13,000 armed men in Eastern Thrace including 8,000 gendarmes, there are probably 17,000 registered but not yet armed or clothed.

8. Perhaps twenty batteries at the most. Refet Pasha is pressing for more artillery and clothing.[2]

[1] Of February 17. This ran: 'Greek Legation report following Turkish activities in Eastern Thrace: 1. 1500 cavalry arrived via Midia. 2. Men, guns and material are continually landed at Rodosto. 3. Total of 20,000 soldiers arrived clandestinely in Constantinople. 4. Pontoon detachment and boats near Maritza. 5. Canteens and troops are continually landed at Midia. 6. Aeroplane at Adrianople. 7. Intensive recruiting. 8. Many guns distributed throughout district. Please obtain General Harington's observations.'

[2] In his telegram No. 44 of February 20, Lord Curzon added: 'Further information from same source is to effect that a Turkish division of 12,000 men has recently been moved from Vize towards the Maritza; that Osman Aga has passed through Constantinople for Eastern Thrace with a large number of irregulars; and that large quantities of war material are reaching Eastern Thrace from Bulgaria via Mustapha Pasha. Please telegraph General Harington's observations as soon as possible.'

Sir H. Rumbold replied in his telegram No. 101 of February 21: 'General Harington states: "1. British representations at headquarters know of only two battleships at Vize. 2. Osman Aga has gone to Eastern Thrace; he has probably a band of two hundred and fifty Lazes with him. 3. No confirmation regarding war material from Bulgaria."'

No. 409

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 22, 10.10 p.m.)
No. 104 Telegraphic [E 2103/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 22, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 46.[1]

I communicated essential portions of your telegram to my French and Italian colleagues last night and held meeting with them this morning to discuss it.

I explained fully situation regarding outstanding points up to moment of Your Lordship's departure from Lausanne and adverted to what had passed on following day between Turkish, French and Italian delegates. I then invited their opinions of procedure now suggested by you.

Italian High Commissioner said he had instructions from his government on such entirely different lines that he was precluded from even discussing your proposal. Following is substance of his telegram from Rome dated February 20th.

'I do not consider that it would be expedient that negotiations should be continued by Adnan and High Commissioners. Secretariat General of conference remains at Lausanne and its authority should not be diminished by discussions with which it would have no connection. It is desirable to maintain intact as far as possible situation ultimately produced at Lausanne in accordance with which negotiations would normally be resumed through Secretariat.

'Statements made by Ismet in Constantinople might serve as bait [*sic*] for resumption of discussions at Lausanne between experts only with a view to agreement on outstanding questions after attainment of which delegates would again meet.'

French High Commissioner had no instructions. Though at first nervous as to responsibility with which High Commissioners would be saddled, he eventually expressed himself personally favourable to your plan.

Both my colleagues laid stress on question whether proceedings here would be official or unofficial. I pointed out that you had left this open but said I thought that High Commissioners would really be fulfilling rôle which would have been performed by a sub-commission at Lausanne where members of sub-commissions met as representatives of their governments without power to commit latter completely but where in practice results agreed in sub-commissions were invariably accepted by conference. I expressed fear that Italian plan would merely produce deadlock as before, as experts if left to themselves would not have authority to effect final diplomatic bargains which in other cases had alone made agreed results possible at Lausanne.

My own view is that if attitude taken up at Angora renders it possible to confine further discussion to points enumerated in your telegram under reply,

[1] No. 406.

suggested procedure might produce settlement. But I cannot disguise from myself fact that detailed discussion of economic clauses here would take much time perhaps several weeks during which extraneous events may bring about hostilities especially in view of present temper of both Grand National Assembly and of Greeks.

My colleagues will of course report to their governments. I myself hope to be able to offer more definite opinion when I know trend of preliminary discussions in Grand National Assembly which began yesterday.

No. 410

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 105 Telegraphic [E 2120/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 22, 1923, 11.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Though I only spoke to my colleagues of points enumerated in your telegram No. 46[2] I fear chance of Turks agreeing to limit further discussion to these points is small. This applies more particularly to financial clauses which Adnan mentioned in private letter to Mr. Henderson. Turks will doubtless rely on following facts:

(1) In their last written statement namely Ismet's note of February 4th[3] they said that suppression of explanatory note to table of debt was 'indispensable';

(2) Same note spoke of other questions as partially solved or not yet settled without specifying them; list of 'essential questions' appended to note excludes section 3 of financial clauses which contains article relative to civil list property in detached territory.[4]

[1] No. 409. [2] No. 406. [3] Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41.

[4] Lord Curzon replied, in his telegram No. 56 of February 24; 'We must not lose sight of fact that further considerable concessions as regards Mosul and economic clauses were offered Turks after Ismet's letter of February 4th had been received.

'Question of explanatory note to annex 1 to financial clauses mainly concerns French who have never yet shown inclination to give way upon it. In any case we can now wait to see how French and Italian governments receive our proposals.'

No. 411

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 106 Telegraphic [E 2121/35/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 22, 1923, 11.30 p.m.*

Admiral Brock and General Harington came today to discuss situation with me. They asked my opinion as to how long His Majesty's Government

intended to maintain British troops at Constantinople in the present circumstances and what a rupture with Nationalists would mean if Grand National Assembly decided to reject treaty altogether and not ask for further discussion. They inquired what French and Italians would be likely to do in the event of hostilities.

I replied I could not express a definite opinion on any of these points. Whilst making allowances for their natural desire to know approximately date on which British troops were likely to be withdrawn from Constantinople I said in my view it was indispensable that those troops should remain here pending a definite solution one way or another of question of treaty. It was impossible to foretell what form a rupture would take. The Turks were past masters in the art of spinning out matters and might find means of prolonging the present uncertain situation for some time to come. I thought Ismet was sincerely desirous of peace and that it would not come to a definite breach between Allies and Turks involving hostilities. Still I recognised situation was critical though political considerations rendered it necessary in the present circumstances to incur risk entailed by retention of British troops here. I could not say what French or Italians would do if hostilities broke out.

Both Admiral and General dwelt on the unsoundness of Allied military position here having regard especially to their knowledge of action contemplated by Nationalist organisations in Constantinople and its suburbs in the event of hostilities. They pointed out that approach of spring would permit of military operations. They also said that Kemalist army had on the whole come through with the winter well. Desertions had been few which was a proof that discipline was good.

I said my visitors had no doubt acquainted their respective Secretaries of State with their views on the military and naval situation at Constantinople.[1]

[1] In his telegram No. 3667 of February 23, to the War Office, reporting this discussion with Sir H. Rumbold, General Harington stated: '. . . military unsoundness of our dispersed dispositions is emphasized by my information of secret organizations which the Turks are gradually perfecting in my rear at Chanak, at Scutari and in Constantinople and by improved organization of training and artillery of Kemalist troops. I am debarred by Mudania Convention from reinforcing Asiatic side even if I had means or of completing defences, and neither my local commanders nor I like situation in which we have to wait for enemy to strike first blow and where he likes.

'Instead of presenting the Turk with all chances of an initial success I should, of course, like to forestall him. He may start infiltration tactics again, as he did at Chanak, and orders have been given by me that any crossing of demarcation line is to be opposed by all our available forces. I (? trust) this is approved. Greek advance across the Maritza might also precipitate a rupture. Latter contingency has assumed a military probability and the Admiral and I wish to emphasise the impossibility of changing dispositions already made to carry out existing instructions, so as to meet policy of holding Constantinople in order to co-operate with Greek advance if there is any such intention.

'A corresponding weakening of our hold on lines of communication through Dardanelles would be entailed by any reinforcement of Constantinople. Our difficulty here is that things may happen so quickly that no time to refer to you or for the Government to consult allies might present itself.

'Turks are so close to me that I should have to act, and no half measures will be any good

with my small forces. There is every chance that I may be the person who will be forced to start a conflict in defence of my own troops, after having done everything possible to avoid it.'

The War Office replied, in telegram No. 91735 D.D.M.O. & I. of February 27:

'Your proposals are approved regarding crossing of demarcation line.

'As regards policy in case of rupture: if rupture is announced diplomatically and there is time for deliberation, you will get your orders from Cabinet to withdraw to Gallipoli. If rupture takes immediate form of attack by Turks, your Break Away scheme will be carried out. Your local dispositions will, of course, be adjusted as you think best within limits of Mudania Convention so long as latter is in force.

'In case of active hostilities, Government have no intention of holding on to Constantinople, therefore the instructions [see No. 314] which have been sent to you still hold good, together with your complete freedom of action in complying with them.

'So far as H[is] M[ajesty's] Government are aware the draft treaty has not been rejected by Angora. No ground for immediate alarm is seen by the S[ecretary] of S[tate] for Foreign Affairs who earnestly deprecates a pessimistic view of political position. He sincerely trusts you will make every effort to avoid any appearance of uneasiness or action which might give the hostile element at Angora encouragement.'

No. 412

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 54 Telegraphic [E 2260/1/44][1]

Most secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 23, 1923, 6.5 p.m.*

Information from a secret source shows that Sherif Bey who was left in charge of Turkish delegation at Lausanne, recently informed Arlotta[2] that Turkey could not take initiative in inviting Allied experts to Lausanne to continue discussion of outstanding questions and that in his opinion it would in any case be more advantageous for Turkey to resume discussions at C[onstantino]ple, since their return to Lausanne would imply moral obligation to accept Allied demands. It is understood that a telegram in this sense has been sent by Arlotta to Maissa.

It may be useful for you to know this in view of Maissa's present instructions (see your tel[egram] No. 104).[3]

[1] The draft only of this telegram is preserved in the Foreign Office Archives.

[2] Signor Mario Arlotta, Secretary General to the Italian delegation at Lausanne.

[3] No. 409.

No. 413

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 57 Telegraphic [E 2139/16/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 24, 1923, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 110 (of February 23rd; Smyrna incident).[1]

Admiralty have been asked to withdraw 'Curaçao' from Smyrna and battleship and other supporting vessels from outside harbour, leaving 'Calypso', as before, in Smyrna.

[1] Not printed. See Nos. 384–7, 389–91, 393, 395, and 399.

You should inform Adnan Bey, and ask him to notify Angora, that action of His Majesty's Government while in no way indicating abandonment of principle affirmed by original despatch of 'Curaçao' and maintained by retention of 'Calypso', is intended as a sign of conciliation and friendliness; it is hoped by thus extricating the Turks from a difficult situation to close the incident and also to strengthen the hands of Ismet Pasha and of the moderate party at Angora.

You should also inform your French and Italian colleagues explaining that retention of 'Calypso' maintains the principle which the allies are united in wishing to uphold.[2]

[2] In his telegram No. 242 of February 28, Lord Crewe, referring to this telegram, reported: 'I learn on good authority that French government are annoyed at decision taken by His Majesty's Government to withdraw extra warship from Smyrna without previously consulting them and that they will show their displeasure by immediately withdrawing only French vessel from Smyrna.'

No. 414

Sir R. Graham (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 24, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 43 Telegraphic [E 2162/1/44]

ROME, *February 24, 1923, 6 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 54.[1]

Following is substance of Italian reply.

Italian government agree that no communication should be made to Ismet or Adnan during discussion at Angora, and they favour employment of this period for reaching agreement amongst allies as to points which can be rediscussed.

Italian government agree with Your Lordship on principle that any proposal for reopening discussion on other points than the three enumerated in your telegram No. 53,[2] should be rejected lest it be made a pretext for reopening whole negotiations. In practice however they consider any concrete and well-defined proposal could be accepted if it would facilitate conclusion of peace.

As regards the three points mentioned by His Majesty's Government.

1. Turco-Greek reparation formula. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs learned from Italian delegation at Lausanne that some sort of agreement had already been reached. Ismet after withdrawing from session of February 4th presented modification to formula proposed by British delegation, to which the three allied delegations made no objection.[3] It is therefore merely a question of drafting and procedure.

[1] No. 407. [2] No. 406. [3] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 845–6 and 851–2.

2. Declaration regarding judicial safeguards for foreigners.

Italian government agree with His Majesty's Government that insertion of paragraph from allied formula relating to domiciliary visits and arrests would be preferable as constituting an effective guarantee for foreigners in Turkey. Ismet, on the other hand, considers not without reason that question is now settled by agreement with Signor Montagna who visited him on evening of February 4th with authority from heads of allied delegations to submit to him a formula upon which allies could be assured to be agreed since Your Lordship yourself awaited the return of delegates at station before finally deciding to leave.

In these circumstances Italian government consider it somewhat difficult to go back on a question which Turks have some justification for regarding as settled. Italian government would be ready, however, to reopen discussion in sense required on condition that it should not constitute insurmountable obstacle to conclusion of peace.

3. Economic clauses. Italian government confirm what Italian delegation were prepared to grant, namely that these clauses should be removed from treaty and reserved for subsequent discussion.

As regards procedure of secretariat of conference, the three governments should only reply after having agreed upon points upon which they are ready to reopen discussion and conditions in which this should be done. They consider that this reply should also be sent through secretariat of conference.

Italian government appreciate delicate reasons why His Majesty's Government do not insist on resumption and conclusion of discussions at Lausanne which was chosen by Your Lordship as seat of conference to avoid Turkish territory. For this latter reason in particular however, since atmosphere in Turkey is extremely perilous, Italian government consider it preferable that discussions should be resumed at Lausanne, thus continuing and closing conference which both allies and Turks only regard as suspended. Again, in event of failure of negotiations at Constantinople, it would be more difficult to resume them elsewhere. Finally, with the exception of Sir H. Rumbold, allied High Commissioners, not having participated at Lausanne, are not au courant with negotiations.

Italian government would prefer that Turkish government be invited to resume discussions at Lausanne, through a small technical commission. Once agreement had been reached by such a commission, allied delegates could return and sign peace.[4]

[4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 543, the substance of which was communicated by Signor Maissa to Sir H. Rumbold, who communicated it to the Foreign Office in his telegram No. 114 of February 25, not printed.

No. 415

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 25, 9.20 p.m.)
No. 115 Telegraphic [E 2159/16/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 25, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 57.[1]

Chief dragoman informed Adnan this afternoon of decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw all ships from Smyrna except one light cruiser. Naval arrangement is to replace 'Calypso' by 'Carysfort' tomorrow and to withdraw other ships on Tuesday. This was carefully explained to Adnan in order that arrival of 'Carysfort' should not give rise to misunderstanding.

Chief dragoman made it clear that this was gesture of goodwill and emphasised your share in it. He pointed out that question of principle is not affected and remains to be settled when Angora government reply to last allied note. Adnan expressed utmost satisfaction.

[1] No. 413.

No. 416

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 26, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 118 Telegraphic [E 2200/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 25, 1923, 11.15 p.m.*

My telegram No. 104.[1]

I see some reason to hope that despite clamours of Extremists, moderate counsels will prevail at Angora and that assembly will be brought to endorse all that Ismet definitely agreed to at Lausanne. Even Moderates, however, are unlikely to accept outright whole of draft treaty even as modified by Allied offer of February 3rd and February 4th.[2] This may necessitate some further discussion of formula concerning régime for foreigners, Greco-Turkish indemnity clause, small number of financial clauses and economic section generally.

I will telegraph considered view regarding régime for foreigners tomorrow.

I agree that difficulty about Greco-Turkish indemnity is mainly one of drafting.

If Turks insist strongly about any or all of the three clauses in financial section to which Turks still take exception, I presume Your Lordship's attitude will depend largely on that of French.

Turkish feeling about economic section is strong. Though unreasonable it is partly due to genuine alarm at complicated nature and far-reaching appearance of clauses. I fear that any procedure for re-discussion in detail

[1] No. 409. [2] See No. 370.

either here or at Lausanne would entail considerable delay. Signature of treaty would thereby be held up and we should meanwhile be at the mercy not only of possible incidents but of continued activities of Extremists who do not want peace.

Assuming that Turks make capital point of this question it occurs to me that possible solution might be to meet them on question of reservation of whole economic section for separate negotiations after conclusion of peace by offering to substitute in treaty much shorter chapter providing for such negotiations but laying down principles on which they should be based and providing that any points on which agreement cannot be reached within stated time should be referred to arbitration. This procedure would have certain advantages from our own point of view. There would, of course, be difficulty in agreeing on statement of principles but it should be much smaller than difficulty of agreeing on details of large number of disputed clauses.

I need hardly say I do not suggest that this course should be followed unless events should prove absolute necessity of giving Turks more satisfaction than was offered on February 4th. My idea is that in that case we should give them what would be in many ways satisfaction of form rather than of substance in shape which would at once gratify their amour propre and would be difficult for them to refuse.

I have prepared tentative draft of chapter which might be substituted in contingency foreshadowed above. It is rather long to telegraph unless absolutely necessary. I will forward it by next bag.[3]

[3] The draft chapter was communicated to the Foreign Office in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 130 of February 27, not printed.

No. 417

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 59 Telegraphic [E 2162/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 26, 1923, 7.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 43[1] (of February 24th: Italy and resumption of negotiations with Turkey).

I welcome Italian government's general agreement as to procedure and points to be rediscussed. I am not satisfied however that Italian government quite realise my position with regard to latter.

Ismet only proposed at the last meeting on February 4th omission from clause regarding Greco-Turk reparation article of all mention of Greek claims against Turkey. On behalf of allies I stated that we might be willing to consider this, subject to Greek delegation's assent. This has not yet been

[1] No. 414.

obtained and seems unlikely to be forthcoming to article in the wording as finally proposed by Ismet. Some change will probably be required.[2]

Signor Montagna had no authority from His Majesty's Government at any rate to propose or agree to any changes in allied draft declaration of February 3rd[3] regarding judicial safeguards for foreigners, nor was my departure from Lausanne, which had been announced four days earlier, dependent upon receipt of any such modification. His Majesty's Government must therefore retain full liberty of action on the subject not even having seen Signor Montagna's formula till a fortnight later,[4] when it failed to meet with their approval. Turks have therefore no justification for regarding the matter as settled.

Further His Majesty's Government never assented to omission of all economic clauses from treaty. Such a procedure might render it difficult for allies to negotiate later with Turks some articles of essential importance to them. His Majesty's Government in particular are not prepared to omit articles 71, 72 to 81, 89, 90, 94, 100, 102 to 107, 108 to 111 and some items in articles 112 and 113.[5] As rediscussion of some points seems bound to take place, and some time must elapse before treaty is ready for signature, it would seem preferable to settle economic clauses in the treaty itself. This seems also to be the view of French government,[6] since they propose, whilst accepting suggested omission of whole of economic clauses from general treaty, that revised clauses to be negotiated in their place should be signed simultaneously with general treaty—a method which in practice is indistinguishable from simple revision of the clauses in general treaty. Exact method, however, to be applied must be dependent on reply of the Turks, and may be reserved for further discussion.

Outstanding questions appear too important to be dealt with only by a small technical commission at Lausanne or elsewhere. I would prefer, however, to suspend final decision as to place for resumption of negotiations until I learn views of French government and in particular of Turkish government. I agree that any communication respecting peace terms from latter to Secretary General should be answered through the same channel.

Please inform Italian government in the above sense.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 59 and Paris No. 92 by bag.[7]

[2] In a letter to M. Veniselos dated 28 February, Mr. Nicolson wrote: '. . . this question [of Greco-Turkish reparations] was not finally decided at the discussion which took place on the evening of February 4th, and His Majesty's Government at least regard it as being still open. We shall shortly be publishing a Blue Book on the Lausanne negotiations in which will be included the notes taken by us of the final conversation. Although these notes cannot be taken as an official *procès-verbal*, yet they represent our own view of what took place, and they show clearly that on this point no decision was come to and no pledges were given. It is probable that this Blue Book will be conveyed to Angora and that the Turkish Government will then see that Lord Curzon expressly reserved his decision on this question pending consultation with the Greek delegation.'

[3] Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.

[4] See No. 397, n. 3.

[5] See Appendix III.

[6] See No. 420, n. 2, below.

[7] In his telegram No. 93 to Paris of February 26, Lord Curzon instructed Lord Crewe as follows: 'Please inform French government of substance of Rome telegram No. 43 of February 24th [No. 414] and my reply.'

No. 418

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 27, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 120 Telegraphic [E 2233/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 26, 1923, 9.10 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 121.[1]

I agree generally with view of Eastern Department subject to following observations. References are to paragraphs of allied draft of February 3rd.[2]

Paragraph 3. Limitation to neutrals though undesirable might be accepted; but we might make this and any other eventual concessions grounds for asking that conditions of service and salaries should be fixed in agreement with permanent court of international justice. This would materially increase chance of getting really capable men.

Paragraph 4. I attach some importance to retention of 'Minister of Justice' (not ministry) at beginning and 'competent Turkish authorities' at the end. These points are not of capital importance but first would enhance authority of counsellors and second would enable them to deal direct as of right with such officers as public prosecutors.

From British point of view limitation to Constantinople and Smyrna might be admitted. I much prefer our proposal to define areas by reference to jurisdiction of court of appeal but would agree to Turkish expression 'cities' provided it is made clear in further discussion or otherwise that it covers suburbs in which foreigners habitually reside. Municipal area under prefecture of city would suffice in Constantinople. I must take advice regarding Smyrna.

Other Turkish alterations in paragraph 4 might be accepted though we should hang on as long as possible to clause empowering counsellors to require representative of State to institute judicial proceedings when necessary to secure redress.

Paragraph 5. I entirely agree that this is the crux of the whole matter, that Montagna formula[3] is practically valueless and that we should not yield unless issue of peace or war should depend on it, in which case matter would be determined by considerations beyond my competence.

Paragraph 6. Turkish formula[4] is illusory but it is hard to defend allied proposal regarding criminal as opposed to correctional cases and we can afford to acquiesce especially if we gain point regarding paragraph 5.

Turkish supplementary paragraph. I do not think that we should ask Turks to drop this as we should thereby incur suspicion of wishing to continue whole system. From tactical point of view I should prefer suggested redrafting to make it clear that clause about arbitral decisions which is important

[1] Of February 19, not printed. This transmitted to Sir H. Rumbold texts of the Allied, Turkish and 'Montagna' formulae on judicial safeguards for foreigners, together with a minute on the subject by Mr. Forbes Adam.

[2] Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6. [3] No. 397, n. 3. [4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 852–3.

and if possible clause about release on bail (maintenance of which is however less important) should continue in force indefinitely.

Departmental minute exaggerates in my opinion contrast between economic nature of our interest and more general nature of French and Italian interests. We have missionary schools and professional men besides poor but respectable Maltese colonists engaged in all sorts of avocations. All three allies are in the same boat though magnitude of their respective interests is proportional to size of respective colonies.

I fear that Mr. Lindsay's suggestion regarding special European police would have no chance of acceptance. Apart from many other objections in Turkish eyes it would look like continuance of allied police system. I will forward by bag revised draft embodying above suggestions.[5]

[5] In despatch No. 136 of February 27, not printed.

No. 419

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received February 27)
No. 482 [E 2217/1/44]

PARIS, *February 26, 1923*

My Lord,

As instructed in Your Lordship's despatch No. 527 of February 14th[1] and as reported in my telegram No. 206 of February 17th[2] I communicated to the President of the Council Your Lordship's reply to Monsieur Poincaré's views on the matter of the engagement of September 5th 1914 not to conclude a separate peace and the bearing of that pact upon any separate negotiations with Turkey.

I have the honour to forward a copy of a note of February 22nd[3] containing Monsieur Poincaré's answer.

You will observe that Monsieur Poincaré while refuting the contention that in his note of the 30th ultimo,[4] he desired to convey to Your Lordship the official intention of France to separate herself from her Allies, declares that after the renewal of hostilities between the Greeks and Turks he cannot consider that the peace which remains to be established in the Near East should be governed by the Franco-British agreement of 1914.

After developing his argument Monsieur Poincaré terminates the note by declaring that if the brotherhood between the two countries has been able, little by little, to transform their co-operation into a really practical alliance the French Government is the first to rejoice and it hopes that such a sure guarantee of European peace will continue to be increased and strengthened.

The conclusion of Monsieur Poincaré's communication is at all events satisfactory.

I have, &c.
CREWE

[1] No. 398. [2] No. 403. [3] Not printed.
[4] See No. 349, n. 5.

No. 420

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 61 Telegraphic [E 2219/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *February 27, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 54 (of February 20th resumption of negotiations with Turkey).[1]

French Embassy now inform us[2] that French government share our views regarding both economic clauses and judicial declaration, namely that proposal to separate economic clauses from treaty for further negotiation after signature of latter and concessions proposed by Signor Montagna[3] regarding judicial declaration, were made with a view to secure immediate signature of peace at Lausanne, and that Allies are not bound by either proposal in altered circumstances of to-day.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 60 and Paris No. 94 by bag.

[1] No. 407.
[2] In a letter of February 24 from M. de Montille to Mr. Vansittart, not printed.
[3] See No. 397, n. 3.

No. 421

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 1, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 125 Telegraphic [E 2304/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *February 28, 1923, 9 p.m.*

My telegram No. 123.[1]

Adnan called this morning in connection with attacks in press on myself. He was visibly greatly disturbed by my letter of protest on the subject. He attributed publication of these attacks to defects in working of Turkish censorship and said that on the receipt of my letter he had himself censored various messages from Angora with result that this morning the press contained no further allusions to myself. I told him frankly that attacks were as senseless as they were objectionable and were a poor return for my frankness towards government of Angora. I obliged him to admit that I had been perfectly straight with him on the subject of declaration regarding judicial régime for foreigners.

He explained that my original communication[2] had greatly upset Angora government and had shaken Ismet's position at a critical moment. I replied

[1] Of February 28. This ran: 'Two Turkish papers published yesterday morning telegrams from Angora accusing myself and Mr. Ryan by name of standing in the way of peace notwithstanding conciliatory attitude of French on outstanding questions. Similar matter was deleted from other papers by censorship, but accusations which appeared were reproduced fully in French inspired organ yesterday afternoon; . . . I have addressed strong protest to Adnan and written remonstrance to French High Commissioner. The latter has sent me a written expression of regret and states that editor of French paper will be censured.'
[2] See No. 405. In his telegram No. 113 of February 25, Sir H. Rumbold, referring to

that Ismet's position would have been still more shaken had we remained silent thereby allowing it to be supposed that His Majesty's Government had accepted Montagna formula[3] and had then undeceived Ismet at a later stage. Adnan agreed that this would have been so. He said that Ismet had informed Angora government on strength of statements made to him by Messieurs Bompard and Montagna that Allies had agreed not only to Montagna's formula but also to taking whole economic section out of treaty and reserving it for subsequent discussion. Adnan enquired what was exact position of British delegation in view of these statements of Messieurs Bompard and Montagna.

I replied that as regards British delegation, position with regard to treaty was as it was left at end of final meeting in your room on February 4th and that His Majesty's Government was in no way committed by what had passed subsequently between Messieurs Bompard and Montagna and Turkish delegation.

Adnan pointed out that this misunderstanding had complicated Ismet's task at Angora and enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not do something to help to smooth over matters. I disclaimed all responsibility for this misunderstanding and said that next movement lay with Angora government. Adnan said that local French press and utterances of individual Frenchmen concurred in stating French were willing to reserve whole economic section of treaty for further discussion. Was that official French view? I had meanwhile received your telegram No. 61 to Rome[4] but as I did not wish to be drawn into a discussion of French or Italian attitude with regard to treaty I merely replied that I could only speak for my own government.

Whilst I have no doubt that Ismet is genuinely perturbed by discovering that Messieurs Bompard and Montagna had no authority to speak for British delegation I suspect that Adnan Bey and Angora government are making the most of this business to try to get us to come into line with the French at all events in regard to reservation for subsequent discussion of economic section of treaty. Adnan ended up by saying it was very regrettable that there had been eleventh hour discussion between French, Italians and Turks after departure of British delegation. I consider Messieurs Bompard and Montagna's final activities have indeed been most unfortunate and have risked seriously compromising discussions at Angora. I understood Adnan to say that matters had been going smoothly at Angora until occurrence of above incident. In any event consideration of Grand National Assembly would take some little time.[5]

Lord Curzon's telegram No. 49 (No. 405, n. 6) reported: 'I sent verbal message to Adnan on February 24th making it perfectly clear that only formula which binds allies as a whole is that of February 3rd.'

[3] See No. 397, n. 3.

[4] No. 420.

[5] Lord Curzon replied in his telegram No. 66 of March 2: 'Your language and attitude are approved. Please telegraph if and when your French colleague receives instructions in sense of my telegram No. 61 to Rome [No. 420] and keep both your French and Italian colleagues informed of the substance of such conversations with Adnan.'

No. 422

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 2, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 131 Telegraphic [E 2360/4/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 2, 1923, 4.40 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 75.[1]

Action of Greek government, which has to-day received wide publicity in Turkish press, appears to me fraught with danger at present juncture. They have been on weak ground as regards civil hostages ever since October, and if they now go back on only binding agreement signed at Lausanne,[2] they may easily imperil chances of peace. In my opinion they should be strongly urged to carry out agreement regarding civil hostages and exchange of prisoners without further delay.

Resentment of Greeks at Turkish attitude regarding Pontus Greeks is justified. It is, however, difficult to prove that Greeks are actually being forced to leave, as many desire to fly, and methods employed by Turks to get rid of others take the form of indirect pressure. Exchange of Populations Agreement[3] cannot unfortunately be invoked as legally binding instrument owing to attitude of Greek delegates themselves in insisting that it should not be ratified independently of Peace Treaty.

I have done, and will continue to do, all I can to induce Turks to act towards Greeks of interior in accordance with spirit of Exchange of Populations Agreement, but if Turks continue to misbehave in this respect, Greek government should consider other forms of reprisal, and should not put themselves in the wrong by failure to discharge their perfectly definite obligations in regard to civil hostages and prisoners of war.

Repeated to Athens, No. 20.

[1] Of March 1; this ran: 'Delegate of International Red Cross called to-day to inform my French and Italian colleagues and me that as Turks are expelling Greeks from Pontus Greek government have refused to continue exchange of prisoners, and transport which was about to start from Piræus has been held up. Turkish delegate has protested to us through Netherlands Legation. Greek press maintain that action of Turks is violation of agreement for exchange of populations. As I understand present arrangement was for exchange of about 4,000 Turkish civilian prisoners against about 200 Greek civilians, it is obviously in Turkish interests to see it through, and I gather privately that Greeks are not sorry of this excuse to denounce one-sided bargain.'

[2] On January 30. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53, and Cmd. 1814, pp. 828–31.

[3] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1054–6, and Cmd. 1814, pp. 817–27.

No. 423

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 68 Telegraphic [E 2358/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 3, 1923, 6.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 61 to Rome[1] (of February 27th: French government and resumption of negotiations with Turkey).

French Ambassador on instructions from M. Poincaré now informs me[2] that while French government entirely agree that only points to be re-discussed with Turkey are the three outstanding at the end of the meeting on February 4th, they share the Italian government's preference for Lausanne instead of Constantinople, because Turks will think that change of meeting place will be tantamount to new conference and will leave them free to re-open other points than the three. Count S[ain]t-Aulaire was informed that we believed Constantinople was more convenient for the Turks, who feared resumption of discussions at Lausanne might prelude Allied demands for more concessions by Turkey. In any case we saw no advantage in pressing for solution at this stage on point of procedure and method.

French ambassador insisted that M. Poincaré wished to settle this point now and urged consideration by His Majesty's Government. On receipt of Turkish reply only technical experts would need to meet at Lausanne, plenipotentiaries attending later for signature.

Count S[ain]t-Aulaire also referred to suggestion to remove economic clauses from the general treaty and relegate them, as revised, to a separate agreement to be signed simultaneously with general treaty. He alleged this proposal to be British. It was explained that it was not our suggestion but that we saw no strong objection to it, if it would persuade Turks to sign. Otherwise it seemed to possess no special merit.

Please let me have your views on both these points.

I remain opposed to Lausanne: in the main because (1) you are our main expert and cannot again be spared from Constantinople: (2) it would be unwise to start a fresh discussion with fresh representatives: (3) reassembling at Lausanne suggests that a new stage of the former conference has begun, admitting of all the old tricks and delays. Moreover I have more than once laid down that conference should only meet again at Lausanne in order to sign.

Repeated to Rome No. 65, and Paris No. 102 by bag.

[1] No. 420.

[2] In a conversation with Sir E. Crowe on March 1. Sir E. Crowe's record of this conversation runs as follows: 'As regards the substance of what was to be discussed, M. Poincaré entirely shared our view that it should be restricted to the three points we had indicated, viz., (1) the question of Turko-Greek reparations, (2) judicial régime, and (3) revision of the economic clauses. The French Government wished us to understand clearly that they did not consider themselves bound now either by Signor Montagna's eleventh-hour proposals on the subject of the capitulations, or by the offer made by M. Bompard at Lausanne to let the whole of the economic clauses stand over for future negotiations. That proposal had been made as an inducement to Ismet Pasha to sign the treaty there and then. Ismet Pasha having refused the proposal, it lapsed.'

No. 424

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 141 Telegraphic [E 2440/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 4, 1923, 11.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 68.[1]

I feel, like Your Lordship, that question of future procedure cannot be satisfactorily settled at this stage as much will depend on outcome of discussions now at Angora. Subject to this my views are as follows:

I have felt all along that discussion of outstanding points at Constantinople even if limited to specific questions would entail risk of considerable delay. Apart from this, many objections formerly advanced against Constantinople when question of holding whole conference here was discussed retain their force in present connection. I do not think choice of Constantinople would attract Turks themselves; and I am impressed by French argument that it would appear to them to be tantamount to new conference.

Disadvantages of Constantinople as meeting place are unfortunately now aggravated by recent Turkish onslaught on me[2] as Turks would pretend that I was responsible for every display of Allied firmness. This would not matter if French and Italians could be relied on to collaborate openly and loyally. As it is they are unhappily only too capable of simultaneously sheltering behind us and misrepresenting us to the Turks. This would place me in invidious position which would be indifferent to me personally but which would react disadvantageously on negotiations.

Objection to French and Italian suggestion is not, in my opinion, that they want further discussions to take place at Lausanne but that they want them to be conducted by technical experts only. To my mind it is essential that further discussion should not be confined to such experts but that there should be sufficient diplomatic element to supervise proceedings and to facilitate inevitable bargaining when points in dispute have been reduced to definite number of issues which it is impossible to settle individually by agreement amongst the experts.

Taking all these considerations and what little we know of probable Turkish attitude into account, I feel that the best prospect of successful issue would be afforded by (a) having definite understanding beforehand with Turks as to range of any further discussions, and (b) meeting at Lausanne of minimum number of technical experts and diplomatists to conduct these discussions.

If this procedure were followed I think that objection in last sentence of telegram under reply would be met by fact that there would still be no question of Your Lordship returning to Lausanne except to sign treaty; and so long as there is no question of this I think we have more to gain than lose

[1] No. 423.

[2] See No. 421, n. 1.

by holding Turks to fiction that Lausanne conference is still in being for it increases difficulty for them of going back on what Ismet agreed to.

Your Lordship's second objection to Lausanne appears to me to apply with at least equal force to Constantinople.

If Turks want to put up fresh representatives, fact of further discussions being held in new place would make it easier for them to do so; while French would almost certainly employ different representatives here, when they have whole staff of officials, who were not sent to Lausanne but who could not be left out of any negotiations in Constantinople.

As regards myself, I cannot obviously be in two places at once and my only desire is to be where you think I can be of most use. I do not feel my personal participation in discussion of questions at issue is so imperative as to make its possibility or otherwise determining factor. I presume that if argument in favour of Lausanne prevails portion of Foreign Office staff which rendered such admirable services at conference would be available.

French suggestion that economic clauses should be embodied in separate agreement to be signed simultaneously with main treaty rests on complete misapprehension of Turkish attitude. What Turks want is to discuss these clauses after coming into force of treaty when we should have hardly any means of bringing pressure on them. Practical alternatives appear to me to be to re-discuss in detail numerous clauses to which they object or to meet them on question of reservations by some such device as that outlined in my telegram No. 118.[3] It is as immaterial to Turks as to us whether economic clauses form section of treaty or annexe to it.

[3] No. 416.

No. 425

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 6, 8.15 p.m.)
No. 144 Telegraphic [E 2493/1/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 6, 1923, 6 p.m.*

My telegram No. 139.[1]

Local French organ and other papers have given great prominence to Havas telegram of March 4th, stating on authority of 'Temps' that Your Lordship has stated in the course of inter-allied conversations that you did

[1] Of March 4. This ran: 'French Government have acquainted French High Commissioner with their views regarding economic clauses and judicial declaration as recorded in your telegram No. 61 to Rome [No. 420], but have not given him any instructions. French High Commissioner has asked for instructions. He tells me that he informed Ismet on his own initiative, when latter passed through Constantinople [see No. 402], that in altered circumstances Allies might not consider themselves bound by thirteenth-hour concessions proposed to Turks at Lausanne.'

not agree with separation of economic clauses from draft treaty, or to Montagna judicial formula.[2]

Although this correctly represents your attitude after leaving Lausanne it is being exploited to represent our present attitude as more uncompromising than it really is, while French are letting it be believed that they are prepared for reservation of both economic and financial clauses. They are holding back two material facts, viz. (A) that French government no longer consider themselves bound by Bompard's offer to reserve clauses altogether and (B) that what they now mean by separation is merely that disputed clauses should be dealt with in separate convention to be signed simultaneously with treaty.

This makes it important that my French colleague should receive definite instructions to acquaint Turks with real French attitude. It also renders it desirable that, for the purpose of language to be held to Adnan, journalists, and others, I should have more latitude than is allowed by your telegram No. 36,[3] by which I still feel bound. What I should like to be able to say is, that while His Majesty's Government cannot agree either to reservation of economic clauses as a whole or to regard judicial question as settled by Montagna formula, they do not exclude possibility of further discussion of points left outstanding at Lausanne if and when Angora confirms agreement with Ismet on other clauses and states its case regarding matters still in dispute on February 4th.

This would not only improve our tactical position but might also help peace party at Angora who are evidently having enormous difficulty with rabble of extremists in assembly.

[2] See No. 397, n. 3. [3] No. 394.

No. 426

Memorandum communicated to the Greek Legation

[*E 2357/6/44*]

Confidential FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 6, 1923*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has the honour to state that the offer of the Greek Government contained in the Greek Legation's memorandum of the 28th February[1] to place the Greek fleet under the orders of the Allied admirals in the Sea of Marmora is one which, for obvious reasons, it is quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to accept.

[1] Not printed.

No. 427

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 7, 11 a.m.)

No. 146 Telegraphic [E 2508/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 7, 1923, 10.40 a.m.*

My telegram No. 138.[1]

Motion for closure was accepted and debate[2] closed late yesterday. Following official communiqué was issued immediately:—

'Draft treaty presented by Entente Powers to our delegation as a result of Lausanne conference has been considered unacceptable as it contains stipulations damaging to our independence.

If Entente Powers should insist on acceptance of this draft as it stands we are free from responsibility for results which will ensue.

Authority was given to government by great majority for continuance of peace negotiations on basis of solution within limited period, of very important and vital Mosul question, full and secure attainment of vital and independent rights of our nation and country in financial economic and administrative questions and speedy evacuation of our occupied territories immediately after peace.'

I will telegraph comment later in the day.[3]

[1] Of March 4, not printed. [2] In the Turkish National Assembly.

[3] Constantinople telegram No. 147 of March 7. This ran: 'Decision of Assembly was accompanied or preceded by formal expression of confidence in Government. Further information so far is meagre. Council met this morning, apparently to draft note to Allied Powers, which may be expected to-night or tomorrow. Unofficial telegrams lay stress on determination of Assembly to secure complete non-interference in judicial matters and indemnity from Greece. Terms of official communiqué, though evidently designed to placate extremists, seem to be in reality fairly satisfactory. Much depends, of course, on meaning attached to clause about Mosul which is ambiguous, but which can be interpreted as, and is probably intended to cover, acceptance of your Lordship's final proposal at Lausanne [see No. 370]. It is satisfactory that so much discretion has been left to Government, who are apparently most anxious to avoid war, though determined to extract further satisfaction from Allies on points left outstanding at Lausanne. Nothing would now be so useful as speedy public reconstruction of Allied front on lines indicated in third paragraph of my telegram No. 144 [No. 425].'

No. 428

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 8, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 148 Telegraphic [E 2534/4/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 7, 1923, 8.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 69.[1]

I had anticipated instructions in last sentence by repeated representations to Adnan regarding Greeks from Black Sea coast. I wrote to him on March

[1] Of March 6. This referred to No. 422 and continued: 'While Greek action at this moment may be bad tactics, continued expulsion of Greeks from Pontus constitutes serious

5th describing gravity of situation and once more urging that measures should be taken to arrest flow of refugees. I asked him to send personal message to Ismet in support of my representations which I renewed verbally on March 6th when he left note referred to in my telegram No. 131.[2]

My Allied colleagues and I have today addressed strongly worded joint protest to Adnan pointing out amongst other things how contrary Turkish behaviour is to spirit of convention for exchange of populations.[3]

While I am thus doing the utmost to remedy the legitimate grievance of Greeks in this direction I see serious objections to linking it with question of civil hostages and prisoners of war. I still think it would be wise to point out to Greek government two-fold danger that Turks, who are very excited over this question, may indulge in reprisals and that Greek attitude may react on political situation just when prospects of peace have improved. If we take no action at all at Athens we shall presently appear to approve attitude of Greek government and we shall increase the tendency of the Turks to accuse not only Greeks but Allies of bad faith.[4]

Sent to Athens No. 25.

Greek grievance, and is distinct violation of spirit of agreements reached at Lausanne. In the circumstances it is rather difficult to put pressure on Greek Government to abandon only lever they possess by releasing Turkish hostages. Unless you see serious objections, you should point this out unofficially to Turkish Government, and renew, if possible, jointly with your French and Italian colleagues, the representations reported in Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 59 of 6th February [not printed], adding that these expulsions and the terrible suffering they entail have become known in this country, and are creating a deplorable impression.'

[2] The reference should be to Constantinople telegram No. 145 of March 6, not printed, which refers to No. 131 (No. 422).

[3] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1054–6, and Cmd. 1814, pp. 817–27.

[4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 579.

No. 429

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 72 Telegraphic [E 2508/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 8, 1923, 2.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 144[1] (of March 6th: resumption of Lausanne negotiations).

If you still attach importance to the point, you may make communication to Adnan Bey which you suggest. Such a separate statement would be clearly justified by attitude of French press and French and Italians generally. On the other hand you may think it unnecessary to make any such statement now in view of your telegram No. 146 (of March 7th),[2] and I would prefer myself to wait until we can make joint allied communication to Angora, for

[1] No. 425. [2] No. 427.

which occasion will presumably arise as soon as Ismet gives effect to paragraph 3 of the Assembly's resolution in his note to the Secretary General of the Lausanne conference regarding the resumption of negotiations.[3]

[3] On March 8, Ismet addressed a Note to Lord Curzon, transmitting the Turkish counter draft of the Treaty which had been presented to the Turkish delegation on January 31, and expressing the desire of the Turkish government for the resumption of the conference (see No. 431, below).

No. 430

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 16)

No. 151 [E 2844/21/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 9, 1923*

My Lord,

I have the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 136 of the 3rd instant,[1] to transmit to Your Lordship herewith copy of the Joint Note[2] which my Allied colleagues and I have addressed to Adnan Bey in regard to the registration of foreign companies in accordance with the Turkish Law of 1914.

2. It will be recollected that as the result of the communications made to Ismet Pasha at Lausanne and to Refet Pasha in Constantinople in December last, the Turkish authorities agreed not to enforce the law in Constantinople for a period of three months ending on March 18th.[3] The present note requests its suspension until the entry into force of the peace treaty.

3. As will be seen from the accompanying copy of a letter[4] addressed to the High Commissioners by the representatives of the foreign insurance companies in Constantinople the Turkish Government is adopting the standpoint that, as soon as that period has elapsed, the law of 1914 is to be regarded not as entering into force inclusive of the delays contemplated in Article 2 thereof but as having definitely entered into force, that is to say that foreign companies which have not complied with prescribed formalities will become from that date liable to the prescribed penalties.

4. I foresee considerable difficulties as the result of this interpretation. Article 2 above referred to lays down that foreign companies must furnish to the competent Turkish authorities within two months an undertaking that they will within six months comply with the formalities indicated in Article 1 of the law. Some of those formalities are of a complicated nature entailing considerable delay in their accomplishment. It is therefore highly desirable that the benefit of these delays should not be foregone.

5. Though all foreign companies will ultimately doubtless be compelled to register, it is important that they should not be obliged to prejudice their

[1] Not printed. [2] Of March 7, not printed. [3] See No. 328.
[4] Of February 27, not printed.

position prior to the signature of peace and consequently without exact knowledge of the future conditions under which they will continue to function in this country.

6. If the Turkish Government agrees that the law of 1914 shall not be applicable in Constantinople until the ratification of peace, foreign companies will at least have the advantage of being able to comply with the required formalities without undue precipitation and with full knowledge of conditions to which they are liable.

7. This is particularly expedient in the case of insurance companies, 70% of the business of which is in the hands of British firms. I have the honour in this connection to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a memorandum[5] summarizing an interview between Mr. Henderson and representatives of the British insurance companies in Constantinople. As will be seen stress is laid on the serious danger to those companies of compliance with the formalities for registration prior to a settlement of the claims for losses arising out of the destruction of Smyrna last September.[6]

8. The question of the date as from which foreign companies shall be definitely subject to Turkish legislation is one which it would be well clearly to define either in the treaty itself or otherwise. It is possible that an opportunity for this may be found in the course of any re-discussion of the economic clauses to which His Majesty's Government may agree.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

[5] Not printed. This memorandum is undated; the interview it records took place on March 22.

[6] See No. 28, n. 2.

No. 431

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 10, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 154 Telegraphic [E 2624/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 10, 1923, 3.45 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Following is summary of covering letter[2] signed by Ismet Pasha.

I transmit modifications[3] proposed by my government in draft treaty and annexed conventions handed to Turkish delegation.

Before setting out considerations underlying these modifications I desire to sum up briefly events before and after departure of various delegations from Lausanne.

[1] Of March 9, not printed.

[2] A copy of this letter, dated March 8, was transmitted to the Foreign Office by Sir H. Rumbold in his despatch No. 154 of March 9, not printed.

[3] See Appendix III.

Marquess of Curzon met Turkish request for eight days' delay to study proposals of January 31st[3] by refusal to wait more than four days.[4] Notwithstanding insufficiency of this period Turkish delegation made great effort culminating in its proposal of February 4th[5] to sign treaty at once subject to questions still in dispute being reserved for subsequent negotiations, sufficient agreement for this purpose having been already reached on fundamental questions thanks to Turkish concessions regarding frontier of Thrace, Anzac graves, Islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Dodecanese, reservation of Mosul question, and various financial, sanitary, judicial and other territorial questions on which agreement had been reached or rapprochement effected, allies nevertheless insisted on acceptance of treaty as it stood subject to reservation of five articles and one annex of secondary importance only; thus seeking to impose on Turkey treaty including disputed economic clauses and various clauses never previously discussed or differing from what had been agreed to in certain commissions e.g. clause concerning [c]abotage. This amounted to dictating terms of peace notwithstanding allied promises to treat with Turkey on terms of equality. British delegation left immediately after this sitting[6] and other delegations followed suit.

If after negotiations lasting two and a half months which had resulted in agreed solution of many questions Turkey had been accorded short delay for which she asked and if above all, regular procedure which had given such good results had not been abandoned in the last phase of conference, peace would have been concluded.

Non-renewal of hostilities since February 4th have [*sic*] already been attributed in the first place to will for peace manifested by Turkey; if draft had been prepared in common as originally agreed to, most of amendments now introduced into it, unnecessarily as texts, would have represented views shared by contracting parties, especially as in many cases amendments are mainly matter of drafting.

To facilitate study of amendments asked for, draft is in parallel columns showing original allied text and proposed modifications.[7]

In part 1 there are no modifications of substance, territorial questions being settled in accordance with views of allies. Requests to treat uninhabited islets of Merkeb similar to Tenedos, to retain Castellorizo under Turkish sovereignty as contemplated in 1914 and to make Thalweg, instead of Left Bank of Maritza, frontier of Thrace cannot be considered inequitable or contrary either to principles usually observed in fixing frontier or to views maintained by allies themselves. Other modifications of territorial and political clauses [concern] drafting or details devoid of influence on agreed settlement of fundamental questions.

As regards part 2, amendment of article 46 merely gives effect to acceptance by allies themselves at the last moment of nominal capital of Ottoman public debt.

[4] See No. 357. [5] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41. [6] See No. 370.
[7] Brackets and italics have been substituted for parallel columns in Appendix III.

Relations between Turkish government and debt administration being of internal character article 47 cannot figure in peace treaty.

Dodecanese and islands assigned to Greece by article 12 occupied almost an identical situation in fact and in law. As former islands are to participate in debts prior to October 17th, 1912[8] latter should *a fortiori* assume share of same debts and not of those in existence on November 1st, 1914 as contemplated in allied draft. Similar annuities payable by both groups of islands which for ten years have been occupied by Powers to which they are now assigned and which have had full benefit of their revenues should be payable not from coming into force of treaty but from date approximating to that of their occupation i.e. October 17th, 1912 (which is very nearly date of treaty of Lausanne)[9] for Dodecanese and date of treaty of Athens[10] for other islands; hence amendments made in articles 48 and 52.

Loans contracted for railway construction have always figured amongst debts to be divided between Turkey and detached territories. Financial commission which sat in Paris[11] after Balkan wars made no objection to this nor did allied Powers when drafting Treaty of Sèvres without Turkish participation hesitate to include these debts in table of Ottoman public debt. To submit to arbitration principle admitted so often by powers themselves would enormously injure Turkey which owing to postponement of distribution of debt contemplated in Treaty of Berlin[12] and exclusion from distribution of many debts e.g. internal loan has already assumed heavy financial liabilities. She cannot therefore consent to discuss before arbitral tribunal elimination from table of debt of charges in respect of Baghdad, Soma-Panderma and Hodeidah-Sana railways; hence suppression of article 50 and annex 2 of financial clauses.

Allies have agreed that payment of back annuities falling on other states taking over share of Ottoman public debt should be effected free of interest within period of 20 years from coming into force of treaty. There is no reason for giving Turkey unequal treatment in this respect. As moreover Turkey has unduly paid major portion of interest and sinking fund shares accruing to these states nothing could be more equitable than that back annuities to be paid by these states should be affected to Turkey's back annuities up to amount so paid by her. Given settlement of back annuities in manner indicated there would be no need to provide any solution regarding revenues affected to service of Ottoman public debt which have not yet been paid. Amendment of article 53 and suppression of article 54 rest on above considerations while Powers have already agreed to delete first paragraph of article 56.

Explanatory note to annex one of financial clauses must be suppressed for following reasons.

[8] i.e. on the eve of the Balkan Wars.

[9] 18 October 1912.

[10] 1 (14) November 1913.

[11] See G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, ed., *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914*, vol. X, Nos. 686 and 1016.

[12] In articles ix, xxxiii, and xlii, of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, for the text of which, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 69, pp. 749–67.

1. Owing to depreciation of Turkish currency enormous difference exists between value of Turkish paper money and that of various allied Powers which makes it impossible for Turkey to pay annuities of Ottoman public debt still chargeable to her indiscriminately in Turkish money or in that of these (? powers) as formerly.

2. As has been frequently stated above relations of Turkish government with their creditors have been of private character and Turkish stipulations cannot therefore well figure in international instrument.

As a result of abandonment in the course of meetings during the last two days of allied demand for payment by Turkey of twelve million pounds gold, section 2 of financial clauses in regard to reparations is suppressed with exception of article 57 which has been ad[a]pted to new arrangement and of article 58 concerning damage caused in Turkey by Greek authorities and army.

Part 3 (article[s] 71 to 117) contains many questions on which no agreement was reached between allies and Turkish delegates. Solution of these questions necessitating exchange of views between interested states, Turkish government considers it necessary to detach them from treaty in order to continue negotiations in regard to them separately.

Part 4 is accepted with the exception of some paragraphs of articles 129 and 130 concerning constitutional functions of sanitary committee. The three foreign counsellors are calculated to render great services to administration.

Two first sections of part 5 are accepted in entirety while third section contains no essential modifications worthy of comment.

Conventions regarding straits régime and Thracian frontier are maintained in entirety with the exception of article 4 which was suppressed by allies.

Convention respecting régime for foreigners should preferably be entitled 'Convention d'établissement' between Turkey and powers and have as its object not only position of subjects of those powers in Turkey but also position of Turkish subjects in allied countries.

All modifications introduced into that convention by Grand National Assembly are inspired by following considerations: (a) that definite abolition of capitulations is recognised by allies, (b) that this recognition entails as immediate consequence necessity for bringing relations between Turkey and allied powers into conformity with requirements of general international law and practice habitually followed between independent nations, (c) that in accordance with international rules of usage conditions which govern entry and residence of subjects of one state in territories of another, their fiscal régime as well as their judicial position in courts of those territories is determined by conventions concluded for a fixed period on basis of reciprocity or reciprocal most favoured nation treatment.

Allied draft takes no account of above principles. Chapter 1 concerning entry and residence inasmuch as it is limited by no period only affects unilaterally position of allied subjects in Turkish territory and omits all

idea of reciprocity in favour of Turks in allied territories and has all appearance of veritable capitulations. Sincerity of allies when they declare that they recognise abolition of capitulations and independence of Turkish nation requires that they should not seek either to obtain from Turkey concessions that she cannot grant nor to create a situation which exists nowhere else.

It is scarcely necessary to add that modifications inserted in this convention are intended to give it normal character of convention of this kind and consequently amended text contains no provisions that are not already consecrated by usage of better nations.

Commercial convention and amnesty declaration contain no essential modification that was not discussed between the two parties or accepted by allies, majority of amendments concerning question of secondary importance or drafting.

Text of declaration by Turkey relating to engagement of legal counsellors for five years is mainly in form settled by agreement with allies at last moment.

I would further recall fact that on conclusion of peace interned Turkish men-of-war and arms and ammunition under allied guard must be restored to Turkey. Justice of this demand was recognised by allied delegation at Lausanne and additional treaty declaration binding allies in this respect was decided upon.[13]

Preceding explanations show once more that three exists between views of Turkey and allies no such divergence as to prevent re-establishment of peaceful relations between them.

By opening the Straits in peace and war to flags of all friendly nations and in agreeing to demilitarised zone to great detriment of defence of country; by abandoning in favour of allied powers islands of strategic importance for protection of coast of Asia Minor; by abandoning its rights over Karagatch to detriment of economic life of Adrianople; by ceding grave-yards in Gallipoli to allies; by accepting clauses concerning rights of non-Moslem minorities; by not at present insisting though reserving its rights there anent on insertion in table of Ottoman public debt for distribution of debts of Ottoman empire at time of Treaty of Berlin although such distribution was solemnly accepted by great powers; by admitting that financial charges of Ottoman Empire such as those of internal loan floating debt etc. shall not figure in that table; by abandoning its demand that rights of Turkey over private property of state in detached territories be respected; by consenting to engagement for five years of legal counsellors selected from list drawn up by permanent international court of justice as well as European medical specialists as sanitary counsellors; by endeavouring to find on every question of particular interest to allies a solution as far as possible in accordance with their views government of Grand National Assembly considers that it has made all concessions in its power in the interests of peace.

My government hope that if allied powers are inspired by the same pacific

[13] Cf. No. 447, below.

sentiments as Turkey has shown during the past three months a conference meeting in some town in Europe or preferably Constantinople should be able in a fortnight to settle in a peace treaty questions enumerated above in regard to which Lausanne negotiations resulted either in an agreement being reached or in a rapprochement of views of Turkey and allies.

Turkish government would be glad of earliest possible reply in order that elements, which might again endanger peace of the world and reproduce as a result of fresh conflagration horrors of the past years, might be eliminated.[14]

[14] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 590–2.

No. 432

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 85 Telegraphic [E 2623/4/44]

ATHENS, *March 10, 1923, 9.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 34.[1]

Head of political bureau at Ministry of Foreign Affairs came to see me and I spoke to him as instructed.

He explained that exchange had merely been suspended with object of drawing attention to expulsions from Pontus. Greek government had now telegraphed to Constantinople through intermediary of Spanish legation to say that if they received message from allied High Commissioners stating that it would facilitate their task with Turks if exchange were resumed they would be ready to comply. Greek government had however added that if expulsions continued they would be obliged to put exchange of populations convention[2] into force immediately and to expel Mussulman population to find room for Greeks from Pontus for whom there is certainly no room at present.

I urged that this would cause serious complications of which my informant was fully aware and I begged that no hasty decision be taken as Sir H. Rumbold was doing all he could at Constantinople. Head of bureau promised to repeat what I had said to Minister for Foreign Affairs. He hoped for desired message from Constantinople tomorrow and said that exchange would then be immediately resumed.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Of March 9. This ran: 'Please make unofficial representations to the Greek government in the sense of Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 131 (of March 2nd) [No. 422], 145 (of March 6th) [not printed] and 148 (of March 7th) [No. 428], adding that, while His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the Greek point of view (see my telegram No. 69 to Constantinople (of March 6th)) [No. 428, n. 1], Greek action in refusing to release hostages is not only technically illegal but may prejudice chances of peace and can thus only react adversely in the end on Greek interests. You should point out that no form of reprisal could be less opportune than the violation by the Greek government of the only formal agreement concluded at Lausanne which has actually come into force, and urge Greek government, in their own interest and in that of an early general settlement, to reconsider their action.'

[2] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53.

No. 433

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 11, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 157 Telegraphic [E 2627/1/44]

Very urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 11, 1923, 12.40 p.m.*

My telegram No. 153.[1]

I have now studied principal portions of Turkish counter draft[2] and am sending series of telegrams[3] showing scope and nature of Turkish demands.

Re-opening of so many financial questions and insistence on proposal to reserve economic clauses altogether are very unsatisfactory features. As regards numerous amendments proposed in other parts of treaty my impression is that they are more formidable in appearance than in reality though some of them are certainly important. It would be reasonable enough to say to Turks that if they ask us to rediscuss matters left outstanding on February 4th[4] they should signify their unqualified acceptance of what was agreed to up to that date. It has to be borne in mind however that moderate party, who have on the whole gained great victory at Angora in the teeth of strenuous opposition, have got to make some show of having obtained further concessions from the allies. I should therefore be inclined to meet Turkish government on their present ground and express readiness to confer further with them on points raised in Turkish counter draft, making it clear however (1) that discussions must be strictly confined to these points (2) that we cannot agree, as condition precedent (? to) discussion, to simple reservation of economic clauses and (3) that Montagna judicial formula[5] was *not* agreed with allies though we are willing to see what more can be done to reconcile divergence of views still existing.

As regards scene of further discussion I was wrong in thinking Constantinople would not appeal to Turks. This removes one great objection to further negotiations being held here but I mistrust their apparent intention to treat next phase of negotiations as new conference and it is absurd to suggest that work could be completed here in two weeks. In my opinion choice of place must depend largely on range of subjects which allies agree to rediscuss; but in any case I think any further negotiations should be given character of resumption of Lausanne Conference on reduced scale to complete discussion of points left outstanding there.[6]

[1] Of March 9, not printed.

[2] See Appendix III.

[3] Telegrams No. 156, No. 158, No. 159, and No. 160 of March 11; No. 161 of March 12; and No. 177 of March 16, not printed.

[4] See No. 370.

[5] No. 397, n. 3.

[6] In his telegram No. 166 of March 12, Sir H. Rumbold added: 'If allies decide that further discussion should take place in Constantinople reasons for insisting that they should be regarded as merely continuation of Lausanne conference are strengthened by consideration that Turks would otherwise almost certainly claim presidency on the ground that new meeting was being held in their territory at their suggestion. If we represent it as

continuation of Lausanne conference held at Constantinople in deference to their expressed wish we can make it a condition beforehand that presidency belongs to inviting Powers in accordance with Lausanne procedure. Turkish presidency would be impossible both for reasons of dignity and practical conduct of business.'

No. 434

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 12, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 282 Telegraphic: by bag [E 2636/1/44]

PARIS, *March 11, 1923*

Monsieur de Peretti informed Mr. Phipps this morning that, according to a telegram received from General Pellé, the text of the draft treaty[1] received from Angora contains far more serious modifications of the allies' terms than the covering note[2] had originally led him to suppose.

Monsieur de Peretti's usual optimism in regard to Turkey seems to have deserted him, and he spoke somewhat despondently of the chances of a satisfactory settlement in the near future. He laid stress on the desirability of French and British concessionnaires (there are, according to him, no Italians) in Turkey coming to an agreement amongst themselves and then seeking to reach a settlement direct with the Turkish government (see Your Lordship's unnumbered despatch of March 8th[3] and my telegram No. 281 of to-day);[3] but he said that a further communication was being [*sic*] made to Your Lordship on the subject by Comte de Saint-Aulaire.[4] This plan need not, he observed, in any way delay the signature of peace, nor would it, he assured Mr. Phipps, be proceeded with unless Your Lordship, after due consideration, agreed thereto.

[1] See Appendix III. [2] See No. 431. [3] Not printed.
[4] On March 8 (see No. 437, below).

No. 435

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 115[1] Telegraphic [E 2682/1/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 12, 1923, 12.50 p.m.*

In view of the length and importance of the Turkish counter-proposals[2] and in order to preserve that complete allied unity, which the three allied governments agree to be essential, His Majesty's Government think it very desirable that there should be an early meeting of French, Italian and

[1] No. 115 to Paris, No. 67 to Rome. [2] See Appendix III.

British experts to discuss the Turkish note.[3] Object of meeting would be to arrive at an understanding (a) as to the answer to be made to the Turkish note and (b) the line to be followed in regard to further negotiations with Turkey, and the place of meeting.[4]

Please therefore invite government to which you are accredited to send experts as soon as possible to London. French and Italian governments will of course decide if their ambassadors here should take part in discussions.

Repeated to Athens No. 35 and Constantinople No. 75.

[3] See No. 431. [4] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 600.

No. 436

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 12, 6.35 p.m.)
No. 87 Telegraphic [E 2686/6/44]

ATHENS, *March 12, 1923, 1.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

It seems to me obvious that any insistence by Turkey on such a demand will merely play into hands of war party and revive danger of desperate move by Greeks. In any case payment is impossible in present state of Greek finances.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 86 of March 12. This ran: 'Reported revival of Turkish demand for Greek indemnity has called forth chorus of indignation in the press, which unanimously states that, rather than pay, Greece will fight for what is for her a question of (? national) existence. Colonel Plastiras made a statement to the press that in no circumstances would Greece pay.'

No. 437

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 76 Telegraphic [E 2569/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 12, 1923, 3.15 p.m.*

French government ask us to accept proposal to allow Turkish government to enter into private negotiations with the various European concessionaires at Constantinople and in Turkey with a view to conclude separate arrangements with them rather than incorporate a general settlement of such questions in the treaty with Turkey. French ambassador in communicating this proposal[1] gave no details as to number, nationality and importance of concessionaires but I gather that it is only arrangements made by these concessionaires with Constantinople government since the

[1] On March 8.

war, for which it is now desired to obtain Turkish government's ratification. French government think that this proposal will humour the Turks, but should such negotiations fail, their intention is to keep clauses in draft treaty, which deal with the point, intact. If negotiations succeed, formal note of private arrangements reached would be taken in a special official agreement between Turkey and the powers concerned, to be signed at the same time as the treaty, whereby powers would retain right to intervene later on behalf of their concessionaires if necessary.

I declined to accept proposal pending further examination, and I pointed out obvious disadvantages of treaty negotiations being delayed to await result of private pourparlers. I also emphasised international aspect of question.

If proposal is really confined to ratification of post-armistice concessions by Constantinople government, it will only meet Turkish objection to ante-penultimate paragraph of article 94. I am not aware what Belgian, Italian and French concessions come into this category. Only British concession affected would appear to be that of Constantinople Telephone Company who are understood to have waived the claims to several hundred thousand pounds worth of war damages in return for 30-year prolongation of concession and reduction of percentage of royalties to be paid by Company.

Unless arrangements made by Italian, Belgian and French concessionaires with Constantinople government since the armistice are numerous and complicated, no great objection need perhaps therefore be taken to French proposal from British point of view. Other negotiations could proceed concurrently with private negotiations of concessionaires concerned at Constantinople.

It seems, however, much more likely that M. Poincaré's actual proposal is wider, and may contemplate settlement of main pre-war concessions and half-completed concessions covered by article 94 and possibly also railway arrangements under article 95 of draft treaty. In that case more important British interests would be involved, for example, the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company, Golden Horn Docks and Quays Company, National Bank, Smyrna Gas Company and various mining concessions. French concessions affected would of course be larger still, such as Régie and the big pre-war French Railway and Harbour schemes. In this case it seems to me quite impossible to accept M. Poincaré's scheme owing to the indefinite delays involved.

Possible alternative which might perhaps be proposed to the French government would be negotiation of a general article to be inserted in treaty on the lines suggested in your despatch No. 130 (of February 27th)[2] but relating only to concessions, and setting forth principles on which both post-armistice and pre-war concessions would be settled later between Turkish government and concessionaires. This might replace articles 94 and 95. Rest of economic clauses would stand subject to negotiated

[2] Not printed (see, however, No. 416, n. 3).

amendments. Board of Trade are now considering whether some less controversial statement and a different procedure safeguarding our interests could be framed in the place of your proposal, which might take nearly as long to negotiate as actual clauses of treaty.

They point out that in any case there are a certain number of the economic clauses to which Turks do not now object and others on which agreement could probably be quickly reached. Under your proposal and under any proposal to separate whole economic section from the treaty and deal with it independently, above mentioned clauses would quite unnecessarily be taken out of present draft treaty.

Please telegraph your views after ascertaining if possible from your French colleague what M. Poincaré really has in mind.[3]

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 116 and Rome No. 68.

[3] In his telegram No. 79 of March 13, Lord Curzon, referring to the third paragraph of this telegram, added: 'Reference should also be to article 70 as well as article 94.

'It would be useful for purposes of eventual negotiations to have compiled complete list of concessions, contracts and agreements etc. covered by article 70 and second paragraph of article 94, if this is feasible.

'Would it also be possible in connection with article 65 to ascertain precisely what civil list properties or alleged civil list properties exist in detached territories?

'Please reply by bag.'

No. 438

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 12, 5.40 p.m.)
No. 162 Telegraphic [E 2688/4/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 12, 1923, 4.35 p.m.*

Athens telegram No. 85.[1]

My colleagues and I feel we are unable to give a definite assurance in the sense desired.

We have however just received joint note[2] from Angora government which, after a lengthy retrospect of the whole question of Greek exodus from Pontus laying much stress on the fact that these refugees were allowed to leave only at the instance of the allied and associated delegates at Lausanne and of High Commissioners at Constantinople and rejecting suggestion that any pressure was being put on them to leave Anatolia, states departure of refugees assembled in Black Sea ports has now been stopped and that orders have been given that Greeks in the interim will be refused travelling permits.

Note reaffirms that the best remedy for the situation is rapid removal of refugees to Greece and particularly of those now assembled at Samsun.

[1] No. 432. [2] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

Action taken by Angora government appears satisfactory and will I hope enable Greek government at once to resume exchange of prisoners.

I cannot too strongly deprecate reprisals of nature mentioned in paragraph two of Mr. Bentinck's telegram.

Repeated to Athens No. 27.

No. 439

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 77 Telegraphic [E 2635/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 12, 1923, 4.45 p.m.*

Paris telegram No. 281[1] (of March 11th and my telegram No. 76[2] of March 12th: private negotiations of allied concessionaires with Angora).

Do you know of any British nationals who have been given such permission or who are so negotiating?

I wish to be on firm ground in protesting against apparent misrepresentations of Quai d'Orsay. Please reply as soon as possible.[3]

[1] Not printed. This reported that 'Pertinax' (André Géraud of the 'Echo de Paris') had been assured by the Quai d'Orsay that British nationals had been given leave to open individual negotiations with Angora.

[2] No. 437.

[3] In his telegram No. 169 of March 14, Sir H. Rumbold replied: 'There is no foundation or statement that Nationals have been authorised or encouraged to open individual negotiations with Angora nor do I know of any responsible British concern which is doing so.' In his telegram No. 193 of March 23, Sir H. Rumbold reported that M. Steeg, the Director-General of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, had left for Angora on March 21, and commented: 'Ottoman Bank has of course plenty of its own business to discuss with Angora . . .; but I can hardly suppose that M. Steeg will not also discuss the large interests of French group with which he is connected.'

No. 440

Letter from Mr. Oliphant to the Italian Ambassador
[E 2581/1045/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 12, 1923*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of the 16th ultimo,[1] transmitting copy of a correspondence exchanged between the Italian Ambassador at Paris and Monsieur Poincaré, relating to the co-operation of Italian and French financial groups in a syndicate to be formed for the purpose of carrying out the working and development of certain enterprises in Turkey.

2. Your Excellency has pointed out that the agreement recently concluded between the Italian and French Governments and embodied in that correspondence was drawn up with the express intention that it should be

[1] Not printed (see, however, *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 508).

completed by the accession of Great Britain so as to form an agreement 'à trois', similar in this respect to the Tripartite Agreement[2] which it is intended to replace, and you have expressed the desire to be informed of the views entertained by His Majesty's Government on the subject.

3. The matter has received the careful and sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government, and, while there appears to be nothing in the agreement to which objection can be taken from the British point of view, I feel bound none the less to point out very clearly to Your Excellency that the established practice of His Majesty's Government is to allow to British financial and industrial firms and groups complete freedom to make their own combinations and arrangements and to choose their own spheres of activity. It would therefore not be possible, nor would it be proper, for His Majesty's Government to influence any British commercial groups to enter into engagements of any kind against their inclination or against what might appear to them to be their interest. The most that His Majesty's Government could undertake, in acceding to an arrangement such as that which forms the subject of Your Excellency's note, would be to bring the agreement to the notice of British financial and commercial groups, leaving it to them to decide whether or not they desire to enter into negotiations with the syndicate to be created under the agreement. Your Excellency will recall that in the case of the British group formed under the Tripartite Agreement, the Smyrna–Aidin Railway Company formed the pivot of British interests. It was consequently through that company that the British group was formed; and it would, therefore, under the proposed agreement, be a matter for that group to consider, in complete freedom, whether they would find it to their advantage and interest to co-operate with the syndicate in the furtherance of the objects defined in the agreement.

4. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the inclusion in the agreement of a provision to the effect that the syndicate is not entitled to claim exclusive diplomatic support in Turkey, since in the absence of such a provision they would have found it difficult to join in the proposed scheme.

5. I have consequently the honour to inform Your Excellency that, subject to the above reservations and to the express condition that His Majesty's Government retain the right to give their support at any time to British companies or groups not in association with the syndicate in any application they may wish to make to the Turkish Government for concessions or contracts in any parts of the Turkish dominions, His Majesty's Government are prepared to accede to the agreement which forms the subject of your note.[3] In so doing, His Majesty's Government understand that this agreement replaces the former Tripartite Agreement and the arrangement signed in Paris on March 25th, 1922.[4]

I have, &c.
(For the Secretary of State).
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

[2] Of August 10, 1920 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 797–803).
[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 694.
[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 566, Annex 1.

No. 441

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 14, 3.25 p.m.)
No. 170 Telegraphic [E 2773/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 14, 1923, 1.5 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 76.[1]

Surmise in 4th paragraph appears to be correct. My French colleague tells me that what is in mind of French government is that interested concerns acting jointly should negotiate with Angora government regarding all their interests including those dating from before the war. Such negotiations would affect Imperial Ottoman Bank, Régie, Quay Company and possibly others. I agree that this proposal would involve very great delay. On my suggesting that objection as from myself French High Commissioner concurred.[2]

There would be more to be said in favour of proposal if it could be limited to convention revised by Constantinople government since armistice. Number of cases would in that case be small. Angora government demur to anti-penultimate paragraph of article 94 on two main grounds namely (1) they have strongest objection to recognise anything done by Constantinople government which they claim have had no lawful existence since March 1920; and (2) they are full of suspicion of what passed between Italians and Constantinople government though I do not believe that Italians got anything which could be claimed as definite concessions.[3] Turks in their anxiety to lessen difficulties with His Majesty's Government, might come to speedy agreement with Telephone Company whose case is strong, if individual negotiations on this limited scale were timed to take place concurrently with fresh peace negotiations. I agree generally with paragraphs 7 and 8 of your telegram. It would certainly be more satisfactory to negotiate whole, or as much as possible, of economic clauses before treaty is signed provided it can be done without great delay. I would however suggest that answer to Angora should be so worded as to enable us to fall back on scheme suggested in my despatch No. 130[4] in case of need. Its merit is not so much that it would make negotiations easier as regards substance (though this might prove to be the case) as that it would give formal satisfaction to Turks on question of reservation to which they are much committed. By laying down too rigidly that whole economic section must be re-discussed in detail we might find it difficult to bring them to fresh discussions. What I suggest is wording of reply so that we could first take ground that clauses must be fully discussed but if necessary offer to substitute something shorter and reserve details if that in due course should prove to be best way to get . . .[5] signed.

[1] No. 437. [2] Cf. No. 461, below. [3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 231.
[4] Of February 27, not printed. See, however, No. 416.
[5] The text is here uncertain.

No. 442

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 125[1] *Telegraphic: by bag* [*E 2777/1/44*]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 15, 1923, 7.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 292 (of March 14th)[2]: your telegrams Nos. 52 and 53 (of March 14th)[2]: meeting of allied experts in London regarding Turkish negotiations.

His Majesty's Government propose that the first meeting of the allied experts should take place in London on the morning of Wednesday, March 21st, and they assume that French/Italian government will have no objection to attendance of Japanese experts who are being invited. It should be possible to conclude discussions by the beginning of the following week. Allied reply could then be despatched to Ismet with suggestion for the resumption of negotiations with Turkey soon after Easter. Please inform government to which you are accredited accordingly.

French/Italian representatives and staffs will be guests of His Majesty's Government. Please telegraph as soon as possible their names and precise time of their arrival in London.

[1] No. 125 to Paris, No. 72 to Rome.

[2] Not printed. These telegrams reported favourable replies to No. 435 from the French and Italian Governments.

No. 443

Mr. Kennard (Rome) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received March 15, 6.35 p.m.)

No. 54 Telegraphic [*E 2802/1/44*]

ROME, *March 15, 1923, 5 p.m.*

My telegram No. 53.[1]

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Italian representatives[2] will be Italian ambassador in London, M[es]sieur[s] Montagna, Guariglia,[3] Nogara.[4]

As regards Turkish counter draft Signor Mussolini said that there was no alternative but to make peace on best terms possible. As regards Castellorizzo[5] however Italian government would be intransigent.[6] He had no strong views as to meeting place for further negotiations or procedure generally.

[1] Not printed (see No. 442, n. 2). [2] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 626, and No. 451, below.

[3] Signor Raffaele Guariglia, head of the European Near Eastern department of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[4] Signor Bernadino Nogara, Italian representative on the Ottoman Debt Council.

[5] See No. 458, below. [6] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 600 and 611.

No. 444

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 16, 10.34 p.m.)
No. 178 Telegraphic [E 2869/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 16, 1923, 7.45 p.m.*

Please see General Harington's telegram No. 3739 of today's date to War Office.[1]

Information given therein tallies with paragraph 4 of Athens despatch No. 133 to War Office[1] and is calculated to cause uneasiness.

Whilst in my opinion there is little doubt that presence of a well equipped Greek army in western Thrace has contributed to make Turkish government anxious to conclude peace with as little delay as possible, any forward movement of that army is to be strongly deprecated in present circumstances. The danger will anyhow come if and when Turks press their indemnity claims on Greece.

Sent to Athens No. 31.

[1] Not printed.

No. 445

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 94 Telegraphic [E 2888/6/44]

ATHENS, *March 16, 1923, 9.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 31 to Belgrade.[1]

In my despatch No. 196[2] already on the way I forwarded texts of Serbian draft convention and Greek counter draft.

Point of difference between them is small and Serbian Minister favours acceptance but he told me to-day that he was still awaiting views of his government.

I know of no intimation of nature reported in your telegram but see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 164,[3] paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 78[4] and paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 178.[5]

Repeated to Constantinople and Belgrade.

[1] No. 31 to Belgrade, No. 12 to Sofia, repeated to Constantinople as No. 84, of March 14. This ran: 'Leader of government in Athens has intimated that Serbia has rejected Greek overtures, while member of Turkish delegation left behind at Lausanne has stated that Turkey has begun secret negotiations with Serbia. Have you any confirmation or comments?'

[2] Of March 10, not printed.

[3] Of March 1, not printed.

[4] Of March 7, not printed.

[5] Of March 8, not printed.

No. 446

Sir A. Young (Belgrade) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 17, 9.45 p.m.)
No. 41 Telegraphic [E 2903/6/44]

BELGRADE, *March 17, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 31[1] and Athens telegrams No. 78[2] and No. 94.[3]

Impressions I have gained are the following:[4]

Attitude of Serbian government towards any Greek overtures has been consistently reserved so as to avoid giving Greece the slightest encouragement to prefer war to peace. Serbia countenanced no action except such as was taken in concert with great powers. As regards guarantee against Bulgaria Serbia avoids going any further than to point of her official declared standpoint that she would tolerate no infraction of treaty of Neuilly.[5]

Serbia is not pleased with the attitude of Greeks towards Salonika question but does not allow this question to influence her attitude towards Near Eastern crisis.

Serbia will not sign treaty which imposes on her objectionable obligations respecting Ottoman debts and if necessity arises will seek in due course to conclude separate treaty with Turkey. In the meanwhile I think it highly improbable that Serbs would conduct secret negotiations detrimental to those of great powers so long as the latter remain in agreement. I have at present no information in regard to this point complementary to that contained in my despatch No. 70.[6]

Repeated to Athens.

[1] No. 445, n. 1.

[2] See No. 445, n. 4.

[3] No. 445.

[4] In his despatch No. 116 of March 22, Sir A. Young, referring to Foreign Office telegram No. 31 to Belgrade (No. 435, n. 1) stated: 'Although I endeavoured to furnish suitable comments on this telegram in my telegram No. 41 of March 17, I must confess that I have no knowledge of any particular Greek overtures at any rate of recent date to which the intimation in question might refer.'

[5] In his telegram No. 19 of March 24, which referred to Foreign Office telegram (No. 435, n. 1), Mr. Erskine, H.M. Minister at Sofia, reported: 'There is evidence of marked rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria, at which my Greek and Roumanian colleagues are much exercised. Latter has received information from what he regards as reliable source that, in course of discussions at Nish, Serbian government promised to support Bulgaria on question of Aegean outlet in return for energetic action against bands and that they even hinted at acquisition of Cavalla by Bulgaria in return for support of Serbian claims on Salonica.

'I cannot guarantee accuracy of this but reserve shown by Serbian legation regarding Nish conference is very marked and it is unlikely that Bulgarian government would go so far as to permit Serbian troops to cross frontier in pursuit of bands unless offered some special inducement.'

[6] Of February 21, not printed.

No. 447

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
No. 695 [E 2989/1/44]

PARIS, *March 19, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to Lord Crewe's despatch No. 607 of March 11th, 1923,[1] on the subject of my visit to Monsieur de Peretti de la Rocca I have the honour to enclose herein copy of a note[2] received from Monsieur Poincaré respecting the validity of the pact of September 5th, 1914.

It will be observed that Monsieur Poincaré refers to his note of February 22nd[3] last which Lord Crewe forwarded to Your Lordship in his despatch No. 482 of February 26th,[4] and contends that a Treaty concluded not for the purpose of terminating a state of war but in order to secure French or British interests in Turkey has no relevancy to the Pact of 1914.

The President of the Council concludes by expressing the hope that in view of the concerted action of the British, French and Italian Governments with regard to Turkey, this discussion which he regards as purely academic will not be continued.[5]

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS

[1] Not printed. [2] Of March 19, not printed. [3] Not printed.
[4] No. 419.
[5] In his despatch No. 1075 of March 27, Lord Curzon replied: 'I note with satisfaction that Monsieur Poincaré characterises his claim to the right of concluding a separate treaty with Turkey as purely academic. His Majesty's Government, however, feel constrained to put definitely on record that they are wholly unable to accept Monsieur Poincaré's proposition that the allies are already at peace with Turkey, and that the treaty about to be concluded with her as a result of the negotiations begun at Lausanne is not a treaty of peace, to which accordingly the pact of 1914 would not be applicable. That is a thesis which His Majesty's Government consider to be quite untenable.'

No. 448

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 21, 5.5 p.m.)
No. 99 Telegraphic [E 3056/6/44]

ATHENS, *March 21, 1923, 2 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 185.[1]

No doubt floods render forward movement impossible for the present but see my telegram No. 67.[2] Nearly five weeks have already passed and

[1] Of March 19. This ran: 'As a result of exchange of views between Generals Harington and Charpy, French High Commissioner spontaneously spoke to me to-day about rumour of forthcoming Greek military activity. He has no information to corroborate this, and points out that fact that Tundza and Maritza rivers are in flood would anyhow preclude any military activity for some time to come.' [2] No. 401.

uncertainty is puzzling and tends to increase exasperation of Greeks (see my despatch No. 133).[3] Turks and Entente may be able to wait indefinitely: Greeks cannot. According to reports Turks are steadily strengthening themselves unhindered in eastern Thrace. General Pangalos and his officers may well prefer risk of a rush on Constantinople to waiting whilst Turks prepare to attack. Greeks do not want repetition of last year's experience in Asia Minor and a day may come when government will no longer be able to restrain hot-heads.

Meanwhile dissatisfaction at inevitable . . .[4] measures is increasing and nervousness at possibility of Serb-Bulgarian rapprochement is growing in Athens (see my despatch No. 196).[5] Recent statement by Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs has been contributory factor.

My Italian colleague believes that Turks are endeavouring to conciliate Serbians and that latter will not give way on Salonica question. Turks he suggests will when ready attempt to seize western Thrace failing indemnity from Greece.

Repeated to Constantinople and Belgrade.

[3] Of February 22, not printed.

[4] The text is here uncertain.

[5] See No. 445, n. 2.

No. 449

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 22, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 190 Telegraphic [E 3071/21/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 21, 1923, 8.15 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Official who delivered note brought verbal message to effect that

(1) Turkish authorities quite appreciate reasons for reservation made by companies which had been registered regarding their future rights under peace treaty; and

(2) while Turkish government could not grant extension of delay no legal action arising out of their local transactions would for the present be taken against companies which registered.

[1] No. 189 of March 21. This stated: 'Following is summary of material portion of note [not printed] delivered by Adnan to High Commissioners on 19th March: Delay accorded to foreign companies and twice prolonged was amply sufficient to enable them to take necessary steps with a view to registration under law. Several companies having done so, the Government cannot agree to request in joint note of High Commissioners [see No. 430]. As regards law prescribing use of Turkish language by foreign companies, this merely (? requires) use of Turkish correspondence with the Government and with customers and private individuals. Companies remain free to use whatever language they wish in the course of their operations.'

In connection with latter point you will observe that Turkish note expressly treats delays already accorded, as having been granted in order that companies might take steps to register, not as being periods at end of which law would become applicable. For importance of this distinction see paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 151.[2]

Situation is most unsatisfactory but I see no hope of moving Angora government from their attitude and I am advising British companies to apply for registration, subject to reservation mentioned above.

Before Turkish reply was received, British Insurance agencies received instructions from head offices in London acting jointly, to cease issue or renewal of fire-policies as preliminary step to withdrawal from the market. Some local agents dislike this. I am observing neutral attitude. On the one hand I do not wish to associate myself with companies in such drastic action. On the other hand, I see great advantage in it, as it will be magnificent object lesson for Turks. It will practically paralyse local insurance market as American companies are understood to intend to follow example of British companies. Some French companies will probably do likewise. In any case non-British companies generally are largely dependent on British market for re-insurance.

[2] No. 430.

No. 450

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 22, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 191 Telegraphic [E 3072/21/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 21, 1923, 10 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Turkish authorities are displaying tendency to enforce other laws also on foreign subjects, e.g. those concerning Temettu[2] and war profits tax. These apparently stupid attempts to force the pace are probably due to desire to support by as many accomplished facts as possible theory to which Turks wish to give effect in peace settlement, viz. that . . .[3] made by allies regarding capitulations is no renunciation thereof as from coming into force of treaty, but rather recognition of fact that capitulations have already ceased to exist in virtue of unilateral abrogation by Turks. This theory is at bottom of proposed modification of article 26 which at first sight looks like mere alteration of drafting and proposal to delete first article of conventions relative to régime for foreigners and commercial régime.[4] This makes it very important to protect ourselves against retroactive measures against our subjects

[1] No. 449. [2] Professional tax.
[3] The text is here uncertain; the word 'concession' was suggested in the Foreign Office.
[4] See Appendix III.

especially as regards arrears of taxes to which they were not formerly liable, judgements of consular courts previous to coming into force of treaty and winding up of cases pending in consular courts.

No. 451

Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 21, 1923, at 3.30 p.m.

[*E 3162/1/44*]

PRESENT:

British Empire: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*in the Chair*), Sir E. Crowe, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Forbes Adam; BOARD OF TRADE, Mr. Payne, Mr. Fountain; TREASURY, Mr. Waley; SECRETARY, Mr. Spring Rice.

France: M. Bompard, M. Bargeton, M. Fromageot, M. Bexon, Comte de Saint-Aulaire; SECRETARY, M. Thierry.

Italy: Marquis Garroni, M. Montagna, M. Guariglia, M. Nogara, Marquis della Torretta.

Japan: Baron Hayashi, M. Nagaoka, M. Sato; SECRETARIES, M. Okamoto, M. Nishizawa.

LORD CURZON said he was sorry the delegates should have been troubled to come to London. He had hoped that their work would have been finished at Lausanne. Nevertheless he extended to them a very warm welcome and hoped that their present labours would be lighter and their stay less prolonged than at Lausanne. He looked forward with pleasure to entertaining them on the 23rd March as the guests of the Government.

The members of the present conference represented the Great Powers: France, Italy, Japan and Great Britain. The delegates might have seen that the British Government had also invited M. Veniselos to London, not as a member of the conference, but because a decision would have to be reached in regard to the question of Græco-Turkish reparation. It was proposed to call M. Veniselos to London for consultation when that question was discussed, since it was only fair that he should be given an opportunity of stating his case in the same way as the Turkish Government.

The present conference had only one object, namely, to succeed where the conference had failed (if indeed it had failed) at Lausanne, and to make arrangements among the Allies which would enable them when they met the Turks later on to carry matters to a successful issue. No false pride ought to deter the delegates from examining every aspect of the case. What they had to do was firstly to determine what reply to send to Ismet Pasha's letter;[1] secondly to decide whether they would meet the Turks again, as he hoped they would, and, if so, where; and thirdly, to decide to what extent it would

[1] See No. 431.

be possible to meet the requests of the Turks, what counter-proposals should be put forward, and in what respects the Allies must insist on their point of view.

He wished to recapitulate the final stages of the negotiations at and after the Lausanne Conference which had brought matters to the present point. The conference would remember that on Saturday, the 3rd February, after a meeting among themselves the inviting Powers had made to the Turks a series of offers and concessions on all the principal points of the treaty, political, financial and economic, as well as on the declaration respecting the judicial régime.[2] On Sunday, the 4th February, Ismet Pasha replied in a letter[3] accepting the political and military clauses with modifications in the case of Mosul, and making observations and reservations on the financial, economic and sanitary clauses. He also submitted a formula concerning the judicial régime of foreigners which contained considerable modifications of the Allies' proposals. On the same day the Allies consulted among themselves and agreed to make a final offer.[4] The final meeting took place in Lord Curzon's room at the Hôtel Beau-Rivage on the afternoon of that day. Ismet Pasha accepted Lord Curzon's offer regarding Mosul; he raised difficulties over the formula respecting Turco-Greek reparation; he entirely refused the judicial declaration proposed by the Allies; and insisted that the economic clauses should be reserved. After a great effort of conciliation on the part of the Allies, during which Ismet Pasha and Riza Nour withdrew to consult among themselves, the Turks finally refused to sign and the British delegation was obliged to leave Lausanne.

After the British delegation left, Signor Montagna, in an admirable spirit of conciliation, submitted to the Turks another formula for the declaration on the judicial régime.[5] The British Government did not see the text of this declaration until about ten days later when it was supplied to them by the Italian Government in response to a telegram to Rome. When this declaration was examined the British Government were not at all satisfied as they considered that it did not sufficiently safeguard very important foreign interests in Turkey, especially as regards the right of arrest and domiciliary visit.

At the same time, M. Bompard made a very generous offer to the Turks to detach all the economic clauses from the treaty and enter into separate negotiations in regard to them.[6] Since the date of this offer the French and Italian Governments had explained—and the explanation appeared to Lord Curzon entirely reasonable—that this offer had been submitted to Ismet Pasha in order that he might sign at once before leaving Lausanne. Unluckily M. Bompard did not succeed, and his offer consequently fell to the ground. It was not obligatory upon the British Government to make these concessions, in offering which they had not taken part, Lord Curzon having left Lausanne.

There was another somewhat delicate and difficult matter in the British

[2] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 832–7. [3] See ibid., pp. 837–41. [4] See ibid., pp. 842–52.
[5] No. 397, n. 3. [6] Cf. No. 455, below.

position. On the 4th February Lord Curzon had offered not to insist on the entire waiving of the Turkish claim to repayment by Great Britain of 5 millions in respect of battleships building for Turkey in Great Britain at the outbreak of war, but to regard the 5 millions as a payment which the British Government would make to the Allied reparation pool, thus freeing Turkey from any Allied reparation claim. Since his return Lord Curzon had had great difficulty on this subject with his colleagues, and especially with the Chancellor of the Exchequer,[7] who said that a vote of the House of Commons would be necessary and would be impossible to obtain in view of the extent to which the British taxpayer had already suffered during and since the war. The British taxpayer could not fairly be asked to pay sums in justice due from the former enemies of his country. This matter did not, however, affect the treaty itself, as the Allies had offered at Lausanne to forgo reparation claims. It was merely a question of a further payment into the Allied pool which already represented certain sums in gold, the property of the Turkish Government, seized at Berlin and Vienna.

After the delegations left Lausanne came the debates in the Assembly at Angora which it was not necessary to resume; they appeared to have been somewhat complicated and difficult. The net result of them, however, was

[7] On March 19, Mr. Stanley Baldwin had written to Lord Curzon: 'I understand that the Allied experts are to discuss on Wednesday the various proposed changes in the Turkish Treaty and in particular some modifications in the financial clauses. I therefore press you most strongly to let them reconsider the proposed £5,000,000 for the Reparation Fund. If this were a necessary concession to the Turk I should feel that your position was a strong one; but as I understand the matter it does not affect the Turk at all. The concession is rather one to the French and I do not feel that they deserve it. I do not suggest re-opening the question as between the Allies and the Turks; what I propose is that the sacrifice involved by waiving any reparation claim against Turkey beyond the sums in gold which are in Paris and London should be borne fairly and equally by all the Allies. This sacrifice on the part of the Allies would, moreover, be one in appearance rather than in reality, since, as you say, any promise of payments by Turkey would be illusory even if it had not become clear that Turkey would not accede to a Treaty which involved the payment of reparation.

'It was of course natural that Monsieur Bompard, realising the hopelessness of getting any reparation (beyond the sums in gold) from Turkey, should spare no efforts to obtain from the pockets of the British taxpayer what he could not get from Turkey. But I do not see why we should allow him to succeed in this attempt. (I understand that the Italian Delegation took a less prominent part in the controversy as Italy had confiscated Turkish ships which were building in Italy on the outbreak of the war between Italy and Turkey in 1912 in the same way as we did in 1914.)

'I remain of the opinion that we should have the very greatest difficulty in getting Parliament to pass such a vote and having regard to the Budget prospects for 1923/24 I do not see how I can provide the money. We came in as a government of economy and there is no doubt whatever that we shall be criticised most strongly on expenditure as it is. As your offer at Lausanne did not produce the desired result of immediate signature and as I understand that the French Government takes the view that the Allies are not bound by eleventh hour concessions to Turkey made in the hope of getting an immediate signature it certainly appears to me that the same doctrine applies a fortiori to concessions made not to the Turks but between the Allies. I would therefore appeal to you most urgently to make it clear that this concession at the expense of the taxpayer cannot stand.'

that the cause of peace, as represented by Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha, had won. The Extremists had been defeated by the Moderates, and the Allies knew that they could count on the influence of the latter in the cause of peace.

The Allies had now received Ismet Pasha's letter[8] and counter-proposals.[9] In that letter Ismet Pasha laid all the blame on the Allies; the Turks were entirely innocent; the Allies had always been *méchants*; the Turks alone had made all the concessions; and it was now for the Allies only to make a gesture of peace. The most important passage in the letter was that which suggested the detachment of the economic clauses from the treaty. This would be a difficult task. Many of the economic clauses were of great importance for all Allied nationals, not only French and Italian, but British also. Many of them had already been accepted by the Turks at Lausanne and others could easily be accepted with slight modifications. If they were detached from the treaty altogether and postponed for settlement at a later date, the result would be a long delay. Lord Curzon felt that it was worth while for the present conference to examine this question with great care. Different methods would doubtless have to be discussed, but he himself was ready, and he believed the Allies also were ready, to resume discussions on the economic clauses with the Turks. On this matter M. Bompard would doubtless speak with special authority. If it should prove impossible to include the economic clauses in the treaty itself, perhaps a general formula could be inserted in the treaty containing a statement of principle, while the details were left for later discussions and possibly for separate negotiations.

As regards procedure at the present conference, it seemed to Lord Curzon the best method might be to constitute committees. His own time was much occupied in Parliament, and he would not be able to assist at all the meetings. He would suggest three committees: one to deal with financial, another with economic and the third with general questions. It would be well that the proceedings should be as informal as possible. The committees would, of course, be free to appoint their own chairmen and to sit as and when they pleased. After they had examined all the questions they would advise the conference (1) which clauses of the Turkish reply could be accepted without discussion; (2) which clauses must be rejected; (3) on which clauses it would be possible to negotiate. When this work was finished and the reports submitted, the main conference would consider what reply to send to Ismet Pasha.

Lord Curzon's view was that it would not be worth while in that reply to go into details; it would be quite sufficient to draw it up on general lines in friendly terms and to express readiness to resume negotiations. His idea was that the reply might be roughly to the following effect:

> The Allied Governments must express surprise that Ismet Pasha has re-opened various proposals which he had himself accepted as closed on the 4th February at Lausanne, and that he has made certain entirely new

[8] See No. 431. [9] See Appendix III.

propositions. Nevertheless, in their earnest desire to expedite the signature of peace, they are prepared to agree to discuss all the points raised in the Turkish note and annex, but *only those*; secondly, the Allies can only agree to such discussion if it is understood that the economic clauses cannot be detached from the treaty and negotiated upon separately later. It can be explained, however, that the Allied delegations are quite ready to endeavour by re-negotiation and mutual concessions to reach an agreement upon the economic clauses to be inserted in the treaty, and that they do not exclude the possibility of shortening them considerably and leaving some details to be settled by later negotiation, perhaps between each Government separately and the Turkish Government; thirdly, while the Allied Governments are prepared to endeavour to reconcile the Turkish draft declaration regarding safeguards for foreigners in Turkey of the 4th February[10] with the original Allied draft of the 3rd February,[11] it must be clearly understood that the Allies have not accepted the Turkish counter-draft, as amended after the departure of the British delegation from Lausanne.

Two further very important questions required to be settled; firstly, as regards the place of meeting with the Turks. Should the discussions be resumed at Constantinople, at Lausanne or some other European town? At first the French and Italian Governments had approved the suggestion of Lausanne. Later on the Turks, although they did not insist on the point, had said that Constantinople would be the best place. Lord Curzon had studied this question closely, since it was of capital importance. He was inclined to favour Lausanne, because at Constantinople the atmosphere would not be favourable for the Allies. The latter would be surrounded by a crowd of fanatical Turks, and there would be the danger of agitation, possibly against the Allies themselves. Attacks had already been made in the Turkish press on Sir Horace Rumbold,[12] and similar attacks might be made on M. Bompard and Marquis Garroni. Further, at Lausanne it would be easy to give the Turks the impression that the conference was merely a continuation of the original conference. At Constantinople there would be a mass of people who knew nothing of what had been done at Lausanne, and would be violently prejudiced. Then again, M. Veniselos was coming to London in connection with the reparation question, and might be required to assist at the final stages of the conference; but it was doubtful whether he would be safe at Constantinople.

The second question concerned the work to be done in London. An agreement evidently must be reached—not of course fixing all that was to be done at Lausanne, because they were going there to negotiate; but there should be no doubt on the general lines of policy. Thus, when the Allies arrived at Lausanne they would be in a position to lay down the guiding principles to be followed on all questions, and the Turks must not have any pretext for thinking that each Power was ready to make separate concessions. At Lausanne the Turks had always had an idea of this kind—that they could get

[10] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 852–3. [11] See ibid., pp. 834–6. [12] See No. 421.

better terms from the French on Tuesday, from the Italians on Wednesday, and from the British on Thursday, thus keeping up a circulation of intrigue. The important thing was to constitute a really solid Allied front.[13]

[13] On March 20, in a minute for Sir E. Crowe, Mr. Forbes Adam had written: 'I venture to put into writing for your personal consideration one aspect of the procedure which you sketched this afternoon (at least as I understood it): namely, as to tying the French and Italian Governments down here to certain points on which there should be no surrender at Lausanne. It is an aspect which occurred to me after our conversation.

'I am afraid that as soon as M. Poincaré learns that we are inviting him to go into the negotiation with his hands in any way formally tied—and a written signature to a document will amount to this—he will again become excited and afraid and think that we are trying to put him into a position where there may be an ultimatum to Turkey (i.e. on the named points) and the danger of the usual consequences of an ultimatum, i.e. war. He flared up in this way over Chanak, over the time-table procedure at Lausanne and over our request for an assurance about no separate treaty (i.e. the validity of the 1914 pact). Each time it was the fear that we might be prepared to go to war and drag France with us. I am sure that if any formal demand for his signature to an Allied document of the nature which I think you had in mind was made to M. Poincaré, he would do the same thing again and, if he did it, the Italians would follow his lead. He will certainly refuse to tie his hands in advance in any formal way before entering the resumed negotiations with Turkey.

'After all, except possibly for Castellorizo and possibly if the Turks refused to ratify pre-war concessions or pay anything to the bondholders, there is probably no question on which French or Italian public opinion would be long intransigent—certainly not intransigent to the point of a threat of war. It may even be doubtful whether there are any points left now on which British public opinion would be intransigent.

'While, therefore, we might get M. Bompard and the Marquis Garroni to agree to a list of points on which they will concur with us that every possible pressure and a very unyielding attitude must be taken up to the last moment and on which no separate negotiations must be pursued at Lausanne, I am sure that they will *not* agree to any points on which, under no circumstances and never, are the Allies to yield, and I am quite certain a fortiori that their Governments will not do so.

'I am only afraid that if this suggestion is put forward, it will lead to a wrangle, to another quarrel with M. Poincaré and a possible postponement of the Lausanne negotiations, which it is important to expedite, with bad feeling between us Allies when we do meet, and with the Turks assured that the Allied front is weak.

'The circumstances being what they are—it being practically essential for the Allies to make peace and time really being on the side of the Turks—we should be as firm *as we can* and ask the Allies to be firm, but we should not aim at formal written agreements between the Allies as to future procedure. We are forced to leave things elastic. This does not of course preclude a verbal demand for a formal assurance that no concession to the Turks shall be made in *separate* negotiations and that no separate negotiation shall be entered into.

'If I misunderstood your suggestion, please forgive my writing this.'

Sir E. Crowe commented: 'I think Mr. Forbes Adam exaggerates the risks of our asking France and Italy to agree to a definite limit beyond which concessions are not to be made. I still believe it is desirable and important that there should be a definite agreement between the Allies on this point. I have always understood that in regard to certain clauses, or parts of the draft treaty, some latitude must be allowed to the negotiators, if only because we shall only ascertain exactly what the Turks have in their mind, when their proposals are actually discussed with them.

'But we can surely insist on establishing agreement that on certain points (capitulations for instance, and territorial questions) the fresh concessions, if any, which the Allies may be ready to make, shall not be exceeded and that in no case shall anything be intimated, directly or indirectly, to the Turks or to the press that one or the other of the Allies is prepared to consider the possibility of giving still further in the way of concessions.'

At Lausanne a communiqué had been given to the press after each meeting; Lord Curzon proposed that in London nothing should be given out in this way. The meeting was not a conference but merely friendly discussions between the experts of the Allied Governments. He might perhaps be permitted to say that the press in London was not so inflammable as in Paris or Rome, and it could be explained to them that as the discussions were quite informal among experts, a communiqué would be issued at the end of the proceedings only. He proposed that a short statement should appear the next day in the press merely stating that the delegates had met, but giving no details.

Lord Curzon concluded by inviting his colleagues to express their views with complete frankness.

M. Bompard, after expressing his thanks to Lord Curzon for his good wishes and the hospitality of the British Government, said that he accepted Lord Curzon's proposal not to go into details at the present meeting.

He thought it advisable, however, to make clear a point to which Lord Curzon had just alluded.

It was not, as Lord Curzon seemed to think, after the departure of the British delegation, but before, and moreover with his assent, that, accompanied by M. Montagna, M. Bompard had endeavoured to reopen with Ismet Pasha the conversation held at the Hôtel Beau-Rivage on the 4th February last, which had not resulted in an agreement. About 8 P.M. they both went for that purpose to the Lausanne Palace, to which Ismet Pasha had just returned.

On his arrival at the hotel, M. Bompard was told that a telephone call for him had just come through from the Quai d'Orsay; it was M. Poincaré, who wanted to know whether the Turkish delegation had signed the treaty. M. Bompard replied that the treaty seemed likely to break down on two questions: the judicial safeguards, with which M. Montagna was dealing at the moment, and the economic clauses, which he himself had just taken over. M. Poincaré replied that he attached the utmost importance to the signing of the treaty, and that therefore if this could only be obtained before the departure of the British delegation by reserving the economic clauses for future discussion, M. Bompard should not hesitate to consent to such a course.

M. Bompard then went to Ismet Pasha's room, where he found M. Montagna discussing the question of judicial safeguards with Dr. Riza Nour. Ismet Pasha had retired, and was not present at the discussion. A new draft of the Turkish declaration relating to the administration of justice having been decided upon between M. Montagna and Riza Nour Bey, the latter took it to Ismet Pasha, who agreed to it.[14]

M. Bompard then proposed to Hassan Bey to substitute for the economic clauses the following proposal:

> 'The high contracting parties agree to submit Part III of the draft treaty (economic clauses) to an immediate revision with a view to reach-

[14] See No. 397, n. 1.

[ing] a definite understanding among themselves in regard to the articles which it has not yet been possible to settle by common agreement.

'The convention to be concluded for this purpose shall be annexed to the Treaty of Peace.'

As will [*sic*] be seen, there was no question in this proposal of separating the economic clauses from the treaty in the sense in which Ismet Pasha was demanding their separation to-day, but merely of re-examining them at the same time, in order to embody them in a separate instrument, which would be annexed to the treaty, like the Straits Convention, the Commercial Convention, and several others.

When Hassan Bey went to consult Ismet Pasha on M. Bompard's suggestion, Ismet Pasha informed Dr. Riza Nour that he withdrew his assent to the declaration prepared in collaboration with M. Montagna.

Without waiting any longer, M. Bompard and M. Montagna left the Lausanne Palace and came to the station platform in time to see Lord Curzon, who was getting into the train. Negotiations came to an end after the departure of the British delegation.

Lord Curzon would thus see that his, M. Bompard's, proposal was not to separate the unsettled points from the treaty, but to join them on to the treaty in a special instrument.

As regards the place for the future meeting with the Turks, the French Government were under the impression that the British Government preferred Constantinople.

Lord Curzon enquired which of the two places proposed M. Bompard himself preferred.

M. Bompard replied that he had no definite proposal to make in the name of his Government, but that personally he thought Constantinople preferable to Lausanne, since delays on the part of the Turks were, as usual, to be expected, and it would be easier to tolerate them where the High Commissioners were available, than in a town where plenipotentiaries only empowered to negotiate the treaty were assembled. In any case, his Government would make no objection to the choice of Constantinople.

As regards the procedure to be followed in London, M. Bompard accepted Lord Curzon's proposals, and agreed with him that the Allies' reply should not be expressed in such a way as to provoke negotiations by correspondence with Turkey.

As regards communications to the press, M. Bompard willingly recognised the reasonableness of the British press, but felt bound to observe that several journalists had already been to see him since his arrival in London. He had of course said nothing to them, but if he did not give them something they would invent news—probably mischievous—of their own. He did not, however, wish to insist on the point.

Marquis Garroni expressed his thanks for Lord Curzon's words of welcome and hospitality. He entirely concurred with Lord Curzon in thinking that there was no occasion to go into details in the reply to Ismet Pasha, as it would serve no useful purpose. As regards the place of meeting for the future

conference, he agreed with Lord Curzon in preferring Lausanne. The conference would thus evidently be a continuation of the previous one, and he could state positively from experience that the drawbacks to a meeting at Constantinople would be very serious. He further agreed that it would be well not to make any communication to the press, since the Turks would have just cause for complaint if the press were informed of the proceedings in London before the Angora Government.

BARON HAYASHI, speaking on behalf of the Japanese experts, thanked the British Government for their courtesy in welcoming them as their guests, and said, although their contribution might be a small one, they were, nevertheless, anxious to do their utmost to assist in bringing about peace with Turkey. With regard to the place of the coming conference of experts, Baron Hayashi endorsed the opinion of previous speakers that Lausanne was the most suitable place for selection, as no objection to the choice can [*sic*] come from Turkey.

LORD CURZON proposed that, as regards the press, a short communiqué should be issued regarding the present meeting, but none in regard to the subsequent meetings of the experts in committee, and only one further communiqué at the end of the conference. M. Bompard would thus have no difficulty with the journalists who called upon him, as he could show them the door.

He proposed that the committees should be constituted forthwith and their work allotted; that their meetings should be purely informal and confidential; that no minutes of the discussions should be kept, but that their conclusions should be recorded in writing and they should make a final report to the conference. He believed that the more the commission put on paper the more would be likely to get out; the less were put on paper the better it would be. The committees could discuss among themselves in what order they should meet; if the same delegates were serving on two committees, one could meet in the morning and the other in the afternoon. A room would be available for the general committee at the Foreign Office, for the financial committee at the Treasury, and for the economic committee at the Board of Trade. (At this point Lord Curzon was obliged to leave the meeting to attend the House of Lords, and requested Sir Eyre Crowe to make the necessary arrangements.)

It was decided after a brief discussion that the committees should be constituted as follows:

(1) *General Questions:* Articles 1–4[4] of the treaty,[15] and conventions respecting the frontiers of Thrace and régime of foreigners.

British Empire	Sir Eyre Crowe.
	Mr. Malkin.
	Mr. Nicolson.
	Mr. Forbes Adam.
France	M. Fromageot.

[15] See Appendix III.

Italy	M. Montagna.
	M. Guariglia.
Japan	Mr. Nagaoka.

(2) *Financial Questions:* Articles 45–69, 17 and 19 of the treaty.

British Empire	Mr. Waley.
France	M. Bexon.
Italy	M. Nogara.
Japan	Mr. Sato.

(3) *Economic Questions:* Articles 70–117 of the treaty, and the special convention concerning the commercial régime.

British Empire	Mr. Payne.
	Mr. Fountain.
France	M. Bargeton.
Italy	M. Nogara.
Japan	Mr. Sato.

It was further decided that the committees should be at liberty to summon certain members only to deal with particular questions as they arose.

It was arranged that the committee on general questions should meet the same afternoon,[16] the financial committee on the 22nd March at the

[16] A report by Sir E. Crowe, dated March 21, ran as follows: 'Monsieur Bompard, at the end of our prolonged sitting this afternoon, asked permission to explain to me more fully the views of his Government on the subject of the economic clauses of the draft treaty with Turkey. He said that it was clear to him that the position which he and, on his recommendation, the French Government, had taken up with regard to this question, and the suggestions which they had put forward, had not been clearly understood here. He wished to explain that their idea had not been simply to cut the economic clauses out of the treaty and leave them to a separate negotiation, nor to leave the important articles dealing with concessions to be dealt with quite alone by the concessionnaires or interested parties themselves in direct negotiation with the Turkish Government. It was not intended to abandon these concessionnaires altogether to their fate. The plan proposed was that, apart from those, fairly numerous, articles among the economic clauses, about which there would be no difficulty in arriving at an understanding with the Turkish delegates, the allies should draw up a set of two or three articles, stipulating quite shortly what should be done in principle concerning the important concessions held by allied subjects and companies in Turkey. These important points were the recognition of the validity of the concessions, the maintenance of their established rights, and some undertaking that they would be prolonged on suitable conditions, with such modifications as the altered situation in Turkey might require. These principles being definitely agreed upon, it would be left to the concessionnaires to work out the details on that basis in agreement with the Turkish Government. M. Bompard said the French Government were well aware that the Turks would object, because they had the greatest reluctance to make any admissions concerning existing concessions, being extraordinarily suspicious as to what the allies might demand from them. The French Gov[ernmen]t felt sure, however, that, if the Turks realised that all they had to do was to come to an agreement with particular concessionnaires, they would make no difficulty about doing so; but, of course, it was necessary to get the Turks to bind themselves in advance to the general lines on which such agreements must be conducted. To attain this end, the French plan was that the allies should propose such general articles

Treasury at 10.30 A.M., and the economic committee on the 22nd March at 3 P.M. at the Board of Trade. The meeting ended at 4.45 P.M.[17]

as he had explained, for insertion in the treaty, but accompany this with an intimation that, if the Turks themselves would rapidly come to separate agreements with the concessionnaires, which would, in fact, be identical with these few clauses on general principles, leaving the details to be settled thereafter, then the allies would not insist on including these general clauses in the treaty, since all they desired to obtain would have been obtained by the separate agreements.

'If this procedure were approved, it would mean that the concessionnaires ought at once to go to Angora and endeavour to obtain the signature of such separate agreements; and the Turks would be given to understand that, unless those agreements were satisfactorily concluded, the allies would feel compelled to insist on the insertion of the general articles in the general treaty of peace. The French Government had already communicated with the French concessionnaires, who had expressed their willingness to act as proposed, it having been pointed out to them that it was not fair to throw upon the French Government the whole burden of securing the concessionnaires in their rights, and that the latter must bestir themselves a little on their own behalf as well. M. Bompard thought that the British concessionnaires, who were few in number—the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Co. being probably the principal one—should be induced to adopt the same course, and he felt sure that, if this were followed, a good result might confidently be hoped for. He asked me to explain all this to Lord Curzon, as he was convinced the British Government had been under a misapprehension as to what M. Poincaré actually had in his mind.

'I thanked M. Bompard, and promised that the matter should be laid before the Secretary of State and duly considered by the competent authorities and the persons interested; at the same time, I said that certainly we had never understood that this was the French proposal. We had, in fact, received only the vaguest intimation of what was intended from the French Ambassador here, who, on being pressed, was quite unable to afford any clear explanation, pleading that he himself was in ignorance. I was therefore all the more grateful for having now received this full information.'

Sir E. Crowe added on March 22: 'I have since ascertained that the Board of Trade are entirely favourable to the adoption of this proposal and would be glad to have authority from the Foreign Office to agree to it.'

Lord Curzon minuted on the same day: 'Very well.'

[17] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 635.

No. 452

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 3)
No. 223 [E 3389/4/44]

ATHENS, *March 22, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegram No. 92 of the 15th instant[1] and to previous correspondence respecting the suspension of the exchange of prisoners between Greece and Turkey,[2] I have the honour to transmit, herewith, a copy

[1] This reported: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that actual resumption of exchange [of prisoners] will (? take) a few days as ships must be requisitioned and other necessary arrangements made.'

[2] See Nos. 422, 432, and 438.

of a 'Notice' from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which effectively summarizes the attitude of the Greek Government as explained to me verbally by Monsieur Politis, Head of the Political Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3]

2. Knowing as I do only too well the difficulties which the Greek Government have had and continue to encounter in finding shelter for the starving multitudes which have been suddenly thrust upon them, I consider that they are fully justified in stating that if more than about five thousand fresh refugees are thrust upon them, they will be compelled to find room for them by deporting an equal number of their Mussulman population. The decision would seem to be a hard one as, according to reports which reach me and with which I have already acquainted Your Lordship, the Mussulman population, excepting in Crete, are, on the whole, comparatively contented and not anxious to depart. Hard as it may be, however, it is less inhuman than it would be to allow the Christians expelled from Pontus to die from exposure and probably to infect the whole population of Greece with Typhus, Smallpox and other epidemics.

3. The exchange, after delay caused by violent storms in the Aegean, has been resumed and it is to be hoped that no further hitch will occur.

4. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
C. H. BENTINCK

[3] See No. 432.

No. 453

Record by Mr. Nicolson of a conversation with M. Venizelos on the Turkish Counter Proposals

[*E 3237/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 23, 1923*

M. Venizelos came to see me this morning and we went over the points in the Turkish counter-draft[1] which affect Greece.

He had not as yet had time to study the final text of the Turkish draft in any great detail but his first impressions were as follows.

1. He did not wish to make any difficulties regarding the adoption of the thalweg and not the left bank of the Maritza as the frontier between Greece and Turkey. He pointed out, however, that as the thalweg was always shifting its adoption as the frontier would lead to endless disputes and difficulties, although he admitted that with a river as variable as the Maritza the banks were also no very stable geographical feature. He said finally that he would accept any decision which the allied geographical experts

[1] See Appendix III.

recommended so long as Turkey was not given the right bank. (The Geographical Section of the War Office are preparing a note[2] on this question).

2. He accepted the cession to Turkey of the islands of Merkeb near Tenedos.

3. As regards the additional article proposed by the Turks in the Thrace convention (page 90 of Foreign Office print)[3] M. Venizelos was quite willing to give the Turks full running rights over the sector of the railway which will be left in Greek territory but asked that the Turkish draft might be checked by the allied experts in order to see whether it was technically correct and in accordance with the general provisions agreed to by the Barcelona Conference[4] for cases of this nature. He made strong objection however to the first paragraph of the Turkish draft on the ground that if the management of the railway were left to the joint direction of a Greek and a Turk it was hopeless to expect co-operation. He would prefer to leave the sector of the railway under a neutral manager appointed by the League of Nations and charged with the duty of seeing that the Turkish rights were fully respected.

4. As regards the minor financial points such as article 48 and the Turkish proposal to omit article 50 he said that he would have to examine the question further and would be glad of an opportunity to consult the allied experts.

5. The series of articles proposed by the Turks in substitution for article 159 (page 73 of British print)[5] caused him some difficulty. At first sight he was prepared to agree to the Turkish demands on a basis of reciprocity. He was not however inclined to agree to the last of these articles (page 74)[6] although he was quite willing to re-affirm the rights given to Moslem landowners in Greece under the treaties of Thessaly and Athens.[7]

6. M. Venizelos also drew attention to the Turkish addition to article 65 (page 32 of British print)[8] regarding the Civil List properties. He had no objection to the Turkish addition provided that the words 'by virtue of the present treaty' were inserted after the words 'territories detached from Turkey'.

7. It will be seen therefore that on all these small technical points M. Venizelos is prepared in principle to meet the Turkish Delegation. As regards the central point of the indemnity, however, I found him adamant. At the mere mention of the question he flamed off into the old arguments about Greece's economic ruin and the responsibility of the Allies for having sent the Greek army to Asia Minor. He said that although he had disagreed with his own government on almost every point, there was one point on

[2] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives. [3] See Appendix III, pp. 1044–5.

[4] The Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit, signed at Barcelona on April 20, 1921. For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 116, pp. 517–27.

[5] See Appendix III, p. 1040. [6] Ibid., p. 1041.

[7] For the text of the Treaty of Athens of 1 (14) November 1913, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, pp. 893–902. The Treaty of Thessaly referred to is presumably the treaty signed at Constantinople on July 2, 1881, by which Thessaly was ceded to Greece; see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 72, pp. 1186–91. [8] See Appendix III, p. 1012.

which he had expressed his complete concurrence with their view, namely that rather than abandon their counter-claim against Turkey the Greek people would again go to war.

I made no comment on this outburst.

[8.] I do not think that it will be necessary to ask M. Venizelos to be heard before the political or general committee but it will obviously be necessary for him to be consulted by and to consult the financial committee. Mr. Waley would be grateful if the Secretary of State could obtain the approval of M. Bompard and Marquess Garroni to M. Venizelos being invited at an early date to appear before the financial committee.[9]

[9] Sir E. Crowe commented (March 23): 'I presume Lord Curzon will receive M. Venizelos personally.'

Lord Curzon minuted (March 23): 'Of course.'

On March 24 Mr. Nicolson added: 'Since my conversation with Mr. Waley yesterday, M. Bompard has raised with him this very question of whether or no M. Venizelos should be heard by the financial commission. M. Bompard was of opinion that if M. Venizelos were formally heard by the commission, the fact would be reported to Angora and irritate the Turks. He would prefer, therefore, that M. Venizelos should be consulted privately by individual members of the commission and not summoned to appear before the Commission as a whole.

'Mr. Waley has no objection to this procedure, but will not call on M. Venizelos without our permission. In any case he would propose to discuss only the smaller technical details and not to raise the indemnity question which is semi-political.'

No. 454

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received March 25, 9 a.m.)
No. 195 Telegraphic [E 3166/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *March 24, 1923, 8.20 p.m.*

Adnan Bey called today to enquire what news I could give him of meeting of allied experts in London[1] and when allied reply to Turkish note[2] might be expected. He said that time was pressing and that the fine weather was coming on. On my asking him what he meant by this, he replied that the armies would be getting anxious. Adnan Bey said that Turkish government had received disquieting reports of Greek military activity and that they heard that there was a clique of officers in Greece which wished for war.

I proved to Adnan Bey by means of a time-table which had been prepared for me that the Turks had taken thirty-four days from date on which you left Lausanne[3] to deliver their counter proposals. The High Commissioners had received these counter proposals on March 9th and allied experts had met to consider them twelve days afterwards. Thus there was no delay on the part of the allies and if there had been any delay anywhere, the Turks

[1] See No. 451. [2] See No. 431. [3] February 4 (see No. 370).

were responsible. As regards reported Greek military activity, I pointed out that rivers in Western Thrace were in flood and that any Greek military preparations were no doubt due to rumoured preparations of Turks in Eastern Thrace.[4] Adnan Bey of course denied that the Turks were making any preparations in Eastern Thrace but I told him we knew for a fact that the Turks had long exceeded the authorised number of 8,000 gendarmes and had more like 20,000 men in Eastern Thrace.[5] Adnan Bey said that his government were constantly receiving reports of shipments of arms and ammunition to Dedeagatch and elsewhere for Greek army. I replied that similar reports had been received about shipments of arms for Turkey.

Adnan Bey then referred to presence of Monsieur Veniselos in London and enquired whether he was taking any part in the meetings of allied experts. I replied in the negative and explained that as the object of the Lausanne conference was not only to conclude a peace treaty between Turkey and the allies, but also between Turkey and Greece and that as the allies were now in possession of Turkish views, it was only right that we should hear the views of the Greeks about questions which were of vital interest to them.

Repeated to Athens No. 35.

[4] Cf. Nos. 444 and 448. [5] See No. 408.

No. 455

Report of Inter-Allied Committee (General Questions) regarding Turkish Peace Negotiations

[*E 3279/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 26, 1923*

This report gives in a summarised form the recommendations of the General Committee appointed on the 21st March[1] to examine all the Turkish counter-proposals of the 8th March,[2] other than the financial clauses (articles 45–70 of the Allied draft of the 31st January, and parts of articles 17 and 19), the economic clauses (articles 71–117 of the Allied draft of the 31st January),[1] the Commercial Régime Convention, and the second chapter of the Convention for the Régime of Foreigners in Turkey, these financial and economic questions being discussed by separate financial and economic committees.

Three meetings have been held by the committee at the Foreign Office, at which the following have been present:

For Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Forbes Adam, and for certain questions Mr. Payne and Mr. Fountain.
For France: M. Bompard, M. Fromageot and sometimes M. Bargeton.
For Italy: Signor Montagna, Signor Guariglia.
For Japan: M. Nagaoka.

[1] See No. 451. [2] See Appendix III

The recommendations below are given in their order as they appear in the Allied draft treaty and annexes.

Draft Final Act.

The Turkish Government proposes to omit the third paragraph regarding the admission of third Powers to the discussion of the conference.

Observations: This is in conformity with the Turkish attitude throughout the conference, namely, that she only recognised the right of admission to the discussions of those Powers who were mentioned in the original invitation of the British, French and Italian Governments. As, in fact, the third Powers in question had taken part, and as it was felt important to try to maintain the article in the treaty enabling Belgium, Portugal, Poland and Czechoslovakia to accede to the financial and economic clauses, it was decided that every endeavour should be made to persuade the Turks to accept this paragraph, even though certain drafting alterations might be made to meet them, such as the substitution of some such phrase as 'certain third Powers having asked to make known their views to the conference'.[3]

Recommendation: That it should be maintained subject to drafting alterations.

The Turkish counter-draft also proposes to change the names of the conventions relating to the Régime of Foreigners in Turkey and the Commercial Régime with Turkey to the 'Convention relative à l'établissement et à la compétence judiciaire entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées', and the 'Convention commerciale entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées'.

Observations: The object of these changes is to suppress any reference which savours of the Capitulations.

Recommendations: That the Turkish titles should be accepted subject to the suppression in each case of the words 'entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées'.

N.B.—It was noted that there were at least three new declarations proposed by the Turks which would have to be added to the Final Act if accepted by the Allies, such as the sanitary declaration, declaration regarding the indemnification of the acts of the occupying Powers during the armistice, and a declaration regarding the maintenance of Allied schools, &c.

Draft of Main Treaty.

Article 1.

The Turks omit the words 'à moins de stipulations particulières' in the second paragraph.

[3] In a letter of March 23, Sir E. Crowe had informed the Belgian Ambassador: 'This question is one of the subjects which we have discussed with the French, Belgian and Japanese experts, who are now in London. The conclusion was unanimously arrived at that we must do our utmost to induce the Turks to reinsert our article when discussions are resumed at Lausanne. You may rest assured that we are all fully alive to the justice of the allied demand on this matter and to the importance to your government and to Belgian interest of securing its maintenance.'

Observations: This article was intended to cover the possibility of separate consular arrangements, and the Turkish proposal to omit it is not understood.

Recommendation: That this should be explained again to the Turkish delegation and an endeavour made to maintain the words.

The Turks also propose the addition of a paragraph regarding the evacuation by the Allied troops of Turkish territory on the ratification of the treaty by Turkey.

Observations: The obvious objection to this proposal is that the Allied troops would have to leave Turkey before the actual entry into force of the treaty (which only takes place after its ratification by three of the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey). In the interim, none of the judicial, &c., safeguards of the treaty would have come into force, while the courts set up by the occupying Powers would vanish. As a matter of fact, the article itself would have no validity for any of the Allied Powers until they ratified the treaty, and would not therefore achieve the Turkish object in any case.

Recommendation: That the deletion of the article in the treaty should be insisted upon, and that if it be decided later to make any concession to the Turks regarding evacuation between the ratification by Turkey and the actual entry into force of the treaty, this should be done outside the treaty by a declaration or note from the inviting Powers.

Article 2.

The Turks propose to make their western boundary of Eastern Thrace the thalweg of the Maritza instead of the left bank.

Observations: It was pointed out that the Greek delegation might have something to say to this change in the treaty, and that since the thalweg was continually changing in this as in many other rivers, there were practical inconveniences to thus fixing the frontier.[4] On the other hand, it was suggested that, if the Turks insisted, the inviting Powers might accept the words 'le cours' instead of the words 'le thalweg', the definition of the words 'le cours' being already given in article 6 of the treaty.

Recommendation: That an endeavour should be made to persuade the Turks to abandon the claim, and that if they insist, and give good reasons, 'le cours' should be accepted.

Article 3: (1) *Syria.*

The Turks propose the addition of the words 'qui reste entièrement en vigueur avec toutes ses annexes' with reference to the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921.[5]

Observations: It was pointed out that in an article dealing only with the frontier of Syria the reaffirmation of the Angora Agreement was out of place, quite apart from other objections which might be raised to the ratification here of the treaty itself and all its annexes.

Recommendations: That the addition of the words proposed by the Turkish delegation should be absolutely refused.

[4] See No. 453.

[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

Article 3: (2) *Irak.*

Recommendation: That the Turkish counter-draft should be accepted subject to an attempt by the British Government to shorten the interim period to three or six months from the coming into force of the treaty, and adding some safeguarding phrase regarding the maintenance of the *status quo* during the interim period.

Article 5.

The Turks wish to delete the first sentence in the second paragraph giving discretion to the Boundary Commissions.

Observations: As the Syrian frontier is already delimited, and special arrangements either between the British and Turkish Governments or by the League of Nations can be made later as regards the delimitation of the Irak frontier, the treaty really only deals with the delimitation of the East Thracian frontier where there is no new line to be laid down on the ground.

Recommendation: That the Turkish proposal should be accepted subject to the omission of the words 'et (3)' in the first sentence of the article.

Article 12.

The Turks propose to add the words 'et des îlots de Merkeb dépendant de cette dernière' after the word 'Tenedos'.

Observations: These islands are small islands in the channel between Tenedos and the mainland, and are usually marked on the map under the Greek name of Gadaro.

Recommendations: That the addition should be accepted, provided the necessary drafting alterations are made in article 14 and an addition made in the main treaty by reference to article 4 of the Straits Convention to apply autonomy to these islands and to ensure their demilitarisation, &c., like Tenedos.

That the name Merkeb should be replaced by the title Merkeb (Gadaros).

Article 15.

The Turks propose the maintenance of Castellorizo under Turkish sovereignty.

Observations: The cession of Castellorizo to Italy was accepted by the Allies during the conferences which preceded the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, and that as there are no Turks on the island it can well be argued to the Turkish delegation that it does not fall within the territorial demands of the National Pact. Tenedos and Imbros have been left to the Turks for strategic reasons in connection with the Straits, and the arguments which apply to them do not therefore apply to Castellorizo.

Recommendation: That no concession on this point should be made to Turkey.

Article 16.

The Turks wish (1) to suppress the second paragraph recognising the mandatory and other régimes outside their new frontiers; (2) to add a

paragraph reaffirming the article of the Angora Agreement relating to the special régime for the Turks of Alexandretta; and (3) to add a paragraph leaving them the sovereignty over Ada Kala in the Danube.

Recommendation: (1) An attempt should be made to maintain this paragraph, if necessary by some other formula which the jurists are to draft; (2) should be refused; (3) the precise status of Ada Kala should be examined by the jurists, but the concession, in any case, should be refused.

Article 19.

The Turks change the words 'nés ou domiciliés' to 'nés et domiciliés'. Secondly, they add a paragraph giving Turks in Cyprus the right to opt for Turkish nationality under the nationality section of the treaty.

Recommendation: The change should be refused, and the addition only accepted, if the British Colonial Office find it administratively practicable to grant such a right of option a second time (it has already been given during the war, and the time limit has now expired).

Article 20.

The Turks change the words 'au Sultan de Turquie' to 'à l'Empire ottoman'.

Observations: The Italian experts point out that both the Allied draft and the Turkish counter-draft omit the words 'et des actes y relatifs', which the Allies at Lausanne agreed to insert after the words '1912'. They cannot accept the Turkish change.

Recommendation: That the Allied draft should be maintained with the insertion of the words 'et des actes . . .'.

Article 21.

The Turks make some drafting changes.

Recommendation: That it should be left to the jurists to decide if these changes can be accepted.

Article 25.

The Turks change the word 'spirituelles' to 'religieuses' in the last paragraph, and insert after it the words 'exercées en dehors de la Turquie par'.

Observations: The word 'religious' might be held to cover such semi-administrative functions as the nomination of 'cadis', &c., and the words inserted might be held to limit the spiritual relations of the heads of the Christian churches outside Turkey over their flocks inside Turkey.

Recommendation: That an endeavour should be made to retain the Allied draft, but that the jurists should consider whether the paragraph might be redrafted. Possibly the insertion of the words 'établis en Turquie' might be inserted between the word 'spirituelles' and the words 'des diverses croyances'. The Italian delegation point out that any change in the Allied draft of this article in a sense desired by Turkey must depend on the maintenance of the Allied draft of article 20.

Article 26.

The Turks change the words 'sont d'accord pour abroger' to 'déclarent complètement abrogées', and they add the words 'ainsi que le système économique et financier résultant des capitulations' at the end of the first paragraph. They also omit the last paragraph which binds to the main treaty the special Convention for the Régime for Foreigners in Turkey.

Observations: The intention of this article is (*a*) to obtain a complete declaration as to the abolition of all the Capitulations in the main treaty; (*b*) to use words implying that this abrogation dates from the unilateral act of Turkey in 1914; and (*c*) not to tie up in any way the special convention with the Capitulations. (*b*) might have the practical and prejudicial result of justifying a Turkish claim for such acts as the retroactive payment of taxes, &c., by Allied companies in Turkey.

Recommendations: The words 'déclarent complètement abroger' might be accepted by the Powers, but certainly not the word 'abrogées'. The suppression of any reference in this article to the special convention might also be admitted.

Article 27.

The Turks add a paragraph providing for the maintenance of their Turkish nationality by Moroccans and Libyans established in Turkey, who have already acquired it.

Recommendation: The paragraph can be accepted if the words 'à leur demande' are inserted after the word 'acquis'.

N.B.—The French experts wish to redraft the words 'Les ressortissants . . . français' to read 'Les Marocains ressortissants français'.

Articles 129 *and* 130.

The Turks suppress the last sentence of the first paragraph, and the other three paragraphs of article 129 and the first two paragraphs of article 130, and substitute a unilateral declaration by Turkey to be attached to the treaty regarding the nomination of three European medical specialists for five years to act as advisers of the Turkish sanitary administration as Turkish officials.

Recommendation: The Turkish omissions and the declaration might be accepted in principle provided the words 'choisis sur une liste de six noms établie de concert par le Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations et par l'Office international d'Hygiène publique' are inserted after the word 'Européens' in the Turkish draft declaration, and some sentence is added as to the 'traitement' and the conditions of service being agreed between the above two bodies and the Turkish Government. The second paragraph of article 130, which, if suppressed, would permit the Turks to subject infected ships touching at ports in the Straits to purely Turkish requirements, in the place of international rules, should be maintained. It is also a matter for consideration whether the Allies would eventually allow the Turks, under the modifications proposed, to retain under the last sentence of the first paragraph of article 131 the substantial residue of the money belonging

to the Constantinople Board of Health, *i.e.*, money originally raised from all nations for the purposes of international sanitary control.

Article 144.

The annex to this article inserted by the Turks represents the offer made to the Turks by the British delegation, who drafted it in agreement with them. The British experts now wish to redraft paragraph 6 in such a way as to prevent unnecessary restrictions being imposed on visitors to the Anzac area.

Articles 152 *and* 153.

The Turks wish to suppress these two articles, which provide a bill of indemnity for the administrative, judicial and other acts of the Allied occupying authorities and their nationals, &c., since the armistice. They propose to substitute a declaration which more or less covers Allied official acts, but not the acts of private Allied nationals and companies.

Recommendation: The proposal of a declaration instead of articles might be accepted in principle, but it is absolutely essential that it should cover the case of private individuals, &c., and all the categories of acts mentioned in the two articles.

Articles 154 *and* 155.

The Turks have shortened and redrafted these articles dealing with the surrender of archives, Wakf documents, &c., relating to the detached territories.

Recommendation: That the jurists should examine the Turkish proposals and decide if they can be accepted as they stand or if they require amplification.

Article 156.

The Turks have suppressed this article, which provides for their recognition and acceptance of the Arms Traffic Convention[6] and other similar conventions which may be made in the future between any or all of the other high contracting Powers or between them and any other Power.

Observations: The Arms Traffic Convention of 1919 has not been ratified by any of the Allied Powers or by the United States Government, but the former have agreed among themselves to apply certain of its provisions. The article has not been discussed with the Turks.

Recommendation: That the text of the Arms Traffic Convention should be communicated to the Turkish delegation and explained to them, and an attempt then made to persuade them to accept it.

Article 157.

The Turks substitute an article which provides for reciprocal recognition of prize court decisions relating to ships and goods up to the armistice of 1918, and for the restitution to their owners of ships under the Turkish flags seized since that date.

Observations: The second paragraph of the Turkish draft would provide for the surrender by the Allies of ex-German ships flying the Turkish flag

[6] Of September 10, 1919 (for the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 909–25).

seized since the armistice, as well as for the annulment of certain prize court decisions taken with regard to some small Turkish vessels seized by the Allies since the armistice, especially during the operations in the Gulf of Ismid in 1920.

Recommendation: The Turkish draft can be accepted if the words 'sous pavillon turc' are changed to 'Turcs', and if some safeguard is introduced regarding prize court decisions since the armistice. It was agreed that details should be obtained regarding the latter before the resumption of negotiations at Lausanne.

Article 159.

The Turks suppress this article, which provides for the accession of Belgium, Poland, Portugal and Czechoslovakia to the financial and economic sections of the treaty, and thereby the restoration of peace between Portugal and Turkey.

Recommendation: That every endeavour should be made to maintain the Allied draft article in the interests of the Allied Powers concerned.

Note 1.

The Turks propose the addition of three articles to this part dealing (1) with the rights of the Wakfs in Serbia and in Greece, including the islands; (2) real property rights in the same territories; (3) certain extensions of article 10 of the Exchange of Populations Convention regarding the rights of Moslems who have emigrated from Greece since 1912 but still retain property there.

Observations: As regards the first of these articles, it was pointed out that the Turks had requested during the minority discussions at Lausanne[7] that some stipulation should be inserted in the treaty by which the Balkan States, including Serbia, should be bound to give Turkey reciprocal treatment as regards minorities, &c., in Serbia. It was explained *ad nauseam* to the Turkish delegation that this was impossible owing to the existence of a Serbian minority treaty,[8] and the Serbian representatives absolutely refused to consider the point. The Turks are now trying to get the idea back into the treaty. They also ignore the existence of a Greek minority treaty[9] where Wakf property is fully safeguarded.

Recommendation: That the above explanation should again be given to the Turks at Lausanne and the article refused.

As regards the second article, the matter is mainly one for the Greek delegation to decide, and it was agreed that they should be consulted.

As regards the third article, it was agreed that, since some assurances had been given to the Turkish delegation in the discussions of the Exchange of Populations Convention and in the discussions of the Minority Treaty that the Turkish claim was not entirely unreasonable, the Turks should be allowed to raise it again at Lausanne, but that in all probability it would

[7] See No. 290. [8] For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 514–23 and 532–3.
[9] For the text, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 471–9.

be necessary to reject it after discussion, and that, in any case, the Greek delegation would require to be consulted.

N.B.—In so far as the first two of the new articles affect the islands ceded to Italy, the Italian delegation, who are consulting the Governor of Rhodes, will be in a position to give a decision at Lausanne.

Note 2.

Ismet Pasha's covering note[10] to the Turkish counter-draft of the treaty recalls that on the conclusion of peace, interned Turkish men-of-war and arms and ammunition under Allied guard must be restored to Turkey. Ismet claims that the justice of this demand was recognised by the Allied delegations at Lausanne and that an additional treaty declaration binding the Allies in this respect was decided upon. Presumably, therefore, the Turks may ask for the latter.

Observations: As regards war material the Turkish contention is baseless. On the 10th January, as regards war material under British guard, His Majesty's Government decided that it was 'undesirable that it should in any circumstances come into possession of Turks', and that the rifle belts, machine-gun blocks and breech blocks in Tash Kishla barracks should be removed to Malta as soon as possible and machine-guns and rifles at Matchka similarly dealt with if possible. The question of the Allied rights in the material and its eventual disposal was to be arranged subsequently in consultation with the Allies.

On the 24th January [*sic*] Ismet Pasha protested in writing[11] at Lausanne against the above proceedings and was informed by Lord Curzon in a note[12] drafted after consultation with the Allies that all the material was surrendered under article 20 of the Mudros Armistice, was not guarded for Turkish benefit and was completely at the disposal of the Allies to do as they liked with. As far as is known, this was the position at the end of the conference.

As regards the interned warships, as there is no article in the treaty about their surrender, the Allies might be prepared to hand them back to Turkey on the conclusion of peace.

Recommendation: It was agreed that the interned warships might be returned to Turkey on the conclusion of peace, and that the Allied Governments should decide nearer the time of their evacuation what action should be taken as regards the war material at Constantinople. In any case, if any of it was given to the Turks, no declaration should be made to the Turks about it.

Thracian Frontiers Convention.

The Turks desire to add an article providing for running rights, &c., over the section of the railway between Kouléli–Bourga[s] and the Bulgarian frontier.

[10] No. 431.

[11] This note, which was dated January 10, is not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[12] Of January 24, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

Observations: A similar stipulation was included in the 1917 settlement with Bulgaria when the territory in question was ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey, but the proposal made in the first paragraph regarding joint Turco-Greek control is probably impracticable and it may be better to substitute neutral or League of Nations control.[13]

Recommendation: That the addition should be accepted in principle subject to any redrafting necessitated by expert examination at Lausanne in consultation with the Greek and Turkish delegations.

Draft Convention regarding the Régime for Foreigners in Turkey.

General Observations.

In his covering note to the Turkish counter-proposals, Ismet Pasha explains that the modifications introduced into the convention are inspired by the fact that the Capitulations are definitely abolished, that further relations between Turkey and the Allied Powers must be in conformity with general international law as followed Turkish [*sic*] independent nations, and that consequently the conditions which are to govern the entry and residence of subjects of one State in the territories of another, their fiscal régime and their judicial position before the courts must be based on reciprocity or reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment. Ismet Pasha claims that the original Allied draft took no note of the above principles.

During the discussions at the committee upon the draft convention, it was pointed out that the whole question of reciprocity had been fully debated at Lausanne between the experts.[14] During these debates the difficulty of providing for reciprocity in a convention to which many States with quite different domestic legislation were parties, was fully explained to the Turks. Examples of these difficulties are, for instance, in France the prohibition on foreigners becoming *avocats*, and in England the post-war legislation which differentiates between other foreigners and ex-enemies, and excludes the latter from establishing and controlling banks, from becoming members of a crew of a British ship, and from engaging in metal industries.

It was generally agreed, however, that if any general convention were to be signed with the Turks it was essential to apply reciprocity as far as possible in the convention, and that for this purpose each article of the convention should be discussed separately and that it should be decided whether in practice reciprocity could be accorded as regards each such article. In some cases it was considered desirable that while the article might contain some statement as to the concession of reciprocity in principle, the detailed application of reciprocity should be expressly left over in the article to separate ulterior negotiations between Turkey and each of the other contracting parties.

[13] See No. 453.

[14] The reference is to the discussion of the Turkish counter-proposals of December 9, 1922, on the judicial régime for foreigners (see Cmd. 1814, pp. 504–5).

Title and Preamble.

The Turks wish to change the title of the convention from 'Relative au régime des étrangers en Turquie' to the words 'Relative à l'établissement et à la Compétence judiciaire entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées'.

Recommendation: That the Turkish title should be accepted subject to the omission of the words 'entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées'.

In the preamble the Turks wish to change the word 'fixer' to 'régler' and to redraft the latter part of the second paragraph of the preamble as follows: 'Les conditions d'établissement des ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes sur les territoires de l'autre, ainsi que la question de la compétence judiciaire.'

Recommendation: That the Turkish draft might be accepted subject to the substitution of the words 'de leurs ressortissants' for the words 'des ressortissants', and the omission of the words 'de l'une des parties contractantes sur les territoires de l'autre'.

Article 1.

The Turks wish to suppress this article.

Recommendation: The suppression might be accepted if a satisfactory redraft of article 26 of the treaty is accepted by the Turkish delegation.

Chapter 1—*Conditions d'Accès et de Séjour.*

Article 2.

In the first paragraph the Turks wish to suppress the provision against discrimination as between Turks and foreigners and to make one other drafting change.

Observations: It was agreed that reciprocity might be given in the case of this article as between Turkey and each of the Allied States, but not as in the Turkish formula, which would bind each Allied country to give reciprocity in this matter not only to Turkey but to the other high contracting parties.

Recommendation: That the jurists should be left to redraft the Turkish text so as to provide for reciprocity. It was suggested that, for instance, the words 'et sur les territoires de chacune des autres Puissances contractantes, les ressortissants turcs' should be inserted after the word 'contractantes' in line 3.

The Turks wish to add a paragraph providing that the article does not prejudice the right of Turkey freely to authorise or prevent immigration into Turkey.

Observations: It was felt impossible to accept Turkish right completely to prevent immigration, although in practice it was realised that this was probably mainly aimed against the Greeks or against the immigration of any large masses of foreigners.

Recommendation: That the Turkish text should be redrafted by the jurists, substituting the words 'de réglementer' for the words 'd'interdire', and adding some such phrase as 'après entente avec chaque Puissance intéressée'.

Article 4.

The Turks wish to omit the last paragraph of the Allied draft, which safeguards foreigners against discrimination as between Turks and foreigners, and to redraft the second paragraph in such a way as to enable them to reserve any Turkish professions or industries to Turkish nationals alone.

Observations: This article raises in an acute form the difficulty as to reciprocity, to which reference has already been made in the above observations on the convention. In any case, it is impossible to leave Turkey complete right to reserve her industries, &c., to her own nationals and thus at any given moment to prejudice the acquired rights of foreigners who are already employed in professions or industries in Turkey.

Recommendation: That the second paragraph of the Turkish draft should be redrafted to provide for the respect of the rights respectively acquired by the nationals of the different high contracting parties in Turkey and to stipulate that special conventions should subsequently be negotiated between Turkey and each of the interested Powers on the matter. The last paragraph of the Allied draft should be maintained.

Article 5.

The Turks wish to make several drafting changes in this article, to exclude, for instance, from its benefits foreign companies working in Turkey who are actually constituted in a foreign country other than that of the nationals which compose it, and generally to provide that foreign companies working in Turkey should be submitted to Turkish laws. They also suppress the sentence in the Allied draft which safeguarded against discrimination between foreigners and Turks.

Observations: The representatives of the British Board of Trade stated that in the last resort they would be prepared to accept the Turkish draft subject to the retention of the last sentence of the Allied draft beginning 'Elles jouiront'. It was generally felt, however, that every endeavour should be made to redraft the article on a reciprocal basis and to obtain the substance of the original Allied draft.

Recommendation: It was agreed to proceed accordingly.

Article 6.

The Turks wish to substitute the words 'aux lois relatives au service militaire' for the words 'aux lois militaires'.

Recommendation: That this modification might be accepted, and that if necessary reciprocity might be given as regards this article.

Article 7.

The Turks have not changed this article, but as it will probably be desired to extend reciprocity to each article in the convention separately, as suggested in the general observations on the convention given above, it was felt that at any rate the second paragraph of this article might have to be changed, as none of the Allied Governments would wish to be bound to pay for the transport of foreign deportees to their destinations.

Recommendation: That this article should be examined by the jurists and compared with other similar articles, *e.g.*, in the German-Swiss Consular Convention.[15] The words 'à la frontière' might, for instance, be substituted for the words 'au lieu de destination'.

Article 8.

The Turks wish to make some drafting changes in this article.

Recommendation: That on the supposition that each article is redrafted to provide for reciprocity, the Turkish draft might be accepted.

Article 9.

The Turks wish to suppress this article.

Recommendation: That on the supposition that reciprocity is to be provided as far as is practicable in each article, the suppression of this article, as proposed by the Turks, might be accepted.

Article 18.

The Turks wish to add at the end of this article the words 'à condition qu'ils soient domiciliés dans le pays dont ils sont ressortissants ou en Turquie'.

Observations: It was pointed out that as regards the Turkish addition and the question of reciprocity, a difficulty arose owing to a 'domicile' being the criterion in England as regards the matters dealt with in this article, while nationality is the criterion in France. In any case the words could only be held to apply as regards 'caution', and not as regards 'l'accès aux tribunaux'.

Recommendation: That reciprocity might be accepted as regards this article provided the words 'domiciliés dans le pays dont ils sont ressortissants ou' are suppressed.

Article 19.

The Turks wish to omit the words 'réelle ou' in paragraph (1), and to suppress certain words in the second paragraph.

Observations: Reciprocity can be accorded as regards this article, but it was agreed that it would not be possible to omit the words 'à défaut des stipulations contraires entre les parties' in the second paragraph, which covered the question of *causes promissoires* which is provided for in the Allied draft judicial declaration.

Recommendation: That the Turkish modification of the first paragraph might be accepted, but that the Allied draft in the second paragraph should be maintained, and that the article should be redrafted to cover the question of reciprocity.

Article 20.

The Turks wish to make several changes, notably, one which is designed to prevent commercial and other cases, justifiable under the other articles

[15] The reference is presumably to clause xi of the Swiss-German Extradition Treaty of 1874 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 66, pp. 143–8).

in the treaty by Turkish courts, being taken out of the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts owing to incidental questions of personal status being raised in the course of the proceedings. They also wish to have questions of heredity and testament regarding immovable property decided by Turkish courts.

Observations: It was agreed that while the Turkish claim regarding the points of incidental personal status questions arising in other cases was reasonable, the whole question would have to be discussed between experts in Turkish law and Munir Bey at Lausanne, and that it would again have to be explained fully to Munir Bey that reciprocity in these matters of personal status cannot be accorded.

Recommendation: That the article should be discussed as above with the Turkish delegation, and that the drafting change made in the last paragraph of the Allied draft by the Turks might be accepted, but that reciprocity cannot be given.

Article 21.

The Turks have inserted a paragraph which would enable Turkish courts to try offences committed on the territory of a third State, but which might, in virtue of Turkish laws, fall within the competence of Turkish tribunals.

Observations: It was pointed out that while the laws of some foreign countries might allow this modification to be accepted, English law does not permit it.

Recommendation: It was agreed that the article should again be explained to the Turkish experts, and the suppression of the above amendment insisted upon.

Article 22.

The Turks desire to suppress this article, which is designed to attach to the convention the judicial declaration and also to lay down that foreigners in Turkey will be assured, with regard to their persons and goods before Turkish courts, treatment in conformity with the principles and methods generally followed in other countries.

Recommendation: It was agreed that, in order to meet the Turks, it might be possible to suppress the words from 'amener' to 'justice', inclusive, but that the rest of the article must be maintained, and that it might be pointed out that it was simply in conformity with declarations which Ismet Pasha had continually made at the meetings of the conference at Lausanne.

Article 23.

The Turks wish to suppress the words 'imprisonment for debt'.

Recommendation: It was agreed that the explanation of this suppression should be obtained from Munir Bey at Lausanne, and a decision taken in the light of his arguments.

Article 24.

The Turks wish to suppress this article, which provides for the free functioning of religious, educational and charitable establishments, as well as hospitals, &c., directed by persons, communities or associations nationals of

the other contracting Powers, and also provides for the special arrangements regarding the creation of similar new establishments. In its place they propose to substitute a unilateral declaration to be attached to the convention recognising that educational and philanthropic works as well as aid societies recognised as existing in Turkey before the 30th October, 1914, and belonging to France, Great Britain or Italy should continue to exist.

Observations: The Turkish draft declaration is not nearly wide enough. It does not cover all the institutions referred to in the Allied article. It puts the date back to the 30th October, 1914, and it suppresses the principle of the negotiation of agreements regarding the foundation of new establishments.

Recommendation: That the principle of a declaration attached to the convention should be accepted, but that the declaration must be redrafted to cover all the substantial points in the original Allied article, and probably extended to include the American schools.

Article 25.

The Turks wish to suppress this article, which provides for the adherence to the present convention of non-signatory Powers (such neutrals as Sweden, Holland, &c., who were represented at Lausanne).

Recommendation: That an endeavour should be made to retain the article, but that it might be redrafted in some such way as follows: 'il appartiendra à la Turquie à s'entendre avec les autres Puissances signataires', &c.

The Turks have added an article to the convention regarding reciprocity.

This article is, in any case, inacceptable in some respects, because it included *en bloc* in the territories of the contracting Powers all their colonies, dominions, protectorates, &c., whereas, in the case of the British Empire, each dominion, &c., would require to be treated separately. As a matter of fact, the article will not be required if, as is suggested, reciprocity should be given, where possible, specifically in each article throughout the convention.

Article 26.

The Turks add some words limiting the duration of the whole convention to five years.

Recommendation: That the principle of such a limited duration of the convention should be accepted, but that every endeavour should be made to extend it from five years to ten.

Draft Declaration regarding Justice in Turkey.

The committee considered the following counter-draft prepared by Sir H. Rumbold and Mr. Ryan at Constantinople since the departure of the Turkish delegation from Lausanne. This counterdraft is an attempt to reconcile Ismet Pasha's counterdraft of the 4th February (including the insertions proposed by Signor Montagna to Ismet Pasha on the 4th February)[16] with the Allied draft declaration of the 3rd February:[17]

[16] No. 397, n. 3. [17] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.

1. La délégation turque a déjà eu l'occasion de faire connaître que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est en mesure d'assurer aux étrangers devant les tribunaux toutes les garanties d'une bonne justice et qu'il est à même d'y veiller dans le plein exercice de sa souveraineté et sans aucune intervention étrangère. Il n'en est pas moins disposé à faire procéder à des enquêtes et études pour introduire telles réformes que justifierait le progrès des mœurs et de la civilisation.

2. Dans cet esprit, la délégation turque tient à faire la déclaration suivante:

3. Le Gouvernement turc se propose de prendre incessamment à son service, pour la période qu'il jugera nécessaire et qui ne sera pas inférieure à cinq années, des conseillers légistes européens, qui seront choisis sur une liste dressée par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale de La Haye parmi les jurisconsultes ressortissants des pays n'ayant pas participé à la guerre de 1914–18, et qui seront des fonctionnaires turcs. Les conditions de service et le traitement de ces conseillers légistes seront fixés d'un commun accord entre le Gouvernement turc et la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

4. Ces conseillers légistes dépendront du Ministre de la Justice. Ils participeront aux travaux des commissions de réformes législatives et seront spécialement chargés de suivre dans les régions comprises dans les circonscriptions judiciaires des Cours d'Appel de Constantinople et Smyrne le fonctionnement des juridictions civiles, commerciales et pénales turques, de réquerir que des actions, appels ou pourvois en cassation ou revision soient introduits par le Ministère public contre les actes ou décisions qu'ils ne jugeraient pas conformes au droit, et de recevoir toutes plaintes auxquelles pourraient donner lieu soit l'administration de la justice civile, commerciale ou pénale, soit l'exécution des peines, soit l'application des lois, avec mission d'en rendre compte aux autorités turques compétentes à l'effet d'assurer la stricte observation de la législation turque.

5. Les visites domiciliaires, perquisitions ou arrestations, sauf dans le cas de flagrant délit, auxquelles les autorités turques dans les circonscriptions judiciaires ci-dessus mentionnées auraient à procéder dans les affaires ci-dessus visées, seront pratiquées d'accord avec lesdits conseillers.

6. Dans les matières correctionnelles, la mise en liberté sous caution devra toujours être prononcée, à moins que la sécurité publique n'en fût de ce fait compromise, ou que la mise en liberté provisoire n'entravât la bonne marche de l'instruction de l'affaire.

7. Tous compromis et clauses compromissoires en matière civile ou commerciale sont permis et les décisions arbitrales ainsi rendues seront exécutées sur le visa du président du tribunal de première instance, qui ne pourra refuser son visa qu'au cas où la décision serait contraire à l'ordre public.

8. La partie de la présente déclaration concernant les conseillers légistes et les fonctions qu'ils auront à exercer sera valable pour une durée de cinq ans, à moins que le Gouvernement turc ne juge nécessaire de prolonger la période de leur service.

Subject to the amendments given below, the draft was accepted as that to which the inviting Powers should base all their endeavours to secure the assent of the Turkish delegation.

In paragraph 3 the words 'qu'il choisira' should be substituted for the words 'qui seront choisis'; the words 'engagés comme' should be inserted after the word 'seront'.

Draft Amnesty Declaration.

Article 2.

The Turks insert the words 'ou militaire' after the word 'politique'.

Recommendation: No objection.

Article 3.

The Turks wish to add a paragraph providing for the surrender to the Turkish Government on the signature of peace of all Turkish nationals arrested or prosecuted in occupied Turkey by the Allies for political, military or common law offences, &c., 'or for any other reason taken away from Turkey'.

Observations: The article is drafted in such a way as to provide even for the surrender of Turks arrested for attacks on the Allied troops of occupation since the armistice and for the surrender of Turks who have helped the Allies or whose departure for any reason from Turkey has been arranged by the Allies, *e.g.*, the ex-Sultan and his entourage. It also covers, as drafted, even the territories to be detached from Turkey by the treaty.

Recommendation: That the addition should only be accepted if it is limited to the new Turkey and to the period up to the armistice of Mudania; if the word 'libérés' is substituted for the words 'restitués au Gouvernement turc' and the words 'mise en vigueur' for 'signature'.

Article 5.

The Turks wish to omit the words 'le Président de' at the end of this article.

Observations: As the president is always present at The Hague, there might be delay if the choice of the *surarbitre* was left, not to the president, but to the whole court.

Recommendation: That this should be explained to the Turks and that they should be asked to accept the Allied draft.

The Turks also wish to add a protocol to the declaration, providing for the exception of 150 Turks from the amnesty.

Observation: This addition was accepted in principle in the discussion of the Minorities Sub-Commission at Lausanne,[18] but it was not to be inserted in the declaration or appear in the treaty settlement, but to be arranged in an exchange of notes between the Turkish and Allied delegations. This procedure was adopted in order to avoid the appearance of only a partial amnesty and not to give occasion for a demand by the Greek delegation for a similar exception to the Greek amnesty.

[18] See *Recueil* (*1*), vol. I, p. 553.

Recommendation: The substance of the Turkish draft protocol should be arranged by an exchange of notes outside the treaty, as proposed at Lausanne. The last paragraph of the protocol should also be redrafted to give twelve months instead of six months for the voluntary liquidation of their property by the deportees, and for the surrender to the latter by the Turkish Government of the proceeds of the liquidation, should this be carried out after the twelve months' period by the Turkish Government.

No. 456

Report of the Turkish Economic Sub-Committee (communicated by the Board of Trade, March 26; received March 27)

[*E 3280/1/44*]

The Economic Sub-Committee held six meetings at the Board of Trade and discussed, in the light of the Turkish observations and counter-proposals,[1] the Lausanne draft of the Allied economic proposals, together with Chapter II of the draft Convention respecting the Régime applicable to Foreigners in Turkey and the draft Convention respecting the Commercial Régime with Turkey. . . .[2]

The following notes contain a record of the decisions of the sub-committee on all points. As a result of the discussions of the sub-committee, the economic clauses of the treaty have been considerably shortened and simplified; the points at issue between the Turks and the Allies are substantially reduced in number, though it is impossible to disguise the fact that on certain matters of importance, notably in regard to concessions dealt with in article 94, there is likely to remain considerable divergence of opinion.

There remain the following questions of a political character, which the sub-committee have considered outside their competence:

Article 159 of the treaty provided for the adhesion to the economic and financial provisions of the treaty of Belgium, Poland, Portugal and Czechoslovakia. This article the Turks propose to suppress.

Article 7 *of the Commercial Convention.*—The Turks, whilst giving the treatment guaranteed by the convention to the four principle Allies, propose to limit its operation to one year in the case of the other Allies.

Article 19 *of the Commercial Convention.*—This article permitted the adherence to the convention of non-signatory Powers. The Turks have proposed its suppression.

It was agreed that the Turkish proposal to leave the whole of the economic clauses (articles 71 to 117) for discussion outside the Treaty of Peace could not be accepted, and that the economic provisions could not be dealt with satisfactorily by clauses merely giving expression to general principles; they should be dealt with as far as necessary by detailed clauses, which should be simplified as far as possible.

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] Here follow lists of representatives for each separate meeting. In addition to those named in No. 451, the following sometimes attended: Monsieur Bompard and Monsieur Bexon (*France*), Signor Montagna (*Italy*), and Mr. Waley (*British Empire*).

The Turkish objections to the Allied draft proposals and the Turkish counter-proposals as disclosed at Lausanne were discussed.

It was agreed that the Turkish suggestion for the substitution of the 29th October, 1914, for the 1st August, 1914, might be accepted generally subject to any question arising in individual cases.

Article 71.—This article contains only definitions on which no question of substance is likely to arise.

[*Property, Rights and Interests.*][3]

Article 72.—This article provides for the mutual return of private property in Allied territory and in Turkey. It was agreed that the Turkish draft might be accepted as a basis, subject to the deletion of the provision for the return of the property of the Turkish State, of the Crown and of the Civil List. The reference to the property of companies under Allied control, objected to by the Turks, was eliminated from this article, sufficient provision being made in article 94.

Article 73.—The Turks demanded that this article, which provides for the search for private property seized and taken away, should be made reciprocal. It was agreed that the article should be modified by giving qualified reciprocity by the insertion of some such phrase as: 'In relation to any country which is prepared to give her reciprocity in this respect. . . .'

Article 74.—This article provides for the restoration of private property in territory detached from Turkey by the treaty. The Turks requested that it should apply to property of the Turkish State, the Civil List, the Crown and the Hedjaz Railway. It was not considered possible to meet the Turks in this respect, but it was agreed that article 74 should be suppressed, subject to the addition of a few words in article 71 to give effect to article 74. The Hedjaz Railway would, it was assumed, be dealt with in accordance with M. Bompard's declaration at Lausanne.[4]

Article 75.—The Turks demanded the suppression of the whole article. It was agreed that the first paragraph, providing for the repayment of taxes levied during the war which were not authorised under the capitulatory régime, should be waived, but the second paragraph, which provides that payment should not be exacted of taxes which had not been paid during the war, should be retained with the necessary consequential drafting amendments.

Article 76.—It was agreed that this article, which provided for compensation being paid to Turkish owners of property which is not returned, should be suppressed. A new provision should, however, be inserted in article 72, providing that, instead of restitution of property which can be identified, the contracting Powers might discharge their obligations in this respect by payment over, within a stipulated period of time, of the proceeds of liquidation, plus any amount awarded by the mixed arbitral tribunal on the ground that the circumstances under which the sale was conducted were such

[3] This heading has been supplied from the Draft Treaty (see Appendix III).

[4] See Cmd. 1814, p. 604.

as to prejudice the realisation of a fair price. The Japanese representative thought that his Government might desire to make a separate arrangement with the Turkish Government for the mutual waiver of all claims, including those under article 72.

Article 77 was adopted, having been accepted by the Turks.

Article 78.—The object of this article was to keep alive claims which had arisen before the war. It was agreed to accept the Turkish redraft, which is in reciprocal form, subject to it being made clear that the Angora Government accept the liabilities of the old Ottoman Government.

Article 79 was suppressed.

Article 80.—This article provides for the payment by the Turkish Government to companies in which Allied interests are preponderant of compensation in respect of losses resulting from acts of war or any act or omission of the Turkish Government. It was agreed that this article could be suppressed, but that a paragraph should be inserted in article 94, which deals with concessions, providing that in the readaptation of the terms of concessions account shall be taken of such losses.

Article 81.—This article provided for the liquidation of property in Turkey belonging to Germany, Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria, or their nationals, those countries having agreed in the respective treaties of peace to recognise any provisions made in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The article as drafted was somewhat far-reaching, and it was agreed to substitute for the article provisions confirming all liquidations or seizures by the Allied Government of ex-enemy property, whether Government or private.

Contracts, Prescriptions and Judgments.

Article 82.—This article provides for the maintenance of certain specified classes of pre-war contracts between enemies. It was agreed that the classes of contracts enumerated in article 82 of the Allied proposals should be divided into two categories. The first would contain (*a*), (*d*), (*e*), (*g*) and (*h*) with the existing provisions of article 82, which were accepted by the Turks as regards those categories. The second would contain (*b*), (*c*) and (*f*), to which the Turks objected. These latter classes of contracts would be incorporated in a new article, providing for their maintenance subject to readaptation by arbitration.

Article 83.—This article provides, by reference to an annex, for the method of dealing with insurance contracts. The Turks do not accept the provisions of the annex, and it is not possible to accept the counter-proposals made by the Turks. In these circumstances, it was agreed to suppress the clause and the annex, subject to the retention of article 86, which confirms compromises already effected between the parties to all contracts, and of the article which it is suggested should be substituted for article 84.

Article 84.—It was agreed to substitute for this article, which was objected to by the Turks, an article making contracts other than those specified in the previous articles the subject of future bilateral arrangements between Turkey and each Power concerned.

Article 85.—It was agreed that this article, which was objected to by the Turks, could be suppressed.

Article 86.—It was agreed that this article, which confirms compromises, should be maintained as indicated above.

Article 87.—It was agreed to suppress this article subject to the part providing for the confirmation of contracts with the Imperial Ottoman Government since the 30th October, 1918, being dealt with under the Concessions clauses.

Article 88.—This article provides for the settlement of disputes with regard to pre-war contracts by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. The Turks objected, and it was agreed to suppress the article, arbitration having already been provided for in respect of contracts (*b*), (*c*) and (*f*) of the original article 82.

Article 89 was maintained with the modifications desired by the Turks in the second sentence.

Article 90 was maintained, having been accepted by the Turks.

Article 91, which provides for the revision of certain judgments of the Turkish courts during the war, was suppressed, as it is not possible to grant reciprocity, it being assumed that article 153, providing for the recognition of judgments of the tribunals of the occupying Powers, will be maintained.

Article 92 dealing with the sale of mortgaged property was suppressed. The Turks objected to the article, and their counter-proposal could not be accepted.

Article 93, which contains a definition of enemies, was accepted by the Turks and was maintained subject to certain necessary drafting alterations in paragraph 2.

The annex relating to insurance contracts was suppressed as indicated above.

Concessions.

Article 94.—This article dealing with concessions in Turkey provides for:

1. The complete restoration of Allied nationals in their rights.
2. Confirmation of agreements relating to concessions before the 29th October, 1914, if they have begun to be put into operation, or had formed the subject of agreement between Governments, notwithstanding the absence of final confirmation.
3. The prolongation of concessions for a period equal to the duration of the war.
4. Account to be taken of any such prolongation in assessing compensation or in the readaptation of the concession.
5. Readaptation of concessions to accord with the new economic conditions.
6. Arbitration in default of agreement as to the readaptation.
7. Confirmation of agreements since the 30th October, 1918, with the Imperial Ottoman Government.
8. Maintenance of Allied subjects in their rights under concessions or licences, whether acquired directly or by transfer.
9. Avoidance of legislative or other provisions inconsistent with the above.

By article 100 it is provided that companies in which Allied interests are preponderant shall enjoy the benefits of article 94.

The Turkish representatives at Lausanne objected to this article,[5] their main grounds of objection being stated to be:

(*a*) That to deal in the Treaty of Peace with the relations between the Turkish Government and Ottoman companies would be derogatory to Turkish sovereignty.

(*b*) That they cannot undertake to confirm arrangements which were not definitely concluded before the war.

(*c*) That any question of prolongation of a concession by way of compensation can only be settled by agreement between the parties.

(*d*) That they cannot recognise any right to arbitration as to readaptation of the terms of concessions unless it is provided for in the concession itself.

(*e*) That as the Grand National Assembly has passed a law making void contracts by the Constantinople Government since the 30th October, 1918,[6] they cannot recognise such contracts.

As regards (*a*), it was considered that in substance provisions must be included in the treaty to safeguard the rights of Turkish companies under Allied control, notwithstanding the Turkish objection, for concessions are invariably held by such companies. The Turkish difficulties might, however, be overcome to some extent by giving the names of the companies referred to in article 100 in an annex or in an exchange of notes.

As regards (*b*), it was agreed that the wording of the article should be maintained, but that the Turks should be eventually supplied with a declaration limiting the application of the article to specific cases.

As regards (*c*), it was agreed to omit paragraph 3 of the article, containing the specific provision for prolongation, together with paragraph 4 of the article, leaving the matter to be dealt with under more general terms in the provision for readaptation.

As regards (*d*), it was considered necessary to retain a provision for settlement of the terms of readaptation in default of agreement, but the reference to 'arbitrators' should be altered to 'experts', and a neutral technical authority should be substituted for the Permanent Court of International Justice.

As regards (*e*), it was agreed to amend paragraph 7 of the article by providing that such agreements shall remain in force until new agreements have been made between the parties interested.

It was also agreed to suppress paragraphs 8 and 9 of the article having regard to objections raised by the Turks to these paragraphs.

The effect of these alterations will be to reduce the length of the article, and to some extent to meet Turkish susceptibilities while maintaining the principle of recognition of the validity of concessions and their readaptation to meet existing economic conditions and to provide some compensation for losses suffered.

[5] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 611–12. [6] Cf. Nos. 139 and 151.

A provisional redraft of the article giving effect to the above decisions has been prepared by M. Fromageot and is given below. This draft makes it unnecessary to retain article 80 or the special reference to companies under Allied control formerly appearing in article 72.

The question of allowing representatives of the concessionaires to endeavour now to negotiate with the Angora Government[7] was mentioned at the meeting of the committee, but, as political questions were involved,[8] the committee came to no decision on this point.

Article 95.—It was agreed that the article, which deals with the future ownership and working of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, should be left for further discussion with the Turks with a view, if possible, to some arrangement being reached with them outside the treaty.

Article 96.—This article provides for the rights of concessionaires in territories detached from Turkey. As the Turks did not object to the first paragraph and disclaimed any interest in the rest of the article it was agreed that it should be maintained.

Article 97.—In view of the Turkish objection to the date, it was agreed that the article should be suppressed.

Article 98.—The Turks objected to the article, and it was agreed to suppress it.

Article 99.—Accepted by the Turks, and it was agreed that the article should be maintained.

Article 100.—As stated in the observations with regard to article 94, it was agreed that this article, which provides for the recognition of the rights of Turkish companies in which Allied interests are preponderant, should be

[7] See Nos. 437, 439, and 441.

[8] Mr. Forbes Adam minuted on March 26: '. . . Signor Montagna asked that the principle involved in the proposal of these private negotiations should first be discussed privately between Lord Curzon, the Marquis Garroni, and M. Bompard. Yesterday (Sunday) Signor Guariglia came to see me and said that he was afraid Signor Montagna (who did not understand the question) and Signor Nogara (who was afraid to take what amounted to a political responsibility) had made unnecessary difficulties. He had now discussed the matter with the Marquis Garroni and they wanted to be helpful and not to obstruct. . . . The Italians feared that the re-adaptation and revision of these old conditions or the concession by the Turks to the companies "of economic advantages or privileges of any kind" by way of compensation for war damages (see second paragraph of article 80) might in fact involve the Smyrna Aidin Company in a discussion with Angora impinging upon the question of the extension of this railway into the Italian zone round Adalia. The Italian interests concerned (represented by Signor Nogara) had made before the war under the auspices of Mr. Parker (then representing the Foreign Office but now the Smyrna Aidin Railway) an agreement with the Smyrna Aidin Railway which required the sanction of the Turkish Government which had never been given. They were now prepared, subject to certain changes to be negotiated between the companies and required by the new situation, to try to obtain the Turkish Government's consent to this joint arrangement after the conclusion of peace. . . . But they feared single-handed negotiations now by the Smyrna Aidin Railway with Angora might prejudice the position and on this point the Italian Government were more apprehensive because of our note to the Italian Embassy of March 12th [No. 440] adhering to the Franco-Italian correspondence about economic co-operation in Anatolia.'

maintained, subject to the inclusion in an annex or in an exchange of notes of a list of the companies referred to in the article.

Article 101.—It was agreed to recommend the substitution of a draft prepared by M. Fromageot, providing for payment of pre-war debts in accordance with the terms of the contracts, instead of the existing provision for payment at the pre-war rate of exchange. A copy of this draft is [given below].

Industrial Property.

Articles 102–106.—It was agreed that the articles be maintained as the Turks raised no objection.

Article 107.—It was agreed that this article, which provides for the recognition of registrations effected since the 30th October, 1918, should be maintained if possible. In the alternative a redraft should be prepared providing that fresh applications should be made, which, if accepted, should date back to the original registration without the payment of further fees.

Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.

Articles 108–111, which provide for the establishment and procedure of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, were maintained, having been accepted by the Turks.

Treaties.

Articles 112–115, providing for the adhesion by Turkey to certain treaties and conventions were maintained, no observations having been offered by the Turks.

General Provisions.

Article 116.—This article refers to the abrogation of the economic régime resulting from the Capitulations and to the proposed commercial convention. It was agreed, as regards the opening sentence, that the same formula be adopted as for article 26.

Article 117, which provides for the treatment of goods originating from or destined for Morocco (French zone), Tunis or Libya was maintained, subject possibly to some small drafting amendment.

Projet de nouvelle rédaction.

ARTICLE 94.

Les contrats de concessions ainsi que les accords subséquents qui ont été conclus avant le 29 octobre 1914 par le Gouvernement ottoman et dont les ressortissants alliés ou des entreprises fonctionnant à l'aide de capitaux appartenant à des ressortissants alliés sont bénéficiaires, sont maintenus.

Leurs clauses seront, d'un commun accord, mises en conformité des conditions économiques nouvelles et revisées, s'il y a lieu, pour tenir compte des préjudices subis par les parties par suite de la guerre.

Au cas où cette revision ne suffirait pas à assurer la réparation de ces

préjudices, il sera pourvu à cette réparation au moyen de versements en espèces ou d'avantages économiques équivalents accordés par le Gouvernement turc.

Faute d'entente dans le délai d'un an, les parties adopteront les modifications qui seront considérées, en ce qui concerne la réadaptation des concessions, comme convenables et équitables par deux experts qu'il leur appartiendra de désigner et qui s'en référeront, en cas de désaccord entre eux, à un tiers expert désigné par. . . .

Il appartiendra également aux experts de fixer le montant en espèces des compensations dues aux concessionnaires pour les préjudices qu'ils auront subis pendant la guerre et d'apprécier si les avantages économiques offerts par le Gouvernement turc sont suffisants pour compenser lesdits préjudices.

Les dispositions de l'alinéa précédent ne portent pas atteinte à la compétence des tribunaux turcs pour connaître des contestations qui s'élèveraient sur l'interprétation des clauses desdits contrats ou des modifications ci-dessus envisagées.

Article 94 *bis*.

Dans le cas où, parmi les contrats et accords visés à l'article 94, il en serait pour la régularisation desquels certaines formalités n'auraient pas été remplies depuis le 29 octobre 1914, ces contrats et accords seront néanmoins considérés comme réguliers et définitifs s'ils ont reçu un commencement d'exécution ou s'ils ont fait l'objet, entre le Gouvernement ottoman et un Gouvernement allié, d'arrangements ayant eux-mêmes reçu un commencement d'exécution.

Article 94 *ter*.

Les accords intervenus depuis le 30 octobre 1918 entre le Gouvernement ottoman et les bénéficiaires des contrats et concessions visés à l'article 94 demeureront en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'une entente intervienne entre les parties intéressées.

Au cas où une entente n'interviendrait pas dans le délai d'un an à compter de la mise en vigueur du présent traité la revision desdits accords sera confiée à des experts désignés dans les conditions prévues dans l'article 94, alinéa 4.

Article 101.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour reconnaître que les dettes exigibles avant la guerre, ou devenues exigibles pendant la guerre, et restées impayées par suite de la guerre, doivent être réglées et payées dans la monnaie et dans les conditions prévues aux contrats.

Cette dispostion s'appliquera, notamment, aux dettes ci-dessus visées existant entre Gouvernements et ressortissants alliés et turcs respectivement.

Elle ne portera pas atteinte aux stipulations contraires qui, avant la mise en vigueur du présent traité, seraient intervenues à l'amiable entre les parties intéressées.

Chapter II of the Convention d'Établissement.[9]

This chapter deals with the taxation of persons and companies, and is based on the general principle of national treatment in regard to taxation.

Article 10, which deals with taxation of persons, is accepted *in toto* by Turkey, and should be maintained.

Article 11 deals with taxation of companies. Two trifling verbal amendments have been introduced by Turkey which can be accepted. The Turks have, however, suppressed the reference to sociétés civiles, which should, if possible, be restored. The original Allied draft requires an amendment to bring it into line with the principles governing the taxation of companies in the United Kingdom and other Allied countries. For branches of companies to be taxed in respect of the business carried on in the country where the branch is situated, and not in respect of the whole business of the company, it is necessary that the central management and control should not be situated in the country where the tax is levied. To meet this there should be inserted after the words 'étant entendu que' in the second paragraph some such words as 'when the central management and control is outside Turkey'.

Article 12 was framed to secure that Allied subjects should enjoy all bounties, exemptions and drawbacks accorded to Turks. The Turks have turned this into an article permitting Turkey a free hand in the matter. It was agreed that the claim to share in bounties might be abandoned, but that exemptions and drawbacks must be extended to Allied nationals, or otherwise the national treatment in regard to taxation might be nullified.

The words 'ou attribue . . . d'encouragement', 'ou encouragements' and 'de manière à . . . desdits pays' should be suppressed.

Articles 13 and 14 are accepted by the Turks and should be maintained.

Article 15 relates to the treatment of charitable and religious foundations. The Turks have eliminated it, but would probably be prepared to embody the first paragraph in a declaration. The second paragraph deals with customs exemptions in favour of such foundations, and Turkey might be asked if she were ready to make some declaration on the subject.

Article 16.—The Turks have eliminated some words at the end and the Turkish version may be accepted, the words 'et aux ressortissants', which appear to have been dropped by mistake, being, however, reinserted after the words 'appliquera à ses ressortissants'.

Article 17.—This is an article making the grant of the conditions in the previous article dependent on reciprocity. It is more satisfactory than the corresponding general article, which appears as a 'disposition finale' in the Turkish draft, especially in regard to the position of allied colonies, &c. It should, therefore, be maintained, but the Turkish preference for a five years' arrangement instead of one for ten years, if pressed, could be agreed to.

Generally speaking, it is not felt that the differences between Turkey and the Allies in regard to this chapter or in regard to the Commercial Convention need give rise to serious difficulty.

[9] *Projet de Convention relative au Régime des Etrangères en Turquie* (see Appendix III).

Commercial Convention.[10]

SECTION I.

It was agreed that the modifications proposed by Turkey in articles 1–3 of this convention might be accepted, subject to an explanation being given of the phraseology of article 2.

Article 4.—In this article, which deals with the grounds on which prohibitions of importation or exportation can be maintained, the Turks have added two new clauses. One of these, relating to goods the subject of a monopoly, can be accepted. The other, which permits of prohibitions instituted to 'prévenir les inconvénients graves menaçant son régime économique', is vague and apparently unnecessary, and should, if possible, be rejected.

Article 5.—The conditions affecting consumption duties proposed in the Turkish counter-draft can be accepted. Similar conditions should, however, be insisted on in the case of internal duties in general and octrois as in the original Allied draft.

Article 6.—The changes proposed by the Turks are trifling and can be accepted, subject to a drafting amendment to which it is not considered that the Turks are likely to object.

Article 7.—The modifications proposed by the Turks can also be accepted so far as the four principal Allies are concerned, but as Turkey proposed to give the treatment guaranteed by the convention for one year only instead of five to the other Allies, the question has a political aspect, to which it is necessary to draw attention.

Article 8.—The Turks have insisted on a form of reciprocity as a condition of securing the advantages of the convention, which are unsatisfactory to France. It will be necessary to secure the adoption of some other form of words on the lines of the original Allied draft.

A new article has been inserted after article 8 dealing with certificates of origin. If possible modifications should be pressed for in this article in order to simplify the procedure. The reference to certificates of verification in the third paragraph should be eliminated, only the final sentence of this paragraph being retained with the substitution of 'certificat d'origine' for 'certificat de vérification'.

Article 9.—There is no objection to the suppression of this article, the question of future treaty negotiations being dealt with in a new final article after article 19.

SECTION II.

Article 10.—The Turks have eliminated two paragraphs in the Allied draft, of which the first relates to coasting trade in detached territories, and the second to the continuance temporarily of the rights to carry on coasting trade of a certain class of Allied company. The first of these need not be insisted on, but the second should be maintained, being, however, limited to under-

[10] *Projet de Convention relative au Régime du Commerce avec la Turquie* (see Appendix III).

takings engaged in the traffic before the war, and the temporary period might be reduced from five to three years.

Article 11 is practically unchanged and the Turkish draft can be accepted.

Article 12.—The Turks have added a phrase at the end providing reciprocally for the recognition of Turkish shipping documents. It is necessary to be sure that such certificates are issued under proper conditions, and the addition after the words 'bateaux turcs' should run 'dans les conditions équivalentes à celles imposées dans les principaux pays maritimes', and the words 'dans les mêmes conditions' should be added at the end.

Article 13 can be suppressed.

SECTION III.

Article 14.—The alteration proposed by the Turks can be accepted.

Article 15 is accepted by the Turks.

Article 16.—The Turks are not prepared to accept the whole of the Copyright Convention. They cannot be forced to do so, but the words proposed by the Turks require to be modified, as they can only adhere to the convention under a reserve if the reserve is accepted by all the conventional Powers.

Article 17 is accepted by the Turks.

Article 18 deals with the position of Allied colonies, &c. The changes made by the Turks are obviously badly conceived, and it will be necessary to secure amendments in order to make the article acceptable.

Article 19 permits of the adherence to the convention of non-signatory Powers. It has been suppressed by the Turks, thus raising a question rather of a political than an economic character.

A new final article has been inserted here by the Turks and can be accepted.

Article 20 is a purely formal article, which the Turks accept.[11]

[11] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 645.

No. 457

Report of the Financial Committee[1] *on the Turkish Counter-Proposals*[2]
(Received in Foreign Office, March 27)
[*E 3282/1/44*]

TREASURY, *March 26, 1923*

INTRODUCTION.

(Translation.)

Financial Clauses.[2]

SECTION I.—*Ottoman Public Debt.*

Most of the numerous alterations proposed by the Turkish Government in this section are unimportant and unobjectionable. However, the experts desire to draw the particular attention of their Government to the following proposals, which cannot be accepted:

[1] See No. 451. [2] See Appendix III.

1. The Turks indicate that they propose to pay the service of the Ottoman Public Debt in a currency other than that provided for in the loan contracts.
2. They ask that the expenses of withdrawing Turkish paper money should be shared among the succession States.
3. They are not willing to include in the treaty provisions which impose upon them the obligation of assigning fresh revenues (if necessary) for their share of the debt (article 47).

SECTION II.—*Reparation.*

The experts draw particular attention to article 57 (Reparation). The British Government being unable to maintain the concession previously made, in accordance with which the British Government was to pay compensation for the seizure of Turkish battleships to be used for the satisfaction of reparation claims of Allied subjects, the whole question of reparation has again to be decided.

A decision will have to be taken as to whether a demand for reparation from Turkey should again be made.

On the one hand, it must be realised that the payment by the Turks of a sum to cover reparation claims, which had been entirely renounced on the 4th February last, will arouse the strongest objections on the part of the delegates of the Angora Government.

On the other hand, the sums transferred by Germany and Austria under articles 259 (1) of the Treaty of Versailles and 210 (1) of the Treaty of Saint-Germain do not exceed £T. 5,000,000 gold. This sum is quite insufficient to cover the settlement of the claims of Allied subjects. If it is desired that these subjects should receive a considerable measure of reparation, it would be necessary to return to the reparation scheme provided for by the draft treaty of the 31st January. The sum to be claimed from Turkey might be reduced to £T. 7,000,000 gold, which sum, when added to £T. 5,000,000 gold transferred by Germany and Austria and renounced by Turkey, forms a total of £T. 12,000,000 gold, a figure which had already been contemplated by the Allies at the last stage of the negotiations.[3]

The matter is one to be decided by the Governments.

Turkish Reparation Claim from Greece.

Article 58 of the draft treaty provides that Greece and Turkey reciprocally renounce all claims for damage caused to their nationals. The Turkish counter-proposal provides that the question shall be settled between the Turkish Government and the Greek Government. In case of disagreement as to the total of the sum to be paid by the Greeks as reparation for damage caused to Turkey by the Greek armies, this disagreement shall be settled by means of arbitration. The question whether Greece should pay an indemnity to Turkey is essentially of a political character, and the experts have not

[3] See No. 370.

felt able to do more than put forward various alternative suggestions. The alternatives which might be adopted are the following:—

(*a*) The complete reciprocal renunciation of an indemnity in accordance with Allied proposals.

(*b*) If the principal [*sic*] of a payment of reparation by Greece is admitted, the settlement of a lump sum for this reparation to be laid down in the treaty.

(*c*) The settlement of the reparation liability by means of arbitration on the understanding that the arbitrator shall take into account not only the amount of the damage caused in Turkey, but also the capacity of payment of Greece.

SECTION III.—*Miscellaneous Clauses.*

Attention should be drawn to the following points:—

1. The Turks demand that Civil List property in the detached States should be kept in the name of the Civil List and should be paid for by those States (article 65).
2. The Turkish Government is unwilling to confirm the validity of contracts and financial transactions which took place between the Constantinople Government and Allied institutions.

Both these demands of the Turkish Government should be refused.

The detailed points arising on each of the clauses are dealt with in the Annex.

ANNEX.

Financial Clauses.

SECTION I.—*Ottoman Public Debt.*

Article 17.

The Turkish Government wishes to add to the article the words: 'Turkey is freed from all liabilities and obligations in respect to the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute.' It is considered that it would be undesirable to release Turkey from this liability before it is assumed by Egypt. Egypt is actually making the payments at present without any formal agreement. It is intended that Egypt should take over the liability formally by one of the subsequent agreements contemplated by article 18.

It will be desirable to explain to the Turks that this question is to be dealt with in a subsequent agreement, and to refuse the proposed addition to the article. If Turkey insists on being liberated at once, a further paragraph should be added to the following effect:—

'Turkey is freed from all liabilities and obligations in respect of the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute, viz., the loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894.[4] In view of the fact that the annual payments heretofore made by Egypt for the service on these loans now constitute a part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debt, Egypt shall not be called upon to undertake any further liability in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt.'

[4] See *Recueil* (2), vol. I, pp. 184–5.

Article 19.

Turkey also asks to be liberated from obligations in respect of the loans secured on the Cyprus revenues. This probably refers to the loan of 1855. The securities assigned to this loan are the Egyptian Tribute, the Customs of Smyrna, and generally the revenues of the Ottoman Empire. The interest is guaranteed by Great Britain and France. Turkey defaulted in 1876, and since that period England (which had the revenues of Cyprus under her control) has applied a sum of 90,000*l.* to the service of the 1855 loan. It is, therefore, natural to consider the loan of 1855 as secured on the Cyprus revenues, though legally this is not the case. The point is dealt with by the suggested addition to article 17 (see above) which refers expressly to the loan of 1855.

Article 45.

No substantial modification is proposed by the Turks.

Article 46.

The Turkish Government proposes to amend this article so as to make the distribution of the capital of the Ottoman Public Debt obligatory and not merely permissive. This concession was made at Lausanne.[5]

The counter-proposal might be accepted subject to the omission of the third paragraph which provides for the issue of fresh bonds by Turkey for her share of the debt within nine months, even if the proposed commission has not finished its work. We cannot agree that Turkey should issue fresh bonds until the amount of her share and the method of distribution have been finally settled. The Turkish proposal may be intended to open the door for an issue of bonds payable in paper francs.

However, it is necessary to provide a practical procedure for bringing the work of the commission to a conclusion without indefinite delay. The experts propose to provide for arbitration by the League of Nations in case the commission fails to agree.

Article 47.

This article provides that Turkey should, if necessary, increase the assigned revenues for her share of the debt, since the detached States have to give adequate assigned revenues for their shares, and it is inequitable that the revenues assigned to the Turkish share should be inadequate.

The article should be maintained, but, if the Turks object to the article on the ground of the intervention of the Debt Council, the wording might be altered so as not to make this intervention obvious.

Articles 48 *and* 49.

No change of substance is proposed. (As regards the islands, see article 53.)

Article 50 *and Annex II.*

The Allies originally proposed that railway loans should be distributed in the same way as other State loans. The Greek and Albanian delegation at

[5] See Cmd. 1814, p. 832.

Lausanne wished to refer to arbitration the questions (1) should kilometric guarantees (which are not loans but variable subsidies and were excluded by the Allies) be included in the debt to be distributed; (2) alternatively, if these guarantees are excluded, should railway loans be distributed geographically and not in the same way as other debt?[6] The Turks desire to suppress the article and annex, *i.e.*, to return to original Allied proposals.

After further consideration of this question the experts are of opinion that the original Allied proposals are preferable to the solution suggested by the Greek and Albanian delegations, and article 50 and Annex II should be omitted.

New Article.

The Turkish Government proposes that the succession States should share in any expenditure incurred by Turkey in withdrawing paper money, in the same proportions as the pre-war Ottoman Public Debt is to be shared. This is unjustifiable because the paper money is not a loan and the loss caused by the depreciation of Turkish currency has already been borne by persons with fixed incomes in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. The proposal is impracticable because the detached States have no control over Turkish currency policy. For example, they could not prevent Turkey from replacing by a fresh issue paper money withdrawn at the expense of the succession States. The charge involved is indeterminate and the liability might last for ever.

This article must be refused.

Article 51.

No substantial change.

Article 52.

The Turkish delegation proposes that the liability of Italy to contribute to the Ottoman Public Debt in respect of the Dodecanese should date as from the 17th October, 1912.[7] The experts are willing to recommend a concession on this point, although they consider that it might be fairly resisted. According to the Turkish counter-proposal, the Greek islands referred to in article 12 should contribute to the debt as from the 14th November, 1913.[8] The situation in regard to these islands seems similar to that in regard to the Dodecanese, but the question will have to be discussed in due course with the Greek delegation.

It is suggested that the Turkish counter-proposal should be agreed to as regards the Dodecanese and reserved as regards the islands referred to in article 12.

Article 53, *paragraph* 1.

No change in substance.

[6] See ibid., pp. 568–70 and 587–92.
[7] i.e. the day before the Treaty of Lausanne of October 18, 1912.
[8] i.e. the day of the Treaty of Athens (see No. 453, n. 7).

Article 53, *paragraph* 2.

This must be suppressed if the following article is maintained (see below).

Article 53, *paragraph* 3.

The Turkish Government proposes that the retrospective contributions of the Balkan States shall be used to reimburse the payments already made by Turkey on account of these Balkan States. This is agreed.

The article should be accepted with omission of second paragraph.

Article 54.

This article provides that the Turkish Government shall repay to the Ottoman Debt Council the assigned revenues which have been withheld since the beginning of the Nationalist movement. The Turkish Government wish to suppress this article and to substitute in the second paragraph of article 53 a provision that these arrears shall be paid off in twenty years without interest in the same way as the arrears due from succession States. This demand is a debatable one. The Turkish Government had no justification for withholding assigned revenues, which had been irrevocably pledged to loans. The position of the other succession States was clearly different; since they could not pay to the debt annuities of which the amount had not yet been fixed, it is equitable to grant them more lenient treatment. For this reason it is considered that the article should be maintained and paragraph 2 of article 53 suppressed, but the experts consider that possibly some concession might be made to the Turks as regards arrears.

Article 55.

No change.

Article 56, *paragraph* 1.

This provides for the confirmation of the decrees and contracts relating to Turkish loans contracted before the 1st November, 1914. The Turks object because they consider this a matter of internal administration. The Allies agreed to withdraw this paragraph if the Turks would sign a declaration to the same effect to be made to the representatives of the bondholders. The declaration was drafted by the Turks and submitted to the Allies, but has not yet been signed, and the paragraph can only be omitted if and when the declaration is duly signed.

Article 56, *paragraph* 2.

No change of substance.

Annexe I.

In the table[9] of Turkish pre-war debt, the Turkish counter-proposal makes numerous alterations in the figures. In order to avoid controversy about figures which cannot be verified readily, the 6th and 7th columns, which contain most of the disputed figures, might be omitted.

[9] See Appendix III, pp. 1006–8.

The Turkish counter-proposal also adds Treasury bills and advances to the amount of £T. 14,000,000. These added items will need to be carefully checked, and the necessary information is being obtained from Constantinople. The amount of the advances which were repaid out of the 1914 loan should be deducted from the amount of this loan, as otherwise they appear in the table twice over.

Explanatory Note and Currency of Payment.

The figures in the Allied table of Turkish pre-war debt are given in £ Turkish gold. The loans are not payable in £ Turkish gold, but in various currencies at the choice of the bondholder, and for the most part these currencies include francs and sterling, as well as £ Turkish paper. An explanatory note was added for the purpose of explaining that the figures were given in £ Turkish gold on the assumption that one of the currencies was at gold par. In order to make the matter clearer it is proposed to show the figures in £ Turkish (*i.e.*, not in £ Turkish gold) and to substitute a shorter note to the following effect:—

> 'The amounts of the loans shown in this table have been given in £ Turkish for the sake of simplicity, but it will be understood that the amount in £ Turkish required for the service of these loans has to be calculated, in accordance with the loan contracts, at a rate of exchange such as to enable the bondholders to obtain payment in the currencies to which they are entitled by the loan contracts.'

It must be made absolutely clear that there can be no question of authorising the Turkish Government to vary the provision in the contracts about the currency in which payment is to be made.

SECTION II.—*Reparation.*

Article 57.

The drafting of this article depends on the settlement of the reparation question. The provisions in regard to property, rights and interests which the Turks wish to include in article 57 can be accepted if the right to restitution in kind of identifiable objects is safeguarded.

Article 58.

This depends on the settlement of the Græco-Turkish reparation question.

Articles 59 *to* 64.

These articles must be maintained if a reparation claim against Turkey is maintained. If the reparation figure is reduced to £T. 7,000,000 gold this figure should be inserted in article 61 and the figure for the annuity in article 59 should be reduced from £T. 900,000 gold to £T. 420,000 gold.

In article 60 it had already been agreed to eliminate the three last paragraphs referring to revenue from concessions.

Article 65.

Article 65 must be maintained in its present form because the Civil List property is essentially State property. No real distinction can be maintained between property belonging to the Ottoman Treasury and property of the Civil List. Moreover, the Civil List property was transferred into the name of the Turkish Treasury after the revolution of 1908. The subsequent re-transfer to the Civil List did not take place until 1919 after the occupation of the detached States by the Allies.

Articles 66 *to* 68.

No substantial change.

Article 69.

This article, except the last paragraph, should be eliminated, since the question of the sums of gold referred to is dealt with elsewhere.

The text proposed by the Allies for the last paragraph provides that Turkey shall undertake the liability in respect of the paper money from which the Ottoman Debt Council is freed. These provisions should be adhered to, but, of course, this is not an essential point for the Allies.

Article 70.

This article confirms the validity of contracts and settlements made [before] the 1st November, 1922, between the Constantinople Government on the one hand, and the Ottoman Public Debt and Allied subjects on the other. The article is suppressed in the Turkish counter-project, the Angora Government refusing to recognise the acts of the Constantinople Government. It must be maintained on account of the harm which would result to Allied interests from the non-execution by the Angora Government of the undertakings of the agreements made by the Constantinople Government. However, the form of this article might be discussed and modified if necessary in order to make it more easily acceptable to the Turks.

No. 458

Minutes of an Inter-Allied Meeting held at the Foreign Office on March 27, 1923, at 4.45 p.m.

PRESENT:

British Empire: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (*in the Chair*), Sir Eyre Crowe, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Nicolson, Mr. Forbes Adam; BOARD OF TRADE, Mr. Payne, Mr. Fountain; TREASURY, Mr. Waley; SECRETARY, Mr. Ronald.

France:

M. Bompard, M. Bargeton, M. Fromageot, M. Bexon, Comte de Saint-Aulaire; SECRETARY, M. Thierry.

Italy:

Marquis Garroni, M. Montagna, M. Guariglia, M. Nogara, Marquis della Torretta; SECRETARY, M. Guarnaschelli.

Japan:

Baron Hayashi, Mr. Nagaoka, Mr. Sato; SECRETARIES, Mr. Okamoto, Mr. Nishizawa.

LORD CURZON, in referring to the reports presented by the three committees[1] appointed at the last meeting,[2] wished to thank and to compliment the experts on their remarkable achievement, which encouraged the hope that the work still to be done at Lausanne would be concluded speedily and successfully.

Before opening the discussion on the three reports, he wished to make certain general observations. While it had been agreed the other day that the Allies, generally speaking, were disposed to consider the various proposals put forward by the Turks, he was alarmed at the prospect of re-examining at the coming conference the whole of the draft treaty clause by clause and line by line. If such a course were adopted, the greater part of the work would have to be done all over again and there would be inexhaustible possibilities of delay.

The new work might perhaps be divided into three categories. Firstly, there was that part of the old treaty which was not now in dispute and was not touched upon by Ismet Pasha's note. At Lausanne it would be unnecessary to discuss this section in any degree at all. In the second place, there was that part of the treaty which had been accepted by the Turks at Lausanne but was now subjected to criticism and objection by them. It should be clearly understood that there could be no fundamental revision of this portion of the treaty. Lord Curzon suggested that it might be pointed out that the objections to that part of the treaty had been noted but, as it had already been accepted by the Turks, it could not be discussed all over again. On the other hand, as a proof of their desire for peace, the Allies were ready to make various concessions. By this means the conference would escape being forced to take word by word those portions of the treaty which had already been accepted. Thirdly, a considerable part of the treaty had been left in dispute at Lausanne. Either the Turks had not given their agreement, or the Allies had not been able to find a satisfactory formula among themselves. This part of the treaty must be discussed in greater detail.

Lord Curzon felt that the Allies would be in a strong position if they decided to adopt the line of procedure suggested by him. In this way they would be able to curtail the length of the proceedings at the coming

[1] Nos. 455, 456, and 457. [2] See No. 451.

conference. He had, however, only intended to sketch in outline the procedure to be adopted and asked whether any of the delegates present wished to make any observations.

As no delegate desired to speak on this subject, Lord Curzon proposed to open the discussion on the three reports.

Report of the General Committee.

He suggested that the names of the delegates present at the Foreign Office meetings should be erased on the first page.

Article 1: *Evacuation of Occupied Territory.*

The Turks wished the Allied troops to evacuate the territory at present occupied by them, immediately the treaty had been ratified by the Angora Assembly. But ratification by Angora alone was not sufficient, as the Allied delegates, on their side, were bound to await ratification by their respective Parliaments. If evacuation were to be expedited, this must be arranged not by the treaty itself, but by private agreement with the Turkish Government after the signature of the treaty.

Article 2: *Maritza.*

Referring to the substitution of 'le cours' for 'le thalweg', Lord Curzon thought that the frontier fixed at Lausanne was more satisfactory. There would undoubtedly be disputes as to the exact meaning of 'le thalweg' and 'le cours'. He felt that it would be better to fix the frontier on the left bank of the river. The Maritza was a small river and probably broke up into many small streams in its bed for the greater part of the year. He presumed that the suggestion was to fix the frontier in the middle of the biggest stream, but the biggest stream would continually be changing in such a river and give rise to endless possibilities of dispute.

M. Bompard remarked that 'le cours' meant the middle of the river. He added that in private conversation with him M. Venizelos had raised no objection to the proposal.[3] The Turks in asking for the middle of the river were actuated solely by motives of *amour-propre.*

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that the Maritza might later become a navigable river and thus come under another section of the treaty. In this event there would be considerable doubt and uncertainty if the phrase 'le cours' were admitted.

M. Fromageot explained that in ordinary parlance, 'le cours d'un fleuve' simply meant 'le fleuve'; the words 'le cours' might just as well be left out. For the purpose of the present draft treaty it was declared in article 6 that 'le cours d'un fleuve' should be interpreted to mean the middle of the water-course in a non-navigable river and in a navigable river the middle of the navigable channel.

Lord Curzon thought it would be best to adhere to the left bank.

[3] Cf. No. 453.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI thought that if one-half of the river belonged to one State and the other to another, there would be endless disputes over fishing and boating rights.

After further discussion, it was decided to adhere to the left bank as the boundary, as proposed in the draft treaty.

Article 12: Castellorizo.

LORD CURZON thought it desirable to say something on the question of the Island of Castellorizo. He recalled that Signor Nitti had asked for this island at a meeting in London and that the Allies had agreed to its concession to Italy.[4] The Treaty of Sèvres confirmed the island to Italy on account of the danger to Adalia if the island remained Turkish. There were no Turkish inhabitants, but there were some 6,000 to 7,000 Greeks on the island. In making their request the Italians had advanced various historical arguments, and at Lausanne he had backed up their request. The Turks now insisted on the island being handed over to them. Clearly the Allies could not go to war on a point of so little importance.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI said that his Government insisted on retaining the island. Castellorizo was of no importance to the Turks, but they were frightened that it might be given to the Greeks, and for this reason only were now pressing their demands. He refused to believe that there was any chance of war breaking out on the question of the island's future.

LORD CURZON enquired why the Italian Government considered the island was so important to them.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI replied that the arguments put forward at San Remo [*sic*] which determined the cession of the island to Italy[5] still held good. Castellorizo was of little value, but if Italy now abandoned it her prestige would suffer.

LORD CURZON said that he had been ready at Lausanne to support the Italian claims, but was now somewhat apprehensive in case the Turks were to insist. He enquired whether the island was very near the coast.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI replied that Castellorizo was at some distance from the mainland, and repeated that the Turks were merely asking for it owing to their fear that it might come under Greek sovereignty.

LORD CURZON recalled that Signor Nitti had said to the Allies in Downing Street, 'Donnez-moi un petit cadeau', whereupon they had given him Castellorizo.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI pointed out that there was no question of raising again the discussion which had taken place at San Remo [*sic*].[5]

M. BOMPARD said that the French had been ready to support the Italian claims at Lausanne. They were ready to continue their support.

LORD CURZON thought it was necessary to contemplate the possibility of the

[4] See Vol. VII, p. 193.

[5] The cession of Castellorizo to Italy was agreed on at the first Conference of London (see Vol. VII, No. 69, minute 5); the question was not discussed at San Remo (see Vol. VIII, Chapter I).

Turks refusing to sign the treaty if Castellorizo were not handed over to them. What, then, should be the attitude of the Allies? Was it reasonable to ask them to lose the peace rather than give up this little island?

M. MONTAGNA said that there was no ground for reconsidering the question of Castellorizo, because it had been decided not to allow any discussion on territorial questions.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI confirmed these remarks.

In any case, M. Montagna suggested, it might be possible to find out, by sounding the Turks unofficially on the point, what importance they really attached to Castellorizo, making it clear to them that there was no danger of the island being handed over to the Greeks.

LORD CURZON agreed, and undertook in the initial stages of the forthcoming resumed conference to support the Italian claim.

Sanitary Clauses.

LORD CURZON enquired whether M. Bompard was satisfied with the sanitary clauses.

M. BOMPARD reserved a final opinion. M. Barrère had attached particular importance to the Allied proposals on this head.

Article 159: *Accession of other Countries to Financial and Economic Sections.*

LORD CURZON called the attention of the meeting to the fact that the Turks had suppressed article 159, which provided for the accession of Belgium, Poland, Portugal and Czechoslovakia to the financial and economic sections of the treaty. These states attached considerable importance to the point. He asked whether the meeting considered that the insertion of the original article should be insisted upon.

M. BOMPARD felt that it would be very hard on these states if they were not allowed to accede to the treaty. It was therefore important to make an effort to induce the Turks to admit the original article.

This was generally agreed to.

Ismet Pasha's Note[6]: *Arms and Ammunition.*

LORD CURZON then referred to Ismet Pasha's contention that the Allied delegates at Lausanne had consented to give back Turkey the men-of-war, arms and ammunition at present under Allied guard. Lord Curzon could not recall any such promise having been given.

M. BOMPARD said that under no circumstances could his Government consent to restore the arms in question.

MARQUIS GARRONI added that during the period of occupation certain banks had made a loan of £T. 2 million on the security of these munitions. Thus the arms belonged to the Allies, who had given a guarantee to the banks for the loan of £T. 2 million to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of these arms.

M. FROMAGEOT agreed with the Marquis Garroni, and said that the

[6] See No. 431.

munitions in question could not now be given back. They had already been paid for and had become the property of the persons who made the loan. The whole question had nothing to do with the Peace Treaty.

Régime of Foreigners in Turkey: Reciprocity.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the Turks had, in a separate clause, demanded the recognition of the principle of absolute reciprocity as regards the position of foreign subjects. This was impossible, seeing that certain signatory States were precluded by their legislation from according such reciprocity in all matters. To meet this difficulty the report of the committee suggested that the Allies should take up article by article, and indicate in each case whether and how far reciprocity could be admitted. Lord Curzon did not like this suggestion. He anticipated its leading to endless discussions with the Turks on every line of every article. He asked whether it would not be preferable to accept the article, stipulating for the general principle of reciprocity, but to add the proviso that this must be subject to the laws of the signatory State permitting the application of the principle in any particular instance.

MARQUIS GARRONI agreed that it would be best to insert some general formula such as that proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. BOMPARD thought it would be extremely difficult to find a satisfactory formula.

M. FROMAGEOT suggested that if reciprocity were made conditional on legislation, it would be possible for Turkey to pass new laws nullifying the effect of the whole convention.

SIR EYRE CROWE interposed that he had meant existing legislation.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that in many commercial and establishment treaties reciprocity was not always specifically mentioned. Such a stipulation was not really necessary, seeing that it is easy to arrange for reciprocity by the wording of the various articles of the treaty.

M. BOMPARD, agreeing on this point with M. Fromageot, suggested that, instead of a general article, it might still be possible to arrange that each article should clearly state whether reciprocity was contemplated or not.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Turks wished for a general article; he repeated the objection to this idea which had been felt by Lord Curzon, and said that the suggested formula by him was specially designed to surmount this difficulty and meet the Turkish demand for the enunciation of a general principle. If it was impossible to decide upon a text there and then, he suggested that the jurists should be instructed to draft an article on the lines proposed by Lord Curzon before the negotiations were resumed at Lausanne on the convention.

This was agreed to.

Schools.

M. BOMPARD thought that the changes proposed by the Turks in the educational régime would not materially alter the sense of the original Allied

draft. The Turkish draft was really aimed at schools run by the Hellenic Government in Turkey, which they do not wish to enjoy the privileges accorded to British, French and Italian schools. As a matter of fact, most of the Greek schools in Turkey were run by and for Greek Ottoman subjects. They would be protected by the terms of the minorities section of the draft treaty. He suggested that as the United States of America were not to be a party to the treaty, it would be wiser to suppress the last words of the recommendation, namely, 'and probably extended to include the American schools'.

This was approved.

Judicial Régime.

LORD CURZON explained that he was rather doubtful regarding the formula which was employed in para[graph] 5 of Sir Horace Rumbold's draft of the 27th February[7] to insure that the arrests and domiciliary visits in the case of foreigners in the Smyrna and Constantinople areas should only be undertaken in agreement with the foreign counsellors. The words were '... seront pratiquées d'accord avec lesdits conseillers'. This phrase was open to the interpretation that the visits to the house of a single foreigner or his arrest would require the consent, not of one counsellor, but of all the counsellors. Secondly, it was not clear how his consent was to be obtained. The original Allied draft declaration in the draft treaty of the 31st January[8] stipulated that the warrants, &c., should actually be countersigned by a foreign adviser.

MARQUIS GARRONI remarked that he had made a suggestion at Lausanne to the effect that the consuls should be previously informed of domiciliary visits, arrests and perquisitions.

M. BOMPARD interposed to explain that the word 'contre-signées' had been purposely dropped from the original Allied draft of the 31st January, and the words 'pratiquées d'accord avec' substituted to make the whole formula more palatable to the Turks. By this substitution the same thing was meant.

LORD CURZON proceeded to point out that quite apart from the failure to specify the number of foreign advisers who were to intervene in the case of these arrests of foreigners, the total number was not limited in any paragraph throughout the declaration, and, indeed, no reference to any number had been made in the Allied draft of the 3rd February,[9] or Ismet's counter-draft of the 4th February.[10] He thought that this was unfortunate, and that some number should be named.

M. BOMPARD suggested that four judges would be sufficient if the foreign advisers were only to work in the districts of Smyrna and Constantinople, as proposed in the present draft declaration. He would revert to this point later, but as regards the actual words in paragraph 5, to which Lord Curzon had drawn their attention, he agreed that some redraft was necessary to make clear both what was meant by the words 'pratiquées d'accord avec',

[7] See No. 418. [8] See Appendix III. [9] Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.
[10] Cmd. 1814, pp. 852–3.

and the actual number of counsellors whose consent would be necessary for a visit or arrest.

MARQUIS GARRONI agreed that a redraft on this point was called for, as the phrase was ambiguous.

M. BOMPARD then reverted to the question of the limitation to the districts of Constantinople and Smyrna. He asked why Sir Horace Rumbold's draft declaration only provided safeguards for foreigners in these areas.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the original Allied draft of the 3rd February had provided similar safeguards for foreigners in the districts of Adana and Samsoun. Ismet Pasha had struck these two districts out of the Allied draft in presenting his counter-draft of the 4th February, and Signor Montagna had accepted this omission after the final meeting in Lord Curzon's room.[11] M. Bompard had also apparently been prepared to accept this omission in Ismet Pasha's counter-draft, as he had accepted the latter with the insertions made by Signor Montagna on the night of the 4th February. Great Britain on her part had no great interest in insisting upon the addition of the districts of Adana and Samsoun, since there were few, if any, British subjects in those areas. And since they believed that France and Italy, who admittedly had more subjects in these districts, were prepared to accept their omission from the draft, His Majesty's Government had been ready to acquiesce in Sir Horace Rumbold's new draft, which was an attempt as far as possible to prepare an acceptable text on the basis of the counter-draft of Ismet Pasha of the 4th February with the insertions made by Signor Montagna. It was to be feared that if M. Bompard and the Marquis Garroni now wished to extend the draft in the direction they had indicated it would become unacceptable to the Turks.

M. BOMPARD pointed out that the idea underlying the original proposal was that there should be European counsellors in each district served by an appeal court. He did not know whether the two appeal courts at Constantinople and Smyrna covered the whole of Turkey. If that were the case, the Allies might rest content with four counsellors, two at Constantinople and two at Smyrna. Otherwise it might be stipulated in so many words that there should be two foreign counsellors for each district of an appeal court.

After enquiry of the experts it was pointed out that each vilayet in Turkey had its own court of appeal.

M. Bompard agreed that in that case it would not be possible to mention all the courts of appeal in Turkey. Moreover, he realised the difficulty of applying the same procedure to foreigners, probably few in number, in the outlying districts of Turkey such as the border of Kurdistan. But he thought that an attempt should be made to redraft Sir Horace Rumbold's declaration so as to provide some safeguards for foreigners in such a position. Possibly the foreign legal advisers might be given information as soon as possible after the arrest of any foreigner outside the districts of Constantinople and Smyrna, so that they could look into the matter.

[11] See No. 397.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the meeting that the conference at Lausanne had broken down largely on this very point, and that it would be exceedingly difficult to persuade the Turks to accept even Sir Horace Rumbold's declaration, and *a fortiori*, therefore, the extension of it proposed by M. Bompard. But since the sense of the meeting was in favour of attempting to cover the point, he proposed that the phrase 'cours d'appel de Constantinople et de Smyrne' should be retained, and that in these vilayets the legal advisers should signify their assent before the arrest or domiciliary visit of any foreign subject, while in the other vilayets the arrests, &c., of foreigners should be reported immediately after the event to one of the foreign legal advisers.

This was approved, and it was decided to leave it to the jurists to redraft Sir H. Rumbold's declaration at Lausanne in this sense, when every endeavour should be made to persuade the Turks to accept it.

Report of the Financial Committee.

LORD CURZON said that two important points arose on the report of the Financial Committee, on which it was necessary to take some decision, namely, whether reparations were again to be demanded of the Turks, and whether reparations were to be paid by the Greeks. On both these points every endeavour had been made to reach a satisfactory settlement at Lausanne, but Ismet Pasha, at the final meeting on the 4th February, had insisted upon any references to the counter-claims of Greece against Turkey being dropped from the final Allied formula, which he otherwise accepted. Everyone seemed to be agreed that the best solution would be to insist upon a complete waiver of claims by the Turks and the Greeks upon each other. The Allies had hitherto failed to achieve this and would probably fail again, and it was therefore incumbent upon them to find a resolution which might in the last resort be accepted by the Greeks, while meeting Turkey's main contention that the principle of her right to some reparation for the Greek devastations should be admitted in the treaty. He had a suggestion to make on this point which he would ask Sir Eyre Crowe to explain.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that, starting from the basis of the Turkish contention to which Lord Curzon had just referred, and taking from the Allied formula the proposal to refer in the last resort the question of any payment by the Greeks to an arbitral tribunal, it might be possible to draft an article which simply stated that the question of the payment by Greece of a sum to Turkey representing the equivalent of the sums necessary to repair devastations committed by her armies in Asia Minor should be referred to an arbitral tribunal which, in fixing the sum, would take into account 'the capacity of Greece to pay, having regard to all the circumstances arising out of the war'. Greece would be able to bring before this tribunal arguments to show her inability to pay, owing to the burden imposed upon her by the expulsion and deportation of the Greeks from Turkey, and thus indirectly to put forward her counter-claim against Turkey.

MARQUIS GARRONI objected to the phrase 'circumstances arising out of the

war', as the Turks would reply that the war had been wilfully caused by the Greeks.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the meeting that the Greeks had originally gone to Asia Minor at the invitation of the Allies, and that it was the Turks who had originally declared war on the Allies, who, at the time of the armistice, included the Greeks.

LORD CURZON said that he could not, of course, press his suggestion if objections were to be raised by the other delegates, and in that case it would not be possible to reach a final decision here, and the meeting would simply take note of its inability to fix there and then the policy in this matter to be pursued at Lausanne.

MARQUIS GARRONI suggested that Lord Curzon's proposal might be accepted if the proposal to refer to the 'circumstances arising out of the war' were withdrawn. The omission of this phrase might, in fact, give the Greeks a freer hand to advance arguments as to their inability to pay. Some of the Greek counter-claims about refugees referred to a period in 1914 before the outbreak of war.

LORD CURZON agreed that there was force in this argument.

It was decided that the proposal to allow an arbitral tribunal to decide the question of a payment by Greece for reparation, taking into account her capacity to pay, might provide a solution.

Railway Loans.

M. BOMPARD said that he had a few points to raise in connection with the Ottoman Debt clauses. As regards article 50 and annex II, he reminded the meeting that in Ismet Pasha's note of the 4th February the following words occurred:—'In view of the request made by the Albanian and Greek delegations we are prepared to agree that the debts connected with railways shall be borne by the States on whose territory the railway lines are themselves situated.' M. Bompard thought that the Allies should refuse to allow the Turks to go back upon this offer, though the report of the committee had not taken the point into sufficient account. This concession must be made the starting point for all future discussions concerning the railway loans.

This was agreed to.

As regards the question of Turkish paper money, M. Bompard pointed out that the loss occasioned by the depreciation of this currency had affected *all* holders of the currency and not only those with fixed incomes, as implied by the committee's report.

As regards article 56, he suggested that the first paragraph could be omitted only if and when the declaration was duly signed and given to the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

This was agreed to.

Referring to article 57, M. Bompard said that his Government took strong exception to the withdrawal of the British offer to pay into the Allied reparation pool 5,000,000*l.*, representing the value of the purchase price of the two Turkish ships seized by His Majesty's Government at the outbreak

of the war. This diminution of the sums available to satisfy in some measure Allied subjects who had suffered severely from the war would entail great hardship on the French claimants, and the French Government would be forced to ask that the original demand of the Allies for 7,000,000*l.* reparation from Turkey, in addition to the 5,000,000*l.* gold at Berlin and Vienna, should again be put forward.

LORD CURZON replied that the situation was one from which all the Allies would suffer. At Lausanne he had consented to admit the Turkish claim for the amount alleged to be due from Great Britain in respect of two battleships, as he had been assured that the only means of getting the treaty accepted by Turkey was to wipe out all her obligations to pay reparations by allowing her to set off the 7 millions she claimed for these ships plus the 5 millions gold transferred from Berlin and Vienna against the reduced Allied claim of 12 millions on account of reparations. M. Bompard now contended that France would never have agreed to this waiving of all reparations if Great Britain had not agreed to make the sum of 5,000,000*l.* available for meeting in part the claims of Allied subjects for compensation for their losses due to Turkish action. Lord Curzon admitted that he had offered to contribute 5,000,000*l.* to the pool out of which Allied private claims were to be met, but since his return to England he had been informed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he could not agree to ask Parliament to vote such a sum out of British taxes.[12] This view would certainly be endorsed by the Cabinet, and however sincerely Lord Curzon regretted it, it was not in his power to get it modified. He did not, however, see how this affected the decision to waive all claim for reparation against Turkey. He was under the impression from what M. Bompard had said to him at Lausanne that the French Government were at the time ready to make almost every concession if thereby it became possible to obtain Turkey's signature to a peace treaty. Lord Curzon found it difficult to believe that this readiness was intended to be dependent on Great Britain paying 5 millions out of her taxes. In any case, the concession offered to Turkey by the Allies was made unconditionally, and could hardly now be revoked. It had been made because it was felt that Turkey would not in fact agree to sign a treaty embodying any claim for reparations. Did M. Bompard believe that Turkey would now change her attitude and agree to the reinsertion in the treaty of the demand for reparations which she had categorically refused and which, in consequence, the Allies had actually withdrawn? M. Bompard apparently contemplated a repetition of what had taken place at Lausanne: the Allies were to insist on reparations from the Turks, but at the last minute the French Government would themselves urge that the Allied demand should be withdrawn. Lord Curzon, on his part, felt convinced that no reparations would ever be obtained from Turkey, and that asking for them would be bad tactics and a waste of time.

M. BOMPARD said that his Government were always ready to make any sacrifice which might be necessary, but it was not the case that they had ever

[12] See No. 451, n. 7.

given instructions to give way on every point—least of all on reparations. Originally 12 to 15 millions had been suggested as reparation payment to private claimants: now the figure had been reduced to 5 millions. This was insufficient, and 12 millions was the lowest figure with which France would be content. He did not wish to criticise or complain about the decision of the British Government to withdraw their offer to contribute 5,000,000*l.* to a common reparation fund; but he asked what could be done to meet the situation. The sums in gold transferred from Berlin and Vienna were inadequate to give any considerable measure of compensation to the Allied subjects who had suffered damage. French nationals who had suffered damage from Germany were entitled to full compensation, and the French Government could never allow that French subjects who had suffered damage owing to the action of Turkey should receive no satisfactory compensation. The withdrawal of the British offer having only been announced at the first meeting of the present conference, he had, as yet, been unable to consult his Government on the new situation.

LORD CURZON said that M. Bompard was fully entitled to refer the matter to his Government, but he hoped he would impress on them the uselessness of putting in the treaty at this stage a demand for 7 millions. The Allies would be placed in a somewhat humiliating position if after making this demand they were again to give way on the point later. In this view he felt that the Italian delegates would probably agree with him.

MARQUIS GARRONI said that having only learnt since his arrival in London that the British Government had withdrawn their consent to the payment to the account of the reparation pool for Allied subjects of the 5,000,000*l.* payable for the warships, he must refer to his Government, and in the meanwhile make a reservation.

M. BOMPARD suggested that as a compromise the Allies might waive their claim for reparation payments from Turkey, but might ask for payment of the sum required under another count. The claims of Germany upon Turkey had been transferred to the Allies by the Treaty of Versailles. These claims amounted to £T. 62,000,000. It had originally been proposed to ask for no payment in respect of the claims so transferred to the Allies, but the payment of £T. 7,000,000 gold might now be insisted on, the balance of Allied claims under this head being weighed.

LORD CURZON doubted whether so transparent a manoeuvre would be the least likely to make the negotiations any easier.

Proposed Reply to Ismet Pasha's Note.

Lord Curzon felt that it was unnecessary to go into details of the report by the economic experts, and proposed to open the discussion on the draft of the identic notes to be addressed to Ismet Pasha.

Subject, therefore, to the preceding observations on the reports of the General and Financial Committees, and to a point raised below upon the Economic Committee's report, all three reports were approved, and

the discussion turned to the draft Allied reply to Ismet Pasha's note of the 8th March (see Annex hereto).[13]

On p. 2[14] Lord Curzon wished to substitute for 'discuter tous les points' 'discuter les divers points', and to suppress the words 'sous réserve . . . discussions et'.

M. BOMPARD suggested that the end of this sentence should be amended to read 'à l'exception toutefois de la modification à l'article 15'.

LORD CURZON thought that this would be unwise, as it would put the Castellorizo question in the forefront of a note which would be read all over the world; a question of this sort should not be given undue prominence.

THE MARQUIS GARRONI agreed that it was unnecessary to amend the draft in this way.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that the last words of the sentence should read: 'dans votre note du 4 février, qui tendrait à une modification substantielle des stipulations territoriales convenues.'

This was approved.

On the suggestion of Lord Curzon the word 'immédiatement' was deleted in the second paragraph after 'sont heureuses d'assurer'.

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed that at the top of p. 3[15] the sentence should be amended to begin: 'En même temps les Puissances invitantes sont d'avis qu'il n'y a pas lieu de rouvrir la discussion . . .'

This was approved.

At the end of the same paragraph it was decided to substitute 'à l' Hôtel Beau-Rivage' for 'dans le salon de Lord Curzon'.

Private Concessionnaires.

Sir Eyre Crowe, referring to p. 4[16] of the draft note, said it had been decided to leave the concessionnaires to negotiate direct with the Angora Government in the matter of the readaptation of their contracts.[17] The British delegation were quite ready to accept this paragraph of the note in principle, but they had not yet had time to consult the British interests concerned. They were doing so to-morrow morning,[18] and would then inform the French, Italian and Japanese delegations if they could consent finally to the text of this paragraph. In any case, he understood that M. Bompard would have to refer the text to his Government.

It was decided to substitute 'invité' for 'engagé' in the fourth line of p. 4.[16]

[13] Not printed. For the text of the reply which was finally sent, see No. 460, below.

[14] See No. 460, below, para. 2. [15] Ibid. para 4. [16] Ibid. para 6.

[17] See No. 451, n. 16.

[18] Invitations to a meeting at 11 a.m. on March 28 were sent on March 27 to the Ottoman Gas Company, the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, the Eastern Construction Company, the Constantinople Telephone Company, the Eastern Telegraph Company, the National Bank of Turkey, the Borax Consolidated Limited and the (partly French) Constantinople Quay Company. Paragraph 5 of this invitation ran: 'It is understood that as a matter of fact, the French companies concerned have already formed a group and appointed representatives who are prepared to start from Paris as soon as the other allied companies are ready, and as soon as the invitation has been sent to, and accepted by, the Turkish Government.'

LORD CURZON suggested that the meeting should decide where the conference should reassemble.

M. BOMPARD said that the French Government wished this question to be re-examined.[19] The Turks in their counter-proposals had raised many important points and it would take some time to deal with them. He suggested that Allied experts should be sent to Constantinople, where they would examine in detail all points still in dispute. When they had finished, the experts would prepare reports for the conference, which could then be reassembled at Lausanne. It would be easy for the experts to discuss matters at Constantinople where the atmosphere was favourable to the Allies. On the other hand, if the conference were to be reopened at Lausanne all the other participating States would have to be invited and the proceedings would last even longer than they would do if the experts held preliminary meetings at Constantinople.

LORD CURZON was afraid that he did not agree with M. Bompard. Hitherto he had proceeded on the assumption that the conference would be reopened at Lausanne. Now the French Government had put forward an entirely new proposal for another stage in the proceedings, namely, a preliminary meeting at Constantinople. He was sure that this would involve endless delays. He had consulted Sir Horace Rumbold, who, for personal reasons, preferred Constantinople, but felt that Lausanne was more suitable in the public interest. The French delegates seemed to think that the atmosphere at Constantinople was more favourable than at Lausanne. Lord Curzon

[19] The Foreign Office consulted Sir H. Rumbold (telegram No. 90 to Constantinople, of March 26, not printed). Sir H. Rumbold replied in his telegram No. 197 of March 27 as follows: 'Avowed French arguments in favour of Constantinople are so weak that they can only cloak some ulterior motive.

'Alleged anti-Kemalist atmosphere here is confined to elements so inarticulate as to count for nothing at all or element[s] which in competition to prove their patriotism would be forced to outdo Kemalists in their insistence on full satisfaction of all Turkish demands. We should be surrounded by noisy journalists and deputies from Angora who would seek to exercise constant pressure on Turkish delegates and to embarrass allied delegates in every way. Javid Bey, who represents one wing of semi-latent [Committee of] Union and Progress, opposed to Kemalists, himself told me some days ago that atmosphere would be most undesirable.

'As for second argument, I feel that choice of Constantinople would of itself conduce to lengthiness whereas at Lausanne we should work on business lines to attain it [*sic*] rapidly without regard to conflicting minor influences which would have full play here. Heads of delegations would have more authority and freer hand.

'I cannot but suspect that Monsieur Bompard is influenced by desire to save his own situation. He has been so violently attacked by Turks of late that it would suit him to leave French High Commissioner to bear the brunt of further odium. This he can do easily if negotiations are left to High Commissioners, while if they take place at Lausanne he cannot escape participation without appearing to run away. In adopting his view, French government may be animated by desire to please Turks by deferring to their expressed preference for Constantinople and by hope that if French lose ground in one Turkish centre, Monsieur Steeg [see No. 439, n. 3] will be able to retrieve it at Angora by private negotiations regarding French economic and financial interests.'

could imagine no more poisonous atmosphere than that of Constantinople with its endless intrigues and petty schemings. Javid Bey, a Young Turk, had informed Sir H. Rumbold that, in his opinion, Constantinople was most unsuited for the reassembly of the conference. Again, the delay involved would be considerable. Personally he was anxious for peace at the very earliest possible moment. The maintenance of the British troops at Constantinople involved a very heavy monthly expenditure. His Majesty's Government could not go on incurring this expenditure indefinitely, but until peace was signed the troops could not be withdrawn, as they were the only means of exerting pressure on the Turks. If Constantinople were chosen as a place of meeting, the Turks would regard it as a great diplomatic victory for them. Moreover, if the conference were held there, the meeting would necessarily take place in some Turkish public building, with the result that a Turk would have to preside. Lord Curzon quoted the case of the conference at Spa, where a Belgian (M. Delacroix) presided because the conference took place on Belgian territory.[20] It had been suggested that in order to avoid the hospitality of a Turkish palace the place of the meeting might be on the Island of Prinkipo or at Beicos; this he felt was not at all desirable, and would involve unnecessary discomfort to all concerned. Finally, Ismet Pasha, for whose attendance the Allies were most anxious, would probably not consent to act as a Turkish delegate if the conference were held on Turkish territory and the President were not a Turk. For these reasons he was now opposed to fixing on Constantinople as the place of meeting.

M. Bompard supposed that all the other delegates would agree with Lord Curzon; he did not therefore wish to insist upon his proposal that Constantinople be chosen as the place of meeting.

Date of Conference.

Lord Curzon then said it was necessary to consider the date of meeting. He suggested that it would be best not to specify any particular day, but merely to say 'aussitôt que possible'. The Turkish press was already accusing the Allies of causing delays.[21] By adopting his suggestion the Allies would throw the responsibility for any dilatoriness upon the Turks themselves. In the second paragraph of p. 5[22] he suggested 'sans difficulté' instead of 'dans un très court délai'. The latter phrase involved a prophecy in which no one seriously believed.

This was approved.

Communication of Note.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggested that, in order to save time, the text of the note should be telegraphed at once to the High Commissioners, Constantinople.[23] Any alterations made by M. Poincaré, when M. Bompard submitted the draft to him, could be telegraphed to Constantinople before presentation of the note. When the draft was finally agreed on, a telegram could be sent to

[20] See Vol. VIII, Chapter VIII.
[21] Cf. No. 454.
[22] See No. 460, below, para. 9.
[23] See No. 459, below.

the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople instructing them to hand the notes to Adnan Bey as having been signed by the Allied representatives in Paris, London and Rome. Signed copies of the identic notes would then be sent out by each Government to Constantinople by bag or post.

Economic Report.

Insurance Clauses.

M. BOMPARD asked leave to revert to the section of the economic report dealing with insurance. He feared that the new proposals of the committee would mean that the insurance experts' labours at Lausanne had been wasted and the insurance companies would be hit very hard.

MR. PAYNE thought that the system of making the insurance company remain liable under their contracts was the most equitable solution possible. Moreover provision was made for special bilateral agreements between Turkey and other States to settle all questions arising out of the complicated question of insurance.

M. NOGARA added that his Government had consulted the Italian companies chiefly interested in insurance in Turkey. An agreement applying to all signatories alike was not possible owing to differences in the systems of insurance prevailing in the various countries; for this reason it had been decided that each Government should be allowed to make a separate agreement and to arrange matters in the manner least likely to harm the interests of its nationals.[24]

Press Communiqué.

SIR EYRE CROWE then read the communiqué which it was proposed to issue to the press.

The following was approved:—

> 'The Allied representatives, under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon, considered the reports of the expert committees on the financial, economic and other parts of the Turkish counter-proposals. After examination and discussion, complete Allied agreement was reached upon all points; the reports were approved and the draft text of a reply to Ismet Pasha's note of the 8th March was considered and passed, subject to the final approval of the respective Governments. It is hoped that this approval will be given in the course of the next forty-eight hours, when an identic note will be despatched to Constantinople for transmission to the Turkish Government at Angora by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives.
>
> 'It is intended to publish this note.'

(*The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.*)

[24] For the Italian Delegation's reports on this meeting, see *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 658–9.

No. 459

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 95 Telegraphic [E 3313/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 28, 1923, 6.15 p.m.*

My immediately following telegram[1] contains text of note drawn up in French in reply to Ismet Pasha's note of March 8th[2] to the Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs. This reply, which is to take the form of identic notes signed by the representative Ministers for Foreign Affairs, and, in the case of Japan, by the Japanese Ambassador here, in the name of his government, was approved at the final meeting of the Allied representatives here yesterday subject to acceptance by the respective governments.[3] You are therefore authorised to communicate it to Adnan Bey for transmission to Ismet Pasha, as soon as your French, Italian and Japanese colleagues receive similar instructions.[4]

It is proposed to publish the note here the day after we receive a telegram from you reporting its communication to Adnan Bey.

Unanimous reports of the three committees on the Turkish counter-proposals[5] and copies of the minutes of the two plenary meetings of March 21st and March 27th[6] follow by bag of April 2nd.

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 157 and Rome No. 80.

[1] No. 460, below. [2] See No. 431. [3] See No. 458.

[4] In his telegram No. 209 of March 31, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'French High Commissioner communicated to me to-day telegram from President of the Council stating that French reply, signed by President of the Council, to Ismet Pasha's note of March 8th would reach Constantinople next Tuesday by bag. On receipt of this note he was to arrange with his allied colleagues for delivery of note. French High Commissioner said that these instructions put him in a most embarrassing position as he knew that Italian and Japanese High Commissioners as well as I were ready to communicate note at once. Moreover local press was also aware that non-receipt by French High Commissioner of instructions from Paris was delaying delivery of note. In these circumstances he had decided on his own responsibility to hand in text of reply which I had communicated to him and we arranged to hand note to Adnan Bey this afternoon.'

[5] See Nos. 455, 456 and 457. [6] Nos. 451 and 459.

No. 460

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 96 Télégraphique

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 28, 1923*

Excellence,[1]

[1] Les Gouvernements de Grande-Bretagne, de France, d'Italie et du Japon ont soigneusement examiné la note jointe à la lettre que vous leur avez adressée le 8 mars[2] à l'effet de proposer certaines modifications au projet

[1] Ismet Pasha. This telegram contains the text of the Allied reply to Ismet Pasha's Note of March 8 (see No. 431). [2] See n. 1.

des traités de paix et aux conventions et déclarations annexées qui ont été soumis à la délégation turque à Lausanne le 31 janvier dernier.[3]

[2] Ces Gouvernements ne désirent pas entrer, pour le moment, dans une discussion de détail des diverses propositions que votre Excellence a présentées, non plus que des arguments invoqués à l'appui. Ils ne peuvent toutefois s'empêcher d'exprimer leur surprise que votre Excellence ait remis en discussion diverses questions que vous aviez vous-même acceptées comme réglées dans les lettres adressées par vous aux délégations britannique, française et italienne à Lausanne le 4 février dernier,[4] et qu'en outre vous aviez inséré parmi vos contre-propositions plusieurs projets d'articles qui soulèvent des questions entièrement nouvelles. Néanmoins, dans leur vif désir de hâter la conclusion d'une paix juste et durable entre la Turquie et les hautes parties contractantes, les Puissances invitantes sont disposées à constater immédiatement qu'elles sont prêtes à discuter les divers points soulevés dans la note de votre Excellence et dans les contre-propositions qui y sont annexées,[5] sous réserve, bien entendu, de la liberté de leurs décisions à la suite de cette discussion, et à l'exception toutefois de toute proposition non formulée dans votre note du 4 février qui tendrait à une modification substantielle des stipulations territoriales convenues.

[3] D'autre part, comme votre Excellence paraît attacher une importance spéciale à la réciprocité des stipulations qui font l'objet de la convention d'établissement et de compétence judiciaire, les Puissances invitantes sont heureuses d'assurer votre Excellence qu'elles acceptent en principe de procéder à nouveau à la rédaction de cette convention, en vue de reconnaître à la Turquie le bénéfice de la réciprocité de telle manière et dans telle étendue qu'il sera jugé possible de le faire en pratique.

[4] En même temps, les Puissances invitantes sont d'avis qu'il n'y a pas lieu de rouvrir la discussion sur aucun des articles du projet de traité du 31 janvier qui sont maintenus sans modification par votre Excellence dans la note jointe à sa lettre du 8 mars, à moins toutefois qu'une modification dans d'autres parties du traité n'entraîne comme conséquence des modifications dans les articles acceptés. En second lieu, alors que les Puissances invitantes sont prêtes à faire tous leurs efforts pour concilier le contre-projet turc de déclaration concernant l'administration de la justice en Turquie figurant parmi les contre-propositions comprises dans votre lettre, avec le projet originaire allié du 3 février[6] sur ce sujet, ces Puissances ne doivent pas cependant être regardées comme engagées par aucun des changements dans le projet de déclaration alliée qui ont pu être suggérés après la réunion tenue par les plénipotentiaires britanniques, français, italiens et turcs à l'Hôtel Beau-Rivage le 5 février au soir.[7]

[5] Il y a un autre point sur lequel les Gouvernements des Puissances invitantes désirent élucider leur position. Dans la note de votre Excellence, vous proposez que les clauses économiques soient disjointes du traité et

[3] See Appendix III. [4] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41. [5] See Appendix III.
[6] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6. [7] See No. 370.

deviennent, après la signature de celui-ci, l'objet de négociations entre les parties intéressées. Comme votre Excellence le sait, le projet d'articles que les Puissances invitantes ont présenté après de longues discussions avec la délégation turque comprend des matières dans lesquelles leurs intérêts vitaux et ceux de leurs nationaux sont en jeu. Si, par conséquent, les Puissances invitantes déclarent maintenant qu'elles sont prêtes à discuter les contre-propositions que votre Excellence a présentées, il doit être bien entendu que ces discussions porteront également sur les clauses économiques. Les Puissances invitantes croient, d'ailleurs, qu'il serait possible, au cours de nouvelles négociations et au moyen de quelques concessions mutuelles, d'arriver à une entente sur les clauses de cette nature à insérer dans le traité.

[6] Quelques-unes de ces clauses ont pour objet de fixer d'un commun accord des règles assurant en Turquie aux ressortissants des Puissances alliées et aux sociétés où leurs capitaux sont engagés la sauvegarde de leurs droits acquis et de leurs intérêts compromis par les événements survenus depuis 1914, ainsi que la réadaptation de leurs contrats aux conditions économiques nouvelles résultant de ces événements. A l'effet de hâter la solution de cette importante question, les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées ont invité ceux de leurs nationaux qui y sont intéressés à entrer eux-mêmes en négociations avec le Gouvernement turc en vue d'arriver à des arrangements conclus avec ce Gouvernement sur la base des dispositions qui ont été insérées dans le projet du traité de paix. Si ces négociations aboutissent à un heureux résultat, les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées ayant constaté la conclusion des arrangements intervenus, les dispositions actuellement consacrées au même sujet dans le projet de traité auront perdu leur raison d'être et la conclusion de la paix paraîtrait devoir en être grandement facilitée. Ce serait seulement dans le cas où les arrangements envisagés n'interviendraient pas en temps utile que les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées devraient s'en tenir à l'insertion dans le traité lui-même de dispositions détaillées se rapprochant de celles inscrites au projet du 31 janvier dernier, afin de sauvegarder ainsi les intérêts vitaux de leurs ressortissants.

[7] Pour le surplus, il sera possible de traiter quelques-uns des autres articles des clauses économiques d'une manière plus générale, en laissant au besoin certains détails à régler par des négociations ultérieures entre le Gouvernement turc et chaque Gouvernement intéressé.

[8] Sous réserve des observations ci-dessus concernant les modifications territoriales, les clauses économiques et la déclaration judiciaire, les Gouvernements des Puissances invitantes ont l'honneur de suggérer à votre Excellence que vous envoyiez des représentants pour reprendre des négociations à Lausanne aussitôt que possible avec des représentants des autres hautes parties contractantes.

[9] Les Puissances invitantes sont convaincues qu'en y apportant de part et d'autre une égale bonne volonté, il sera possible de conclure la paix sans difficulté, et elles prennent note avec plaisir des assurances que votre Excellence leur a données du désir qu'en a et des vœux que forme dans ce sens le Gouvernement turc; elles partagent ses sentiments et son espoir et tiennent

ces dispositions communes comme de bon augure pour le succès de la conférence à reprendre à Lausanne.[8]

Repeated to Rome No. 81; copy to Paris.

[8] An Italian text of the Allied Note of March 31 is printed in *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 669.

No. 461

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
No. 97 Telegraphic [E 3313/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *March 28, 1923, 7 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 170[1] (of March 14th: negotiations by private concessionaires).

Monsieur Bompard has now explained here that Monsieur Poincaré's proposal is really as follows:

The French, Belgian, Italian and British companies who had concessions in Turkey before the war and who would have claims under articles 94 and 80[2] for the confirmation of their concessions and, if necessary, their readaptation and prolongation, should at once send representatives to Constantinople or Angora to negotiate on general lines the principles of the settlement regarding the above matters. The agreement, so negotiated, would take the form of two or three articles containing in any case a general statement of principle. If these negotiations were begun at once and proceed concurrently with the resumed negotiations for the treaty of peace, the Allies should be able to obtain a clear idea before the close of the latter whether in fact the Turkish government could be relied upon to give [allied] nationals proper treatment. If toward the close of the resumed general peace negotiations, the special negotiations with the concessionaires had not reached a satisfactory conclusion, the Allies would have to insist on inserting in the general peace treaty a number of articles containing the same stipulations of general principles as would have formed the content of the suggested separate agreements between Angora and the several concessionaires. The intention of the Allies to do this would be made clear at the outset of the resumed peace negotiations to the Turks who would thus realise the advantages of concluding practical arrangements with the concessionaires themselves. The negotiations with the latter would be rigidly confined to companies who actually had concessions before the war and have a just claim for their maintenance and possible prolongation or readaptation within the terms of the existing draft treaty.

Apparently French concessionaires have already entrusted their interests to selected representatives who are ready to proceed with such negotiations

[1] No. 441. [2] i.e. of the Allied Draft Treaty of January 31 (see Appendix III).

but have not been allowed to start operations pending agreement among the Allies.

After full consideration, I have decided to assent to Monsieur Poincaré's proposal and have so informed Monsieur Bompard.[3] I am also informing the Belgian Ambassador here of the proposal as it is agreed that the Belgian companies concerned should be included in the group of private interests who are to negotiate with Angora.

We are arranging to explain the proposals to representatives of the British companies[4] mainly concerned such as the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, the National Bank, Smyrna Gas Company, Constantinople Telephone Company, Vickers and the Quays Company, which is partly French. We will propose that the companies should either send out representatives or depute representatives already at Constantinople or Smyrna to meet the French and Belgian representatives concerned at Constantinople and concert together as to the procedure to be followed.

A reference to this effect is being included in the reply[5] to Ismet's note of March 8th.

Copy of this telegram is being given to Monsieur Bompard and the Marquis Garroni.

Since the above was drafted the British interests have been consulted and have accepted the proposal. They are sounding Sir H. Lamb[6] as to whether he will act as a kind of general secretary and liaison officer for the different firms. While prepared to go to Constantinople and even favouring it, representatives all expressed great dislike of idea of going to Angora. They hope Turks can be induced to send experts with real technical knowledge and powers to Constantinople to conclude definite arrangements there.

Repeated to Brussels No. 59.

[3] See No. 458. [4] See No. 458, n. 18. [5] No. 460.
[6] Consul General at Smyrna from March 19, 1921; retired on January 5, 1923.

No. 462

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 2, 9.40 p.m.)
No. 215 Telegraphic [E 3456/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 2, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 84.[1]

I learn secretly that dragoman of Serbian delegation called on Refet and stated that presence of forty or fifty Moslem deputies in present government's party made it necessary for Serbia to adopt policy acceptable to these in her relations with Turkey.

Pressing appeals by Greece necessitate immediate decision as to future policy. Serbia desired a thorough understanding or even agreement with

[1] No. 445, n. 1.

Turkey. Pas[h]itch's view is that the southern frontier of Serbia should be the Aegean and the western frontier of Turkey the Struma.

In that case access to Aegean might be given to Bulgaria, with Turkey's consent, near Cavalla. Dragoman urged immediate despatch of an accredited representative and senior staff officer to Belgrade. Similar overtures have been made to Hamdullah (?Sa)bhi.[2]

Refet's comment is that Serbs appear to be alarmed by possibility of understanding being reached between Turks and Bulgarian officials now in Constantinople and Hungarians in Angora.[3]

Not repeated.

[2] Hamdullah Subhi Bey, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly and the leading propagandist of pan-Turanianism.

[3] In his despatch No. 133 of April 5, Sir A. Young, H.M. Minister in Belgrade, commented on this telegram as follows: 'I fear that I have exhausted my possibilities of enquiry into the alleged Serbo-Turkish negotiations and that I see no prospect of obtaining further light by any available method on such a startling reversal of this Government's avowed policy of peace as is implied by the programme attributed by the Dragoman to M. Pašić. To begin with, the Dragoman's statement with regard to the number and attitude towards the present Government of the Moslem Deputies is highly inaccurate. . . . I do not know what is meant by the pressing appeals of Greece which appear to necessitate immediate decisions. The Greek Minister here told me this morning that he had not seen M. Ninčić since the elections. . . . I touched with M. Ninčić on the subject of Turkey and the peace negotiations but he spoke so decidedly to the effect that the Turks were not to be trusted that I saw no chance of eliciting any hint about a desire on the part of the Serbs to conciliate them.'

No. 463

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 3, 5.15 p.m.)
No. 114 Telegraphic [E 3455/6/44]

ATHENS, *April 3, 1923, 2 p.m.*

My telegram No. 112.[1]

It is reported locally that reason for Minister for Foreign Affairs' journey is to explain to Monsieur Venizelos that Greece cannot continue as at present but must renew war.

I am not in a position to verify [this] report, which seems improbable.

Report that Allies have decided that question of Greek indemnity is to be left for negotiations direct between Greece and Turkey has naturally caused greatest disappointment here. It is pointed out in Press that Greeks gave up Eastern Thrace in order that Allies should give them peace but that net result is that they are now to be left to negotiate it alone.

Press reports that Minister for Foreign Affairs will stop at Belgrade on his return from Monte Carlo.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 65.

[1] Of March 31, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

No. 464

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 16)
No. 269 [C 6837/153/19]

Confidential ATHENS, *April 5, 1923*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that a social *volte-face* of the French Legation has caused a certain amount of comment and amusement during the last week or so. At a party the other night, the drawing-room, where I had never before seen an anti-Veniselist, contained Veniselists and anti-Veniselists together, and in one of the leading and ardent Royalist drawing-rooms the wife of the French Minister suddenly made an appearance, for, having met the hostess a long time ago, she had at last decided to call upon her because she was 'tellement sympathique'. No French people had, the hostess told my staff, been inside her house for seven years. It seems to me obvious that the French Minister is preparing for the day, which may not be very far distant, when his country will recognise King George. He tells me that he has informed the King's Marshall that, as soon as peace is signed, France is prepared to recognise the King. I asked him if he knew whether our Governments had been discussing the matter recently, but he said he did not know, nor did he know if France would recognise the King by herself or wait for her allies. All he knew was that in principle she was prepared to take this step, once peace had been signed.

2. M. de Marcilly agrees with me in thinking that the Greek people on the whole are not Republican, and the Republican propaganda which began to make its appearance at the beginning of the revolution has, as I have already had the honour of pointing out to your Lordship,[1] since been relegated to the background, as it was seen to have been a mistake. MM. Rentis, A. Karapanos, and Melas, although avowed Republicans, have, I understand, declared their intention of supporting King George. M. de Marcilly points out, however, that though, in the event of properly conducted elections, there is at present small chance of any very important portion of the people supporting Republican Deputies, there will certainly be a small Republican party in this country. Like everybody else, he considers General Pangalos to be the unknown and dangerous factor (see my telegram No. 118 of the 4th instant).[2] If this general chose, with the support of a small section of officers, to make a *coup* and call upon the King to abdicate, His Majesty, according to M. de Marcilly, would have no option but to depart. The Prime Minister, Colonel Gonatas, he said, would certainly be ready to support the King, but he is, as a matter of fact, merely a figurehead. Colonel Plastiras, we know, favours the retention of what is termed a 'crowned republic', but how far he would be prepared to stand by the King in the face of a band of irresponsible hotheads commanded by General Pangalos is doubtful. He

[1] See No. 392. [2] Not printed.

could, I believe, count upon the support of General Nider in such an emergency, and these two popular officers would certainly carry great weight in the army. M. Papandreou, the Minister of the Interior, is, I understand, an honest Republican, but does not advocate making this question an issue at the next elections. He was in prison under the late régime. He is supposed to exercise great influence over Colonel Plastiras, who is admitted by all to be an honest—though less ambitious—patriot. M. de Marcilly tells me that he has taken care to let it be generally known that, whilst France has no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of this country, she would in nowise, contrary to what is frequently alleged, favour a republican *coup*.

3. In spite of the many stories to the contrary, I personally believe that the French Legation are perfectly loyal. There is, however, another dangerous factor in the situation which I naturally cannot discuss with my French colleagues—namely, General Gramat, the head of the French Military Mission, who, from all accounts, is a thoroughly black sheep and detested by most of his acquaintances, including his own Legation. In spite of the denunciation of his contract, he is said to be in no hurry to depart. Why he should desire to remain on in Greece I do not know, but we know that he egged General Pangalos on to commit last November the judicial murders which brought about the rupture with England.

4. My French and Roumanian colleagues agree with me that it is not correct to say that there are internal disturbances in Greece, as alleged by the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sir H. Dering's telegram No. 55 of the 31st March),[2] and that it would consequently be out of place to draw the attention of the Government to the unfortunate reaction which such disturbances would have on the prospects of peace in the Near East, and that such a warning would not be justified by the situation.

5. To parry any *coup* which General Pangalos or any other hotheads might meditate, however, M. de Marcilly considered that some sort of joint declaration by England, France and America to the effect that any disturbances of the internal tranquillity in Greece would prejudice any possibility of a loan being obtained in those countries after the conclusion of peace might act as a restraining feature. Such a loan would, of course, he added, have to come under the guarantee of the International Financial Commission.

6. The objection to this, however, as pointed out in my telegram No. 118 of the 4th instant,[2] lies in the fact that, as I understand it, it would be impossible effectively to veto a loan on the markets of those countries. A negative declaration would not, moreover, carry the same weight as a positive promise of an Allied loan conditional upon internal tranquillity being maintained, but, of course, such a promise or declaration would be out of the question so long as the present régime remains in power, if only for the reason that we can have no dealings with it.

7. The Roumanian Minister[3] told me confidentially that the Czechoslovakian Minister,[4] an eccentric man, who is supposed to hate kings and

[3] M. Djuvara. [4] M. Meçir.

priests, was lately sounded by M. Papanastassiou, Captain Hadjikyriakos and M. Pericles Argyropoulo[s] as to what attitude his country would adopt in the event of a *coup* and the establishment of a republic in Greece. M. Meçir replied that it would be no great concern of his country, but he presumed that his Government would conform its attitude to that of its allies, Roumania and Serbia, who would be more directly concerned. M. Papanastassiou asked whether he thought that Serbia and Roumania would resort to armed intervention. M. Meçir replied that he doubted whether they would go to such lengths in present circumstances, but that a *coup* as suggested would certainly not improve Greece's relations with those countries. The Roumanian Minister, whose duties in this country are, for obvious reasons, closely connected with the dynasty, told me that the American Chargé d'Affaires[5] had also been sounded in a somewhat similar manner, and had replied that America was anxious to do business with Greece and that any disturbances of the peace would militate against relations between the two countries.

8. I may here mention that M. Papanastassiou was one of the seven Republicans condemned to three years' imprisonment by the late régime and he may be said to be now the leader of the Republican party. Captain Hadjikyriakos, the head of the fleet, may be classed as an irresponsible, though capable, hothead, who would probably be only too ready to make trouble. M. P. Argyropoulo[s] is young and active and may develop prudence with age.

9. When all is said and done, however, as I had the honour to point out in my telegram No. 116 of the 3rd instant,[2] my information does not lead me to suppose that General Pangalos contemplates any such *coup* at present. In my despatch No. 103 of the 12th ultimo[6] I reported what I knew about his attitude towards the monarchy, which he declared himself prepared to support for the present. In my despatch No. 250 of the 29th ultimo[2] I reported that he was in accord with the party represented by the 'Eleftheron Vima' newspaper, which is pressing for the withdrawal of the Revolutionary Government in favour of M. Zaimis. If this information, which was given to a member of my staff by the generally well-informed editor of the newspaper himself, is true, I consider it to be good news, for the group of politicians represented by the 'Eleftheron Vima' are, so far as I know them, on the whole moderate and level-headed men. On the other hand, it is admitted by all who know General Pangalos that he cannot be depended upon for any length of time together, and even those closely associated with him never know what he may or may not do next. According to the French Minister, he remains a danger so long as he lives.

I have, &c.
C. H. Bentinck

[5] Mr. Jefferson Caffery.

[6] No. 392.

No. 465

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston[1]
(Received April 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 225 Telegraphic [E 3584/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 8, 1923, 8.40 p.m.*

My telegram No. 216.[2]

My immediately following telegram[3] gives slightly condensed translation of Turkish reply[4] delivered by Adnan this afternoon. His covering note[5] states that Turkish government will publish text tomorrow April 9th. While expressing an appreciation of generally conciliatory tone of note I made three observations when he handed it to me. First I said that while some of the suggested modifications proposed by Turks in territorial clauses were of minor importance others did appear to involve substantial changes, e.g. proposal regarding Castellorizo. Secondly I had myself made it perfectly clear[6] within a few days of my return to Constantinople that nothing which had passed after you left Lausanne bound the allies as a whole and that we were therefore in no way committed by Montagna formula.[7] Adnan had to admit that I had left no room for doubt on this subject and said he had informed Angora at the time. Thirdly I said that similar considerations applied to anything that had passed regarding proposal to detach economic clauses. Adnan leaves for Angora tomorrow.

[1] Lord Curzon was on holiday in France from April 3. As will be seen from No. 469, below, important papers were sent to him there.
[2] Of April 2, not printed. [3] No. 466. [4] i.e. to No. 460.
[5] Of April 8, not printed (see No. 466, n. 7, below). [6] See No. 405.
[7] See No. 397, n. 3.

No. 466

Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 226 Telegraphic [E 3585/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *April 8, 1923, 8.40 p.m.*

Following is translation referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Government of Grand National Assembly have received reply[2] of British, French, Italian and Japanese governments to its note of March 8th.[3]

Without wishing to provoke controversy as to whether Turkish counter proposals really tend, as allied governments suppose, to reopen questions which they considered settled by Turkish delegation's letter of February 4th,[4]

[1] No. 465. [2] No. 460. [3] See No. 431. [4] Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41.

my government notes with satisfaction declaration of inviting powers that they are prepared to discuss points raised in Turkish note of March 8th and annexed counter proposals. It considers counter proposals do not contain any substantial modification of territorial clauses or any other modification of them which has not been or cannot be fairly accepted by allied powers.

Turkish government particularly desire to express satisfaction regarding consent of powers to re-draft convention on établissement[5] with object of securing to Turkey enjoyment of reciprocity. It cannot but believe that acting in the same spirit, they will consider equally favourably other just observations made by Turkey regarding this convention.

Turkish government cannot conceal its surprise that inviting powers by promising to exert themselves to reconcile Turkish counter draft declaration regarding administration of justice in Turkey with allied draft, should have displayed tendency to reopen discussion of an important question which it was entitled to consider already settled in agreement with allied powers concerned. Indeed text inserted in Turkish counter proposals is not properly speaking a Turkish draft. It is on the contrary result of utmost joint efforts of delegates acting on behalf of allied and of Turkish delegations to harmonize respectively drafts of both contracting parties; all the more as this arrangement known as 'Montagna formula'[6] was several times confirmed in the course of both oral and written suggestions of allied powers subsequent to February 4th.

As regards economic clauses, Turkish delegation was convinced that by proposing to detach them from treaty while continuing negotiations regarding them, it was expediting conclusion of peace desired by all nations. After departure from Lausanne suggestions and communications both oral and written of allied powers apprised us of acceptance of this proposal. It may well be feared that action of allies in again going back on acceptance already given and asking that economic clauses be discussed at the same time as treaty, may render peace more difficult or delay conclusion.

Nevertheless Turkey, duly appreciating wish expressed by allied powers for favourable settlement of pending economic questions, does not object to discuss questions which can properly form subject of international negotiation. She has invited holders of concessions formerly granted by Turkey to enter into direct negotiations as allies themselves proposed and equitable arrangements have already been made with two of them.

Subscribing to hopes and wishes of inviting powers for success of conference to be resumed at Lausanne and complying with wish expressed by them for earliest possible departure of Turkey representative, government of Grand National Assembly informs British, French, Italian and Japanese government[s] that it will send plenipotentiaries thither in time to start negotiations with those of other contracting parties on April 23rd.[7]

[5] See No. 456, n. 9. [6] No. 397, n. 3.

[7] In his despatch No. 218 of April 10, not printed, Sir H. Rumbold transmitted to the Foreign Office a copy of the Turkish Note of April 7, and of Adnan Bey's covering note of April 8 (cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 693).

No. 467

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (Paris)
No. 164 Telegraphic [E 3519/1/44][1]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 9, 1923, 1.40 p.m.*

Question of the Powers to whom invitations to participate in resumed negotiations at Lausanne should be extended was not discussed during recent allied meeting in London.[2] My own view is that since the present negotiations are confined to a strictly limited number of points, only the three inviting Powers, Japan, Greece and Turkey should be asked by M. Massigli as Secretary General of the Conference, to send representatives to Lausanne on a date to be fixed as soon as the Turkish reply to the last allied note is given.[3] On the other hand Roumania and Yugoslavia are interested in some of the financial and economic questions and in the convention for the régime for foreigners. They were invited as full participants in the original Lausanne Conference[4] and their representatives have been helpful. They will also be eventually required to sign all parts of the treaty. If, therefore, the French Government think they should be invited too, I would not raise any objection. Since the Straits Convention is settled and since only one point in the Thracian frontiers Convention, which concerns really only Greece and Turkey is outstanding, there is no need to invite Bulgarian representatives except to sign these two conventions at the close of the resumed negotiations.

Nor does there seem any necessity to invite Belgian representatives since their main interest is now centred in the private negotiations to be opened by pre-war concessionaires direct with the Turkish Government.[5] Similarly there will be no advantage in asking the various neutral Powers interested in the capitulations again to send delegates [t]o Lausanne. The inviting Powers will be able to defend their interests so far as this is still practicable and probably better than if they were present.

There remains the question of the United States. While the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] raised objections at the last moment to some of the economic clauses of the treaty,[6] they possess no established economic interests

[1] The draft only of this telegram is preserved in the Foreign Office archives.

[2] See Nos. 451 and 455–8.

[3] This telegram must have been drafted before action was taken on Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams reporting the Turkish reply (Nos. 465 and 466).

[4] See No. 134.

[5] See Nos. 451, n. 16, 456 and 461.

[6] In a Memorandum of March 31 (see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 972–4). This was summarised in Sir A. Geddes's telegram No. 176 of April 3, as follows: '1. Paragraph 2 Article 94: United States government think this might be invoked as validating claims not in fact finally approved by Turkish government before October 29th, 1914 and that it would be unfortunate if the allies were to confer by treaty, rights more extensive than those acquired under conventions contracts etc. in question. In this connection attention is also drawn to concessions which might be claimed under article 96 from governments of territories detached from Turkey and provision in article 65 regarding acquisition of Ottoman Empire possessions without payment. United States government presume that property

in Turkey and are perfectly free to make a treaty with Turkey on terms equally as good as those of the Allies' treaty, as regards the future. In any case they do not intend to sign the present treaty and they have taken no active part in the past discussions. Subject to any views which M. Poincaré may entertain on the matter, I am disposed therefore, to consider that M. Massigli should send no invitation to Washington, but that the inviting Powers should await an initiative from the U[nited] S[tates] G[overnment] when they can consider what reply should be returned.[7]

Please make a communication in the above sense to the French Government, adding that I feel sure that they will share my view that the more the resumed discussions can be confined to the representatives of the three inviting Powers, Japan and Turkey and, on a few essential questions, to Greece, the better chance there is of a speedy and successful result.[8]

acquired under operation of this article would be subject to existing rights of interested parties but they think language should be more explicit.

'2. Article 97: United States government think this open to objectionable interpretation and could not admit that it impairs any right acquired by American nationals legally and in good faith.

'3. United States government presume that annulment of concessions specified in article 98 cannot be intended to deprive American nationals of rights they have in good faith acquired therein.

'Lastly United States government presume that article 115 does not cover any existing agreement between United States and Turkey and does not affect legal status of any treaty rights of United States government.'

[7] Sir A. Geddes was informed of this decision in Foreign Office telegram No. 123 of April 9, not printed. For the attitude of the United States Government, see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 974–86.

[8] This telegram crossed Mr. Phipps's despatch No. 857 of April 5, which transmitted to the Foreign Office a Note of April 4 from the French Government, proposing the following: '(1) Dès que la date de la reprise des travaux de la Conférence aura été fixée, M. Massigli en informera les Représentants à Lausanne des États-Unis d'Amérique, de la Grèce, de la Roumanie, de l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène et de la Belgique, par l'entremise des Ambassades ou Légations à Paris. (2) En ce qui concerne la Bulgarie. . . M. Massigli priera le Ministre de Bulgarie à Paris d'informer les Représentants bulgares que les travaux de la Conférence sont repris, en ajoutant que. . . la date à laquelle la présence des Plénipotentiaires bulgares sera utile à Lausanne sera communiquée ultérieurement. (3) Le Secrétaire Général de la Conférence adressera une lettre personnelle aux Représentants à Lausanne de l'Espagne, de la Norvège, des Pays-Bas, du Portugal et de la Suède, les informant de la reprise des négociations et ajoutant que la date à laquelle la Commission aux séances de laquelle ils participaient, reprendrait ses travaux sera communiquée ultérieurement. (4) En ce qui concerne les Soviets,. . . il n'y a pas lieu, à l'heure actuelle, de leur adresser une convocation quelconque. Toutefois,. . . il conviendra, en cours de la Conférence. . . que le Secrétariat Général leur fasse savoir qu'aucune modification n'a été apportée à la Convention des Détroits telle que leurs Représentants en ont eu connaissance et que, en conséquence, si le Gouvernement des Soviets décide d'y adhérer, ses Délégués devront se trouver pour la signature à Lausanne.' Lord Curzon replied, in his telegram No. 165 of April 9: 'Please inform the French government that I agree as regards points 2 and 4 (Bulgaria and Russia) but ask them to reconsider points 1 and 3 in the light of the observations in my telegram No. 164 [the telegram here printed] and to let me have their views.'

No. 468

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 385 Telegraphic: by bag [E 3718/1/44]

PARIS, *April 11, 1923*

My telegram No. 383.[1]

A magnified reflection of Monsieur Poincaré's pessimism is to be found in today's press. 'Pertinax' in the 'Echo de Paris' discusses the Chester scheme[2] and declares that it is merely a means used by Angora for annulling concessions in Asia Minor already promised and practically granted to French and British groups.[3] Mustapha Kemal and his colleagues simply intended to resume their liberty of action and France who, in June 1914 granted a loan of 500 million francs for the Armenian railway lines, is now left with that sum lost to her, and is quietly told that an agreement cannot be concluded until the payment of the second instalment of 500 millions. 'Pertinax' concludes his article by stating that the allies are now confronted in Turkey with a revolutionary and tyrannical power which does not intend to recognise the most legitimate rights and is itself incapable of replacing the régime which it overthrew. 'What is the use of going to Lausanne? For the moment the best plan is to let the naval and even the military power of the Greeks bring the Turks back to an appreciation of realities.'

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking tribute to the Near East policy of His Majesty's Government.

Monsieur Gauvain in the 'Journal des Débats' continues to deplore the mistaken policy of the French government, whose incredible weakness has resulted in the Turks turning towards the English, who knew how to stand out against them, and towards the Americans who possessed the necessary capital. The Turks, after having made use of France, were now flouting her.[4]

[1] Of April 10, not printed.

[2] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1198–1252.

[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 724.

[4] In his despatch No. 226 of April 16, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'My recent telegrams and despatches will have informed Your Lordship of the deplorable effect produced on the French by the acceptance by the Grand National Assembly of the Chester Concession. It is not too much to say that the French here, headed by the French High Commissioner, are exasperated by the action of the Nationalist Government. Nor has the attitude of the Turkish press in face of General Pellé's protest against the acceptance of the Chester Concession tended to improve matters between France and Turkey.

'The Turkish press has used two arguments in defence of the action of the Grand National Assembly in approving the Chester Concession. These are, firstly, that that concession was not at the time formally approved by the Turkish Parliament, and secondly, that the war anyhow cancelled such concessions, ignoring the fact that the Turks had received five hundred million francs, but had not delivered the goods. Were the Turks to maintain this second argument it would presumably affect all foreign companies holding pre-war concessions.

'In addition to the official notification made to the Debt Council, as reported in my despatch No. 208 [of April 3, not printed], one of the leading papers has openly stated that the Régie Concession will not be prolonged, and that the Nationalist Government will call upon the Régie Company to refund a sum of £.T. 5,800,000. So much for the manner in which the actions of the Nationalist Government are calculated to injure French commercial interests to a vital extent. But this is not all. There seems little doubt, and the French admit it, that the recent movement of troops from Balikesir to Afion Karahissar is designed as a threat against Syria and as a means of bringing pressure to bear on France. Monsieur Steeg, who has now gone to Paris to report on his recent visit to Angora [see No. 439, n. 3], stated, on his way through Constantinople, that there was nothing to be done with the Nationalist Authorities, who were hopeless people.

'Whether from stupidity or from other motives there is no doubt that the Turks are flouting the French in every way. The acceptance of the Chester Concession proclaims the final bankruptcy of the Franklin-Bouillon policy, which seemed to enjoy the sympathies of Monsieur Poincaré. The net result of the recent trend of Nationalist policy towards France will undoubtedly tend to stiffen the attitude of the French Delegation at Lausanne.'

No. 469

Sir E. Crowe to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Tours)[1]
No. 1 Telegraphic [E 3726/1/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 11, 1923*[2]

Following from Sir W. Tyrrell.

Sir A. Geddes[3] and Sir H. Rumbold[4] have both replied in long telegrams which follow on to-day's file that in their opinion the balance of advantage lies in allowing Secretary-General to inform United States government of date of resumption of negotiations at Lausanne. They both believe United States representatives might do more harm outside the conference, especially if they knew invitation had been deliberately withheld from them. Sir H. Rumbold also gives other reasons.[5]

[1] See No. 465, n. 1. [2] The time of despatch of this telegram is not recorded.

[3] In his telegram No. 182 of April 10, not printed.

[4] In his telgram No. 231 of April 10 (see n. 5).

[5] These were: '1. If we hold the view that resumed discussions at Lausanne are a continuation of Lausanne conference Americans may claim with some reason that they should be invited.

'2. Turks communicated to United States High Commissioner here their counter-proposals as well as recent note fixing renewal of conference for April 23rd.

'3. In view of passing of Chester scheme [see No. 468, n. 2] by grand national assembly Turks would consider any omission to invite Americans as a direct encouragment to make further economic or political arrangements with them and as a proof that allies had disinterested themselves in economic arrangements already come to between Turkey and United States.

'4. We have nothing to lose by inviting Americans to attend conference whilst failure to invite them besides being a real slap in the face might prompt them to work against allied interests on the spot.'

Mr. Phipps telegraphs from Paris[6] that M. Poincaré shares generally your views but wishes Roumania, Yugoslavia and possibly Belgium invited.[7] This presumably means that he will agree to send no invitations to neutrals and United States government, although original French suggestion was, as you will remember, that same invitations should be sent out as to original Lausanne conference, except as regards Russia and Bulgaria. M. Poincaré is to reply in writing.

If we are therefore to reconsider in the light of Sir A. Geddes's and Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams views already expressed to French government regarding United States government, which I personally consider it advisable to do, it seems important to forestall French reply. This telegram is therefore being sent to Paris by bag tonight, together with Sir H. Rumbold's and Sir A. Geddes's above-mentioned telegrams, in case Your Lordship thinks it advisable to instruct Mr. Phipps to explain at once to M. Poincaré that we wish to reconsider our views regarding United States participation as observers. Mr. Phipps can use generally the arguments given in Constantinople and Washington telegrams.

Repeated to Paris No. 168 by bag.

[6] Telegram No. 386 of April 11. This ran: 'French government adhere to their desire to invite Belgian representatives, but agree on the other points raised in Your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 164 [No. 467] and 165 [No. 467, n. 8]. They think it highly desirable that an United States observer should be present, in view of the Chester concession scheme, but they will probably agree that the inviting powers should await an initiative from the United States government.'

[7] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), Nos. 698 and 704.

No. 470

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 169[1] *Telegraphic* [*E 3584/1/44*]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 12, 1923, 12.20 p.m.*

My view is that the reply of the Turkish government of April 8th[2] to the allied note[3] is sufficiently satisfactory to justify negotiations being begun on April 23rd without further correspondence.

Please inform government to which you are accredited accordingly and suggest that allied High Commissioners at Constantinople should be instructed merely to inform Turkish representative there that the allied powers will send representatives to Lausanne for the opening of the conference on the date suggested by the Turkish government.[4]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 119, Athens No. 59, Bucharest No. 21 and Belgrade No. 44.

[1] No. 169 to Paris, No. 89 to Rome. [2] See No. 466. [3] No. 460.
[4] i.e. April 23 (see No. 466).

No. 471

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Phipps (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)

No. 170[1] *Telegraphic* [*E 3584/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 12, 1923, 12.20 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[2]

Note of Turkish government appears to accept proposal for negotiations between Turkish government and allied companies holding pre-war concessions. It is therefore desirable that such negotiations should be opened as soon as possible. British companies concerned are being urged to expedite their arrangements as far as possible, but they are very anxious that Turkish government should be induced to hold them at Constantinople and not at Angora, and to send there someone with technical knowledge and real powers to negotiate.

Please ask government to which you are accredited to instruct French/Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople to concert at as early a date as possible a note to the Turkish government asking them to hold negotiations at Constantinople, and enquiring with whom negotiations are to take place and on what date the Turkish government will be prepared to begin them.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 120.

[1] No. 170 to Paris, No. 90 to Rome. [2] No. 470.

No. 472

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received April 12, 3.25 p.m.)

No. 134 Telegraphic [*E 3761/4/44*]

ATHENS, *April 12, 1923, 2 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 235.[1]

Head of political bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to whom I mentioned matter asks me to give, on behalf of Greek government, most categorical denial to alleged deportation of all Turkish males from Western Thrace. He admits that a certain number of Turks who had threatened

[1] Of April 11. This ran: 'I have received note from Turkish Government stating that Greek authorities have deported to the islands all Turkish males from Western Thrace. Note protests against this action as a violation of principle of Exchange of Populations Agreement. My impression is that deportations have been confined to Bulgarians, and note appears to indicate some connivance between Turkish and Bulgarian Governments.'

In his despatch No. 268 of May 1, Mr. Henderson reported: '. . . the position of Moslems in Western Thrace has recently been receiving a considerable amount of attention at the hands of the local Turkish press. Accounts of persecution and deportation are served up daily and very thinly veiled threats of retaliation against the Greek population of Constantinople have been general.'

military communications have been deported as military measure (see my telegram No. 119).[2] He volunteered expression of conviction that there is connivance between Turkish and Bulgarian governments to prepare ground for raising question of status of Western Thrace at forthcoming conference.[3]

Repeated to Constantinople and Sofia.

[2] Of April 5, not printed.

[3] Commenting on the telegram under reference, Mr. Erskine, in Sofia telegram No. 31 of May 1, stated: 'Existence of such alliance is highly improbable and report may safely be disregarded. It is possible that Bulgarian government may have agreed to assist or at least not to impede action by comitadjis in event of renewal of hostilities but I have no real evidence even of this and Turks appear as recalcitrant as ever regarding return of Bulgarian refugees to Eastern Thrace. Bulgarian government have recently published categorical denial of any agreement with Turkey.'

No. 473

Mr. Phipps (Paris) to Sir E. Crowe[1] *(Received April 12, 9.45 p.m.)*
Unnumbered Telegraphic [E 3774/1/44]

Urgent PARIS, *April 12, 1923, 7.55 p.m.*

Following from Lord Curzon No. 4.[2]

Secretary of State adheres to his original view that it is quite unnecessary to invite either America or Belgium to conference and he deplores attempt which is being made in every quarter to convert conversations at Lausanne into a resumption of full blown conference with all former elements of publicity and intrigue.

American government does not mean to sign treaty any more than Russia means to sign Straits convention and she merely utilises her presence as observer to foster intrigue. Secretary of State thinks therefore that we should wait for initiative to be taken by America.

If she asks to be admitted again as observer application may be considered on its merits. Secretary of State has [? not][3] seen telegrams[4] from Sir H. Rumbold and Sir A. Geddes but does not think that they will alter his view which rests upon fundamental conception of what revived conference ought to be, rather than what everybody else seems bent upon making it.[5]

[1] See No. 465, n. 1.

[2] This telegram replies to No. 469.

[3] This word is supplied from the Confidential Print.

[4] See No. 469, nn. 3, 4, and 5.

[5] Lord Curzon minuted on April 13: 'The Conference is becoming so rapidly a new Lausanne Conference to do the bulk of the business all over again, with all the familiar moves, plots, intrigues, bluffs and lies, that I do not now think it matters in the least who is there or who is absent.

'I am disposed therefore to say "Let 'em all come". But this is merely another way of stating (in my judgment) that the chances of success are receding with every day that passes and every move that is made.'

No. 474

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 30)
No. 314 [C 7666/362/19]

ATHENS, *April 19, 1923*

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that, according to the press, Colonel Plastiras, in an interview given to a journalist at Salonica a day or two ago, stated that, as a Revolution and as a Government, he and his colleagues were working for the restoration of peace in the country and to put an end to internal discord. He recognised, he added, that the work was difficult, and that, in spite of goodwill, the Revolutionary Government were continually being misrepresented. 'How,' he said, 'could it be otherwise, when the anti-Veniselists grumbled, and the Veniselists declared that they were being persecuted?' The task, he continued, which the Revolution had undertaken was difficult and heavy. They would hand it over to politicians if they could be sure that this work would be safe in their hands. Unfortunately, nowhere could they find a politician who would give guarantees for a happy continuation of the work of the Revolution. That is why, he said, the military people were continuing to hold the reins of government until they were convinced that their work would be consolidated. 'For,' he said, 'we have decided to save the country in collaboration with the people or in spite of the will of the people, if they should show signs of corruption or of ill-will. For, do not forget that the vicissitudes of the last years have rendered the people neurasthenic and ill.'

2. These and previous declarations of Colonel Plastiras to the effect that the popular wishes are to be considered, but only provided they run on lines which, in his opinion, are for the good of the country, throw an interesting light on what may be anticipated at a future general election. A Veniselist said to me yesterday that the so-called 'Liberal party' had not a majority in the country. At present, both they and their opponents are divided amongst themselves, and the most important section of them consider that it is high time for the Revolutionary Government to give place to a proper constitutional form of government. This may perhaps account for Colonel Plastiras's anxiety as to what his 'neurasthenic' compatriots may or may not decide in the future.

3. Unfortunately, M. Zaïmis, after considerable indecision, feels himself unable to form a Government until peace has been signed, although the Revolutionary Government again offered to withdraw in his favour.

4. A British officer, until recently attached to Greek General Headquarters, told me that a few days before he left the front, General Pangalos had referred in conversation to a military dictatorship as being a desirable form of government, observing that it already existed in Macedonia and Thrace. He added that at present there was a different form of government in Athens! It may here be observed that this view has also been expressed both by

General Dousmanis and General Metaxas in the recent past, in each case, however, with himself as Dictator under the King.

Copy to Lausanne.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

No. 475

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 30)
No. 316 [C 7667/362/19]

ATHENS, *April 19, 1923*

My Lord,

The chief point of interest during the last few weeks has been the journey of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to France, where, I understand, he conferred with M. Veniselos and M. Poincaré, returning subsequently to Greece via Belgrade, where he had interviews with the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister. His Excellency then returned to Athens, after halting at Salonica, where Colonel Plastiras and General Pangalos came from the front to hold a conference with him and with Captain Hadjikyriakos, the head of the fleet.

2. Little is known by the public of what occurred at these various conferences. M. Alexandris merely informed the press that he had been received very cordially by M. Poincaré, whom he had assured of the unalterable friendship of Greece for France, and he expressed himself as having been generally satisfied with his visits. He stated that M. Veniselos was determined firmly to maintain the absolute refusal of Greece to pay an indemnity of any kind to Turkey, which, as he had explained to M. Veniselos, would mean complete ruin to the economic future of the country.

3. On the other hand, my Italian colleague assures me that the real reason for M. Alexandris's visit to M. Veniselos was to persuade the latter to withdraw his objection to representing Greece again at Lausanne so long as the revolutionary Government remained in power, and to explain to him the reasons for which it was impossible for the present Government to retire until the conclusion of peace (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 314 of to-day).[1]

4. The conference at Salonica of course gave rise to all sorts of rumours, which the warlike speeches made by General Pangalos, Colonel Plastiras and Captain Hadjikyriakos at Volos, where they addressed the fleet on their way to Salonica, naturally tended to increase. 'The army,' said Colonel Plastiras, 'is ready on the Maritza. Our fleet is also ready, and we hope that, God willing, we shall have the glory of a victory that shall give us an honourable and lasting peace.' General Pangalos said: 'I hope the officers of the navy will present an admirable organisation, and that in the near future army and fleet will march together in a common effort which will

[1] No. 474.

permit us to celebrate a revival of our ancient glory and of our national welfare. We believe that this moment is near.'

5. All this may, of course, be mere talk intended to impress the Turks and Europe before the forthcoming Lausanne Conference, but it must be admitted that feeling in Greece is running high both on the subject of the Turkish claim for indemnities and of the disgraceful condition in which the Greek prisoners have been returned to them. A certain amount of encouragement has also been given to the warlike section of the press by the recent indignation displayed in France at the concessions given by Turkey to Admiral Chester,[2] and, of course, the newspapers have been anxious to lay stress on the probability of support being forthcoming from France for Greece at the forthcoming conference.

6. It is difficult to believe that anyone in Greece would dare to take the responsibility of advancing alone, more especially as the advice received by M. Alexandris on the occasion of his visits to France and Serbia is more likely to have been of a moderating nature than the reverse, but, as I have said before, the doubtful factor is General Pangalos, who may some day refuse to listen to the advice of anybody, except possibly that of M. Veniselos. He and his colleagues consider, I am told by someone in close contact with him, that the position of the revolution in the country is doubtful, and they feel the necessity of doing something (e.g., the recovery of Eastern Thrace) in order to ingratiate themselves with the Greek people. As however the British liaison officer, Major Johnston, who was attached to the headquarters, has gone home, we shall now be still more in the dark as to happenings in Thrace.

7. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to Lausanne and Constantinople.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

[2] See No. 468, n. 2.

No. 476

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington) and Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)

No. 140[1] *Telegraphic [E 3849/1/44]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 20, 1923, 2 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 182[2] (of April 10th. United States Government and
Your telegram No. 231[3] Lausanne).

It has been agreed that Secretary General shall notify United States

[1] No. 140 to Washington, No. 134 to Constantinople.
[2] Not printed (see No. 469, n. 3).
[3] See No. 469, nn. 4 and 5.

Government, like other powers, of the resumption of the negotiations at Lausanne.[4]

The above is for your own information.

[4] In his telegram No. 398 of April 15, Mr. Phipps had reported that the French Government, having received a note from the American delegation at Lausanne requesting to be informed of the date of the resumption of the conference, proposed that an invitation to attend the Conference should be addressed to the Government of the United States. Instructions had been given to Mr. Phipps by telephone on the morning of April 16 to agree to this proposal.

CHAPTER IV

Correspondence and Memoranda relating to the Conference of Lausanne April 23–July 24, 1923

No. 477

Sir H. Rumbold[1] *(Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston*
(Received April 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 3 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4146/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 23, 1923*

I arrived last night with General Pellé and saw my French and Italian colleagues separately this morning, after which we three met together to decide the procedure to be followed and the division of the work of the conference.

I had suggested to General Pellé in the train that we could not do better than adopt the division of the work which had been adopted at the recent London conference,[2] and I suggested that we should hold a meeting this afternoon to communicate our decisions to the Turkish and other Delegations. Whilst inclined in principle to agree to my suggestions, he said that he must consult his own Delegations, and I found this morning that the question of who was to preside at the first sitting was exercising his mind. His Delegation had evidently told him that it was the turn of the French delegate to preside at a plenary session of the conference.

I explained that there could be no plenary session of the conference in the absence of the First Plenipotentiaries, and that what I had in mind was a purely business meeting at which I, as the senior Ambassador, claimed to preside. This view was subsequently accepted both by my French and Italian colleagues on the understanding that the sitting was to be termed an unofficial one.

Signor Montagna, who began by objecting to the proposed division of work, finally agreed to it. He had hoped to secure the presidency of the first commission or committee so as to be able to deal, while in the chair, with the question of Castellorizo.[3] But both General Pellé and I pointed out to him that it would be better to adhere as far as possible to the procedure followed at the first conference under which the first commission was presided over by the British Plenipotentiary and so on. Any other procedure would excite

[1] Sir H. Rumbold had been appointed to lead the British Delegation at Lausanne.
[2] See No. 451.
[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 736, and *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 989.

the suspicion of the Turks. A full meeting[4] of the three allied delegations and the Japanese delegation was held in my room at 3 p.m. when I explained the programme agreed upon in the morning, and invited observations. The meeting was useful and it was unanimously agreed that the work should be divided in accordance with the London programme. It was decided to set up three committees which will be a kind of cross between the commissions of the first Lausanne conference and the sub-commissions of that conference, and which will do all the work. I shall preside over the first committee which will deal with the outstanding territorial clauses and the judicial régime for foreigners. General Pellé will take the second committee which will deal with financial and sanitary matters, while Signor Montagna will take the third committee which deals with economic questions. It is intended to hold two sittings a day, ringing the changes on the committees, as the three allied plenipotentiaries mean to be present at the sittings of all three committees.

In order to meet the susceptibilities of Ismet Pasha, who appears or pretends to be somewhat disconcerted at the absence of the first plenipotentiaries, we invited him and Riza Nour to a private meeting at the Château[5] at 4.30, at which we communicated our proposed procedure and division of work. He expressed himself satisfied, though he laid stress on the fact that it would be unnecessary to deal with economic matters which were to form the subject of direct negotiations between foreign companies and the Turkish government. He also enquired with great insistence whether the work the conference was about to undertake now would be subject to revision by another set of plenipotentiaries. We replied in the negative and reassured him on this point. We also made it perfectly clear to the Turkish delegation that there was no question of reopening discussion on articles already agreed to.

A full meeting of the conference followed at 5.15 p.m.[6] at which I presided, and my colleagues and I took this opportunity of thanking the Swiss government and Cantonal authorities for their renewed courtesy in facilitating the work of the conference. I also thanked the Turkish delegation for having undertaken such a long journey, and said that I knew that they were anxious to complete their labours as soon as possible and that the British delegation would do its utmost to assist them to that end. I outlined to the conference the procedure and division of work on which we had agreed beforehand. My

[4] Except in the case of the semi-official meeting of April 23 (see n. 6, below), no separate English minutes were made of the sessions of the Conference of Lausanne when it was resumed on April 23. From time to time the British delegation transmitted to the Foreign Office the minutes taken by the French secretary. (These were filed along with other papers relating to the Conference, the reference of the first set of minutes being E 5003/1/44.) No translation was made of these minutes, and they were not published as a Command Paper. They were, however, published by the French Government in a publication, here cited as *Recueil* (2), vol. i (see List of Abbreviations). For the Allied Draft Treaty of January 31 and the Turkish Counter Proposals of March 8, see Appendix III.

[5] The Château D'Ouchy.

[6] According to the British Secretary's minutes (E 4149/1/44), not printed, the meeting began at 5.30 p.m.

colleagues, the Japanese delegate and the American observer[7] spoke to the same effect, and Ismet Pasha followed with an appropriate speech in which he incidentally thanked the British delegation for their courtesy. I brought proceedings to a close by remarking that the whole world expected us to achieve a rapid and successful result, and that we should do our utmost to secure this.

On the whole, I consider that we have begun in a satisfactory manner.

[7] Mr. Grew. In his telegram No. 4 of April 23, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'Mr. Grew, the American observer, called on me this afternoon to explain that the American delegation would fill the same rôle as at the first conference of Lausanne. He added, however, that it was probable that he would take a more active part when the question of the judicial and economic régime for foreigners came to be discussed, going so far as to say that he might wish to participate directly in the negotiations. He thought that a more active intervention in these matters on the part of the American delegation would be helpful to the inviting powers.

'In the statement which he subsequently read at the full sitting this afternoon [see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 988], whilst emphasising that the United States were concerned to maintain the principle of the Open Door, he hinted at a more active participation in the proceedings of the conference.'

No. 478

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 26, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 6 Telegraphic: by bag [4147/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 24, 1923*

The first committee[1] sat this morning under my presidency.

I stated that I wished to reserve discussion of the first article of the political clauses, whilst pointing out that the addition suggested in the Turkish counter-draft would anyhow have no validity for any of the Allied Powers until they had ratified the treaty.

There was a long discussion with regard to the Turkish demand that the thalweg of the Maritsa should be the frontier with Greece. Ismet Pasha, who was attended by a phalanx of forbidding-looking Turks, seemed impervious to all argument on the subject and his obtuseness and obstinacy put the patience of the Allied delegates to a severe test. As neither side would give way, we passed to the consideration of article 3. The persistence with which the Turks insisted on maintaining their addition to part 1 of the article showed that they wished to get the British and Italian delegations to recognise the Franklin-Bouillon agreement in a formal manner. General Pellé loyally helped to resist this attempt on the part of the Turks, and his interventions throughout were both businesslike and effective. Ismet Pasha pressed General Pellé hard to explain why the French government had not ratified the Franklin-Bouillon agreement, but got no satisfaction.

I explained briefly the modification and addition to article 3 (2) of Turkish counter-proposals which His Majesty's Government would require, and I

[1] See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 1–8.

reserved the right to discuss them later with Ismet Pasha. Latter raised no objection to such discussion, and seemed inclined to admit addition regarding status quo.

We reached agreement on articles 5 and 12.

The second committee met in the afternoon[2] and dealt wholly with the articles relating to the debt. Agreement was reached on article 51, and article 52 referring to the Dodecanese was reserved as the Italians wished to discuss it privately with the Turks. Articles 45 to 50 inclusive, which are of a highly technical nature, were referred to a committee of experts set up ad hoc with instructions to report back to the committee in forty-eight hours. The second paragraphs in the Turkish counter-draft of articles 17 and 19 were also considered. With regard to article 17, we stated that we agreed that Turkey should be relieved of formal responsibility for the Turkish loans secured on the Egyptian tribute, but we considered that this should be done by a subsequent agreement under article 18 by which Egypt would simultaneously assume formal responsibility. As regards article 19, we explained that the Turks were wrong in supposing that the guaranteed loan of 1855 is secured on the Cyprus tribute. We intend to explain the matter privately to the Turks and expect to be able to satisfy them.

The Allied delegates categorically rejected the new Turkish article providing that the Succession States should share in any expenditure incurred by Turkey in withdrawing paper money, but I do not expect that we have heard the last of this article.

Although Ismet and Riza Nour were present, Hassan Bey conducted the proceedings for the Turkish delegation and amused the committee by a characteristic and disingenuous statement regarding the almost entire absence of any financial advantages hitherto secured by Turkey.

[2] See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 176–83. The president of this committee was General Pellé.

No. 479

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 27, 8.45 a.m.)
No. 7 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 4215/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *April 25, 1923*

Articles 71 to 78 were discussed in the third committee this morning.[1]

On Article 71 the Turks raised some difficulty as to including protected persons in the definition of allied nationals, contending that there had been no protected persons since 1863. This was referred for consideration by the legal experts.

In Article 72 Ismet accepted the principle of restitution of property. The reference to Turkish companies controlled by allied subjects, which arises

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. 1, pp. 268–71. The president of the third committee was Signor Montagna.

in the first paragraph, was deleted in this Article as this point arises in connection with concessions. Objection was raised to the date of 1st August 1914, and it was agreed that here and elsewhere in general the 29th October 1914 should be substituted for the 1st August. The Turks objected to the obligation to indemnify third parties injured by restitution of property, and this was referred for consideration by the drafting committee. The question of the settlement of disputes by the arbitral tribunal was reserved for further consideration by the Turkish delegation.

On Article 73 a suggestion was made that any country which desired to exercise the rights given by this Article should be required to accord similar rights to Turkey. The Turks seemed inclined to accept this, but reserved the point for further consideration.

Article 74 was accepted in principle, subject to further examination of the second paragraph by the drafting committee. The last paragraph of this Article was reserved by the Turks in the same way as the last paragraph of Article 72.

Article 75 was objected to by the Turks. Hassan Bey endeavoured to enforce the view that the capitulations were unilateral acts and had ceased to operate in September 1914. The allied delegations strongly repudiated this contention. No decision was reached, but there appeared to be some indication that they would be prepared to accept a provision that taxes unpaid during the war should not be enforced provided that the requirement for repayment of taxes which were not authorised under the capitulatory régime is not insisted on.

Article 76 was reserved by the allies on the ground that the Article in its present form is not required now that reparation will be abandoned.

Article 77 was accepted.

On Article 78, while the Turks stated that they would accept reciprocally the continuation of old claims in principle, they again raised their old point that the present Turkish Government is not the successor of the Old Imperial Ottoman Government and argued that the Turkish Government should not take over the whole of any liability which might have been incurred by the former Ottoman Empire. No conclusion was reached as regards this Article.

The first committee met in the afternoon[2] and began the consideration of Article 15. Previous to the meeting I had warned Ismet Pasha privately that the Italians would not give way about Castellorizo and that the allied delegations would support the Italian delegation in rejecting the Turkish proposal. After explaining on behalf of the British delegation that the Turkish proposal involved a substantial modification of the territorial clauses and was not warranted by anything in the national pact, I called on Signor Montagna to defend his case, which he did with great vigour.[3] In reply Ismet relied largely on the argument that Castellorizo was within Turkish territorial waters, but the Italian delegation subsequently pointed out that although the point of the island nearest the mainland might be just within territorial waters, the island as a whole lay outside them. The Turkish

[2] *Recueil* (2), vol. 1, pp. 9–19.

[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 743.

demand was categorically rejected, but the Turks said they would reserve the question.

Article 16 gave rise to much the same discussion with regard to the mention of the Angora agreement in the treaty as had taken place yesterday. Previous to the meeting I had a private conversation with Ismet in which I made it clear that the allied delegations could not even indirectly become parties to the Angora agreement by agreeing to its being mentioned in the treaty. General Pellé suggested that he should prepare a paragraph to replace paragraph two of the Turkish counter-draft which would reassure Turkey as to the rights she is to have at Alexandretta and Antioch in accordance with the Angora agreement.

The Turkish demand for sovereignty over Ada Kala gave rise to a most amusing discussion, the brunt of which fell on the Roumanian delegate.[4] With the help of a legal opinion which I read regarding the status of Ada Kala and the arguments advanced by the Roumanian delegate, the Turkish claim was completely demolished. Ismet gave a very feeble explanation of the reasons for the Turkish request, which he appeared to base mainly on the fact that the Turkish Government had recently sent a Cadi to officiate on the island. It subsequently transpired that the Roumanians had immediately ejected this Cadi. The Turkish request was unanimously rejected by the conference, the Roumanian delegate remarking that the Roumanians would reserve the island whilst the Turks would doubtless reserve their Article. The Serbian delegate[5] intervened to contest the Turkish claim whilst avoiding joining issue with the Roumanians on the subject.

With regard to the second part of Article 19, I stated that the British delegation would be able to give the Turks a measure of satisfaction and would submit a new draft.

It was arranged that the Italians should come to a direct agreement with the Turks with regard to Article 20.

Articles 21 and 25 were referred to the drafting committee.

The mention of the Straits in Article 21 led to a statement by Ismet that if the question of the Straits came up for discussion in any way, it would be necessary to secure the presence of representatives of the States bordering on the Black Sea.

I anticipate no difficulty in reaching agreement with regard to the four last mentioned Articles.

The necessity of referring such a number of Articles in the financial, economic and territorial clauses to experts or to the drafting committee will necessarily slow down the work of the three main committees, and it is clear to my colleagues and to myself that we shall not be able to hold meetings of one or other of the committees both in the morning and in the afternoon. In fact the pace we have set has begun to prove a little too hot.

[4] M. Diamandy. [5] M. Yovanovitch.

No. 480

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 26, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 10 Telegraphic [E 4218/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 26, 1923, 4 p.m.*

My telegram No. 7.[1]

Now that we have reviewed the whole of the territorial clauses I anticipate that we shall without great difficulty obtain agreement on all points except two, namely, Maritza frontier and Castellorizo. Turks are unlikely to give way readily on both of these as, however great their desire for peace, they must have something to show on credit side on their return to Angora.

If and when we reduce territorial clauses to these two points I think we shall have to consider advisability of bargaining one against the other. In my opinion this bargain should take the shape of agreeing to Turkish proposal that thalweg of Maritza should be frontier in consideration of Turks giving up Castellorizo subject perhaps to Italians agreeing to a form of demilitarization.[2] Arguments in favour of such a bargain are as follows.

1. Venezelos clearly attaches little or no importance to Maritza question and there would appear to be no other allied interest involved.

2. Turkish case for thalweg is difficult to refute in any manner which would satisfy impartial world opinion.

3. Italian claim to Castellorizo is not strong but they are in possession and it is a point of honour with them not to give it up.

4. Christian population of island would certainly be better off under Italians than under the Turks, an argument which should appeal to Monsieur Venezelos notwithstanding his dislike of Italians. I should like to have authority to proceed on above lines when time comes. I should, of course, do nothing without a preliminary understanding with my French and Italian colleagues and Monsieur Venezelos. It would be a question of future tactics whether to propose bargain as soon as agreement has been reached on other points in territorial clauses or to reserve it to form one of a series of simultaneous bargains on question finally left outstanding after discussion of other parts of treaty and annexes.[3]

[1] No. 479.

[2] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 750.

[3] Lord Curzon replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 6 to Lausanne, of April 30: 'I think you should be careful at the present early stage of negotiation to refrain from any statement or action indicating a disposition on our part to give way as regards the thalweg. Any hint of this in whatever quarter would inevitably and immediately reach the ears of the Turks.

'If it be true that Monsieur Venizelos would not object to this concession circumstances may eventually render it desirable for us to give way in order to avoid a breakdown and to save Castellorizo for Italy, but for the present you should give no hint of this.'

No. 481

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 12 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4251/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 26, 1923*

Ismet asked for an interview with me yesterday.

2. He began by referring to the paragraph which the Turks have added to article 1 regarding the evacuation by the Allied troops of Turkish territory on the ratification of the Treaty by Turkey, and pressed hard to know when the Allies would notify the Turks of their intentions with regard to the evacuation of Turkish territory. He said that this is a matter to which Turkish opinion attaches very considerable importance, and he hoped that the Allied delegations would be able to discuss the question with him in two or three days' time. I said that this would be impossible, and explained the reasons for which the Allies could not accept the paragraph in question. On his insisting that the Turks must know as soon as possible how it was proposed to deal with the question of evacuation, I said that there could surely be no doubt that the Allies were anxious to evacuate Turkish territory at the earliest possible moment.

3. If the negotiations with the Turks appear likely to lead to a successful result, I think it will be necessary to deal with the question of evacuation before we separate at Lausanne.

4. Ismet then referred to an allusion which had been made at the morning sitting[1] to the question of reparations, and said that the Turks had every reason to believe that this question had been settled. He added that the Turks had the British word for it that the reparations question was settled. The Italian delegate had in fact made an indirect allusion to reparations in connection with one of the economic articles which we had discussed that morning. I managed to explain the matter away, but it was obvious that Ismet is very suspicious. I have already told the French and Italian delegates clearly that we cannot allow the question of reparations to be raised again, but General Pellé tells me that he has certain instructions on the subject from his government, and I foresee that he will propose a meeting with the experts to discuss the question.[2]

5. I then warned Ismet that the Italians felt very strongly about Castellorizo,[3] and would not give way on the point. I again explained the reasons for which we could not agree to accept the allusions to the Angora Treaty in the form suggested by the Turks in their counter-draft to article 3, section 1, and in article 16.

6. Ismet was evidently very worried, and said that he had hoped for support from the British delegation in economic and financial matters, but I told him at once that there was complete solidarity between the Allies in these matters.

[1] See No. 479. [2] See No. 482, n. 6, below. [3] See *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 748.

7. The impression I derived from the conversation is that Ismet Pasha is very uneasy at being faced with the alternative of either returning without a treaty, or of having to give way on certain questions. In private his attitude is one of appeal rather than of intransigence, and would seem to reflect the more unfavourable situation in Turkey herself at the present moment and her extreme need for peace.

8. Ismet Pasha asked me to convey his respects to you.

No. 482

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 27, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 13 Telegraphic [E 4235/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 27, 1923, 2.20 a.m.*

At outset of meeting of third committee[1] this afternoon[2] unfortunate episode occurred. We had at previous meeting[3] discussed articles 71 to 78 inclusive. As this brought us to series of clauses in which it had been agreed in London[4] that several concessions could be made to Turks, I got my French and Italian colleagues to agree beforehand that when these concessions were not of substantial nature they should be made at once and that we should only keep up our sleeves such of them as would be of real use for bargaining afterwards. I did this because I knew that Italian delegate's tendency is to reserve anything and everything until he gets Castellorizo question settled. I understood that article 79 which would come first in today's proceedings would be dropped.

Italian delegate started meeting by disregarding article 79 altogether and proposing discussion of article 80. Ismet at once made point that he assumed omission of any reference to article 79 meant that it had been dropped. Italian delegate first insisted that it had been read through and reserved at previous meeting. This was inaccurate as at that meeting question of reparations had cropped up incidentally in connection with an earlier article but article 79 had not come up at all. He had to confess himself mistaken but attempted to get out of the matter by now proposing reservation of article. Suspicions of Turks were now thoroughly aroused and matters were made worse by floundering of Italian delegate and attempt by French delegate to maintain that article 79 could not be dropped pending consideration of Turkish redraft of article 57. This, though reasonable in itself, was not calculated to dissipate Turkish suspicions and neither French nor Italians seemed to realize that even if reparations question generally [were] reopened with Turks on basis of asking Turks to pay up equivalent of money for battleships, article 79 would still be superfluous.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 272–8. [2] i.e. April 26. [3] See No. 479.
[4] See No. 455.

I had no alternative but to ask for suspension of sitting. I then pointed out to my colleagues, (1) that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to reopen reparations question with Turks, and (2) that in no case would article 79 be necessary. On this they agreed to drop article and on resumption of sitting Italian delegate announced that Allies were prepared to do so without prejudice to other articles. This did not satisfy Ismet who strongly insisted that reparations question had been finally settled at previous conference and quoted French yellow book[5] in support of this.

Italian delegate escaped by admitting that article 79 was definitely suppressed and saying that question of reparations whatever its position was beyond competence of his committee. Ismet finally accepted this but asked that situation regarding reparations should be cleared up as soon as possible.

Effect has been to bring reparations question into prominence prematurely and to show pretty plainly that Allies are not entirely agreed about it. It will now be difficult to avoid its being raised in early future. I should, therefore, like instructions as to my attitude vis-à-vis Allies. During suspension of sitting French expert reverted to suggestion that Turks might be asked to pay amount necessary to complete reparations fund out of their debt to Germany which has been transferred to Allies.[6]

[5] *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iii, p. 115. For Ismet Pasha's conversation with Mr. Grew, on the evening of April 26, concerning reparations, see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 989–91.

[6] Referring to this telegram and to paragraph 4 of No. 481, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 7 of April 30, instructed Sir H. Rumbold as follows: 'You should stand fast on the line of action which was clearly laid down at the recent meeting in London, i.e. that we cannot allow the question of reparations to be raised again.'

No. 483

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 14 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 4252/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *April 2*[7], *1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Article 80: This article was objected to by the Turks, Hassan Bey raising objections on the ground that it deals with dommages de guerre and was not therefore within the competence of the Economic Commission and the old objection that on principle the Turks will not admit in the Treaty any regulation of the relations between Turkey and her nationals. He said that the concessionaires must proceed with their negotiations. I replied that the Turkish Government must assist in this and must not delay matters by requiring the concessionaires to proceed to Angora.[2] The article was

[1] No. 482. [2] See No. 471.

reserved for further discussion in connection with other articles dealing with concessions, having regard to the negotiations to be undertaken with the concessionaires.

Article 81: This article was objected to by the Turks, Hassan Bey stating that while they had no objection to the liquidation of German properties in Turkey, the Turkish government could not agree to be bound to undertake that liquidation themselves. The article was referred to the experts for further consideration.

Article 82: This article provides for the maintenance of certain categories of pre-war contracts, and the Turks had previously objected to the inclusion of some of the classes of contracts mentioned, maintaining that they should be regarded as having been dissolved by the war. These objections were not raised at the meeting, but certain modifications of a drafting character were raised and it was agreed to refer the matter to the experts.

Article 83: This article was agreed to, but the annex referred to in the article, on which points of difficulty are likely to arise, was not discussed.

Article 84: The first paragraph was accepted by the Turks. The second paragraph, which provides for compensation being paid in respect of the dissolution of a contract for delivery of goods, the execution of which has been begun, was objected to by the Turks on the ground that both parties should have a right to compensation and not only the contractor for delivery of the goods. This point was reserved by the French for further consideration.

Article 85: This article was accepted subject to an alteration of a drafting character to be considered by the experts, and subject to a reserve as to the necessity for the consideration of matters of this kind by an arbitral tribunal.

Article 86: This article was accepted by the Turks.

Article 87: This article was objected to by the Turks so far as regards the recognition of contracts entered into by the Imperial Ottoman government since the 30th October, 1918, on the usual ground that the Angora government is not the successor of the Imperial Ottoman government. Hassan Bey suggested that the interests of Allied nationals can be safeguarded without any recognition of the Imperial Ottoman government, but on being asked to indicate the manner in which these interests could be safeguarded he was not prepared to make any suggestion. It was agreed to submit the clause to economic experts, in consultation with the jurists, to devise a draft. The Allied delegates took the strongest exception to the attitude taken up by the Turkish delegation with regard to the non-recognition of contracts, etc. made between Allied subjects and the Constantinople government.

Article 88: The Turks pressed for an alteration of date to the 29th October, 1918, and the matter was referred to the experts to consider.

Article 89: The Turks objected to any prolongation for the period of the war of the time for operation of concessions and licences, Has[s]an Bey and Cherif Bey maintaining that there had been no interference during the war with the operation of such licences. The clause was referred to the experts to endeavour to come to some agreement.

Article 90: This article, which prevents negotiable instruments being invalidated by failure to comply with the necessary formalities of presentation etc. owing to the war, was accepted by the Turks.

Generally speaking, the discussion on the clauses referred to above showed some indication of a desire on the part of the Turks to come to an agreement, for of their own volition they have dropped some objections which had been foreshadowed at meetings last January.

No. 484

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 9 [E 4213/1/44][1]

Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *April 27, 1923*

Sir,

I have to inform you that I learn from a most secret source that the Angora Envoy at Moscow recently informed M. Chicherin that the Angora Gov[ernmen]t had decided to request the presence at Lausanne of the Russian, Ukrainian [and] Georgian delegation.

2. M. Chicherin replied that he welcomed the Turkish initiative in this matter, which would show to the world that the united Turco-Russian front was still being maintained. He added that he had communicated the Turkish decision to M. Vorowsky[2] [and] that the latter would establish contact with the Turkish delegation at Lausanne.

3. As far as H[is] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] are aware, however, the Turks have made no attempt to secure the invitation of Soviet delegates to the resumed conference at Lausanne.[3]

I am, &c.,
(For the Secretary of State)
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

[1] The draft only of this despatch is preserved in the Foreign Office archives.
[2] Head of the Soviet commercial delegation in Rome.
[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), Nos. 1 and 2.

No. 485

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 15 Telegraphic [4278/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 27, 1923, 11.10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 3.[1]

A further conversation which I have had with Mr. Grew shows that word

[1] This referred to Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 4 of April 23 (No. 477, n. 7), and continued: 'Please ask Mr. Grew for a more precise indication of the position he intends to

'negotiation' which he used in our first conversation[2] was too strong. He does not claim any right to participate in actual negotiations but simply to take a more active part in discussions by making more frequent 'declarations' on behalf of his government and possibly commentaries as to meaning of his declarations in the hope of thus assisting inviting Powers more effectively in such questions as future safeguards for foreigners in Turkey. This is borne out by his remarks at opening of semi-official meeting of Conference[3] immediately after his conversation with me (see British secretary's note sent by bag April 23rd).[4]

I have made position and our attitude perfectly clear to Mr. Grew[5] whose statement at this afternoon's meeting of first committee (see my telegram No. 16)[6] fully bears out above interpretation of his intentions.[7]

assume. . . .You should make it clear that we continue, as hitherto, to value the friendly and informal co-operation of the United States delegation, and are always glad to be acquainted with their opinions and to listen to any suggestions they may wish to make. But negotiation means settling terms with the Turks, and it is not reasonable that the United States, who have not been at war, and are not concluding peace with Turkey, and will neither be bound by, nor have any responsibility for, the treaty, should actually claim the right to negotiate its terms.'

[2] See No. 477, n. 7.
[3] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 988.
[4] As Lausanne despatch No. 1 (E 4149/1/44), not printed.
[5] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 992–3.
[6] No. 486, below.
[7] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 993–4.

No. 486

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 29, 9 a.m.)
No. 16 Telegraphic: by bag [4289/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 27, 1923*

The first committee sat this afternoon.[1]

We started with Article 26 of the draft treaty. Although this Article is closely bound up with questions which will arise later more especially on the Convention regarding régime des étrangers and the commercial convention, Hassan Bey's statement at the meeting of the economic committee on April 25th (see my telegram No. 7)[2] made it necessary to challenge the Turks at once as to what they meant by their revised draft of the Article now under consideration. I opened the discussion by asking why, if the Turkish delegation considered the abolition of the capitulations by the unilateral action of the Turks in September 1914 to be valid, they thought it necessary to have any article in the present treaty regarding their abrogation. Ismet Pasha made no direct answer, but attempted to maintain that the changes proposed by the Turks were merely matters of drafting and that the Turkish delegation had sought to establish an already admitted principle in a clearer

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 20–5.
[2] No. 479.

form. The three allied delegations were unanimous in rejecting this view of the matter. It was pointed out to Ismet Pasha that there might be room for drafting alterations but that it must be clearly laid down that the termination of the capitulations was to be effected by the peace treaty and that the object of the Article was by no means to validate retrospectively the unilateral act performed by the Turks in 1914. We demonstrated that the Turkish wording would not only be open to the latter interpretation, but would also go beyond what the contracting parties had power to do, as it was not within the competence of the allies to terminate the capitulatory régime as regards all foreigners. Ismet Pasha, though loth to show his hand, was forced to admit explicitly that the Turks regarded the abolition of the capitulations by their own act in September 1914 as having definitely terminated them. He supplemented this by the argument that in any case the outbreak of war had terminated all treaty arrangements between the parties. He still attempted to minimise the difference between the two texts. It was pointed out to him that practical difference would be great as on the Turkish wording it would not only be possible to claim arrears of taxation from allied subjects, but also to call in question decisions of consular courts re-established by the powers after the armistice. Ismet replied that these matters fell to be discussed in other Articles in which special mention was made of them.

Mr. Grew intervened with a statement[3] to the effect that the American Government could not admit that the action of the Turks in September 1914, could, in any way, affect existing international agreements. It was then agreed to refer the Article to the drafting committee.

I think that this discussion served a useful purpose, as it will strengthen our position in discussing the material questions of arrears of taxation, judgments of consular courts and any other particular questions which arise elsewhere in the treaty. If we can get satisfaction in the particular articles dealing with such questions we can afford to meet the Turks to some extent as regards the wording of Article 26.

Article 27 was left for private discussion between the Turks and the Fr[e]nch and Italians.

We then considered the recommendations of the d[r]afting committee on certain earlier articles which had been referred to them. The drafting committee had secured agreed texts of Articles 5 and 21 and the second paragraph of Article 1 by making slight drafting alterations. These texts were definitely adopted. The question of the Merkeb Islands in Article 12 was once more reserved as some doubt still seemed to exist regarding the identity and proper designation of the islands.

Agreement was also reached regarding the earlier portion of Article 16. It was agreed to drop the second paragraph of the allied draft and to complete the first paragraph by the addition of the words 'le sort de ces territoires et îles étant réglé ou à régler par les intéressés'. Ismet Pasha drew attention to the fact that the second paragraph of the Turkish draft still remained in

[3] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 992.

reserve, but he made no mention of Ada Kala, which perhaps indicates that even he does not take this question seriously.

The drafting committee had agreed to replace the second paragraph of Article 25 by the words 'il demeure entendu qu'il n'est pas porté atteinte aux attributions spirituelles des autorités religieuses musulmanes'. General Pellé and Monsieur Montagna both said they wished to consider the matter further before agreeing definitely to this text. I regret this postponement as the proposed text seems to attain the object which His Majesty's Government had in view when the question first arose, and I should have liked to settle the matter out of hand.

The Turkish addition to the Thracian frontiers convention was next considered. M. Venizelos said he had no objection to the last three paragraphs. He thought, however, that these gave the Turks all they could legitimately ask for and that the first paragraph was unnecessary. He urged that any mixed Turco-Greek control would be a source of perpetual discord. After some little discussion between Turks and Greeks, I asked the former whether they would be satisfied with a neutral supervisor appointed by the League of Nations. Ismet did not take kindly to this suggestion at first, but eventually agreed to consider it. It was agreed to refer the matter to a small committee of experts who would examine the whole question including my suggestion in all its bearings.

No. 487

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received April 30, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 17 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4290/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *April 28, 1923*

Discussion of the economic clauses was resumed in the third committee this morning.[1]

Article 91. The Turkish delegation objected to the revision of the judgments of their national tribunals by a mixed arbitral tribunal and asked that any revision should be made by the national tribunals and that the clause should be made reciprocal in form. The article was referred for consideration by experts without any decision on principle being come to.

Article 92. Technical difficulties as to acceptance of this article were raised by the Turkish delegation and the article was referred for consideration by experts who were to consult with the jurists if necessary.

Article 93. A point of minor importance with regard to persons or companies who had representatives in Turkey was raised, and referred to the experts.

Annex relating to insurance. Several technical points were raised on this annex by the Turkish delegation and the annex was referred for consideration to experts.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 279–84.

Articles 94–100. Discussion of these articles, which are those forming the section relating to concessions, was suspended pending the negotiations between the Turkish government and the concessionaires.[2]

Article 101. This article dealing with pre-war debts was accepted by the Turkish delegation subject to a reserve with regard to the last paragraph, but as the article is to some extent dependent on the decisions come to on other economic clauses, it was also referred to experts.

Articles 102–106. These articles, dealing with industrial property, were accepted by the Turkish delegation.

Article 107. This article, which provides for the recognition of the grant of patents and the registration of trade-marks effected at Constantinople since the 30th October, 1918, was objected to in its present form. Hassan Bey stated, however, that they agreed in principle that the proprietors of such patents and trade-marks should not suffer any prejudice and the article was referred to experts to prepare a draft to give effect to this principle.

Articles 108–111. No objection was raised to the constitution of the mixed arbitral tribunal provided for in these articles, but the Turks maintained that there was not now any necessity to establish such a tribunal. This view was not accepted by the Allied representatives, and the articles were referred to the jurists for consideration. They were to consult with the economic experts if necessary.

Articles 112 & 113. Reserves of minor importance were made on these articles by the Turkish delegation who desire to consider them further and the jurists were to consider whether it is necessary to include the fifth paragraph in Article 112.

Articles 114 & 115. The Turkish representatives maintained that these articles were unnecessary and reserved them for further consideration.

The attitude of the Turkish delegation was conciliatory, and I do not anticipate much difficulty in reaching an agreement with the Turks on several of the articles referred to the experts.

[2] See Nos. 471 and 483.

No. 488

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 3, 8.50 a.m.)
No. 22 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4427/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 1, 1923*

The first committee met this morning[1] to consider chapters 1 and 3 of the draft convention regarding the régime for foreigners.

I had previously held a meeting of my Allied colleagues and experts to consider our course of action. It was agreed that practically all the clauses

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 26–38.

would have to be referred to the drafting committee, owing to their technical character, and that the object of the meeting of the committee should be to elicit the views of the Turks on the various questions at issue. The Allied legal experts considered that the difficulties of drafting a general reciprocity clause were insuperable and it was decided to fall back for the present on the alternative of considering, in connection with each clause, how far reciprocity could be given.

I opened the proceedings this morning by defining the Allied position as regards reciprocity. I read an extract from the Allied note of March 27th[2] showing that what had been promised was such reciprocity as might prove to be possible in practice. Ismet Pasha attempted to maintain that the Allies had agreed to make the whole convention reciprocal, but did not demur to the suggestion that the question of reciprocity should be considered by the drafting committee in connection with each article as it arose.

As regards the title, it was pointed out to the Turks that the signed copy of the convention would not have any title and that its description would only appear in the final act. It was agreed after some demur on the part of the Turks that the question of title should be left for eventual consideration.

It was left to the drafting committee to re-draft the preamble in a form satisfactory to both sides.

Article 1. We informed the Turks that the Allies would be prepared to suppress this, subject to a satisfactory wording of Article 26 of the treaty.

Article 2. After it had been decided to refer the first paragraph to the drafting committee, a discussion arose regarding paragraph 2 of the Turkish counter proposal. The Allied delegates did not object in principle to the Turks reserving the right to regulate immigration in the ordinary sense of the word, but suggested that the words 'd'autoriser ou d'interdire' should be replaced by the words 'de réglementer'; or still better that the paragraph should be suppressed altogether on the ground that it was unnecessary to affirm in an agreement of this sort a right which every state is free to exercise in virtue of its sovereignty. The Turks insisted that an express provision should be made. They appeared to regard immigration as including the entry of any person or persons into Turkey with an intention to settle there permanently without regard to the number of persons concerned. The Allied delegates took exception to this as being susceptible to an interpretation which would defeat the intention of the first paragraph. The question was then referred to the drafting committee.

Article 4. The Allied delegations . . .[3] unanimously to the Turkish re-draft of the second paragraph. The discussion fell into two parts:

(a) the question of the acquired rights of foreigners already established in professions, etc.,

[2] No. 460. The Allied note was drafted on March 27 (see No. 458).

[3] The text is here uncertain. The French minutes (*Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 29) ran: 'Aucune observation n'est présentée sur l'article 3, non plus que sur le premier alinéa de l'article 4. Sir Horace Rumbold donne lecture du texte proposé par la Délégation turque pour le deuxième alinéa de l'article 4: . . .'

(b) the question of foreigners wishing to exercise professions etc. in the future.

As regards (a) the Turkish delegation said that the acquired rights of persons already established in, or before October, 1914, would be respected. It was pointed out that this would exclude those who had started professional practice or business during the last nine years.

As regards (b), the Allied delegates urged that under the Turkish wording, it would be possible to legislate against foreigners engaging in any or every avocation. After some discussion, Riza Nour Bey said that all that the Turks wanted was to be able to reserve professions for Turkish nationals. General Pellé hinted at the possibility of dealing with (b) by a provision for subsequent separate treaties between Turkey and each of the high contracting parties. The discussion was not proceeded with further and the article was referred to the drafting committee.

Article 5. The Allied delegations took exception to the Turkish draft on various grounds, and it was eventually referred to the drafting committee. Two points on which most stress was laid from the Allied side, were firstly that there was no assurance even of national treatment for foreign companies, and secondly, that the provision in paragraph 2 regarding établissement might be interpreted in such a way as to compel certain foreign companies to adopt Turkish nationality.

Article 6. The Turkish draft of paragraph 1 was adopted. I raised the point on paragraph 2 whether Allied subjects would be assured of equal treatment with Turkish subjects. The Turkish delegation agreed that this was their interpretation of the clause.

Article 8. The Turkish delegation claimed that their wording was more categorical, although there was no difference of sense. The question was referred to the drafting committee.

Article 9. This was also referred to the drafting committee to be considered in connection with the general question of reciprocity.

Article 18. The Turks explained that the object of their counter proposals was to facilitate the execution of decisions especially as regards legal costs. They said that their text was based on that of the Hague civil procedure convention, certain other articles of which might also with advantage be incorporated in the convention. The article was referred to the drafting committee without further discussion.

Article 19. The Turks explained that in deleting the words 'à défaut de stipulations contraires' they had no intention of preventing provision from being made in contracts for arbitration. This was noted, and the article was referred to the drafting committee.

Articles 20 & 21. These articles owing to their technical character were referred to the drafting committee without any detailed discussion. General Pellé raised a point about the solemnisation of marriage by consular officers. The Turks said that they had no intention of interfering with this, but that divorce was a matter involving judicial proceedings. Under Article 21, I made it clear that the British delegation could not accept the proposal that

Turkish courts should exercise jurisdiction over British subjects in respect of offences committed outside Turkey.

Article 22. Ismet Pasha objected strongly to any reference in the convention to the declaration regarding the administration of justice, which should be regarded as a spontaneous act of the Turkish government. It was pointed out to him that not only did the Turks wish to omit any mention of the latter declaration in the present convention, but they also wished to omit any mention of it from the final act. The Allied delegates intimated that they must reserve this point for discussion in due course.

Article 23 was referred to the drafting committee after a short technical explanation had been given by the Turks of their proposal to omit the words 'et la contrainte par corps'.

Article 24 gave rise to some discussion before it was referred to the drafting committee. Ismet Pasha claimed that the question of schools etc. was one of internal concern and said that the Turkish delegation was going to the utmost limit of concession by offering a declaration which was on the same lines as the letter annexed to the Franklin-Bouillon agreement[4] and which, he claimed, covered the same ground as the Allied article. My colleagues and I pointed out several lacunae in the Turkish declaration even after the word 'religieuses' had been inserted after 'oeuvres', an omission which the Turks said was merely accidental. We objected to the limitation of date, to the offensive reference in the Turkish declaration to propaganda, and to the omission of the phrase in the Allied draft article safeguarding the special character and 'libre fonctionnement' of foreign institutions. I finally said that we should accept the principle of a declaration subject to its being satisfactorily worded. It was also suggested that the declaration ought to figure in the final act.

Article 25. Ismet Pasha strongly contested any reference whatsoever to the adhesion by non-signatory Powers. I said that we should propose an alternative draft in the drafting committee. Ismet Pasha at first demurred to the article being referred to the drafting committee at all, but eventually agreed to this course after formally reserving the Turkish point of view.

I pointed out that the new penultimate article proposed by the Turks presented a special difficulty for the British delegation apart from the general question of reciprocity as the British Empire, owing to its internal arrangements, could not be treated as a single whole for the purpose of a convention of this kind.

Article 26. The Allied delegates agreed in principle to a time limit, but suggested that five years was too short. I proposed to fix the period at ten years and General Pellé added that provision should be made for the continued operation of the convention, unless it were formally denounced at a stated period before the time limit expired. Ismet Pasha accepted General Pellé's suggestion, but the question of the duration of the convention was reserved pending discussion in the drafting committee. Riza Nour Bey said that in all arrangements which had been discussed at the Conference,

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

the Allies had taken five years as a standard period. My colleagues and I strongly demurred to this.

The discussion was entirely confined to the British, French, Italian and Turkish delegation. Neither the Americans, nor anyone else intervened. I observed that Riza Nour Bey, though he has spoken very little at any meeting up-to-date, appeared to be doing a great deal of prompting at this morning's meeting.

The financial committee will meet tomorrow morning.[5] The economic, financial and legal experts continue to work actively on the numerous questions which have been referred to them. Some progress is being made at these meetings of experts, but it is very slow owing to the meticulous and sometimes uncompromising attitude of the Turkish representatives.

[5] See No. 490, below.

No. 489

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 3, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 23 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4428/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 1, 1923*

Mr. Grew informed me today that the Turkish delegation had expressed an urgent wish to conclude a treaty of commerce and amity with the United States with a view to the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations.[1] He had now been authorised by the State Department to commence negotiations for the above purpose with the Turks.[2] He thought that these instructions would prove a useful lever for making the Turks amenable in such questions as the régime for foreigners in Turkey.

I pointed out that there was a possibility that the Turks might attempt to take advantage of what would amount to a parallel set of negotiations to try to play the Americans off against the Allies. There was also the practical disadvantage that parallel negotiations with the Americans would presumably take some of the time which the Turks would otherwise be able to devote to negotiations with the Allies. I added that the purpose of the meeting at Lausanne was the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey.

Mr. Grew replied that the first of these considerations had already occurred to him, but he thought that a close co-operation between the Americans and the Allied delegates would checkmate any manoeuvre of the kind by the Turks. He also pointed out that a treaty of commerce and amity would in reality be a short document not requiring much negotiation.

[1] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 956–7, 970, 987, 989 ff., 993–4 and 1040–1198.
[2] Ibid., p. 996.

Mr. Grew said that he meant to tell Ismet Pasha that he would be prepared to negotiate such a treaty on three conditions, i.e. (1) that he would not sign a treaty until the Turks had signed a treaty with the Allies (Mr. Grew added for my information that if our negotiations with the Turks broke down, the Americans would naturally resume their liberty of action), (2) that the Conventions relating to the judicial and commercial régime for foreigners would follow the lines of the similar conventions to be concluded between the Allies and the Turks, and that unless therefore Ismet satisfied the Allies as regards the latter, he would not be able to satisfy the United States government, (3) that the negotiations for this treaty must not be allowed to interfere in any way with the course of the negotiations between the Allied and the Turkish delegations.[3]

I am satisfied that Mr. Grew really wishes to be helpful.[4]

[3] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 997–9.

[4] In his despatch No. 117 of June 2, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'Mr. Grew informed me yesterday that the preliminary and unofficial conversations which he has had with the Turkish Delegation now permit of his taking up officially the negotiations for the conclusion of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Turkey. He had received full powers to enter into these negotiations and thought that the instrument which would be negotiated would be a short one. The details of the Commercial Convention would, he presumed, be settled later on at Constantinople.' See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1067 ff.

No. 490

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 25 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4476/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 2, 1923*

The second meeting of the Second Committee (Financial) was held today.[1] A report[2] was received from the Sub-Committee of experts, a copy of which is being sent by bag. It will be seen that the text of articles 17 and 19 (financial paragraphs) and articles 45 to 49 inclusive has been agreed with two reserves. (1) The Italians are withholding their consent to date back the Debt Contribution of the Dodecanese to 1912 until Castellorizo is settled. (2) The Turks reserve article 46 bis (completion of guarantees for the Turkish part of the Debt) because they consider that it prejudges the question of the exchange options contained in the loan contracts.

The Greeks had objected that it is inequitable to treat the Customs of Salonica etc. as exclusively Greek revenues, since transit goods to Serbia etc. now pay no Customs to the Greek Treasury; article 49 had been redrafted to meet this point and was accepted as altered.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 186–93.

[2] This report (E 4477/1/44) dated May 1, is not here printed. See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 194–7.

The report of the experts was accepted, subject to some unimportant observations, and the two above-mentioned reservations.

The committee then discussed the remaining articles of the section on the Ottoman Public Debt. (Articles 53 to 56 and annexes I and II). The following points of principle arise here:

(1) The Turks claim that the arrears of assigned revenues confiscated by the Nationalist government should be repaid on the same terms as the arrears of assigned revenues in detached States—i.e. in 20 years without interest. The Allies refuse to admit that the circumstances are at all the same, since Turkey is formally responsible for the whole debt until liberated from a part by the treaty, while the responsibility of the detached States does not exist till the treaty establishes it.

(2) The Allies demand that the Decree of Mouharrem[3] and the Loan Contracts should be confirmed either in the treaty or in a declaration such as that drafted on February 4th,[4] and accepted by Ismet Pasha's letter of that date.[5] Ismet Pasha asserted that this question is connected with the question of exchange options and was very evasive in his reply on the matter.

(3) As regards the question of exchange options which is raised by the Turks in connection with the explanatory note to the table, General Pellé made a formal declaration that the French Government could never agree to deprive the bondholders of their existing rights by a provision in the Treaty of Peace. I supported this view on behalf of the British delegation and Signor Montagna did the same on behalf of the Italian delegation.

These points were referred to the experts together with the rest of the section on the debt. General Pellé proposed to await the report of the experts before holding a further meeting, but Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Venizelos pressed for an early meeting to discuss reparations without waiting for the experts to report on the debt section.

[3] Of December 8/20, 1881; this decree set up the Council of the Ottoman Debt. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 73, pp. 115–40.

[4] See *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iv, p. 19.

[5] See Cmd. 1814, p. 839.

No. 491

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received May 3, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 27 Telegraphic [*E 4446/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *May 2, 1923, 11.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 7.[1]

I have informed my French colleague of my instructions. He states that when he saw M. Poincaré in Paris last Sunday, latter said that he felt bound, if only for parliamentary reasons, to raise again question of reparations from

[1] No. 482, n. 6.

Turkey and that French Ambassador in London had been instructed to make a démarche in this sense.

My French colleague agrees with me in recognising grave effect which revival of demand for reparations would have on course of negotiations. As this was a confidential expression of opinion on his part, I beg that no use be made of it. Mr. Grew informed me yesterday that Ismet had stated to him two or three days ago that if demand for reparations from Turkey were raised again, he would have no alternative but to leave Lausanne.[2]

I have informed General Pellé of this but meanwhile you will appreciate embarrassing situation in which General Pellé and I find ourselves with absolute contrary instructions.

Financial committee today concluded consideration of articles dealing with debt,[3] and reparations chapter would normally be next subject to be dealt with.

Ismet, who evidently realises that there is a conflict of opinion amongst allies on this matter, will not be slow to profit by this knowledge. At end of this morning's sitting,[3] he demanded that reparations section of treaty should be considered as soon as possible presumably in order to get acceptance of Turkish counter draft of article 57. Monsieur Veniselos likewise demanded discussion of reparations section in order, as I understand, to guard against danger of Greco-Turkish reparations being shelved and of an arrangement unfavourable to Greece being arrived at or pressed on him at the last minute by allies. I have arranged with my French colleague that [that] section, during discussion of which we shall have to declare our policy about reparations, should not be taken in committee before Monday[4] pending which we hope our two governments will be able to agree on a common line of policy.

General Pellé is telegraphing to his government in the same sense.

Even if French government decide, as I hope, to adopt Your Lordship's policy as to waiving of reparations claim, it will anyhow be necessary to discuss Turkish counter draft of article 57.

[2] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 989.
[3] See No. 490.
[4] i.e. May 7.

No. 492

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 3, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 28 Telegraphic [E 4475/1/44]

Immediate and Confidential LAUSANNE, *May 3, 1923, 12 noon*

My telegram No. 27.[1]

General Pellé has now shown me various telegrams from his government on reparation question including report of a visit of Monsieur Barrère to

[1] No. 491.

Italian Foreign Office where he was informed that it would be useless to revive a reparation claim against Turkey which would be inevitably rejected by the Turks. Italian Foreign Office suggested that French and Italian Ambassadors at London should propose that five million pounds in gold transferred from Berlin and Vienna should be allocated to the allies other than ourselves (? leaving) us to compensate British nationals.

General Pellé and I both infer from these telegrams that French and Italian governments recognise that question of Turkish reparation now at issue is a question between us and our allies and not one between allies and Turks.

If you can induce French and Italian governments to act at once on this view and instruct their delegates here not to revive reparation claim against Turkey exceedingly difficult situation which now exists will be cleared up and we can proceed with discussion of requisite clauses.

As regards question between ourselves and our allies, proposal to exclude us from [£] 5,000,000 will no doubt be refused and I have reason to believe in that event French government will propose that portion of [£] 5,000,000 in London which amounts to about [£] 2,000,000 should be allocated to British nationals[2] and balance of [£] 5,000,000 which is in Paris should be shared by other allies. The intention to make this proposal was communicated to us very confidentially and I am very anxious that French government should not have any suspicions that this information has been given to us.

After consulting experts here I think that this last proposal is one which might be accepted in the circumstances.

[2] A message from H.M. Treasury to Mr. Waley, transmitted in Foreign Office telegram No. 14 to Lausanne, ran: 'If you and Payne concurred in proposal for stereotyping British share at £2,000,000, we agree. If not, wire observations.'

No. 493

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 29 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4520/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 3, 1923*

The Third Committee this morning discussed[1] articles 116 and 117 and the fiscal clauses (articles 10 to 17) of the convention respecting the régime applicable to foreigners.

Article 116. The Turks maintained that this article was unnecessary because the first sentence was being dealt with in the article relating to the abolition of the capitulations, and the second sentence was dealt with by the proposed commercial convention. No difference in principle arose, and the article was referred to the jurists.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 285–90.

Article 117. This article was also referred to the jurists, the Turks arguing that it was also unnecessary, but this view was not accepted by the French and Italian delegations.

Article 10 of the convention respecting the régime applicable to foreigners was accepted.

Article 11. The Turks objected to the words 'civiles ou' at the beginning of the article, and this point was referred to the jurists for examination. No objection was raised by the Turks to the insertion of words limiting the application of the last part of the second paragraph to cases in which the central management and control is outside Turkey, but the Turkish delegation suggested that part of the paragraph was unnecessary and this point was referred to experts.

Article 12. The Turks objected to this article and were not at the moment prepared to accept the article with the modifications agreed upon in London.[2] The Turkish proposals were declined by the Allied representatives and the article was referred to experts.

Articles 13 and 14. These articles were accepted.

Article 15. The Turkish delegation maintained that the first paragraph was sufficiently dealt with in the declaration which they proposed to add to the convention, and it was agreed to deal with this paragraph in that declaration. The Turkish delegation accepted the principle of equality, but they declined to agree to any preferential treatment such as is provided for in the second paragraph.

Article 16. This article was accepted in the form proposed in the Turkish counter-project subject to a slight drafting alteration to be considered by the Drafting Committee.

Article 17. No objection was raised in principle, but the Turks did not accept the period of ten years. The article was referred to the jurists for consideration of a clause to cover the whole convention and not merely the fiscal clauses.

[2] See No. 456.

No. 494

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 11 Telegraphic [E 4358/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 3, 1923, 10.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 19 (of 30th April. Merkeb Islands).[1]

I agree to action proposed in last paragraph but please consider following point.

[1] This ran: 'Turkish delegation have explained that their proposed insertion of resultant phrase "Islands of Merkeb depending on Tenedos" in article 12 was intended to relate to Rabbit Islands, already mentioned in and demilitarised by article 4 of the Straits Convention.

When allies agreed to hand over Tenedos and Imbros to Turkey, no provision was made to protect inhabitants from Turkish military service. It was subsequently thought undesirable to raise matter officially with the Turks. As Turks are now raising a point on which concession will perhaps be made to them, opportunity might be taken to bargain with them regarding military service of inhabitants of these islands. It will of course be necessary when stipulating for exemption from military service of inhabitants of the islands to limit exemption to Greeks actually resident at the time of signature of treaty and their descendants, in order to avoid influx of Greeks from other districts for purposes of exemption.

I leave matter to your discretion.

. . . As group is nearer mouth of Straits than Tenedos and Imbros, both of which are Turkish under treaty, I propose, if your Lordship now approves, to agree to cession of Rabbit Islands to Turkey if my colleagues and M. Veniselos agree.'

No. 495

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 30 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4521/35/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 3, 1923*

General Pellé informs me that on his return from Paris, he spoke to Ismet Pasha about the Turkish concentrations on the Syrian frontier in the same terms as the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople had been instructed to speak.[1]

A Reuter telegram from Constantinople received here yesterday represents the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople as having stated that, unless the Turks withdrew their troops from the Syrian frontier, the French representative would leave the Lausanne conference.

General Pellé explains that, put like this, the French démarche would have the appearance of an ultimatum. What he said to Ismet was that it would be difficult for France to continue negotiating under the threat of the menace of Turkish concentrations on the Syrian frontier.

General Pellé's démarche produced a great effect on the Turkish delegation here.

[1] In his telegram No. 263 of May 1, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Acting French High Commissioner tells me he is addressing to Turkish representative today on instructions of President of the Council categorical request for immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces recently despatched towards Syrian frontier.'

No. 496

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 6, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 31 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4541/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 4, 1923*

The First Committee met this morning[1] to discuss the question of the declaration regarding the administration of justice in Turkey.

I held a meeting with my allied colleagues yesterday afternoon to decide upon our course of action. We adopted with slight modifications a redraft of the declaration prepared by the allied jurists in accordance with the London decisions.[2] Foreseeing that the question of the position regarding the Montagna formula[3] would inevitably come up in the Committee, I told my colleagues that I should prefer to take the initiative in regard to this rather than leave it to the Turks. I read to them a draft statement which I had prepared. This draft emphasised the fact that anything put forward by M. Montagna on the evening of February 4th could only have the character of a personal suggestion. M. Montagna begged me not to read my statement in this form, as he said he was in a very difficult personal position. He maintained that, before leaving your room on the evening of February 4th, he had touched up the declaration so as to give it the form now associated with his name. He said that he had taken this new draft to the Lausanne Palace with the authority of the allied delegates and that it had actually been accepted by Riza Nour Bey, only to be rejected immediately after by Ismet Pasha. I demurred strongly to M. Montagna's statement that he had propounded this formula with Your Lordship's authority. I said that I myself had been present throughout and that I had no knowledge of a new draft having been produced before Messieurs Montagna and Bompard went to visit the Turks.[4] I agreed, however, in response to M. Montagna's pathetic appeal to re-word my statement in a form which would not give him away.

At the outset of this morning's proceedings in the Committee, I read a revised statement which I had drawn up with great care. I said I wished to dissipate a misunderstanding which appeared still to exist. I insisted that the Montagna formula had never been an official draft. It had been produced at the last moment in the hope of rendering possible the immediate signature of a peace treaty on February 4th. This hope not having been fulfilled, both sides remained as they were at the end of the meeting in your

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 39–51. [2] See No. 455. [3] See No. 397, n. 3.

[4] Cf. Nos. 370, 371, 373, 397, and 417. In his telegram No. 13 of May 6, referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon stated: 'You are quite right in saying that Montagna formula was neither produced nor even hinted at in my room on February 4th. Signor Montagna had no authority either to frame or to present it. Nor was I ever made aware of its contents until, after repeated requests, I obtained it from Rome a fortnight later. All that he told me at station was that his effort at conciliation had failed.'

room on February 4th. I expressed all the more surprise at seeing it stated in the Turkish note of April 8th[5] that the allies had accepted the formula as I myself on my return to Constantinople had caused the true situation to be explained to Ismet Pasha.[6] I went on to say that the allies, in fulfilment of their promise to endeavour to harmonise their own draft of February 3rd[7] as much as possible with the Turkish proposal, had prepared a new draft which would be circulated at the end of the meeting, and which I proposed should be referred to the Drafting Committee. I drew attention to the one important difference between this draft and that proposed by the Turks, viz. our insistence on the special provisions regarding arrests etc. I begged the Turkish delegation to consider our proposal in a conciliatory spirit as we had done our utmost to reconcile their concern for Turkey's sovereign rights with our own concern for the interests of our subjects.

A long discussion followed in an atmosphere of considerable tension. Ismet Pasha began by insisting that the Montagna formula had been put forward in the name of the allies and had been accepted by the Turks as an allied proposal. He admitted in the course of debate that this acceptance had not been given until the day after Your Lordship had left Lausanne. He quoted a statement attributed to the Secretary-General of the Conference to the effect that M. Bompard had agreed to the formula. He also quoted a letter written by Colonel Mougin at Angora into which he read its acceptance by the French government. He also endeavoured to maintain that by coming to the Conference after the Turkish government had defined its position in its note of April 8th, the allies had accepted the Turkish contention as one of the bases of the conference.

My colleagues and I reiterated in turn the allied point of view. M. Montagna explained his personal part in the matter with as much plausibility as was possible under the circumstances. General Pellé argued with great force that any statement by M. Bompard could only have been an expression of his personal opinion at the time when it was made, and that Colonel Mougin's letter which in any case had not been written by an accredited representative of the French government, went no further than what M. Bompard had said. I reaffirmed in the course of the debate what I had said about my own communication to Ismet Pasha after my return to Constantinople and observed that the only reply I had received was that it had placed him in a very difficult position.[8]

All our efforts failed to induce Ismet Pasha to abandon definitely his contention that the Montagna formula was in the nature of an allied proposal. We brought him down, however, to the point of claiming little more than that the French and Italians had committed themselves to it. He gradually shifted his ground to the contention that the formula as reproduced in the Turkish counter proposals represented the maximum sacrifice which Turkey could make. He declined my proposal to refer the matter to the Drafting Committee unless it were laid down that all the Drafting Committee had to

[5] See No. 466. [6] See No. 405. [7] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 834–6.
[8] See Nos. 405 and 421.

do was to adopt the Turkish draft. When I rejected this preposterous suggestion he said that the Turkish delegation could go no further. He appealed to the opinion of the world, which he said would see that Turkey had made the utmost concessions in order to secure peace, and that it was the allies who stood in the way. We wished, he said, to impose on Turkey a system such as existed in no independent country. He accused us of treating Turkey as an inferior in spite of all our professions to the contrary and of seeking to substitute a new form of capitulations for the old. I exclaimed at this and retorted that, if the Turks refused even to look at an allied proposal, the verdict of the world would be very different from what he anticipated. The allies had not refused to consider a single Turkish proposal, and the Turkish delegation would be unable to defend their refusal to consider one of ours.

It was pointed out to Ismet Pasha that the only question which it was proposed to refer to the Drafting Committee was the question of the range of powers to be conferred by Turkey in the exercise of her sovereign rights on legal counsellors whom she was prepared to engage, who would be Turkish officials, and on whom certain powers would be conferred in any case. None of the arguments used availed to move Ismet Pasha from his position. In the end I warned him that if he persisted in his refusal even to discuss our draft he would compel us eventually to put it forward in its present form as part of the Treaty and its annexes. I closed the discussion by stating that the allied proposal would be circulated after the meeting, and that the matter would be again taken up at a later stage. Ismet Pasha said that the Turkish delegation must maintain their attitude.

My colleagues and I displayed absolute unity throughout this discussion. Towards the end of the debate Mr. Grew intervened with a useful though somewhat guarded statement[9] welcoming the expression of readiness on the part of the Turks to make a declaration and saying that he would be happy to see this declaration drawn up in a form acceptable to the United States in connection with any revision of existing treaties which might be agreed upon with Turkey. His Government would, he said, attach great importance to the functions of the legal counsellors being clearly defined in the declaration, e.g. as regards domiciliary visits, searches, arrests and measures of detention. Ismet Pasha at once said that the United States delegation had also agreed to the Montagna formula and referred to a visit paid to him on the evening of February 4th by Mr. Child, Admiral Bristol and Mr. Grew himself.[10] This elicited from Mr. Grew a statement that anything which he and his colleagues had done on that occasion was intended to promote the conclusion of peace and that they had not entered into any commitments either on behalf of the United States or of the allies.

The impression which I derived from these proceedings is that Ismet Pasha is very worried over the whole business, but that he is so bound down by his instructions from Angora that he dare not waver. He remarked significantly to Mr. Ryan after the close of the meeting that it was only

[9] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1001–2.

[10] See ibid., p. 969.

the British who blocked the way and that the others—meaning the French and Italians—were in line. He is coming to see me this afternoon. I will report separately what he says. I am sending home by King's Messenger this evening copies[11] of the new allied draft declaration,[12] my opening statement at this morning's discussion, and Mr. Grew's statement regarding the attitude of the United States Government.

[11] In Lausanne despatch No. 18 of May 4, not printed.
[12] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 50–1.

No. 497

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 6, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 32 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4542/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 4, 1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

After adjourning the discussion of the judicial declaration in the first committee this morning, I went on to the amnesty declaration.

On the first article, General Pellé asked the Turks whether the expression 'inhabitants of Turkey' included persons who were no longer resident there. He suggested that the declaration would be more explicit if it were made to apply to inhabitants and former inhabitants. It was agreed that this point should be discussed in the drafting committee.

M. Venizelos said he wished to reserve the right to make a statement at the end of the discussion on a point which he had raised during the first stage of the conference as to the unwillingness of the Greek government to promise a general amnesty to military offenders. Munir Bey observed that the Turkish acceptance of the declaration was dependent on its being accepted by the other parties.

M. Venizelos said that the point at issue was one on which he was in full agreement with the Turks. The question was one between Greece and the allies. Having said so much, he might as well make his statement at once. He had, he said, previously pointed out to the allies that they could not, having regard to their position vis-à-vis of Greece in the conference, impose on the Greeks a measure of the kind contemplated in the draft declaration. Greece was prepared for a complete amnesty for political offences and had indeed already accorded it. She could not accord an amnesty for military offences which would bar proceedings against those responsible for the catastrophe in Asia-Minor. The demand that she should do so was inadmissible. It might be necessary for the Greek Government to accept the declaration as drafted, and he might even be driven to advise them to do so under pressure. If, however, things came to that pass, he would not himself

[1] No. 496.

put his signature either to the declaration or to the treaty to which it was to be annexed.

I averted further discussion by telling M. Venizelos that I should prefer to discuss the matter with him outside the conference before it went further.

We agreed to the insertion of the words 'or military' in paragraph 2.

I explained the various objections on our side to the article which the Turks wish to insert after article 3. Following closely the recommendations in the report of the general committee of the inter-allied meeting held in London in March,[2] I suggested that the article should be referred to the drafting committee with directions to revise it in such a way as to meet these objections. Munir Bey observed that the principle of the Turkish additional article had been agreed to during the first phase of the conference. It was agreed to refer the question to the drafting committee.

The Turks objected to the allied proposal to maintain the words 'the President of' in article 5. I explained the reasons of practical convenience in favour of this, and it was agreed that the matter should be discussed in the drafting committee.

I suggested that it would be preferable to deal with the exceptions covered by the Turkish draft protocol annexed to the declaration by an exchange of notes. It was agreed that this matter should also be referred to the drafting committee, where I will see that the subsidiary points raised at the inter-allied meeting in London are adequately discussed.

[2] See No. 455.

No. 498

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 6, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 33 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 4543/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *May 4, 1923*

My telegram No. 31.[1]

Ismet Pasha came to see me this afternoon. I knew at once that he had come to discuss the question of the declaration regarding judicial safeguards for foreigners in Turkey. He appeared to be greatly worried. Although he was difficult to follow at times I think I have accurately reproduced his statements and line of argument.

He began by saying that the proceedings at this morning's sitting of the first committee had produced a painful impression on him. He had not expected that the British delegation would have played such a prominent part in disputing the Turkish contention that the question of judicial safeguards for foreigners had been settled by the acceptance of the Montagna formula, and by insisting on the reference of the Allied draft declaration to the legal experts. He contended that this proceeding on the part of the British delegation would completely disarm him vis-à-vis public opinion in his own country.

[1] No. 496.

He stated that at the first conference[2] he had settled all the questions in which Great Britain was mainly interested. When he had defended his actions in the Grand National Assembly at Angora after his return from Lausanne, he had always taken the line that the questions in dispute between Turkey and Great Britain had been settled, and that this settlement constituted the basis on which Turkey might hope to conclude peace with the Allies generally. This basis was disturbed by the insistence of the British delegation in bringing up again a question on which Turkish opinion was very sensitive, and which he had declared to his compatriots had been settled by the acceptance of the Montagna formula by the Allies.

He went on to say that he was in a very difficult position. He wished to explain one point which he could not explain in committee this morning, namely, that Turkey had a convention with Russia[3] and any advantages which the Allies might secure under the declaration providing judicial safeguards for foreigners would have to be extended to the Russians, Greeks and others. This meant that the Turkish judiciary would be hampered in its dealings with Russian Communists for instance. I at once remarked that I was convinced that the legal experts would be able to get over this difficulty, and that I could not admit that, because the Turks had a convention with the Russians, our nationals should not enjoy such judicial safeguards as we might be able to procure for them.

I then went over much of the ground covered by the discussions this morning, and I said that I had, with your authorisation, taken the earliest opportunity after my return to Constantinople to explain that my government could not be bound by anything which had happened after you had left Lausanne with the British delegation on February 4th.[4] I had repeated this statement when Adnan Bey had handed me Ismet Pasha's Note of April 8th.[5] We had, therefore, acted with the greatest frankness. Ismet Pasha said that he had acted with equal frankness. As he continued to suggest that the British delegation had, so to speak, gone back on him, I reminded him that the two questions on which the first Conference had broken down were the questions of judicial safeguards for foreigners in Turkey and the reservation of the economic clauses, both questions interesting our Allies as much as, if not more than, they did ourselves. He could not have expected these questions to be shelved. I said that I could not understand his refusal to submit to the legal experts the Allied draft declaration regarding judicial safeguards which had been drawn up on the basis of the Turkish draft. Since the Conference had been resumed, the Allies had faithfully gone through the Turkish counter-draft which had raised such questions as the withdrawal of paper money, the island of Castellorizo, etc. etc. Now the Turks refused to consider an Allied counter-draft about one question. Public opinion would not understand this, and the Turkish delegation would cut a deplorable figure. He would notice this when he came to read the press

[2] See Chap. II.
[3] Of March 16, 1921. For the text see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 990–6.
[4] See No. 405. [5] See No. 465.

tomorrow. Ismet Pasha said that if I had accepted the Montagna formula[6] this morning the work of my committee would have been brought to a successful conclusion. As it was, however, we had reached a deadlock. I replied that we must find a way out of this deadlock, and we could not do better than begin by seeking the assistance of the legal experts. He had not even seen the Allied draft. He was free to give any instructions he liked to Munir Bey, but it was essential that the legal experts should meet. I added that it was inconceivable that our negotiations should break down over this business and that we must get peace this time.

As the conversation proceeded, he became more and more dejected. I urged him to reflect on what I had said, and when he got up to go he said that he would see what could be done. I would not like to say more than this conversation shook him considerably because, although it was obvious that he came to make a strong bid for our support, or, to put it another way, to get me to agree to abide by the Montagna formula, he discovered that I was solid with the Allies in insisting upon an examination of the Allied draft.

[6] See No. 397, n. 3.

No. 499

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 5, 4 p.m.)
No. 158 Telegraphic [E 4544/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 5, 1923, 12 noon*

Your telegram No. 68.[1]

I communicated message by private letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs adding that alleged intervention of destroyer[2] had not been explained.

Last night I received a private letter in reply from head of political bureau stating that there is no fear of incidents as suggested. Letter justifies formation of corps of volunteers to strengthen army in Thrace so long as there is a danger of renewal of hostilities but adds that there was never question of immediate despatch to Western Thrace. Volunteers are concentrated in Macedonia under strict military discipline.

Letter adds that destroyer, in spite of orders not to approach the coast of

[1] Of May 1. This referred to reports, transmitted to the Foreign Office in Athens telegrams No. 148 of April 20 and No. 154 of April 29 (not printed), that bands composed mainly of Circassians were being trained in Mitylene to instigate a rising against Mustafa Kemal in Asia Minor, and continued: 'Greek explanation appears far from satisfactory. Result of formation of such bands can only be increased danger of incidents which at present stage of negotiations at Lausanne would be deplorable. You should explain this to Ministry for Foreign Affairs and add that if unfortunate developments occur, His Majesty's Government may not be able to afford to Greek case that help which they are giving at present.'

[2] In his telegram No. 148, Mr. Bentinck had reported that 600 of the men being trained on Mitylene were to leave for Asia Minor in the Greek destroyer *Aspis*.

Asia Minor, proceeded thither in order to rescue Greek refugees concentrated on the coast opposite Samos and justification is therefore claimed on the ground of humanity.

Letter admits possibility of some Circassians whose families remained in Asia Minor on coast but states that this was not encouraged by government who opposed it whenever they heard about it.

Copies of correspondence by bag.[3]

Reports now reach me of formation of volunteer bands at Volos for operations in Thrace, but I trust that timely warning may prevent incidents.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 64.

[3] In Athens despatch No. 352 of May 5, not printed.

No. 500

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received May 7, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 35 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4553/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 5, 1923*

We arranged that there should be no meeting of any of the three main committees today, as it was considered advisable to allow the experts time to catch up the work of the main committees.

With the temporary adjournment of the discussion on the judicial declaration yesterday, my committee[1] has reviewed all the work allotted to it, and since the work of neither of the two other committees is so advanced, I propose to obtain the consent of my Allied colleagues to treat in my committee articles 152/160 which have not yet been allocated.

As regards the clauses dealt with by my committee, agreement has not yet been reached on the following points: (1) The paragraph added by the Turks to Article 1 regarding the evacuation by the Allies of occupied territory, on which discussion has been postponed, (2) the thalweg of the Maritza, (3) the final drafting of Article 3 (i) and (ii), (4) Article 12—the islands of Merkeb, (5) Article 15—Castellorizo, (6) addition of a paragraph to Article 16 regarding Turkish rights at Antioch and Alexandretta, (7) Article 19—additional paragraph regarding nationality of Turks in Cyprus, (8) Article 20—drafting alterations desired by Turks, (9) Article 25—French and Italian reserve on paragraph agreed upon by drafting committee, (10) Article 27—French and Italian reserve on paragraph added by Turks, (11) Article 114—change desired by graves commission in paragraph 6 of annex, (12) additional article to Thrace convention, (13) Chapters 1 and 3 of the convention for foreigners, referred to the drafting committee, (14) various points in the amnesty clauses referred yesterday to drafting committee.

On the above-mentioned outstanding points good progress has already been made by the drafting committee, who have reached agreement on

[1] i.e. the First Committee.

nearly all points in Chapter 1 of the convention for foreigners. A committee of experts reached provisional agreement today on the clause to be added to the Thrace convention. The Turkish delegation are considering our draft for the additional paragraph in Article 19, (Cyprus nationality), and we are considering their counterdraft to our fresh draft of paragraph 6 in annex to Article 144.

While the Italians are having considerable difficulties in private discussion with Turks over Articles 20 and 27, it seems likely that agreement will eventually be reached without much difficulty on all points in the work of the first committee enumerated above, except probably Castellorizo and the judicial declaration.

The work of the second committee is less advanced than that of the other two, partly owing to the difficult technical questions which have arisen on the debt, but mainly because of the inter-Allied disagreement regarding reparations.

As regards the financial clauses, only those relating to the distribution of the Ottoman public debt have been discussed up to the present.

The main controversial points are (taking the articles as numbered in the Turkish counter-proposals):

(1) Article 47. Assignment of additional guarantees by Turkey for her share of debt, where necessary.
(2) Article 50. Treatment of railway loan.
(3) Articles 53–54. Payment by Turkey of arrears of assigned revenues.
(4) Article 56. Confirmation of decree of Mouharrem.
(5) Annex I—Addition of advances of table of debt.
(6) Explanatory note to Annex I. Exchange options in regard to the Ottoman debt.

None of these main controversies have [*sic*] yet been solved, but nevertheless a great deal of useful and difficult work has been accomplished by making the technical and drafting alterations required in consequence of the decision to distribute the capital of the debt.

Agreement has moreover been reached on Articles 17 and 19 (Liberation of Turkey from liability for loans secured on the Egyptian tribute), and Articles 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and 55 (with a temporary Italian reserve about the date from which the debt contribution of the Dodecanese should run). These articles deal with the distribution of the debt.

The experts are now discussing Article 50 (railway loans) and the table of the debt. The difficulty is here with the Greeks rather than with the Turks and no agreed solution is yet in sight.

The question of exchange options (which is the most important question at issue), and that of the confirmation of the decree of Mouharrem have not yet been discussed by the experts, but General Pellé has formally declared (with the support of Signor Montagna and myself) that there can be no question of depriving the bondholders, by a clause in the treaty, of their right to obtain payment of the coupons in sterling, and that any such

renunciation could only be by means of a voluntary arrangement between the bondholders and the Turkish government. On this point and on the rejection of the proposal that the Succession States should contribute to the cost of withdrawing Turkish paper money, we have made it quite clear at meetings of the second committee that no concessions will be made.

The third committee has reviewed all the economic clauses in the treaty except articles 94/100 (concessions), the discussion on which must be reserved until we learn the fate of the negotiations in Turkey between the concessionaires and the Turkish government.[2] The same committee has also reviewed the second chapter of the convention for foreigners and has only now to take the commercial convention in which there are not understood to be any really difficult points.

The economic experts have now made a report dealing with the section relating to property (Articles 72–81).

Reserves have been made by the Turkish delegation and by the Roumanian, Greek and Serbian delegations with regard to Article 73 (relating to the search for property in the respective territories of those states, which has been seized and taken away by enemy armies).

Article 75 is subject to a reserve by the Allied delegations that some provision should be made in the assessment of taxes for persons who have suffered losses from the Smyrna fire. It seems probable that the Turks will agree to this.

Article 77. A general reserve has been made by the Turkish delegation with regard to the working and constitution of the mixed arbitral tribunal. This question has been referred to the legal experts, but it cannot be determined until the final form of the whole of the economic clauses is known approximately.

Article 78. The Turks only accept this article, which deals with the continuation of claims made before the war against the Imperial Ottoman government, on condition that its application is restricted to Great Britain, France and Italy.

Subject to these reserves the articles (72–81) have been agreed by the experts.

In addition to the articles relating to property referred to above, the economic experts have also considered the articles relating to contracts (Articles 82–93, together with the annex relating to insurance) and they will be making a report on this section very shortly.

Articles 82, 84, 85, 86, 88 and 89. Agreement has been reached on these articles.

Articles 83, and the Insurance Annex. Agreement has been reached subject to one reserve made by the Turkish delegation on paragraph 3 of the insurance annex, which the British delegation will be unable to accept.

Article 87. The Turks have suggested an alternative draft for this article, dealing with contracts entered into between Allied nationals and the Imperial Ottoman government or the occupying authorities since the

[2] See Nos. 471 and 483.

30th October, 1918. The Turkish proposal is not satisfactory, and the matter will have to be considered in its general aspect, and not under the economic section alone.

Article 90 has been accepted in the third committee.

Articles 91 and 92. It was agreed by the economic experts to delete these articles.

Article 93. A small alteration has been suggested by the Turks, to which there is probably no objection in principle, subject to final examination by the jurists.

To sum up, the whole of the Turkish counter-proposals should have been reviewed by the three main committees by the end of next week or the middle of the week following, and, in a fortnight, the experts—finance, economic and jurist—should have reached agreement, where agreement is possible among the experts, on all matters referred to them. Apart from the question of concessions, the Conference will then probably find itself faced with what I believe to be the four most difficult questions:

(1) The Judicial Declaration,

(2) Castellorizo,

(3) Currency in which bondholders are to be paid, and

(4) The liquidation of all Allied acts since the Armistice in Turkey, and confirmation of acts of the Constantinople government from 1918 to 1922.

I do not regard the Turco-Greek reparation question as presenting the same difficulties of solution as the above.

No. 501

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 7, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 36 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4554/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 5, 1923*

Signor Montagna called on me this morning.

He said that the proceedings in the first committee yesterday[1] had shaken his position vis-à-vis the Turks, with whom he was now discredited. Immediately after the sitting, they had openly reproached him with not honouring his bond. He had felt for some little time past that the Turks took little account of him. He had been to see Ismet three or four times (presumably about Castellorizo), and had always found him intractable. Ismet had never once been to see him.

The result of this was that his power to make the Turks drop their demand for Castellorizo was weakened. Moreover the attitude of the Turks towards him prevented him from playing the same useful part as he had played during the first conference. In these circumstances, he thought that the only thing which would strengthen his position would be if we would help him to put

[1] See No. 496.

through a deal about Castellorizo. If he could get this question out of the way, he would be able to pull his proper weight in the boat.

I gathered that he had already offered to date back their contribution to the arrears of annuities for the Ottoman debt which would have to be taken over by them in respect of the Dodecanese to 1912 (as the Turks ask) instead of to 1914, if they would drop their claim to Castellorizo. But this bargain had not appealed to them. He wanted to throw in the thalweg of the Maritza and the Merk[e]b Islands.

I did not give Signor Montagna any encouragement. I told him that the moment was anyhow not ripe for the intervention of the plenipotentiaries. It would be much better to allow the committees of experts to agree on as many articles as possible. The time for our intervention would come later on; possibly the week after next. We should then find that we were faced with a certain number of unsettled questions and we should have to decide on our course of action.[2]

Signor Montagna, who appeared somewhat disappointed by my remarks, begged me nevertheless to explain his position to you, as he said that he thought you had appreciated the work he had done during the first conference.[3]

[2] In his telegram No. 17 of May 10, Lord Curzon replied: 'Your language approved. Since the concession of the Maritza thalweg against Castellorizo would be entirely at the expense of Greece, it will no doubt have occurred to you that Monsieur Venizelos's attitude towards any concession to the Turks on the former point may be largely affected by the compensating concessions which the Italians may be willing to offer to Greece.'

[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), No. 21.

No. 502

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received May 6, 11.10 p.m.)

No. 273 Telegraphic [E 4593/199/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 6, 1923, 6.30 p.m.*

Following is appreciation of general situation.

Disorganisation and administrative chaos in Turkey is everywhere increasing. Pay of officials and even troops is months in arrears. Latter are, I believe, on unpaid requisitions. Prolonged mobilization has caused another seed-time to be lost. Both army and peasants are therefore dissatisfied. Great incentive to united resistance and endurance disappeared when Greeks were driven out of Smyrna and Adrianople was recovered. Unless some fresh stimulus can be found Turkey will consequently tend to become more and more disunited and consequently weaker.

Intrigue and espionnage are already growing to proportions probably equal to those of Abdul Hamid[1] régime while recent treason law has

[1] Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who ruled from 1876 to 1909.

produced feeling of insecurity throughout the country. Great bulk of more intellectual population in Constantinople at any rate is thoroughly anti-Angora and lower classes are dissatisfied owing to increase in cost of living as result of ill-considered legislation.

Even Kemalist officials such as prefect of Constantinople and chief of police, though latter was subsequently reinstated, are dismissed at a moment's notice. Nevertheless precautions taken by Kemalists are such that their sweeping victory in elections, which are not likely to be completed before July, seem[s] inevitable.

External position of Turkey appears weaker than at any time since last eighteen months. She has pushed too far her bluff with French who incidentally, by their present firm attitude, have recovered much of their lost prestige.[2] She has gone too far in her negotiations with western Powers to be able to count longer on altruistic support of Russia and recent despatch of Kiazim Karabekir[3] to eastern front is a sign of the times.

She is faced with situation of insecurity on four fronts, Syria, Kurdestan, Caucasus, and Thrace.

I hear from sometimes well informed source that at meeting with his principle supporters about a fortnight ago Mustapha Kemal insisted upon necessity of peace at any price, and in reply to Raouf's objection that Grand National Assembly would not approve a peace which was not in accord with all points of national pact, declared if Assembly rejected peace he was prepared in last resort and in the interest of nation to make a coup d'état and establish military dictatorship.

Above report may well be true. Certainly for the moment the tide in Turkey's fortunes appears to have turned. External and internal insecurity may well convince the Kemalists that not only Turkey's but their own position is perilous and can only be remedied by peace or 'by desperate appliance'. Though possibility of war cannot be entirely excluded it has, I think, almost reached vanishing point provided that the Greeks do not make ill considered move and French firmness be not relaxed. War would be extremely unpopular and unless the Greeks intervene nation would be apathetic while Turkey would be risking all her gains of the past six months. Peace, therefore, seems essential both for Turkey and the Kemalists.

In order to get the most favourable possible terms Turks will doubtless continue to bluff until the last moment. But if it were possible to convince them that both France and ourselves were definitely prepared in the last resort for military action peace could now be rapidly attained.

Sent to Lausanne No. 86.

[2] See No. 495.

[3] Former commander of Kemalist forces on the Russian frontier (see Vol. XVII, No. 228).

No. 503

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 38 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4666/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 7, 1923*

In the third committee this morning[1] the report of the economic experts[2] on their examination of articles 72 to 81, a copy of which went by bag on the 5th instant (despatch No. 20),[3] was considered.

Article 73. All the reserves, except that of the Turks demanding the elimination of the words 'y compris les espéces, titres et valeurs', from the first paragraph of the article, were withdrawn. It was arranged that the Chairman of the committee should discuss this with the Turkish representative with a view to coming to an arrangement if possible.

Article 75. The reserve on this article was withdrawn on Ismet Pasha agreeing to write a letter,[4] the terms of which are to be agreed, undertaking that, in collecting taxes for the year 1922–23, due regard should be had to losses suffered in the Smyrna fire.

Article 77. The general reserve of the Turkish representatives with regard to the mixed arbitral tribunal remains.

Article 78. The Turkish reserve requiring that this article should apply only to Great Britain, France and Italy, was accepted, but it was agreed that the article was to be redrafted in such a manner as to apply only to those powers, while not drawing any distinction in principle between them and the smaller powers.

Subject to the above, the articles prepared by the economic experts for this section of the treaty were approved.

The committee then considered the first four articles of the commercial convention.

The title was agreed to.

Article 1. The suppression of article 1, as requested by the Turks, was agreed to.

Article 2. The Turkish draft was accepted, on a satisfactory explanation being given as to the reason for their [*sic*] modification.

Article 3. No difference in principle arose, but the article was referred to the experts to deal with certain small points.

Article 4. It was agreed to adopt the Turkish d[r]aft subject to the substitution of the word 'sauvegarder' for the word 'à' in the second line of the paragraph numbered (1°), and the suppression of the paragraph numbered (2°).

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 291–9.
[2] Dated May 3, *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 300–3.
[3] Not printed.
[4] Dated July 24, *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 511.

No. 504

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 39 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4667/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 7, 1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

At the end of this morning's meeting of the Third Committee, General Pellé explained that the next meeting of the finance committee would take place on May 9th. An earlier date was not possible owing to the delays caused in the meeting of financial experts on the articles referred to them about the debt, due to the desire of the Turks to draft the latter in such a way as to safeguard their attitude on the question of the currency in which the bondholders were to be paid. General Pellé therefore took the opportunity of begging the Presidents of the various delegations to instruct their experts not to discuss the question of such reservations in these articles, since the delegations of the three Inviting Powers had made it perfectly clear at the last meeting of the finance committee that there could be no question of modifying, by any stipulation in the present treaty, the relations between the Turkish government and her private creditors, as laid down in the contracts between them. I supported General Pellé on behalf of the British delegation and said that it was our view that no articles could be inserted in the treaty, either increasing or decreasing the rights of the bondholders. I also quoted a telling passage from Ismet Pasha's note of March 8th[2] to the Inviting Powers in which he asks for the suppression of the explanatory note to Annex 1 on two grounds, the second of which is that 'as has been observed already on many occasions, the relations of the Turkish government with its creditors having a private character, such dispositions cannot find any place in an international act'.

Ismet Pasha took the line that whatever the theoretical or juridical position, if the Turkish government had to pay their creditors in sterling, it would be found that they did not in fact possess the necessary resources. Inevitably therefore the conference must deal with this de facto situation and examine the question of the exchange rates. He could not wait until after the treaty to regulate the matter direct with the bondholders. The Turkish government wanted to see how they stood financially and for this purpose it was necessary to include a settlement of this point in the treaty among the other financial questions.

General Pellé said that he did not think there was really so much difference of view between the allied governments and the Turkish government. Ismet Pasha asked that the Turkish government might be allowed to pay according to its capacity. All that the allied governments contended was that they had no power to interfere between the bondholders and the Turkish govern-

[1] No. 503. [2] See No. 431.

ment. Turkey must settle direct with the bondholders and might begin to do so at once.

Ismet Pasha as usual reserved his point of view, while agreeing that the work of the financial experts should be expedited. It was, however, quite useful to have brought the matter up again as it shows Ismet Pasha that on this point the Allies are determined to stand fast. He will probably continue to discuss the question privately with General Pellé and myself.

No. 505

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 8, 6.30 p.m.)
No. 160 Telegraphic [E 4663/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 8, 1923, 2 p.m.*

My telegram No. 159.[1]

Member of my staff was informed that after meeting of Cabinet attended by General Pangalos, it has been decided in principle to send Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform M. Veniselos of urgent necessity of clearing situation one way or other without further delay. Reported decision of conference to postpone settlement of indemnity is causing dismay. It is stated that M. Veniselos will be instructed, subject to his discretion, to inform powers that if question is prolonged indefinitely, Greece will be forced to bring matters to a head by declaring at an end armistice already broken by Turkey[2] unless Turks accept Greek terms within fixed period. It is argued that morale of troops will never be better than it is now (see my telegrams Nos. 120[3] and 143).[4]

I may remind you that question of Serbian zone is now out of the way whilst seizure of deposits in Greek banks is aggravating situation.

Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne.

[1] Of May 7, not preserved in the Foreign Office archives.
[2] See, for example, Nos. 307, n. 2, 408, and 454.
[3] Of April 6, not printed.
[4] Of April 17, not printed.

No. 506

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 10, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 43 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4726/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 8, 1923*

After the conversation reported in my immediately preceding telegram,[1] Ismet asked me when I thought we should be likely to finish our labours. I

[1] No. 42 of May 8, not printed. This reported a conversation with Ismet Pasha about the frontiers of Irak.

replied that I hoped by the end of the month and said that I was sure he would agree that we were working very fast. He said he was very pleased with the progress which we were making.

He then referred to the question of the judicial safeguards for foreigners and said that that question was settled. I said of course that it was nothing of the sort and again urged him to instruct his legal expert to examine the Allied draft[2] with the Drafting Committee. After a struggle in which I proved to him that his obstructive attitude could only produce a very bad impression, he said that he would allow his legal expert to discuss the draft privately with the Allied legal experts. I have warned the latter accordingly, but Ismet is quite capable of going back on his word in this respect. I am not at all hopeful that we shall be able to induce him to accept anything beyond the Montagna formula.[3] He said he had read through the Allied draft and he described the proposals in it as 'très graves'.

It is clear to me that he has committed himself in the Grand National Assembly to the Montagna formula, and that he probably did not have the courage to tell that body of my statement to Adnan Bey[4] that His Majesty's Government were in no way bound by the Montagna formula.

[2] See No. 496, n. 12. [3] See No. 397, n. 3. [4] See No. 405.

No. 507

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 10, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 44 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4728/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 8, 1923*

The First Committee sat this morning.[1]

We first took the report[2] of the sub-committee of experts appointed on April 27th[3] to consider the proposed Turkish addition to the Thracian Frontiers Convention. Copies of this report, and the article as re-drafted by the sub-committee follow by King's Messenger.[4] The greatest difficulty was removed by M. Venizelos withdrawing his reservation in regard to paragraph (a) of the article as re-drafted. After some discussion on other points, it was referred back to the sub-committee for further consideration of paragraphs (b) and (g). As regards paragraph (c) I supported the French proposal to omit the words 'parmi les ressortissants des Puissances n'ayant pas participé à la guerre de 1914–18', although personally I attach no importance to the point. The matter was left unsettled for the time being. As regards paragraph (g), M. Venizelos was willing that the facilities for traffic between Turkey and

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 52–63. [2] Of May 7, ibid., p. 64.
[3] See No. 486, last paragraph.
[4] Lausanne despatch No. 24 of May 8, not printed.

Bulgaria should be granted permanently, but objected strongly to the maintenance of any form of control in Greek territory after the Turks should have constructed a line in Turkish territory connecting the existing railway through Eastern Thrace with Adrianople. This seems to me a reasonable view, and I will support it in the sub-committee. A suggested alternative is that the question of arrangements to be made if and when the new Turkish line is constructed should be left for settlement by the League of Nations when it arises. This may provide the final solution. In any case I do not anticipate that the article will give rise to any further serious difficulty.

It was next decided to remit to a special committee of experts Articles 24 and 15 of the convention concerning the Régime for Foreigners as the jurists considered the question of institution like schools, etc. outside their sphere.

I then took the miscellaneous clauses at the end of the draft treaty which had not previously been definitely assigned to any committee.[5] Some discussion arose on Articles 152 and 153. I stated that the Allies would in principle accept a declaration in lieu of these articles, but that the declaration proposed by the Turks[6] was wholly inadequate. Ismet Pasha assured us that the Turkish government had no intention of making trouble over the acts and decisions dealt with in the two articles, but he refused to admit that they could be validated en bloc. He argued that so far as any allied interest was concerned, the Turkish draft declaration gave full satisfaction. My French and Italian colleagues and I warmly contested this. We insisted that it was not sufficient to afford protection to allied judges and other authorities, and that protection must also be afforded in respect of decisions and other acts of such authorities. Ismet Pasha finally admitted that particular cases, by which he meant particular categories of cases, might be reviewed, and on this understanding it was agreed to refer the matter to the jurists acting in consultation, when necessary, with experts having special knowledge of the subject.

In the course of this discussion, Ismet Pasha referred to arms and ammunitions in allied custody and also to ships, the restoration of which had been claimed by Turkey. I ruled this out of order in the present connection. Ismet Pasha endeavoured to make out that we had admitted the Turkish claim to restitution of the objects in question. I protested against this and made it clear that the matter had been ruled out simply on the ground that it found no place in the present discussion. Ismet Pasha then explained that all he meant was to ensure that the Turkish claim to restitution should not be prejudiced by anything in the draft articles under discussion.

It was agreed, without discussion, to refer Articles 154 and 155 to the jurists.

Ismet Pasha justified the Turkish proposal to suppress Article 156 by saying that Turkey could not enter into an engagement regarding arms which might clash with arrangements into which she had entered into with third parties, more particularly neighbouring States. I suggested that if the

[5] Cf. No. 500.

[6] On March 8 (see Appendix III).

Turkish delegation studied the convention of September 1919[7] and listened to explanations which would be furnished to them they would see that there was nothing in the allied proposal to which they could take exception. I read a passage from the preamble to the convention proving that it had been drawn up in the general interest of all nations. Ismet Pasha said that he did not question the good intention with which the convention had been drawn up, but he maintained his view that it might interfere with Turkey's arrangements with other Powers, or with legitimate provision for national defence. General Pellé made a short and very clear statement of the allied view. After Monsieur Montagna had supported this, Ismet Pasha agreed, subject to what he had already said, to consider the convention, and it was arranged that the allied jurists should explain it to the Turkish delegation.

I opened the discussion of Article 157 by expressing some hesitation as regards the date[8] in paragraph 1 of the Turkish draft. I then asked what was meant by 'navires sous pavillon turc' and whether this included German ships under the Turkish flag. Ismet Pasha said he was only concerned with the interests of Turkish subjects, but if a non-Turkish ship had been regularly acquired by a Turkish subject it would be covered. I suggested that in that case he could accept the wording 'navires turcs'. Ismet Pasha said that, subject to legal opinion, he could see no difference. Having briefly mentioned the possibility of special cases which would have to be considered in connection with paragraph 2 of the Turkish draft, I proposed that the whole article should be referred to the jurists.

At this point, M. Venizelos intervened with an emphatic statement that he could not agree to paragraph 2 of the Turkish draft or to the date in paragraph 1. Greece, he said, had been engaged in hostilities with Turkey subsequently to that date and she could not admit that ships captured during such hostilities were not lawful prize. A short duel ensued between him and Ismet Pasha who claimed that Turkey was entitled, if only as victor, to the return of ships seized by the Greeks. I observed that the Turks themselves had captured two Greeks ships last year and had sent them into Turkish Prize Courts. M. Venizelos maintained strongly that if the Turks had any claim in respect of ships seized in regular warfare it came into the general Turkish claim for an indemnity, a claim which he did not admit but which fell to be dealt with separately. He repeated that he could not possibly accept the Turkish draft. I pointed out that the Allies had not accepted it either and that all that was proposed was that the matter should be referred to the drafting committee. It was unanimously agreed that this should be done. The Japanese delegate, who had contemplated making a statement, confined himself to acquiescence in this decision.

A long discussion ensued on Article 159. Ismet Pasha strongly contended that any question concerning the Powers named therein was outside the competence of the conference which had met for the purpose of peace

[7] i.e. the Arms Traffic Convention of September 19, 1919. See No. 455, n. 6.
[8] October 30, 1918.

negotiations between the Powers named in the correspondence which preceded it. He said that Turkey was perfectly ready to negotiate separately with other Powers but that they had nothing to do with the present conference. My French and Italian colleagues and myself reasoned with him in turn but he remained inflexible. We pointed out that these Powers had been our Allies in the war and that we could not ignore their interests. We further pointed out that the object of the conference was, as the Turks themselves had recognised, e.g. in the last paragraph of Ismet's note of March 8th,[9] to bring about peace all round and that it would be most unfortunate if the position as between Turkey and other Powers were left in an indeterminate state. Ismet Pasha stated that Turkey desired good relations with everybody, but that the economic and financial clauses might not suit all cases and that the proper course was clearly that Turkey should negotiate separately with those other Powers who had not participated in the conference and had not been parties to our negotiations. My colleagues and I pointed out that representatives of certain of the Powers concerned had followed the discussions in the first phase of the conference and that the articles were of such general bearing that they could not fail to apply equally to the case of these Powers. If the Powers concerned themselves thought otherwise, they would be free not to adhere but to negotiate separately. Ismet then shifted his ground and said that the stipulation was of an unilateral character. General Pellé pointed out that this might be true as regards the form, but not as regards the material effect of the clause. I eventually asked whether the Turks would consider making a declaration in lieu of the article. None of our arguments moved Ismet Pasha. He said that Turkey was prepared to negotiate with the Powers concerned, if necessary, here and now in Lausanne, but independently of the conference. At this point I adjourned the discussion, saying that it would be resumed at the beginning of the next meeting.

The Roumanian and Yugoslavian delegates intervened in this debate to support the allied view. The former threw out the suggestion that the Turks might accept the article if 'pourront être' were substituted for 'seront'.

[9] See No. 431.

No. 508

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 9, 8 p.m.)
No. 45 Telegraphic [E 4727/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 9, 1923, 4.25 p.m.*

My allied colleagues and I had a private conversation with M. Veniselos before meeting of second committee this morning[1] in order to remove a difficulty on a technical point about railway loans.

[1] See No. 509, below.

2. M. Veniselos stated that public opinion in Greece was so inflamed against Turkey owing to bad treatment to which Greek prisoners of war had been subjected, seizure of Greek safes in banks at Smyrna and at bank of Athens at Constantinople, as well as continued expulsion of Greeks from Asia Minor, that he had learnt that his government contemplated issuing an ultimatum to Turkey to put an instant stop to above-mentioned measures. He had telegraphed to Greek government begging it on no account to execute its intention, pointing out that if an ultimatum were eventually to be issued to Turkey, question of Greco-Turkish reparations would furnish a far better ground. He had requested Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to (? come to) Lausanne where he was envoy on Saturday.

3. I informed M. Veniselos that my colleagues and I had taken up with Ismet Pasha question of violation of Greek safes and that we were addressing Ismet a note[2] on the subject of bad treatment of prisoners of war.

4. M. Veniselos said that atmosphere created by recent actions of Turkish government would make it impossible for him for the moment to take up question of Greco-Turkish reparations direct with Ismet as had been his intention and as my allied colleagues and I had agreed he might try to do.

My allied colleagues and I have no wish to shelve question of Greco-Turkish reparations and delay in taking it up is due to French delegation being still without definite instructions to drop demand for reparations from Turkey.[3]

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

[2] Of May 10, not printed. A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 31 of May 10 (E 4813/4/44), not printed.

[3] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), Nos. 28—31.

No. 509

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 46 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4781/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 9, 1923*

The third meeting of the second (financial) committee was held today.[1] The report[2] of the financial experts on the remainder of the debt clauses was considered: a copy is being sent to you by the bag (despatch No. 25).[3]

I will refer to the articles by the numbers which they bear in the reports of the experts. A few verbal alterations in Articles 45 to 49 were adopted.

Of the new articles proposed, Articles 52, 52 bis and 53 were adopted. The last article allows the Turks to pay their arrears of debt annuities on the same terms as the Succession States, namely, in twenty years without interest. This is a great concession, but was received with only the mildest expression of gratitude.

[1] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 199–206.

[2] Of May 8, ibid., pp. 207–10.

[3] Of May 9 (E 4774/1/44), not printed.

On Article 50 (railway loans), there was agreement between the Allies and the Turks to retain the first question to be referred to The Hague by the draft treaty of January 31st, but to suppress the second. Monsieur Veniselos had agreed at a private meeting with myself and my French and Italian colleagues to accept this compromise, subject to a drafting alteration in the first question. He afterwards proposed to alter the first question fundamentally by making the question to be referred to arbitration relate only to the kilometric guarantee of the Jonction–Salonique Railway paid by Greece to the exclusion of the other similar kilometric guarantees paid by Turkey and Syria. In other words, he wanted to stand the chance of escaping 90% of his liabilities without running the risk of taking a 10% share of the liabilities of Turkey and Syria. This proposal seemed to us entirely illogical and to amount to a reversal of his agreement to accept the compromise proposed. Accordingly we propose that the first question should be maintained as it stands in the draft treaty of January 31st (with drafting alterations only) and that the second question should be suppressed.

Monsieur Veniselos defended his point of view at length and with his usual ingenuity, but we understand that he will give way on the point later if he obtains satisfaction on more important matters.

On Article 48 bis, which deals with the advances not repaid by the 1914 loan, Monsieur Veniselos formally reserved his agreement, as he had failed to obtain satisfaction on the railway loan. The sums involved are small, since most of the advances are payable in paper, and no doubt the Greek delegation will give way later.

As regards Articles 56 (confirmation of decree of Mouharrem[4] etc.) and the table of debt, our position is that we propose to eliminate all the figures in the table by omitting columns 5, 6, and 7 and consequently to suppress the explanatory note. We are also ready to omit the first paragraph of Article 56 if, and when the declaration drafted on February 4th is signed. We are thus ready to comply entirely with the request made in Ismet Pasha's letters of February 4th[5] and April 8th.[6]

Ismet Pasha said that he would sign the declaration with a reserve as to the exchange options; he could not commit Turkey to a financial burden which she would be unable to meet. We explained once more that we ask Turkey to undertake no fresh obligations, but merely to recognise existing engagements which could only be varied by agreement with the bondholders and not by a clause in the treaty. Ismet Pasha was obdurate and the point was reserved.

The second committee will next deal with the sanitary clauses.[7]

[4] See No. 490, n. 3.
[5] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41.
[6] See Nos. 465 and 466.
[7] See No. 515, below.

No. 510

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 49 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4808/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 10, 1923*

Articles 5 to 11 of the draft commercial convention were considered in the third committee this morning.[1]

Article 5. The Turks argued that it was impossible for them to bind local authorities not to impose local taxes, but they accepted the principle that no discrimination should be exercised in the levying of local taxes. The article was referred to the experts.

Article 6. The Turkish draft was accepted subject to the substitution of the words 'aucun moyen' for the words 'un moyen direct ou par des surtaxes ou exonérations de quelque nature et sous quelque dénomination que ce soit'.

Article 7. The question of the period during which the convention should apply to the small Powers was reserved. Subject to this, the article was agreed in principle and was referred to the experts to prepare a draft.

Article 8. While the Turks stated that they were unable to accept the Allied proposal in its present form, there was no substantial difference in principle and the article was referred to the experts to endeavour to prepare a draft to which general agreement could be obtained.

The new Article, after 8, proposed by the Turks was accepted in principle but referred to experts to simplify if possible.

Article 9. It was agreed to suppress this article.

Annex. This was referred to experts.

Article 10. The first two paragraphs of the Turkish draft were agreed to. The third and fourth paragraphs were reserved.

Article 11. The Turkish draft was accepted with the substitution of the word 'établie' for 'accordée' in the second line.

The proceedings at the meeting were somewhat dilatory and a good deal more progress might well have been made if the Chairman had adopted more business-like methods. Indeed the lack of dignity with which Signor Montagna conducted the proceedings and which verged at times on buffoonery produced a very unfavourable impression on General Pellé and myself.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 304–11.

No. 511

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 51 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4842/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 11, 1923*

My committee resumed to-day[1] the adjourned discussion on Article 159.

I referred again to the desire expressed in Ismet Pasha's note of March 8th[2] to re-establish a general state of peace and to what he had said at the last meeting regarding his wish to make quickly a separate treaty with each of the four Powers mentioned in Article 159. I suggested that it was profoundly important for a country which had been at war as long as Turkey to make peace with everyone as quickly as possible. In a spirit of conciliation all the Allies present at the conference therefore urged her to use the practical opportunity offered her by this clause to reach a settlement with these four Allied peoples. Ismet repeated what he had already said regarding Turkey's desire to reach peace as quickly as possible with these third parties, but he did not consider this conference competent to provide the solution. He wished to reserve the right to conduct separate and direct negotiations with them. Both General Pellé and I suggested that the drafting committee should meet to try to find a formula acceptable to both parties. Ismet refused this suggestion on the ground that there was a fundamental difference of principle between us, and Riza Nour intervened to suggest that the Turkish delegation only had full powers to conclude a treaty with the inviting Powers, Roumania, Greece and the Serb-Croat and Slovene State. I challenged Ismet to inform the conference whether or not he was actually engaged in separate negotiations with one or more of these four Powers,[3] with Poland for instance, but he only answered that Turkey was in contact with them elsewhere than at Lausanne. He expressed apprehension lest any reference of this article to the drafting committee might make the third parties concerned less ready to negotiate direct with Turkey.

I finally reserved the right of the Inviting Powers to submit to Ismet Pasha for his consideration, a new formula which would take into account the difficulties expressed by the Turkish delegation in the course of the discussion. Ismet Pasha accepted this proposed procedure.

I then took the first two of the three articles which the Turkish delegation had proposed to add to the treaty after Article 159. The first article provided for the respect of Wakf property in Serbia, in the islands ceded to Greece and Italy by the present treaty and in Greece outside the territories covered by the Exchange of Populations Convention. The second article provided generally for the inviolability of the acquired rights of Moslem landowners in Serbia, in the islands and in Greek territory mentioned in the

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 66–77. [2] No. 431.
[3] i.e. the four powers mentioned in the Allied draft of Article 159: Belgium, Poland, Portugal, and Czechoslovakia.

preceding article, and for the continuance of the treatment of all such Moslem properties according to Ottoman law.

M. Yovanovitch took objection not only to the scope of the proposed articles, but also to the fact that the Turkish delegation took no account of Article 10 of the Serb minority treaty of 1919[4] which specifically safeguarded the rights of Moslem Wakf and religious establishments or of the provisions of the Serbian constitution regarding the rights of landowners. He characterised the Turkish claim regarding landed properties as an attempt to create a double sovereignty in Serbia and said that if it were accepted, the majority in Serbia would require protection from the minority.

M. Veniselos rejected the two articles on more or less the same grounds as M. Yovanovitch. He also explained by specific reference to various anomalies in the Turkish land legislation how impossible it was for any western State to harmonise Turkish and western land legislation. The only exceptional treatment which had ever been meted out to Moslem landowners in Greece had been in the nature of reprisals taken in 1914 against the expulsion of 400,000 Greeks from Asia Minor, and even these measures of reprisal were open to review by the mixed arbitral tribunals established under the Exchange of Populations Convention.

In reply Munir Bey confined himself to pointing out that the clauses suggested by the Turkish delegation were not an innovation. He referred to the treaties of Berlin,[5] Thessaly,[6] the treaties after the Balkan Wars,[7] and the convention with Great Britain regarding Cyprus.[8] The Turkish delegation did not regard the European minority treaties as offering sufficient safeguards on these two points, and asked for more explicit treatment by the insertion of these articles in the main treaty of peace. He suggested that the European minority treaties only applied to parts of Greece and Serbia, and while Wakf property and Moslem properties in Greece had been specially dealt with in the Exchange of Populations Convention,[9] that convention did not cover either Western Thrace or the rights of all Moslem landowners in Greece.

I pointed out that whilst Munir Bey had quoted treaties dating back to the treaty of Berlin, he had only made a passing allusion to the treaty of St. Germain from which the Serbian delegate had quoted and which dealt specifically with Wakfs.[10] This treaty constituted an engagement of an

[4] See No. 455, n. 8. See also n. 10, below.

[5] Of July 13, 1878; see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 69, pp. 749–67.

[6] The reference is to the Convention of Constantinople, May 24, 1881, in which Turkey ceded to Greece most of Thessaly. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 72, pp. 382–9.

[7] i.e. the treaties of May 17/30 (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, pp. 656–8), of September 16/29 (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, pp. 706–21), and November 1/14, 1913 (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, pp. 893–902).

[8] The reference is to the annex, signed at Constantinople on July 1, 1878, to the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4, 1878. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 69, pp. 746–8.

[9] Cmd. 1814, pp. 817–27; *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53.

[10] The reference is to the Serbian Minorities Treaty, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, on September 10, 1919 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 514–23). The Wakfs are specifically mentioned in article 10.

international character undertaken towards the League of Nations. It was open to any member of the League to see that the provisions of the treaty were carried out and Turkey when she became a member of the League would have this right.

It was also pointed out to the Turkish delegation that in all the minority treaties which had been made by the Great Powers after the war, special safeguards had been introduced for the protection of Moslem minorities and especially for Wakfs. Similar clauses mutatis mutandis had been inserted in the present treaty to protect minorities in Turkey, but the Allies had actually consented to their being framed on a narrower basis than the European minority clauses, e.g. as regards their limitation only to non-Moslem minorities.

Further, by Article 44 of the present treaty,[11] Greece accepted safeguards for Moslem minorities in Greece similar to those accepted by Turkey in the minority clauses for non-Moslem minorities in Turkey. The Turkish delegate on the minorities commission had pressed for the acceptance of similar obligations by all the Balkan Powers, but in the face of the explanations of M. Spalaikovitch and the Roumanian delegation regarding the safeguards already provided by the Roumanian and Serbian minority treaties, he had accepted the limitation of that article to Greece. Yet Turkey was now trying to re-open the whole question, and indirectly to strengthen certain European minority treaties. By the second of these two articles, Turkey was not only trying to force a form of capitulations upon Greece and Serbia, but she was also trying to crystallise a form of land tenure in the countries for all time.

The Turkish delegation disclaimed any intention of asking for capitulations and said that they were only trying to protect acquired rights.

After the Italian delegation, who were in a different treaty position to Greece and Serbia in these matters, had offered to give some satisfaction as regards Turkish Wakf properties in the Dodecanese, on a basis of reciprocity, by a fresh draft of both articles, I rejected both articles as regards Greece and Serbia on the ground that safeguards were already fully provided by the minority treaties. I left the Italian delegation, however, free to agree upon a satisfactory re-draft of these articles to cover the Dodecanese.

The Turkish delegation reserved its attitude.

Discussion then turned on the third of the three articles which provided in effect for the compulsory liquidation by the Greek government of Moslem properties in Greece and Crete, the owners of which were either domiciled outside Greece or had emigrated from Greece or Crete before 1912. This category of property was not dealt with by the Exchange of Populations Convention because it fell outside the terms of reference of the sub-committee.

In the course of discussion, Riza Nour tried to claim that Signor Montagna had confirmed the justice of the Turkish demand when it was discussed by

[11] i.e. the Draft Treaty of January 31, 1923 (see Appendix III).

his committee dealing with the Exchange of Populations Convention, and that Signor Montagna had only ruled that it must be inserted in some other part of the treaty.

Signor Montagna proved, however, by a quotation from his report to the First Commission in January[12] that the point had merely been ruled outside the competence of his sub-committee and referred by him in his report to the sympathetic examination of the commission.

M. Veniselos, while declaring that he was prepared to maintain the rights of the Moslem landowners in question, refused to accept the article or any liability on the part of the Greek government compulsorily to liquidate these properties.

The Turkish delegation then reserved their right to deal similarly with any analogous case of Greek properties in Turkey. M. Veniselos speaking with some emotion asked the conference to take note of this attempted intimidation by the Turkish delegation and hinted that the latter were trying to justify the action which they had already taken with regard to the opening of the Greek safes at Smyrna.

Munir Bey disclaimed any intention of wishing to threaten the Greek delegation, but said that all that the Turkish delegation wished was to enable these Moslem proprietors to liquidate their properties.

Mr. Ryan then suggested that in the light of these declarations by the two parties, it should be possible to find a satisfactory formula regarding the liquidation of the properties in question, and it was agreed that the question should be referred to the experts.

There will be no meeting of the committees tomorrow in order to give the experts time to get on with their work. The Second Committee will take the Sanitary Clauses on Monday[13] and the Third Committee will take the second part of the commercial convention on Tuesday.[14] I said that my committee which had now finished the main part of its work would sit again on Wednesday,[15] by which time those delegations or experts who were considering with the Turks any articles submitted to them by my committee were to report to it the results of their work.

The First and Third committees should thus have reviewed all their work by Wednesday. The Second Committee is unfortunately behind-hand owing to the French delegation being still without instructions on the question of reparations, although General Pellé has again telegraphed to his government on the subject.

[12] See *Recueil* (*1*), vol. i, pp. 634–7. This report, dated January 30, is not printed in Cmd. 1814.

[13] May 14. See No. 515, below.

[14] May 15. See No. 519, below.

[15] May 16. See No. 523, below.

No. 512

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 52 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4859/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 12, 1923*

Since the date of my telegram No. 35 of May 5th[1] appreciable progress has been made in clearing the ground of questions of secondary importance. The following is a summary of the present position.

First Committee.

I finished on May 11th[2] the general review of Articles 152 to 160 which had been left unassigned in the original distribution of work. We meet again on May 16th[3] when I shall take reports on a certain number of questions which have been referred to sub-committees or have been the subject of private discussion with the Turks. Several of these are in a fair way of solution or have already been settled among the experts subject to confirmation by the committee. I hope definitely to dispose of Article 19 (Cyprus nationality), Article 144 (Anzac Graves Regulations), the additional article to the Thracian Frontiers Convention, for which the experts have now arrived at an agreed text, and perhaps the declaration to be attached to the Régime for Foreigners Convention relative to schools and other institutions. I am also anxious to dispose as far as possible of the questions on Articles 16, 20, 25 and 27 which specially interest the French and Italians. I have urged General Pellé and M. Montagna to have these ready for my meeting on May 16th.

The jurists have made good progress with Chapters I and III of the Régime for Foreigners Convention itself and it should be possible if not on May 16th at least very shortly after to record agreed texts in the committee except as regards Article 25 which provides for the adhesion of non-signatory Powers.

This will leave outstanding (a) the questions on Articles 1 to 15 enumerated in my telegram No. 35,[1] (b) the points raised in the recent discussion of Articles 152 to 160, and (c) the Amnesty Declaration. As regards (a) the questions of the Maritza thalweg and 'Merkeb' Islands are of little intrinsic importance and it is a question of tactics when and how they should be disposed of having regard to the desirability of getting a favourable settlement of the parallel but more important question of Castellorizo. Ada Kala has not been formally disposed of but I cannot believe that it will give any serious trouble when the time comes to finish with it. As regards (b) Articles 152 and 153 present great difficulty. The other questions under this heading should admit of settlement as soon as the experts and jurists have threshed them out. (c), i.e. the Amnesty Declaration, should present no difficulty once the jurists have reported on the two outstanding points.

[1] No. 500. [2] See No. 511. [3] See No. 519, below.

Second Committee.

General Pellé holds his next meeting on May 14th.[4] Not having had his instructions regarding reparation he will take the sanitary clauses Articles 129 to 131. We have had a preliminary discussion among Allies to-day and have I hope got things into train for a settlement in due course on the basis of a declaration by the Turks regarding sanitary advisers and an arrangement assuring that the funds of the old Board of Health shall be duly affected to sanitary purposes. General Pellé should complete the preliminary review of his work in this and one more sitting, provided his instructions regarding the reparation question are not delayed, but the questions of the Decree of Muharrem, interest on the debt and Turco-Greek indemnities still threaten trouble. Recent indications lead me to fear that the last named may present more difficulty than I anticipated a week ago and the final settlement may have to be reserved for the ultimate bargaining on big questions.

Third Committee.

Two more meetings of M. Montagna's committee, the first of which is fixed for May 15th,[5] should suffice to complete the general review. The experts are making steady progress and agreement has been reached on a considerable number of individual articles up to date. I do not think that any serious question within the scope of this committee need remain outstanding for long, provided M. Montagna handles the business properly. There remains, however, the question of the negotiations with the concessionnaires.[6] I am increasingly apprehensive lest delay over these should react on our work here. I will telegraph separately on this subject.[7]

The above review shows that the forecast in the penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 35 seems likely to prove only a little too optimistic. We must be prepared for the battle royal over the big question[s] any time after the middle of next week.

[4] See No. 515, below.

[5] See No. 519, below.

[6] In his telegram No. 269 of May 6, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'Adnan Bey informs me that all preparations have been made for reception of representatives of foreign companies at Angora and that Turkish Government does not propose to answer applications of companies, but is ready to begin negotiations at once with all companies which have applied. I therefore see no reason to delay any further departure of British representative from London.'

[7] In his telegram No. 53 of May 12. This ran: 'Unless I am much out in my estimate, there is no reason why the conference should not have completed its work early in June. On the other hand, there appears to be now little chance of the negotiations between the concessionnaires and the Angora Government beginning before 21st May. They will be of a kind which, if conducted in the habitual Turkish manner, might be expected to take months. ... In these circumstances it is for consideration whether we should not at a very early date ask the French and Italians to join in intimating to the Turks a time-limit within which the concession negotiations must be concluded; failing which we should have to fall back on the plan foreshadowed in the Allied note of 27th March [31 March, see No. 459, n. 4] of pressing for the insertion of [*sic* ?in] the treaty of clauses similar to those in the draft of 31st January. . . . The ideal thing, however, would be to exert such pressure as to compel the Turks to come to terms with the concessionnaires within a reasonable period of weeks.'

No. 513

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 14, 8 a.m.)
No. 56 Telegraphic [E 4921/6/44]

Immediate. Most confidential LAUSANNE, *May 14, 1923, 3 a.m.*

Monsieur Veniselos came to see me today. He said that he had discussed situation in Greece with Monsieur Alexandris, the Greek Foreign Minister, who arrived last night. The latter reported that Greek military authorities thought that with demand for an indemnity from Greece hanging over their heads time had come to clear up situation with Turkey. On my asking Monsieur Veniselos what this expression really meant he replied that military authorities were in favour of denouncing the armistice. Happily Monsieur Alexandris was of another way of thinking and he had agreed that Monsieur Veniselos should at once take up question of Greco-Turkish reparation direct with Ismet Pasha. Before doing so Monsieur Veniselos wished to have my opinion. I had discussed question with my colleagues yesterday and we had agreed that it would be far better to try to settle Greco-Turkish reparation question outside Conference room rather than bring it in committee where it might lead to a scene and to categorical statements on finance upon which it would be difficult to go back. I, therefore, told Monsieur Veniselos that I was entirely in favour of his approaching Ismet direct on the subject. He then said that he would seek an interview with Ismet tomorrow and would talk to him on following lines.

He would say as it was quite out of the question for Greece to pay any indemnity to Turkey (and he told me on this point Greeks were adamant) it would be better for Turks to accept Article 58 as it stands in Allied draft. Should Ismet prove intractable Monsieur Veniselos would suggest settlement of question by means of arbitration in accordance with solution he accepted on February 4th.[1] He promised to tell me upshot of his interview with Ismet tomorrow. If Ismet also rejected proposal to refer question to arbitration Monsieur Veniselos thought of proposing following solution as a final effort to avert resumption of hostilities.

He said he was most grateful to you for having saved Karagatch for Greece during first phase of Conference.[2] In view of your action in the matter he wished to have your views as to offering Turks Karagatch with a few kilometres to south plus a small triangle of territory to north between rivers Maritza and Arda. Under this arrangement northern frontier of Greece would be brought back to river Arda and railway from Karagatch to Bulgarian frontier would become Turkish. He thought that this proposal would give best means of personal satisfaction to Ismet but he would only make it with your consent and on condition that Turks accepted Allied wording of Article 58 and dropped once and for all their demand for an indemnity from Greece. He further suggested that if you approved this

[1] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 846 and 852. [2] See No. 226.

proposal it might in last resort be put forward by British delegation as it would carry more weight with Turks coming from us. He would, of course, make it clear that proposal was put forward with complete assent of Greece so that we should not have appearance of making a bargain at his expense. Meanwhile he asked me not to mention it to my Allied colleagues.

I said I hoped that Monsieur Veniselos would do everything he could to try and settle indemnity question without having recourse to re-opening a territorial question which had already been settled. I hear Turks are determined to press for reparations from Greece and so we are faced with a difficult situation.

Monsieur Veniselos added that whatever might be thought of the revolutionary government at Athens they had succeeded in making army as efficient as it had ever been and he knew that if hostilities were resumed Greek military authorities confidently reckoned on reaching Chatalja lines and making peace without there being any question of an indemnity. But both he and Monsieur Alexandris were opposed to further adventures and wished to make peace at Lausanne.

No. 514

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 14, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 57 Telegraphic [E 4922/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 14, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 27.[1]

Signor Montagna communicated to General Pellé and myself to-day telegram which he had received from Italian President of the Council regarding question of Turkish reparations.

Substance is briefly as follows:

Italian government state that they cannot admit justice of diminishing amount of sum which would cover losses of Italian nationals. Italian government had agreed to waive their demand for reparations from Turkey in consequence of your offer on February 4th[2] to pay battleship money into a common pool. Nevertheless as a proof of their desire for peace Italian government would in last resort accept arrangement under which five millions gold now held in London and Paris should be available for distribution between French and Italian subjects. Should this last proposal be rejected Italian government reserved their right to reopen question of reparations with Turkey.

General Pellé said that his government were in agreement with Italian government in this matter and that he had been so instructed. I replied by

[1] Of May 3. This transmitted to Sir H. Rumbold a copy of Lord Curzon's Note of that date to Comte Saint-Aulaire (see n. 3 below).

[2] See No. 370.

referring to note addressed by you to French ambassador on May 3rd,[3] copy of which I had communicated to both General Pellé and Signor Montagna and stated that I was bound by decision conveyed in that note.

We have thus reached deadlock which can only be solved by governments, as it is not possible for me to induce my colleagues to disregard their instructions.

This reparation question is hanging up work of General Pellé's committee and threatens soon to hang up work of conference. Financial experts have been unable to do any work since May 9th. Turks are no doubt already aware that there is a difference of opinion between our governments on the subject.

[3] This, which replied to a French Memorandum of April 30 on the subject of Turkish reparations, ran as follows: '. . . His Majesty's Government remain convinced that it could only do harm and could present no advantages if the Allies were first to insist on a demand to which they knew perfectly well that the Turks would not agree, and were subsequently to give way in the face of Turkey's obstinacy. The French Government will no doubt remember that it was on account of the persistent refusal of Ismet Pasha to consider the original Allied demand [of January 31] that the Allied delegates at Lausanne definitely gave way on this question on the 3rd February last, and that Ismet Pasha, in his note to the presidents of the Allied delegations of the 4th February [see Cmd. 1814, pp. 837–41], definitely recorded and accepted "the renunciation on the part of the Allied Powers of the sum of 12 million gold pounds claimed by them under the heading of reparation". In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government do not see how the Allies could honourably withdraw a concession so solemnly made and so formally accepted, and they therefore regret that they cannot see their way to issue instructions to Sir Horace Rumbold in the sense desired.' A similar Note was addressed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires on May 17 (E 4961/1/44).

No. 515

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 59 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4996/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 14, 1923*

The Second Committee held a short meeting this morning[1] to deal with the sanitary clauses.

General Pellé explained that the Allies were prepared to accept a declaration on the broad lines proposed by the Turks in lieu of the portion of Articles 129 and 130 which the Turks wished to suppress, but that they considered the Turkish draft declaration insufficient in its present form. It would be necessary, he said, to refer the matter to a sub-committee of experts to draft the exact text, but it would be well to indicate in general terms the desiderata of the Powers in order that principles might be laid down for the guidance of the sub-committee.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 211–14.

Riza Nour Bey, who was in a singularly melting mood, agreed in rapid succession to all the principles enunciated by General Pellé. He raised no objection to the proposal that the sanitary counsellors should be chosen from a panel drawn up by the two international health bodies, and that their salaries should be fixed in consultation with these bodies. He also agreed that it would be necessary to draw up regulations in accordance with the various international conventions. He suggested that this would best be provided for by a further paragraph in the Turkish declaration thus anticipating what the allied delegates had intended to propose. He offered spontaneously to strengthen the sole remaining paragraph which is to be retained in Article 130 of the draft treaty by a provision that the proceeds of taxes levied under the sanitary tariff should be devoted exclusively to sanitary purposes, and that there should be a special budget therefore.

We then passed to Article 131. We had anticipated that the Turks would object to any alteration, but they admitted readily that the disposal of the reserve funds of the old Board of Health would have to be reconsidered in view of the changes in the arrangements originally proposed in Articles 129 and 130 of the treaty. Riza Nour Bey raised no objection to the suggestion that the disposal of these funds was a matter of international concern, and that the two international health bodies should have some say in the matter.

Articles 132 and 133 were confirmed as they stood, except for the substitution at my request of the word 'Egypt' for 'Alexandria' at the end of the first paragraph of Article 132.

An agreement having thus been reached on all the questions of principle, it was left to the sub-committee to draft the text of the declaration, and to redraft Articles 130 and 131. It was agreed at the request of the Turks that the sub-committee should meet tomorrow.

These unusually harmonious proceedings were appropriately closed by two suggestions from the Chair, the unanimous adoption of which contributed to increase the general good feeling. General Pellé proposed at my suggestion that the conference should direct the Secretariat-General to convey the thanks of all the delegations to the International Red Cross for the manner in which it had discharged its task in connection with the exchange between Greece and Turkey of civil hostages and prisoners of war. M. Caclamanos rather tactlessly seized the opportunity of drawing the attention of the conference to the recommendation of the International Red Cross in favour of the Greek prisoners still in Turkey. This was out of place, as the delegates of the Inviting Powers have already addressed Ismet Pasha on the subject.[2] General Pellé politely ruled M. Caclamanos out of order, and the proposal to address a letter of thanks to the International Red Cross was adopted.

General Pellé then observed that the Turkish festival of Bayram fell due in the course of the next few days, and suggested that the conference should not sit on the first day of the festival. He said that the matter lay with the Turkish delegation, as this suggestion had been made out of consideration for them. The Turks were obviously gratified at this attention, and welcomed

[2] See No. 508, n. 2.

the suggestion which was adopted after an amusing little discussion as to when the first day of the festival fell. The Turks agreed among themselves that Thursday, 17th, was the safest day to choose, and it was decided that no committee should meet on that day.

We have now got to the point at which it will be difficult for General Pellé to hold any further meetings of his committee without either facing up to the reparation question, or evading it more obviously than he has hitherto had to do. I trust therefore that an issue from the deadlock described in my telegram No. 57[3] may be found at a very early date.

[3] No. 514.

No. 516

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 15, 5.15 p.m.)
No. 61 Telegraphic [E 4949/6/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 15, 1923, 1.25 p.m.*

Ismet came to see me last night. He began by asking when we should be prepared to discuss arrangements for evacuation of Constantinople. I said it was much too early in the day and that we must get rid of all big outstanding questions such as Greco-Turkish reparations, interest on debt, judicial safeguards for foreigners etc. It was impossible to talk of evacuation before we knew peace was assured and would be signed.

Ismet said that our failure to take up question of evacuation was creating suspicion in his country. I said he could not doubt our sincere desire for peace and our wish to leave Turkey as soon as possible.[1] He then referred to question of arms and ships but I told him that these matters were bound up with question of evacuation of Constantinople.

He then went on to talk about Greco-Turkish reparations and I said that I had heard what had passed between him and Monsieur Veniselos on the subject. I should observe that I had heard that arrival of Monsieur Alexandris had disturbed Turks a good deal. Ismet gave me rather a different account of his interview with Monsieur Veniselos from that which the latter had given me. He represented Monsieur Veniselos in fact as having delivered a kind of ultimatum to him by saying that unless Greco-Turkish reparations question were speedily settled and got out of the way Greek army would become restive.[2] This led Ismet to say that it was difficult for Turks to

[1] In his despatch No. 65 of May 19, Sir H. Rumbold, referring to this and other similar conversations with Ismet Pasha, reported: '. . . I am using the question of evacuation as a useful lever to get the Turkish Delegation to expedite the proceedings of the Conference in so far as they are concerned.'

[2] Monsieur Venizelos's account of this conversation was reported by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 60 of May 14, which ran: 'Monsieur Veniselos explained [to Ismet Pasha]

continue negotiations under a threat and to draw a picture of defenceless state of Eastern Thrace. He pointed out that under Mudania armistice Turks could only maintain 8,000 gendarmerie in Eastern Thrace. I took this opportunity of telling Ismet that we knew that ever since Rafet Pasha had been in Eastern Thrace he had been busy building up a force far in excess of 8,000 gendarmerie.[3] Moreover Turks had sent artillery into Eastern Thrace.

Ismet stoutly denied this but I said that we were aware of what was going on and that if Turks accused Greeks of violating Mudania armistice it was certain that Turks had violated it equally.

He maintained his denials and enquired what allies would do supposing Greek army crossed Maritza. They ought to restore liberty of action to Turks and allow latter to take defensive measures. I said I could not discuss a hypothetical case. I told him I did not believe Greek army meant to resume hostilities and that [Messieurs] Veniselos and Alexandris were reasonable men who did not wish for further adventures. He must continue his conversations with Monsieur Veniselos with a view to reaching a settlement of Greco-Turkish reparations question. I asked him to look at matter from a practical point of view viz:—the utter inability of Greeks to pay anything at all. He could not get blood out of a stone.

Ismet went over old ground about destruction of his country and injustice of not getting some reparations from Greece. He asked me what allies thought about it and I said that their opinion was expressed in their wording of Article 58. I then enlarged on enormous expense to which Greeks had been put by influx of over a million refugees. Finally Ismet said that Greeks ought at all events to make gesture of good will and this remark leads me to think that it will be necessary to make offer about Karagatch foreshadowed in my telegram No. 56.[4] What is clear is that Turks will insist on getting some sort of satisfaction in the matter of reparations. Ismet said he wished to speak to me again about question tomorrow or the next day but I said that I should not be prepared for a further discussion on the subject until Thursday[5] morning. I hope by then to be in possession of your views on Monsieur Veniselos'[s] tentative proposal.

Ismet is naturally very much . . .[6] Greek threat in Western Thrace and certain minatory utterances of Monsieur Veniselos'[s] entourage are not calculated to smooth over matters. Ismet is trying to drag allies into the matter in the sense of restraining Greeks on the one hand and on the other of allowing Turks a free hand in Eastern Thrace. I feel situation as between

that it was materially impossible for Greece to pay anything in shape of indemnity, but adopting what he thought had been a provision in treaty of Sèvres article 231 he told Ismet that in order to give moral satisfaction to Turkish government he was willing to make a declaration recognizing that it was incumbent on Greece to pay indemnity for acts committed by Greek army in Asia Minor contrary to laws of war, if Turkey on her side recognized that Greece's financial position precluded payment of any indemnity in respect of such acts and therefore waived demand for indemnity.'

[3] See No. 408. [4] No. 513. [5] May 17.

[6] The text is here uncertain.

Greece and Turkey will continue to be dangerous until reparations question is out of the way and that we ought to get it out of the way as quickly as possible. Monsieur Alexandris whom I also saw yesterday afternoon and who spoke on same lines as Monsieur Veniselos said that he hoped some means would be found of settling reparations question by beginning of next week.

No. 517

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 21 Telegraphic [E 4921/6/44]

Confidential FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 15, 1923, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 56 (of May 13th).[1]

Allied generals at Constantinople are alarmed[2] by northward movements of large bodies of Greek troops, estimated at a division, in Western Thrace, which appear to foreshadow Greek advance into Eastern Thrace and on Constantinople. Presumably these movements are connected with plan, favoured by Greek military authorities, of an early resumption of hostilities to which Monsieur Veniselos as well as Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs have definitely declared themselves opposed[3] unless all efforts to come to terms with Turks over question of reparations should fail.

We are uncertain as to precise geographical limits of Monsieur Veniselos'[s] suggested concession which appears to be limited to a small triangle between Maritza and Arda and to contemplate retention of rest of Demotika block by Greece. If so, this seems a very patchwork and impracticable proposal. Whatever it be do you consider that if proposed in the last resort, it would be likely to bring about settlement, or that on the contrary, it would endanger it,

[1] No. 513.

[2] In his telegram No. 3885 of May 14 to the War Office, General Harington had reported: 'There was a meeting of Allied Generals this morning. My appreciation, which is being forwarded to C.I.G.S. by next bag, is entirely agreed with by Generals Mombelli and Charpy and we are submitting it to High Commissioners to-morrow. Both Generals agree that our position here would be impossible if Greeks advance on Constantinople. For first time to-day they agreed as to importance of holding as long as possible Gallipoli Peninsula and also Chanak, as opposed to their previous view that Constantinople was more important tha[n] Straits. They could not of course until permitted by their Governments commit their troops to Asiatic shore. They put forward serious situation which would arise for Christian population and agree that Nationals would have to be evacuated before troops and represented difficulties as regards shipping. We should have to try and fix a ringed fence with Turks in which Nationals and Christians could be concentrated and into which Turkish troops would not enter; but I doubt whether Turks would agree to any conditions if Greek Army was advancing on Constantinople and we could never run a dual control.

'We are all agreed (a) as to action and withdrawal from Maritza of buffer troops; (b) as to impossibility of Chatalja lines being held against Greeks; (c) as to impossibility of preventing entry of Kemalist reinforcements into Europe; (d) only course is after saving our Nationals and preventing massacre to withdraw to Straits. In the event, which I do not think likely, of situation suddenly arising before you can give me instructions, I should act on above lines.'

[3] See No. 513.

by creating impression that Allies will make any concession rather than lose the peace? If the former, which I much doubt, His Majesty's Government would not wish to stand in the way of proposed transaction and you might support it but only if all other means of arriving at a settlement with the Turks fail.

Meanwhile you will probably agree that Allied generals at Constantinople may be assured,[4] on the strength of Monsieur Veniselos'[s] statement to you, that there is no question of an immediate denunciation of armistice by Greek government, or of resumption of hostilities by them without previous notice to Allies. It is difficult to believe that they would embark on such adventure in the face of decided opposition of Allied governments, of which they are fully aware.

Please speak on this point to Monsieur Veniselos, and on receiving from him confirmation of assurances in above sense, telegraph to Acting High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Repeated to Paris (by bag) No. 225, Rome No. 140, Constantinople No. 152, Athens No. 76.

[4] In reply to General Harington's telegram No. 3885 (see n. 2), the War Office, in telegram No. 91840 of May 15, stated: '. . . the Cabinet find that definite instructions cannot be given until a uniform line of allied action is assured. They are communicating on the subject with French and Italian Governments. Meanwhile your action must be governed by events to the extent that every endeavour should be made by you to prevent either Greeks or Turks infringing the armistice, but you must not go to the length of provoking a conflict between allied troops and Greeks or Turks nor should your troops be allowed to become involved in any situation which it is not possible militarily to maintain.'

No. 518

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 77 Telegraphic [E 4921/6/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 15, 1923, 9 p.m.*

My telegram to Sir H. Rumbold No. 21 of today.[1]

Please endeavour to obtain reliable information concerning reported movements of Greek troops and renew warning to Greek government against folly of allowing their military authorities to create situation which might precipitate hostilities contrary to declared intentions of Monsieur Venizelos and Minister for Foreign Affairs and would certainly wreck conference at Lausanne.

The Allied Powers would view any such proceeding with extreme displeasure, and could not allow Greece to profit by it.

His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Rome have been directed to

[1] No. 517.

invite government to which they are accredited to instruct your colleagues to take similar action.[2]

Repeated to Paris by bag No. 226, Rome No. 141, Lausanne No. 22 and Constantinople No. 153.

[2] In Foreign Office telegram No. 227 to Paris, No. 142 to Rome, of May 15. In his telegram No. 96 of May 17, Sir R. Graham replied: 'President of the Council is in entire agreement and will send similar instructions at once to Italian representative at Athens.'

No. 519

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 62 Telegraphic: by bag [E 4995/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 15, 1923*

The Third Committee this morning[1] considered the new draft of article 78 prepared by the economic experts,[2] the report of the economic experts dated May 12th,[3] and the remaining provisions of the commercial convention, i.e. articles 12–20.

Article 78. The Turkish and Serbian delegates having agreed that the article should not apply to matters referred to in the Serbian Turkish treaty of Constantinople of 1914,[4] it was agreed to add Serbia to the article, which was passed without any other alteration.

Article 82. I made a reserve with regard to paragraph (e), explaining that the reference to dissolution by the national law of one of the parties to the contract should only apply in the case of partnerships, and this paragraph was referred back to the experts for further consideration. Subject to this point and to the reserve made by the allied representatives with regard to concessions, the article was accepted.

Articles 83–88. These articles were accepted in the form agreed by the experts subject to the observations with regard to article 87 contained in the report and subject to the general Turkish reserve on article 84 as regards the mixed arbitral tribunal.

Article 89. This article was accepted subject to further consideration by the experts after hearing representations to be made by the Roumanian delegation for some alteration of the date of 29th October, 1914, with regard to some countries which entered the war at a later date.

Article 90. This article was accepted in the form agreed on by the experts subject to the omission of the words 'au moins' near the end of the article.

Articles 91–93 and the annex. The recommendations in the experts' report were accepted.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 312–19. [2] Ibid., p. 320. [3] Ibid., pp. 321–6.
[4] Of 1/14 March, 1914; see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 108, pp. 579–83.

Articles 101 and 101 bis. A point was raised by the French delegation as to whether article 101 bis should be placed immediately after 101 or in some other part of the economic clauses. Hassan Bey stated that the Turkish delegation only accepted article 101 on condition that 101 bis immediately followed it, and no definite conclusion was reached on this point.

Articles 102–107. The recommendations of the experts were agreed to.

Commercial Convention.

Article 12. This article was referred to the experts for consideration of the addition proposed by the Turkish delegation.

Article 13. It was agreed to delete this article as the matters dealt with in it would be disposed of elsewhere in the convention.

Article 14. This article was referred to the experts on the demand of the Italian delegation.

Article 15. This article was accepted.

Article 16. The proposed Turkish modifications were referred to the experts.

Article 17. This article was agreed.

Article 18. This article was referred to the experts.

Article 19. The Turkish representative objected to the power of adhesion being given to all other powers, and he was asked by the Chairman whether they would agree if the power to adhere were limited to powers who had been allied with powers other than Turkey during the war. Hassan Bey replied that they wished to maintain complete freedom of negotiation with any power which was not a party to the treaty. No final decision was come to.

Article proposed by the Turkish delegation after article 19. The Greek, Serbian and Roumanian delegates objected to the proposal to limit the duration of the convention to one year in their cases. After considerable discussion, Hassan Bey suggested that the Turkish delegation might be disposed to agree to the convention having the same duration with regard to all the signatories if the smaller powers would undertake with regard to Turkey the same obligations which Turkey was required to undertake by the convention. The article was referred to the experts.

Article 20. This article was agreed.

No. 520

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 173 Telegraphic [E 5033/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 16, 1923, 11.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 77.[1]

I made communication to head of Political Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs as instructed.

[1] No. 518.

M. Politis expressed himself as painfully surprised as he had hoped nothing of the kind would have been said. He pointed out Turks were continually breaking Mudania convention with impunity and strengthening their position in Eastern Thrace. Present situation could not drag on and morale of army would decline if there were further delay. He feared our démarche would create painful impression in country when it became known: that it would encourage Ismet in adopting uncompromising attitude and weaken hand of M. Veniselos.

Turks would never come to agreement if they knew allies would not allow Greece to use only weapon which could bring them to reason. He hinted at possible resignation of M. Veniselos.

I mentioned reported movements of Greek troops having somewhat alarmed military authorities at Constantinople: that there were continual reports in Athens that General Pangalos would act on his own without approval of Greek government or of Monsieur Veniselos and that in any case a military advance seemed to be most risky. He expressed himself as confident regarding ability of army to defeat Turks.

I asked if I could assure you that Greek army would not move without approval of Monsieur Veniselos in whom I thought everyone had confidence. Monsieur Politis would not go as far as that because he said if government gave such an assurance it [*sic*] would become critical and again encourage Turks. If Monsieur Veniselos could threaten that army might get out of hand it would be a useful card to play. But he said that I might assure you that if Turks gave way on indemnities question there would be no war. If they refused to give way there would in any case be an interval before Greek army advance, to enable Monsieur Veniselos to acquaint powers with situation. Greek army would not advance in defiance of orders of government and General Pangalos, he added, had never yet disobeyed orders of government.

He proposed to telegraph to Monsieur Veniselos tonight gist of our conversation.

My impression is that Monsieur Politis wished me to understand that action of powers was deplorable as it was weakening Greek bluff against Turks and encouraging Turkish bluff against both Greeks and allies.

I am endeavouring to obtain information regarding reported movements of troops.

Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne.

No. 521

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 17, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 65 Telegraphic [E 5049/6/44]

Confidential LAUSANNE, *May 17, 1923, 2.40 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 21.[1]

I have seen Monsieur Veniselos and Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs together.

They gave me a formal assurance that Greek government have no intention of immediately denouncing armistice or of resuming hostilities without previous notice to the Allies. This assurance can certainly be passed on to Allied generals at Constantinople. Both Monsieur Veniselos and Monsieur Alexandris strongly demurred to suggestion that troop movements in Western Thrace indicated aggressive designs against Eastern Thrace. They pointed out as a matter of fact concentration of Greek army has been completed.

I emphasized to them both in strongest possible terms criminal folly of any adventurous policy at this stage from point of view of Conference and Greece.

Monsieur Veniselos and Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that fact that they were contemplating cession of Karagatch in last resort to Turks in return for a complete waiving of demand for reparations from Greece, was a proof that they were pushing conciliation to utmost extent possible. But they pointed out that Greco-Turkish reparations question must be settled 'within a reasonable time'; that they were ready to exhaust every means of settling this question but if they could not do so then they would be solid with military in considering that only issue would be a resumption of hostilities. Even in that case they undertake that present Greek government would formally denounce armistice after previous notice to Allies.

Present position of question is statement that Veniselos and Alexandris have telegraphed to Greek government for permission to make in last resort proposed cession of Karagatch and small triangle between Maritza and Arda to Turks. They have not yet received an answer to their telegram and Monsieur Veniselos has informed Greek government that if they reject his proposal he will decline to represent Greece any longer at Conference and will ask that Colonel Gonat[a]s should be sent here in his place. Monsieur Veniselos is to have an interview with Ismet tomorrow and I propose to await result of that interview before seeing Ismet myself. Monsieur Veniselos purposes submitting three proposals:

(1) A waiving of demand for reparations in accordance with Article 58 of Allied draft.

(2) A formula acknowledging that Greece ought to pay for damage committed by army in Asia Minor contrary to laws of war provided that

[1] No. 517.

Turkey on her side recognizes that financial situation of Greece renders payment of any indemnity impossible and

(3) Cession of Karagatch and small triangle above-mentioned. It will be seen that he has dropped the idea of reference to arbitration of counter claims of Greece and Turkey because in his opinion such a procedure would mean that reparations question would be still left in suspense and he wishes an immediate settlement in the interests of peace.

Both Monsieur Veniselos and Monsieur Alexandris insisted more than once that they would in no circumstances consent to payment of reparations and that if Turks were intractable a breach between two countries would be inevitable. They also urged that this question should be settled within a week as every day's delay allowed for occurrence of incidents which would still further inflame Greek public opinion which is already exasperated by treatment meted out to Greek prisoners of war and by closing of Greek banks at Constantinople and Smyrna. I have been impressing above point of view on my colleagues for some time past.

Monsieur Veniselos, whom I had informed of my conversation with Ismet (as reported in my telegram No. 61[2]), is confident that Turks will (?forgo) demand for an indemnity if they get Karagatch.

I do not think such a concession, which is absolutely conditional on complete waiving of Turkish reparations claim on Greece, would endanger a settlement by creating impression that His Majesty's Government would make any concession rather than lose peace. I am under the impression that Turks have a considerable respect for His Majesty's Government at present moment. Their whole attitude at present Conference has shown this and manner in which Turkish delegation attends to remarks made by British delegation has impressed everybody. Second question at issue is known to be one which after all does not primarily concern Great Britain, France or Italy and cession is proposed by Greece herself.[3]

Stipulations of Thracian frontier convention regarding demilitarization would, of course, apply to any Greco-Turkish new frontier.

Last twelve groups of your telegram under reply were undecypherable and I am still awaiting a repetition.

I thought it, however, desirable to act at once.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

[2] No. 516.

[3] In his telegram No. 66 of May 17, Sir H. Rumbold added: 'Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that he had had a telegram from Greek government to the effect that Reouf Bey, President of the Council of Turkish ministers, had sent an agent to Greeks to propose that Turkey and Greece should make peace on basis of mutually waiving indemnities. Agent in question is described as being a foreigner. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked Greek government by telegraph whether he can make use of above information with Turkish delegation.'

No. 522

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 18, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 175 Telegraphic [E 5073/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 17, 1923, midnight*

Head of political bureau called again to see me this evening after having communicated to Council of Ministers message contained in your telegram No. 77[1] which had caused them also pained surprise. They had also communicated with General Pangalos who had warmly insisted that he would take no action without the authority of government.

Monsieur Politis had not yet seen telegram from Monsieur Veniselos mentioned in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 65,[2] extracts from which I read to him. I urged most strongly that Greek government should not do anything which should provoke his resignation. Monsieur Politis said he had no reason to suppose that government would not follow advice of Monsieur Veniselos, that he knew intention of every member of cabinet was to accept his guidance, and he thought government would be prepared even to yield on question of Karagatch if Monsieur Veniselos urged. If, however, Turks proved intractable or gave evasive reply question could not be allowed to drag on and resumption of hostilities seemed the only course. For this reason Premier no longer favoured arbitration which must mean further delay.

I again read to him middle paragraph of your telegram No. 77 . . .[3] of which he notes. He expressed hope that Sir H. Rumbold would support Monsieur Veniselos as that would certainly bring Turks to reason. He added that influence of power which should assist Greece now in her hour of need would be paramount in Greece.

I said that Sir H. Rumbold was doing all he could to reach a peace and appeared to be in close co-operation with Monsieur Veniselos. Greek government must not do anything foolish but must assist them in their task.

French Minister is as yet without instructions. He informed his government some days ago that he considered situation very grave. I personally feel happier this evening for everything tends to show that Greeks wish to act in accordance with our wishes but if there is further delay situation will then undoubtedly become most grave.

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 518. [2] No. 521. [3] The text is here uncertain.

No. 523

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 67 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5080/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 17, 1923*

The First Committee met yesterday morning[1] and reviewed the position in regard to various articles in the treaty, which have been the subject of discussion between individual delegations and the Turks or which had been referred to experts. We placed on record the position regarding these articles as follows:

Article 3. The French and British delegations respectively are still engaged in private conversations with the Turks about this article.

Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Turkish Draft. The French are still discussing this with the Turks.

Article 19, last two paragraphs of the Turkish Draft. The British delegation are still awaiting the concurrence of His Majesty's Government in the solution provisionally adopted here by the jurists.

Article 20. The private discussions between the Italians and the Turks have reached an advanced stage, and the Italians hope for a settlement before the committee again meets on May 19th.

Article 25. General Pellé withdrew his reservation regarding the jurists' redraft of the second paragraph which he is now prepared to accept. The Italians still maintain their reservation as their attitude depends on the settlement regarding Article 20.

Article 26. The committee considered a redraft prepared by the jurists, which read as follows:

> 'Les Hautes Parties Contractantes déclarent accepter chacune en ce qui la concerne, l'abolition des Capitulations en Turquie, tant au point de vue des conditions d'accès et de séjour des étrangers, qu'au point de vue fiscal, judiciaire, économique et financier.'

General Pellé took exception to the words 'et financier' at the end of this draft, on the ground that the words 'fiscal, judiciaire et économique' covered the whole range of the Capitulations and the addition of the words 'et financier' might create doubt as to the position in regard to the purely financial obligations of Turkey and arrangements made between her and her creditors, matters which had no connection with the Capitulations. It was decided, after some little discussion, to send the article back to the Drafting Committee for further consideration of this point.

Article 27. This is still the subject of private discussion between the French and Italian delegations and the Turks.

Article 144. Ismet Pasha accepted the redraft of paragraph 6 of the Anzac regulations which had been privately negotiated between the British and

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 78–87.

Turkish experts (see my despatch No. 44 of May 15th).[2] The paragraph will therefore read as follows.

> 'Le Gouvernement turc accepte que lesdites formalités qui doivent être aussi simples que possible ne soient pas, sans préjudice toutefois des autres dispositions de cette annexe, plus onéreuses que celles imposées aux autres étrangers se rendant en Turquie et qu'elles soient remplies dans des conditions tendant à éviter tout retard inutile.'

I announced that active discussions were in progress regarding Articles 152 and 153 and the first two of the three new articles which the Turks wish to insert after Articles 159. As regards the third of these new articles, I said that the British delegation had suggested that the point should be covered by a declaration to be made by the Greek delegation, and that a draft declaration had been submitted to the Turks and the Greeks which it was hoped would provide the basis of a definite settlement at the next meeting of the committee. I had, as a matter of fact, agreed the form of the proposed declaration with M. Veniselos yesterday and had hoped to obtain the assent of the Turks before this morning's meeting. The latter, however, asked, at the last moment, for further time to consider it.

The committee adopted the draft of the additional article of the Thracian Frontiers Convention as drawn up by the sub-committee of experts.[3] (For the text of this see my despatch No. 40 of May 15th.[2])

We then took the report of the sub-committee appointed to discuss the form of the Turkish declaration which is to replace Articles 15 and 24 of the convention concerning the Régime for Foreigners.[4] I am sending home a copy of this report in my despatch No. 46 of May 16th.[2] We discussed at length the four points on which the sub-committee had been unable to reach any agreement.

Ismet Pasha was very intractable. As regards point 4, he was impervious to all arguments in favour of including in the declaration institutions of Roumanian, Yugo-Slavian and Greek nationality. He argued that in making any declaration at all, the Turks were going out of their way to oblige the Powers, and they were under no obligation to extend its provisions to other than French, British and Italian institutions. I reserved the point after a debate so futile that it is not worth while to report it in any detail.

As regards point 6, Ismet Pasha stubbornly maintained that he could not agree to any formula which would qualify the stipulation that foreign institutions must be governed by Turkish law. It was pointed out by myself and my colleagues that something was necessary to protect institutions against unreasonable action such as would destroy their fundamental character. Ismet Pasha relented to the extent of admitting that provision might be made for certain specific points, and it was decided to refer the matter back to the Sub-Committee. We pointed out to Ismet Pasha that there was no disagreement on the question of principle involved, and that if only his representative

[2] Not printed. [3] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 89. [4] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 90–2.

on the Sub-Committee were given power to negotiate a formula it should be possible to find a solution. We insisted on this point because the failure of the Sub-Committee to reach an agreement is largely due to the fact that the Turkish delegate had apparently had no latitude whatsoever.

As regards point 7, Ismet Pasha refused to say anything except that the creation of new institutions must be governed entirely by the provisions of Turkish law. We vainly pointed out to him that he was not asked to enter into any commitment beyond an admission that the question of such new establishments might be discussed between the Turkish government and the Powers concerned. We could not move him from this position, and when we asked point-blank whether his attitude meant that Turkey intended not to authorise the creation of any new establishments, he screened himself behind a reaffirmation of what he had said already to the effect that the matter would be entirely one to be decided in accordance with Turkish law.

Ismet Pasha was, if possible, even more unbending as regards point 8. He maintained that it was entirely inequitable to ask for any continuance of customs immunities. It was finally agreed that all the points at issue should be reconsidered by the Sub-Committee subject to a reservation on Ismet Pasha's part, especially as regards point 8, that he could not agree to any privileged treatment of foreign institutions.

This sterile debate left the question of the future of foreign institutions exactly where it was yesterday when the report of the Sub-Committee was drawn up. We are asking for extremely little, but the Turks do not want to commit themselves even to that little because their attitude towards foreign institutions, and especially schools, is based on extreme nationalism, and they view with implacable hostility the activity of schools which give a foreign or semi-foreign education to large numbers of native children. I fear that the position of all foreign schools and, in a lesser degree, other institutions will be one of great difficulty for some time to come. It is, however, necessary to reach an agreement. I think we shall have to give way on point 4. So far as I know, there are no Roumanian or Yugo-Slavian institutions involved, and the Turks will not be prepared to commit themselves in any way as regards Hellenic institutions of which there are probably a certain number. So far as I am concerned, I do not propose to press point 7 any further. I should be very sorry to see any new British institutions started in present conditions, and, if things should improve later, we can always take the question up with the Turkish government, whatever Ismet may say now. I propose also to get my colleagues to drop point 8, as I do not think we can defend the request for customs immunities to which only the French and Italians attach importance. I shall endeavour to arrive at some formula to cover point 6, as the present attitude of the Turks makes it very important that we should at least have some ground of diplomatic action if they should push their hostility to existing institutions too far.

At the end of this morning's meeting, I urged everyone concerned to collaborate in enabling me to dispose of as many outstanding points as possible and also to take the Convention concerning the Régime for Foreigners

at my next meeting on May 19th. This morning's meeting, disheartening as it was, has prepared the ground, and I hope to be able to report better progress with the remaining work of my Committee in three days' time.

No. 524

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 18, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 69 Telegraphic [E 5069/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 18, 1923, 3 a.m.*

My telegram No. 65.[1]

I saw Ismet this morning.[2] He asked me whether I could report any progress in the matter of Greco-Turkish reparations question but I replied that as he wished to see me I had come to hear what he had to say.

He said position as between himself and M. Veniselos was that he could not accept latter's formula which only contemplated moral satisfaction for Turkey. Turkey must have some form of reparation.

After again explaining to Ismet that it was impossible for Greece to pay any indemnity having regard to her financial situation and that therefore it was useless to insist on this, I asked him what he had meant by an expression he had used when I had last seen him, 'that Greece should give some proof of goodwill in this matter'. He replied that he had meant that Greece should make some practical proposal and on my pressing him said that this proposal might be something in lieu of cash. For instance Greece had ships. He said that if Greece made a practical proposal he would examine it carefully. He added that he was not in favour of a reference to arbitration of Greco-Turkish reparations question because it was desirable to get question settled straight away. I reminded him that basis on which Turks had suggested reference to arbitration was quite different from Greek basis. Finally he said that if Greeks made an acceptable proposal it was clearly understood that Turks would definitely drop their demand for reparations.

Having listened to him I told him that I would inform M. Veniselos of what he had said and personally I understood that he was to see M. Veniselos himself in the meantime. He confirmed this.

I subsequently informed M. Veniselos of my conversation with Ismet. M. Veniselos said that he was still without a reply from Athens with regard to his proposal for cession of Karagatch and small triangle between Maritza and Arda[3] (there is no question of cession of Demotika). He explained that in the absence of a reply from Athens his hands were tied and all he could do was to ask Ismet for a reply to his proposed formula providing moral satisfaction for Turkey. He could not make a fresh proposal to Turkey but he might bring Ministry of Foreign Affairs to point of making revision of suggestion. I told M. Veniselos that I could not usefully intervene any further in this matter for the present and although I did not of course say

[1] No. 521. [2] May 17. [3] See Nos. 521 and 522.

so to him I may say that I find role of mediator between Greeks and Turks in this matter anything but satisfactory as I have greatest difficulty in ascertaining exactly what has passed between the two.

I took an opportunity of informing M. Veniselos of contents of Athens telegram No. 64 [*sic*][4] and said that it was a great pity that Greek Prime Minister should have referred to eventuality of recalling Greek delegates from Lausanne. I said that such statements combined with alarmist telegrams appearing in Greek press or telegraphed from Lausanne were calculated to create difficult situation. No object was to be gained by exaggerating matters.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

[4] The reference is presumably to Athens telegram No. 169 of May 16 to the Foreign Office, repeated to Lausanne, which referred to No. 505, and continued: 'Prime Minister has issued official statement regarding interview between Monsieur Veniselos and Ismet report of which I presume has reached you direct from Lausanne. Prime Minister added that tomorrow Monsieur Veniselos was to receive Ismet's reply on the question of indemnity which would then be submitted to conference. Only if conference were to insist on Greece paying indemnity to Turkey would former recall her delegates from Lausanne.'

No. 525

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 18, 1.55 p.m.)
No. 176 Telegraphic [E 5075/6/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *May 18, 1923, 11.30 a.m.*

My telegram No. 175.[1]

When I warned Monsieur Politis last night against danger of resumption of hostilities instancing disillusionment of Germany in 1914 he declared that Greeks were absolutely confident of being able to reach Chatalja easily. They had nothing to fear either from Turkey or Bolsheviks and everything to gain by recovery of Eastern Thrace with a shorter line to guard. The one restraining factor was desire not to act contrary to wishes of powers and particularly of England.

Sent to Lausanne. Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 522.

No. 526

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 178 Telegraphic [E 5087/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 18, 1923, 2 p.m.*

Confidential

Military Attaché saw yesterday chiefs of naval and general staffs and head of second bureau of general staff.

Chief of naval staff said that shipping amounting to 60,000 tons requisitioned two to three months ago was ready and sufficient for all military needs. He hoped for early peace but thought a little war first would be good.

Chief of the general staff, who spoke to Military Attaché a few days ago gravely of Greek situation, assured him definitely yesterday that he knew of no movements of troops in Thrace and Macedonia and was confident that none except local movements of small bodies had been made without his knowledge. All preparations had been made for advance and army was ready but troops were remaining in their positions on front. Even if Monsieur Veniselos and Minister for Foreign Affairs left the conference it would not necessarily mean war. General Pangalos and army would obey government which would conform to wishes of allies. If allies gave sanction, Greece would fight. If they told Greece not to advance army certainly would not think of forcing allied sentries on Maritza. But Greece would not pay an indemnity.

Head of second bureau believed that there would be peace because both Turks and Greeks wanted it. He said in confidence that the only people in Greece who wanted war were General Pangalos and chief of the revolution and some of their friends for political reasons.

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

No. 527

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 74 Telegraphic [E 5094/6/44]

Confidential LAUSANNE, *May 18, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Messieurs Veniselos and Alexandris have just informed me that Greek government have given them . . .[1] offer Karagatch and small triangle between rivers Maritza and Arda in last resort to Turks provided this offer effects immediate settlement of big outstanding question of reparations between Turkey and Greece and that Turkey definitely drop[s] [her] demand for reparations from Greece. They added that telegram from Greek government had been sent after mature deliberation by a cabinet council at which General Pangalos was present.

Two ministers then asked how they should proceed. I told them that I had discussed question with my colleagues this morning in all its bearings but that my hands had been tied by my inability to hint at what the Greeks were prepared to offer in last resort. I had informed my colleagues of my conversations with Ismet[2] on the subject and had told them that I had derived impression that Ismet now realised that he could not hope to get any cash from Greece but that he could not return to Angora without something in place of cash. At this point Monsieur Veniselos said that his

[1] The text is here uncertain. [2] See No. 524.

impression coincided with mine. I went on to say that my colleagues and I had decided that General Pellé should now intervene as President of committee concerned and that if he could not get Turks to drop their demand for an indemnity or if both parties reject alternative (c) contemplated by London conference[3] either Turks or Greeks must be induced to make a proposal for settlement of question. We could not tolerate a deadlock which would be dangerous.

Question now was how to proceed and I pointed out to two Greek ministers that idea of proposing cession of Karagatch would never enter the head of Turks or my allied colleagues. Monsieur Veniselos then said that he would see General Pellé at once and tell him as from himself and without mentioning Greek government in any way that he would be prepared to cede Karagatch and above mentioned small triangle to Turks as a condition of immediate settlement of reparations question. He would suggest that General Pellé should in his turn mention suggestion to Turks as coming from the General himself. Monsieur Veniselos was to tell General Pellé that he had mentioned matter to me. If Turks accepted proposal Monsieur Veniselos would inform General Pellé that he would telegraph to Greek government for authority to confirm it.

I regret that my repeated efforts to induce Ismet to agree to one or other of solutions proposed in London have failed and that we may have to fall back on territorial adjustment.

Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

[3] See No. 457.

No. 528

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 179 Telegraphic [*E 5085/6/44*]

Urgent ATHENS, *May 18, 1923, 8 p.m.*

My telegram No. 175.[1]

Italian chargé d'affaires has to-day received his instructions. He read to me telegram from Lausanne in which Monsieur Montagna hinted at pressure being put on Greeks by Allies to force them to yield to Turkish demand for reparation. Italian chargé d'affaires agrees with me that this would be most unjust and that it would also assume grave responsibility on our part for even if it prevented war it would almost certainly provoke another and more disastrous revolution.

I venture to remind you that Monsieur Montagna is violently hostile to the present régime in Greece and I fear this hostility may warp his judgment [and] also that chargé d'affaires can scarcely be expected to take strong line against proposals of his ex-chief.

[1] No. 522.

With reference to suggestion in Lausanne telegram No. 69[2] I feel sure that Greek government could never surrender merchant marine which is the life blood of Greece and public opinion would certainly prefer war.

Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne.

[2] No. 524.

No. 529

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received May 19, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 299 Telegraphic [E 5092/6/44]

Urgent CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 18, 1923, 11.55 p.m.*

My telegram No. 297.[1]

Meeting of allied generals, admirals and acting-High Commissioners was held to-day to discuss policy in the event of renewal of Turco-Greek hostilities as result of Greek advance.

It was decided to ask for definite expression of views of three governments as to whether

(A) They accept commissions of allied generals as based on military considerations and set forth in General Harington's telegrams to War Office and in appreciation contained in my despatch No. 293 which should reach Foreign Office on May 20th.[2]

(B) Whether they for political or other reasons regard allied forces here as responsible not only for safety of allied nationals, but also for that of whole city and population.

In the event of allied governments accepting (A) action will be taken in accordance with generals' proposals namely, evacuation after securing safety of allied nationals. We would endeavour to come to arrangement with Turks accordingly.

Should however allied governments consider Constantinople cannot honourably or without serious loss of prestige be abandoned, meeting decided that best course in that eventuality would be to ask Turks to sign convention recognising neutrality under allied protection and control, of a restricted zone round Constantinople say from Stenia to San Stefano.

In return for acceptance of that proposal Turks would obtain valuable advantages of securing allied neutrality, free passage for their troops from

[1] Of May 16. This referred to General Harington's telegrams to the War Office (see for example, No. 517, n. 2) and continued: 'While I fully realize that we must be ultimately guided by military considerations... I cannot but feel strongly that if it be militarily possible and even at a certain risk, allied forces should not evacuate Constantinople. In a conflict between Turks and Greeks in Europe its fate would otherwise be likely to be that of Smyrna and I would not wish to expose city and population to that danger except as last resort and in case of force majeure.'

[2] Of May 15, not printed.

Asia to Eastern Thrace by approved route, liberty for Turkish troops in Constantinople to join Refet Pasha's forces in Thrace as well as knowledge that Greek warships and transports will not be granted passage through Dardanelles.

Obvious risks entailed by this course would be:

1. Refusal of Turks to accept this compromise.

2. Danger of incidents in Constantinople itself as result of disloyal execution of it by Turks and

3. Danger of refusal of Greeks if victorious to stop outside neutral zone.

First two would mean conflict with Turkey and third with Greece.

Such neutrality would admittedly be more favourable to Turks than Greeks since latter would be refused any passage through Dardanelles whereas restriction on passage of Bosphorus for Turks would only be limited. But it seems hardly possible to preserve strictly impartial neutrality if allied troops are to remain in Constantinople.

Meeting was unanimously of opinion that Dardanelles must be held in any event but admirals enquired whether, in the event of war, allied warships should remain as at present in Smyrna.

I have shown above telegram to General Harington and my allied colleagues are telegraphing in similar sense to their governments.[3] I cannot but believe refusal to allow passage of Turks to Europe would involve us in war with Turkey. On the other hand I do not believe Greece would attempt any folly if it were made clear to her that her action would lead her into open conflict with the Allies.

Sent to Lausanne No. 110. Repeated to Athens No. 56.

[3] In his telegram No. 3902 of May 18, to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'Opinion is held by French and Italian High Commissioners that Turks would agree to effective control of city being resumed by us and would abide by our orders and restrictions as regards entry and passage of Turkish troops. They think control would be renounced by Turks in our favour in exchange for our preventing Greeks entering Straits. Frankly, I do not think Turks would agree and, in any case, I should place no reliance in any promise made by Turks to observe our orders. It would be certain to lead to incidents. Bearing in mind that the Turk has an army in the field nearly three times size of Greek, I cannot conceive him suddenly renouncing all his claims of sovereignty and independence and accepting our orders with Greek advancing on his capital. If Greek should arrive at gate, should we stop him? If responsibility for law and order was accepted by us we should have to, and should then certainly get embroiled with both. Similarly, if responsibility for Christian population is accepted by us and we collect them within ringed fence we should have to feed them and have no means whatever. Only measure to take, in my opinion, is to stand aside but suppress at once any attempt to massacre and, as soon as evacuation of Nationals is completed, to withdraw to Straits.'

No. 530

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 20, 9 a.m.)
No. 184 Telegraphic [E 5090/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 19, 1923, 9 p.m.*

My telegram No. 169.[1]

Prime Minister made another statement to press again threatening withdrawal of Greek delegate if powers yielded to Turkish demands for indemnity. Greece he added would not act contrary to the wishes of the powers but if Turkey pushed their uncompromising attitude to the extent of provoking war he hoped that inasmuch as war would serve interests of allies even better than those of Greece, allies would not be acting in opposition to their own interests.

This latter point is I think expressive of general opinion in Greece.[2]

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

[1] See No. 524, n. 4.

[2] In his telegram No. 188 of May 21, Mr. Bentinck stated: 'In my humble opinion, viewing situation from this end, in waiving reparations (? to) allies may lie only hope of getting Turks to drop demand for (? reparations) from Greece. I do not know whether anyone really hopes to extract reparations from Turkey nor am I in a position to judge how far French and Italians are sincerely desirous of preventing resumption of hostilities. But if they are sincere might not pressure be brought to bear to persuade them to agree to waive demand for reparations for every day's delay makes situation here more critical and difficult to control?'

No. 531

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 185 Telegraphic [E 5091/6/44]

Urgent ATHENS, *May 19, 1923, 9 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 299, last sentence.[1]

As already reported I feel convinced that Greece will not do anything which would lead her into conflict with the Allies and that one word from Your Lordship could hold up victorious Greek army outside Constantinople provided, of course, that the Turks were not massacring Christians inside.[2] But I trust if war becomes inevitable we shall stand aside and see fair play (see my telegram No. 179[3]) and not deprive the Greeks of the use of their fleet by closing the Dardanelles to them.

[1] No. 529.

[2] In his telegram No. 187 of May 21, Mr. Bentinck reported further: 'I am told, and am inclined to credit, that idea in military circles is, in the event of hostilities, to advance on Chatalja. . . . On reaching Chatalja Greeks would claim great victory and then again approach allies before continuing advance. If Turks resist at Chatalja Greeks would attack but would ask consent of allies before entering Constantinople.' [3] No. 528.

Confidential. I know Greeks are most anxious regarding Dardanelles. Presence of two Greek divisions and shipping ready at Leftora and Cavalla seems to favour the idea that Greeks would endeavour to turn Turkish flank by landing troops necessary on south coast of Eastern Thrace. Military Attaché has heard from a doubtful source that a landing is intended at Kalli Kratia.

In spite of statement of chief of naval staff (my telegram No. 178[4]) it is perhaps significant that four or five small ships were requisitioned yesterday and that two large Greek trans-atlantic liners at Piraeus not due to leave for several weeks have gone to the expense of raising steam.

Sent to Lausanne. Repeated to Constantinople.

[4] No. 526.

No. 532

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 21, 8.20 a.m.)
No. 78 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5105/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 19, 1923*

The Second Committee met yesterday morning.[1]

The Sub-Committee, appointed on May 14th to consider the sanitary clauses, ha[s] produced an agreed report[2] as the result of two meetings. I am sending a copy of this report and the agreed text annexed to it by King's Messenger (my despatch No. 55 of May 18th).[3] I consider the settlement as satisfactory as could have been hoped for. Riza Nour, with whom the agreement was reached in Sub-Committee, deserves credit for having lived up to his promises in the Main Committee on May 14th.[4] The declaration substituted for the major part of Articles 129 and 130 is a great improvement on that originally proposed by the Turks, and gives full effect to the decisions taken in London in March.[5] What remains in the treaty of Articles 129 and 130 and Articles 132 and 133 have been only slightly modified and call for no comment. Article 131 threatened to cause difficulty. The formula eventually agreed for the concluding sentence of this article was proposed by the British delegation and satisfied all parties, as it leaves all contentious questions to the future and provides a practical machinery for dealing with them when they have to be thrashed out.

The report was approved by the committee, subject to the inscription in the Minutes of the following two points.

1. It was agreed to place on record a voeu [*sic*] of the conference that the balance of the funds after liquidation should be devoted to the sanitary needs

[1] *Recueil (2)*, vol. i, pp. 215–18.
[2] Of May 17. Ibid., pp. 219–20.
[3] Not printed.
[4] See No. 515.
[5] See No. 445.

of Turkey, special mention being made of the requirements of international defence and of the need of restoring lazarets to proper condition.

2. Attention was drawn to the discriminatory effect of Articles 1 and 2 of the Turkish law of July 16th, 1921 (see my despatch No. 62 of May 19th enclosing Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 79 of May 8th[6]) and Riza Nour gave assurances which were recorded in the minutes that, when peace was made, steps would be taken to establish equality of treatment for all shipping.

We then took Section 3 of the Financial Clauses. It was agreed to refer Article 65 to the experts, after a short discussion in the course of which Zekiai Bey admitted that Turkey could not claim properties which had been transferred from the civil list to the ministry of finance, but maintained that anything which had remained the property of the civil list could not be taken over by the governments of detached territories without compensation. It was pointed out to him that there must be a distinction between Crown property and property, if any, belonging to Imperial personages personally. It was agreed that this point could only be satisfactorily thrashed out between the experts, to whom the Turkish delegation were invited to produce a list of the properties in detached territories, the transfer of which is claimed by them to necessitate compensation.

At a meeting of the financial experts which immediately followed the meeting of the Main Committee, Zekiai seemed disposed to accept the text contained in my telegram No. 77 of the 18th instant.[7] As the Turks admit that the civil list property transferred to the state in 1908 and 1909, which comprises all or nearly all the civil list property in Iraq and Palestine, shall pass without payment, no serious difficulty should arise on this article.

Article 66 was maintained.

Articles 67 to 69 were reserved for consideration in connection with the re-drafting of the reparation clauses.

Article 70 was referred to the experts, after Zekiai had vainly attempted to maintain that everything in it came within the scope of the negotiations between Concessionary Companies and the Angora government. He was forced to admit that the article was of more general scope, and he himself suggested that it should be left to the experts to sift out what should be dealt with in the Concessionaries' negotiations, and what remained to be dealt with in the treaty.

This article had already been discussed informally between Hassan Bey and the financial experts. Hassan seemed ready to agree

[6] Not printed.

[7] This ran: 'Les États, en faveur desquels un territoire est détaché de l'Empire ottoman par le prèsent traitè, acquerront gratuitement tous biens et propriétés de l'Empire ottoman situés dans ce territoire. Il est entendu que les biens et propriétés, dont le transfert de la liste civile au Gouvernement ottoman fut ordonné par les iradés de septembre 1324 (1908) et du 20 avril 1325 (3 mai 1909), sont compris parmi les biens et propriétés visés par l'alinéa précédent. Les biens et propriétés de la liste civile non visés par ladite loi seront considérés comme propriété privée.'

(1) that the advances made by the Debt Council and others to the Constantinople government should be repaid out of the gold sequestrated in 1919,[8] and

(2) that the letter to the Debt Council declaring their past actions during the Constantinople régime null and void[9] should be withdrawn.

Yesterday afternoon Zekiai seemed ready to agree that an addition should be made to Article 89 whereby contracts made by the Constantinople government would be confirmed or compensation paid, and that in any case payments made to the Constantinople government would not have to be paid over again to the Angora government.

If these suggestions are endorsed by the Turks, it may be possible to agree to suppress Article 70.

[8] See No. 140. [9] See *The Times*, October 21, 1922, p. 10.

No. 533

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 21, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 81 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5108/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 19, 1923*

First Committee met this morning[1] to deal with various outstanding questions.

Article 19 (Cyprus). The British and Turkish legal experts had agreed on a re-draft of this article which is understood to satisfy the Colonial Office. The article as re-drafted (see my despatch No. 59 of May 19th[2]) was adopted.

Article 26. The following re-draft of this article, prepared by the Drafting Committee in the light of the observations made at the recent meeting of the First Committee, was adopted:

'Les Hautes Parties Contractantes déclarent accepter, chacune en ce qui concerne, l'abolition complète des capitulations en Turquie à tous les points de vue.'

Article 35. The French delegation said that they wished to reopen the question of the drafting of Article 35 regarding the acquisition of Palestinian nationality by non-Ottoman Jews, although the article was not technically open to re-discussion as it was accepted by the Turks. They said they wished to complete the article by the addition of some such phrase as 'sous condition de se conformer à la loi nationale'. I reserved the point and am telegraphing separately on the subject to-day.[3]

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 93–103.

[2] Not printed. For the draft of the article, see *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 104.

[3] Lausanne telegram No. 83 of May 19. This ran: 'Object of this addition is to provide that French Jews in Palestine may not acquire Palestinian nationality until they have performed their military service obligations in France.

'The Colonial Office originally asked, as they will remember, for the insertion of Article 35 in the treaty in order to give a certain political support to Sir H. Samuel for the special

The Drafting Committee (see my despatch No. 49 of May 18th)[4] had circulated a note[5] on certain aspects of the first of the three articles which the Turks proposed to add at the end of the treaty dealing with the protection of Wakf properties in Serbia, Greece and the Aegean Islands. Although my committee had rejected the Turkish article, so far as Serbia and Greece were concerned, on the ground that the minority treaties of these two countries offered adequate safeguards, the Turkish expert on the Drafting Committee had convinced his colleagues that the relevant articles in these two minority treaties were not, on paper, quite adequate. Whilst explaining that the Drafting Committee were not technically competent to re-open this question, I asked the Serbian and Greek delegations for their observations. M. Yovanovitch protested against the action of the Drafting Committee, and referred again to the written declaration[6] which he had made on this subject at the recent meeting of the First Committee[7] and which is inscribed in the minutes, and to the provisions of the Serbian Constitution and the minority treaty protecting Wakf properties in Serbia. He explained that his expert had discussed the whole question at great length with Munir Bey and that he regarded the proposed Turkish article as definitely rejected. M. Veniselos, while supporting his Serbian colleague's remarks, said that as an expert on this question himself, he was willing to attend the Drafting Committee and satisfy the Turkish representative that the Greek Minority Treaty and Constitution gives all the protection required by Turkey. Ismet Pasha, after pointing out that Serbia and Greece were in different positions, as in the former case the Minority Treaty had been ratified and had entered into force, while in the latter case it had only been ratified by Greece, accepted M. Veniselos's proposal. I formally rejected the article again so far as Serbia was concerned.

The committee then considered the final report[8] of the special committee of experts regarding schools and religious institutions etc. in Turkey. A copy of this report follows in my despatch No. 60 of May 19th.[9] As foreshadowed in my telegram No. 67 of May 17th,[10] I had decided to concentrate on obtaining from the Turkish delegation satisfaction regarding some addition to the Turkish assurances which would give us a basis for diplomatic representations should Turkish legislation in future interfere with the free working of these private foreign schools. As a result of the appeal which I had made at the last meeting of the First Committee,[11] the Turkish expert had been given

treatment in the matter of the acquisition of Palestinian nationality which he proposed to accord to foreign Jews in Palestine. To judge from Colonial Office letter enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 46 of May 16th [not printed], Sir H. Samuel now wishes to insert an article which does not specifically refer to Jews at all.

'In these circumstances, since the whole nationality section of the treaty has been agreed with the Turks and is technically not therefore open to re-discussion with them now and since the French delegation object to Article 35 in its present form, I propose with the consent of the Colonial Office to omit the whole article from the treaty.'

[4] Not printed. [5] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, p. 105. [6] Ibid., p. 106.
[7] See No. 511. [8] Of May 18. See *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 107–8.
[9] Not printed. [10] No. 523. [11] See ibid.

greater latitude and had agreed to the following addition to the third paragraph of the declaration:

'Il est entendu toutefois que le gouvernement turc tiendra compte des conditions du fonctionnement de ces établissements et, pour ce qui concerne les écoles, de l'organisation pratique de leur enseignement.'

In order to overcome the difficulty as regards discrimination between the greater and smaller Powers, the committee had agreed to recommend that instead of articles in the convention for foreigners or an unilateral declaration by Turkey attached to that convention, the whole question should be dealt with in identic notes to be addressed by Ismet Pasha to the Presidents of the three allied delegations here. This suggestion was adopted by the committee as well as the whole report of the experts. In order to remove the one difficulty left outstanding by the latter, my allied colleagues and I waived our demand for the exemption from customs duties on the importation into Turkey during a temporary period of articles required by these institutions. Both sides also formally reserved their points of view regarding the right of the allied governments in future to open negotiations with the Turkish government regarding the creation of new schools in Turkish territory. I regard this solution as containing the best terms obtainable in the circumstances. Few new foreign schools will wish to start operations in Turkey in the future and the identic note will give the allied governments a sufficient basis for diplomatic representations if their existing institutions are damaged by Turkish legislation.

The committee then discussed a note[12] by the Drafting Committee upon the Amnesty Declaration (see my despatch No. 50 of May 18th[13]). The sentence which the Drafting Committee proposed to add to paragraph 1 of the declaration was meant to extend the benefits of the declaration to Turkish and Greek subjects who had already left Turkish or Greek territory, while protecting any infringement of the Exchange of Populations Convention,[14] so far as the return to Turkey of Greeks coming within the scope of that convention is concerned. Both my allied colleagues and I took the opportunity, however, to raise the question of the difficulties now being made by the Turkish government in connection with the return to Turkey of Greeks, Armenians and others who left Turkey and, in particular, Constantinople last autumn. We pointed out that various Greeks and Armenians who had left Constantinople during the panic of last October and November had been furnished with British, French and Italian papers in the place of Turkish passports which they could never have procurred in the circumstances then prevailing. According to a recent Turkish decree no Turkish subject who had left Turkey without a proper Turkish passport was to be allowed to return. Many of these Turkish subjects were people of influence and considerable wealth. Their properties were now being treated as abandoned properties owing to the inability of the owners to return. My colleagues and I urged Ismet Pasha to repair this injustice and to interpret the amnesty in

[12] Of May 16. See *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, p. 109.

[13] Not printed.

[14] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53.

the widest possible sense. We pointed out that many of these Turkish citizens were being kept as refugees by foreign governments who were thus relieving Turkey of her proper responsibilities. Ismet Pasha promised to look into the question of the passport decree and said that in general the Turks wished to carry out their engagements fully and to interpret the amnesty declaration in a broad sense.

In the course of the discussion both Signor Montagna and M. Veniselos pointed out that Articles 2 and 16 of the Exchange of Populations Convention fully provided for the right to return to Turkey of Greeks resident in Constantinople and therefore in an area not covered by the Exchange of Populations Convention, who might have left Turkey.

I finally suggested that the first paragraph prepared by the Drafting Committee should be completed by the addition of the words 'par le fait des traités', and Ismet Pasha agreed that a committee of experts should examine this, together with the other points in the Amnesty Declaration which are raised below on the Drafting Committee's report.

Three alternative formulas had been prepared by the Drafting Committee to deal with the question of the liberation of Turkish subjects arrested or prosecuted in occupied territory by the Allied Powers. Ismet Pasha preferred the first of these formulas with the omission, however, of the phrase limiting the scope of the article to those Turks who had been carried off from Turkey. He objected to the other two formulas on the ground that the phrase 'all acts committed against the troops of occupation' admitted too wide a latitude of interpretation. I explained, of course, that we were only concerned with attempts against the lives of officers and soldiers of the allied occupying forces which was a very serious question. It was agreed that the experts should study the three formulas. Meanwhile I am telegraphing to General Harington for his views.[15]

In paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Amnesty Declaration it was agreed to substitute the Council of the League of Nations for the President of the Hague Court of International Justice as the authority designed to select the arbitrator.

With regard to the protocol which the Turks wished to attach to the Amnesty Declaration excepting the 150 Turks from the scope of the declaration, I emphasised again the undesirability of thus deviating from the provisions of a full amnesty. As, however, the principle of such exception had already been accepted by the conference, I said that I would only ask that the protocol should be worded so as to make it quite clear that the proclamation to be eventually published by the Turkish government regarding this Amnesty should name specifically all these Turks who were to be exempt from its benefits. Ismet Pasha regretted that the Turkish delegation were forced to maintain their request for these exceptions, but agreed that the precise draft of the protocol should again be studied by an expert committee.

[15] Lausanne telegram No. 24 of May 20 to Constantinople, transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 73 of May 21, not printed.

M. Veniselos maintained his reserve regarding the extension of the Greek amnesty to offences against military discipline, and it was agreed that this point should also be considered by the special committee to which a Greek expert would be added.

I concluded the meeting by emphatically appealing to the other delegations present and to the Drafting Committee to expedite their conversations and reports on Articles 3(1), 16, 20, 25, 27 and the Convention d'Etablissement. I said that my committee would not meet until the latter convention had been finished by the Drafting Committee and probably not therefore until Saturday[16] next. There would be no meeting of a committee on Monday[17] in order to enable the various experts to catch us up. On Tuesday the Third Committee[18] will deal with certain reports which it is hoped the Economic Sub-Committee will by then have prepared, either on the second chapter of the Etablissement Convention or on the Commercial Convention.

The Second Committee can hardly meet again until private conversations on Greco-Turkish reparations have been exhausted or have reached a result, or until differences between Paris, London and Rome regarding general Turkish reparations question have been settled. Possibly, however, Hassan Bey, who has gone to Paris ostensibly to endeavour to negotiate a settlement with representatives of the bondholders regarding the currency in which Turkish debts are to be paid, may ask for a meeting of the Second Committee on his return, on this subject.

[16] May 26. [17] May 21. [18] See No. 543, below.

No. 534

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received May 21, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 82 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5096/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 19, 1923*

Although my committee has been unable as yet to settle the text of the few remaining articles in the political section of the treaty or to take the convention for the régime of foreigners, which is nearly ready, I think that the moment has now come to attempt to settle the four points outstanding other than the few articles in question, which are dealt with in my telegram No. 81.[1]

I therefore propose next week to try and induce the Turks to drop their demand for Castellorizo and Ada Kaleh on condition of our giving them the Merkeb Islands and possibly agreeing to the thalweg of the Maritza as the frontier, provided M. Veniselos has no objection. M. Veniselos recently suggested conceding the thalweg of the Maritza as a further inducement to the Turks to drop their demand for an indemnity from Greece.[2] It is clear that the thalweg cannot be used for two bargains.

[1] No. 533. [2] See No. 527.

We are waiting for the completion of the convention for the régime of foreigners to take up the question of judicial safeguards. The convention should be ready early next week. The failure of the French and Italians to get definite instructions from their governments is responsible for the delay in settling part of Article 3 and Articles 16, 20, 25 and 27.

No. 535

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 20, 9 a.m.)
No. 85 Telegraphic [E 5097/6/44]

Confidential LAUSANNE, *May 20, 1923, 1.30 a.m.*

My telegram No. 74.[1]

Before speaking to Ismet with regard to cession of Karagatch in return for a withdrawal by Turkey of her demand for an indemnity from Greece General Pellé who had in previous interview with Ismet tried to persuade him to accept one or other of the solutions proposed in London consulted me as to how he should put new suggestion. I said in my opinion he ought not to identify allies too closely with proposal but that he should put suggestion to Ismet in form of an enquiry.

General Pellé tells me that he broached the subject with Ismet this morning and derived impression that latter was gratified by proposal which he promised to telegraph at once to Angora. Ismet however at once asked General Pellé whether allies had dropped their demand for reparations from Turkey to which Pellé replied that he saw no connection between questions of reparations for allies and Greco-Turkish reparation.

In Turkish eyes of course two questions are connected and our case for urging Turks to drop demand for reparations from Greece is considered stronger if we ourselves waive reparations from Turkey. The fact that French and Italian governments have not yet definitely agreed to drop question of reparations from Turkey becomes increasingly awkward and unfortunate.

I rather gather from General Pellé's description of what he said to Ismet with reference to Karagatch that he did after all put it forward as an allied proposal which is I think regrettable.[2]

Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

[1] No. 527.

[2] In his telegram No. 196 of May 22, Mr. Bentinck stated: 'Report based on press telegrams from Lausanne is being circulated here that proposal for cession of Karagatch originated with Sir H. Rumbold.' Sir E. Crowe minuted this telegram on May 23 as follows: 'This is monstrous. The French first publish the Karagatch proposal thereby risking its effectiveness, and then attribute it to Sir H. Rumbold when they are perfectly aware that it did not originate with him.... Signor Mussolini has shown himself lately far more reliable and helpful than M. Poincaré who seems to be trying at Athens the double game that proved so disastrous at Angora.'

No. 536

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 29 Telegraphic [E 5136/1/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 21, 1923, 1.15 p.m.*

Turkish Reparations

Your telegrams Nos. 72 (of May 18th)[1] and 86 (of May 20th).[2]

1. We were prepared to accept French proposal[3] provided (1) that we should pay two, and French three, fifths of Italian compensation and (2) that Italian claims should be so reduced that greater part of the two millions should be available for satisfaction of our claims, as we shall have given up far more on expenses of occupation than Italy. It would have to be realized that Exchequer cannot find any money for payment of claimants on Turkey and Board of Trade would have to accept settlement on that basis and be able to defend the ratio of British to French payments.

2. Unfortunately French government have just withdrawn[4] their proposal without defining it further, alleging as reason that Italian opposition makes it inapplicable. They see no objection to Italian proposal,[5] that Great Britain should forego all share in the five million pounds, and failing this recommend either of the two other suggestions in French ambassador's note of May 12th.[6]

3. The proposals in the immediately preceding paragraph are of course entirely unacceptable to us. Would it be possible for your experts to discuss scheme in paragraph 1 of this telegram with French and Italians. We can see no other solution to this problem? We have no information here as to what French and Italian claims amount to.

Italian dependence on our support in respect of Castellorizo should greatly strengthen your hands.

[1] Not printed.

[2] This ran: 'I earnestly trust that it may be possible for you to send me further instructions in regard to Turkish reparation during the course of Monday. . . . I see no means of postponing a discussion about reparation any longer.'

[3] Contained in a Note of May 12 from the Comte Saint-Aulaire to Lord Curzon. This ran: 'La France désintéresserait ses ressortissants sur la somme transférée par l'Allmagne, en vertu de l'Article 259 du Traité de Versailles et qui se trouve à la Banque de France. L'Angleterre agirait de même vis à vis de ses nationaux sur la somme transférée par l'Autriche, en vertu de l'Article 210, du Traité de Saint-Germain. Les réparations des ressortissants italiens et qui s'éleveraient, d'après M. Nogara, à plus de Un Milliard, seraient couvertes moitié sur la part française et moitié sur la part anglaise.'

[4] In a Note dated May 17, not printed.

[5] See No. 514.

[6] See note 3, above. The other two suggestions were: (1) to revive the claim to the seven million pounds owed by Turkey to Germany and her allies, (2) to demand from Turkey seven million pounds on the reparation claimed from Greece.

No. 537

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 22, 2.35 p.m.)
No. 90 Telegraphic [E 5196/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 22, 1923, 12.10 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 29.[1]

I arranged meeting with my French and Italian colleagues last night in order to discuss situation as explained in your telegram. I said that it would be impossible to delay discussion of question on Allied reparation in second committee much longer as Greeks would properly insist on discussing article 58 of Greco-Turkish reparation the moment Ismet has reply to his telegram and this would involve discussion of article 57 of Allied reparation. If my French and Italian colleagues acting on their present instructions revived reparation claim I should be bound to remain silent and Turks would know that Allied unity of front had been broken. My colleagues agreed that it was essential to avoid this and promised at once to telegraph to their governments for instructions. I said that I hoped that would make real question at issue clear. Everyone agreed that there is now no chance of obtaining reparation from Turks and only question is whether my French colleague and Italian colleagues shall put forward without my support a demand which they will ultimately have to drop again. I also trusted that there would not be a moment's avoidable delay. I urged that the immediate need is to decide on our attitude . . .[2] Turks and that inter-Allied arrangements of dividing £5,000,000 should be left to be settled later. It is, however, possible that French and Italian governments will now put forward suggestion that we should contribute to reparation pool Turkish Treasury bills for £846,000 which Treasury bought from construction groups in 1914 when ships were requisitioned as these bills were delivered to construction group in lieu of cash and as Treasury bills are available without a vote it seems not unreasonable to ask us to carry out to this extent arrangement originally contemplated in February for contributing ship money to reparation pool.[3] These Treasury bills are included in table of Ottoman public debt to be distributed but it seems doubtful if Turks will pay their share (80%) at any rate as long as bills are held by us since we took ships without payment. Our Allies are aware of doubtful value of this asset but may suggest it as better than nothing.[4]

Waley asks that, to save delay, Treasury may be informed of his personal view is that above proposal should be accepted if it will put an end to present deadlock which is hanging up whole work of Conference, but that he has in no way committed Treasury to agree to it.

[1] No. 536. [2] The text is here uncertain. [3] See No. 370 and No. 451, n. 7.

[4] In his telegram No. 94 of May 23, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'I am informed that General Pellé telegraphed to Paris recommending Treasury bill arrangement and that Signor Montagna telegraphed to Rome to suggest that his government should consult French Ambassador there. I also learn that Italian government may be unwilling to propose Treasury bill arrangement unless they know it will be accepted.' Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), No. 52.

No. 538

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 22, 6.15 p.m.)
No. 91 Telegraphic [E 5201/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 22, 1923, 3.40 p.m.*

Confidential

Serbian Minister at Berne, who represents Serbia at Lausanne Conference, informs me that he had returned to Berne yesterday when Ismet sent him three separate and urgent messages asking him to return to Lausanne at once. An interview took place between them last night at which Ismet began by talking about Greco-Turkish reparations. Serbian Minister said that Turkey could not hope to get any money from Greece and that Allies had waived their demands for reparations from Turkey. Ismet had better, therefore, drop demand for an indemnity from Greece. Ismet hinted at possibility of some arrangement to take place of cash. He then came to his main purpose in seeking an interview which was to ask whether Serbian Minister could reassure Turkish government as to attitude of Serbia in the event of resumption of hostilities between Turkey and Greece. Serbian Minister inferred that Ismet was acting on instructions.

Ismet protested pacific intentions of his country but added that hostilities might break out owing to attitude of Greeks. Serbian Minister in reply to a demand as to whether Serbia would remain neutral in the event of hostilities stated that he could not give any such assurance and that he did not know what his government would do in the circumstances. Once a war was started in the Balkans, Serbs might be drawn into conflict. He strongly advised Ismet not to risk any further adventures in which Turkey stood to lose (? a great deal) (? of her) (? territory). Moreover, Turkey's strategical position in Europe was bad. Ismet replied that Turks had a little passage out of which they could pass troops into Europe. Serbian Minister assumed that this meant the Bosphorous. Serbian Minister assures me that he did his best to disillusion Ismet and thinks that he produced a considerable impression on the latter.[1]

Serbian Minister says that in a previous conversation which he had with Ismet on May 17th on the subject of Turco-Greek reparations the latter was much more intractable. Serbian Minister added unofficially that Bulgarian delegate here, Todoroff, is seeing a good deal of Ismet and, he fears, is encouraging him to hope for assistance from Bulgarian bands in the event of a renewal of war between Turkey and Greece.[2]

Repeated to Constantinople, Athens, Belgrade, Sofia.

[1] In his telegram No. 39 of May 26, Lord Curzon replied: 'Serbian minister spoke wisely and his words may have considerable effect.'

[2] In his telegram No. 100 of May 24, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'M. Todoroff unofficial Bulgarian agent here called to-day to say that he had heard that there were reports in circulation . . . to the effect that he, Todoroff, was encouraging Ismet in his demands on Greece. He wished to give me formal assurance, which he hoped I would repeat to you, that the exact contrary was the case and he had never ceased impressing on Ismet the

necessity for signing peace as soon as possible. . . . Having heard of proposed cession of Karagatch to Turkey Todoroff had informed Ismet that this would not suit Bulgaria at all.' Mr. Erskine commented, in Sofia telegram No. 38 of May 25: 'It is most unlikely that Bulgarian government are encouraging Turks. I believe they do not desire renewal of hostilities which may lead to violation of Bulgarian territory and must cause them much anxiety and expense in guarding frontier.'

No. 539

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 23, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 195 Telegraphic [E 5225/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 22, 1923, 9.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 190.[1]

French Minister yesterday spoke to Prime Minister in the sense of his instructions which did not include penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 77.[2] Prime Minister gave assurances similar to those already given to me,[3] adding that in proof of pacific intentions Greek government were willing to agree to slight rectification of frontier.

Press today draws attention to fact that French Minister's démarche was not as categorical as that of my Italian colleague[4] and myself. News of démarche has caused great disappointment in press generally as it is considered likely to stiffen Turkish obduracy.

Repeated to Constantinople and Lausanne.

[1] Of May 21, not printed. [2] No. 518. [3] See Nos. 520, 522 and 525.
[4] See No. 528.

No. 540

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 93 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5267/6/44]

Confidential LAUSANNE, *May 22, 1923*

M. Veniselos came this morning to say that directly the Greco-Turkish reparations question had been settled and was out of the way he meant to ask for the approval of the allied powers to the conclusion of immediate preliminaries of peace between Greece and Turkey. Whilst he felt certain that peace between the allies and Turkey was assured, the actual signature and ratification of the treaty might take two or three months. It was most urgent that Greece should have immediate peace with Turkey if only for the following three reasons:

1. That Greece should be able to get back the 80,000–100,000 Greek males[1] kept back by the Turks at the time of the exodus of Ottoman Greeks from Asia Minor, in order that these males should rejoin the remnants of their families. The treatment to which Greek prisoners of war had been subjected in Asia Minor was causing the Greek government the greatest anxiety regarding the welfare of the above-mentioned males.

2. To enable the Exchange of Populations Agreement[2] to come into force, whereby the Greeks would get rid of a large number of Turks.

3. To allow the Greek government to demobilise a considerable portion of the Greek army and so relieve the Greek Exchequer of an intolerable burden. M. Veniselos thought that it would be possible to reduce the Greek army in Western Thrace from nine to four divisions.

M. Veniselos explained that, if the allied powers agreed to the above-mentioned suggestion, which he would only put forward to the allied delegations here after the Greco-Turkish reparations question had been settled, it would be possible to take out of the present treaty such articles as specifically and exclusively referred to Greece, leaving the convention for the régime of foreigners, the commercial convention and the economic clauses to be concluded by the conference. M. Veniselos said that he had not mentioned the above proposal to anybody but myself.

[1] See No. 202. [2] See Cmd. 1814, pp. 817–27.

No. 541

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 95 Telegraphic [E 5310/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 24, 1923, 1.10 a.m.*

My telegram No. 93.[1]

Idea underlying M. Veniselos'[s] suggestion appears to be twofold.

1. Doubt as to his ability to restrain war party in Greece indefinitely and desire of both on this account and for financial reasons to hasten possibility of demobilizing Greek army.

2. Desire to end situation in which relations between Turkey and Greece are constantly at the mercy of waves of feeling like those created by Bank of Athens incident,[2] state of returned prisoners of war and indemnity question.

It is difficult not to sympathize with this attitude.

I understand that from legal point of view suggestion presents no difficulty though it would be necessary before it was reduced to concrete proposal to obtain clearer view of what was intended, e.g. whether preliminaries of peace would merely be superior kind of armistice or whether they would constitute instrument entirely independent of general peace treaty and likely to be ratified separately from and in advance of latter. In either case it seems unlikely in view of advanced state of our negotiations that preliminaries could

[1] No. 540. [2] See No. 508.

be signed much ahead of general treaty unless signature of latter is held up by concessionaires negotiations at Angora. Value of first alternative to Greece would be that mere signature of satisfactory preliminaries would probably enable Greeks to demobilize, at least partially. It would not, however, entail immediate release of male Greeks detained in Asia Minor or coming into force of exchange of populations agreement unless new specific provision were made therefor. Value of second alternative, i.e., embodiment of preliminaries in instrument not only to be signed but also ratified independently, would be much greater as ratification of two powers only would be required and might be expected to take place more expeditiously than ratification of general treaty.

On the whole I am disposed to view situation favourably although I am alive to certain dangers which may be summarized as follows:

1. Turks may counter it by proposal to negotiate whole peace with Greece separately. This would mean negotiations so prolonged as to defeat objects which M. Veniselos has in view. Turks would also make capital out of new situation to detriment of allies as well as of Greece by claiming that latter had found her only means of salvation in sueing for separate peace and that Great Powers had had to recognize that this was her only course.

2. Change so considerable in procedure hitherto followed might complicate task of conference through mere necessity for a readjustment of present plans. Greeks might in fact find that in certain directions, e.g. financial and economic clauses of treaty, Turks would refuse to give them terms as good as those which they are now obtaining as one of group of allied signatories, and allied assistance might thus be invoked by Greeks on questions already settled in existing draft treaty o[r] treaty of Neuilly. It might also make Turks more difficult for allies to deal with as latter at present benefit indirectly from nervousness of Turks regarding potential military action by Greece. I do not think, however, that exaggerated view should be taken of this latter objection for, as I have said above, it is unlikely that preliminaries could be ready for signature much, if at all, in advance of general treaty.

No. 542

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 31 Telegraphic [E 5202/1/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 24, 1923, 2.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 90[1] and 94[2] (of May 22nd and 23rd; reparations).

Treasury state that it is by no means clear that the Turkish bills can be surrendered without a vote, but if the reparations question can thereby be settled His Majesty's Government would be prepared to hand over the bills to be realised for the reparations pool.

[1] No. 537. [2] No. 537, n. 4.

They add that there must of course be no question of paying £846,000 in cash and the position that the two million pounds Turkish gold remain here for British claimants should be maintained; Great Britain has already given up huge sums in respect of army of occupation costs.[3]

[3] To this telegram Sir H. Rumbold replied (in his telegram No. 101 of May 25) as follows: 'Proposal contemplated is that British claimants should share in £5,000,000 in proportion to their claims which will probably entitle them to considerably more than £2,000,000. Payne thinks they should acquiesce in this proposal and I assume you will not object.'

No. 543

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 7 p.m.)
No. 96 Telegraphic [E 5323/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 24, 1923, 3.45 p.m.*

Penultimate paragraph and last pargraph of my telegram No. 81[1] and my telegram No. 82.[2]

Meeting of third committee which it was hoped to hold on May 22nd did not take place owing to non arrival of French economic expert which has completely held up preparatory work of sub-committee of experts. This delay has been most unfortunate as no progress has been made either with part two of convention for foreigners or commercial convention which apart from small number of reserved questions are only outstanding portions of economic work of conference. Expert having now at last arrived I hope sub-committee will finish quickly and that third committee will be able to sit within next few days.

It has also been impossible to proceed on lines foreshadowed in my telegram No. 82. I am holding meeting of first committee on May 26th to deal with parts one and three of convention concerning régime for foreigners on which drafting committee have produced agreed report (see my despatch No. 86)[3] and to dispose of various isolated articles in draft treaty. I cannot, however, broach proposed deal over Castellorizo and minor territorial questions so long as deadlock concerning reparations continues. This clouds whole atmosphere and indisposes everybody immediately concerned in territorial questions to commit themselves regarding latter.

As regards second committee work this has also been held up by reparations question. Allies have been unable to convoke it because they have not been prepared to take latter. On Turkish side there have been indications of increasing tendency to connect Greco-Turkish indemnity with Allied reparations. Turks are aware of our difficulties regarding latter. They are themselves nervous so long as it is unsettled as between us and them and they may at any moment place us in awkward position by announcing their

[1] No. 533. [2] No. 534. [3] Of May 24, not printed.

readiness to settle Turco-Greek indemnity question on basis of M. Veniselos's Karagatch proposal.[4]

I am telegraphing separately[5] about reparations question considered in itself. Object of present telegram is to explain reasons which have suspended all real progress of Conference as a whole for nearly a week. I am doing everything in my power to get a move on but causes of delay are beyond my control especially as I suspect that my French and Italian colleagues have not that authority with their governments which is necessary to make latter realize need for greater expedition. In spite of my constant pressure coupled with his own efforts it took General Pellé several days even to get economic expert sent out and Signor Montagna is in mortal terror of Italian President of the Council.

[4] See No. 527. [5] See No. 545, below.

No. 544

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 8 p.m.)
No. 309 Telegraphic [E 5359/6/44]

Most secret CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 24, 1923, 5.20 p.m.*

Refet Pasha has telegraphed that he cannot hold Chatalja lines owing to number of his troops who have already been, and anxiety of those who remain to be, demobilized. He informs Angora that either more troops who would be recruits and unsuitable must be sent from Anatolia or all idea of defending Eastern Thrace must be abandoned.

In latter case he proposes to send back immediately to Anatolia all surplus troops, guns and material except some 3,000 men.

This is first definite evidence that Refet's military organization in Thrace is a failure.

Re-transfer of men to Anatolia looks as if idea was to be able by removing all trace of breaches of Mudania convention to hold allies responsible for its protection against Greeks.

Information confirms appreciation in my telegram No. 273.[1]

General Harington is of the opinion that the moment has come for firm line to be taken. I entirely agree with him. The Turkish situation today is comparable to that of the Greeks last September. What General Harington describes as human element is now making itself felt. Turkish soldiers are weary of war and waiting for peace and it is doubtful if they can any longer be counted upon whereas Greek morale is high.

Information may be useful in inducing Turks to settle Greco-Turkish indemnity question.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 118.

[1] No. 502.

No. 545

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 8 p.m.)
No. 97 Telegraphic [E 5323/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 24, 1923, 5.30 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram[1] shows that it is reparations question which now blocks the way. Although my French colleague has throughout agreed with me that it would be useless to confront Turks with any demand for contribution by them to reparations pool he has not yet been able to induce his government to accept this view nor has he hitherto taken strong line with Signor Montagna. He has however agreed this morning to hold meeting of Second Committee on May 26th to clear up situation regarding Turco-Greek indemnity. He is moreover sending Bargeton to Paris to-day to press for a decision on allied reparations question in the sense of definitely dropping any demand as against Turks.

General Pellé will endeavour this afternoon to extract from Ismet information as to attitude of Angora government towards Karagatch proposal.[2] If Ismet intimates readiness to accept this without making his acceptance contingent on Allies dropping reparations meeting of Second Committee on Saturday[3] may be unnecessary. We cannot however count on this as even if Karagatch proposal appeals to Turks they are unlikely to show their hand until they are sure that no further allied demand for reparations will be made. My Italian colleague is more difficult to bring to my way of thinking

(1) because his government are loath to abandon claim on Turks until they know what they will get out of pool and

(2) because he would like to use this question as means of pressure both on Turks and Allies in connection with Castellorizo. He professed until quite recently to regard Greek attitude towards Turkey as bluff. This is only partly true because while men like Monsieur Veniselos wanted peace war party in Greece may get out of hand. Moreover Turco-Greek situation is at mercy of incidents.

I have told Signor Montagna most categorically this afternoon that I will not take up question of Castellorizo until reparations is out of the way. I have asked him to convey this to his government.

We should indeed be in sorry position if delay over reparations concerning only Allies were to precipitate armed conflict between Turkey and Greece. In getting General Pellé to agree to meeting on May 26th and taking above line with Signor Montagna I have done what I can to avert this danger. Immediate outlook would be however much better if we were not hampered by our own reparations question. I venture to suggest therefore that you should take strong and immediate action at Paris and Rome with a view to French and Italian delegates being instructed before midday on Saturday that any further allied claim on Turks must be dropped and that distribution

[1] No. 543. [2] See Nos. 527 and 535. [3] May 26.

of sum available for reparations without further Turkish contribution must stand over for settlement between the three governments.[4] This should be facilitated if you could take immediate concurrence of Treasury in proposal to throw Turkish treasury bills into reparations pool (see my telegrams Nos. 90[5] and 94[6]).

Repeated to Paris and Rome.

[4] In his telegram No. 236 to Paris, No. 151 to Rome, of May 25, Lord Curzon instructed Lord Crewe and Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please urge government to which you are accredited immediately to instruct their delegates at Lausanne to agree to drop allied claim for reparations against Turkey, leaving distribution of sum available for subsequent settlement among allied governments. You may inform them that His Majesty's Government are prepared to hand over for reparations pool the £846,000 of Turkish Treasury bills although in view of huge sum given up in respect of British army of occupation they could not consent to payment of this amount in cash. You should point out that settlement of Turkish reparation claim against Greece and contingent issue of peace and war may be dependent on earliest possible settlement of this question.'

[5] No. 537.

[6] No. 537, n. 4.

No. 546

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 98 Telegraphic [E 5349/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 24, 1923, 7.10 p.m.*

My telegrams Nos. 96 and 97.[1]

In interval between drafting these two telegrams I saw General Pellé. He had just received Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs who told him that Greeks could no longer wait and that if indemnity question were not settled by Saturday Greek delegation would leave that day. In myself pressing General Pellé to take action I was influenced, not by this threat, but in own conviction that situation is becoming impossible. Nevertheless threat shows how serious situation is viewed by Greeks, who have made real effort to arrive at settlement with Turks. We cannot in justice to Greeks refuse to discuss matter in committee if such a course becomes necessary.

Monsieur Veniselos, speaking to member of my staff this morning, held language similar to that of Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs and said that he intended to ask for interview, with my concurrence, with allied colleagues and myself tomorrow in order to explain his position. He would apparently be satisfied if Ismet intimated even privately to Allies that he accepted proposed solution of Greco-Turkish indemnity question.

From what Monsieur Veniselos said Greek government seemed to have telegraphed that while accepting his advice and offering a sacrifice for the sake of immediate settlement of outstanding question between Greece and Turkey they cannot much longer keep open offer or await settlement.

[1] Nos. 543 and 545.

. . .[2] while ready to accept private assurance from Allies that no reparations claim is again to be put forward by them against Turkey he [Ismet] will either temporize on plea that his government have not answered or will counter claim for 1913 frontier, prepared though he probably will be to accept Monsieur Veniselos'[s] offer as made as soon as he receives above mentioned assurance; 1913 frontier would of course be quite unacceptable to Greece.

I do not think in taking up attitude described above Monsieur Veniselos is bluffing. All that has passed with Greeks this morning confirms me in view that failure of Allies to agree amongst themselves about their reparations claim before Saturday[3] may have disastrous effect on Turco-Greek situation and so on conference.[4]

[2] The text is here uncertain.

[3] May 26.

[4] In a further telegram, No. 105 of May 24, Sir H. Rumbold reported that he had asked M. Venizelos and M. Alexandris to see him that evening. He continued: 'Interview was distinctly lively. It was difficult to keep them to any reasonable discussion of present situation. They insisted on their pacific intentions disclaiming any idea of ultimatum and refused to admit that they were doing more than what was necessary and would be sufficient to elicit definite answer from Turks to Karagatch proposal. They said that they suspect Turks of deliberately withholding answer in order to gain time and to strengthen their military position. I pointed out that Turks showed no signs of wanting war or of taking any special military measures in Thrace. I expressed personal conviction that Ismet had not answered proposal because he had not heard from Angora. I said that in any case we had given Greeks satisfaction by arranging for meeting of Allied, Turkish and Greek delegates on Saturday afternoon (this had been arranged between my French and Italian colleagues and myself late this afternoon).

'My visitors continued to rail against Turks and at intervals to reproach Allies. I at last put definite question as follows—Allies would hold meeting on Saturday. Turks might put forward unreasonable demands. If so Allies would resist them but they were unlikely to get Turks to hear reason in one sitting. For Allies that would mean adjournment of discussion. What would it mean for Greeks? M. Veniselos promptly replied that on his present instructions it would mean departure of Greek delegates. He was obviously, however, somewhat shaken for he said that he would at once telegraph and without saying he expected new instructions he emphasized fact that he would have time to receive them.'

No. 547

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 24, 11.15 p.m.)
No. 99 Telegraphic [*E 5337/1/44*]

Personal LAUSANNE, *May 24, 1923, 8 p.m.*

I am somewhat disturbed at criticism in British press and especially the 'Times' regarding work of conference. So far as this week's suspended work of main committee is concerned there is of course some justification for criticism as my telegrams Nos. 96 and 97[1] will have made clear. Main

[1] Nos. 543 and 545.

method of meeting that criticism lies in as urgent as possible a solution of allied and Greek reparation question on lines already suggested.

I am convinced that more general criticism of press regarding futility and procrastination of conference is quite unfair and unjustifiable. To the public bulk of questions at issue for which solutions have been found only by patient debate are probably uninteresting and may often appear unimportant but agreement by discussion however slow is the only procedure possible to-day.

My delegation have done their best to explain to press correspondents here nature of questions at issue and progress of conference from time to time. In order to counteract unnecessary pessimistic tendency in press circles here I also had a report circulated yesterday to British and reliable American journalists showing number of questions with which conference was confronted at its opening and progress made in solving them. Copies of this report go by bag tonight.[2]

I shall be grateful if press section of Foreign Office could also be instructed to do what they can to counteract tendency perhaps by making use of that report and by speaking to representatives of prominent papers particularly the 'Times'.

[2] Lausanne despatch No. 85 of May 23, not printed.

No. 548

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 8 Telegraphic [E 5338/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 25, 1923, 12.10 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 197 to Foreign Office.[1]

On strength of Constantinople telegram No. 114[2] which was not repeated to you, I informed Monsieur Veniselos on May 22nd that there was no truth in report that 7,000 Turkish troops had crossed to Eastern Thrace from Asia Minor. I have since ascertained from M. Veniselos that he at once passed my statement on to his government. Please use above information as best you can.

Repeated to Foreign Office[3] and Constantinople.

[1] Of May 23. This ran: 'Reported crossing of over 7,200 armed Turkish troops and officers from Asia Minor to Eastern Thrace . . . is causing considerable anxiety here and does not tend to allay warlike feeling.'

[2] This, dated May 21, had reported: '"Reshid Pasha" sailed from Constantinople on May 8th for Gulf of Ismid returning on May 10th with 2,700 soldiers on leave for Black Sea ports. She is still in Black Sea. "Akdeniz" was in Black Sea or Constantinople until May 16th when she sailed for Panderma returning on May 19th with 2,000 men for Black Sea ports.

'A number of Turkish soldiers have been recently embarked in ports of Sea of Marmora for transport to their homes on demobilisation, "electoral leave" etc.'

[3] As Lausanne telegram No. 102 to Foreign Office, where it was received on May 25 at 8.30 p.m.

No. 549

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 103 Telegraphic [E 5348/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 25, 1923, 1.35 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 32[1] was crossed by my telegrams Nos. 96, 97 and 98[2] which will have explained developments in Greco-Turkish reparation question here up to this afternoon.[3]

This evening General Pellé informed Signor Montagna and myself that Ismet had not yet had a reply from Angora with a view to offer of Karagatch. He had told Ismet that question of Greco-Turkish reparations would be discussed on Saturday[4] by which day he hoped Ismet would have had a reply.

It is difficult to prophesy how or when question will be settled but my colleagues and I are fairly confident that Ismet can be forced to accept Karagatch solution once we can take united and drastic line with him on the subject. This will only be possible once the allies have definitely decided to drop all reparation claims on Turkey and can speak energetically to Ismet and with one voice. When that will be and whether M. Veniselos can control his government or his government their military authorities until then are at present uncertain factors in the situation.

[1] This referred to Lausanne telegram No. 93 (No. 540) and continued: 'May I understand from it that there is now a real prospect of an early settlement of the question of Greco-Turkish reparations?'

[2] Nos. 543, 545, and 546, respectively. [3] May 24. [4] May 26.

No. 550

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 35 Telegraphic [E 5350/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 25, 1923, 1.30 a.m.*

My telegram No. 85 to Athens.[1]

Turko-Greek reparation question has assumed somewhat formidable aspect owing to not unnatural but embarrassing impatience of Greeks. They have now pushed their insistence on immediate settlement to length of threatening to leave Lausanne on Saturday[2] afternoon if it is not settled by then. Question has been held up partly because of difficulty of taking it up in conference independently of allied reparation question, partly, and especially of late, in hope that it would be settled separately as a result of direct conversations between Ismet and M. Veniselos. Ismet states that he has had no answer

[1] The reference is presumably to Lausanne telegram No. 85 to the Foreign Office (No. 535), which was repeated to Athens.

[2] May 26.

from Angora regarding proposal that it should be settled by cession of Karagatch in lieu of indemnity. Line now taken by M. Veniselos amounts to backing this proposal by a sort of ultimatum. He is clearly acting under strong pressure from Athens and main difficulty of situation lies in the fact that military party there may escape his and allied control.

My colleagues and I are straining every nerve to prevent situation from developing from one of grave anxiety into one of real danger. We have all agreed that conference must deal with Turko-Greek indemnity question without delay even if it has to be taken independently of our own reparation question. We have arranged in principle to hold meeting of second committee on Saturday to discuss former. Lest it should be impossible to disassociate two questions, I am pressing strongly for action to induce French and Italians to drop any further reparation demand against Turks.

I have now enlisted strong personal support of General Pellé in this.

Above is for your information and for discreet use as situation develops in next few days.

Repeated to Foreign Office[3] and Athens.

[3] As Lausanne telegram No. 104 to the Foreign Office, where it was received on May 25 at 8.30 a.m.

No. 551

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 34 Telegraphic [E 5352/6/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 25, 1923, 12.45 p.m.*

Bentinck's private and secret telegram of yesterday.[1] Please speak at once to Veniselos and with reference to your telegram No. 65 (of May 17th)[2] ask whether His Majesty's Government are right in relying on his formal assurance that Greek government will not denounce armistice nor resume hostilities without previous notice to Allies, and on Greek Prime Minister's further statement, reported in Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 184 (of May 19th),[3] that Greece would not act contrary to wishes of Powers.

M. Veniselos will realize the gravity of the responsibility which his government will incur if in disregard of these assurances they now take action destroying all chances of peace in the Near East, which the Powers are so earnestly striving to attain.

[1] This stated: 'King's Marshal called this evening to tell me that His Majesty is extremely worried about situation. He has been told by government that they intend to make war tomorrow or next day. His Majesty warned them seriously about acting contrary to the will of the Powers and without obtaining approval of the people or their representatives. I beg that the King's name be not mentioned on any account.'

[2] No. 521. [3] No. 530.

No. 552

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 25, 5.25 p.m.)
No. 204 Telegraphic [E 5367/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 25, 1923, 2 p.m.*

My telegrams Nos. 200[1] and 202.[2]

Prime Minister told press last night that Greece would consent to proposed postponement of indemnities discussion for a few days to enable Ismet to hear from Angora. He denied Turkish reports regarding movement of fleet and transports towards Dardanelles. He added that Serbia had now given very favourable assurances to Greece respecting her attitude in case of war.

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

[1] Of May 24. This reported: 'Chief of Revolutionary Committee informed press last night that Greek delegation had been instructed to withdraw from conference if final decision imposes indemnity.'

[2] Of May 24, not printed.

No. 553

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 25, 6.30 p.m.)
No. 205 Telegraphic [E 5368/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 25, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Chief of revolution informed head of British school[1] yesterday with obvious desire for repetition to me that if Greek delegation withdrew from Lausanne cabinet meeting would consider attitude and next step and could not bind themselves to act in accordance with recommendations of Greek delegation. Army said by him to consist of 150,000 men including 100,000 bayonets and 300 guns prepared to advance at 24 hours' notice (compare my telegram No. 180).[2]

He added that troops would be much encouraged by fact that Constantinople was objective but that Greeks had no desire to retain Eastern Thrace and Constantinople and would if necessary be content with Maritza frontier.

Chief of revolution appeared very determined maintaining that prolongation of present state of uncertainty was worse even than unsuccessful war. Greeks needed no excuse for attacking as presence of 40,000 Turkish troops with guns in Eastern Thrace was a violation of armistice. He seemed to think war the most probable solution.

The number of people who still believe in peaceful solution is declining and every day adds to gravity of the situation(my telegrams Nos. 175[3] and 188[4]).

Repeated to Lausanne and Constantinople.

[1] Mr. A. J. B. Wace, Head of the British School of Archaeology.

[2] Of May 18. This transmitted the Military Attaché's view that the Greek army in Thrace had in the first line, 55,000 rifles, 116 field guns, and 152 mountain guns.

[3] No. 522.

[4] No. 530, n. 2.

No. 554

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 36 Telegraphic [E 5382/6/44]

Urgent *Confidential* FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 25, 1923, 4 p.m.*

Discussions at Lausanne have reached a point where it becomes urgently necessary to take stock of the situation and to be prepared for a crisis which will require a definite decision involving the fate of the conference. Apart from minor issues a deadlock may ultimately be reached on any of the four following outstanding questions, on which no agreement is at present in sight: (1) Turkish reparations, (2) Concessions, (3) Régime for foreigners, and (4) Greek reparations. It seems essential to come to a clear understanding with our Allies on a common policy regarding these questions and for this purpose they must decide how far they are prepared to yield in order to obtain Turkish signature to a treaty. Before approaching the French and Italian governments I shall be grateful for your views and advice. I will deal with the four points in order.

(1) Pending the result of inter-allied discussions now proceeding it is impossible to foresee the ultimate outcome, but it may be assumed that allied governments, having in July [*sic*][1] last unconditionally waived demand for Turkish reparations, will not wish to break off on the ground that Turkey now refuses to allow the waiver to be withdrawn.

(2) We shall have to insist on either a very speedy termination of the negotiations at Angora, which it seems hopeless to expect if present dilatory proceedings continue, or on the inclusion of some general stipulations in the treaty or in an annexed instrument, or possibly on some other binding guarantee by the Turks which might in the last resort be separate from the treaty itself.

(3) There is no sign of Turkey's receding from the Montagna formula[2] and it may well be that Ismet is committed to this at Angora. On the other hand we can hardly agree to the far-reaching concessions involved in that formula, and I gather your experts have expended all their ingenuity in vain attempts to render our minimum demand acceptable. If a breakdown of the conference is inevitable, it may be of advantage that it should come on this ground where we can count on American support and the general approval of public opinion.

(4) The question of Greek reparation to Turkey depends on Greece herself rather than on the Allies; whilst everything points to her inability to yield to the Turkish demand, there appears to be some hope of a settlement by compromise. On this point I am awaiting your answer to my telegram to

[1] The reference is presumably to the Allied offer of February 3, 1923, to renounce the twelve million Turkish pounds claimed as reparation, on condition that Turkey renounced all claim to the five million Turkish pounds of gold transferred from Berlin and Vienna, and to the seven million Turkish pounds of gold in respect of the two battleships seized by the Allies. See Cmd. 1814, p. 833.

[2] See No. 397, n. 3.

you No. 32 (of May 24th).[3] Should, however, the separate negotiations now proceeding between Veniselos and Ismet come to nothing, and particularly should the Turks refuse the Karagatch offer[4] in return for the abandonment of the Turkish claim for Greek reparations, the probability of a denunciation of the Mudania Convention by Greece must be reckoned with. We shall therefore have to consider two contingencies:

(a) Greek and Turkish delegations may merely report to you and your colleagues their inability to agree. In this event I do not see that we can do more than urge both sides to reconsider their attitude since we can force neither to yield, and endeavour to relegate settlement of this question to some future agreement, meanwhile signing the treaty of peace.

(b) Disagreement may be followed by denunciation of the armistice, which would raise whole question of the position of the Allies at Constantinople in the event of the renewal of hostilities. French and Italian governments will probably agree that three principal Allies ought, if possible, to avoid being themselves involved in hostilities against either Greece or Turkey, and also that they should maintain allied occupation of Constantinople until a peace is concluded, although the allied generals at Constantinople appear anxious to withdraw to Gallipoli if hostilities are renewed.[5]

The best plan, if militarily feasible, would probably be that advocated in Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 299 (repeated to you No. 110)[6] namely, the recognition by both belligerents of a restricted neutral zone around Constantinople and other positions occupied by the Allies whilst Greek and Turkish naval as well as military forces would be free to operate in every other theatre of war.

The whole question will have to be considered in the immediate future by the Cabinet, but in the meantime I should be glad of your views on the several points raised in this telegram. You will realise that our attitude in the event of a renewal of hostilities must largely depend on the attendant circumstances, which may be either Turkish refusal of reasonable Greek offer and of allied advice or—as appears less likely—a Greek policy of adventure in defiance of allied warning.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 165, Paris No. 237, Rome No. 152.

[3] No. 549, n. 1.

[4] See No. 549.

[5] See No. 517, n. 2. In a further telegram, No. 3906 of May 22, General Harington stated: 'If I could be informed of British views in following circumstances, in the event of Greek advance, it would be a great help to me. (a) Am I to oppose Greeks by force at Chatalja or before Constantinople? (b) Am I to oppose Turks by force should they, in event of Greek advance, march on Constantinople and Chanak or Thrace? (c) Am I to declare neutrality and allow Turks to cross provided that they respect neutral zone? (d) What if they refuse, am I to use force to oppose? (e) Am I to try to safeguard Constantinople, our troops, Nationals and Christians against all comers? (f) Am I to evacuate to Gallipoli our troops and Nationals?' The War Office replied in their telegram No. 91854 D.D.M.O. & I.: '. . . a telegram No. 36 [No. 555] has been sent by Foreign Office to Sir H. Rumbold and Mr. Henderson, which you will see. As to the policy which the Government intend to pursue we have at present no further information to give you. You can only fit your plans and action to that policy as it develops, and as decisions of Government regarding it are sent to Mr. Henderson.'

[6] No. 529.

No. 555

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris) and Sir R. Graham (Rome)
No. 238[1] *Telegraphic [E 5348/6/44]*

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 25, 1923, 4.35 p.m.*

My telegram No. 236 (to Paris).[2] My telegram No. 151 (to Rome).[2]

Telegrams just received from Sir H. Rumbold[3] show that the situation at Lausanne has now become most critical especially in connection with Greek demand for immediate settlement which hinges on Turkish demand for reparations from Greece. Allied representatives seem convinced that this question of Greek reparations cannot be settled until Turks are assured that at least allies will not demand for themselves any reparations from Turkey. A critical meeting is to take place May 26th. Greek delegates declare they will have to leave Lausanne unless agreement on the reparation question is arrived at that day. It is therefore of the utmost importance that government to which you are accredited should without fail authorise their representative at Lausanne tonight by telegram to inform Ismet that allies will claim no reparations from Turkey. It would then be for the allies to arrange subsequently among themselves method of allotting the money available for their claims.

Please act immediately.[4]

Repeated to Lausanne No. 37, Athens No. 86, Constantinople No. 167.

[1] No. 238 to Paris, No. 153 to Rome. [2] No. 545, n. 4.

[3] See Nos. 545, 546, 549, and 550.

[4] Lord Crewe replied, in Paris telegram No. 531 of May 25: 'French government agree and will instruct their representative at Lausanne accordingly.' Sir H. Rumbold reported in his telegram No. 107, of May 25, as follows: 'General Pellé has just had telephone message from Monsieur Bargeton that Monsieur Poincaré agrees definitely to renounce French reparation demand upon Turkey.' Signor Montagna did not receive his instructions until May 26 (see No. 565, n. 2, below).

No. 556

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 87 Telegraphic [E 5351/6/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 25, 1923, 5.15 p.m.*

My telegram to Paris No. 238.[1]

In discussing with Veniselos[2] meeting for May 26th Sir H. Rumbold pointed out probability that it would not be possible to bring Turks to reason in one sitting. Veniselos said that on his present instructions that would mean departure from Lausanne of Greek delegation. He said how-

[1] No. 555. [2] See No. 546, n. 4.

ever that he would telegraph again and without saying he expected new instructions emphasised that he would have time to receive them.

Take urgent action to ensure that utmost latitude is given Monsieur Veniselos not to leave Lausanne precipitately or while there is the smallest chance of a peaceful settlement.[3]

Repeated to Paris No. 239, Rome No. 154, Constantinople No. 168, Lausanne No. 38.

[3] Mr. Bentinck replied in his telegram No. 206 of May 25: 'Head of Political Bureau to whom I delivered your message took it immediately to the Prime Minister. As chief of revolution (? could not be) found Cabinet could not meet tonight and Prime Minister dared not give necessary instructions without Cabinet authority.'

However, in his telegram No. 207 of May 26 Mr. Bentinck reported as follows: 'Head of political bureau has just called and read out to me message of which following is a translation:

' "After receipt of British message Greek government decided to exhaust every effort for peace and to instruct Greek delegation at Lausanne that if they are convinced that there is the slightest chance of settling Greco-Turkish question in pacific sense they are to remain until Monday night in spite of fact that Greek government are convinced that Turks do not intend to make peace but are only dragging out discussion so as to gain time for military preparations."

'I thanked Monsieur Politis for message which he said had already been telegraphed to Greek delegation.'

No. 557

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 25, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 108 Telegraphic [E 5363/6/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 25, 1923, 8 p.m.*

My colleagues and I received M. Veniselos this morning. We went over much old ground which I had covered with him in my interview last night (see my telegram No. 105).[1] He again explained at length that it was impossible for the Greeks to wait indefinitely for Turkish reply to their offer of Karagatch in settlement of indemnity question and seemed to proceed on the assumption that the Turks were purposely delaying their reply or would decline the offer.

We insisted that, as he had put himself in our hands and had asked us to mediate between the Turks and himself, he must allow time for our mediation to have effect. We impressed on him that we were just as anxious as himself to get this question out of the way and that we would not tolerate delay. We said that, if the facts regarding the offer of Karagatch were made known, public opinion would be unanimously opposed to Greece, if her delegates suddenly left the conference without allowing time for a settlement. M. Veniselos, who was much calmer than last night, then said that he would

[1] No. 546, n. 4.

not leave Lausanne tomorrow evening even if it did not prove possible to reach a solution of the Greek indemnity question at tomorrow's meeting.

I have asked the Serbian and Roumanian delegates to speak to M. Veniselos in much the same sense. They say they have already done so. Roumanian Minister stated that he had already requested the Roumanian government by telegraph to enjoin moderation at Athens. I shall also see Ismet and tell him that he must lose no time in settling the indemnity question with Greece.

I understand that the Turks are very depressed at what they allege to be the failure of Hassan Bey's conversation with the bondholders in Paris and I think the moment has now arrived to show the utmost firmness with Ismet on the indemnity questions.

No. 558

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 25, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 109 Telegraphic [*E 5364/6/44*]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 25, 1923, 8.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 34.[1]

Your instructions acted on.

M. Veniselos repeated formal assurance which he had already given me that the Greek government will not denounce armistice nor resume hostilities without previous notice to the allies. He said that he could not express an opinion on the statement made by the Greek Prime Minister as reported in Athens telegram No. 184.[2] M. Veniselos added that, in order to guard against hasty action by the Greek government, he had already arranged that, as Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs is now at Lausanne, denunciation of armistice and notification to allies would be made here always supposing that the Greek government decided on that course of action. I had pointed out to M. Veniselos that in view of Reuter's telegram which I had shown him last night (see my telegram No. 105),[3] it was to be feared that the Greek government might embark on hostilities at a moment's notice even tomorrow or Sunday.

M. Veniselos admitted that he had been somewhat carried away by his feelings last night and promised that he would do nothing to precipitate matters if at tomorrow's meeting he saw the least chance of a solution of the reparations question.

Repeated to Athens.

[1] No. 551. [2] No. 530. [3] No. 546, n. 4.

No. 559

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 26, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 110 Telegraphic [E 5403/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923, 2 a.m.*

My telegram No. 108.[1]

I have asked Ismet this afternoon[2] whether he had had an answer from Angora regarding suggested cession of Karagatch. He replied in the negative but I have some reason for believing that he is not telling the truth and that an answer has come which he considered unsatisfactory[3] and that he has telegraphed to Angora again.

[1] No. 557. [2] May 25.

[3] In his telegram No. 312 of May 26, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Following is summary of a telegram from Reouf to Ismet dated May 24th.

' "Claim for reparations cannot be renounced in return for Karagatch. Turkish public debt cannot be paid unless devastated areas are reconstructed. Turkey who in spite of devastations has agreed to pay war indemnity cannot forego payment by Greece who has not herself been invaded and has carried off property from Turkish invaded districts. Greece if unable to pay in money should be made to pay partly in cash, partly by surrender of Greek property in Constantinople and partly in merchant ships. She should also accept 1913 frontier. If Allies uphold Greek inability to pay they should equally admit Turkish inability and, rather than hold up peace on account of Greeks, conclude it as between Allies and Turkey leaving latter to settle with Greece. (Angora apparently recommends this latter course). If Turks give in to Greek threat before important questions are settled, Allies in their turn will endeavour to secure further advantages in similar manner."

'It is suggested that Ismet would do well to adopt these views at plenary meeting and submit them to public opinion of Allies. The above telegram has crossed two dated same day from Ismet to Reouf and Mustapha Kemal. They have not yet reached me but I understand that former which is not yet complete gives full statement of situation and states that peace cannot be attained within instructions laid down by government at Angora. If government will not agree to modify, Ismet proposes to return to Angora to give verbal explanation leaving delegation at Lausanne and if thereafter his recommendations are not agreed to, he will resign. Personal telegram to Mustapha Kemal begs him earnestly to consider telegram to Reouf.'

In his telegram, No. 314 of May 26, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Ismet's telegram urges acceptance of Karagatch solution, refers to certain opposition on the part of Serbia and Bulgaria to 1913 frontier and futility of war, even if victorious, with Greece. In telegram to Kemal he expresses conviction that peace is only attainable on lines indicated by him.'

In his telegram No. 315 of May 26, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Reouf telegraphed urgently yesterday that cabinet under presidency of Mustapha Kemal took following decision. If any sacrifice is made in Greek reparations question this must conduce to attainment of peace by settlement of outstanding important questions in favour of Turks. Question of interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied areas, judicial régime and compensation of allied companies should be coupled with that of Greek reparations and only in the event of settlement of these questions in favour of Turkey being guaranteed could a sacrifice be made in regard to reparations. Council of ministers, convinced that protracted negotiations could not give Turkey a good peace, which can only be attained in manner proposed, instructs Ismet to make this final proposal to conference reporting result.'

In his telegram, No. 317 of May 27, Mr. Henderson reported: 'In a further telegram signed by Reouf and Mustapha Kemal, Ismet is begged not to insist on sacrificing reparations demands and to withdraw his threat of resignation. They add "so long as allies have

I told him that this question must be settled without further loss of time, in fact at tomorrow's meeting if possible. I asked him how it was that he who always strenuously (? asserted) that he had full power to settle matters and was Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not settle this question on his own responsibility. His answer was evasive and unsatisfactory but he agreed that question must be got out of the way immediately.

I told him that I had seen in the press that Turks meant to ask for railway between [Kuleli] Bourgas and Karagatch and I said that such a demand was quite preposterous and out of the question. He said that press seemed to know more about Turkish intentions than Turks did themselves. He stated that he would like to settle all the other questions between Greece and Turkey straight away such for instance as question of (? Greek) (? prizes). I inferred from this that he is . . .[4] Greek army and about situation on Maritza.

Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

not decided unfavourably on vital issues connected with our independence they cannot, by allowing the Greek army to take action, commit themselves to participation in war arising out of our firm attitude on Greek reparations question. Should they however finally decide these questions against us Greek army would be able to take action in more favourable conditions in order to force on us more important issues such as the evacuation of Constantinople, current debt and judicial régime. The difference is that our position might then be weaker. It would not be in our interests to yield to Greeks on question of reparations in order to prevent them from withdrawing from the conference. Such action would have no meaning unless allied delegates follow suit. If their withdrawal be followed by a resumption of hostilities there are certain points which allies must explain. If in face of such a threat we were to yield on an isolated question such action might be taken as calculated to delay peace. Please ask allies to settle principal questions." Portions of telegram are somewhat obscure.'

[4] The text is here uncertain.

No. 560

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 26, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 313 Telegraphic [E 5401/6/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 26, 1923, 12.45 a.m.*

My telegram No. 299.[1]

French Acting High Commissioner informs me that French government have instructed him that, in the event of Greco-Turkish hostilities, French forces are not to be involved, army and French citizens are to be evacuated as soon as possible and no opposition is to be raised to passage of Turkish troops into Eastern Thrace.

[1] No. 529.

Italian High Commissioner has no instructions but declares in any case it will be impossible for him to evacuate Italian colony.[2]

Sent to Lausanne No. 124.

[2] In his telegram No. 3931 of May 26 to the War Office, General Harington reported: 'I met today with Admiral Chatfield and Mr. Henderson and subsequently with Allied Generals. Complete agreement exists as to action that will be taken. We shall send for Salaheddin, if Greeks advance, and tell him quite plainly that we will safeguard Constantinople within a boundary we have agreed upon. We will maintain law and order in this area and will admit within it no Turkish troops except Caliph's bodyguard and such police and gendarmerie as may be required by us. We shall use force if he refuses. [W]ithin this area we can afford protection, and from this area we can embark Nationals and evacuate or carry out whatever instructions may be sent us. Plans have been made accordingly. As soon as Nationals have got away, I shall evacuate Ismid side. Shall then have 6 battalions, one squadron and one battery at Constantinople, remainder at Dardanelles except one battalion on Maritza which, if hostilities begin, will be withdrawn via Dedeagach. (? French) say they could (? now) get out with Nationals in 10 days instead of 15. If ordered directly, in order to leave together, I should synchronize our departure with theirs. I do not think we shall have much difficulty if we act quickly and firmly on first sign of trouble and panic and frustrate Turkish plans which are known to exist.'

No. 561

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 113 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5417/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923*

The First Committee met this morning[1] and made distinct progress with outstanding questions. The following is summary of proceedings.

Article 3 (1) of draft treaty.

I asked whether the French and Turkish delegations had reached a settlement. General Pellé said that he had had a conversation with Ismet Pasha last evening, but that an agreement had not yet been arrived at. From recent information I gather that the Turks are no longer likely to insist on reference being made to the Franklin-Bouillon agreement in this and Article 16, but they are still worried by the fact that the French government has not ratified it as an independent instrument, and that this is the real difficulty at present.

Article 3 (2).

I asked whether the Turkish delegation had any answer regarding the period to be indicated for the negotiations between Great Britain and Turkey. Riza Nour Bey, who in the absence of Ismet Pasha was the principal Turkish delegate present, said that no answer had been received from Angora, but that an answer might possibly arrive tomorrow.

[1] *Recueil (2)*, vol. i, pp. 110–15.

Articles 20 and 25.

The Italian and Turkish delegations had agreed on a wording of Article 20 (see my despatch No. 81 of May 23rd[2]). In view of this, the Italians were prepared to withdraw their reservation regarding the second paragraph of Article 25, which the drafting committee proposed some time ago to word as follows:—

> 'Il demeure entendu qu'il n'est pas porté atteinte aux attributions spirituelles des autorités religieuses musulmanes.'

As the British and French delegations had already accepted this wording, I hoped to finish with both articles to-day. The Turkish delegation, however, scented a possible contradiction between the new wording of Article 20 and the proposed wording of paragraph 2 of Article 25 as given above. They were anxious that the latter should be modified so as to state that the present treaty did not affect the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities. It was pointed out that this might materially affect the sense of Article 25 taken by itself. The jurists, on being consulted, suggested that the difficulty might be got over by prefacing the new text of Article 20 by the words 'without prejudice to the stipulations of Article 25'. The Italians demurred to this, but eventually agreed that Article 20 might be completed by some other words, making it clear that, as regards spiritual jurisdiction, Lybia was in no different position from any other country. The article was referred back to the jurists to devise a suitable formula.

Article 27.

The Turkish, French and Italian delegations, having failed to agree about this, the dispute regarding the proposed Turkish addition to the allied draft had been discussed in a small Sub-Committee, in which my representative played the part of mediator. The Sub-Committee suggested the following paragraph to take the place of the 3rd paragraph which the Turks wished to insert:—

> 'Les dispositions du présent article ne préjugent pas de la nationalité des personnes originaires de Tunisie, de Lybie et du Maroc établies en Turquie.'

The effect of this is to shelve the outstanding dispute between the Turks and the French and Italians respectively, regarding a number of persons living in Turkey whom the French and Italians claim as subjects. Under the proposal of the Sub-Committee these disputes will fall to be settled by ordinary means after the conclusion of peace. The committee adopted the proposal after General Pellé and M. Montagna had made it clear that they reserved the right to discuss these questions in due course, General Pellé pointing out, as regards Lybians and Tunisians, that existing conventions no longer met the case. Riza Nour Bey agreed.

[2] Not printed.

Articles 154 and 155.

The draft article[3] proposed by the jurists (see my despatch No. 98 of May 26th)[4] to take the place of these two articles was adopted.

First of the three additional articles proposed by Turks after Article 159.

As there was some uncertainty as to how this had been left after M. Veniselos had offered to discuss the question as among experts, I proposed that a special Sub-Committee should deal with the matter, both in regard to Wakfs in Greece and Wakfs in the Dodecanese, regarding which the Italians are prepared to give the Turks satisfaction.

Third of the three additional Articles proposed by the Turks after Article 159.

A draft declaration[5] to be made by the Greek delegation in place of the Turkish article had been agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek experts under the auspices of Mr. Ryan. Riza Nour Bey and M. Veniselos having expressed their readiness to accept this draft, the committee noted the fact that an agreement had been reached. A copy of the draft declaration in its final form follows in my despatch No. 97 of May 26th.[6]

We then passed to the convention concerning the Régime for Foreigners (see my despatches Nos. 86, 91 and 95 of May 24th and 26th,[6] enclosing the texts[7] agreed upon by the jurists and economic experts and the jurists' notes thereon). It was agreed to take parts 1 and 3 as read and only to discuss the points arising on the jurists' notes or any other points which particular delegations might have to raise. M. Ochiai said that he had one point to raise, but would do so later. The result of the discussion of the points raised in the jurists' notes was as follows:—

Article 1.

The addition proposed in the jurists' note of May 25th was agreed to, after Riza Nour Bey had asked whether Turkish subjects in Tunis, Lybia etc. would receive similar treatment to that assured to Tunisians, Lybians etc. in Turkey by Article 25, and had received satisfactory assurances from General Pellé and M. Montagna.

Article 4.

After some discussion Riza Nour accepted January 1st, 1923, as the date before which rights acquired by foreigners in Turkey in the matters dealt with in that article are to be respected by the Turks.

Article 5.

Signor Montagna pressed the Turks to agree that the article should be drafted to cover 'personnes morales'. He pointed out that his government attached particular importance to the continuance in Turkey of Italian humanitarian and cultural associations. The Turkish delegation explained that existing law in Turkey did not differentiate between Turkish and foreign

[3] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 116.
[4] Not printed.
[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 117.
[6] Not printed.
[7] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 118–22.

associations and was such as to protect the freedom of all foreign associations at present existing in Turkey which did not offend public order. Riza Nour also assured Signor Montagna that there was no present intention of the Turkish government to change the law or interfere with the functioning of these associations, but that of course he could not tie his government down in principle not to modify their own legislation. Signor Montagna accepted these declarations as satisfactory and waived his demand for the proposed addition to the article.

Article 20.

After discussion, during which the Allies pressed for ten years' duration of the convention and the Turks demanded five years, Riza Nour promised to consider whether a compromise of seven years or a re-draft of the article whereby, in return for a five years' duration, the convention could only be denounced after preliminary notice dating from the end of the five years and running for eighteen months or two years had been given, could be accepted by his government.

Article 25 of the Allied draft of January 31st.

After some discussion, during which I hinted that the Allies might be content if the right to adhere was given to those Powers which had fought with the Allies in the Great War and were mentioned in Article 159 of the main treaty, and not as in the above article to any third Power, and after Riza Nour had demurred to any clause in the convention allowing third parties to adhere, it was agreed to reserve further discussion on the point until the next meeting of my committee.

It is hoped that the jurists may have found a method whereby Turkey will accept under Article 159 the adherence to the financial and economic clauses in the main treaty of Portugal, Belgium and possibly Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Turks are unable to give a final reply on that point until the drafting of the economic and financial clauses is complete. If they accept such a solution they may also agree to insert an article in the convention for foreigners enabling the same Powers to adhere to that convention.

I announced that I would have a final meeting of my committee next week to conclude discussion if possible on the points left over by my committee to-day and on Articles 3, 16, 35 (as to which I am still awaiting a reply from the Colonial Office to my telegram No. 83 of May 19th),[8] 152, 153, 156, 157 (as to which I am awaiting reply from Admiralty to my telegram No. 92 of May 22nd)[9] and the Amnesty declaration, on most of which agreement is in sight.

[8] See No. 533, n. 3.

[9] This ran: 'Mr. Henderson telegraphs following information given by Senior Naval Officer at request of the Admiralty regarding former German vessels seized by us since October 30th, 1918.

'Motor launch "Yildirim" and Tug "Nixa" are employed by G.O.C. and N.T.O. respectively.

'V.S.O. and V.A.D. were reported sunk in 1920.

The Third Committee will meet on Monday morning to take the reports of the economic experts on Article 82 (e), chapter 2 of the convention for foreigners and on the commercial convention. The experts are more or less agreed on both the latter, except as regards the article relating to cabotage in the commercial convention.

'Motor boats "Maintz", "B.R.C.", "C.O.B. 52" and "Julius" were sold by Admiralty order.

'First four vessels may correspond with those mentioned in first paragraph of Admiralty letter of April 9th [not printed], but I should like to be definitely informed on this point. All vessels were owned by Turkish government except the privately owned "Yildirum".

'Even assuming that we were entitled to seize these vessels, we should have validated our seizures by Prize Court proceedings. This has apparently not been done in a single case of these ex-German ships and the irregularity makes some practical compromise with the Turks as regards this category of vessel under Article 157 essential. French appear to be in somewhat similar position but apparently have begun prize proceedings in the case of their seizure of two ex-German steamers.

'If Admiralty agree and subject to French finding some analogous solution, we propose to offer to return to the Turks two launches still in our hands in return for a complete waiver of Turkish claims as regards the two sunk and the two sold. Claim of Turks for surrender of the proceeds of sale in latter case may however be difficult to meet, and if there are any facts which go to justify our action I should be glad to be informed.

'If four vessels mentioned in first paragraph of Admiralty letter of April 9th are still in our hands and are not identical with ex-German ships, we would propose to return these as well.

'Please telegraph Admiralty views as soon as possible.'

No. 562

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 27, 9 a.m.)
No. 209 Telegraphic [E 5409/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 26, 1923, 9 p.m.*

My telegram No. 195.[1]

French Minister tells me that he is authorised, should he consider situation should justify it, to convey to Greek government message similar to that contained in penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 77.[2] He has hitherto not done so.

Prime Minister told French Minister to-day what has already been said before, that retirement of Greek delegation from Lausanne would not necessarily mean war.

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 539. [2] No. 518.

No. 563

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 26, 10.50 p.m.)
No. 114 Telegraphic [E 5418/6/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923, 6.40 p.m.*

At a private meeting this afternoon between heads of allied delegations, Ismet and M. Veniselos, a settlement of Greco-Turkish reparations question was reached on following basis:

1. Greece recognises in principle that she ought to pay an indemnity for actions of Greek army in Asia Minor which were contrary to laws of war, Turkey on her side renouncing a money indemnity in consideration of financial position of Greece:
2. Rectification of frontier of Karagatch:
3. Mutual restitution by Turkey and Greece of prizes of war taken since armistice of Mudros.

Serbian delegate read a declaration by his government objecting to proposed cession of Karagatch on the ground that an extension of Turkish frontier beyond Maritza might lead to complications and would place a further hindrance in the way of Bulgaria's access to Aegean. Declaration added that Serb-Croat-Slovene government would not however push their objection to the point of its becoming an obstacle to peace.

Best tone prevailed throughout meeting and everybody felt that in arriving at a settlement of this question a great obstacle to peace had been removed.

My immediately following telegram[1] gives account of meeting.[2]

Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

[1] No. 564, below.
[2] For the minutes of this meeting, see *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 230–9.

No. 564

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 115 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5419/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

At the meeting this afternoon, General Pellé reviewed the successive proposals put forward by the allies or by Monsieur Veniselos for the settlement of the Greco-Turkish reparations question. These had culminated in the proposal that Greece should cede Karagatch to Turkey in return for a complete waiver by the latter of any indemnity. General Pellé dwelt on the

[1] No. 563.

efforts which the three delegates of the inviting powers had made in interviews with Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos to bring about a peaceful solution of this question which at the present moment constituted a menace to the peace of the Balkans. He added that if war were resumed in the Balkans, there was no knowing how far the conflagration would spread.

I followed by stating that I had been convinced by my recent interviews with Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos that both were sincerely desirous of arriving at a peaceful solution and that if they were left to themselves by their governments, they would reach a solution. I said very pointedly that my further remarks were meant for their governments and especially for the Turkish government rather than for Ismet Pasha. I then said that the indemnity question might be considered from a practical and a moral point of view. The practical point of view was that Greece had no money and could not pay an indemnity, and it was therefore useless to ask for something one could not get. I instanced the cases of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Austria, so far from paying reparation, had had to be assisted by a loan;[2] Hungary was trying to obtain a loan;[3] whilst the figure which had been fixed for Bulgarian reparations had been drastically cut down.[4]

As regards the moral side of the question, I said that Turkey's case did not stand by itself. Other countries had been devastated and had received nothing. If the Turks objected that they had not devastated allied countries, I would point out that by entering the war against the allies, they had caused enormous devastations of human lives, which were more valuable to us than houses and fields. I added that an agricultural country quickly recovered from the effects of war and that nothing was more striking in this respect than the recovery of Serbia, which was practically due to her own efforts. The Turkish peasantry would soon restore the devastated portions of Anatolia. I dwelt on the urgency of settling this question, and I appealed to Ismet to accept the solution now proposed to him.

The Italian delegate made an impassioned, if somewhat theatrical, appeal to the Turks on behalf of humanity and, as he expressed it, of the millions of beings who were awaiting the settlement of this question. The American observer read a statement to the effect that whilst his government were not so interested as Europe in the question at issue, they felt that peace was vitally necessary in the interests of the two countries which were starting on the work of reconstruction after years of warfare. The Serbian and Roumanian delegates made statements in which they developed the line of argument I had used, and the former read the declaration reported in my immediately preceding telegram.

Ismet Pasha, who looked very ill and who was evidently deeply impressed by a sense of responsibility, then proceeded to try to elucidate the exact scope of the solution which had been proposed for the settlement of the question. He pointed out that the renunciation by Turkey of an indemnity for

[2] See *Survey of International Affairs 1920–3* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford and London, 1925), pp. 316–19.

[3] See *Survey of International Affairs 1924*, p. 425.

[4] See ibid., pp. 437–40.

Greece would have a repercussion on the financial situation of Turkey, and in this connection he expressed the hope that the allies would bear that aspect of the matter in mind. He went on to review the present position of the work of the conference and expressed the opinion that the outstanding questions between Turkey and the allies could be settled in two or three days. It would then be possible to settle the Greco-Turkish indemnity question. Upon this General Pellé at once stated the reasons for which an immediate decision with regard to the indemnity question was imperative. He asked Ismet point-blank whether the latter had had an answer from Angora about the Karagatch proposal. Ismet replied in the affirmative.[5] It was then evident to the whole meeting that Ismet had decided to accept the proposal, but before actually coming out into the open he raised one or two further points besides the three conditions mentioned in my telegram No. 114.[6]

He said that he assumed that the allies stood by their agreement to drop the claim for reparations against Turkey. We had foreseen this question, and as the Italian delegate had not received instructions to drop the demand for reparations, I had agreed with General Pellé that he should tell Ismet Pasha that the latter could have confidence in the allies on this point. This satisfied Ismet Pasha, who then said that in dropping his demand for reparations from Greece he assumed that Turkey would not be held responsible for damage caused by the Greek army or by the action of the Greek authorities to Turkish companies with allied capital. He meant by this companies like the Smyrna–Aidin and Smyrna–Cassaba Railway Companies. There was no difficulty in giving him this assurance. Finally, having obviously in his mind the question of the currency in which the interest on the Turkish debt is to be paid, he said that as Turkey had consented to take the financial position of Greece into account, he hoped that the allies would do the same for Turkey.

By this time the meeting was under the impression of the relief felt at the settlement of this difficult question and complete harmony was shown between Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos. The meeting, which had begun on a serious note, ended in an expression of friendly sentiments all round and of mutual congratulations. Both Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos thanked the delegates of the inviting powers for their mediation.[7]

[5] Cf. No. 559. [6] No. 563. [7] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1010–12.

No. 565

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 118 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5422/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923*

Your telegram No. 36 (of May 25th:[1] future procedure at conference).

Of the four outstanding questions named in your telegram, (1) (Turkish

[1] No. 554.

reparations) may, I think, be regarded as settled, as the Italians have now received the requisite instructions.[2]

(4) (Greek reparations) has, I trust, been settled this afternoon (see my separate telegrams[3] on this subject). I have telegraphed separately[4] regarding our policy at Constantinople in the event, now I hope remote, of hostilities breaking out between Greece and Turkey. I would have advised that allied delegations should continue to endeavour to sign peace here with Turkey, even if Greek delegation had withdrawn, although it would be difficult to foresee international reactions which might follow Greco-Turkish hostilities in Europe or therefore to forecast chances of success of allied negotiations with Turkey pursued here in such circumstances.

(2) (Concessions). Nature of reports, which I have asked Mr. Henderson to send me and which I am still awaiting regarding progress of negotiations at Angora should enable me to advise Your Lordship at the proper moment whether we should open negotiations here with Turks for embodiment in treaty of something like present concession clauses, or whether we should adopt suggestion made in my telegram No. 106 (of May 26th)[5] of a declaration by Turkey to be annexed to the treaty as signed, setting forth in more general terms how negotiations will be continued and concluded with companies after the signature of the treaty. I believe Turks are likely to accept generally principles of maintenance, prolongation and, in some cases, re-adaptation of concessions. I am more doubtful regarding compensation to companies under article 80 and treatment of French 1914 inchoate concession agreement.[6]

(3) Régime for Foreigners. (Judicial Declaration.) In accordance with Ismet's promise, Munir Bey has discussed this privately with British and French jurists. They found him prepared to consider minor differences between Montagna formula and allied draft of May 3rd.[7] He was immovable on question of arrests, searches and domiciliary visits. I agree that there is practically no chance of Turkish surrender on this point. It is of great importance but I do not feel that we should be justified in breaking conference on it should it remain only obstacle to peace. We are undoubtedly

[2] In his telegram No. 101 of May 26, Sir R. Graham reported: 'Your telegram Nos. 151 [No. 545, n. 4] and 153 [No. 555] only reached me at 8.30 last night. I made urgent representations to President of the Council at once and am informed this morning by Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs that telegram was sent last night to Signor Montagna and has been confirmed by telephone today instructing him to agree to renounce Italian claim on Turkish reparations.' Sir H. Rumbold, in his telegram No. 123 of May 28, reported: 'After my telegram No. 116 of May 26 [not printed] was drafted Signor Montagna told me he had received instructions to drop demand for reparations. Rome telegram No. 101 was handed to me while he was with me. On my telling him sense of latter he showed confusion and admitted that he had had instructions from Rome early in the day but said that they had not been couched in satisfactory terms.' Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), No. 57.

[3] Nos. 563 and 564. [4] No. 566, below. [5] Not printed.

[6] See J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (New York, 1956), vol. i, pp. 273–6. [7] See No. 496.

asking for something inconsistent with judicial practice of civilised countries and few people outside Turkey realise cogency of reasons for demanding it. I myself, strongly as I feel about it, cannot regard the safeguards which our formula would provide so valuable or so essential as to make it worth while to destroy chances of peace for sake of them; nor do I think that allies or United States of America would support us in doing so. Best indication of probable attitude of former is that both French and Italians did accept Montagna formula in February in vain hope of preventing rupture. My view is that we should now leave question alone until last round, but that we should then be prepared to compromise on basis of getting satisfaction on minor differences between two formulae and contenting ourselves with provision that legal counsellors shall have power to set law in motion against officials responsible for arrests etc. which they consider arbitrary.

I fear that another question which may remain outstanding until the end is that of the payment of the interest on pre-war Turkish loans in paper francs, which is now the chief outstanding matter in the financial clauses. Turkey will have to find roughly £5,000,000 a year for the service of these loans, if the coupons are paid in sterling according to the loan contracts, and about £1,700,000 if they are paid in francs, and therefore the question is of great importance to them. There are indications that they consider the demand for payment in sterling as a demand for a kind of disguised indemnity.

If possible, the Turks wish that the treaty should definitely empower them to pay in francs for a long period (perhaps ten years). The allies regard this as absolutely impossible to accept and I do not think that Ismet will insist upon it.

Failing this, the Turks wish that their position for negotiating with the bondholders after the peace should not be prejudiced by any provisions of the treaty or by the declaration to the debt council which we offered to accept in place of article 56 which confirms the loan contracts. Allies have already agreed to suppress the explanatory note to Annex 1 which Turkey regards as prejudicial to her negotiations and have made it clear that they fully recognise Turkey's right to negotiate with her creditors. No doubt, from what Ismet said at this afternoon's meeting, he will consider that in return for waiving his demands on Greece for reparation payments he is entitled to press for very lenient treatment from allies as regards debt payments. As the bondholders in Paris, however reluctantly, expressed their willingness to negotiate after the peace, I regard as a matter of secondary importance the exact form of words which the allies allow the Turks to employ in their declaration in order to make it clear that they reserve the right to negotiate after peace with their creditors.

Ismet Pasha suggested to General Pellé this morning that the declaration which Turkey is to make to the bondholders as drafted in February[8] should be accompanied by a second declaration taking note of the resolution passed by the bondholders in Paris on May 23rd[9] and re-affirming the inability of

[8] See *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iv, pp. 19–20.

[9] This declaration, a copy of which was communicated to the Foreign Office on May 25

the Turkish government to pay their coupons in sterling. Probably in the end, the allies will agree to accept some such compromise, though the tenderness of the French government for their bondholders may form a temporary obstacle.

I believe group of territorial questions (Ada Kaleh, Maritza Thalweg, Merkeb Islands and Castellorizo) should be soluble by separate bargain, but Castellorizo may prove more of a stumbling block than I foresee,[10] especially in view of recent unexpectedly intransigeant attitude of Angora as opposed to that of Ismet on certain other questions.

by the Council of Foreign Bondholders, London, ran: 'Ils [the bondholders] tiennent à affirmer que le Gouvernement ottoman, ainsi que les États subrogés, demeurent obligés, chacun pour leur part, à l'égard des porteurs de la Dette publique ottomane, dans les conditions stipulées par les contrats d'émission. Toutefois, ils ne se refuseront pas, au cas où après étude la situation paraîtrait l'exiger, à examiner, après la signature du Traité et en accord avec le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, les modalités d'ordre pratique que le Gouvernement ottoman pourrait proposer pour l'accomplissement de ses obligations.'

[10] See *D.D.I.* (*ii*), Nos. 14, 17, 21, 39, 43, and 59.

No. 566

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 119 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5423/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 26, 1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Contingency discussed at 4(b) of your telegram No. 36[2] now seems infinitely less likely than it did this morning. It could now only arise if one of two governments immediately concerned went back on arrangement to which Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos have agreed this afternoon.[3] Danger of this happening is, I hope and believe, small, but as it is conceivably possible it may still be useful for Your Lordship to have statement of views which I formed this morning.

I had dismissed possibility of Turks denouncing Mudania Convention as outcome of immediate situation. I felt with you that if Greece denounced it our attitude towards them and Turks respectively would have to depend to large extent on actual circumstances of such denunciation. Should a fresh crisis occur in the near future owing to the governments not honouring the bonds of their delegates here, the two alternative situations will be the same, i.e. either Greece will put herself entirely in the wrong by precipitate action in which case we shall be justified in weighting our neutrality against her; or the onus will be on the Turks owing to their taking up a wholly unreasonable attitude, in which case we shall have no reason for favouring Turks more than may unfortunately be necessary to avoid embroiling ourselves.

[1] No. 565. [2] No. 554. [3] See No. 563.

In either case, I should be strongly opposed to evacuation of Constantinople because throughout Asia, though not perhaps in Europe, it would look like consummation of Turkish victory over allies and still more because we should be abandoning population in circumstances most likely to produce after our departure catastrophe similar to that of Smyrna.[4] It is true that some months ago His Majesty's Government approved of General Harington's proposal to concentrate at Dardanelles if things went wrong here,[5] but at that time what we feared was Turkish attack on our own forces. In contingency now in contemplation such attack would be very unlikely unless indeed our neutrality took form so unfavourable to Turks as to make them take risk of attacking us while fighting Greeks.

In my opinion, therefore, we ought to (a) remain neutral and (b) stay in Constantinople, but stay there in conditions least likely to provoke Turkish attack on ourselves. It appears to me to follow that (c) we ought for our own sakes to refuse passage of Dardanelles to Greek fleet;[6] firstly because if we did stay in Constantinople we must have safe communications and hostilities in Straits and Marmora would imperil these; secondly, because our position vis-à-vis of the Turks as occupying portion of their territory would be much more difficult if we gave Greeks free access to internal waters.

Granted these premises, we should presumably not need to make any material alteration in our dispositions on both sides of the Dardanelles, but our position at Constantinople would have to be most carefully re-considered. We could not use it to prevent contact on land between Greeks and Turks and to use it in such way as to hamper Turkish military movements seriously would entail danger of quarrel between Turks and ourselves which it would be our wish to avoid. Three alternatives occur to me, viz. (1) to confine ourselves to restricted neutral zone round Constantinople say from Stenia to San Stefano as suggested by generals[7] with or without similar small zone in Asia round southern mouth of Bosphorus and to deny all passage of troops through that zone or zones; (2) to confine ourselves to such zone or zones and to keep order there, but to allow passage of Turkish troops through them; or (3) to confine ourselves to zone between Golden Horn and Bosphorus allowing Turks free hand everywhere else.

Disadvantage of (1) would be that we should be depriving Turks of use of one or both of their principal railheads. We should thereby gravely hamper their movements which, if they decided to defend Chataldja lines, would have to be effected rapidly and they might be unwilling to tolerate situation. Disadvantage of (2) would be that our neutrality would be highly peculiar and keeping of order would be extremely difficult. (3) would obviate these objections and would provide definite though congested area in which

[4] See No. 28, n. 2.

[5] See No. 355.

[6] In his telegram No. 92 of May 28 to Athens, Lord Curzon instructed Mr. Bentinck as follows: 'You had better inform the Greek government that the admiral has standing instructions not to admit the Greek fleet into the Straits and Marmara without reference to London, and that these apply pending any further orders.'

[7] See No. 529.

we could hold on ourselves and protect Christians without interfering with Turks, but I do not know whether it would be militarily feasible. If it were, I should favour it, especially in first alternative contemplated in paragraph 2 above, i.e. if Greeks placed themselves patently in wrong by precipitate action.

While considering above alternatives I received Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 313[8] to you, according to which French have already decided to evacuate Constantinople should hostilities break out. I cannot reconcile this with statement made this morning by member of French delegation who has just returned from Paris that President of Council had last evening consulted you[9] as to joint allied action. If report from Constantinople is correct, it does not materially affect my view as stated above unless military considerations would make it impossible for British forces to remain after French had left. On this point I can form no opinion here. From political point of view I do not think that danger of complications with Turks would be materially increased by British remaining in sole occupation, always provided that conditions of occupation were such as to show that we were not using it to the disadvantage of Turks as against Greeks. This amounts to saying that if onus of maintaining allied position in Constantinople devolved on British alone, disadvantages of first two of alternatives reviewed in preceding two paragraphs would be aggravated and reasons for preferring third would be strengthened.

Two further considerations of more speculative nature may affect views of His Majesty's Government. Firstly, secret information shows that Refet Pasha considers defence even of Chataldja lines impossible and has recommended withdrawal to Asia if Greeks attack.[10] If Angora acted on this, problem might be simplified, but I doubt whether Angora would readily reconcile itself to course so humiliating. Secondly, indications up to date have been that Greeks would stop at Chataldja unless allies authorised further advance. This is all to good, but I do not think we could count on Greeks sticking to it once they had reached Chataldja if they found no serious Turkish resistance ahead. Bitterness against allies, improbability of latter resisting them by force and lure of Santa Sophia might then draw them further than they have as yet thought of going.

[8] No. 560.
[9] In a Note, dated May 26, from the Comte de Saint-Aulaire to Lord Curzon, not printed.
[10] See No. 544.

No. 567

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 27, 3.30 p.m.)
No. 121 Telegraphic [E 5425/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 27, 1923, 1.45 p.m.*

My telegram No. 120.[1]

Ismet has asked to see me this afternoon.

Information from Constantinople shows that he placed widest possible construction on his instructions yesterday in order to obtain settlement of immediate question with Greece. He did refer in general terms to some of the questions which Reouf links up with that of Greek indemnity but he did not mention them all or make settlement of latter conditional on that of former. He was content with vague general assurances.

I anticipate that he will endeavour this afternoon[2] to enlist my sympathy with a view to favourable settlement of those other questions. He will certainly revert to evacuation of Constantinople and Dardanelles. If as I anticipate ground is cleared of almost all minor questions during next few days I think we should be prepared for discussion of evacuation towards end of the week. I should like to be able to tell Ismet as soon as possible that such is our intention.

Before actual discussion takes place it is necessary to decide when we are willing to begin evacuation and what time should be allowed for its completion.

As regards first of these points it seems to me that there is no serious objection to Turkish proposal that evacuation should begin as soon as Angora ratifies treaty. I take it that it would suit War Office to expedite it to this extent and any danger entailed in evacuation before treaty as a whole comes into force would be mitigated by fact that our fleet would still have the run of the Straits until latter event. Technical difficulty could be overcome by providing for evacuation in treaty itself and making clause operative after ratification by Turkey by means of suitable separate instrument.

[1] Of May 26, not printed. This, which was sent in cypher, gave the gist of Nos. 565 and 566, which were sent *en clair* by bag.

[2] In his account of the afternoon interview (telegram No. 122 of May 28) Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'As I expected he [Ismet] placed evacuation in the forefront and was most persistent about it. He wished to give it precedence of everything else. I said I was quite willing to discuss outstanding large questions falling to my committee without delay and outline plan for preliminary private discussions beginning with judicial declaration on Tuesday [May 29]. I noticed for the first time he himself mentioned this as one of the questions requiring discussion. As regards evacuation I said that Turks had no grounds for depression or anxiety as we certainly meant to evacuate but that this question could not in logical sequence be dealt with until agreement had been reached on others. In order to reassure him, I told him that I had already asked for your instructions regarding it. Ismet doubtless wishes for reasons of home politics to be able to justify his accommodating attitude of (? yesterday) [see No. 564] by showing satisfaction that evacuation is well in sight. Our interest (? is) to strengthen his position with his own people.'

As regards second point evacuation of Constantinople would presumably precede that of Dardanelles but it would be well to fix shortest period reasonably possible for completion of operation especially first part of it, i.e. evacuation of Constantinople.

If you agree you will doubtless take up question of procedure here with French and Italians in advance of stock-taking and more general consultation mentioned in last paragraph of my telegram under reference.[3]

Repeated to Paris, Rome and Constantinople.

[3] In their letter of May 31, 121/Gen. No./9240 (M.O.I.), the War Office commented as follows: '. . . there is no military objection to the evacuation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles beginning on the ratification of the Treaty by the Turkish Government. It is estimated that the evacuation will be completed in a maximum of 35 days from the date of the receipt of the orders in Constantinople. This includes all troops, Air Force, animals and military equipment, but a small amount of stores might remain at Kilia pending disposal, necessitating the retention of a guard at that place.

'The Army Council have no observations to make except with regard to the ante-penultimate paragraph of Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 121. The evacuation of Constantinople will be carried out simultaneously with that of the Dardanelles, with the proviso that the last troops will not leave the Dardanelles until after the final evacuation of Constantinople has been completed. I am to say, further, that the Council consider that it is essential that the withdrawal of the fleet should not take place until after the evacuation of the troops is completed.'

No. 568

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 128 Telegraphic [E 5518/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 28, 1923, 5.40 p.m.*

Meeting of second committee was held this morning[1] to deal with reparation clauses. General Pellé formally announced allied decision to maintain settlement of allied reparations proposed in February[2] and emphasised sacrifices involved. He explained that settlement did not involve waiver of reparations claims of concessionary companies which had throughout been dealt with separately and were now being discussed at Angora. Ismet said that if Angora discussions failed he would refuse to admit discussion at peace conference of reparation claims of concessionary companies since settlement should cover all reparation claims; he implied that he would be prepared to discuss other questions concerning concessions here if Angora negotiations fail.

Allied delegates stated that they could not possibly accept this point of view as regards reparation claims of concessionary companies. Finally it was agreed that settlement of allied reparations should be discussed entirely without prejudice to view of either party on question of these claims.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 221–9. [2] See No. 370.

Pellé then announced Greco-Turkish settlement. Ismet said that settlement should not cover goods requisitioned or confiscated by Greeks. We refused to contemplate any alteration in basis of agreement reached on Saturday[3] but, subject to this, matter was referred to experts. Committee has now discussed all the financial clauses. We shall endeavour to clear up outstanding questions in next day or two and a final meeting will then be necessary to endorse settlement reached.

Question of exchange of options on pre-war loans is the only outstanding question of first rate importance in financial section of treaty.

[3] See No. 563.

No. 569

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 129 Telegraphic [E 5520/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 29, 1923, 12.25 a.m.*

At a private meeting this afternoon[1] between delegates of inviting Powers and Ismet, latter agreed to drop his demands for Ada Kale and Castellorizo. We agreed to Thalweg of Maritza as frontier of eastern Thrace and to cession of Rabbit Islands. The Italian delegate likewise withdrew his reserve with regard to sum payable by Dodecanese on account of Ottoman public debt arrears.

It was not possible to bargain with Thalweg because M. Veniselos had already given it away on Saturday afternoon, after discussion on Greco-Turkish reparations question.[2]

Above agreements will be recorded at next meeting of my committee[3] probably on June 1st when I shall take up point regarding exemption from military service of Greeks actually resident in Tenedos and Imbros at the time of signature of treaty.

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

[1] i.e. May 28. [2] See Nos. 563 and 564. [3] See No. 590, below.

No. 570

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 130 Telegraphic [E 5519/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 29, 1923, 2 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

As Ismet had expressed to my colleagues and myself great eagerness to

[1] No. 569.

settle four big outstanding questions this week we discussed with him at our private meeting a time table of work. It was agreed to take judicial declaration tomorrow, question of interest on debt on Wednesday,[2] concessions on Thursday,[3] and question of evacuation of Constantinople on Friday[4] provided that my colleagues and I have received our instructions by then.

Whilst I shall not commit myself definitely to any formula which we may reach tomorrow in connection with judicial declaration I shall be grateful for your early views on solution foreshadowed in my telegram No. 118.[5]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[2] May 30. [3] May 31. [4] June 1.

[5] No. 565. Lord Curzon replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 44 of May 30: 'I agree that in view of the arguments adduced in your telegram and of the further fact that the degree of protection that the provision would in practice afford to foreigners is somewhat doubtful, it is not worth breaking on the question. But you should not give way except in the last resort.'

No. 571

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 31, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 131 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5581/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 29, 1923*

The delegates of the inviting Powers held two sittings to-day with Ismet to discuss the draft of the Judicial Declaration,[1] which was forwarded in my despatch No. 18 of May 4th.[2] Each delegate was accompanied by his expert.

At the morning sitting, we took all the paragraphs except 5 and discussed the modifications of the Turkish formula. Ismet took exception to all the modifications contending that in some cases they were unnecessary and that in others, as for instance in paragraph 4, they extended the powers of the Legal Counsellors. I reserved Article 5, on which I knew the struggle would centre, for the afternoon's sitting.

Before the afternoon sitting, M. Fromageot spent two hours with the Turks in furnishing explanations in regard to the modifications suggested in the morning and produced a fresh draft of paragraph 4.

Ismet would not commit himself to the acceptance of this fresh draft and we then discussed paragraph 5 dealing with domiciliary visits and arrests. As I had foreseen, Ismet rejected the allied draft of this paragraph with great vehemence. A long and wearisome discussion followed in the course of which Ismet became very excited. He ended by insisting that we should come to a decision at once with regard to the Judicial Declaration, but we explained that this was quite out of the question and that we could not undertake to reach a settlement on each big question every day. He then

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 50–1. [2] Not printed: see, however, No. 496.

took the line that it would be useless to take up any of the three remaining questions until the Judicial Declaration was settled and we could not make him recede from this position. Finally we agreed to meet again tomorrow for a new discussion of the Judicial Declaration and M. Fromageot will, in the meanwhile, have another interview with him in the hope of finding some formula providing that the Legal Counsellors shall be immediately notified of orders for arrests of foreigners and domiciliary visits and should be entitled to make representations to the authorities concerned if they consider these called for. He will also inform Ismet that the allied delegates are bound by their instructions and that they cannot commit themselves to a definite acceptance of any formula which may be reached now.

It will be seen from the foregoing that Ismet practically delivered to us an ultimatum to dispose of one question before proceeding to the consideration of another. We shall not of course submit to this demand. It is evident that Ismet has been worked up by instructions from his government or by members of his own delegation and his general attitude put[s] a severe strain on the patience and good temper of the allied delegates.[3]

[3] In his telegram No. 321 of May 30, Mr. Henderson reported: '. . . telegrams from Mustapha Kemal to Ismet make it clear that council of Vekils [Ministers] is gravely perturbed by Ismet's action in settling Greek reparations question in defiance of its orders. In a personal telegram he says "your position is serious and critical, be careful".

'Renewed instructions are that sacrifice in regard to Greek reparations is to be made conditional on prompt settlement in favour of Turks of following questions: interest on public debt, early evacuation of occupied territories, judicial régime and compensation to companies. Ismet is instructed to make a final and definite proposal to conference on these lines.

'Prevailing view of Cabinet is that rupture brought about by a Greek attack owing to failure to reach agreement on reparations question would be better received both in Turkey and abroad than rupture with allies in general over questions of world wide interest. It is added that a rupture which was not followed by operations would suit allies' book.

'Cabinet are particularly anxious for reports on atmosphere prevailing at Lausanne after Turkish sacrifice "on account of new hopes which allies may cherish as a result of success secured by threats".

'Orders from Fevzi Pasha to Refet and Constantinople command issued on 26th in anticipation of rupture say that all officers must rejoin their units and prepare for war. The western command will be ready to attack Straits, Ismid and Chanak zones. The Thrace and Constantinople command are to stand by to act on their instructions. Operations to be undertaken against Irak and French in Syria are described in detail.'

No. 572

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 30, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 132 Telegraphic [E 5573/6/44]

Most confidential LAUSANNE, *May 30, 1923, 2.15 a.m.*

M. Veniselos informs me that he has received . . .[1] congratulations from the King of Greece, chief of revolution and Prime Minister with regard to

[1] The text is here uncertain.

settlement arrived at on Saturday.[2] On the other hand General Pangalos and head of navy[3] who appear to be dissatisfied with settlement have telegraphed to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that latter has exceeded his powers. Without consulting M. Veniselos, M. Alexandris thereupon telegraphed his resignation. M. Veniselos has telegraphed urging that resignation should not be accepted and he said to me that intervention of General Pangalos and head of navy in this matter was most improper.

He then again reverted to his proposal to sign preliminaries of peace with Turkey[4] and developed his idea a little more fully. He even suggested that Greeks and Allied Powers should now sign Thracian convention. He pointed to fact that Greece and Turkey had signed at (?Lausanne) exchange of populations agreement and for exchange of prisoners of war.[5] On this analogy he did not see why Greece should not sign peace preliminaries with Turkey and continue to sit in conference in order to reach a mutual settlement on all other questions being dealt with by conference. He explained that signature of preliminaries of peace would not necessarily constitute a separate peace with Turkey. He proposed if I had no objection to sound Ismet tomorrow before proceeding to Paris for a few days. I told him I would think over matter but I mean to ask him to hold his hand.[6] Although I shall not tell him so it would not suit us for Ismet to think he can afford to leave Greeks and Greek army out of account.

Repeated to Athens.

[2] See No. 563. [3] Captain Hadjikyriakos. [4] See No. 540.

[5] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–56.

[6] Lord Curzon replied, in his telegram No. 48 of May 31, as follows: 'As events appear to be moving fast now, I agree that it would be preferable that Monsieur Veniselos should wait, at any rate for a week.' Referring to this telegram, Mr. Bentinck, in his telegram No. 220 of June 2, reported: 'It will every day become more and more difficult to hold rank and file of Greek army together. There are already signs of unrest both in the army and navy which may provoke leaders to reckless action. Rank and file find it hard to understand any delay in demobilization as was the case with our own men after the armistice. I can only urge that matters be speeded up as far as possible so as to bring about Turkish demobilization before Greek army becomes a useless card in our hand.'

No. 573

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 31, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 133 Telegraphic [E 5621/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 30, 1923, 4.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 131[1] sent by bag last night.

My immediately following telegram[2] gives French text of draft of a judicial declaration which is result of prolonged discussions throughout yesterday and at a meeting this morning. Ismet is prepared to accept this

[1] No. 571. [2] No. 134 of May 30, not printed.

draft which allied delegates realise falls very short of allied draft (see my despatch No. 18)[3] in that instead of consent of judicial counsellors being necessary before arrests etc. can be made, they will only be informed immediately afterwards. But Ismet's acceptance of this provision represents a considerable advance on Montagna formula[4] and if counsellors chosen are competent they should be able to ensure some measure of protection for allied subjects against military action. We have also extended general function of counsellors to whole of Turkey instead of their being confined to two towns.

My colleagues and I are convinced that we shall not get any better conditions and it remains therefore for our governments to decide whether by insisting on inclusion in declaration of paragraph 5 of allied draft they will risk a rupture of conference. I have no doubt that French and Italian governments will accept present proposal.

With regard to paragraph 3 Ismet took exception to number of legal advisers and undertook to make a statement which can be recorded on procès-verbal to the effect that Turkish government would engage at least four such advisers. He pressed for omission of last sentence of paragraph 3 stating that he would declare in committee that conditions of service and salaries of legal advisers would be fixed by Turkish government in agreement with permanent court of international justice.

Monsieur Fromageot who has borne brunt of discussions with Turks other than those in which allied delegates took part informed us that Turks could not agree to article 8 of allied draft which would bind them in perpetuity to make no changes in Turkish law relating to matters dealt with in article 6 and article 7. This article has been replaced by last sentence of Turkish draft.

At end of this morning's sitting we informed Ismet that latest draft fell so far short of allied draft that we must seek instructions on the subject from our respective governments by telegraph.[5] He had to accept this statement on our part and did not revert to announcement he had made yesterday[6] that he would not agree to discuss other big questions until question of declaration regarding judicial safeguards had been disposed of. We have therefore arranged to take exchange of options at a private meeting tomorrow afternoon.[7]

[3] Of May 4, not printed.

[4] See No. 397, n. 3.

[5] In his telegram No. 57 of June 2, Lord Curzon replied: '. . . we do not consider question sufficiently important to break up on, and you are therefore authorised to accept the compromise draft. You may possibly find it useful to withhold notification of our assent until agreement is reached on debt and concessions.'

[6] See No. 571.

[7] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1012–14.

No. 574

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 31, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 213 Telegraphic [E 5598/6/44]

ATHENS, *May 30, 1923, 10 p.m.*

Lausanne telegram No. 132.[1]

Commander-in-Chief and head of navy, as well as Chief of Revolution have expressed themselves as not altogether pleased with settlement on the ground that resumption of hostilities would have allowed victorious Greek army to dictate terms (see my despatch No. 384).[2] They, as well as certain section of press, describe settlement as a sacrifice to please the allies. Wild and improbable stories of forthcoming coup by General Pangalos have been revived (see my despatch No. 269)[3] and I consider resignation of either Veniselos or Minister for Foreign Affairs at this juncture would be a misfortune and play into hands of Extremists such as Commander-in-Chief and head of navy.

Idea of separate peace has been talked of for some time (see paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 347)[4] and whilst disclaiming any intention of making peace without approval of the allies, Greeks are well aware that their army is a trump card in hands of the allies and they argue that Turks would give Greece better terms in order to get it out of the way.

I must remind Your Lordship that cause of recent crisis was absolute necessity of ending state of intolerable suspense. If not even a preliminary peace is now to be signed suspense will continue with danger of more serious crisis.

Sent to Lausanne, repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 572.

[2] Of May 16. This ran: '. . . The Greek fleet, according to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, could easily pass the Dardanelles, provided England did not block the way, and as things stand at present, it would not be difficult, according to Colonel Plastiras, for the army to reach at any rate the Chataldja line. This, it is stated, would be easier to defend than the Maritza, and, . . . once in occupation of Eastern Thrace, Greece would be able to negotiate on far better terms with Turkey than at present. Possession of Eastern Thrace would, besides, help to solve the all-important refugee problem.'

[3] Of April 5, not printed.

[4] Of May 3, not printed.

No. 575

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received May 31, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 135 Telegraphic [E 5599/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 31, 1923, 12.15 a.m.*

In two sittings yesterday and today[1], committee of experts agreed upon new draft of article 2 necessitated by change in Greco-Turkish frontier at

[1] May 30.

Karagatch and upon text of article to be added to Thracian frontier convention regarding transit over, 1, Turkish and, 2, Greek sections of railway between Kul[c]l[i] Bourgas and Greco-Bulgarian frontier. Frontier is correctly given in small sketch map in 'Times' of May 28th except that it leaves Arda at a point to be fixed by delimitation in neighbourhood of village Tcheurekkeui lying two kilometres south west of railway bridge over Arda and reaches Maritza at a point one kilometre south of village of Bosnakeui. Same commission will also decide whether former village shall be included in Greece or in Turkey on basis of Greek or Turkish majority population existing on October 12th, 1922.

Additional article is similar to that already adopted by first committee on May 16th (see my despatch No. 40)[2] except that (a), first paragraph provides for reciprocal freedom of transit for Greece and Turkey over all three sections, (b) second paragraph is replaced by new one obliging Turkey as regards transit rights for Bulgaria over Turkish section of line to give Bulgaria same treatment as that accorded her by Greece under article 4 of Western Thrace treaty of August 10th, 1920,[3] (c) League of Nations commissary is to be assisted by Bulgarian as well as Greek and Turkish assessors, (d) after five years Council of League of Nations may decide on demand of any of three powers whether control by League of Nations commissary is to continue.

Bulgarian delegate assisted at second meeting and accepted article without demur.

M. Veniselos also raised new points regarding right of inhabitants of Greek race on Turkish territory west of Maritza to stay if they wish or if they choose to leave to benefit by machinery for liquidating property etc. provided by exchange of populations convention. Without some such stipulation inhabitants in so far as they are Turkish subjects of Greek Orthodox religion would be compulsorily exchanged under latter convention. Turks have not yet agreed and matter will have to come before first committee unless experts can meanwhile find privately a basis of agreement.

[2] Of May 15, not printed. For the draft article, see *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 89.
[3] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 479–85.

No. 576

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 1, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 327 Telegraphic [E 5671/1/44]

Personal and secret CONSTANTINOPLE, *May 31, 1923, 6 p.m.*

I gather from usual sources that irritation of Council of Ministers with Ismet for exceeding their instructions has been allayed by latter's explanation of situation and of his efforts to achieve peace by getting early discussion

of main outstanding questions, i.e. judicial régime, public debt, evacuation and foreign companies.

Ismet pointed out on May 29th that if agreement be not reached on other questions, that of Greek reparations can again be raised inasmuch as nothing had yet been signed and he has stated to allies that recent sacrifice was only made in return for allied concessions in other matters. Ismet explains that in the same way as during first conference he acted on principle of settling with danger of strongest enemy first so in present instance he thought it expedient to solve question which might be regarded by Turkey's most dangerous enemy as pretext for war.

Ismet also points out elsewhere that once Greek reparation dispute has been settled and menace of Greek army thereby eliminated as a weapon against Turks, allies cannot hope to achieve any result by use of threats in other questions. He observes that if rupture eventually takes place either Greek army will not move having no particular reason to do so, or if it moves will do so with allies and on clearly stated ground that it is defence of their cause. Such situation would in Ismet's opinion be morally and materially preferable to a Greek attack on account of indemnity.

Generally speaking, Ismet denies that his action in last crisis has prejudiced Turks' position should rupture ultimately take place and he describes his difference of opinion with Angora as one of procedure, not of principle. He says question of peace is 95% settled.

It would seem however clear that Ismet's position will be likely to be very difficult if he cannot succeed in showing some serious compensating advantages for his Greek surrender.[1]

Repeated to Lausanne No. 138.

[1] See No. 564.

No. 577

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 2, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 136 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5672/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *May 31, 1923*

In the Third Committee this morning[1] certain outstanding points on the economic clauses and the reports of the economic experts on the fiscal clauses of the etablissement convention and on the commercial convention were considered.

Article 73. The reserve of the Turkish delegation with regard to the inclusion of the words 'y compris les espèces, titres et valeurs' was mentioned, but no decision was come to and the reserve remains.

Article 78. The Japanese delegation asked that Japan should be included

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 327–33.

in this article. The Turkish delegation raised no objection in principle, but it was left to the Japanese delegation to explain to the Turkish delegation the necessity for Japan being included. The article was also referred for examination by the financial experts, in order to determine its financial effect.

Article 82 (e). There was considerable discussion on the wording proposed by the allied experts[2] (see my despatch No. 83 of May 23rd)[3] to which the Turks refused to agree, and the matter was referred to the jurists to consider. The Turks had admitted in sub-committee that they had in mind the Vickers-Armstrong Docks case.[4] They tried to make out today that the position of concessionaires would not be prejudiced by anything in the present article but I said that this did not satisfy me as the proposed text might impair the very basis of the negotiations at Angora in the case of Vickers-Armstrong.

Article 87. The text proposed by the economic experts in their report of 28th May[5] (see my despatch No. 113 of May 31st)[3] was accepted.

Article 89. The modification of this article, proposed in the report of the economic experts of the 21st May[6] (see my despatch No. 83 of May 23rd)[3] was accepted.

Articles 89 and 93. The proposal in the expert's report of 26th May[7] (see my despatch No. 104 of May 29th)[3] to exclude Japan from the section dealing with contracts, was accepted.

Fiscal clauses of the Établissement Convention.

The recommendations contained in the economic experts' report of the 22nd May[8] (see my despatch No. 91 of May 24th)[3] were accepted subject to the modifications suggested in the Drafting Committee's note of the 25th May[9] (see my despatch No. 95 of May 26th).[3]

Commercial Convention. (See text and covering note by experts sent home in my despatch No. 106 of May 29th).[3]

Article 2. It was agreed at the end of the penultimate paragraph to substitute 'livres sterling' for 'livres turques or'.

Article 9. The third and fourth paragraphs dealing with 'cabotage' were reserved. This will be dealt with ultimately by a letter being written to the British, French and Italian delegations agreeing to give modified 'cabotage' rights for a limited period to some of their undertakings which were engaged in this business before the war.

[2] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 334.

[3] Not printed.

[4] The docks contract with Messrs. Whitworth, Armstrong and Vickers was concluded by the Turkish Government in December 1913. As Mr. Beaumont, First Secretary of the British Embassy at Constantinople, explained: 'No such contract has ever been made in any country. . . . Except in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf it gives a monopoly for the repair and construction of warships in the Ottoman Empire for thirty years to a company which, though nominally Ottoman, is in fact entirely controlled by the British directors.' (Annual Report, Turkey, 1913, p. 15.)

[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 335.

[6] Ibid., p. 336.

[7] Ibid., p. 337.

[8] Ibid., pp. 338–9.

[9] Ibid., p. 340.

Article 14. It was agreed to modify the Turkish condition of adhering to the Berne convention[10] as regards the right of translation by limiting it to the right of translation into Turkish.

Article 17, dealing with the proposed adhesion of non-signatory powers, was reserved after the allied delegates had admitted that the proposal to allow non-signatory powers generally to adhere was too wide, but had maintained that the right to do so should be given to certain powers like Belgium, Portugal and Czechoslovakia.

Article 18. After some discussion Riza Nour stated that, as a compromise, the Turkish delegation would accept the proposal of the allied experts if the period were reduced from thirty months to two years in respect of Greece, Roumania and Serbia. The Roumanians and Serbians said that their instructions did not allow them to accept this compromise and the question was reserved for them to obtain further instructions. The difficulty arises through the reluctance of the Turks to accord so long a period to Greece, and it is clear from private conversations that Turkey would be willing to accept the article in the form proposed so far as regards Roumania and Serbia, if she could get the period limited to one year so far as regards Greece.

Subject to the above points, the articles[11] prepared by the economic experts were accepted.

[10] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 77, pp. 22–34. [11] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 341–9.

No. 578

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 1, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 142 Telegraphic [E 5676/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 1, 1923, 3.55 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 52.[1]

I adhere (?generally) to views expressed in my telegrams Nos. 121[2] and 122.[3] If anything, I am strengthened in view that we should do well to agree to evacuate Constantinople and Dardanelles, beginning with former,

[1] Of May 31. This ran: 'French Ambassador in discussing with me today question of military evacuation, informed me that it was possible, though not perhaps very likely, that the French Parliament, owing to necessary formalities, might not be able to ratify Treaty, even if ratified by Angora and the other Powers, in the course of present parliamentary session, which ends in July, and that French ratification might, therefore, have to be postponed till October. When I asked him what would happen to the treaty in the interim, he replied that presumably it could not come into force. Technically this would, I suppose, be true. But I doubt whether that is view that will be taken by the Turks, who probably look forward to early operation of entire treaty. Please inform me of your views and consult your legal committee on the point. It obviously affects the question of evacuation.'

[2] No. 567. [3] No. 567, n. 2.

as soon as Turkey ratifies peace treaty. Settlement in principle in this sense in the course of next few days, combined with settlement of judicial declaration on lines now proposed, if allied governments approve of these, is just what is required to consolidate Ismet's position vis à vis Angora and he would have greater courage to meet us half way over questions of debt and concessions.

We have ourselves something to gain from point of view of economy by early evacuation. Politically show of generosity would have some little favourable effect on our future relations with Turks. Fact that French ratification may be delayed until autumn is further reason for not waiting until treaty comes into force.

From our own point of view it is not desirable to wait so long with continuing expenditure and with risk of incidents in occupied area. In Turkish eyes delay, which would be caused if His Majesty's Government ratified treaty in July, but waited for French ratification before evacuation, would give us appearance of wanting to keep our foothold at all costs, as Turks have always regarded occupation as British enterprise into which we have dragged unwilling allies.

Turks are so keen on securing acceptance of their proposal that they would almost certainly agree to subsidiary conditions, which it would be useful to impose, viz: 1. That ratification by Greece and Turkey only should re-establish state of peace between these two powers and 2. That provisions of convention for régime for foreigners and commercial convention should be applied in Turkey as from date of Turkish ratification. My legal expert[4] thinks it should not be impossible to devise suitable instruments to provide for these and former would satisfactorily dispose of Monsieur Veniselos's proposal for separate preliminary peace between Greece and Turkey.[5]

I will discuss matter confidentially with my French and Italian colleagues who I think will agree. I send this reply at once however as I consider it urgent that allied governments should agree without delay on common lines.

Only means of providing for whole treaty to come into force in advance of French ratification would be either to expedite ratification by Great Britain, Italy and Japan or to reduce the number of principal allied powers whose ratification is necessary for its coming into force. Former method would probably break down on delay over Japanese ratification. Latter would involve question with France so delicate that I doubt whether it would be wise to raise it nor do I think it would be necessary to do so if programme outlined in paragraph 3 above could be carried out.

[4] Mr. H. W. Malkin.

[5] See Nos. 540 and 572.

No. 579

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 3, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 222 Telegraphic [E 5719/6/44]

ATHENS, *June 2, 1923, 9.30 p.m.*

Constantinople telegram No. 324.[1]

Attention of Greek government has already been called to formation of bands (see my despatch No. 352[2] and previous correspondence).[3] I will again draw serious attention to these reports but I have no knowledge of (1) whether incursion complained of took place after May 26th and (2) if so whether they can be substantiated by other than Turkish sources.

Meanwhile we should scarcely be justified in allowing Turkish vessels through the Dardanelles and denying passage to Greek vessels (see your telegram No. 92)[4] when this might have enabled them to deal heavy blow at Turkey. Greeks have besides frequently complained of what is notorious, that Turks have constantly violated Moudania agreement by sending troops from Asia Minor into Eastern Thrace. We could hardly on the top of all this grant to Turks a weapon which we have persistently denied to Greeks.

Another matter for serious consideration is that if Turkish coast defence vessels appear in the Aegean for patrolling purposes there is danger of incidents with Greek destroyers. If they fire on bands Greek ships would probably sink them. Commander-in-Chief and head of navy would welcome pretext thus offered and the fat would be in the fire (see my telegram No. 213).[5] To put such a card into the hands of hot heads at a moment like the present would be most dangerous. Threat suggested by Mr. Henderson would I fear have just the opposite effect to what he anticipates.[6]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 125.

[1] Of May 30. This stated: 'Adnan Bey read me to-day telegram from Reouf Bey calling attention to serious inconvenience which was being caused by incursions of Greek bands from islands (Mitylene, &c.) to mainland, and instructing him to request Allies to allow two Turkish coast defence vessels at present in Golden Horn to be used for patrol of coastal region there.'

[2] Of May 5, not printed.

[3] See No. 499.

[4] See No. 566, n. 6.

[5] No. 574.

[6] In his telegram No. 182 of June 5, Lord Curzon replied to Mr. Henderson: 'Your telegram No. 324 (of May 30th: Turkish desire to send coastal defence vessels to the Aegean). You will now have seen the Commander-in-Chief's objections to granting the Turkish request as well as those contained in Mr. Bentinck's telegram No. 222 (of 2nd June) repeated to you No. 125. You had better therefore reply to Adnan that further representations are being made at Athens but that request to allow Turkish vessels to pass the Straits could not be granted as it would raise the question of similar passage by Greek warships.'

No. 580

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 146 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5725/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 2, 1923*

The question of the exchange options possessed by holders of pre-war Turkish loans has been fully discussed during the last two days and a deadlock has now been reached. The Turkish government evidently intends to refuse to pay the coupons in sterling and at the same time wishes to avoid the loss of credit which a simple repudiation of existing liabilities would involve.

They therefore decline to agree to any confirmation of pre-war loan contracts unless an explicit reserve is made as regards the exchange options. Ismet Pasha would be willing either (1) to give the proposed declaration (confirming the decree of Mouharrem[1] and loan contracts) with an explicit reserve as regards the exchange options, [or] (2) to give no declaration at all, [or] (3) to obtain the consent of the bondholders to payment in francs before the treaty is signed.

We have replied that the third alternative is obviously impracticable, and as regards the other two we cannot possibly agree to vary the loan contracts to the detriment of the bondholders, even if we had the legal power to do so, which we clearly have not in the case of neutral bondholders. We have proposed that the declaration to the council of the debt should be given as drafted in February,[2] and that the proposed reserve should take the form of a separate communication to the syndicates, taking note of their declaration of May 23rd,[3] expressing the intention of Turkey to negotiate immediately after peace, and re-affirming her inability to pay in full without some facilities. Ismet Pasha insisted that the 'reserve' should be inserted in the declaration to the council of the debt and not in a separate communication to the syndicate of bondholders.

We consider that as a final concession, the proposed communication to the bondholders might be replaced by a covering letter to the debt council in the same terms, which would more nearly approach to Ismet's desire to introduce a reserve into the declaration.

Ismet Pasha was this morning more outspoken than on previous occasions as to the determination of the Turkish government not under any circumstances to pay in sterling at present and the impression of myself and my colleagues was that he might carry the matter to the point of a rupture of negotiations.[4]

[1] See No. 490, n. 3.
[2] On February 4; see *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iv, pp. 19–20.
[3] No. 565, n. 9.
[4] In his telegram No. 331, of June 1, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'Deadlock has again been reached between Ismet and council of ministers. Ismet proposed to Angora three solutions for debt interest question:

At the end of our discussion we told Ismet that we could only refer the question to our governments. Put shortly, our position is (a) that we cannot vary the contracts (either expressly or by implication) to the detriment of the bondholders, by making the annuities payable in francs: (b) that we wish to place no obstacle in the way of negotiations between the Turks and the bondholders and would agree to make this clear by the compromise suggested above or some similar arrangement.

I should be glad to receive Your Lordship's instructions on this point as soon as possible. My colleagues are telegraphing to their governments in a similar sense.

(a) francs payment.

(b) no mention in treaty either of conditions of payment or of confirmation of Muhurrem decree etc. and

(c) confirmation of Muhurrem decree and old loan contracts with reservation respecting settlement with bondholders, after peace, of conditions of payment.

'Angora telegraphs May 31st preferring (a) and accepting (b) but instructing Ismet definitely to reject (c) on the ground that if franc payment is not admitted recognition of Muhurrem decree would place most important part of state revenue under foreign control.

'Ismet in telegram dated June 1st complains that this rejection is contrary to scope of his former instructions on basis of which negotiations have been conducted and states that delegation had already decided that alternative (c) would be preferable to (b).

'Ismet declares that negotiations have reached final and critical stage and that any changes in their course is practically impossible. Non-confirmation of decree will be regarded as abolition of debt administration which was never contemplated. He describes situation of delegation as unbearable and concludes by saying that he cannot carry on if government persist in their new instructions against adoption of (c).'

No. 581

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 147 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5726/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 2, 1923*

Your telegram No. 45 (of May 30th: general situation).[1]

Progress which I hoped might follow settlement of Greco-Turkish reparation dispute has on the whole been achieved.

[1] This referred to No. 567, n. 1, and continued: 'I am quite content to await your appreciation of the general situation at the end of the week before consulting Allied governments. Progress already made reflects greatest credit on yourself and your delegation. . . . Your handling of the Greek reparation question has earned the admiration of His Majesty's Government and I desire to offer you my warm personal congratulations. I should be grateful if you would also convey to Monsieur Veniselos and Ismet Pasha an expression of my friendly sentiments.' Sir H. Rumbold, in his telegram No. 137 of May 31, thanked Lord Curzon for his generous appreciation of the delegation's work and stated: 'The results you obtained and the respect which you inspired in Ismet Pasha during the first phase of conference have been responsible for such measure of success as we have been able to achieve during second phase, whilst immediate action you took in inducing French and Italian governments to drop their demand for reparations from Turkey was decisive factor in solution of Greek reparation question.'

Of the four outstanding questions or group of questions to which I drew attention in my telegram No. 118 (of May 26th),[2] judicial declaration has been provisionally settled here and my allied colleagues and I await the instructions of our governments. I presume that I should not regard your telegram No. 44 (of May 30th)[3] as covering His Majesty's Government's approval of the formula subsequently adopted here and I shall be grateful for His Majesty's Government's early decision as Turks are inclined to be suspicious, however unjustifiably, that allied governments are purposely delaying their replies. Italian government have already informed M. Montagna that they agree to the formula.

Group of territorial questions has been settled on lines given in my telegram No. 129 of May 28th,[4] and settlement will be formally recorded at next meeting of my committee, probably on June 4th.[5]

Question of debt coupons is proving an even greater obstacle than I had anticipated. I am explaining present situation in a separate telegram[6] on the reply to which further course of negotiation here on the subject will depend.

I am also telegraphing separately[7] on the procedure which my allied colleagues and I intend to adopt on June 4th in opening discussion with Ismet Pasha on the question of concessions. My latest information from Mr. Henderson is that contained in his telegram No. 322[8] to the Foreign Office. It seems unlikely, however, from that telegram that progress in the negotiations at Angora will be so rapid as to enable allied delegates here,

[2] No. 565. [3] No. 570, n. 5. [4] No. 569. [5] See No. 587, below.
[6] No. 580.

[7] Lausanne telegram No. 148 of June 2. This ran: 'My allied colleagues and I discussed to-day privately the procedure which we should adopt in opening discussion with Ismet Pasha on Monday on the question of concessions. My delegation had prepared a statement of principles to be covered by any articles for insertion in the treaty or any declaration by Turkey to be attached to the treaty, upon which we may agree with Ismet Pasha next week. This statement was based on the redraft of Articles 94, 94 *bis* and 94 *ter* prepared by M. Fromageot during the Inter-Allied meeting in London, which will be found on page 6 of Foreign Office print, Section 1, of March 27th [No. 456, pp. 639–40].

'My immediately following telegram [No. 149, of June 2, not printed] contains the text of the statement in question. The statement will not be handed to Ismet Pasha as it stands, but will form the basis upon which the allied delegates will conduct the discussion.

'I intend, if possible, to confine the articles to be inserted in the treaty or the declaration to the treatment of concessions in Turkey within her new frontiers, but it is possible that, as in the first phase of the conference, Ismet Pasha may demand reciprocal treatment of Turkish concessions in detached territories on ground of prestige rather than for material reasons, since there is, of course, no Turkish capital in such concessions. Such a development may entail the drafting of a text which will indirectly raise question of Turkish Petroleum Company's concession and treatment of French inchoate 1914 agreement, so far as it relates to Palestine, and I have therefore telegraphed separately to-day asking that a Colonial Office expert may be sent out as soon as possible.

'Statement of principles, which conforms generally to original allied draft of Articles 80 and 94 in the draft treaty of January 31st, requires no comment, except that my allied colleagues and I realise that we shall probably not be able long to maintain paragraph 4, which raises the question of direct cash compensation to the concessionary companies.'

[8] Of May 30, not printed.

when treaty is ready for signature, merely to take note in some form or other of results already then achieved at Angora. Discussions with Ismet Pasha will therefore be directed towards agreeing upon articles or a declaration which will bind Turkey to give satisfaction in those negotiations with concessionary companies which will have to be completed after signature of the treaty. Precise form of declaration of articles will have to be settled here in the light of the latest information received from Mr. Henderson before treaty is prepared for signature.

On the balance side of progress made this week, I may also mention that Drafting Committee have agreed upon a text of articles 152 and 153 providing for bill of indemnity for allied acts, etc. during occupation. This is very satisfactory in view of the disparity on this point between allied draft of January 31st and Turkish counter-proposals of March 8th. The experts have also agreed upon an amnesty declaration. Their report contained a Greek and a Turkish reserve but from private discussions which have since taken place I hope that both reserves will be withdrawn when the report comes before my committee. It is particularly important to obtain withdrawal of the Greek reserve as it involves the question of the Greek right to except certain military offenders from the amnesty. On this point M. Veniselos feels so strongly that he may refuse personally to sign treaty or declaration, unless difficulty is overcome.[9]

On the debit side I should mention that unfortunately two details of the Greco-Turkish reparation settlement are still outstanding. Turkish experts are still holding out for an interpretation of the new draft of article 58, involving the admission of Greek liability to pay requisition notes issued by the Greek authorities in Asia Minor (see third paragraph of my telegram No. 128).[10] M. Veniselos accepts Greek liability for formal contracts entered into by Greek administration, but he rightly claims that complete waiver of Turkish reparation claims against Greece covers requisitions, as is admitted by Turks in similar allied waiver of reparation claims against Turkey in article 57. Allies will, of course, strongly support Greek delegation. Other point is treatment of population of ceded area round Karagatch (see last paragraph of my telegram No. 135).[11] M. Veniselos is not in my view on strong ground here, particularly as he raised question in sub-committee of experts, after main lines of settlement had been reached last Saturday[12] and recorded in meeting of main committee last Monday.[13] I doubt therefore whether we can obtain any satisfaction from Turks who have so far refused it in private discussions between experts.

In addition to the big outstanding question of debt coupons and concessions, there remains question of evacuation, on which I am awaiting Your Lordship's instructions in reply to my telegrams Nos. 121, 122 (of May 27th), and 142 (of June 1st).[14] Mr. Henderson's recent telegrams[15] bearing on situation of Ismet vis-à-vis of Angora confirm me in the opinion, which I

[9] Cf. No. 533. [10] No. 568. [11] No. 575. [12] See Nos. 563 and 564.
[13] See No. 568. [14] No. 567, No. 567, n. 2, and No. 578, respectively.
[15] See Nos. 559, n. 3, 571, n. 3, 576, and 580, n. 4.

have already expressed to Your Lordship, that if I can only be authorised to inform Ismet at an early date that we will, in principle, meet him on this question, his hand will be strengthened and allied task in reaching settlement on other outstanding questions, particularly debt coupons, may be correspondingly facilitated.

To sum up, while my fears that Angora's attitude might retard conclusion of peace are being to some extent confirmed, e.g. in the matter of the debt coupons, I still trust that there is no insoluble problem before us, nor do I think that any consultation between the three governments should prove necessary except upon question of evacuation and possibly on question of debt coupons, in the event of the three governments sanctioning solution proposed in my separate telegram of today[16] and that solution being definitely turned down by Ismet here. It is also possible that events of next week may eventually render necessary some consultation between governments on the question of concessions.

[16] No. 580.

No. 582

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 151 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 5730/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 2, 1923*

My telegram No. 147 second paragraph (of June 2nd:[1] Judicial Declaration).

My French colleague has since informed me that he has received a telegram from M. Poincaré in which the latter states that although the Judicial Declaration contained in my telegram No. 134[2] is unsatisfactory, yet if the acceptance thereof is necessary to secure the signature of peace, and provided that the British and Italian governments agree, he will consent thereto.

General Pellé considers that it is better policy to strengthen Ismet Pasha's position with his own government by informing him of the acceptance of the Judicial Declaration in question, if His Majesty's Government and the Italian government agree thereto, than to defer the acceptance thereof for bargaining purposes in connection with the question of exchange options possessed by holders of pre-war Turkish loans. I agree with this view.

[1] No. 581. [2] Not printed; see, however, No. 573.

No. 583

Mr. Nicolson to M. Veniselos (Lausanne)
[*C 9590/4/19*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 2, 1923*

My dear President,

I have received your letter of the 28th May[1] in which you enquire whether His Majesty's Government are prepared to initiate general negotiations with the Italian Government in regard to the ultimate disposal of the Dodecanese, or whether they would prefer that the Greek Government should take advantage of M. Alexandris's forthcoming visit to Rome to open direct negotiations on their own behalf.

I have consulted Lord Curzon in the matter, and am authorised by him to give you the following reply:

'In February of last year the Foreign Office had occasion to learn[2] that the Italian Government considered that the status of the islands of the Dodecanese was no longer governed by the Græco-Italian Treaty of the 10th August, 1920.[3] Lord Curzon informed M. de Martino at the time that His Majesty's Government had been under the impression that the Italian Government remained pledged, both in relation to Greece and in relation to their Allies, to the execution of this treaty, and in order that there might be no misunderstanding on the matter in future he furnished the Ambassador with a memorandum[4] recording his views on the subject, and recalling to his Excellency's notice the several stages by which the treaty of August 1920 had been reached. This memorandum concluded with the statement that His Majesty's Government did not consider that the Græco-Italian Agreement of 1920 could now be regarded as null and void, and that, in view of the very direct interest which they formerly took in its signature, we could not now remain indifferent to its execution.'

No reply to this memorandum was received at the time, and indeed we have reason to believe that the Italian Ambassador failed to communicate its contents to his own Government. The question was, however, again raised in October of last year, when M. de Martino made a verbal communication[5] to the Foreign Office to the effect that the Italian Government had notified the Greek Minister at Rome that they regarded the treaty of August 1920 as having lapsed. Lord Curzon took the occasion of informing[6] the Italian Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had learned with astonishment that it was the intention of the Italian Government unilaterally

[1] Not printed. In this letter, M. Venizelos had enclosed a copy of his letter of January 29, 1923, not printed, to the Delegations of the Powers at Lausanne (cf. *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 482).

[2] From a conversation between the Italian Ambassador, Mr. Murray, and Mr. Osborne of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, on February 1, 1922.

[3] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 1078–80.

[4] Of February 10, 1922 (C1954/1953/19), not printed.

[5] On October 9, see No. 148, n. 2.

[6] In a letter of October 15, 1922 (C14136/1953/19), not printed.

to renounce the solemn agreement into which they had entered with the Greek Government. He added that His Majesty's Government had been prepared, at the time of M. Schanzer's visit to London, to use their good offices with the Greek Government to secure, as part of a general settlement, some modification of the treaty of August 1920; but that 'they were not prepared to consider that the Dodecanese question could be detached from the general settlement, or decided by unilateral action on the part of Italy'. Lord Curzon concluded by informing the Ambassador that a solution of the question based upon the unilateral repudiation of the whole treaty on the part of Italy was not one which His Majesty's Government were willing either to recognise or to admit. The reply to this note took the form of a letter[7] addressed to Lord Curzon by M. Mussolini himself, in which the latter admitted that the settlement drawn up in August 1920 was the result of an agreement between the Allies, and that he was willing once more to examine with them the problem as a whole in order to arrive at a fresh settlement. Lord Curzon informed M. Mussolini[8] that he had received this intimation with sincere satisfaction, and that he fully appreciated the friendly and helpful spirit in which his Excellency had dealt with the subject.

You will observe from the above summary of the correspondence which has passed with the Italian Government that His Majesty's Government have always considered themselves interested in the settlement of the Dodecanese question, and that they have in no way abandoned their right to participate in the negotiations which might eventually be conducted for that purpose. They do not however see any objection, indeed they would welcome it, if discussions between the Greek and Italian Governments were to hold out the prospect of a settlement, which His Majesty's Government, consistently with the line which they have taken throughout, could accept as a fair and equitable solution of the problem.[9]

I have, &c.
HAROLD NICOLSON

[7] Of November 3 (C15283/1953/19), not here printed. For the Italian text, see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 70.

[8] In a letter of November 10 (C15283/1953/19), not here printed. For the Italian text, see *D.D.I.* (*i*), No. 100.

[9] Cf. *D.D.I.* (*ii*), No. 61.

No. 584

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 152 Telegraphic [E 5734/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 3, 1923, 11.40 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 55.[1]

I have spoken to Monsieur Veniselos.

Although he states he is not in very close touch with what is going on in Greece he does not consider Commander-in-Chief and head of navy can

[1] Of June 2, not printed.

bring off a coup.[2] He says he knows eleven divisional commanders and that their past records satisfy him that only two out of the eleven might lend themselves to a policy of adventure. He admitted that his influence was no longer as strong as formerly but said that Greek government still listens to him. He pointed out apparent uncertainty of situation in Greece and reinforced his argument that it would be impossible for him to propose sacrifices to his government by agreeing to pay for requisitions.

I asked Monsieur Veniselos to speak to Ismet both with regard to Turkish claim to reimbursement for requisitions irrespective of their waiver of reparations from Greece and also with regard to right of inhabitants of Greek race to stay at Karagatch if they wish (see my telegram No. 135).[3] He promised to see Ismet to-morrow and I told him that he could certainly count on my support with regard to requisitions question.

I took the opportunity to give him message contained in your telegram No. 45[4] and he asked me to express his gratitude to you.

Repeated to Athens.

[2] Cf. No. 574. [3] No. 575. [4] No. 581, n. 1.

No. 585

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 155 Telegraphic [E 5806/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 4, 1923, 11.20 p.m.*

French delegate has read to Italian delegate and myself a telegram which he has just received from his government with regard to evacuation of Constantinople and other occupied territory in Turkey. The telegram begins by stating that it would be unsafe to count on French parliament ratifying treaty during its present session.[1] The French government therefore suggest evacuation of occupied territories should begin immediately after ratification of treaty by Grand National Assembly and that it should end after treaty has come into force owing to its ratification by Great Britain, Italy and Japan and demobilization of Turkish army to proceed pari passu with evacuation. Telegram adds that French government believes Italian government shares above views.

My allied colleagues and I are agreed in considering suggestion as to spinning out evacuation until three Powers other than Turkey have ratified treaty, is both dangerous and unpractical.[2] The Turks would certainly

[1] Cf. No. 578, n. 1.

[2] In his telegram No. 68 of June 6, Lord Curzon commented: 'I agree that proposal in question is dangerous and impracticable. If policy of evacuation on ratification of treaty by Angora is to be adopted, it should preferably be in accordance with plan referred to in my telegram No. 62 (of June 5th)' [No. 588, below].

reject any such proposal and apart from this Allies might find themselves at a given moment with greatly reduced effectives and liable to pressure to which their weakness would expose them. The suggestion as to demobilization of Turkish army simultaneously with evacuation is quite new and would be equally rejected by Turks. Commissions of control would presumably be necessary to superintend such demobilization. The whole proposal if insisted upon might even wreck conference and we hope it will be dropped.[3]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[3] In his telegram No. 3984 of June 6 to the War Office, General Harington commented: 'From military point of view I am in complete agreement with Sir Horace. Allied Generals are unanimously of opinion that once evacuation has begun, it should be carried out right through. I am informed by General Charpy that he has sent this view strongly to General Pellé. It would be exceedingly dangerous and unsound to leave small detachments exposed to incidents and insults with Turks in their present uppish mood, which will be accentuated when we are actually going. In my opinion, evacuation should be started on ratification by Angora and a time limit should be fixed by Lausanne, say 6 weeks, by which, it will be completed. 6 weeks suits us all. I could evacuate Ismid and Constantinople in 2 weeks, but in order to synchronize with French who have more to move from here, I would delay evacuation of latter place. In our opinion 3 British, 3 French and 1 Italian Battalion[s] should remain at Constantinople backed by strong fleet, till French are ready in say 3 to 4 weeks from start, and all step off together on one day. Allied Generals formally handing over. This would be a suitable moment to end Allied Command. Balance of 6 weeks allowed under time limit would be taken up in evacuating Chanak and Kilia base. Above would give effect of leaving Constantinople before expiration to time limit, and incidents which are certain to occur might in this way be largely avoided. Idea of establishing at this stage allied missions of control to supervise Turkish demobilization is quite unpractical.'

No. 586

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 7)
No. 157 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5882/3579/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 4, 1923*

My telegram No. 148.[1]

The private meeting between Ismet Pasha and the Allied delegates, assisted on each side by experts, to discuss the question of concessions, took place this morning. I was unavoidably prevented from attending personally. Mr. Ryan took my place.

My colleagues and I had agreed, for the reasons stated in my telegram No. 151,[2] that it would be better to inform Ismet Pasha at once of the assent of our Governments to the proposed judicial declaration.[3] It was decided to make the announcement at the outset of this morning's private meeting, in the hope that it would create a favourable atmosphere for the discussion of the concessions question. Ismet Pasha expressed thanks for the announcement, but was not gushing.

[1] No. 581, n. 7. [2] No. 582. [3] See No. 573, n. 5.

M. Montagna then showed Ismet Pasha a copy of the statement of principles[4] embodied in my telegram No. 149,[5] and explained the reasons for which it would probably be necessary after all to deal with concessions in the treaty. Ismet Pasha professed to be taken aback. He said the statement contained everything which had been laid down in the draft treaty of 31st January, including a demand for reparation, although it had since been arranged that the matter should be the subject of negotiations with the companies at Angora. He could not understand why the question was now raised in Lausanne.

General Pellé made a very clear statement of the Allied position. He read the portion of his general instructions from the French Government bearing on the subject. He stated most strongly that, in agreeing to the Angora negotiations, the Allied Governments had not intended to renounce their right to protect Allied capital or to leave their subjects to their own resources. He emphasised the fact that reparation did not necessarily mean the payment of cash indemnities, as in most cases it could be provided for in other ways.

Ismet Pasha said he would consult his Government, but he foresaw great difficulty. He suggested that, if little progress had been made at Angora, it was due to the dilatoriness of the Allied subjects concerned in beginning them. He took strong exception to any suggestion that companies were entitled to indemnification for war losses. He contended that the Allies must choose one of the two alternatives: either the companies were Turkish and, in that case, the Allied Governments had no ground for interfering between them and the Turkish Government, or the interests involved were

[4] This ran: 'Les concessions accordées avant le 29 octobre 1914, dont des ressortissants alliés ou des entreprises fonctionnant à l'aide de capitaux appartenant à des ressortissants alliés sont bénéficiaires, seront confirmées. Seront églalement confirmées les concessions pour la régularisation desquelles certaines formalités n'auraient pas été remplies avant la guerre, mais qui ont reçu un commencement d'exécution ou ont formé le sujet d'un accord entre le Gouvernement turc et un Gouvernement allié.

'2. Les accords entrevenus avec le Gouvernement ottoman depuis le 30 octobre 1918 relatifs aux concessions visées à l'alinéa 1 demeureront en vigueur, sous réserve de leur soumission, à la demande du Gouvernement turc, à l'examen des experts dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la mise en vigueur du traité. Dans ce cas, l'accord sera confirmé ou modifié selon les recommandations des experts.

'3. Les provisions des contrats de concession seront:

(a) Mises en conformité des conditions économiques actuelles;

(b) Revisées comme réparation des préjudices subis par suite de la guerre. La revision à titre de réparation pourra comprendre l'augmentation des prix exigibles aux termes de la concession, la modification des droits payables au Gouvernement turc conformément aux dispositions de la concession et la prolongation de la durée de la concession.

'4. Au cas ou cette revision ne suffirait pas à assurer la réparation des préjudices subis, les concessionnaires auront droit à un versement en espèces en ce qui concerne toute somme qui ne serait pas couverte par la revision.

'5. Faute d'entente entre le Gouvernement turc et un concessionnaire en ce qui concerne les questions visées ci-haut, le différend sera réglé par deux experts, dont chaque partie nommera un, ou, si les experts n'arrivent pas à un accord, par un tiers expert qu'ils désigneront.'

[5] Of June 2, not printed. See, however, No. 581, n. 7.

those of Allied subjects, and in that case, any reparation for war losses came under the settlement of the reparations question.

Mr. Ryan said that the procedure now contemplated was exactly what was foreshadowed in the Allied note of the 27th March.[6] He urged that, if there had been delay in beginning the Angora negotiations, the Allied interests were by no means solely responsible for it. He confirmed that General Pellé had already said to the effect that the Allied Governments had never renounced their right to protect the important interests of their subjects whose capital was involved. As for the question of indemnification, a distinction had throughout been made between reparation to concessionnaires and the reparation to Allied subjects contemplated in the financial clauses of the treaty. The Turks had been well aware of this distinction and, in redrafting article 57 of the treaty, they had made no attempts to alter its scope so as to include Allied subjects who had suffered in their capacity as shareholders in concessionary companies.

The subsequent discussion was very lengthy. Ismet Pasha asked for explanations on certain points in the statement of principles. As regards inchoate pre-war concessions, he argued that any question regarding the rights of the claimants was a purely juridical one, and could not be dealt with in a political treaty. He provoked laughter by advancing the novel suggestion that, if concession contracts were re-adapted to new conditions, the same rule should apply to loan contracts. He evaded a proposal of M. Montagna's that the principles in the Allied statement should be discussed one by one. He reaffirmed with constant iteration and great persistency his main points, which were that the question of concessions could only be settled by the negotiations at Angora; that no proposal to indemnify the companies for war losses could be entertained, though he admitted at one moment that, if indemnification were merely to take the form of readaptation to new conditions, the question need not present great difficulty; that there was no occasion to embody in the treaty provisions concerning the relations between concessionary companies and the Turkish Government; and that, if agreements with such companies were to be readapted, loan contracts must also be readapted.

The Allied delegates repeatedly traversed these arguments on the lines already indicated above. They refused to admit any analogy for readaptation purposes between concession contracts and loan contracts. They disclaimed any intention of forcing the Angora Government to accept all the demands of the companies, and pointed out that their statement of principles contemplated arbitration on matters which could not be settled by negotiation.

Ismet Pasha repeated that he would refer the matter to his Government, but he said he could state at once that no proposal to indemnify the companies for war losses would be entertained and his Government would probably hold that the principle of readaptation, if accepted, must apply to all contracts, including loan contracts. He harped on what he called the unforeseen character of the proposal now being made to him. He said that if the

[6] No. 460.

companies thought that they could get everything they wanted, thanks to the backing of the Allied delegates at the conference, nothing would ever be settled at Angora.

General Pellé protested against this description of the situation at Angora. He read extracts from reports he had received as to how matters were proceeding there. These reports showed that, while one or two companies had reached a settlement and others seemed to be making good progress, several were in a very unsatisfactory position. The representative of the Smyrna–Cassaba Railway had had such poor success that he had left Angora to consult his principals, though without breaking off negotiations. Mr. Ryan said that the reports from Angora concerning British negotiations were less detailed, but their general tenor showed that things were going very slowly.[7]

General Pellé said that the Allied delegates did not want in any way to hamper the discussions at Angora. They merely wished to agree here upon principles in order that the conclusion of peace might not be delayed. He once more summed up the desiderata of the Allied Powers, and said that if agreement in principle were reached, a suitable form for giving effect to it could be devised.

Ismet Pasha was given a copy of the statement of principles. It was, however, impressed on him that it was not in any sense a text which the Allied delegates were proposing for his acceptance, but merely a note prepared to serve as a basis of discussion.

The results of the discussion were extremely nebulous. Ismet Pasha, while unbending on certain points, especially the question of indemnification for war losses, seemed anxious not to indispose the Allied Governments by taking up a *non possumus* attitude as regards negotiations here. It is pretty clear that his present intention is not to give satisfaction on this or any other important questions until he has made further progress with the two questions which now loom largest in his mind, namely, those of the interest on the debt and the evacuation of Constantinople and Chanak.

Towards the end of the discussion recorded above, General Pellé referred to the question of the Chester Concession[8] in relation to the French agreement of 1914.[9] He said that this was a question specially concerning France and Turkey, but that he thought it would be well to discuss it in the presence of his Allied colleagues. He explained that he preferred to do this at a private meeting rather than at an official sitting of the conference. Ismet Pasha acquiesced, and it was decided to take the matter up at a further private meeting to-morrow.[10]

Sent to Constantinople No. 62.

[7] See No. 629, below.

[8] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1220–40.

[9] See J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (New York, 1956), vol. i, pp. 273–6.

[10] For Mr. Grew's conversation with Ismet Pasha on June 5, see *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1016–18.

No. 587

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 62 Telegraphic [E 5676/1/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 5, 1923, 3.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 142 (of June 1st; evacuation of Constantinople and Straits).[1]

I am quite ready to consider possibility of arranging that evacuation should begin on ratification of the treaty by Angora provided a protocol is signed simultaneously with treaty, so drawn as not to require ratification, under which certain parts of the treaty would become operative at once. I agree that these should include: (1) immediate peace between Greece and Turkey on ratification by two governments, and (2) régime of foreigners and commercial convention.

But in discussing this arrangement with your legal advisers you should consider whether as a possible third point provisions regarding frontiers, including the Irak frontier clause, should not also be rendered immediately operative, failing which it would appear imprudent to withdraw the allied forces.

[1] No. 578.

No. 588

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 63 Telegraphic [E 5673/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 5, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 138[1] and 150[2] (of May 31st and June 2nd: Russian signature of Straits Convention).

[1] This ran: 'It will be necessary shortly to take a decision as to whether Russia should be given another chance of signing the Straits convention at the same time as the other powers. Your Lordship will recollect that, at the last meeting of your political commission on February 1st [see No. 360], M. Chicherin rejected the convention, and that no satisfactory reply has been sent to the Secretary-General's letter of April 12th, enquiring whether the Russian government were disposed to reconsider their decision and sign. In these circumstances we must decide whether to regard the Russian rejection as, for the moment, final, and proceed to sign without them, or to enquire again whether they are now prepared to sign. My French and Italian colleagues, with whom I have discussed the question and who are telegraphing in the same sense to their governments, agree with me that the former course is preferable. If it is adopted Russia will have, under article 19, the right to adhere at any time, and we think that to approach them again in existing circumstances would be undesirable for various reasons, including the probable attitude of the Swiss government.'

[2] This ran: 'My French colleague informs me that he has received a telegram from M. Poincaré in which the latter expresses the opinion that, as the Russian representatives explicitly stated at the last phase of the Lausanne Conference that they would *not* sign the Straits Convention submitted to them, there is no need for a further enquiry to be addressed to them on this subject.'

My view is that in order to forestall accusations of ignoring or flouting Russia we should put ourselves entirely above criticism by notifying the Russian government once again when the moment for signature is imminent and by intimating at the same time that if they still find themselves unable to sign they will yet be able to accede whenever they may wish to do so under the terms of the convention.[3]

Repeated to Paris No. 250 and Rome No. 168.

[3] In his telegram No. 169 of June 6, Sir H. Rumbold replied: 'I informed my allied colleagues this morning of your views. Italian delegate is in entire agreement with them but French delegate referred to telegram from his government, substance of which I reported in my telegram No. 150 [see n. 2]. French delegate undertook to inform his government of divergence of opinion between your views and views of French government.'

No. 589

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 64 Telegraphic [E 5677/1/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 5, 1923, 3.25 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 143[1] (of June 1st: Turkish accession to Arms Traffic Convention).[2]

You are authorized, if you find it necessary, to drop Article 156 but before deciding to do so you should make a further attempt to obtain Turkish accession to the existing provisional arrangement[3] by pointing out to Ismet that when Turkey applies for membership of the League latter will undoubtedly insist on her acceptance of the Arms Traffic Convention as a condition of entry; she might just as well, therefore, swallow the pill at once.[4]

[1] This ran: 'I should be glad to learn whether particular importance is attached to retention of article No. 156 [of] allied draft treaty. Turks cannot be expected to accept it in its present form because it binds them to accede to Arms Traffic convention which no one has ratified and also to any future conventions on the subject. The only possible course is to endeavour to get them to accede to existing provisional arrangement under which convention is to be applied only to prohibited zones dealt with in chapter 2 but Turks will object to this because countries concerned are neighbours of theirs and I am convinced that they would not in practice fulfil any obligations which they might accept. Whole position of convention is provisional and unsatisfactory and only solution would probably be for League of Nations to take whole question up in which case Turkey would presumably be party to whatever arrangement was reached. In these circumstances I am strongly in favour of dropping article.'

[2] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 909–25.

[3] See n. 1.

[4] In his telegram No. 76 of June 11, Lord Curzon instructed Sir H. Rumbold as follows: 'You may discard argument concerning arms traffic convention.'

No. 590

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 7)
No. 159 Telegraphic: by bag [E 5884/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 5, 1923*

My Committee reviewed following outstanding questions this afternoon.[1]

Article 3 (1) and Article 16.

General Pellé explained that he was still awaiting Ismet Pasha's definite reply to his proposal that the Turkish addition to these Articles regarding the Angora Agreement[2] should be dropped, but that France should reaffirm that Agreement in an exchange of notes. I made it quite clear that so far as my Delegation were concerned, there could be no question of accepting the Turkish additions and that a definite decision must be reached by the Turkish Delegation before the next and final meeting of my Committee.

Article 3 (2).

Ismet refused to give any answer regarding the period for separate negotiations on the Iraq frontier, and he significantly linked up this question with that of the Turkish addition to Article 1 regarding evacuation.

The Committee then formally recorded the arrangement reached in private conversation last Monday whereby the Maritza thalweg and the Rabbit Islands were conceded to Turkey, while the Turkish Delegation withdrew its reserves regarding Castellorizo and Ada-Kale.[3]

Article 20.

The draft provisionally accepted at the last meeting[4] of my Committee by the Italian and Turkish Delegations was finally completed by the addition of the words: 'Sans préjudice des dispositions générales de l'article 25' at the beginning.[5]

Article 35.

I announced that this Article would be dropped.

Articles 152 and 153.

A text of both these Articles had been agreed by the Drafting Committee (see my despatch No. 125 of June 4th).[6] Ismet pointed out that Article 152 really only dealt with orders and decisions affecting private persons and that contracts, concessions and financial arrangements etc. entered into by the Constantinople Government were dealt with by other Articles in the Treaty.

[1] i.e. June 4, see *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 124–36. This telegram was drafted on June 4.
[2] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2. [3] See No. 569. [4] See No. 561.
[5] See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 137.
[6] Not printed. See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 138.

He therefore proposed the omission of the words 'ou d'accord avec'. I refused to accept this, and the Article was referred again to the jurists.

Article 153 was accepted as drafted by the jurists.

Article 159 bis (Wakoufs in the Dodecanese and Greece).

Two declarations (the texts of which are enclosed in my despatch No. 129 of June 5th)[7] were proposed by the experts, one regarding Wakoufs in Greece to be made by the Inviting Powers, and the other regarding Wakoufs in the Dodecanese to be made by the Italian Delegation. Both were accepted by the Committee and duly recorded in the procès-verbal. I also read a short declaration explaining that the treatment of Wakoufs in Cyprus was in full conformity with the declarations made by the Italian Delegation and the Inviting Powers regarding Wakoufs in the Dodecanese and Greece (see also my despatch No. 129 of June 5th for the text).[8] This disposes of the Turkish demand for the addition of this article to the Treaty.

Article 20 of the Établissement Convention.

After Ismet had made an ingenuous attempt to fix the duration at six years on the ground that the Allies were proposing seven and the Turks five, the compromise proposed by the Allies at the last meeting of my Committee, namely seven years, was accepted by Ismet. The Établissement Convention is thus complete.

The Judicial Declaration.

After Ismet had been informed at a private meeting this morning that our three Governments had accepted the Judicial Declaration (see my telegram No. 157),[9] the Declaration itself[10] was circulated to the Conference. I asked whether any other of the Delegations who had not been represented at the private discussions wished to make any observations. Mr. Grew read a declaration[11] to the effect that he understood the object of the judicial formula was to inspire confidence in Turkey among foreigners who wished to reside and trade there. He said that he was glad to see that in this direction certain detailed safeguards had been inserted, and he felt sure that no one more than Ismet Pasha would realise the immense importance to Turkey of giving the most liberal possible interpretation to the Declaration in order that Turkey might attract the capital and skill necessary for reconstructing the country and with a view to enter into closer relations with the Western Powers. Ismet emphasised the spontaneous character of the Declaration which showed how far the Turks were disposed to go in order to ensure a satisfactory judicial régime in Turkey. The Declaration was not intended to accord special rights to foreigners and was intended just as much for Turks as for foreigners. In response to my request he fulfilled the promise which he had made at the private meeting by formally stating that the

[7] Not printed. See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 139.
[8] Not printed.
[9] No. 586.
[10] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 140–1.
[11] *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 1015.

Turkish Government intended to engage at least four counsellors and to fix their salaries and conditions of service in agreement with the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Allies took note of this statement.

A discussion followed on the report of the experts regarding the Amnesty Declaration (see my despatch No. 123 of June 4th).[12] I pressed the Turkish delegation to explain the precise scope of the first part of Article 1, in so far as the return to Turkey of Armenians and other Turkish subjects who had left Turkey since the armistice were concerned. Riza Nur in reply read a rather involved declaration which explained that, while the amnesty was a general one and while the Turkish Delegation had every intention of carrying out the Exchange of Populations Convention,[13] the Turkish Government reserved to itself the right to prevent the return to Turkey of all suspects, spies and evil doers etc. This did not mean, however, that peaceful persons of good character would not be allowed to go back.

My Allied colleagues and I pointed out in reply the anomaly of thus permitting the Turks to reserve to themselves the right to make many more exceptions from the amnesty than the original 150 provided for already in a separate protocol and who are in fact all Moslem Turks. It was a very serious matter for the Conference to pass over what amounted to the perpetual banishment of a large category of Turkish subjects who were thus deprived of their homes and were forced to live in many cases at the expense of the other countries who were harbouring them, while their goods in Turkey were forcibly seized and sold on the ground that they had not returned.

At this point General Pellé and I pressed Ismet Pasha to make an explicit declaration that most, if not all, of this scattered Armenian community should be allowed to return to Turkey except where definite proof against individuals existed. Ismet refused to enter into any engagement regarding the return 'en masse' of these people. He said that the better disposed among them were perfectly well-known and would find it quite easy to satisfy the Turkish authorities of their good character. He did not, however, satisfactorily explain how that large category of Armenians whom the Turkish Government in any way suspected was in fact to be given an opportunity of proving their innocence in a legal manner before the Turkish Courts. Finally he took refuge in the quibble that the amnesty only concerned persons in Turkey or after they had entered Turkey and in no way affected the Turkish Government's right to prevent those of its subjects who had left from returning. I pointed out that when the Turks had refused to consider the creation of a national home for the Armenians they had declared during the first phase of the Conference[14] that the Armenians were free to settle in any part of Turkey. Yet now it was apparent that the Turkish Government meant to prevent the return of the large number of Armenians who had left Turkey last year under the impulse of fear.

This question had perforce to be left in an unsatisfactory state by the Conference, but the Turkish attitude of course renders the amnesty to a

[12] Not printed. For the draft text, see *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 142–3.

[13] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53.

[14] See No. 275.

large extent a farce, and I trust that as much publicity as possible will be given to the matter.

M. Venizelos also insisted upon Ismet Pasha formally re-affirming those articles in the Exchange of Populations Convention which enable those Greeks of Constantinople who are exempted from the exchange to return to Constantinople if they left before a certain date. Ismet Pasha demanded a similar declaration regarding the Moslems in Western Thrace. In reply M. Venizelos offered complete reciprocity as regards any Moslems who might have been forced to leave their homes owing to the recent necessary, but regrettable, military measures of an exceptional nature taken by the Greek military authorities. Finally, since Ismet Pasha's declaration regarding the Greeks of Constantinople did not seem completely to satisfy M. Venizelos, it was arranged that the two should discuss the matter again in private.

With regard to M. Venizelos'[s] reserve on the first part of the amnesty, Signor Montagna briefly explained that he did not wish to press his attitude regarding the proposed exceptions from the Greek amnesty to the point of preventing M. Venizelos from signing the treaty, but that he trusted the Greek Government would interpret any clause regarding such exceptions in a generous spirit. M. Venizelos thanked Signor Montagna and assured him that the exceptions aimed only at enabling the Greek Government to banish a few embezzlers of army funds and some officers who had shown cowardice in the face of the enemy. The Committee then accepted the text of the protocol[15] prepared by the British Delegation to be added to the amnesty reserving the right of the Greek Government to prosecute members of the Greek army of Greek race and nationality accused of dereliction of duty during the hostilities between Turkey and Greece.

The Turks withdrew their reserve on the paragraph regarding the reciprocal amnestying of offenders in the occupied territories—an article which they wished to add to the amnesty declaration, after the Allies had declared their intention to recommend to their Governments the generous treatment of the few exceptions from the amnesty which they were forced to demand.

The Italian Delegation finally asked that the Turkish Delegation might make some similar declaration as to their intentions regarding any Allied subjects who might have been tried for offences against common law outside the occupied territories and sentenced by the Turkish tribunals. No such cases are known to exist and the Italian Delegation got no satisfaction from the Turks.

The meeting concluded by a general appeal from the Presidents of each of the three Committees that outstanding questions should be wound up this week.

I intend to hold one more and final meeting of my Committee to settle definitely the few still outstanding points, namely, Article 1 (Evacuation), Article 2 and the Article to be added to the Thracian Frontier Convention regarding Karagatch and the railway, Article 3 (1) and (2) (Syria and Iraq frontiers), Article 16 (relating to Article 7 of the Angora Agreement),

[15] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 143.

Article 156 (Arms Traffic Convention), Article 157 (Prize Court decisions and Prizes), and Article 159 (Adherence of Belgium etc. to the financial and economic clauses).

The experts have already produced an unanimous report regarding Article 2 and the Article to be added to the Thracian Frontier Convention,[16] but M. Venizelos is engaging in further private conversations with Ismet Pasha regarding the two outstanding details of the Greco-Turkish reparations settlement viz. requisitions and the treatment of the population in the ceded territory round Karagatch. I therefore considered it preferable not to touch on these questions at the Committee today.

[16] See No. 635, below.

No. 591

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Bentinck (Athens)
No. 103 Telegraphic [E 5718/6/44]

Confidential FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 6, 1923, 2.15 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 220 (of June 2nd; Greek army).[1]

We are considering possibility[2] of arranging for evacuation of Constantinople and the Straits immediately on ratification of the treaty by Angora and on signature of a protocol providing for immediate peace between Greece and Turkey on ratification by their two governments as well as for immediate entry into force of certain portions of the treaty without awaiting ratification by Allied governments and consequent entry into force of entire treaty.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 67 and Constantinople No. 184.

[1] No. 572, n. 6. [2] See No. 587.

No. 592

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 7, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 166 Telegraphic [E 5933/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 6, 1923, 8.30 p.m.*

My telegram No. 161[1] which is being sent by bag reports a discussion with General Pellé as to final phase of negotiations. The question was again

[1] Of June 5. This ran: 'He [General Pellé] suggested that we should decline to discuss the question of the evacuation of Constantinople etc. until the Turks had settled the other two outstanding questions, namely the currency in which the interest on the Debt is to be paid, and the protection to be afforded to the concessionary companies. As I have throughout

discussed between us this morning. Owing to a careless mistake on the part of French Foreign Office General Pellé's despatch asking for instructions about question of debt coupons did not reach M. Poincaré before he left for Brussels and General Pellé does not expect to receive a reply until Saturday.[2]

We propose to compare instructions received from our governments on Saturday and on Sunday to hold a private meeting with Ismet to resume discussion of debt question in the light of these instructions. We propose at this meeting to present texts, both on debt question and on concessions question, latter being in the form of a declaration of principles on which negotiations with concessionnaires will be based. Without in any way delivering an ultimatum we propose to ask Ismet for a very early reply on these texts. We propose to deal with above mentioned declaration of principles in the same way as we dealt with declaration regarding judicial safeguards for foreigners. During discussion of these texts we shall be prepared to make such concessions as have been authorised by our governments, for example, to drop demand for cash compensation to concessionary companies and texts as thus amended will represent our last word. This procedure should enable discussions to be terminated early next week unless, which is quite possible, Turks prove intractable.

told Ismet that we must settle all questions before dealing with the question of the evacuation, I found no difficulty in agreeing with General Pellé. It is evident to both of us that the Turks are connecting the question of the interest on the Debt with that of Concessions. We do not propose to allow these questions to drag on too long, and General Pellé suggested that if they were not settled say by the end of the week we should prepare the necessary Articles in connection with both of the above-mentioned questions and submit them for acceptance by the Turks within a given period. I informed General Pellé that I was inclined to agree with his suggestion.'

[2] June 9.

No. 593

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 22)
No. 452 [C 10867/362/19]

ATHENS, *June 7, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 225[1] and 227[1] of the 5th and 6th instant, I have the honour to report that, availing myself of the permission granted in your Lordship's telegram No. 100 of the 2nd instant,[1] I authorised Mr. S. C. Atchley, first secretary and translator at His Majesty's Legation, to see the chief of the revolution privately regarding the rumours of an impending *coup* by the commander-in-chief and head of the navy.[2] I have now the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum[3] which Mr. Atchley

[1] Not printed. [2] Cf. Nos. 574 and 584. [3] Of June 5, not printed.

has prepared regarding the private conversation which he had with Colonel Plastiras at the house of a mutual friend. Mr. Atchley has also added a summary of a conversation with an old friend of his, M. Lambrakis, editor of the 'Eleftheron Vima', which, as your Lordship is already aware, is the leading newspaper in Greece and represents a group of politicians embracing the moderate and larger wing of the Veniselist party. Colonel Plastiras did not altogether satisfy Mr. Atchley as to a *coup* having never been premeditated by the commander-in-chief, and I fear that the information reaching me from all sources is now too well substantiated for me to be entirely satisfied that no such intention existed at the time. The leading Venizelists, however, may be correct in their belief that it has been parried for the moment at any rate, chiefly owing to the efforts of Colonel Plastiras.

2. It is satisfactory to note that Colonel Plastiras speaks highly of the general attitude of the King, and I believe that His Majesty is inclined to trust the colonel.

3. Your Lordship will note what to us appears to be perhaps exaggerated optimism on the part of the chief of the revolution, when he claims to be able to take Constantinople in six days and to enter Angora in three or four months! I observe, however, from the telegram sections, a telegram from Constantinople[4] which tends to show that the Greek reports reaching me of demoralisation and desertion in the Turkish army were not entirely unfounded, and statements since made to me by British visitors from Constantinople would appear to justify the optimism of the Greek army commanders.

4. Colonel Plastiras has strange ideas if he imagines that any independent Prime Minister would be willing to consent to the revolution appointing the Ministers of War and Marine in any future constitutional Government. M. Zaïmis has all along declared that in no circumstances would he accept responsibility under such conditions, and it is inconceivable that General Metaxa[s] or any other anti-revolutionary candidate would consent to do so.

5. Your Lordship will notice that M. Lambrakis is not so confident as is Colonel Plastiras himself of the latter's influence over the army of Thrace. Whatever power General Pangalos may exercise over the officers, however, it is generally thought that the rank and file of the army would never march against their hero (see my despatches No. 133 of the 22nd February[1] and No. 269 of the 5th April[5] last).

6. It is satisfactory to note that the powerful 'Eleftheron Vima' group (see my despatch No. 250 of the 29th March last[6]) are, in conjunction with other moderate elements, again appealing to M. Zaïmis to come forward and save the situation, in order to prevent its falling into the hands of hotheads.

7. I trust that the permission granted to Mr. Atchley to see Colonel Plastiras may be fruitful of good results and have a salutary and steadying influence upon the situation. I shall not fail to report the result of a further

[4] Presumably No. 544.
[5] No. 464.
[6] Not printed. See however, No. 464, paragraph 9.

private talk which these two gentlemen are to have at the end of the week in the house of a mutual English friend.

8. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Lausanne.

I have, &c.

[C.] H. BENTINCK

No. 594

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 73 Telegraphic [E 5999/1/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 8, 1923, 8 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 146 (of June 2nd: Ottoman debt).[1]

Treasury point out in first place, that if Turkish Government fail to pay coupons on pre-war Turkish loans in sterling, when due, in that currency, it is quite impossible for them to escape the inevitably resultant loss of credit. Turkish representatives should be made unmistakably to realise that probably such loss of credit would ultimately cost them more than sum produced by their action, in shape of the higher rates that will inevitably be demanded by investors in Turkish issues, if, indeed, such issues could be made at all. Turkey must consider her true interests in the matter.

Any action on the part of His Majesty's Government prejudicial to position of bondholders in regard to their unquestionable rights is impossible. His Majesty's Government have no power to take such action and it is useless for Turks to attempt to obtain concessions as part of present negotiations.

Treasury, therefore, approve your attitude, and would assent to compromise you suggest if, as is understood, liberty of action of bondholders is in no way curtailed. They regard the issue as primarily one between bondholders and Turkish Government, and would have supposed that former would, in fact, recognise that in present state of Turkish finance some agreed concession on their part will ultimately be inevitable.

Your telegram No. 167[2] has been sent to Treasury, who will reply as soon as possible on any points not covered by above paragraphs.

[1] No. 580.

[2] Of June 6. This referred to No. 580, and continued: 'My own [view] is that at present we should make no concession beyond that of allowing declaration to be accompanied by a covering letter, but that we should, in the last resort, but only in the last resort, agree to abandon proposal to confirm decree of Mouharrem [see No. 490, n. 3] and loans contract of (?March 11th) either by treaty or by declaration, leaving question to be dealt with entirely as between Turkey and her creditors. Procedure of [Congress of Berlin] 1878 would afford a precedent for this. It is clear that in any case Turkey will default by paying in francs and it does not seem justifiable in last resort to allow a rupture to occur by insisting that Turkey shall, on paper, confirm obligations which we all know she does not intend, in fact, to fulfil.'

No. 595

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 10, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 173 Telegraphic [E 6030/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 9, 1923, 11.50 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 73.[1]

Instructions of French government arrived this morning and those of Italian government had already been received. They conform entirely to those given to me by Your Lordship.

Turks are using every possible means of pressure to obtain concessions on this point. Ismet has interviewed Roumanian and Serbian delegates in order to ask them to intervene. Mr. Grew had an interview with Ismet last night[2] and informed latter that if Turkey failed to fulfil terms of her pre-war loan contracts her credit in United States would be gravely damaged. It seems clear that strong pressure is being brought to bear on Ismet by his delegation and he told Mr. Grew that he was being crushed between a French and a Turkish wall.[3]

According to information given to me by General Pellé, Angora government are purposely mutilating Colonel Mougin's telegrams to French Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople, so as to conceal the fact that Turkish authorities are stone walling in negotiations with concessionnaires until they obtain satisfaction about debt question.

They have also begun to force safes of Credit Lyonnais at Smyrna.

We are to meet Ismet tomorrow to discuss debt question and I propose to make a formal and emphatic statement in accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 73.

[1] No. 594.

[2] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1020–1.

[3] In his telegram No. 334 of June 4, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'Ismet has been informed by Mustapha Kemal that government will under no circumstances pay interest on debt in gold and that if franc payment cannot be obtained, declaration confirmed by [Mouharrem] decree cannot be agreed to. He is requested to insist upon solution whereby interest is paid in francs though any intention of abolishing public debt is denied.... Angora is anxious lest if [Mouharrem] decree which they regard as contrary to national sovereignty is confirmed all prospect of amending it hereafter would be lost. I gather... that if Allies refuse various proposals made and if matter is obstacle to peace, Angora insists on clause being inserted in treaty whereby question of currency for debt interest, and of such clauses in decree as are contrary to national sovereignty, shall be decided between Turkish government and bondholders direct.'

In his immediately following telegram, No. 335 of June 5, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Angora insists that declaration confirming maintenance of public debt administration (?and) Muharrem decree can only be made if allies agree to payment of interest on franc basis and that it is insufficient for allies to grant temporary facilities for payment of interest if period is limited to five years "as in the case of Bulgaria". There are indications that Angora does not intend to settle concessionary companies' question until after settlement of public debt question in Turkey's favour.'

No. 596

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 175 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 6032/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 9, 1923*

I discussed today with my French and Italian colleagues the course we should adopt as regards Article 159 of the Allied draft treaty, which provides for the accession to certain parts of the treaty of Belgium, Portugal, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Turks have so far refused to accept this article, but there seems to be a possibility that they might accept a formula, which the jurists have prepared, under which a protocol would be signed by the signatory Powers at the same time as the treaty, giving these four States or some of them, the right to accede to certain portions of the treaty, and a formal declaration would be made at the same time by representatives of these States, under which they would accede accordingly, subject to ratification. Note would be taken at the same . . .[1] of this declaration by the signatory Powers, and thus the Turks would know on the day of signature which States were acceding, a point to which they attach importance. The Turks have reserved their opinion on this proposal until they know definitely to which portions of the treaty it is proposed to allow these Powers to accede, and the text of those portions. It is also uncertain whether in the event of their accepting this proposal, they would be prepared to agree that it should apply to all the four Powers, or only to Belgium and Portugal, whose position is different to the others, in that they were belligerent States, and their nationals and their goods were apparently treated in Turkey as enemies and enemy property.

The Portuguese representative is being extremely insistent that Portugal should be allowed to sign the treaty in the same way as the other Allied Powers, on the ground that Portugal declared war on Turkey, which none of the other three did. It is certain that it is impossible to get the Turks to agree to this, as Portugal was not originally invited to the Conference as an Allied Power, but I think that the above proposal, if accepted, would give Portugal as much satisfaction as she can reasonably expect.

At our meeting today, I proposed that we should endeavour to get the Turks to agree to allow all the four Powers to accede in the manner indicated above, but that if necessary we should agree to drop Poland and Czechoslovakia, if the Turks will accept the proposal as regards the other two. My colleagues are telegraphing for instructions on this point and I should be glad to learn whether Your Lordship agrees. Meanwhile the experts will be requested to specify the provisions of the treaty to which it seems right that these Powers should be allowed to accede.

We would also propose to proceed on similar lines as regards the Commercial Convention and the Établissement Convention. The Allied text of these

[1] The text is here uncertain.

Conventions contains an accession clause under which any non-signatory State can accede. This the Turks have consistently refused to accept, but it is possible that they might accept it if it was confined to the four Powers mentioned above, or alternatively to Belgium and to Portugal. There have already been indications that the Turks would allow Belgium to accede to the Commercial Convention, and, if so, I should hope to obtain the same privilege, at any rate for Portugal. Poland is already negotiating direct with the Turks about the matters dealt with in these two Conventions, and there seems no reason why Czechoslovakia should not do the same.[2]

[2] In his telegram No. 85 of June 14, Lord Curzon replied: 'Subject to satisfaction on major questions dealt with in separate telegrams, His Majesty's Government would be prepared in last resort to agree to your proposals.'

No. 597

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 10, 7.55 p.m.)
No. 176 Telegraphic [E 6033/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 10, 1923, 6.20 p.m.*

Question of Ottoman debt was discussed at a private meeting with Ismet Pasha this morning. I made a declaration in the sense of instructions contained in your telegram No. 73[1] and added that, while I could not discuss any proposal to deprive bondholders of their existing rights in treaty or declaration, I was ready to consider any form of words which did not contravene this principle.

General Pellé made a statement in the same sense and repeated proposal that Turkey should sign a declaration to Ottoman debt council recognising her existing obligations, and should send a separate communication to bondholders taking note of their declaration of May 23rd,[2] reaffirming her inability to pay in full at present, and asking for negotiations immediately after peace. Signor Montagna associated himself with us.

Ismet Pasha said that Turkey recognised her debt but was unable to pay in full. If allied government would agree to payment in francs Turkey would agree to recognise her engagements as legally valid but she would not confirm her engagements by proposed declaration in return for vague promise that bondholders would examine her financial situation and discuss modalities of payment after peace. Alternatively Turkey would agree to have no declaration and to leave both sides of the matter to be discussed with bondholders.

Turkey for the sake of her credit and reputation for good faith would never undertake engagements which she could not carry out.

[1] No. 594. [2] See No. 565, n. 9.

Long discussion followed. I think we convinced Ismet of our genuine desire to meet his point of view so far as our instructions and conviction allowed, but he maintained view that he would only sign declaration if payment in francs or a similar relief is definitely promised either by governments or by bondholders before peace is signed.

Discussion was friendly and I think we made a little progress but not much.

Discussion is to be resumed at meeting of experts this afternoon and at further private meeting with Ismet tomorrow afternoon. I propose to send a further telegram tonight.[3]

[3] See Nos. 598 and 599, below. These telegrams were not despatched until the early hours of June 11.

No. 598

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 177 Telegraphic [E 6059/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 11, 1923, 12.30 a.m.*

Meeting between Ismet and financial experts lasted from 6 to 9.30.[1] Allied experts first tried to convince Ismet that it is impossible to settle as part of peace negotiations that coupons shall be paid otherwise than in accordance with contracts. Ismet appeared convinced and stated that position of Turkish government is 'I recognize my debts but cannot pay in full at present'. After a lengthy discussion a draft was suggested to the effect that financial situation of Turkey made it necessary for her to negotiate with her creditors with a view to a reduction in sums to be paid for service of loans. Ismet insisted that this should be incorporated in declaration drafted in February.

Experts said that their governments would have to be again consulted on this. Ismet seemed on the point of agreeing when he put forward demand that declaration should be more precise and should state definitely that Turkey proposes to pay in francs or alternatively to pay one third of sums due in sterling and default on the rest. Experts pointed out that in substance this was much the same as text proposed since it is notorious that Turkey desires to pay in francs but that in form this would amount to a declaration of bankruptcy. Ismet could hardly expect the Allies to make concession of dropping first paragraph of Article 56 in return for such a document and it would clearly be rejected at once by our governments. Ismet insisted that declaration could only be signed if it contained an explicit statement of fact that Turkey intends to pay annuities equivalent to a payment in francs—i.e. one third of sterling sums due.

No agreement was reached but the impression of experts was that Ismet and Hassan Bey would accept formula but for opposition of Riza Nour and Angora.

[1] i.e. on the evening of June 10.

No. 599

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 11, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 178 Telegraphic [E 6046/1/44]

Immediate Confidential LAUSANNE, *June 11, 1923, 1.15 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

We have now reached absurd position that a rupture on Ottoman debt question seems possible though matter now in dispute is only a question of words.

Your telegram No. 73[2] states view of Treasury on purely financial aspect of the question but I have now reached a point when I must ask for definite instructions as to whether His Majesty's Government are prepared to face a rupture on this question. My impression is that British opinion would not tolerate rupture and attendant risk of renewal of hostilities in order to obtain a formula more satisfactory in appearance though not in substance than formula which Ismet would accept.

I, therefore, think in the last resort we should either have no declaration at all as proposed in my telegram No. 167[3] or else agree to best formula which we can obtain from Ismet.

Turn which events will take largely depends on council of war which is no doubt now being held at the Lausanne Palace and I shall be able to gauge situation better after tomorrow afternoon's meeting at which we shall use lever of evacuation for all it is worth. But it is clearly possible that Turks are prepared to break on this point and I feel that I should lose no time in asking you for instructions as to attitude which I should assume upon this question in last resort.

I should add that I foresee that Turks will prove equally intractable on concessions question.[4]

[1] No. 598. [2] No. 594. [3] No. 594, n. 2.

[4] In his telegram No. 4018 of June 10 to the War Office, General Harington had reported: 'From secret information sent you, it is evident that Ismet has been instructed by Angora to break rather than give in on remaining points. Although I am in no way concerned with policy it is only right I should point out that the Turk is nothing like such a formidable military factor as four months ago. His military position has deteriorated. Within ten to fifteen days he can only concentrate following approximate rifle strength. Ismid front 24,000, Chanak 22,000, Smyrna 15,000, Eastern Thrace 15,000, Constantinople 15,000, Irak 9,000, Syria 8,000, with no general reserve. Failure attended his effort to raise a formidable army in Eastern Thrace. His crops will in most cases only yield one-third of normal. He has no men, except from Army, to work in fields as result of having forced out non-Turks. To-day he finds himself therefore with no Navy, deteriorating Army, negligible Air Force, no money or prospects and yet the mentality of Angora orders Ismet to stand out.... There is deliberate policy to irritate and challenge our authority which is shown by threat to seize property of insurance companies tomorrow and several other measures. If policy should be to refuse his demands at Lausanne, I think, provided we are assured effective control of Constantinople directly a break occurs, we are now militarily strong enough to enforce our will. This would of course entail using force and might in initial stage lead to serious conflict, but personally I think that if the Turk sees we really mean business he would not face it.'

No. 600

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 11, 10.45 p.m.)
No. 180 Telegraphic [E 6101/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 11, 1923, 3.20 p.m.*

My French colleague has communicated to me a long telegram from his government containing their instructions on all points still left outstanding.

2. French government state that they cannot make any further concessions as regards exchange of options. I understand that they are not as yet prepared to drop their demand for declaration concerning decree of Muharrem.[1] As regards question of concessions French government say that as information from Angora with reference to negotiations with certain French companies is unsatisfactory Turks must be made to accept principles such as recognition of pre-war concessions, indemnification of companies by means of re-adaptation of their concessions, and automatic prolongation of concessions by a period equal to length of war and armistice. This latter point will be difficult to obtain. No specific mention is made of cash indemnities for losses or damage suffered by concessionary companies. General Pellé is instructed to prepare necessary texts in connection with exchange of options and concession questions and to present these texts for acceptance of Turkish delegation within a reasonable delay.

3. French government agree to commence evacuation after ratification by Turkey of peace treaty and suggest that this evacuation should be completed within two months. They also agree that sections of treaty enumerated by you[2] should come into force on ratification by Turkey, though it occurs to us that as regards convention d'établissement this would presumably have to be done by a unilateral act on the part of Turkish government since it will be necessary for French parliament to ratify convention d'établissement. They demur to surrender of Goeben[3] to Turks because they point out that such a surrender will alter balance of naval power in eastern basin of Mediterranean. But they add that if British delegation are prepared to surrender Goeben they will not make difficulties.

4. Finally French accept your point of view as to expediency of giving Russians another chance of signing Straits convention.[4] Secretary General of conference has therefore gone to Berne to-day to inform Swiss government of above in case that government should object to possible arrival of a Soviet representative for the purpose of signing convention.

5. As some mention has been made in press of possibility of second adjournment of the conference French government instruct General Pellé to oppose such an idea by every means. 'Temps' recently threw out this suggestion.

[1] See No. 490, n. 3. [2] See No. 587. [3] See Appendix I, section I, paragraph (f).
[4] See No. 588.

No. 601

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 11, 4.50 p.m.)
No. 181 Telegraphic [E 6092/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 11, 1923, 3.45 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

I should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether His Majesty's Government would accept six weeks as period for evacuation as suggested in my telegram No. 172.[2] This suggestion was based as you will remember on definite recommendation by General Harington who had consulted his allied colleagues.[3]

If so, you may think it desirable to ask French government to modify their instructions to General Pellé which at present contemplate two months as period.

[1] No. 600.

[2] Of June 8, not printed. This telegram, which was a reply to No. 587, stated: '. . . my colleagues and I unanimously agreed to recommend to our respective governments that evacuation should begin on ratification by Turkey and that it should be completed in six weeks' time.'

[3] See No. 585, n. 3.

No. 602

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 12, 10 a.m.)
Nos. 184 and 185 Telegraphic [E 6103/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 12, 1923, 3 a.m.*

My telegram No. 178.[1]

Three allied delegates without their experts discussed debt question with Ismet this afternoon.[2] I had insisted on Riza Nour being present at discussion in order to emphasise fact that meeting was to be of a serious character necessitating presence of both principal Turkish delegates.

Great agitation prevailed amongst Turks before meeting and Ismet had addressed a letter[3] to allied delegates informing them of his instructions on the subject of interest on debt and emphasising necessity of settling forthwith that payment of interest was to be in francs. L[e]tter states that failing acceptance of this request negotiations will prove sterile.

Discussion therefore turned on Turkish demand that second declaration which it had been suggested should be addressed by Turks to bondholders

[1] No. 599. [2] June 11.

[3] Of June 11, not printed. This letter was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 151 of June 12 (E 6160/1/44), not printed.

should declare that in future interest on debt should not be payable either in pounds sterling or in gold but in francs. Allied delegates pointed out that their instructions did not allow of their accepting any declaration containing specific mention of currency in which debt was to be payable and that their governments were materially debarred from authorising in an official document any declaration which had effect of depriving bondholders of their full rights under loan contracts. My colleagues and I had the greatest difficulty in drumming this into the head of Ismet who kept on repeating the same demand time after time. We also pointed out that even supposing our governments authorised us to accept a formula which would have the effect of depriving bondholders of their full rights a unilateral declaration on the part of Turkish government that it intended in future to pay one quarter or one third of proper interest on debt would at once destroy Turkish credit. Such a declaration would in fact have most serious consequences for Turkey.

My French colleague then said that he wished to allude to one of the remaining outstanding questions, viz: evacuation of Constantinople and Turkish occupied territory. He had reason to think that allied governments were sympathetically considering speedy evacuation of Constantinople after ratification of treaty by Turkey in accordance with what he believed to be Turkish desire. He reminded Turkish delegation that French public opinion had until recently been favourable to Turkey. This had facilitated conclusion of Angora agreement[4] at a moment when Turkish prospects were far from rosy. Angora agreement had been of considerable advantage to Turkey but recent attacks on France by Turkish press combined with other incidents had begun to alienate a considerable section of French public opinion. If Turks by an arbitrary act were now to announce their intention of despoiling bondholders whole public opinion in France would be turned against Turkey. It would then be at least doubtful whether treaty would be ratified by French parliament and French government would have to ask itself whether French troops could evacuate Constantinople. Ismet immediately said that he had never imagined that Allies would use question of evacuation as an arm against Turks but did not pursue the subject.

A long and wearisome discussion followed in which Riza Nour took part. Turks with painful reiteration suggested that formula containing a reservation as drafted by allied delegates to the effect that financial position of Turkey did not permit of fulfilment of loan contracts, did not go far enough. They insisted that it should definitely provide for payment of interest in francs or that there should be no declaration at all and that Turks should be left face to face with their creditors. As meeting after more than two hours discussion was unable to record any progress my colleagues and I requested Turks to telegraph to Angora that Allies were unable to contemplate mention of currency in second declaration. Ismet did not promise to comply with this request but it is certain that he will not only telegraph what passed

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

this afternoon but emphasise connection which French delegate established between evacuation of Constantinople and settlement of debt question.

Demeanour of Turks reminded me of their demeanour on February 4th.[5] We know their instructions regarding payment in francs[6] are very strict and my impression is that they will even risk breaking the conference on this question. The French seem equally determined not to yield and it appears to me that question is now one for discussion between our governments. Although I think French delegate was fully justified in connecting evacuation and debt questions it is certain that Turks will use connection thus established in order to work up and divert feeling in Turkey where according to all accounts financial, political and economic situation is very bad.

It is for consideration whether it would not in practice be preferable to drop demand for a declaration which, qualified in manner which we suggest, will be of little use to bondholders, and leave Turkish government to negotiate direct with bondholders. Turks will undoubtedly require a loan at a very early date and bondholders would then have an opportunity of making as satisfactory conditions as are possible in the circumstances. Turkish attitude at present is that they openly declare their intention of defaulting on a large part of debt and wish us officially to recognise this intention.

We have arranged to discuss concessions tomorrow[7] but until debt question is settled further progress is to all intent and purposes blocked.

[5] See No. 370. [6] See No. 595, n. 3. [7] June 12.

No. 603

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 12, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 183 Telegraphic [*E 6102/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 12, 1923, 6.30 a.m.*

My telegram No. 181.[1]

My French colleague further states that French government maintain their view that demobilization of Turkish army should proceed concurrently with evacuation and should be completed before the last allied soldier leaves Turkish soil.

I feel that to put forward any such suggestion after we have agreed to abandon any claim to restrict military forces of Turkey and have not fixed Turkish peace effectives, would arouse utmost resentment and suspicion, nor should we gain much unless we had power to control demobilization which is out of the question. I adhere strongly to view expressed in my telegram No. 155[2] in which my French and Italian colleagues concurred and still concur although I should of course not wish French delegate to be quoted against his own government.

I would suggest that this question should be taken up with French government as I cannot get French delegate's instructions modified here.

[1] No. 601. [2] No. 585.

No. 604

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 188 Telegraphic [E 6137/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 12, 1923, 8.50 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Additional article to Thracian frontiers convention, see my despatch No. 40,[2] will come up for discussion at the next and final meeting of my committee. Monsieur Stancioff will be present. Unless he is over-ridden by his government in the meantime, I propose then to ask him how it is that Bulgarian delegate who was given full opportunity to consider draft of this article and was present at meeting of experts accepted it without criticism subject to mere formal re-affirmation of Bulgaria's general protest. I will suggest that in view of apparent indifference of Bulgarian government to transit rights over Karagatch section afforded to Bulgaria by Turkey, article can be modified to omit any mention of Bulgaria or Bulgarian rights should Bulgarian government prefer it. I will then point out the most important part of convention is concerned with demilitarised zones and that Bulgaria there assumes obligations and obtains benefits. Bulgarian government were represented at negotiations of that part of conference and accepted it during first phase of conference. Allied governments cannot therefore accept Bulgarian government's refusal to assume their share of responsibilities assumed by each of the three interested Balkan powers in convention and they must ask them to reconsider their attitude.

I shall be grateful if Mr. Erskine can be instructed to use latter argument with new Bulgarian government[3] pointing out serious effect if new government's first international act is such a repudiation of their responsibilities.

I understand that Monsieur Todoroff[4] is unlikely to keep his post under the new government; argument regarding his acceptance of Karagatch article should not therefore be used at Sofia.

Repeated to Sofia.

[1] Of June 12. This stated that M. Stanciov had addressed a further protest to the Conference about Dedeagatch, and continued: 'Protest signed by himself and M. Todoroff states that Bulgarian Government will not sign this convention [Thracian Frontiers Convention], because Turkey's obligations under convention are unilateral, while Bulgaria [m]akes no engagement towards any other Power.... Facilities afforded Bulgaria by Turkey in new article in Thracian Frontiers Convention are of no real value as long as Bulgaria's free outlet on the Ægean is not definitely and practically established.'

[2] Of May 15, not printed. See No. 575.

[3] Following a military *coup d'état* on June 9, the Stamboliiski Government was replaced by that of M. Tsankov. In his despatch No. 138 of June 14 (C10563/10054/7), Mr. Erskine reported fully on these events.

[4] M. Kosta Todorov, Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade, and second Bulgarian delegate at the Lausanne Conference. He resigned on hearing of the *coup* and went into exile in Paris.

No. 605

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 189 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6152/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 12, 1923*

At a private meeting with Ismet this morning, the question of concessions was again discussed.

M. Montagna explained that the position, the possibility of which had been foreseen in the correspondence which had preceded the second phase of the conference,[1] had now arisen. We were approaching, he said, the time when it was hoped that a peace treaty would be signed shortly but the negotiations with the concessionaires had not been completed.

I gave in some detail a comparison of the position regarding these negotiations as represented by the Turkish delegation and the position as shown by the definite information which I had received from Mr. Henderson.[2] I pointed out that the result was not encouraging, and showed the necessity of some provision being made in the treaty or in some document to be signed at the same time as the treaty for the recognition of certain principles which would regulate the outstanding negotiations at Angora.

General Pellé stated that many of the telegrams from the representatives of the French concessionaires at Angora arrived in a mutilated condition, but his information showed clearly that no satisfactory progress was being made, and that the facts stated in the communiqué issued by the Turkish delegation were quite inaccurate.

Ismet replied that his information was to the effect that the negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily, but he recognised that there was a difference of opinion as to exactly what had happened. The view which his government took was that if this matter were dealt with by the conference, their position in the negotiations with the concessionaires would be prejudiced. As regards the principles proposed, there was no disagreement as regards the recognition of the principle of the maintenance of existing concessions, for the negotiations at Angora were being conducted in accordance with that principle. His government could not agree to its extension to agreements when the contemplated concessions had not become definitive. The question of the readaptation of concessions to existing economic conditions was now being considered at Angora. His government recognised this in practice, but they were not prepared to insert a provision to that effect in an international document. Nor were they prepared to undertake to pay compensation. As regards arbitration, they had every intention of proceeding expeditiously

[1] See Nos. 441, 451, n. 16, and 461.

[2] See, for instance, No. 595, n. 3. In his telegram No. 83 of June 13, Lord Curzon informed Sir H. Rumbold: 'There is reason to believe that Angora is supplying Ismet with false information about the progress of the negotiations with the concessionary companies, which are described as progressing much more favourably than appears in reality to be the case.'

with the negotiations, and did not feel that anything would remain to be settled by arbitration.

General Pellé stated that it was necessary to have some impartial authority to decide, in the event of there being a disagreement.

Ismet said that there was usually a provision for arbitration in the concession itself, but we pointed out that this merely related to arbitration on a difference of opinion arising as to the construction of the concession, which was an entirely different matter.

In the course of a more detailed discussion, Ismet raised the point that any readaptation should be mutual, apparently having in mind that the Turkish government should be able to adopt the position that, in existing economic conditions, they might not require to have works undertaken which were thought desirable before the war, and he again objected to the payment of compensation in any form. He also stated that he could not agree to any proposal for readaptation in a case such as the Baghdad railway, where the undertaking was not controlled by allied subjects before the war, but had been acquired recently.

With regard to the question of arbitration, a proposal was at one stage made by Hassan Bey that a general clause should be inserted providing generally for arbitration in the event of any dispute, without mentioning details, but Ismet stated that his instructions did not permit him to enter into any question of arbitration, nor indeed did his instructions permit him to deal here with the question of concessions at all. He would at once consult his government.

It was ultimately agreed that the experts should meet this afternoon to discuss the matter further and give any explanation necessary in order to avoid misunderstanding, but it was definitely stated by Ismet that the Turkish expert would have no power to agree to any settlement of the question, which is a matter on which he considers himself bound to obtain further instructions.

I stated that, as there seemed no prospect of any immediate conclusion of the negotiations at Angora, my instructions[3] were to provide for the matter in the treaty.

General Pellé stated that his instructions were similar. Ismet stated that his instructions were that the matter was to be dealt with at Angora, that there were other matters such as the debt and the evacuation still outstanding, and that the moment had not yet arrived for the settlement of the concessions question.

[3] See No. 461.

No. 606

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 80 Telegraphic [E 6101/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13, 1923, 3.45 p.m.*

Situation at Lausanne seems to be reaching a point where in spite of the desire for peace, which is I believe shared by Turks as well as by allies, negotiations threaten to come to a standstill owing to the opposing instructions of both sides and irreconcilable demands of their respective governments. For your guidance I think it desirable to set forth the views of His Majesty's Government on the position. They are as follows:—

(1) Evacuation. The Turks are asking us to agree to evacuate as soon as Angora shall have ratified the treaty. This would constitute so important a concession that it ought not to be lightly granted. Moreover it furnishes us with our most powerful lever which we cannot relinquish merely from fear that the Turks might, as suggested in your telegram No. 185 (of June 12th)[1] start an anti-allied agitation on the strength of our attitude. We ought not therefore to proceed with discussion of this question until we are satisfied that an acceptable peace is on eve of being concluded, and that presupposes a settlement of the important questions still outstanding especially the debt, commercial concessions and Mosul. If failure to arrive at adequate settlement of these questions results in no peace treaty being signed, evacuation will have to be reconsidered and Ismet should be made to realize this contingency.

(2) Debt. It is evident that the Turks, in refusing to confirm the decree of Muharrem[2] and annuities without provision for payment in francs, are endeavouring to secure official allied endorsement of their intended default. We cannot agree to sign away rights of bondholders, which indeed we have no legal power to do. The possible compromise of making in the treaty no provision or declaration regarding debt, presents the advantage that if the Turks subsequently are driven to default, this can only have the effect of damaging their credit and so rendering it increasingly difficult for them to raise fresh loans. If on the other hand we agree at the eleventh hour to omit all reference to arrangements for meeting debt charges, this might be regarded as implicit surrender of bondholders' rights. As this matter is predominantly a French interest, we are prepared to be largely guided by French view and to support it. The fact, however, that relatively unimportant British interests are involved, necessarily makes us reluctant to see peace negotiations finally break down on this particular point.[3]

[1] No. 602.

[2] See No. 490, n. 3.

[3] In his despatch No. 194 of June 23, Sir H. Rumbold pointed out that the wording of a note addressed by Lord Crewe to the French Government on June 15 did not correspond exactly to the wording of this paragraph. The note ran: '[His Majesty's Government] are, however, naturally reluctant to witness a final breakdown of negotiations on this point, seeing that British interests, although relatively unimportant, are involved.'

(3) Concessions. The Turks wish us to drop treaty provisions in consideration of assurance, which we have every reason to believe to be false, that private negotiations at Angora are proceeding satisfactorily. Unless we are assured by the British companies themselves that they have obtained satisfaction at Angora, we must insist on inclusion in the treaty of principles contained in your telegram No. 149 (of June 2nd),[4] although we do not desire to make extension of concessions for war and armistice period a condition *sine qua non*, as French suggest (see your telegram No. 180)[5] and are prepared, in cases where other conditions are satisfactory, to abandon monetary compensation.

(4) Mosul. We cannot sign any treaty which does not contain satisfactory provision on the lines of our formula,[6] but with period allowed for settlement reduced if possible to six, or, failing that, to nine months.[7]

Repeated to Rome No. 173 and Constantinople No. 191.

[4] Not printed. This transmitted an allied statement on concessions. See No. 581, n. 7.
[5] No. 600.
[6] See Cmd. 1814, p. 851. See also No. 370.
[7] In telegram No. 256 to Paris, No. 174 to Rome, Lord Curzon instructed Lord Crewe and Sir R. Graham to inform the French and Italian Governments of the views contained in the telegram here printed.

No. 607

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 13, 7.40 p.m.)
No. 190 Telegraphic [E 6153/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 13, 1923, 4.25 p.m.*

My telegrams Nos. 187[1] and 188.[2]

In a further note copy of which went by bag last night[3] Monsieur Stancioff corrects his previous note and explains that Bulgaria is prepared to sign all articles of convention except new transit article. He does not explain how this is to be done but in conversation with me he suggested that allies might satisfy Bulgaria by signing protocol annexed to convention to the effect that nothing in it prejudices Bulgaria's right to free economic outlets on the Aegean Sea. Latter suggestion is not acceptable but my legal adviser considers that if necessary Bulgarian desires on this point might be met if Bulgarian delegates in announcing to Secretary General their intention of signing convention explain that they do not regard their signature as in any way prejudicing Bulgaria's right to free economic access to Aegean Sea. Or if alternatively they simply announced when matter comes up in first committee that their acceptance of new article is without prejudice to protests already made by them regarding more general question of free access claimed by Bulgaria. My colleagues agree. We consider second alternative preferable

[1] No. 604, n. 1. [2] No. 604.
[3] In Lausanne despatch No. 157 of June 12 (E 6166/1/44), not printed.

but either would meet the case and I shall take an early opportunity of suggesting one of these solutions to M. Stancioff. Latter told me he was in any case asking new Bulgarian government for instructions regarding new transit article.

Repeated to Sofia.

No. 608

Sir H. Dering (Bucharest) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 14, 10.30 a.m.)
No. 80 Telegraphic [E 6188/1/44]

BUCHAREST, *June 13, 1923, 10 p.m.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs my French and Italian colleagues and myself that Djevad Bey[1] declared to him that Angora government could not give way as regards payment of Turkish coupons and would prefer war to yielding, which would mean economic ruin.

He enquired what was view of Roumanian government in the matter and whether they would not intervene with Great Powers at Lausanne to support Turkish contention. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Roumania was interested mainly in establishment of peace and that he hoped some way out of the difficulty could be found as in other cases. There was no necessity for intervention as requested for Roumanian delegate had already discussed the point with colleagues of Great Powers at Lausanne and expressed to them hope of Roumanian government that solution would be found.

Monsieur Duca said that Djevad Bey began by asking him what would be attitude of Roumania in the event of renewal of conflict but that he had cut him short and declared that this eventuality on such inadequate grounds was unthinkable and that he preferred not to discuss it. Turkish representative had evidently received instructions direct from Angora. Minister for Foreign Affairs does not attach great importance to his statements but is inclined to think probable real object was to ascertain Roumania's attitude in case of renewal of hostilities.

Sent to Lausanne.

[1] Djevad Abbas Bey, Turkish minister in Bucharest.

No. 609

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 96 [E 6024/1/44]

Secret FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 13, 1923*

Sir,

I transmit to you herewith, for your information, copies of two telegrams[1]

[1] General Harington's telegrams No. 3993 of June 7 and No. 3995 of June 8. (No. 3993 has not been traced in the Foreign Office archives.)

from General Harington to the War Office relative to the question of the evacuation of Constantinople by the allied troops.

2. I share the views expressed by General Harington in his telegram of the 8th instant.

I am, &c.
(For the Secretary of State)
LANCELOT OLIPHANT

ENCLOSURE IN No. 609

General Harington (Constantinople) to War Office

3995 cipher 8/6

Reference my 3993 giving proposed Turkish terms regarding evacuation; if it is to be understood from paragraph (C) that Turkish troops are to be allowed to enter Constantinople before we leave, I consider this most undesirable. It would be certain to lead to incidents as it would mean triumphal marches and demonstrations extremely distasteful to Allied troops.

No. 610

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 22)
No. 463 [C 10870/362/19]

ATHENS, *June 13, 1923*

My Lord,

With reference to my despatch No. 452 of the 7th instant[1] and to my telegram No. 236 of the 11th instant,[2] I have the honour to transmit a further memorandum[3] by Mr. S. C. Atchley, first secretary and translator at His Majesty's Legation, regarding conversations with the Chief of the Revolution and the Prime Minister held on the evening of the 9th instant at the house of a mutual English friend at Dionysus, near Athens. Mr. A. J. B. Wace, head of the British School of Archæology, was present and has also been good enough to record the gist of what was said on that occasion.[2]

2. The Prime Minister, it should be remarked, admitted that General Pangalos had meditated a *coup* as reported, but that, in his opinion, the danger was now past. It is interesting to note that, according to Colonel Gonatas, General Pangalos had overrated his personal influence with the army.

3. Your Lordship will observe the apparent desire of the Prime Minister to hand over the reins of power to a regular Government, and that M. Zaïmis would appear to be the man most favoured, but, unless he has changed

[1] No. 593. [2] Not printed. [3] Of June 11, not printed.

his mind, he would, as he told me in December last, never undertake the responsibility so long as the Revolution took any part in the Government (see my despatch No. 727 of the 16th December, 1922).[4] In this connection I would draw your Lordship's attention to Mr. Atchley's memorandum (see my despatch No. 452 of the 7th instant)[1] reporting that Colonel Plastiras personally suggested retaining the posts of Ministers of War and Marine in the hands of the Revolution. From Mr. Atchley's present memorandum it is obvious that what they fear from the elections is a Metaxas majority, more especially in view of certain statements, alleged to have been made by the supporters of the General, to the effect that he would resort to reprisals in the event of his coming into power. Colonel Plastiras evidently wanted Mr. Atchley to understand that in that case there would be another revolution. Your Lordship will have seen from my telegram No. 227 of the 6th instant[2] that the powerful 'Eleftheron Vima' group of politicians are again endeavouring to persuade M. Zaïmis to come forward and save the situation.

4. General Metaxas, as already reported, is certainly gaining ground. I did not think that his prospects were good last January, when the anti-Veniselist party appeared to be as sheep without a shepherd. Since then not only have many of the Gounarists and Stratists thrown in their lot with the General, but he has, I am told, recently received a large addition to his electioneering funds, which has enabled him to buy up two anti-Veniselist newspapers which had been attacking him. As the General is now clamouring for elections and championing the Constitutional party, he would appear to me to have greatly strengthened his position and to have rallied round him many of those who in January were looking for a leader. It seems to me that the longer the present unconstitutional state of affairs continues the greater will become General Metaxas's chances (see my despatch No. 429 of the 1st June).[2]

5. Colonel Plastiras's indignation[5] about the refugee loan and the bankers not being satisfied with the present security was doubtless caused by what M. Parmentier[6] said to the Minister of Finance, as recorded in my despatch No. 457 of the 9th instant.[2] I may here mention that M. Adossides, since some time representative here of the League of Nations and a well-known moderate Veniselist, who is going to Geneva and to London to endeavour to do what he can to assist [in] the refugee question, told me that he feared the League of Nations loan stood little chance of fulfilment. I asked whether

[4] No. 280.

[5] In his memorandum, Mr. Atchley wrote: 'Colonel Plastiras spoke for some time of the injustice of delaying a loan for the refugees on account of the nature of the present régime, and said that part of the responsibility for the plight of the refugees lay at the door of the Allies, especially England and France, and that they should at least do something to save the victims from a miserable death. The present Government could give as good security as any Greek Government could give, and if bankers pretended they were not satisfied with the security their pretence was a mere excuse.'

[6] A Member of the French Finance Ministry, and of the League of Nations finance committee. The League of Nations' scheme for the Greek Refugee loan is described in a Foreign Office Memorandum of December 6, 1923 (C 21226/6644/19), not printed.

he did not think that the present régime would be prepared to hand over to a constitutional régime if they realised that they stood in the way of a loan, but M. Adossides feared that for the present they would not be willing to surrender the government into other hands, much as he himself and his friends desired to see a return to constitutional methods.

6. I learn to-day that Colonel Plastiras and Colonel Gonatas were disappointed at Mr. Atchley's not being able to hold out hopes to them of recognition before elections and at what they describe as a greater willingness to receive than to give information on his part.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to Lausanne.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK

No. 611

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 14, 9.45 a.m.)
No. 191 Telegraphic [E 6185/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 14, 1923, 3.40 a.m.*

Following is present position of work of Conference.

Ottoman debt question.

Jurists have now produced form of declaration[1] for signature by Turks recognizing that stipulations contained in decree of Muharrem[2] and annexed decrees as well as all the other contracts and agreements relating to loans and advances concluded by former Ottoman government remain in force in so far as they are not modified by present treaty except currency in which service of loans and advances is to be effected, this being a question which it is for Turkish government to settle with bondholders. In consequence of that being so debt administration will be re-established in exercise of its rights, etc. at latest by September 1st, 1923. Jurists consider terms of this declaration in no wise curtail liberty of action of bondholders.

We have some reason for thinking Turks will accept this formula which is to be discussed with Turkish legal adviser tomorrow. Meanwhile Ismet yesterday[3] sought mediation of Roumanian delegate[4] to whom he proposed despatch of a Turkish representative to Paris to have a further discussion with bondholders on basis as I understand of payment of coupons in sterling at an arbitrary rate of exchange to be fixed by Turks themselves in neighbourhood of 50 francs to the £. The French delegate has informed his government of this suggestion but there is a danger that unless great pressure is brought to bear on French bondholders to meet Turks at least half way negotiations might break down and position would then be worse than it is

[1] See No. 617, n. 3, below. [2] See No. 490, n. 3. [3] i.e. June 12.
[4] Cf. No. 608.

now. There is also risk that Ismet may expect to reach an agreement in principle in Paris before signature of peace treaty and be proportionately disillusioned. State of mind of Turks might be gauged by fact that Ismet sent his secretary to station yesterday at an early hour to ask Madam Gaulis, who is notoriously Turcophil and who was returning to Paris, to implore French President and Monsieur Poincaré 'not to precipitate matters'.

Concessions.

Allied experts have been working all day with Turks on a form of protocol and letter to be signed by latter embodying certain principles for application in the case of concessionary companies who have not concluded their negotiations at Angora by time treaty is signed. Demand for a cash indemnity for reparations has been dropped but requirement of cash payments for utilizing property or services remains. While Turks have stated that they have no authority to deal with this question they show some disposition to endeavour to agree to a formula which they can recommend to Angora to accept. Turkish representatives here (? have) recognized, principle of maintenance of pre-war concession[s], settlement of accounts between concessionaires and Turkish government, and readaptation of terms of concessions to new economic conditions where concession had been operative before the war.

They at present maintain their objection to recognize concessions for completion of which certain formalities were still required at outbreak of war. They will agree to submission of disputes regarding accounts to arbitration but will not at present agree regarding readaptation being submitted to arbitration in the event of a dispute.

Turks are prepared to get over difficulty which they have always raised as to any interference between Turkish government and Turkish companies by insertion in protocol of provisions respecting concessions held by allied subjects and signing a letter at time of signature of protocol undertaking to apply the same treatment to Turkish companies in which allied capital was preponderant at outbreak of war. They may also be prepared to extend this system to certain named companies in which allied capital is now preponderant owing to recent purchases of shares. . . .[5]

Evacuation.

We cannot usefully discuss this question until we know whether our governments accept period of six weeks and until French government . . .[5] their condition as to demobilization of Turkish army. It is most desirable that we should be in a position to discuss this question at the right moment.

We propose to treat outstanding questions as a whole and insist on their being settled together. There is no reason why, if Turks accept formula we have now proposed regarding Ottoman debt question, we should not be able to finish off remaining business in two days.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[5] The text is here uncertain.

No. 612

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 192 Telegraphic [E 6168/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 14, 1923, 3.40 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 48[1] and Athens telegram No. 234.[2]

Following is summary of note[3] by Monsieur Veniselos to British, French and Italian delegates this afternoon.

Unexpected prolongation of peace negotiations and recent rumours regarding probable adjournment of conference have greatly disturbed Greek public opinion.

Greece, mobilised for the past eight years, cannot support much longer burden of maintaining army of 200,000 men on war footing. She is compelled to think without delay of demobilisation and return to normal national life.

Contrary to expectation, pending questions between allies and Turkey have not been solved. Present phase of discussions is unlikely to end this week or even next. This prospect compels Greek government and delegation to consider situation seriously. I urgently beg your support therefore with a view to signature of preliminary peace between Greece and Turkey, which would comprise essential clauses of draft treaty particularly concerning these two countries and which, by restoring regular relations, would allow Greece to demobilise and proceed with reconstruction. As regards conditions of general peace Greece would still endeavour to contribute thereto in agreement with allies.

Negotiation of such preliminaries should hasten rather than prejudice conclusion of general peace.

Fact is that continuance of Greek mobilisation could have favourable influence on negotiations only if Turks feared that powers might in certain eventualities contemplate resumption of hostilities. As Angora knows perfectly well that powers absolutely rule this out, institution of negotiations for signature of Greece and Turkey peace preliminaries could in no way affect the situation. On the contrary they would tend to make Turks more conciliatory as regards acceptance of ensemble of treaty, as they would constitute proof that inviting powers had decided to push matters to adjournment of conference rather than accept Turkish view on questions still in suspense.

Negotiations for signature of preliminaries cannot moreover be deferred, for, if conference were adjourned in a few days' time, Ismet would in all probability leave Lausanne immediately and negotiations with subordinates would have no chance of success, so that most painful surprises might ensue.

[1] No. 572, n. 6.

[2] Of June 9. This referred to No. 574, and continued: 'Prime Minister (? stated) in press last night that if signature of peace was to be long delayed by questions not interesting Greece, Greek Government had authorised Greek delegation at Lausanne, subject to approval of Powers, to sign peace preliminaries with Turkey.'

[3] Of June 13, not printed.

I firmly hope for favourable answer to this request, urgency of which I need not emphasise.

Text will follow by bag tomorrow.[4]

Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.

[4] In Lausanne despatch No. 165 of June 14, not printed.

No. 613

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 14, 1.30 p.m.)
No. 193 Telegraphic [E 6189/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 14, 1923, 10.50 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

M. Veniselos prepared me in private conversation yesterday for this démarche. He spoke on lines developed in his note. I said I would discuss matter with my colleagues when he brought it forward officially. I disabused him of idea that rupture of conference was in sight or that inviting powers had any intention of provoking adjournment.

Impatience of Greeks is comprehensible. From our point of view however, and even from that of Greece advantages of separate negotiations indicated in my telegram No. 95[2] now appear to me smaller and disadvantages proportionately greater than they did three weeks ago having regard to present state of general peace negotiations and probability that definite turning point in latter will be reached in very near future.[3]

Repeated to Constantinople and Athens.

[1] No. 612. [2] No. 541.

[3] In his telegram No. 241, of June 16, Mr. Bentinck, referring to this telegram and to No. 612, commented: 'Press continues to agitate for decision at Lausanne with a view to demobilisation of Greek army. . . . Although danger of a collapse of Greek army similar to that which occurred in Asia Minor last August does not appear to be imminent it would in my opinion be unwise to assume that it is impossible. If such a collapse were to occur unpreceded by at least a partial Turkish demobilisation it is to be feared that attitude of Turkey *vis-à-vis* of allies would be stiffened.'

No. 614

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople)
No. 60 Telegraphic [E 6225/21/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 14, 1923, 12.20 p.m.*

Your despatch No. 332[1] and your telegram No. 341[2] to Foreign Office.

1. Ordinary temettu.[3] I could not press Ismet for formal assurance that

[1] Of June 5. This ran: '. . . pressure was exerted last month to exact arrears of temettu from foreigners by withholding the delivery to them of goods from the Customs unless they

tax payable in accordance with arrangement made here will not be collected until treaty comes into force without to some extent reopening question whether capitulations ceased in 1914 or cease by operation of peace treaty. So far as general principle is concerned, this has had to be left vague. What I anticipate is that while we remain in occupation, Turks will in practice not push matters far, but will demand arrears as from March 1, 1922, as soon as evacuation takes place. If we make it condition of evacuation in advance of entry into force of Treaty that our subjects should similarly have benefit during transition period of Régime for Foreigners Convention, we shall probably have to acquiesce in such collection. I do not therefore think it worth while to raise question with Ismet.

2. Policy tax.[4] I shall take no action here pending negotiations between companies and Defterdar. For your information economic experts here have agreed (subject to confirmation in Conference) that where taxes have been collected by any person or Company on behalf of Government, arrangement regarding arrears prior to March 1, 1922, shall not preclude Government from receiving taxes so collected but not paid over to it. I am not clear whether Turks can find strong claim against insurance companies on this, as I am not sure whether policy tax was in form tax payable by policy-holders to Government through companies or was merely tax due by companies to Government for which they chose to recoup themselves by surcharge on premiums.

3. War Profits Tax. Attempts to collect this from our subjects seem to be sporadic. I will not take matter up unless they are resumed on such scale as to make action here desirable in support of local representations.

produced receipts showing that all their temettu taxes had been paid. In the face of the opposition raised both here and at Lausanne, this form of blackmail had been temporarily and tacitly abandoned. Nevertheless, though the Turkish Custom Authorities have been notified that foreigners are not liable to arrears of temettu prior to March 1922, no definite instructions have been issued making it clear that this tax cannot be levied until after the conclusion of peace. I am therefore somewhat apprehensive lest, unless a formal guarantee be obtained from Ismet Pasha in this respect, a fresh attempt to collect this tax may be made after the signature and prior to the ratification of peace. In the meantime spasmodic efforts are being made by the Turks to collect other taxes such as that on war profits.'

[2] Of June 10, not printed.

[3] Professional tax.

[4] The reference is to the taxation on insurance policy premiums. In his telegram No.339 of June 8, Mr. Henderson had reported: 'Turkish financial authorities have addressed identic communication to all insurance companies and agents announcing that unless arrears of Temettu collected since 1919 as premiums from insured are paid before June 10th property of companies or of agents will be sequestrated. Deputation of agents and British companies called on me yesterday. Their principal arguments were (1) iniquity of law holding agents personally responsible, (2) injustice of retro-activity particularly in view of Lausanne agreement respecting non-payment of arrears of taxation prior to 1922–1923, and (3) charge levied on premiums not being Temettu Turkish claim amounts in fact to tax not on insured but on companies themselves which were not liable to Temettu during period from 1919 to 1922.'

No. 615

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 16, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 195 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 6217/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 14, 1923*

Your telegram No. 80[1] and my telegram No. 191.[2]

The question of the interest on the debt has continued to stand in the way of all progress today. This morning I communicated to my French and Italian colleagues the substance of your telegram No. 80. They agreed that it would be useful if concurrently with the discussion between jurists of the latest formula (summarised in my telegram No. 191) I saw Ismet Pasha and impressed on him the seriousness of the situation and the necessity of finding a solution for the very small number of questions which now remain outstanding.

I called on Ismet Pasha late this afternoon. He had himself visited General Pellé at an earlier hour and I again saw the latter before going on to Ismet. General Pellé told me that he had received very uncompromising instructions from his government. They related to the formula evolved on June 10 (see first paragraph of my telegram No. 177)[3] and they ruled out any use of the word 'reduction' in connection with the future settlement of the interest question. The French government said they were willing that the Turkish reservation regarding interest should form part of the declaration maintaining the decree of Muharrem[4] but they indicated in a precise formula of their own the utmost which they were willing to see embodied in the reservation. General Pellé did not give me a copy of this formula but it was one which the Turks would certainly not accept. General Pellé himself took this view of it and practically said he would beg his government to discard it in favour of the jurists' formula of yesterday.

The instructions of the French government also ruled out any idea of the French government bringing pressure to bear on the French bondholders to come to an immediate agreement with the Turks. The bondholders, they said, would not consent to negotiate until after peace had been signed and the French government would not seek to make them depart from this attitude.

General Pellé had found Ismet Pasha most intractable. The Pasha quoted new instructions from Angora to the effect that he must make no declaration unless it were agreed that the interest would henceforward be paid in francs or alternatively that the validity of the declaration would be dependent on a satisfactory settlement between the Turkish government and the bondholders. General Pellé had rejected both suggestions as well as a renewed suggestion for immediate negotiations direct with the bondholders. He asked me not to tell Ismet that the latter had informed him of the new instructions from Angora as the Pasha had given the information in the form of a personal communication.

[1] No. 606. [2] No. 611. [3] No. 599. [4] See No. 490, n. 3.

I agreed with General Pellé that, in view of his instructions from the French government, I should not represent the jurists' formula as a firm proposal of the allies, but rather as an attempt at something which if agreed to by the Turks might perhaps satisfy the allied governments. At the same time I again made it clear to General Pellé that he could not expect His Majesty's Government to support the French in an attitude so intransigent as that manifested in the latest instructions from Paris. He quite saw this.

My conversation with General Pellé prepared me to find Ismet extremely difficult regarding the debt question. He surpassed my worst expectations. I began by saying that Your Lordship had been taking stock of the situation here and was disquieted by the deadlock which had apparently been reached. I spoke to him of the various questions enumerated in your telegram No. 80 on the general lines laid down therein. He endeavoured to twist what I said about evacuation into an assurance that the Turkish proposal on that subject would be accepted if the other outstanding questions were settled. I declined to commit myself so far, but said that once these other questions were out of the way, the evacuation question could be settled by a very short discussion. On the other hand, if no settlement were arrived at on those questions that of the continued occupation of Constantinople would present itself in a very different aspect. To this he replied that we were here to make peace and that if peace were not made, both sides would naturally be where they were before.

He had little to say about concessions or Mosul, beyond intimating in general terms that the latter question would be settled on the nine months basis when it came to final arrangements. The bulk of a very lengthy discussion turned on the debt. Ismet claimed to have explored every avenue and made every advance only to find the way always blocked by allied obstruction. He concentrated on his latest solution, namely that the validity of the declaration to the bondholders should be made dependent on the settlement of the interest question with the bondholders. I said that this provided no solution. I pointed out the illogicality or worse of saying in effect to the bondholders 'You have rights of various kinds under the Decree of Muharrem. Come to terms about the currency in which interest is to be paid and we will respect all those rights. If you do not come to terms we reserve the faculty of disregarding all those rights'. This, I argued, was to connect two different things which we on our side wished to keep apart because on the one hand the rights of the bondholders as regards the maintenance of the public debt administration and the management of the ceded revenues must be maintained and needed to be affirmed all the more as they had been so freely disregarded by the Angora government of late; while on the other hand we recognised that the financial state of Turkey made it reasonable that the interest question should be discussed with the only people qualified to discuss it, namely the bondholders themselves. The jurists' formula marked this distinction. It was so far from true that allied obstruction was responsible for the deadlock that I myself in allowing the jurists' formula to be

discussed was going to lengths which might not obtain the approval of His Majesty's Government.

Ismet Pasha contended that if the bondholders got their declaration before the question of the currency for payment was settled, they would consent to no abatement of their rights. They would stick out for their sterling pound of flesh and the whole of Turkey's economic future would be endangered. I told him that such fears were grossly exaggerated. The bondholders would have every inducement to come to terms if only because no one was in a stronger position as regards money payments than an impoverished debtor. I did not mince matters. I quoted the leading article in yesterday's 'Times'.[5] We were reproached, I said, with allowing the proceedings here to be spun out at the expense of our interests and dignity and we were being told that it would be better to break off once again rather than go on as we were doing now. It was not, I was careful to add, the desire of His Majesty's Government to precipitate a rupture, but the present situation could not last indefinitely, and what the 'Times' thought yesterday, His Majesty's Government might be compelled to think in the near future. I could imagine nothing more fatal to the future of Turkey than a failure to conclude peace owing to disagreement on a question like the present.

Ismet was dejected, but obstinate to the end. He tried to make out that if there were a rupture Turkey would have a clear conscience and a good case before the world. The only satisfactory features of a peculiarly disheartening conversation were that he seemed to have no desire to force matters to a rupture himself, and that he sounded as though, if the Debt question were settled, an arrangement could be come to about concessions. He obviously feels that he is between the devil and the deep sea. He professes to regard his instruction from Angora as absolutely final. I have no doubt he will report today's proceedings, but he probably thinks that if he cannot get what Angora wants he is done for. I particularly asked him to bring Mustapha Kemal round as I believe half the trouble to be due to that personage's personal fanaticism over this question and his desire to put it in the forefront of the elections whichever way it goes.

The above conversations had their reflection in the proceedings of the jurists. In the morning Munir Bey was prepared to discuss variants on the jurists' formula[6] of yesterday. In the afternoon, having had a short interview with Ismet, he was all for a declaration to the bondholders the validity of which would be conditional on an agreement regarding the interest on the loans.

[5] See *The Times*, June 13, 1923, p. 13.
[6] See No. 617, n. 3, below.

No. 616

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 257 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6102/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 15, 1923*

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 155 (of June 4th.[1] Allied evacuation of Constantinople etc. and proposed demobilisation of Turkish army).

Sir H. Rumbold learns from his French colleague that the French government hold that demobilisation of Turkish army should commence concurrently, and be terminated simultaneously, with allied evacuation.

Please point out to French government that to put forward any such suggestion after we have agreed to abandon any claim to limit Turkish military forces on either peace or war basis would arouse utmost suspicion and resentment, and we should in any case have no power to control demobilisation on various fronts even by establishing commissions of control, which Turks would not accept.

In the circumstances His Majesty's Government trust that French government will modify instructions issued to General Pellé, and also authorise him to agree in principle to reduction of evacuation period to six weeks, starting from date of ratification by Angora, as recommended by allied generals at Constantinople.[2]

This will not prejudge question as to moment at which and quid pro quo for which the proposed concession shall be made.

Repeated to Rome No. 175,[3] Lausanne No. 87 and Constantinople No. 196.

[1] No. 585. [2] See No. 585, n. 3.

[3] In his following telegram, No. 176 of June 15, Lord Curzon instructed Sir R. Graham to inform the Italian Government of the views of His Majesty's Government.

No. 617

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 16, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 196 Telegraphic [E 6252/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 16, 1923, 2.30 a.m.*

Italian delegate informs me that Ismet called on him this evening[1] and gave him to understand that he might accept formula regarding declaration to be made to debt council which had been drawn up by jurists.[2] This formula is given in my immediately following telegram.[3]

[1] June 15. [2] See Nos. 599 and 611.

[3] No. 197 of June 16. This ran: 'Following is summary of latest version of jurists' formula for declaration to be made by Turkish delegation regarding public debt.

Ismet said, however, that in order to strengthen his hand with his own government he wished to be in a position to telegraph to them conditions of evacuation of Constantinople and occupied Turkish territory. He added that there would be no difficulty about concession question.

Italian delegate replied that he could not give Ismet the details about evacuation which he had asked for but that I might possibly be able to supply these. Ismet thereupon asked Italian delegate to inform me of what he had said. Italian delegate pointed out that jurists' formula went beyond anything hitherto contemplated by allied governments whose consent it would be necessary to obtain. This would in any case entail a delay of two or three days. Ismet expressed disappointment and added that once debt question was out of the way remaining questions could be settled in one day.

I pointed out to Signor Montagna that I could not meet Ismet's wish for two reasons. In the first place my instructions,[4] which I had communicated to him, laid down that evacuation question was only to be discussed after we had obtained a satisfactory settlement of outstanding questions and more particularly of debt, concessions, and Mosul questions. Secondly we should anyhow be hampered in discussion of evacuation question until French had dropped condition regarding simultaneous demobilisation of Turkish army.[5] It is urgent that French government should be got to drop this impracticable condition.

I also said that even if British and Italian governments accepted formula we might have great difficulty in getting French government to accept it.

'Undersigned, duly authorised by Turkish government, declares that all concessions etc. provided for in decree of Muharrem [See No. 490, n. 3] and annexed decrees and in other agreements relative to Turkish loans and advances shall remain in force in so far as they are not modified by peace treaty except as regards currency in which service of loans and advances shall be [effect]ed which will fall to be settled between Turkish government and bondholders.

'Consequently and subject to observance of such settlement public debt administration shall by September 1st, 1923 at the latest be restored to full exercise of rights and functions in accordance with said decrees and agreements. Pending such settlement administration shall not perform any operation calculated to prejudice eventual execution thereof in favour of either of the governments or bondholders. (Agreement shall be come to between Turkish government and debt council as to proportion of revenues collected by latter which shall be paid over to Turkish government provisionally subject to subsequent settlement of accounts).

'Words in brackets represent addition suggested this morning but not yet reduced to precise form in order to overcome anxiety of Turks lest, failing settlement by September 1st, large amounts should be immobilised in hands of public debt council though they might not be necessary for service of loan on terms eventually agreed. I see no objection to this addition and Ismet will probably consider it as forming integral portion of formula for the purpose of getting it accepted by Angora.'

On June 18 the Foreign Office transmitted in telegram No. 92 to Lausanne, the Treasury views on this formula. This telegram ran as follows: 'They [Treasury] would prefer to substitute for the words "currency in which service of loans and advances shall be effected" the alternative words "any adjustment in the gold value of the interest payable". Their idea is that latter formula would better safeguard rights of bondholders while former might be interpreted as definitely sanctioning a breach of the contract.'

[4] See No. 606.

[5] See No. 603.

But I promised to explore the matter further and I shall endeavour to arrange for Ismet to come to see me tomorrow.

My colleagues and I had taken stock of situation in the afternoon. At present, deadlock is complete, and none of sub-committees have [*sic*] any work to do. We feel this situation cannot be allowed to continue as it is as undignified as useless. I told my colleagues that in my considered opinion account must be taken of following two considerations.

(a) That Turkish delegation were no longer in a position to persuade their government to accept solution of any question on its merit. Since settlement of Greco-Turkish reparation question, Turkish delegates had lost credit with their government and were afraid of [*sic*] their own necks. Consequently we were unable to act on Turkish government through their delegation here.

(b) Although situation in Turkey was bad from every point of view I did not think, in the event of a rupture over debt question, Turkish government would be deterred from resuming hostilities. They were worked up to the point of fanaticism about this question.

Both my colleagues subscribed to first appreciation but French delegate was by no means convinced that Turkish Government might go to war again. He had previously reported to his government that if Allies showed a firm front Turks would give way over debt and concession questions. I recommended that we should continue to endeavour to find a formula which would be acceptable to us and Turks. If we failed to do so within next 24 hours it seemed to me that we ought to report our failure to our governments and ask for instructions whether to propose compromise of making no provision in treaty or declaration regarding debt, or to summon Turks within a specified period to agree to our proposals and texts regarding sanctions questions including debt and concessions.

I impressed on French delegate that my government would be reluctant to see a rupture of conference on question of debt, with all possible consequences of such a rupture and I asked him, point blank, whether, if positions were reversed, French Parliament would be willing to see France engaged in hostilities on account of British bondholders. His embarrassed silence was a sufficient answer. French delegate's instructions are so categorical that he is in a difficult position and it is evident even if Turks accept jurists' formula or it is decided to fall back on compromise of making no provision in treaty or declaration regarding debt, considerable pressure will have to be applied to French government.

As it is mainly due to strong support given by me yesterday to French that Turks now seem disposed to yield to extent of accepting jurists' formula, I feel French cannot be too strongly urged to accept latest solution. They will certainly get nothing better and matter has become one of extreme urgency.

No. 618

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 18, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 199 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6261/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 16, 1923*

Your telegram No. 86.[1]

It is proposed that the five million pounds and the proceeds of the Turkish Treasury Bills, 1911, which will constitute the Turkish reparation fund, shall be distributed by an inter-allied commission to all allied claimants in proportion to their claims as assessed by the commission. The provisional draft of an inter-allied agreement to give effect to this proposal was sent to the Foreign Office, Board of Trade and Treasury semi-officially by Thursday's bag.[2] The tentative proposal to allot an arbitrary percentage of the reparation fund to the various governments has been abandoned by common consent as impracticable, since the amount of damage in the case of French and Italian claimants is an unknown factor.

In these circumstances and especially in view of the complete uncertainty as to amount of the claims which the French companies are entitled to put forward, I consider that it would not be possible to adopt either of the methods suggested in your telegram.

I think that the best method of dealing with the problem will be to allow the companies' claims to rank pari passu with individual claims but to exclude any part of the companies' claims for which the Turkish government recognises liability. This would leave little besides claims for damage to property by shell-fire, etc. in the war zones to be met from the reparation fund, the chief claimants being the Smyrna-Cassaba and Smyrna-Aidin Railways and would probably not swamp the fund to such an extent as to render it completely useless to private claimants.

[1] Of June 15. This ran: 'Board of Trade and Treasury take view which I share that if companies fail to obtain satisfaction at Angora they could not in fairness be excluded from participation in five million pounds, and that it would be desirable to agree with allies as soon as possible how this participation should be provided for. Two methods appear possible: (i) A proportion of the total five million could be set aside for all the companies and apportioned by an inter-allied board; (ii) the five million could be divided among the allies according to the present scheme [see No. 492] and each ally could then set aside a portion of its own share for those companies in which its nationals formed a majority of the shareholders. The obvious objection to the second alternative is that the companies could not receive equal treatment from all the allies.'

[2] In a letter, dated June 14, from Mr. Waley to Mr. Oliphant, not printed.

No. 619

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 17, 8.30 a.m.)
Nos. 200 and 201 Telegraphic [*E 6262/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 17, 1923, 1 a.m.*

My telegram No. 196.[1]

Ismet came today.[2] He began by asking me how we were to escape present deadlock. I said that it was for him to find a way out. After some preliminary beating about the bush we then got to business.

He said two formulae were before us viz:—allied formula and his formula subordinating recognition of decree of Muharrem[3] etc. to any arrangement come to between Turkish government and bondholders. If experts could find a half way house between two formulae, and if I were able to state more precisely conditions in which evacuation of Constantinople and occupied Turkish territory would be carried out a better atmosphere would be created and we might solve present difficulties.

I at once said that we must avoid all misunderstanding. In the first place his formula was totally inacceptable. In second place what he called 'allied' formula[4] was in reality a formula which had originally been drafted by jurists without the knowledge of allied delegates and went a good deal . . .[5] instructions of latter. All I had done was to indicate this formula to him as a possible means of escaping from present deadlock but I could not even say whether allied governments would accept it. I repeated what I had already told him that subject to a satisfactory settlement of outstanding questions, evacuation question would not give rise to any difficulties. He did not insist on this matter but proceeded to discuss second part of formula.

I then sent for Mr. Waley and an amicable discussion of a technical character followed. Ismet seemed to be mainly concerned with two points viz:—that council of debt should not blockade all revenues but that Turkish government should be able to receive a considerable portion of those revenues in order to meet their pressing necessities and secondly that date September 21st of this year suggested for reinstatement of administration of debt in all its functions was too near. We explained that first point was already intended to be covered by words added yesterday to end of formula. It was finally agreed that formula should be re-examined by jurists and given to Ismet in its final form tomorrow morning.

I derived impression that with alterations to meet these two points formula will be acceptable to him. I arranged to have another conversation with him tomorrow after he had considered formula in its final form. I made it clear that our governments were not bound by formula.

I am equally clear that we must now stick to principle of formula and that a proposal to leave all mention of decree of Muharrem out of treaty or

[1] No. 617.
[2] June 16.
[3] See No. 490, n. 3.
[4] See No. 617, n. 3.
[5] The text is here uncertain.

declaration would arouse Ismet's suspicions although it is one of the three alternatives he originally put forward himself. Another consideration is that we should certainly lose more prestige by proposing omission of all reference to decree of Muharrem in treaty or declaration.

I have informed my colleagues of foregoing.

No. 620

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 18, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 202 Telegraphic [E 6286/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 18, 1923, 2 a.m.*

My telegram No. 197.[1]

Ismet informed me tonight[2] that he was willing to refer to Angora jurists' formula with two additional paragraphs to replace words in brackets and to provide that all revenues collected by debt council should be paid over provisionally to Turkish government up to March 1st, 1924, and if an agreement about currency question had not been reached by that date a considerable proportion of revenues should be provisionally paid over after March 1st pending an agreement on currency question.

I told him that new conditions were diametrically opposed to my instructions since they would clearly curtail liberty of bondholders' negotiations and I could not even refer his proposal to you.

I had previously learned that French government are strongly opposed to any further concessions and have put before you[3] and Italian government proposals in regard to position here generally.

I will confer with my colleagues tomorrow morning and telegraph again on position now reached as regards this most difficult question.

[1] No. 617, n. 3. [2] June 17.

[3] In his telegram No. 90 of June 18, Lord Curzon stated: 'French government ask that you should support your French colleague in the line contemplated by fresh instructions just sent to him regarding the debt settlement. They propose settlement on basis of declaration of February 4th [see No. 580, n. 2] to be addressed by Turkish government to Debt Council with the addition of a phrase of which wording is given in my immediately following telegram [not printed, but see No. 621, below]. French delegate is not to accept any further concession or to consent to fresh visit of Turkish delegate to Paris to consult bondholders.'

No. 621

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 19, 8.30 a.m.)
Nos. 203, 204, and 205 Telegraphic [E 6356/1/44]

Part 1 LAUSANNE, *June 18, 1923, 8.50 p.m.*

My telegram No. 202.[1]

Allied delegates reviewed situation this morning. Discussion revealed

[1] No. 620.

complete cleavage between French views and my own on two essential points viz: (1) French consider jurists' formula in any of forms which have been given to it since its inception as being so prejudicial to rights of bondholders as to be inadmissible. (2) French are imbued with the idea that Turks are so unprepared for rupture and its consequences that they would certainly yield to mise-en-demeure which I understand French government have already proposed to His Majesty's Government and Italian government. As regards (1) General Pellé's position is that he is tied by his instructions from Paris which appear still to be those re-produced in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my telegram No. 195.[2]

Slight change for the better in Ismet's attitude on June 15th has produced no corresponding change in that of French government though I believe General Pellé himself would like to have more elastic instructions. As regards (2) General Pellé unfortunately shares view of French government that Turks would certainly yield to ultimatum. He relies on reports from Constantinople regarding incapacity of Turks to face new war and evidence of more conciliatory disposition on their part in local questions. My own view is that while Turks are most unwilling to go to war their fanaticism regarding debt question is such that they would face rupture of conference with all its consequences rather than agree to what French want.

Part 2

At outset of meeting I gave brief summary of history of question up to and including my conversation with Ismet last evening. General Pellé made formal reservation to the effect that his instructions debarred him from pursuing matter on basis of any formula other than that approved of in Paris but subject to this he did not demur to further exploration of possible solutions. Monsieur des Closières, representative of French bondholders on Ottoman debt council, then informed us that in a conversation with Ismet on Saturday morning[3] he had discussed proposal that Ottoman debt council should simultaneously, but independently from peace negotiations, make an agreement with Turkish government that all assignments of revenues[4] collected by council up to March 1924 should be placed at disposal of Turkish government subject to a later settlement of accounts. Personally Monsieur des Closières fully recognised that it would be impossible for Turkish government to be deprived abruptly and immediately of revenue belonging to debt council which formed at present a considerable part of receipts of Turkish state. He preferred to advance all receipts rather than any fixed proportion as this would in no way pre-judge negotiations as to currency in which coupons should be paid.

Ismet (apparently largely under influence of Riza Nour who was present) had refused to consider offer unless it were to continue until date of conclusion of an agreement between Turkey and bondholders on the currency

[2] No. 615.

[3] June 16.

[4] It was suggested in the Foreign Office that this should read 'assigned revenues'.

question. Monsieur des Closières had pointed out this would place bondholders absolutely at Turks' mercy in these negotiations.

I then summed up alternatives before us as being:—

1. To find a formula acceptable both to Turks and Allies.
2. An ultimatum in some form.
3. No declaration.

As regards (1) I said that I had been driven to the conclusion that the task of finding such a formula was beyond our power and I restated my objection to (2). I said in these circumstances I was disposed to fall back on (3) but to mitigate its disadvantages by arranging that a letter should be written by inviting powers to Ismet explaining that abandonment of declaration did not imply governments considered contracts as otherwise than valid, or in any way gave up the right to protection of interests of their subjects arising out of contracts hereafter if necessary; in other words it would be open to French government to send French fleet to Constantinople to protect their bondholders if a friendly agreement was not reached, in unlikely supposition that they should decide to do so. General Pellé considered third alternative failed as completely to satisfy his instructions as any compromise of formula hitherto suggested. After much discussion it was decided to prepare yet another formula based on earlier portion of that of jurists but taking account of French view and to try Ismet with this this afternoon. This new formula is summarised in my telegram No. 206.[5] It would be supplemented by a separate agreement with debt council providing for advance to Turkish government of all new receipts up to March 1st or possibly September 1st, 1924.

Part 3

It was agreed that my financial experts should present this to Ismet this afternoon, still not as being firm allied or even British offer but as something which if acceptable to him I might induce His Majesty's Government to accept. Ismet uncompromisingly rejected it and made it clear that nothing would satisfy him except arrangement by which amount of revenue allocated to coupons should in no circumstances exceed amount required on francs basis whether in virtue of agreement with bondholders or pending its conclusion. He presented formula of his own going slightly further even than that which I rejected last night. After this interview I again met my colleagues. We agreed that it would be useless to consider any further formula and that we could only await instructions from our respective governments. Situation of

[5] Of June 18. This ran: 'Undersigned duly authorised by Turkish government declares that all cession etc. provided for in decree of Muharrem [see No. 490, n. 3] and annexed decrees and in other agreements relative to pre-1914 Turkish loans and advances shall remain in force in so far as they are not modified by peace treaty. As regards currency in which service of loans and advances shall be effected this question will fall to be settled between Turkish government and bondholders. Consequently and subject to observance of such settlement public debt administration shall on ratification of treaty by Angora assembly be restored to full exercise of rights and functions in accordance with said decrees and agreements.'

conference is therefore one of complete deadlock pending agreement between French and British governments regarding further course to be pursued. Italians can be relied on to fall in with any plan not involving rupture on which His Majesty's Government and French may agree.

Since parts 1 and 2 of this telegram were drafted I have received your telegram No. 90.[6] I anxiously await your views on request of French government. Formula which they ask us to join in pressing on Turks is identical with that mentioned in 2nd paragraph of my telegram No. 195.[7]

[6] No. 620, n. 3. [7] No. 615.

No. 622

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 208 (and 207[1]) Telegraphic [E 6323/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 19, 1923, 1.30 a.m.*

My telegrams Nos. 192 and 193.[2]

Monsieur Veniselos informed a member of my delegation today that Ismet called on him this afternoon for first time at his hotel. Visit was ostensibly only one of courtesy but Ismet had enquired into truth of reports in press about a correspondence between allies and Greece regarding a separate peace between latter and Turkey. Monsieur Veniselos said that he explained to Ismet that there was no question of separate peace but merely of expediting re-establishment of a state of peace between Turkey and Greece by some preliminary arrangement between them, should general negotiations between allies and Turkey drag on at Lausanne or be adjourned. Principle of some such separate Greco-Turkish instrument which would ultimately form part of main settlement between allies and Turkey could already be found in Prisoners convention.[3] Monsieur Veniselos concluded by explaining that he was not pressing his request on the allies because latter had announced that they did not foresee an adjournment of conference or any prolonged delay in making peace. Ismet did not pursue the conversation.

Monsieur Veniselos got impression from Ismet that he expected to reach an agreement with allies on debt question.

Monsieur Veniselos repeated what he has often said before that if allies made war or peace Greece would follow them but that if there was a rupture without hostilities or an adjournment Greece must in her own interests make peace.

[1] No. 207 supplied an omission in No. 208. [2] Nos. 612 and 613.
[3] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1054–6.

No. 623

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 19, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 209 Telegraphic [E 6324/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 19, 1923, 1.30 a.m.*

My telegram No. 183.[1]

My French colleague told me today[2] that French government had abandoned idea of demanding demobilisation of Turkish army pari passu with evacuation, also that they were agreeable to proposal that period for evacuation should be six weeks. He added that he was authorised to inform Ismet that subject to satisfactory settlement of other questions evacuation question would be settled to satisfaction of Turks. I encouraged him to take advantage of these instructions to reassure Ismet on this point, thus confirming broad hints which I have myself already given to latter.[3]

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 603. [2] i.e. June 18.

[3] Referring to this telegram and to No. 616, Lord Crewe, in his telegram No. 599 of June 20, reported: 'Note received from French government agreeing both as regards date on which evacuation shall begin and period for evacuation.'

No. 624

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 212 Telegraphic [E 6406/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 20, 1923, 12.45 a.m.*

My telegram No. 203.[1]

Following analysis of situation may assist you in deciding on line now to be taken with French and Turks.

Difficulty of bringing debt question to final issue arises from two main factors viz:—

1. French government have not substantially altered their attitude during the past week. They adhere to their own formula as described in your telegram No. 90.[2] It would certainly be impossible now to get Turks to accept this by ordinary negotiations even if it had united allied backing, and even if it were accompanied by offer which Monsieur des Closières thinks debt council could be induced to make, namely to place whole debt revenues at disposal of Turkish government for a stated period.

2. French government believe that Turks would yield to mise-en-demeure. They regard this as so certain in view of their reports from Constantinople and Angora that they believe it would entail no serious risk of rupture. My Italian colleague and I disagree. As regards 1, central idea in minds of

[1] No. 621. [2] No. 620, n. 3.

Turks is still that interest must be paid in French francs. In their view only alternative to specific provision for such payment is some solution which will give them (a) immediate disposal of at least as much of ceded revenues as may be left after retention by debt council of amounts necessary for service of loans in French francs and (b) power to compel assent of bondholders at early date to definite arrangement for payment in French francs at any rate for a longish term of years. Closières's offer is, from this point of view, beside the mark because Turks feel no matter for what period whole public debt revenues are advanced to them, time will come when bondholders (supported by one or more governments at favourable moment) will claim their full rights under contracts and will not come to terms on any less favourable solution.

As regards 2, all our evidence tends to show that leaders at Angora, headed by Mustapha Kemal and supported by most influential elements in the country, are worked up to point of fanaticism on this question. They do not want to go to war about anything but this has become one of the questions on which they would risk the madness of war rather than give way unless they can get French francs affixed or something as near it as to make no difference.

They want this in order to have money both for reconstruction and for maintenance of strong military situation. They also feel that they could have no better grounds from point of view of home politics than to be able to say that they had broken off conference rather than leave most important portion of revenues of the country in the hands of extortionate foreigners. This would answer their purpose as an election cry all the better as idea of French francs originated with people like Djavid and Djahid who are now active members of the opposition. As for military aspect Mustapha Kemal and his associates have never shrunk from heavy risk and it would be foolish to count on their doing so now especially as chances of their having to take on Greek army are small. Turkish army is reported to be in a poor way but every recent estimate of its value has been made with reference to its capacity to face a war with Greeks or with Greeks plus Allies.

Recent capture of guns which were being transferred from Silivri to Panderma (see Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 353)[3] seems to confirm theory that Turks, thinking they have nothing more to fear from Greeks, wish to be prepared for action against ourselves or French in case of necessity.

Assuming that His Majesty's Government wished, at all costs, to avoid rupture I think we should aim at getting French to agree to following successive lines being taken at Lausanne.

(1). Vigorous united effort to make Ismet accept jurists' formula, summarized in my telegram No. 197,[4] with any modifications agreed to in discussions with French who must however be made to realize that any attempt to make it substantially more stringent would destroy last chance of its acceptance by Turks. If this fails further search for a formula should be finally abandoned.

[3] No. 630, n. 2, below.

[4] No. 617, n. 3.

(2). Immediate discussions between French bondholders (who probably hold 90% of bonds) and Turkish government. This has been unofficially suggested by a French expert to Paris. It would avoid rupture if bondholders will decide to accept francs but would accentuate difficulties otherwise. It would therefore be dangerous to suggest this procedure until bondholders have been sounded. Also British and other bondholders might refuse to follow the French.

(3). Fall back on my suggestion at meeting yesterday[5] to drop all question of declaration but to place it on record in a note that Allies by abandoning their demand for (1) do not abandon their right to protect bondholders if latter are not fairly treated by Turks. This note would to some extent meet argument as to implicit surrender of bondholders' rights resulting from dropping declaration.

It may be assumed that (3) would settle our difficulties without danger of rupture though Turks would probably place on record their own view that interest question was not matter of international concern. Each side would then rest on their positions until such time as (a) Turks and bondholders came to terms more or less amicably or (b) bondholders were able to exert pressure owing to Turkey's need to raise new money abroad or (c) position of Turkey vis-à-vis powers were so altered by future developments as to make this question merge in some new political settlement in conditions more favourable to us than those now prevailing.

General Pellé at my suggestion proposed to leave for Paris tonight to review whole position here but M. Poincaré has discouraged the idea.[6]

[5] See No. 621.

[6] In his telegram No. 213 of June 19, which was despatched and received before the telegram here printed, Sir H. Rumbold stated: 'Should His Majesty's Government decide after full consideration in favour of mise-en-demeure, I trust it will be (?confined) to debt and concessions question with or without (?favourable) offer regarding evacuation of Constantinople and Chanak in order to encourage Turks to accept our terms regarding above mentioned two questions. This suggestion is inspired by mention of Mosul in your telegram No. 80 [No. 606]. There would be in my opinion no need to include Mosul settlement in mise-en-demeure as it is clear from numerous conversations with Turks that they are only waiting for settlement of other outstanding questions, including evacuation, to agree to nine months proposal. Ismet Pasha has already accepted rest of our draft article regarding status quo etc.'

No. 625

Lord Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 20, 6.55 p.m.)
No. 600 Telegraphic [*E 6426/1/44*]

PARIS, *June 20, 1923, 4.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 256[1] and your telegram No. 80[2] to Lausanne.

Note received today from French government of which following is very brief summary.

[1] See No. 606, n. 7. [2] No. 606.

Concessions. French government agree as regards insertion in treaty of 5 principles in the case foreshadowed, also as regards not extending concession for war and armistice period. As regards Ottoman Bank they suggest asking for a delay of two years to examine new contract.

As regards debt, they agree that rights of bondholders cannot be infringed. They object to suppression of Turkish declaration of February 4th[3] and urge His Majesty's Government to accept formula communicated by French Ambassador in London on June 15th.[4] They reciprocate promise of His Majesty's Government of support on debt question with a promise of support as regards Mosul and announcement that their willingness to accept a treaty is equally governed by their receiving satisfaction on debt question.

Evacuation. French government agree to view of His Majesty's Government.

Copy of my note to French government and of their reply by bag.[5]

Repeated to Lausanne.

[3] See Cmd. 1814, p. 839.

[4] The reference is apparently to the formula communicated by M. de Montille on June 16. On that day, Mr. Oliphant minuted: 'French Embassy telephoned this morning to ask us to instruct Sir H. Rumbold to cooperate with his French colleague in submitting a fresh proposal to the Turks. It is, apparently, the Turkish declaration of February 4th . . . with an added phrase regarding negotiations with the bondholders; beyond this no concession is to be made.' Cf. No. 620, n. 3.

[5] In Paris despatch No. 1469 of June 20, not printed.

No. 626

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 21, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 215 Telegraphic [E 6448/1/44]

Personal LAUSANNE, *June 21, 1923, 12.55 a.m.*

Following for Lord Curzon.

I have endeavoured in my telegrams Nos. 203[1] and 212[2] to faithfully present situation here. It is difficult however in official telegrams, which, owing to nature of question immediately at issue necessarily abound in technical details, to describe slough of despond into which conference has sunk and from which nothing but speedy joint decision of governments can extricate it. Turks being equally unwilling to initiate rupture or to yield on debt question, have simply dug themselves in.

I have stated in my telegram No. 212 how I consider this situation should be dealt with if, as I believe to be the case, it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to avoid rupture and possible resumption of hostilities on question which mainly interests French. Alternative is to join French in ultimatum covering debt and concessions questions. Even if Italians would

[1] No. 621. [2] No. 624.

agree to this, which they show no inclination to do, it would in my opinion be dangerous. Should you nevertheless contemplate this alternative it is important that solution regarding debt proposed in ultimatum should be sufficiently moderate to offer some chance of Turks agreeing to it. Whichever solution you favour, key to situation is now in Paris. It is for this reason that I suggested two days ago that General Pellé (whose personal views are moderate, though even he underrates the chances of Turkish resistance to ultimatum) should go to Paris. President of the Council unfortunately refused to sanction this and suggested that negotiations should continue. Trouble is that we no longer have any basis for negotiations. I realise that my own proposals while, as I hope, paving the way for peaceful if inglorious settlement of debt question will leave that of concessions to be dealt with subsequently in somewhat similar conditions and we may emerge from one deadlock to find ourselves in another. I do not think, however, that when debt question is out of the way Turks will be so adamant about concessions as they have been about debt. Once both are settled peace may be regarded as assured as apart from these two questions only small matters of detail remain to be disposed of.

Making this strong personal appeal to you to help conference I would point out that dangers of present situation may be seriously aggravated by delay. Monsieur Veniselos is impatient and if he and Ismet came to terms behind our backs[3] we might find Turks even more uncompromising than they are now; more disposed perhaps for [*sic*] madness of going to war with ourselves and French 'in order' they would say 'to save their country from financial and economic servitude'.

[3] Cf. No. 622.

No. 627

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 95 Telegraphic [E 6448/1/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 22, 1923, 5.30 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 203,[1] 204,[1] 205[1] (of June 18th), 212[2] and 213[3] (of June 19th; debt).

It is clear that views of French and Turkish governments and instructions sent to their delegates are so far apart as no longer to admit of the possibility of a compromise formula and that consequently we must decide whether to try to induce the French to agree to omit any declaration and be satisfied with a unilateral reservation in a letter to Ismet, or whether in the alternative we should join the French in a policy involving some form of ultimatum.

[1] No. 621. [2] No. 624. [3] No. 624, n. 6.

Before a decision can be taken on this, it is essential that the Concession question and any other question on which agreement has not been reached should be brought to the point of either solution or deadlock. As regards Concessions, indications are that the Turks will refuse to include any principles or safeguards in the treaty. This may therefore become a further argument in favour of a strong policy. But in order that the problem may be viewed as a whole and considered in all its bearings, it would be an advantage if we could have before us the complete draft treaty with the exception of clauses relating to the so far insoluble questions. We could then more clearly balance the pros and cons of either holding out definitely for our demands or trying to persuade our allies to make yet further concessions in order to secure such benefits as the body of the treaty confers. For if we finally decide on ultimatum policy it will be desirable to present to the Turks for final acceptance or refusal, not only our last word on Coupon and Concessions questions, but the whole treaty, including provisions governing these two questions. Our demands concerning Mosul would thus be covered. This procedure would have the further advantage of enabling us to include offer of evacuation as an inducement.

Will you therefore endeavour to leave aside the Coupons question for the time being and to bring Ismet into the open on the Concessions question and any others still outstanding.

You can explain to your colleagues that decision of His Majesty's Government on the Coupons question is under consideration and that meanwhile your instructions are as above.

I am repeating this telegram to Paris and Rome for information of French and Italian governments.

Repeated to Paris No. 272, Rome No. 182 and Constantinople No. 202.

No. 628

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 23, 6.50 p.m.)
No. 216 Telegraphic [E 6525/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 23, 1923, 4.20 p.m.*

I communicated your instructions[1] to me to a meeting of allied delegations this morning. French delegate had previously informed me of his instructions which were to the effect that three proposals which I had submitted for a settlement of coupon question had been referred to French Ministry of Finance whose views would be subsequently communicated to General Pellé. Meanwhile he was instructed to concert with his colleagues in drawing up a note to Ismet covering all other questions still unsolved including concessions question, stating definite views of allied governments on these questions and asking for views of Turkish delegation thereon.

[1] See No. 627.

I pointed out that there was considerable similarity between French delegate's instructions and my own and I suggested that it would be more satisfactory as well as more expeditious to review outstanding questions except coupon question at a private meeting with Ismet and his experts which might take place this afternoon than to address a note to him on the subject. This was accepted. My delegation had meanwhile prepared a list of all outstanding questions from which we selected those of sufficient importance to be reviewed at meeting with Ismet. These number about 11, remainder being of quite minor importance or questions which have been to all intents and purposes already . . .[2] I am sending by bag this evening copies[3] of complete list and of agenda for discussion at meeting.

I will telegraph result of this afternoon's meeting.[4]

Repeated to Constantinople No. 95.

[2] The text is here uncertain. [3] Lausanne despatch No. 191 of June 23, not printed.
[4] See No. 632, below.

No. 629

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 23, 7.50 p.m.)
No. 217 Telegraphic [E 6526/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 23, 1923, 4.20 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Ismet called on me last night before I was in possession of your telegram No. 95[2] and pressed me to bring coupons question to a head and to settle it. I replied that a satisfactory settlement of this question depended on himself and that I personally had done all that I could to promote a settlement. He then urged that we should take question at a private meeting and if necessary register a disagreement on it. I enquired what would happen then, to which he replied that this would be a matter for allies to decide. He was evidently very worried and is probably being pressed by his government to finish off negotiations.

He added that information he had received from his government showed that concessionary companies were making satisfactory progress in their negotiations at Angora.

Having just received Mr. Henderson's telegram No. 358 to you,[3] I replied that my information was diametrically opposed to that of Ismet and was to the effect that five of the principal British companies had completely failed to conclude acceptable agreement. I shall make further use of Mr. Henderson's telegram at this afternoon's meeting.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 67.

[1] No. 628. [2] No. 627.
[3] Of June 22, not printed. This reported that the representatives of the National Bank of Turkey, Armstrong Vickers and Company, Eastern Gas Company (Smyrna), and Borax Consolidated, had, 'after making every possible effort and showing spirit of extreme conciliation', been unable to conclude acceptable agreements with the Turkish Government.

No. 630

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 23, 9.25 p.m.)
No. 218 Telegraphic [E 6527/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 23, 1923, 4.20 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

During his visit to me last night Ismet stated that he had received information that allied military authorities at Constantinople were evacuating Turkish war material which is in allied custody and which Turks expected to receive back when allied forces evacuated Turkish territory. He protested against this proceeding which he said would cause Turks much inconvenience. I replied that I knew nothing of matter. He was unable to give me details.

I then enquired whether he was alluding to recent seizure by British authorities of field and mountain guns on board 'Umid'.[2] As he professed to know nothing about this incident, although in subsequent conversation it was clear that he was perfectly familiar with it, I told him what had happened and said that seizure of these guns which had been put on board at Silivri was a clear proof that Turks had violated Mudania convention. He tried to make out that this was not the case as guns were not being transported from Anatolia to Rumelia and suggested that these guns had been buried in Rumelia and since dug up. I said I could not accept this ridiculous explanation and I rubbed into him manner in which Refet Pasha had been consistently violating Mudania convention for a long time past.[3]

Ismet then said that he wished to assure me that there had been no concentrations of Turkish troops on Syrian frontier. On the contrary French had made concentrations on Turkish frontier.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[1] No. 629.

[2] In his telegram No. 353 to the Foreign Office of June 17, which was repeated to Lausanne, Mr. Henderson reported: 'Turkish steamer "Umid" with field and ten mountain guns, 300 men, 200 horses on board was intercepted by destroyer on leaving Silivri for Panderma this morning and brought to Haridi Pasha. Mountain guns and breach-blocks of field guns will be removed in British vessel and "Umid" immediately released. I anticipate resort to protest on the part of Turkish authorities. If approached by Adnan I shall inform him that I regard incident as serious breach of Turkish good faith and as direct refutation of his emphatic assurances, given previously to me, that no military organisation had been built up in Eastern Thrace. I shall add that guns are being detained as proof of Turkish violation of Article 13 of Mudania convention pending decision of His Majesty's Government as to their disposal.'

[3] In his telegram No. 186 to Lausanne, No. 364 to the Foreign Office, of June 25, Mr. Henderson, referring to the telegram here printed, stated: 'In the event of Ismet reverting to question General Harington suggests it might be pointed out that guns when captured were accompanied by battery personnel, artillerymen and horses etc. and that Jafar Tayar gave written certificates that all guns in his possession had been handed over. As a matter of fact three of the guns bear our marks showing that they were in Tophane depôt last June. If Adnan approaches me I propose to ask him for full details of where and how guns were discovered in order if possible to get false statement in writing out of him.'

No. 631

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 219 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6546/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 23, 1923*

A meeting of the third committee was held on the 22nd June[1] when several small outstanding matters were disposed of.

Article 71. The proposals of the drafting committee for the second paragraph of this article, contained in their draft of the 7th June[2] (see my despatch No. 142 of June 7th),[3] were approved subject to a reserve made by Ismet with regard to the position of Turkish property in Egypt, and the rights of Turkish nationals regarding their relations with Egyptians. It had already been agreed between the experts to dispose of the question of Turkish property in Egypt by a declaration, the terms of which had been approved, and I am now in communication with Egypt as regards the relations between Turkish nationals and Egyptians on matters such as contracts, the operation of which was suspended by the war (see my despatch No. 189 of June 23rd).[3]

Article 73. It was agreed to delete the words 'y compris espèces, titres et valeurs' (see my despatch No. 174 of June 18th).[3]

Article 73 bis. The article annexed to the report of the economic experts of 13th June[4] was accepted (see my despatch No. 166 of June 14th).[3]

Article 75. The letter to be written by the Turkish delegation[5] and the declaration by the allied delegations set out in the same experts' report of 13th June were accepted.

Article 77. It was agreed that the mixed arbitral tribunal should not have jurisdiction to determine any disputes which might arise under article 73.

Articles 82, 84 and 87. The modifications recommended in the above mentioned experts' report of the 13th June were accepted.

Article 88. The article annexed[6] to the experts' report of the 13th June was accepted.

Articles 108–111. The proposals in the drafting committee's text of the 6th June[7] (see my despatch No. 141 of June 7th)[3] were accepted subject to a reserve by Ismet demanding the insertion of an article providing for the termination of the jurisdiction of the mixed arbitral tribunal within three years after the coming into force of the treaty. He suggested that at the expiration of three years any outstanding cases should be referred to the permanent court of international justice at the Hague. This question was referred to the drafting committee.

Article 112 (4). It was agreed that this paragraph should remain in the treaty leaving any question of the contributions in arrear to be dealt with between the Turkish government and the agricultural institute at Rome.

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 350–8.
[2] Ibid., p. 359.
[3] Not printed.
[4] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 361.
[5] Ibid., p. 362.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid., pp. 363–4.

Article 113 (12). The Turkish reserve on this paragraph was withdrawn.

Article 113 (13). The Turkish reserve as to the inclusion of this paragraph was withdrawn subject to it being provided that Turkey's adhesion was to be conditional on her obtaining, under the protocol of 1st May, 1920,[8] such derogation from article 5 of the convention relating to aerial navigation as is necessary having regard to her geographical situation. This modification was accepted.

Article 114. It was agreed to delete this article.

Article 115. It was agreed to delete the second sentence; the first sentence of the article was to be further considered by the drafting committee.

Article 128 bis. A clause prepared by the drafting committee[9] providing for the suppression of foreign post-offices in Turkey was agreed to (see my despatch No. 147 of June 9th).[3]

Commercial Convention. Article 9. A small drafting alteration at the beginning of the second paragraph for the purpose of making it clear that the paragraph does not refer to the relations between the allies themselves was accepted. The Japanese delegate made a declaration stating that their acceptance of this paragraph was not to be taken as an acceptance for general purposes of the definition of cabotage contained in the article.

Article 17. The question of adhesion of non-signatory powers was raised but the Turks maintained their objection to the article.

I enquired whether they would be prepared to give an undertaking to negotiate commercial treaties with Belgium and Portugal 'sur les mêmes bases' as in this convention. Ismet stated that it was difficult to know what this would mean, and I then suggested that he should undertake to negotiate treaties 'd'après les mêmes principes'. He said that he would consider this.

Article 18. The question of the duration of the commercial convention was raised again but the same difficulty still arises with regard to Greece, Turkey stating that she is not prepared to agree to the duration of this convention being longer than one year so far as regards Greece. M. Veniselos stated that Greece would not agree to this discrimination between her and other Balkan powers and the question was again reserved.

During the meeting an agreed protest was made by the allies with regard to a communiqué published at Smyrna by the Angora Minister of Economic Affairs with regard to the Smyrna fire,[10] in which circular it was stated that it had been proved that the fire was not a consequence of war, and recommended owners of insured property to take proceedings against the insurance companies in the courts if they could not obtain satisfaction otherwise. It was pointed out in the protest that this was a most improper interference in matters which were within the jurisdiction of the courts.

[8] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 783-5.

[9] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 367.

[10] See No. 28, n. 2.

No. 632

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 220 Telegraphic: by bag [*E 6547/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *June 23, 1923*

My telegram No. 216.[1]

The meeting[2] with Ismet Pasha this afternoon lasted three and a half hours. He brought with him Riza Nour and Hassan and four experts, but he himself conducted the Turkish side of the proceedings almost entirely, prompted occasionally by Riza Nour. We took the subjects in the order given in the paper[3] which the allied delegates had sent him earlier in the day (see my despatch No. 191 of to-day's date).[4] I began by explaining the object of the meeting. The allied governments, I said, were seriously preoccupied by the prolongation of the conference which had already consumed twenty weeks. We had been instructed to review the outstanding questions with Ismet Pasha and the decisions of the governments would depend on what he had to say to us.

The following is a short resumé of the discussion under each head:—

Article 1. Evacuation.

I said that the Turks had no reason to doubt the intentions of the allied governments who were disposed to meet their views subject to a satisfactory settlement of other questions. We could not, however, discuss the question of evacuation, least of all in its details, until those other questions were in a fair way of settlement or actually settled. Ismet Pasha, reverting to this question after I had gone on to Article 3, said he had hoped for something definite about evacuation instead of which I had merely repeated what had already been said. Could this question, he asked, be disposed of at once if the other questions were settled? I said, certainly. He took note of this and said he understood my meaning to be that if the other questions were settled satisfactorily evacuation would be settled in accordance with the Turkish point of view. I replied in the affirmative with the concurrence of my colleagues.

Articles 3 (1) and 16. Syria.

I repeated a question which I had already put as to whether the Turks were prepared to drop all mention in the treaty of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement.[5] General Pellé reminded Ismet that he had three days ago offered to define the intentions of the French government in a letter and that Ismet had promised to consider this offer. After some little discussion, Ismet agreed to the proposed procedure on the understanding that the French statement should take the form of a declaration signed by the French plenipotentiaries

[1] No. 628.
[2] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 393–407.
[3] Not printed; see, however, No. 628.
[4] Not printed.
[5] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

with a covering letter and that the settlement thus arrived at should be recorded at a meeting of the conference.

Article 3 (2). Iraq Frontier.

Ismet, after a brief discussion, agreed that the period for negotiation between the British and Turkish governments should be nine months. I expressed myself satisfied, though I had pointed out at the outset that what His Majesty's Government had officially proposed was six months and that the nine months proposal had merely been a personal suggestion of my own.[6]

Article 159. Adhesion of Belgium, Portugal, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

There was a good deal of rather loose discussion about this. My colleagues and I took the line that there was a strong case for giving the first three of these Powers the benefit of Section 1 of the Financial Clauses and the whole of the Economic Clauses, and a certain case for doing the same for Poland, even though she had entered into separate negotiations with Turkey for certain purposes; that a state of peace must moreover be re-established between Portugal and Turkey; and that the same Powers should be allowed to adhere to the Établissement Convention. Ismet repeated his usual objections. He agreed, however, that the experts should re-examine the question of the four Powers, or at any rate Belgium and Portugal, being allowed to adhere to the portions of the main treaty which we had indicated. He maintained strongly his refusal to let them adhere to the Établissement Convention even after we had intimated pretty clearly that we should be prepared to drop Poland.

Passing to the financial clauses, General Pellé explained that we could not deal with the Ottoman Debt question at this meeting since we had not yet all received final instructions. Accordingly Articles 56 (confirmation of Decree of Muharrem)[7] and Article 46 bis (completion of assigned revenues by Turkey) were left over for future discussion. At this, Ismet pathetically exclaimed that the discussion was all upside down from his point of view. He had expected to talk about evacuation and the public debt and these were the very questions which we said we were unable to deal with! He did not, however, demur to the discussion being continued on the lines which we had laid down.

Article 65. Civil List Property.

Ismet agreed with the principle that properties transferred from the Civil List to the Turkish State should pass to the detached States without payment and the experts were instructed to continue their work of agreeing on the text of the article.

Article 70.

It was stated that the experts were studying the possibility of suppressing the article and replacing it by an agreement that the Turkish government would raise no objection to payments on account of coupons made by the

[6] See No. 606. [7] See No. 490, n. 3.

Ottoman Dept Council and other establishments during the régime of the Constantinople government and would accept as final settlements of past accounts under various agreements between the Debt Council and the Constantinople government.

Ismet Pasha objected that these matters belonged to the internal administration of Turkey and that they were connected with the payment in francs question. We strongly contested both points and it was agreed that the experts should continue to discuss the declaration.

We shall clearly be unable to settle this matter until the payment in francs question is out of the way: it should then cause no great difficulty.

General Pellé also took occasion to protest against the refusal of the Turkish government to carry out their own agreement as to the sum of £T 442,000 gold sequestrated in 1919. Although Angora had agreed to repay the advances if the balance of the gold were then released (see Constantinople telegram No. 599 of 18th instant)[8] the French delegation learn that Angora has now demanded that all the gold should be transported to Angora, the repayment of the advances being left for subsequent settlement.

Hassan Bey said there must be a misunderstanding on this and we pressed him to get the matter put right.

Articles 72 and 72 bis.

These articles had been agreed, but the Turks have been making difficulties about Turkish subjects of Egyptian origin for whom they wish to secure the benefit of certain portions of the treaty. As reported in my telegram No. 219 of to-day,[9] I am in correspondence with Lord Allenby about this, but as the Turks ask for a little more every day I took the opportunity of telling Ismet that I could not go further than I had already offered to do subject to Lord Allenby's concurrence for which I had asked by telegraph. After some little attempt to obtain more, he agreed not to press for more.

Concessions.

M. Montagna stated that the position with regard to concessions contemplated in the letter of 27th March,[10] had now arisen and it was therefore necessary to consider what clauses dealing with this subject should be inserted in the treaty. A protocol and declaration had been prepared by the allied experts and explained to the Turkish representatives in consultation with them, and it was now desired to have the agreement of the Turkish delegation to the provisions included in the protocol and declaration.

Ismet replied that he had always maintained that this matter was one to be settled at Angora by negotiations between the Angora government and individual concessionaires. His government took the view that for the present the question was not within the competence of the conference. The

[8] The reference appears to be to Constantinople telegram No. 354 of June 18, not printed, which was repeated to Lausanne as No. 177.

[9] No. 631.

[10] No. 460, which was drafted and approved on March 27 (see No. 459).

conference had not yet finished its work on the other parts of the treaty and since the last meeting some of the negotiations at Angora had been completed.

I read a telegram from Mr. Henderson[11] showing that in five British cases the concessionaires had been unable to come to any agreement with the Angora government after making every possible effort. They had therefore closed the negotiations and had appealed to His Majesty's Government to secure adequate protection by provisions in the treaty. I took this opportunity to speak in the sense of the second paragraph of your telegram No. 89.[12]

General Pellé stated that the representatives of three French undertakings had also been completely unsuccessful and had left Angora. In three other cases the representatives were still at Angora and in one case agreement had been reached, subject to the approval of the Ottoman Debt Council which had not yet been given.

I drew attention to the treatment of the representatives of Vickers Armstrong[13] showing that their concession was treated as non-existent and the only suggestion made to them was that they should negotiate some entirely fresh agreement.

Ismet said that the claims put forward by the concessionaires might have been unreasonable and asked whether the British government wished to support unreasonable claims, to which I replied that we had no wish to do anything of the kind and that the provisions of the protocol which provided for arbitration would not assist the companies in any unfair demands. Ismet stated that after the debt and evacuation questions had been got out of the way, his government would consider the question of concessions and give him instructions. At present he had no instructions to deal with concessions here. I stated that my instructions did not permit me to agree to anything with regard to evacuation until the concessions question had been settled.

General Pellé stated that his instructions were similar.

Ismet repeated over and over again that in his view the moment to deal with the question of concessions would only arise when everything else had been completed and that consequently this moment had not yet arrived as there were still outstanding matters to settle. It was pointed out to him by all the allied representatives that in many cases a settlement by direct negotiation between the concessionaires and the Angora government had now become impossible because negotiations had been broken off, and that the time to deal with the clauses to be inserted in the treaty had now arrived.

[11] See No. 629, n. 3.

[12] In this telegram, Lord Curzon had informed Sir H. Rumbold that the Turks were working on the principle that negotiations with the concessionary companies would succeed if the companies themselves entertained no hopes of intervention on their behalf at Lausanne. Lord Curzon had continued: 'You might take an opportunity of making Ismet realize that companies have always been aware of what we told Turks themselves in our identic notes of March 28th namely that failing satisfaction being attained in private negotiations at Lausanne Allied governments would insist on insertion of guarantees in the treaty.'

[13] See No. 577, n. 4.

Ismet declined to give any undertaking that if the debt question were settled he would accept the protocol and declaration dealing with concessions. I asked him whether I was to report to my government that he refused to discuss concessions until all other matters are settled, and he replied, after some hesitation, that his instructions were only to discuss this matter after everything else was settled.

Riza Nour stated that the instructions from their government were not to deal with concessions until after the debt and evacuation questions were settled. After that, his government would be prepared to discuss the question of concessions, but he would give no promise of any kind as to the manner in which they would be prepared to deal with them. My colleagues and I protested vigorously against this attitude and reaffirmed in the most categorical terms our statement that we could not embark on a discussion of the conditions of evacuation until all other important questions had been disposed of.

By this time the hour was so late and the atmosphere so tense that we did not take the two remaining items of the programme.

Ismet and Riza Nour showed signs of being much rattled by the turn of events, but it did not make them any less uncompromising as regards the principle questions discussed. Hassan maintained a detached attitude and confined himself to sotto voce comments on what passed. I will telegraph tomorrow[14] a considered opinion on the general effect of the discussion on the work of the conference and its bearing on our future procedure.

[14] See No. 634, below.

No. 633

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 363 Telegraphic [E 6534/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *June 24, 1923, 11.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 95 to Lausanne.[1]

Following is appreciation of general situation here. Please see my telegram No. 273.[2] Decline in Turkish fortunes indicated therein has been accentuated during past six weeks. Information from all sources is confirmatory of growing internal disunion amongst Turks, of increasing administrative disorganisation and of waning influence of Mustapha Kemal, at any rate amongst civilian population.

As I have reported in my despatches nationalist administration in Constantinople is the subject here of daily criticism in the press. Publication in defamatory nationalist paper a few days ago of open and partly censored letter from renegade circassian Edhem[3] describing nationalist sovereignty as

[1] No. 627. [2] No. 502. [3] See Vol. XVII, No. 23, n. 6.

despotic, attacking Turkish army and praising committee of union and progress is in itself significant.

Experience in Constantinople shows that elections are a (?farce) and are recognised as such by Turks themselves. None but Defence of Rights party have been elected for the simple reason that there is no liberty of vote. Extraordinary precautions taken in this respect, regulation forbidding officers below rank of colonel to vote and fact that no progress with elections, even secondary in Eastern Vilayets, has been reported indicate that Kemalists feel insecure both as regards people in general, army in particular and eastern provinces most of all. Such at least is the conclusion which I draw and which is borne out by general information. Façade of national unity remains at Angora and is still defiant. I would view, however, its collapse from within without surprise though everything in this respect depends on loyalty of army. Many Turks regard a dictator with dislike and apprehension and prefer a Sultan. All, with the possible exception of the military party, ardently desire peace.

Real weakness of Turkish position would seem to be demonstrated by outcome of our action in seizing guns on 'Umid'.[4] Though a week has elapsed no protest has yet been made. As on the last day of the Mudania negotiations, as at Smyrna in February and as with Greeks at the beginning of this month Turks have yielded to force or fear of it. In my opinion they are incapable here of active resistance to force. If attempted, it could be broken without difficulty.

From information in our possession it is clear that in the opinion of local Turkish commanders successful opposition to allies on the European side of the Straits is excluded. Transfer of Refet's troops to Anatolia is capable of various interpretations such as (1) to conceal traces of violation of Mudania convention and to remove troops which so long as they remain on this side of the Bosphoros, they now regard merely as hostages to fortune and (2) reorganisation of army in Asia Minor with a view to resistance there in the event of rupture. I regard first as the subsidiary and second as more probable reason.

Danger in fact which I foresee is risk of Angora preferring to withdraw into Anatolia rather than sign a peace which they regard as compromising principle of financial and economic independence. Turkish view possibly is that while allies are capable of effectual occupation of Constantinople they would not be prepared to follow Turks into Anatolia. So long as they do not anticipate active measures against them in Anatolia I incline to believe that they would be prepared to face rupture rather than agree to sterling payments for coupons.

It is for the allies to decide whether they can afford to face this risk in their belief that Turks would yield to allies' last word if it were made clear to them that refusal would mean, instead of early evacuation, indefinite prolongation of reinforced occupation of Constantinople and restoration in all respects of status quo ante Mudania convention. If they did not, it is

[4] See No. 630, n. 2.

the opinion of General Harington that allied forces would have no great difficulty in reverting to that status quo. In that case Kemalists would in addition to running risk of losing all that they have hitherto gained be exposed to grave danger of ruining personal position as result of internal troubles.

For military appreciation of the situation please see General Harington's telegram No. 4113 to War Office which is being repeated to Lausanne.[5]

Sent to Lausanne No. 184.

[5] Of June 24. This ran: 'Owing to demobilisation Turkish military situation in Eastern Thrace and Constantinople has been getting steadily weaker. Units from Thrace are being used to fill up others in Anatolia. Information shows Turks are anxious as to what action will be taken by us here if a rupture occurs. They know their organisations in Constantinople and Thrace have met with no success, and their intention, I think, is to get their soldiers back to Anatolia for fear of being held as hostages here in case of trouble occurring. They have not said a word yet regarding our recent coup of guns and it is evident they are disturbed over this affair.

'My object is to show that every move is observed by us as we are aware they are anxious we should not know. They are undoubtedly afraid that martial law may be proclaimed, and effective control resumed by us. I do not regard Turkish military value as more than 50% value of 5 months ago. If there is a rupture or refusal of time limit, we are, I think, strong enough now, if we act firmly, to assume effective control and cancel authority of Adnan, Refet and Salaheddin. The Ismid Peninsula is my only anxiety. Turk might retaliate, on my seizure of Constantinople, against my three battalions covering Scutari. It may well be that with aeroplanes and naval guns support we could stop him but, as I cannot reinforce them, I do not want to get these three battalions embroiled. I should have to give up Scutari side, but the harbour becomes untenable for fleet if Turks get guns above Scutari, though, no doubt, ships would stand off in Marmora outside of range.

'To hold Scutari I should want considerable reinforcements and I understand these are not available. Two points would require clearing up. Firstly, Moudania convention should end from expiration of ultimatum so that I could wire, entrench and reinforce Chanak and Ismid if I wished to do so. Secondly, Italian Government and French Government should agree that I can use their troops as and where I like. We cannot risk repetition of last September. If Turks attack us French and Italians should reinforce up to our strength. On expiration of time limit, battalions on Maritza should return. It is essential earliest information is sent me of line of action, so that, in order to cover Scutari from European side, I can bring some six inch howitzer batteries from Dardanelles, and also if ultimatum is given I must take extra precautions from that day to avoid being forestalled. Personally, I think if we act firmly and quickly, we are strong enough to enforce any policy decided upon. I think Turk would give in if faced with it. He has given way every time we have held pistol to his head. Morale of his Army is declining.'

No. 634

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 25, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 221 Telegraphic [E 6548/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 25, 1923, 3.10 a.m.*

My telegram No. 220[1] sent by bag last night[2] gives account of meeting between British, French and Italian delegates yesterday afternoon.

[1] No. 632. [2] June 23.

Discussion showed that Ismet realises that allies have lost patience and that time has come to clear away secondary questions including some which he has been keeping up his sleeve for final bargaining.

On the other hand he is determined to connect questions of debt, evacuation and concessions which he expressly puts in that order. His idea is (1) to extract settlement of debt question on basis of explicit or disguised proviso for payment of interest in francs and (2) to get firm official assurance of evacuation immediately after Turkish ratification and by these two victories to justify whole of his conduct of negotiations up to date. He perhaps hopes that having brought matters to this point he may induce Angora to give us some measure of satisfaction regarding concessions but he dare not say so as his instructions so far are to refuse any such satisfaction.

This leaves us still in difficult position. Impression which I derived from yesterday's meeting with Ismet was that it would be dangerous to leave concessions question for settlement after settlement of debt question. In my view Turks would be encouraged to be intransigent about concessions question by a settlement of debt question which would presumably be more or less in their favour and we should proceed from one deadlock to another.

We repeatedly made it clear to the Turks that whilst, if they were reasonable about debt and concessions questions, they could be assured that we should be reasonable on question of evacuation, we absolutely declined to discuss evacuation question until all the other outstanding questions had been settled in a satisfactory manner. Although the Turks were visibly disturbed by this statement I am convinced that evacuation question is not a sufficient lever in itself to bring about a satisfactory settlement of either debt or concessions questions and still less of both of those questions taken together.

Attitude of Turks towards concessions question was clearly stated by Riza Nur in following words 'at present moment our instructions are not to include concessions question in treaty. If we get satisfaction on question of debt and evacuation we shall perhaps modify our point of view but not before'. It would be most unwise to rely on this vague assurance but Riza Nur's statement shows that Turks connect all three questions in manner indicated above. It seems to follow that we ought to settle debt and concessions questions simultaneously either by means of a bargain or else present Turks with definite texts on both of these questions for acceptance by them within a time limit accompanied by a declaration that if they accept texts evacuation question will be dealt with in a manner satisfactory to Turks.

I am somewhat less disinclined than I was some days ago towards second of these alternatives but we should still have to reckon with definite risk of ultimatum being rejected which would entail rupture of conference followed either by fresh period of prolonged uncertainty or by hostilities. It would be worse than useless to resort to ultimatum unless we were prepared to face these consequences.

First alternative would require preliminary understanding with French

more or less in favour of proposals set out in paragraph three of my telegram No. 212.[3] We should then have to embark on fresh series of conversations with Turks starting with statement that we were prepared to make fresh endeavour to find solution for debt question provided that they on their side were prepared to deal with concessions question as part of treaty settlement and to discuss simultaneously with debt question principles governing concession to be incorporated therein. This alternative is in many ways unsatisfactory but it has at least advantage that it would postpone and perhaps avert rupture.

I do not think consideration of these alternatives should be delayed. I therefore indicate them at once though I may be able to express more definite views as to which should be preferred or whether any other course is open when I have seen how Ismet reacts to demonstration of yesterday afternoon and when General Pellé has received further instructions which will doubtless be sent him from Paris.

We hope to dispose of lesser outstanding questions in two committees sitting to-morrow and Tuesday thus leaving practically nothing but articles dealing with evacuation, debt and concessions questions for settlement.

[3] No. 624.

No. 635

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 223 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6666/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 26, 1923*

The first committee met this morning[1] to clear off as much as possible of the outstanding business. We took all the subjects enumerated in the first of the two lists enclosed in my despatch No. 191 of the 23rd instant,[2] except article 1, Evacuation, and article 27. The proposed addition of the latter to take the place of article 117 (see my despatch No. 146 of June 9th)[2] presents some difficulty from the point of view of the French and Italians, but I hope it will be disposed of at the next meeting of the third committee.

The results obtained this morning were as follows.

Article 2 and additional article to the Thracian Frontiers Convention. The recommendations of the sub-committee[3] (see my despatch No. 114 of May 31st)[2] were adopted generally. At the request of the Turkish delegation, I made a statement to the effect that the words 'cours de la Maritza' meant the principal channel of the river in accordance with the general principle laid down in article 6. Monsieur Veniselos asked Ismet Pasha to consider two proposals, firstly that the delivery of the Karagatch territory to be restored to Turkey should be effected as soon as the delimitation commission had

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 144–50.
[2] Not printed.
[3] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 151–2.

established the new Turco-Greek frontier, and that the commission should finish its task within two months after the ratification of the treaty; secondly, that the population of the Karagatch area should be excluded from the exchange of populations, but that such of the inhabitants as might wish to emigrate should have the benefit of the exchange of populations convention, provided they expressed their desire to leave within six months. Ismet Pasha promised to consider these proposals without committing himself in any way to acceptance.

The Bulgarian delegate[4] read a declaration[5] expressing readiness to sign the Thracian Frontiers Convention, but taking exception to the proposed additional article dealing with transit on the ground that this article affected incidentally the question of Bulgarian access to the sea, regarding which Bulgaria still hopes to receive satisfaction of a real kind. I expressed regret that the Bulgarian delegation, which in the sub-committee accepted the article subject to a reservation of Bulgaria's general point of view regarding access to the sea, should have gone back on this. [Monsieur Morphov] insisted on his refusal to accept the article, explaining that any advantage which it secured was already assured by the convention of Barcelona[6] and that the article relative to transit found no proper place in the Thracian Frontiers Convention, which dealt with demilitarisation. He suggested that the transit article should be placed elsewhere without any mention of Bulgaria. It was agreed that the drafting committee should seek a suitable place for the article in the main treaty, and should redraft it so as to omit any mention of Bulgaria.

Articles 3 (1) and 16. Syrian Frontier and Angora Agreement.

General Pellé announced that the Turkish delegation had agreed to drop its demand for confirmation of the Angora agreement in the treaty of peace on the understanding that the French delegation would furnish a declaration and covering letter confirming the validity of the agreement. Ismet Pasha having concurred, it was agreed that the Syrian frontier should be defined as in the original allied text. General Pellé said that, in order to remove Turkish anxiety lest the deletion of paragraph 2 of the Turkish counter-draft of article 16 should appear to prejudice the stipulations of the Angora agreement[7] regarding Antioch and Alexandretta, the French delegation proposed to replace that paragraph by another in the following terms: 'Les dispositions du présent article ne portent pas atteinte aux stipulations particulières intervenues ou à intervenir entre le Turquie et les pays limitrophes en raison de leur voisinage.' This was agreed.

Article 3 (2). Iraq Frontier.

I announced that some time ago Ismet Pasha had agreed in private discussion to a formula proposed by me regarding the Iraq frontier subject to further consideration of the period for negotiation between Great Britain and

[4] M. Morphov.
[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 145.
[6] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 116, pp. 517–43.
[7] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

Turkey. I understood that he was now willing to fix this period at nine months, to which I also was prepared to agree. The formula thus completed was circulated and adopted. My despatch No. 204 of June 26th contains the text.[8]

Article 152. Blanket Clause.

The Turkish delegation having withdrawn its objection to the words 'ou d'accord avec', the text proposed by the drafting committee in their report of June 1st[9] (see my despatch No. 125 of June 4th)[8] was adopted.

Article 156. Arms Traffic Convention.

I stated that the Inviting Powers were willing to drop this article, but hoped that Turkey would nevertheless collaborate with other powers in their endeavours to prevent illicit traffic in arms. Ismet Pasha assured us that Turkey would not fail to take her share in such endeavours, a statement which was noted in the minutes.

Article 157. Prize Court Decisions.

The two articles prepared by the drafting committee[10] (see my despatch No. 145 of June 9th)[8] to replace the original article were adopted with the exception of the last paragraph of the new article 157. Ismet Pasha had before the meeting expressed a wish to reserve the question of Turkish and Greek ships for discussion with Monsieur Veniselos, who agreed to this course. In order to make it clear that the second paragraph of article 157 protected the British owners of two small steamers and other smaller craft seized by the Turks during the war and restored after the armistice of 1918, I read a declaration for insertion in the minutes explaining that I understood this to be the intention of the article. Ismet Pasha assented to this declaration, which had been shown to the Turks before the meeting.

Article 159. Accession of Belgium, etc.

I reminded Ismet Pasha of numerous previous discussions and private conversations in the last of which he had agreed to reconsider this question. He stated that the Turkish delegation would not object in principle to the accession of Belgium and Portugal to certain financial and economic clauses of the treaty, subject to the provision for this being made when the full text of the financial and economic clauses was known. My colleagues and I, supported by the Japanese delegate, expressed regret that the Turks did not see their way to making a similar concession regarding Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was agreed that the drafting committee should prepare suitable texts covering the case of Belgium and Portugal on the lines indicated by Ismet Pasha. I pointed out that these would naturally include a provision for the re-establishment of a state of peace between Turkey and Portugal.

[8] Not printed. [9] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 138. [10] Ibid., p. 154.

Établissement Convention. Original Article 25. Accession clause.

Ismet Pasha stated that Turkey would be prepared to negotiate corresponding conventions with Belgium and Portugal as far as possible on the same principles as those embodied in the convention with the allies. General Pellé said that whatever objections the Turks might have to including Poland and Czechoslovakia in the provisions to take the place of article 159, he could not understand why they should object to extending their statement regarding the Établissement Convention to these two powers, who had fought by the side of the allies during the war and whose future relations with Turkey might reasonably be established on the same lines as those laid down in the convention with the allies. He did not press the claim of Poland, which had already entered on separate negotiations with the Turks, but he urged very strongly that of Czechoslovakia. His appeal was supported by myself and Monsieur Montagna, as well as by the Serbian, Roumanian and Japanese delegations. After a certain amount of fencing we extracted a statement from Ismet Pasha that, in negotiating the Établissement Convention with Czechoslovakia, Turkey would be guided as far as possible by the same principles as had served for the convention with the allies. General Pellé pointed out that this amounted to the same as what Ismet Pasha had already said regarding Belgium and Portugal. Ismet agreed that this was so.

No. 636

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 26, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 225 Telegraphic [E 6642/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 26, 1923, 7.20 p.m.*

Ismet came to see me to-day.

He asked when Allies would be prepared to settle debt question. I replied that I had reported to you what had passed at meeting between allied delegates and Ismet on June 23rd[1] and that I was awaiting expression of your views as to procedure to be followed with regard to debt and concessions questions. I said my French colleague was also awaiting instructions from his government and I held out a hope that we might be in a position to meet Ismet tomorrow afternoon. If I were in a position to inform you that Ismet had undertaken to sign a protocol embodying certain principles of a general character for application in the case of concessionary companies who had not been able to reach an understanding with Turkish government I thought a better atmosphere would be created. I insisted that in any event debt and concessions questions must be settled simultaneously.

Ismet gave me a positive undertaking that if we reached a solution on debt question he would settle concessions question in a manner satisfactory

[1] See No. 632.

to us. I do not propose however to be put off by assurances of future satisfactory action by Turkish delegation with regard to concessions question. It is clear that Ismet was much shaken by meeting on Saturday last.[2]

French delegate sent one of his experts to Paris two days ago to discuss debt question with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance. The expert returned to-day and French delegate informed me confidentially that French Ministry of Finance would prefer omission of any declaration regarding debt to a bad formula which might compromise bondholders. French delegate is expecting his instructions tomorrow morning and I hope we shall be able to meet Ismet in the afternoon.

[2] June 23.

No. 637

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 28, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 226 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6667/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 26, 1923*

A brief meeting of the financial committee was held yesterday[1] to confirm agreement reached among the experts on minor points.

Certain changes proposed in articles 48, 49 and 52 (regarding payment of debt arrears by Italy in case of the Dodecanese), a drafting change in article 49, and the text of articles 49 bis (Advances), 56 bis (Periods of Prescription for Coupons), 57 (Reparation) and 67 (German claims on Turkey) were adopted as set forth in the third report of the financial experts dated 12th June[2] and a postscriptum to it,[3] of which copies were enclosed in my despatches Nos. 161[4] and 197[4] of June 14th and June 26th.[4]

It was agreed to suppress article 50 and annex II of section I of the financial clauses (Railway Loans). Monsieur Veniselos agreed to this, but took the occasion to declare that, if Turkey paid her coupons in francs, it would be right and proper to allow Greece to pay the service of her share of the Ottoman debt in the same currency, to which General Pellé replied that, in the case of Greece as in the case of Turkey, this was a question which was for the bondholders and not for the peace conference, to deal with.

On the financial clauses, apart from the coupon question, the only outstanding articles of importance are 58 (Greco-Turk Reparation), 65 (Civil List) and 70 (Financial Operations of Constantinople Government). The financial experts have agreed on article 65. We are prepared to suppress article 70 if the Turkish government gives the necessary assurances to the debt council: a letter has been drafted by the financial experts tonight[5] and will be

[1] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 241–44. [2] Ibid., pp. 245–9. [3] Ibid., p. 250.
[4] Not printed.
[5] See No. 639, below. This letter is printed in *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 257–8.

referred to Angora. On article 58 the only question outstanding is whether the waiver of reparation is to cover requisitions also, on which Monsieur Veniselos seems confident that Ismet Pasha will give way.

Thus the financial clauses are practically finished, except for the coupon question.

No. 638

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 99 Telegraphic [E 6642/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *June 28, 1923, 3.30 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 225[1] (of June 26th. Debt and Concessions).

I see you are awaiting an expression of my views as to procedure; I was not proposing to take any decision until I received the more definite views on the alternatives of a bargain or an ultimatum promised in penultimate paragraph of your telegram No. 221 (of June 25th).[2]

Secret information indicates that Angora is not disposed to abandon insistence on prior settlement of Coupons and evacuation questions and there is nothing to show that Ismet is authorised to give you the positive undertaking mentioned in your telegram under reference.

It seems to me that everything now depends on French decision on Coupons question. If they maintain insistence on their own formula[3] we shall have to consider some form of ultimatum combining it with our text of the Concessions guarantees. If, as seems possible from last paragraph of your telegram, they decide to give way and to agree to omit any declaration, a combined bargain on the two questions can probably be secured. In either case we must insist on complete satisfaction on Concessions prior to, or concurrently with, settlement of Debt question.

But before taking a definite decision or approaching allied governments I shall await your further views and especially information as to decision of French government regarding Coupons question.

[1] No. 636. [2] No. 634. [3] See No. 625, n. 4.

No. 639

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 28, 8.30 p.m.)
No. 232 Telegraphic [E 6720/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 28, 1923, 6.10 p.m.*

General Pellé communicated this morning to myself and Signor Montagna a telegram from his government summarising a note from His Majesty's

Ambassador Paris dated June 25th[1] on lines of instructions conveyed to me in your telegram No. 95.[2]

General Pellé then communicated to us a further telegram containing instructions of his government to himself.

French government is not prepared to agree to any change in formula contained in your telegram No. 91[3] except trivial alteration omitting words 'qui pourront être' in last sentence. French government is prepared to sign treaty with above formula as regards debt protocol and declaration about concessions and evacuation on ratification by Angora. Alternatively French government would sign treaty with no declaration about debt and no provisions about concessions if occupation is continued in a rigorous form until bondholders and concessionaires make satisfactory arrangements with Turkish government.

I told General Pellé that I should feel bound to inform you that I regarded it as certain that former alternative would be rejected by Turks and that second would almost certainly be rejected and would if accepted involve great political difficulties and would I imagined make it necessary for us to ask French and Italian governments to send reinforcements to Constantinople.

I added that in my opinion it would be undesirable to present a formula which we knew would categorically be rejected and subsequently to give way in face of such a rejection. Better plan would be to present proposal which Turks might reasonably be expected to accept and rejection of which would fully justify a rupture to public opinion.

I therefore said that I should recommend to you as our final word on three outstanding questions which would be presented as a single whole following proposals.

1. Debt. Turkey to choose between two alternatives (a) Paris formula[4] incorporated in declaration or (b) no declaration at all but a letter from the allies that we in no way give up our right to protect legitimate interests of bondholders who are our nationals.

2. Concessions. Protocol and declaration already communicated to Turkish delegation. I am sending by bag[5] tonight latest text of these.

3. Evacuation. On ratification by Angora to be completed in six weeks.

Signor Montagna said that his opinion coincided with mine and that he would telegraph in above sense to his government. General Pellé took note of our views and promised to communicate them to his government.

As regards procedure Signor Montagna and I felt strongly (and General Pellé personally assented) that as agreement exists on all questions of any importance except debt and concessions it would be very undesirable to present whole draft treaty to Ismet for his acceptance or rejection and that right course would be to limit our démarche to these two questions to be linked up with offer to evacuate on ratification by Angora. We also agreed that our démarche should be made verbally in the first instance so as to

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 627.
[3] Of June 18, not printed. See, however, No. 621, last paragraph and No. 620, n. 3.
[4] See No. 625, n. 4. [5] Lausanne despatch No. 214 of June 28, not printed.

make minor adjustments possible and to avoid unnecessary rigidity in our demands. If Ismet rejected these proposals when made verbally we should put them into writing in form of a mise-en-demeure and we should desire to know beforehand if our governments would be prepared to face a rupture if we failed to obtain satisfaction.

No. 640

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 233 Telegraphic [E 6731/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 28, 1923, 8.10 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Situation here is becoming more embarrassing every day. Our one chance of escaping from fresh deadlock is in speedy agreement between allied governments as to course of action to be pursued.

All three delegates are agreed that rupture is inevitable if Allies insist on Paris formula regarding debt; nor do we feel any other formula at all acceptable to us would now have better chance of acceptance by Turks. Practical alternative therefore is that we should waive any declaration to bondholders but reserve right to protect allied interests involved should bondholders and Turkish government fail to reach agreement.

This latter alternative assumes very different form for French and for us. Former would like to make reservation of right to protect rights of allied bondholders effective by delaying evacuation and if necessary tightening up occupation until agreement between bondholders and Turkish government has been reached. Italian delegate and I regard it merely as reservation which would afford reply to criticisms that we have surrendered rights of bondholders and would entitle one or more allied Power to intervene at any future convenient time should attitude of Turks towards bondholders prove unreasonable but in the meantime peace would be signed, evacuation would follow on Turkish ratification, and Allies would ratify treaty in the normal course of events.

Procedure which French wish to pursue if we should abandon declaration to bondholders would be almost as likely to lead to rupture as would insistence on Paris formula as nothing short of firm prospect of early evacuation will reconcile Turks to our proposals regarding concessions which are third factor in problem. It must be remembered that Ismet is encountering determined opposition at Angora to any weakening on concession question even if Turks get favourable terms regarding debt and evacuation.

Choice of His Majesty's Government therefore lies between following French in one of two courses either of which will probably lead to rupture,

[1] No. 639.

or French to agree that, even if we abandon declaration to bondholders, Turks shall be promised evacuation on ratification of treaty by Angora provided we get satisfaction regarding concessions.

Disadvantage of first alternative is that if rupture results we must be prepared for prolonged period of uncertainty and possible hostilities and we should almost certainly have to make our occupation of Constantinople and Chanak much more effective than it is at present both in order to impress Turks and to secure the safety of our forces. This would make it necessary for us to ask French and Italians to share burden of occupation more equally with us. French could hardly refuse to do this but Italian delegate made it clear this morning that his government would contribute nothing to measures necessary to make occupation more stringent. I earnestly trust that it may be found possible for the two governments to decide on a common policy and give us identic instructions at the earliest possible moment.

No. 641

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 234 Telegraphic [E 6728/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 29, 1923, 12.20 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 99[1] reached me after I had drafted my telegrams Nos. 232[2] and 233[3] which will I trust give you complete view of situation as it now stands. Alternatives indicated in ant[e] penultimate paragraph of latter differ somewhat in form from those described in my telegram No. 221[4] but are substantially similar. If we follow French we shall gain time by preliminary verbal démarche but we shall almost certainly encounter Turkish refusal and have to fall back on ultimatum. If we bring French round to more moderate view proposed verbal démarche will in effect constitute offer to Turks of bargain which there is some chance of Ismet accepting though it is quite true attitude of Angora may make it impossible to do this.

Position is that he and his delegation were greatly impressed by allied onslaught of June 23rd[5] but his chiefs at Angora have not yet reacted to it and he may be unable to overcome their obstinacy.

We are now fixed as to French views on coupon question. French government are unlikely to modify them unless His Majesty's Government strongly urge them to do so. My personal view is that we should so urge them as [*sic*] if we are to get reasonable measure of satisfaction on concessions question. British interest in debt question does not seem to me great enough to justify rupture with its possible consequences and doubtful eventual gain to bondholders or anyone else.

[1] No. 638. [2] No. 639. [3] No. 640. [4] No. 634.
[5] See No. 632.

No. 642

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 29, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 236 Telegraphic [E 6729/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 29, 1923, 1.40 a.m.*

My telegram No. 225.[1]

Ismet came tonight[2] and enquired when allies would be prepared to discuss debt question.

I informed him that he had only his government to thank for delay in settlement of debt and concession questions. I reminded him that allies had originally inserted an article in peace treaty recognising decree of Muharrem[3] etc. They were now willing to accept a declaration, last part of which foreshadowed negotiations between Turkish government and bondholders, necessitated by financial situation of Turkey. Allies had therefore gone a very long way to meet Turkish point of view but Turkish government remained intransigent both on debt and concessions questions thereby creating a very difficult situation which required careful consideration of allied governments. Delay was entirely due to Turkish government. I did not blame him so much as I did his government.

Ismet of course protested against this but I said that situation was as I had described it. I impressed on him that debt and concession questions were linked together and that we must insist on solution of both. I asked him whether if a solution were found for debt question he was empowered to settle concession question here. He replied categorically in the affirmative.

[1] No. 636. [2] June 28. [3] See No. 490, n. 3.

No. 643

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 30, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 239 Telegraphic [E 6790/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *June 30, 1923, 6.50 p.m.*

My telegram No. 235.[1]

Objection to opening Greco-Turkish negotiations at this stage is to my mind as great as ever. They could only stiffen Turkish attitude towards

[1] Of June 29. This ran: 'Messieurs Veniselos and Alexandris came together to see me today [June 28]. They said that a fortnight had now elapsed since they had received note from allied delegates foreshadowing end of peace negotiations. No solution however had been reached and they could not contemplate with equanimity a prolongation of present state of things. The continued mobilisation of Greek army was costing Greece seven million drachmas a day and country was being ruined in consequence. In these circumstances they

Great Britain, France and Italy and would probably be regarded by Turks as precursor of similar separate negotiations with Roumania and Serbia. Responsibility of our continuing to discourage them however is increasing.

It occurs to me that possibly we might now represent matter to M. Veniselos as follows:

Two alternatives face us—signature of peace or breaking up of conference. In latter case allies intend to continue to occupy Constantinople and Straits. They may have to strengthen their position there and for that purpose might have to regard Mudania convention[2] as lapsed and might have to carry on on the basis of Mudros armistice unless necessary measures could be taken without contravening former convention.

It by no means necessarily follows that Turks will themselves commence hostilities, at any rate at first, and if they do it will be almost certainly against the three allies either in the direction of the Straits from Anatolia or in the direction of Syria and Irak. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have every reason to believe that Turkish military organisation in Eastern Thrace has failed and the case of 'Umid'[3] shows that they are actually sending back men and guns from Thrace to Anatolia.

In these circumstances, even in the event of rupture of the conference, there seems to be no Turkish danger to Greece in Western Thrace, all the more so as the conference will have broken on questions interesting primarily the principal allied powers. On the other hand in practice and however justifiable Greek action may be in theory opening of preliminary negotiations by Greece with Turkey at this stage owing to its effect on Turks vis-à-vis other allies can only prove a dis-service to allied cause as a whole.

Whatever be the rights and wrongs of Greece's case she must admit that ever since collapse in Asia Minor allied action at Straits and help in her negotiations here are bringing her better terms from Turkey than she could then have hoped for. His Majesty's Government are therefore anxious to avoid separate negotiations if only practical inconveniences to Greece of further delay can be overcome. Would not this be effected if Greece demobilised, at any rate a part of her army in Western Thrace, at once and without waiting for signature of peace, and would not the above examination of present position and future contingencies justify such action? To my mind

felt obliged to return to the charge and meant to ask allied delegates to lend their good offices with a view to conclusion of preliminaries of peace between Greece and Turkey.

'Monsieur Veniselos explained that he made this request out of loyalty in particular to His Majesty's Government but that he did not consider himself under any obligation to Italians who had been avowed enemies of Greeks, or to French whose conduct during last two years had not been that of allies.

'I told Monsieur Veniselos that I quite sympathised with his point of view though I thought it was asking too much of allies to lend their good offices for above-mentioned purpose. Monsieur Veniselos then explained all he wanted to know was whether His Majesty's Government would wish to persuade him from concluding preliminaries of peace with Turkey. I said that I did not think my government would wish to take any responsibility in the matter one way or the other.'

[2] See No. 119.

[3] See No. 630, n. 2.

effect on Turkey of partial demobilisation in Western Thrace would be less disadvantageous from allied point of view than opening of Greco-Turkish negotiations.

M. Veniselos might not think such advice from His Majesty's Government sufficient to convince his government nor am I aware whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to take responsibility of giving it but it might be useful in any case for me to talk the matter over here with M. Veniselos on these lines.

M. Veniselos told a member of my staff today that he was sending no communication to the three allied delegations here on this subject at any rate before July 2nd in the hope that I should have received your views before then.[4]

Repeated to Athens.

[4] In his telegram No. 105 of July 3 (repeated to Athens as No. 113) Lord Curzon instructed Sir H. Rumbold as follows: 'Your reply to M. Veniselos should be to the effect that we greatly appreciate his past and present action in this matter, that we fully understand his position and that of his government, and that in the circumstances we can only leave the decision and the responsibility to them.

'It would however be most useful if you could defer this reply to the last possible moment. I am not prepared to advise M. Veniselos in the sense of your telegram No. 239, but you might perhaps speak to him in that sense confidentially and personally on your own initiative.'

No. 644

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received June 30, 10.30 p.m.)
No. 240 Telegraphic [E 6791/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *June 30, 1923, 8.20 p.m.*

French delegate has just communicated to me two telegrams from his government of which following is substance:

First telegram reports a conversation between you and French Ambassador yesterday morning[1] in the course of which you recognised advantage of procedure which French propose to follow in connection with outstanding questions. You expressed view that allies should form a block of all questions at present outstanding and should afford each other mutual assistance in solving them. You did not object to French formula regarding debt question but you added before sending me definite instructions you wished to consider my latest telegrams.

[1] In his telegram No. 106 of July 3, Lord Curzon informed Sir H. Rumbold: 'The French Ambassador has given a quite incorrect account of what passed. He produced a formula about the coupons which I did not even read, but begged leave to examine. He asked me on the strength of this to agree to a Franco-Anglo-Italian ultimatum. I said that I was certainly in favour of grouping the three outstanding questions and procuring a united front. But I was in communication with you and was still hopeful than an ultimatum might be avoided; and until I heard from Lausanne I could enter into no undertaking.' Cf. No. 652 below.

Second telegram stated that Monsieur Poincaré accepts proposal that note to be addressed to Turks should only deal with debt concessions and evacuation questions. He also consents to a verbal discussion with Turks in the first instance on basis of proposed note reserving if necessary a written note for a M[ise] E[n] D[emeure]. Monsieur Poincaré comments on attitude of Italian delegate and myself in the sense that he does not consider difference between our views and those of General Pellé was warranted by the attitude or instructions of British and Italian governments. As regards alternatives suggested for settlement of debt question French President of the Council considers these alternative suggestions cannot be considered of equal value as only the first, i.e. French formula,[2] gives French satisfaction. But he authorises present second alternative, i.e. absence of all declaration regarding decree of Muharram[3] on condition:

1. That allies reserve all rights under decree of Muharram, its annexations and loan contracts and
2. That evacuation shall only take place in (?six) weeks if an agreement has in the meantime been reached between bondholders and Turkish government.

This latter condition in reality amounts to laying down that settlement between bondholders and Turkish government must be reached between signature of treaty and its ratification by Turkish government.

[2] See No. 625, n. 4. [3] See No. 490, n. 3.

No. 645

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess Crewe (Paris)
No. 281 Telegraphic [E 6729/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 2, 1923, 3.40 p.m.*

The position which has now been reached in the negotiations at Lausanne is shown in Sir H. Rumbold's telegrams Nos. 232, 233, 234[1] which Your Excellency has received by bag. The moment appears therefore to have come when a final decision must be taken by the allies as to the demands which it is necessary to put forward to the Turks on the questions of (1) the debt coupons, (2) concessions.

On the attitude which it is decided to take up on these points will depend also the decision as to evacuation. The alternative French proposals to meet the situation are as follows:

(A) Signature of a treaty containing French formula[2] on the coupons question, and agreed allied text covering the concessions question and protocol providing for evacuation in accordance with Turkish desires; or,

(B) Failing Turkish acceptance of this, signature of a treaty omitting provisions covering the coupons and concessions question, and maintenance

[1] Nos. 639, 640, and 641, respectively.
[2] See No. 615, No. 620, n. 3 and No. 625, n. 4.

of allied occupation until the bondholders and concessionaires shall have reached satisfactory agreement with the Turkish government.

The first of these alternatives represents what His Majesty's Government for their part agree would be an ideal solution. The second is open to the objection that the allies will be committed to a continuance of the occupation of Constantinople and neighbourhood with the inconveniences and risks which would be inevitably connected therewith.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the force of the views strongly held by Sir H. Rumbold as set forth in his telegrams Nos. 232 and 233 that the French terms will certainly be rejected and having regard to the effect which the indefinite continuation of the occupation would entail on public opinion in all countries, they feel impelled to invite the careful examination by the French government of the alternative scheme submitted by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 232 under the headings numbered 1, 2 and 3. Your Excellency should when discussing the matter with M. Poincaré enquire whether notwithstanding the consideration urged by Sir H. Rumbold the French government propose to adhere to their own proposals, and if so whether they have weighed all the consequences which may arise and whether in particular they would be prepared to send reinforcements which in the opinion of the delegates at Lausanne may become a necessity.

Repeated to Rome No. 195,[3] Constantinople No. 208 and Lausanne No. 102.

[3] In his immediately following telegram to Rome (No. 196 of July 2) Lord Curzon, having pointed out that the Italian delegate at Lausanne seemed to be in general agreement with Sir H. Rumbold, went on to instruct Sir R. Graham as follows: 'In these circumstances it appears only necessary that Your Excellency should when communicating to the Italian government the substance of my telegram No. 281 to Lord Crewe merely add that I assume that the Italian government share these views and will inform the French government accordingly.'

No. 646

Mr. Bentinck (Athens) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 3, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 257 Telegraphic [E 6876/6/44]

ATHENS, *July 2, 1923, 10 p.m.*

Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 111, Lausanne telegram No. 239.[1]

Situation here remains as described in my telegram No. 241[2] except that press is more open in scoffing at way 'great powers of the earth' present themselves as beggars before Greece—terrified by the idea of a separate peace. It is argued here, as I have already pointed out, that Turks would be so glad to get out of the way of the only army capable of taking the offensive against them that they would readily give Greece good terms to achieve this end.

[1] No. 643, which had been repeated to Athens.

[2] See No. 613, n. 3.

I venture to doubt whether Greek government would dare to assume responsibility for demobilisation without signing at least a preliminary peace[3] and it appears to me that we ourselves should incur grave responsibility in recommending them to do so. Experience of last year here shows that once demobilised it will be impossible to get men to return to the colours.

Whilst it is true that our action served Greece last autumn it seems to me difficult to contend that it has brought her any advantage during the last three or four months. On the contrary as far as my information goes we have for the third time within two years stood between Greece and Constantinople and thus prevented her from striking a blow at Turkey and perhaps settling whole question in a manner satisfactory to herself as well as to us without any cost to ourselves.

At present whether we acknowledge it or not we are using the menace of Greek army to secure our ends at Lausanne and of course presence of that army on Maritza must strengthen our position at Constantinople. Demobilisation must perforce weaken efficacy of that menace. According to press Greek Prime Minister stated yesterday that 'if coercive measures against Turkey are realized Greece will not participate'.

If after all that has passed—our failure to save Greece from collapse after she had placed herself in our (? hands); our failure to help solve refugee problem; our preventing Greek occupation of Constantinople and recovery of Eastern Thrace—we are now to come as suppliants to a government with which we have severed relations and, whilst offering them nothing in return, beg them not to make a separate peace, our position in this part of the world will be truly humiliating. If we *must* beg Greek government not to make separate peace would it not be somewhat less humiliating and cheaper in long run for us to offer to re-open abandoned credits and enable Greeks to keep army in field and maintain solid front with us?

Sent to Constantinople No. 135.

[3] On July 5 Mr. Bentinck telegraphed (No. 261) as follows: 'President of the Council is reported in press to have stated that Greece would certainly not demobilise before signature of at least a preliminary peace.'

No. 647

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 3, 8.30 a.m.)

Nos. 242 and 243 Telegraphic [*E 6860/1/44*]

Part 1. LAUSANNE, *July 3, 1923, 2.40 a.m.*

Signor Montagna this morning[1] informed General Pellé and myself that he had received instructions from Italian government that Italian delegation should not take any further part in drawing up draft agreement for distribution amongst allied nationals who have reparation claims against Turkey, of the five million pounds in gold and proceeds of £846,000 Turkish treasury

[1] July 2.

bills. Italian government consider that questions dealt with in this draft agreement should be discussed between governments and not by delegations here and state that they are about to communicate with His Majesty's Government and French government through Italian ambassadors in London and Paris. We received this announcement with considerable dismay as it appears to us essential that arrangements granting some measure of compensation to reparation claimants should be made simultaneously with treaty negotiations and should not be deferred to some indefinite future date. Also as a matter of practical convenience it seems essential to take advantage of presence of allied experts here to reach agreement on any points of difference that may arise between governments in regard to this question especially as Roumania, Serbia and Japan are interested as well as inviting powers. Italian delegation state that their government have given no reasons for their decision but it seems probable that they object to draft agreement,

(1) In view of their refusal to abandon pretension that His Majesty's Government should contribute £5,000,000 to Turkish reparation fund, and

(2) Because they fear claims of concessionary companies (none of which are Italian) will swamp fund to the prejudice of claims by individuals.[2]

Part 2.

To meet first point we might agree that article one of convention should refer to (1) sum of £5,000,000 in gold and (2) any other sum which may be available so as to enable £5,000,000 in gold to be distributed without waiting until Italian government has abandoned its pretensions in regard to payment of a further £5,000,000 sterling by His Majesty's Government. We should of course withhold Turkish treasury bills until this pretension had been given up. As regards second point it seems essential to settle at once whether and to what extent concessionary companies are to share in fund, and agreement can be reached here between allied experts acting on instructions of their governments more easily than by diplomatic correspondence. In this connection see my telegram No. 199.[3] General Pellé is telegraphing in a similar sense to his government.

Copies of draft agreement drawn up on June 6th and of article 6 as redrafted on June 28th have been sent to Mr. Oliphant semi officially.[4] Copies of draft with further minor changes will be sent by bag tomorrow.[5]

Repeated to Rome No. 5.

[2] Referring to this telegram, Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 203 of July 5, instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please urge Italian government to authorise their representatives at Lausanne to continue to co-operate with their allied colleagues in negotiation of draft agreement on distribution of Turkish reparation fund. You should lay stress on necessity of early settlement and practical convenience afforded by presence of experts at Lausanne.'

[3] No. 618.

[4] By Mr. Waley, in his letters of June 14 and 28, not printed.

[5] Lausanne despatch No. 225 of July 3, not printed.

No. 648

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 3, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 244 Telegraphic [E 6862/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 3, 1923, 2.40 a.m.*

Following is summary of note addressed this afternoon[1] by Ismet to delegates of inviting powers through secretary general. Text was given by Turks to press immediately after despatch.

'Inviting powers when proposing settlement of Greek reparation question on May 26th[2] assured Turkey that she would enjoy same facilities regarding financial questions concerning her. Immediately after settlement of reparation question I proposed that essential outstanding questions notably the judicial declaration, evacuation, and coupons should be disposed of successively and without break, like reparation question, which had been settled before any of the others.

This procedure was accepted and followed at first. Agreement was thus reached regarding judicial declaration.

Evacuation and coupon questions have not however been settled. Allied delegations on their part have not continued to study them until solution should be found [*sic*]. Inviting powers have throughout deferred decision on these questions which are the principal obstacle to peace.

Turkish delegation has exerted every effort in this direction. It took as basis formula prepared by jurists[3] and proposed with the approval of allied plenipotentiaries. It went into precise . . .[4] elaborated by the same jurists and assented finally to reasonable formula resulting from combination of the two proposals made in collaboration with an allied financial expert. About two weeks have since elapsed.

At the meeting of June 23rd[5] evacuation and coupons were not discussed although they appeared on agenda circulated beforehand. In reply to repeated verbal representations made by me since then I have always been told that they would be proceeded with within one or two days.

I am still without any reply although four days have elapsed since my latest representation.

I have not ceased to add that I was ready to settle successively in one sitting questions of evacuation, coupons and concessions.

Turkish delegation, which has throughout exerted itself to avoid delay in conclusion of peace, requests conference to proceed with discussion of essential questions enumerated above successively at single meeting, more particularly question of coupons which constitutes principal obstacle to conclusion of peace.'

[1] July 2. A copy of this note was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 224 of July 2, not printed.

[2] See No. 564.

[3] See No. 611 and No. 617, n. 3.

[4] The text is here uncertain. The Note ran: '. . . Elle est entrée également sur le terrain des précisions élaborées par ces mêmes Légistes. . . .'

[5] See No. 632.

No. 649

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 3, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 245 Telegraphic [E 6863/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 3, 1923, 2.40 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Turkish note is a tissue of misrepresentations, seriousness of which is aggravated by its premature publication. Ismet came to see me just after I had received it. I protested vehemently against his action. I said that I had spared no effort to accelerate the settlement of outstanding questions and that it was intolerable that we should be accused of dilatoriness on the ground that we had not accepted, lying down, Turkish view of how they should be settled. Angora government showed clearly that they had no idea of compromise. He himself had transformed jurists' formula into something totally unacceptable. Even at earlier stage I had warned him that in discussing it I had got [*sic*] beyond instructions of His Majesty's Government and could not pledge them to it. It was not until a few days ago that he had told me that he could discuss concessions questions at all. As for evacuation I had always told him, and I now repeated, that while ready to discuss this at same sitting as the other two questions, it must come last in order. I said that his action in publishing note without previous reference to allied delegates was incorrect and would compel us to reply at once showing up its inaccuracies. My observations to him were of the most forcible description.

Ismet attempted to justify his action but his replies to my observations were of lamest description. He made grievance of fact that we are holding meetings of second and third committee tomorrow to dispose of as many as possible outstanding subsidiary questions. Only foundation for this grievance is that there has been accidental delay in giving notice of these meetings.

I will confer with my colleagues first thing tomorrow regarding reply to Turkish note.[2]

[1] No. 648.

[2] A copy of the reply of the Allied Delegates, dated July 3, was transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 227 of July 3, not printed.

No. 650

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 246 Telegraphic: by bag [E 6955/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 3, 1923*

My allied colleagues and I decided yesterday morning to hold a meeting today to clear off certain subsidiary outstanding points in the second and third committees. In conversation with my French colleague yesterday

Ismet hinted that he would be unable to agree to any of these points, while no progress was being made with the three major questions of coupons, concessions and evacuation. Judging, however, by the nervously accommodating attitude of Ismet and the rest of his delegation at the meeting this morning, he must have been shaken out of these intentions by the vigorous onslaught which I delivered on him yesterday (see my telegram No. 245 of July 2nd [*sic*])[1] and an equally powerful attack by my French colleague whom he saw after leaving me. Following is record of today's proceedings.

Second Committee.[2]

Articles 45, 48, 49 and 52.

Outstanding question here was that of providing in them for Greek responsibility for share of debt in area in Western Thrace ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey in 1915 and now ceded to Greece (see reports of experts of June 12th[3]—my despatch No. 161 of June 14th).[4]

This question was taken together with that of article 50 (Greco-Turk reparations: see above-mentioned report of June 12th), which was still outstanding owing to Turkish attitude regarding payments for Greek requisition notes. Monsieur Veniselos and Ismet Pasha explained that they had discussed both of these questions and were waiting for certain instructions from their governments on one or two small points. They hoped to reach complete agreement in a few days and would then inform the Secretary-General, thus rendering any further meeting of the committee on these two questions unnecessary.

Article 65. Ismet Pasha accepted the draft text agreed upon by the experts in their report of June 29th[5] (see my despatch No. 217 of June 30th),[4] but he explained that he had been in communication with Monsieur Veniselos regarding similar property in Greece and that they hoped to agree, within the next few days, on the clause relative to such property which could be added to that concerning civil list property in the detached territories in Asia. It was arranged that if they reached such an agreement they should communicate it to Secretary-General, without necessitating another meeting of the committee. My colleagues and I thanked Turkish delegation for communicating to us Iradés of 1908 and 1909 and lists of the civil list properties referred to in these Iradés. Copies of these lists will be sent home after translation.[6] They comprise a list of 'ancient Imperial properties' retained by the Sultan in 1909. This makes no mention of any property in Iraq or Palestine thus greatly strengthening our belief that all Civil List property in these countries will be acquired gratuitously by the Iraq and Palestine governments under Article 65.

Article 70. (Bill of indemnity for financial acts of Constantinople government, Debt Council, etc, since the armistice.)

[1] No. 649. [2] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 253–6. [3] Ibid., pp. 245–9.
[4] Not printed. [5] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 257–8.
[6] Not traced in the Foreign Office archives.

Ismet explained that, while the question of the gold sequestrated in 1919 and the advances to the Ottoman bank and Debt Council secured on this gold had been settled (see Constantinople telegram No. 194 of June 29th to me[4]—copy enclosed in my despatch No. 225 of July 3rd),[4] he was awaiting instructions from his government before being able to accept draft of letter from Turkish government to Debt Council set out in experts' report of June 29th[7] (see my despatch No. 217).[4] In reality Ismet is believed to be merely withholding acceptance until the debt question is settled. General Pellé read—and Ismet accepted—an allied declaration to explain that we regarded article 152 as covering reimbursement by Debt Council since the armistice of certain taxes collected on spirituous liquors. I also read a declaration, which Riza Nur formally accepted, making it quite clear that quarantine dues are covered by the expression 'sanitary tariff' in Article 130 (see my despatch No. 219 of June 30th).[4]

Third Committee.[8]

Article 72. I read the declaration regarding Turkish property in Egypt and Turco-Egyptian economic questions attached to the note of the Secretariat dated June 27th (see my despatch No. 215 of June 29th),[4] and this was accepted by the Turkish Delegation.

The modification of the article suggested in the economic experts' report of June 29th[9] (see my despatch No. 218 of June 30th)[4] was agreed to, and it was also agreed to add the same words at the end of the first sentence of the second paragraph of the article.

Article 72 bis. (Restitution of Property.)

The modification contained in the economic experts' report of June 29th[9] (see my despatch No. 218)[4] was accepted and the declaration also set out in that report was made by the Turkish Delegation and accepted by the Allied Delegations.

Article 109 (Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.)

The additional paragraph proposed in the Drafting Committee's Report of June 25th[10] was accepted (see my despatch No. 199 of June 26th).[4] This provides that after three years the Mixed Tribunal may on the demand of either party be transferred outside the country where it has its seat. Thus Turkish fears regarding the thin end of a new capitulations' wedge are removed.

Article 115.

It was agreed to suppress the first paragraph of this article, which was reserved at the last meeting for further consideration, so that the whole article has now been suppressed.

Article 117. This article will now be suppressed, as the French and Italians had agreed upon covering the contents of the article elsewhere in the treaty. The provisions with regard to trade between Turkey and Libya, and

[7] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 257–8. [8] Ibid., pp. 369–72. [9] Ibid., p. 373.
[10] Ibid., p. 374.

including a provision that most-favoured-nation treatment shall be granted by Italy to Turkish goods entering Libya, will now appear after Article 16 in the Commercial Convention.

Trade between Morocco and Turkey is to be the subject of a separate arrangement later between France and Turkey. This is provided for by a modification in Article 27.

Commercial Convention.

Article 11. The Declaration with regard to the use of the Turkish language contained in the economic experts' report of June 29th[9] (see my despatch No. 218)[4] was read and accepted by the Turks.

Article 17. The Turkish Delegation stated that they were now negotiating a commercial treaty with Poland and that they would negotiate commercial treaties with Portugal, Belgium and Czechoslovakia in accordance, as far as possible, with the same principles as those contained in the Convention with the other Allied Powers, thus agreeing to a compromise similar to that adopted in the case of the adherence clause in the Convention d'Établissement. This article will accordingly be suppressed.

Article 10. The question of the duration of the commercial convention was referred to particularly in connection with Greece, and Ismet stated that there would be a meeting within the next day or two between the Greek and Turkish representatives when this matter would be discussed between them, and the result communicated in writing to the Secretary-General. The question of duration so far as regards the other powers had already been agreed in accordance with the recommendations in the economic experts' report of the 26th May[11] (see my despatch No. 106 of May 29th).[4]

M. Veniselos explained to a member of my delegation after the meeting that he had talked yesterday to Ismet Pasha about the last paragraph of Article 157 (mutual restitution of ships captured since the armistice) as invited to do by Ismet Pasha at the last meeting of my committee (see my telegram No. 223 of June 26th).[12] To their apparently mutual surprise M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha have discovered that this exchange will work out much in favour of the Greeks, and Ismet Pasha has asked M. Veniselos to get him out of a hole with his government by consenting to abandon Turkish restitution of Greek ships. Apparently M. Veniselos has telegraphed to his government asking them to agree, if various other points such as the duration of the commercial convention are settled in Greece's favour. We may therefore expect that all outstanding points between Greece and Turkey will be settled soon, probably without necessitating any further meetings of the three committees.

Apart from debt, concessions, evacuation and questions on Articles 58, 45, etc. and 65, which M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha hoped to settle between them, only points technically outstanding are final draft of last paragraph of Article 157 (Greco-Turkish restitution of ships), final text of protocol and declaration under Article 159, Articles 46 bis and 56 (which depend on the

[11] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, p. 341. [12] No. 635.

debt settlement), Article 70 (reserved this morning), Article regarding cabotage in commercial convention (settled in principle but allies still undecided regarding choice of lines to benefit by two years' continuance of pre-war service) and declaration to be made by Turks regarding allied lighterage service in Turkish ports.

No. 651

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 4, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 247 Telegraphic [E 6937/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 3, 1923, 11.40 p.m.*

Roumanian and Serbian delegates called today together to say they were uneasy at present state of conference and disturbed by reports of an intention to present Turks with a mise-en-demeure. They pointed out that their countries would be immediately affected by renewal of hostilities with Turkey. They therefore hoped allies would not take any action which would either lead to a rupture of conference or to mise-en-demeure which might bring about a rupture. They did not wish to criticise any action allies thought fit to take in defence of financial and economic interests of their subjects but they considered that a rupture of conference for sake of bondholders difficult to justify. They said that they were going to speak to French and Italian delegates in the same way.

Serbian delegate who had seen Ismet yesterday stated that latter had informed him that a rupture would this time mean resumption of hostilities. Nothing would induce Turks to pay interest on debt in gold. If rupture occurred Turks would openly proclaim throughout Asia that allies had not hesitated to bring about renewal of hostilities for the sake of bondholders. Ismet asked Serbian delegate whether Serbs would . . .[1] back Greek army in the event of resumption of hostilities. Serbian delegate returned a non-committal reply. Ismet added he had noticed in press a suggestion that allied occupation of Turk territory might be prolonged until Turks had reached an arrangement with bondholders. He said that any prolongation of occupation would mean war and that Turks would never sign peace unless they were assured beforehand that their territory was to be evacuated.

Allowing for a certain amount of bluff on Ismet's part I have little doubt that Turks would view prolongation of occupation in manner stated by Ismet. If French have recourse to their second alternative[2] with regard to debt concessions questions their action will in effect amount to creation of another Ruhr question at Constantinople and I am convinced that this policy will land allies in serious difficulties. Sense of conference is entirely

[1] The text is here uncertain.
[2] See No. 645.

opposed to proposed French solution of debt question and they are isolated on this subject.[3]

Repeated to Paris.

[3] Referring to this telegram, Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 250 of July 4, further reported: 'Monsieur Diamandy told a member of my staff confidentially that he had invited Greek delegation to join him and Monsieur Yovanovitch in making these representations to British, French and Italian delegations. He had pointed out advantage of such action from point of view of Greece's anxiety to join in Little Entente.

'Monsieur Veniselos, whom Monsieur Diamandy had seen in presence of Monsieur Alexandris, had been very anxious to accept invitation but Monsieur Alexandris said that he could not agree. Monsieur Diamandy presumed this was due to latter's anxiety to keep a complete free hand for Greece in case latter is forced to open separate negotiations with Turkey.'

No. 652

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 3, 11.45 p.m.)
No. 640 Telegraphic: by telephone [*E 6887/1/44*]

PARIS, *July 3, 1923*

Your telegram No. 281[1] and my telegram No. 639.[2]

Reply received from French government this evening.

They ask that urgent instructions be sent to Sir H. Rumbold to agree with his French and Italian colleagues on the final proposal to be made on outstanding questions. Note states that the three points of the suggestion in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 232[3] are in accord with instructions sent through French Ambassador in London on June 29th on which His Excellency was at once to approach Your Lordship.[4] His Excellency was instructed, however, as regards the debt to add to alternative B of point one a provision whereby evacuation would only take place within six weeks after ratification by Turkish parliament if in the interval an agreement was reached with bondholders. This would safeguard interests of the bondholders while giving the Turks time to reach an agreement with them. The alternative would thus be (A) either the text in the draft of February 4th[5] maintaining the decree of Mouharrem[6] with which should be embodied the Paris formula,[7] or

(B) no declaration at all, it being understood (1) that this would be interpreted by the Allies as leaving the Mouharrem decree in full validity as well as the annexed decree and loan contracts, and (2) evacuation would only take place six weeks after Turkish ratification if an agreement had been reached with bondholders in the interval.

It would follow that point 3 in Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 232 [evacuation] would require modification.

[1] No. 645. [2] Of July 3, not printed. [3] No. 639.
[4] See No. 644 and No. 644, n. 1. [5] See No. 580, n. 2. [6] See No. 490, n. 3.
[7] See No. 615, No. 620, n. 3, and No. 625, n. 4.

Text of telegram from General Pellé referred to in my telegram No. 639 is enclosed in French government's note.[8] Summary is given in my immediately following telegram.[9]

Repeated to Lausanne.

[8] Not printed.

[9] No. 641 of July 3. This ran: 'Zekiai Bey suggested to Monsieur des Closières that the Allies should abandon any demand from the Turkish delegation for a declaration regarding the debt. Instead an exchange of letters should take place between the Turkish government and the council of the debt outside the conference. The Turkish government would inform the council that it confirmed it in its powers, restored to it all administration of the debt and the loan securities and had decided to enter into negotiations with the bondholders. The council would take act [*sic*] of the declaration and answer that to meet the needs of the government it would undertake to hand over fifty per cent of the revenues of the debt until an agreement had been reached with the bondholders.

'Zekiai stated that the idea was purely personal and had not been mentioned to other members of his delegation.

'Monsieur des Closières declined to discuss it as it was too late now to discuss such solution and said that the allied governments would without delay make known their last proposals.'

No. 653

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 4, 11.30 p.m.)
No. 249 Telegraphic [E 6956/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 4, 1923, 5.25 p.m.*

Paris telegrams Nos. 639[1] and 640.[2]

French government apparently wish to represent themselves as going a long way to meet us by accepting point 1. in my telegram No. 232[3] and agree to confront Turks with two alternatives regarding debt, viz. A, acceptance of Paris formula or B, abandonment of declaration of bondholders subject to reservation on our part of our right to protect interests of latter in so far as they are allied subjects. They attach, however, to B conditions, which as I explained in my telegram No. 233[4] would inevitably make this alternative as unwelcome to Turks as A. Turks are growing daily more sensitive and suspicious regarding evacuation question. If we should now tell them that we can only abandon declaration to bondholders on conditions

1. That evacuation will in any case be deferred until six weeks after ratification by Angora in the hope that they will thus have time to reach an agreement with bondholders, and

2. That failing such agreement within that period evacuation will be still further postponed, effect on them will be the same as that of ultimatum and they will refuse to sign treaty. In this connection see my telegram No. 247.[5]

[1] Of July 3, not printed. [2] No. 652. [3] No. 639.
[4] No. 640. [5] No. 651.

I have spoken to General Pellé in the above sense and told him that effect [of] his government's policy would be to create another Ruhr question. My Italian colleague, who was present at interview, supported my views throughout and is so reporting to his government.

French are thus still seeking to involve us in policy which means rupture of Conference but they refuse to face the consequences of such rupture. These consequences are

1. Indefinite postponement of peace.

2. Probable necessity of tightening our hold on Constantinople where we cannot with dignity or safety remain for any length of time on present basis.

3. Possible resumption by Turks of hostilities in one or more of three directions, viz. Constantinople and Chanak, Syria or Irak. Even the first of these consequences is fraught with danger having regard to the general state of unrest in the Balkans and Near East. Second means that we must assume large measure of responsibility for administration of Constantinople and some measure of responsibility for Eastern Thrace unless we ask Greece to take it over. Third means war, the ultimate extension of which cannot be foreseen.

Monsieur Poincaré dismisses possibility of Turkish resistance so lightly or appreciates its consequences so imperfectly that when asked whether he will in certain eventualities send reinforcements to Constantinople he says that this is the last thing anyone wishes.[6] This amounts to saying that if above consequences ensue he expects British to bear almost the entire brunt of the danger at Constantinople and Chanak. Bulk of allied forces in that area are ours; we alone, thanks to the French attitude in the past, have any forces at all on the Asiatic side of the Straits. In these circumstances I cannot see how French can ask us to pull chestnuts out of the fire for bondholders, majority of whom are French citizens and who would themselves gain nothing unless and until we had inflicted fresh and crushing defeat on Turkey. I cannot see either, though this is a question for you rather than for me, how we could justify to British public opinion rupture of Conference involving so much uncertainty and danger. In my considered opinion one chance of avoiding rupture is to follow course recommended in my telegram No. 232.[3]

It is quite true that another question which, as outcome of proceedings at Angora, is as much a British as a French question is still outstanding but in my opinion there is little doubt that Ismet, even on his present instructions from Angora, is in a position to, and anxious to, settle it on lines more or less satisfactory to us. Question in itself is not therefore so difficult of solution as that of debt and in so far as it can be made to appear more a British than a French interest, is for that very reason more likely to be settled by Ismet.

Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.

[6] In his telegram No. 642 of July 4, Lord Crewe reported: 'I questioned President of the Council as to reinforcements at Constantinople in certain eventualities. Monsieur Poincaré stated that last thing anyone wished was to send further reinforcements and he assumed I should agree with that view.'

No. 654

Mr. Henderson (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 5, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 377 Telegraphic [E 6959/1/44]

CONSTANTINOPLE, *July 4, 1923, 7.5 p.m.*

Telegram No. 281 to Paris.[1]

General Officer Commanding in Chief has shown me copy of his telegram to War Office [No.] 4154 today[2] drawing attention to difficulties of situation here if evacuation is suspended until such time as coupon and concession questions be settled. I entirely share General Harington's view that if occupation is to continue in such circumstances its legal position should be clearly defined.

My own view is that there are three courses open to us: either, (a) [to] evacuate Constantinople and Gallipoli as soon as possible, (b) to resume effective control here, (c) to evacuate Constantinople and to retain hold on Straits.

(a) is natural outcome of satisfactory treaty, (b) that of rupture, and (c) that of treaty in which outstanding questions remain to be settled.

(b) would mean resumption of police control and other measures which would probably be resisted to an extent likely to lead to serious incidents. It is not the course to adopt unless powers are prepared for all possible contingencies. Prestige of allied troops could only be upheld if real force were applied.

If a treaty with reservations be signed moral and persuasive effect of maintenance of occupation of Straits seems to me almost equally powerful as would be effect from occupation of Constantinople and, being far less irritating and easy to manage, more likely to produce in the end an amicable solution.

Sent to Lausanne No. 203.

[1] No. 645. [2] Not printed.

No. 655

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 5, 3.35 p.m.)
No. 251 Telegraphic [E 6978/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 5, 1923, 1.20 p.m.*

My telegram No. 249.[1]

Ismet replied yesterday to allied note enclosed in my despatch No. 227.[2] I am sending copy of his further note[3] in my despatch No. 232.[3] It is defensive and comparatively mild in tone but concludes with expression of hope that allied delegates will speedily receive instructions necessary to

[1] No. 653. [2] See No. 649, n. 2. [3] Of July 4, not printed.

enable pending questions to be settled. Turks are in fact thoroughly impatient and, though primary responsibility is theirs, there is some ground for their complaint that delay in arrival of our final instructions has held up conference since June 23rd. My French colleague has impressed very strongly on his government danger of keeping Turks waiting indefinitely in present temper of Angora. This doubtless accounts for rapidity with which French government answered British note of July 3rd.[4]

I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government and French government will if possible reach speedy agreement and send us identic instructions not later than end of this week.

You will see by my immediately following telegram[5] that I have also to keep M. Veniselos in play and have induced him to hold his hand until Sunday.

Repeated to Paris.

[4] See No. 652. [5] No. 657, below.

No. 656

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris)
No. 284 Telegraphic [E 6937/1/44]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 5, 1923, 3.55 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 639[1] [640,[2] 641,[3] and] 642[4] (of July 3rd; Lausanne).

Please make a communication to the French government in the following sense.

His Majesty's Government greatly regret that they find a further exchange of views with the French government necessary before they can send Sir H. Rumbold further instructions.

The latest French proposal still contains elements which Sir H. Rumbold and, as His Majesty's Government believe, his Italian colleague consider certain of refusal by the Turks and therefore likely to produce a rupture, since they confront the Turks with a choice between integral acceptance of the French formula or a postponement of evacuation. General Pellé will doubtless have communicated to French government the serious warning of the Serbian and Roumanian delegates at Lausanne[5] together with Ismet's statements that the Turks will not pay interest in gold, that a rupture would mean renewal of hostilities and that they would not sign peace failing assurance of evacuation. This all bears upon the French proposals and the French government may desire to reconsider their decisions and their instructions to General Pellé.

His Majesty's Government take note of Monsieur Poincaré's statements that he must 'ménager' the Turks (your telegram No. 639) and that the

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 652. [3] No. 652, n. 9.
[4] Of July 4 (see No. 653, n. 6). [5] See No. 651.

last thing he desires is to despatch reinforcements to Constantinople (your telegram No. 642). They appear to His Majesty's Government to be inconsistent with a policy of insistence on a solution of the debt question which it is generally agreed is calculated to lead to a rupture with the Turks.

His Majesty's Government can only explain this inconsistency by the assumption that Monsieur Poincaré believes that a definite settlement between the Turks and the bondholders will follow from Zekiai's personal and quite unauthorised proposal,[6] that such settlement will be reached in the interval between signature at Lausanne and ratification at Angora so as to permit of the beginning of evacuation on the latter, and that the Turks, in spite of Ismet's statement referred to above, will be prepared to sign a treaty without any definite agreement as to the date of evacuation.

His Majesty's Government would be only too glad to be able to share this belief. But they apprehend on the contrary that the French proposals which require Turkish acceptance of either the French debt formula or a postponement of evacuation are far more likely to lead to a rupture and they can therefore only ask the French government to reconsider the possibility of omission of any declaration on the subject of the debt from the treaty, full reservation of the bondholders' rights in a letter to Ismet but no corresponding postponement of evacuation.

Should the French government, as they hope, see their way to instructing General Pellé in this sense, it seems desirable that he be at the same time instructed to submit this solution to the Turks simultaneously and in conjunction with the protocol and declaration governing the concessions. It is essential to avoid a further deadlock arising on this second question which is of almost greater importance to allied interests since the debt contract would remain valid in equity while the rights of allied concessionaires require to be guaranteed by definite stipulations in the treaty. The two questions must therefore be treated together and their solution secured simultaneously in consideration of Turkish satisfaction on evacuation.

Repeated to Rome No. 202,[7] Lausanne No. 107 and Constantinople No. 216.

[6] See No. 652, n. 9.

[7] In his telegram No. 204 to Rome, of July 6, Lord Curzon instructed Sir R. Graham as follows: 'Please inform Italian government of substance of [No. 656] and urge them to bring such pressure as they can on French government to adopt Sir H. Rumbold's proposals, in which we understand M. Montagna entirely concurs for settlement of debt question.' Sir R. Graham replied in his telegram No. 130 of July 6: 'President of the Council informed me to-day that he has already approached French government in the sense desired.'

No. 657

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 5, 7.45 p.m.)
No. 252 Telegraphic [E 6979/6/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 5, 1923, 4.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 105.[1]

M. Veniselos called this morning and I felt I could no longer defer replying to enquiry which I had reported to you in my telegram No. 235.[2] I spoke to him in the sense of your instructions to me and then went on to speak to him in the sense of my telegram No. 239,[3] as authorised by you, making it perfectly clear that I was speaking to him on my own initiative.

M. Veniselos replied that he understood and appreciated considerations which I had submitted to him. He stated that he had been thinking what could be done supposing there was rupture of conference. He was deeply concerned to secure immediate return of remaining Greek prisoners of war in Turkish hands as well as of 80,000 males of Greek origin who had been kept back by Turks. It was urgent that these males should rejoin their families at earliest possible moment and he was also anxious to give immediate effect to agreement for exchange of populations in order that the said males and their families should by 1st October next be settled on the lands to be vacated by Turks under exchange of populations agreement. If this could not be effected by 1st October another agricultural year would be lost and Greece involved in further huge expenditure on account of refugees. He added that there was danger if immediate steps were not taken that a considerable number of Greek prisoners would die in Asia Minor.

He therefore contemplated following procedure. If there were rupture of conference he would propose to Turks to draw up a protocol providing for immediate handing over to Greece of remaining Greek prisoners of war and 80,000 above-mentioned males as well as immediate application of exchange of populations agreement. If Turks required to be reassured against employment against them of these males he would be prepared to settle them temporarily in islands under supervision of Red Cross or neutral representatives. In return for Turkish readiness to accept such a protocol he would undertake to demobilise Greek army but he would not make peace with Turkey and Graeco-Turkish relations would continue to be governed by armistice of Mudania[4] until such time as Great Powers made peace with Turkey. He would ask latter to give an assurance that when they made peace with Turkey they would see to it that Greece should be able to make peace simultaneously on conditions not less favourable than those possible at present moment. He thought of approaching Ismet on foregoing lines.

I took it upon myself to tell M. Veniselos that allied delegates confidently expected to receive by Sunday next[5] agreed and final instructions from their

[1] No. 643, n. 4.
[2] No. 643, n. 1.
[3] No. 643.
[4] See No. 117.
[5] July 8.

governments with regard to questions still outstanding. This would permit of an immediate meeting with Turks. In these circumstances I suggested that M. Veniselos might hold his hand until Sunday next and he agreed to do so.

Repeated to Athens.

No. 658

The Marquess of Crewe (Paris) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 7, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 655 Telegraphic: by bag [E 7017/1/44]

PARIS, *July 6, 1923*

Your telegram No. 284.[1]

In pursuance of Your Lordship's instructions, I made an appointment to see M. Poincaré this morning and handed him a confidential *aide mémoire*, containing the substance of the above telegram. M. Poincaré said that the distinction drawn by His Majesty's Government between the claims of the concessionaires and those of the bondholders seemed to him a just one. Unless the former were looked after in the actual treaty their interests might lapse entirely, while the bondholders possessed an inherent and continuing right to the support of their government. On the other hand, the concessionaires, speaking generally, were big men, and the French bondholders were many of them small men, so that in a democratic country it would not do to seem to ignore their interests. Once more he could not give me an immediate answer, as he must consult M. de Lasteyrie on this particular point. I pressed M. Poincaré very strongly to consider with the Minister of Finance if the bondholders would not be safeguarded, so far as was possible in the circumstances, by the proposed declaration outside the treaty. I added that the matter was exceedingly urgent, as I had heard that a further meeting was to be held at Lausanne tomorrow, and that M. Veniselos had said that, unless something could be settled before Sunday,[2] he could no longer refrain from making separate terms with Turkey.[3] The President of the Council said that this was not the statesmanlike and sensible M. Veniselos of whom they had had experience during the Peace Conference, but the other M. Veniselos, who became excited and made use of threats. As to the danger of a Turkish attack, he ought to say that his information from Lausanne on the Roumanian and Serbian attitude did not tally with that which Your Lordship had received.[4] It was quite true that the French government did not wish to send reinforcements to Constantinople, but there were 20,000 troops in Syria, who would be available against Turkey in case of need. I repeated the earnest hope that instructions might be sent to Lausanne in the sense of Your Lordship's proposals, and I begged that I might receive an answer at the earliest possible moment.

[1] No. 656. [2] July 8. [3] See No. 657. [4] See No. 651.

The substance of the French government's reply, which I am happy to think is generally satisfactory, has been transmitted to Your Lordship by telephone this evening.[5]

[5] As Paris telegram No. 654 of July 6. This referred to No. 656 and continued: 'Following is the central portion of note from French Government just received quoting instructions sent to General Pellé to-day.

'Following is in French:

"Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a prescrit par télégramme au Général Pellé de se résigner à accepter qu'aucune déclaration relative à la question de la dette ne soit insérée au traité, à la condition qu'il soit notifié expressément à la délégation turque que si les Alliés renoncent à demander une déclaration au Gouvernement turc, ils n'en considèrent pas moins que le Décret de Mouharrem et les décrets annexes restent valables dans toutes leurs parties.

"Cette notification prendra la forme d'une note ou d'une lettre annexée au traité; elle devra être insérée dans la note faisant connaître aux Turcs les conditions définitives des Alliés en ce qui concerne la dette.

"Il est bien entendu que dans cette note, qui sera remise à Ismet Pacha, seront comprises toutes les questions encore en suspens et notamment celle des concessions." '

No. 659

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 7, 6.15 p.m.)
No. 254 Telegraphic [*E 7052/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *July 7, 1923, 4.25 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 284 to Paris.[1]

His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris informed me yesterday by telephone of substance of note which he had just received from French government.[2] General Pellé confirmed this information a little later. As French have now come into line with our proposals except on two minor points, I am assuming that I can proceed without awaiting further instructions.

One of the minor points just mentioned is that French government apparently contemplate immediate despatch of a note to the Turks. Second point is that French wish allied declaration reserving right to protect rights of bondholders to be annexed to treaty which would, in my opinion, make it much more difficult for Turks to swallow it.

As regards first point, General Pellé agrees that we can hold private meeting with Ismet before deciding whether note is necessary or not. As regards second, we have agreed that question whether declaration should be annexed to treaty by being inserted in final act need not be raised for the moment.

In these circumstances we have arranged to hold private meeting with Ismet this afternoon in order to discuss questions of debt and concessions and evacuation. We shall take them in that order making it clear, however,

[1] No. 656. [2] See No. 658, n. 5.

that we are discussing them as a single whole. I will report result of meeting this evening.[3]

Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.

[3] See No. 660, n. 1, below.

No. 660

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 256 Telegraphic: by bag [E 7073/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 7, 1923*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

The private meeting[2] this afternoon between the allied delegates and the Turkish delegates, each assisted by experts, lasted nearly six hours, with two intervals for separate consultation among Turks and allies respectively. The attitude of the Turks was exasperating to the last degree. They were equally shameless in their demands and ungenerous in their lack of appreciation of any concessions offered by the allies. They tried the patience of my French colleague and myself to an extent unparalleled during the present phase of the conference. Nevertheless I think they were severely shaken, and although their attitude this afternoon was unsatisfactory and disheartening, I am not entirely without hope that we may see the reaction in a better attitude when we resume the conversation again tomorrow afternoon.

I opened the meeting with an explanation of its object, in the course of which I made it clear that the three questions to be discussed, namely, the debt, concessions and evacuation, must be considered as a single whole. I emphasised the spirit of conciliation shown by the allies and expressed a hope that this might be our last private meeting, to be followed by final sittings of the three committees at which the work of the conference could be completed. After my French and Italian colleagues had spoken in the same general sense and Ismet Pasha had made a reply asserting the Turkish delegation's eagerness for peace, General Pellé propounded the two alternative solutions for the debt question, namely: (a) the acceptance by the Turks of the Paris formula[3] for a declaration to the bondholders or, (b) the abandonment of any attempt at a formula in the treaty settlement, subject to a declaration by the allied delegates affirming their view that Decree of Muharrem,[4] loan contracts etc. retained their validity, and that the allied governments, while hoping for a direct settlement between the Turkish government and the bondholders, reserved their right to protect the interests of their subjects.

[1] No. 255, which was despatched at 2.10 a.m. on July 8, but drafted on July 7. This telegram, not here printed, summarised the results of the private meeting which is fully reported in telegram No. 256.

[2] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 408–22.

[3] See No. 615, No. 620, n. 3, and No. 625, n. 4.

[4] See No. 490, n. 3.

My colleagues and I had agreed that it would be desirable to put the Turks in possession of the allied case regarding all three questions before asking for a reply on any one of them. Monsieur Montagna therefore went on to explain our views regarding the question of concessions, with which it had become necessary to deal in the conference owing to the failure, in a large number of cases, of the negotiations at Angora. The protocol[5] and the declaration[6] drawn up by the experts were, he said, already in the possession of the Turks. These texts represented the final views of the allies.

I then outlined the proposals of the allied delegations regarding the evacuation of Constantinople and Chanak. We had reduced these to the form of a protocol,[7] copy of which I am sending home tonight.[8] My Italian colleague had concurred in this draft and General Pellé had expressed general concurrence in it subject to any views which might be expressed by his government on questions of detail. This made it necessary for me to tell the Turks that, although we had prepared a text, it might be subject to slight modifications of form. I said I understood that Ismet Pasha and Monsieur Veniselos had reached an agreement regarding the arrangements for the handing over of the Karagatch area. This left the question of arrangements for Imbros and Tenedos, regarding the handing over of which the allied delegations would be prepared to make suggestions. Finally, we would propose an addition to article 160 of the treaty, providing for the re-establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the Greco-Turk frontier clauses as soon as Greece and Turkey had both ratified the treaty.

Ismet Pasha asked to be given copies of the Paris formula regarding the debt and of the draft protocol regarding evacuation.[9] We gave him these, after renewing as regards the evacuation protocol our reservation that modifications of form might be necessary. He then asked for an adjournment of one hour to confer with his colleagues. When we reassembled, he said that although all questions at issue in the conference had been discussed, the proposals now made contained much that was new. He would, however, state his view regarding the general principles involved. Dealing first with the debt question, he dismissed outright the Paris formula as unacceptable. The Turkish delegation could, he said, accept the alternative proposal for the abandonment of any mention of the debt question in the treaty settlement, but he took strong exception to the proposal of the allies to make a unilateral declaration of their own affirming their own point of view. He proposed that the abandonment of the declaration to the bondholders should be unaccompanied by anything in the nature of commentary or interpretation. The question would thus remain entirely one between the Turkish government and the bondholders with whom he had hoped an understanding would be reached.

[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 423–4.
[6] Ibid., p. 425.
[7] Dated July 6. See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 426–7.
[8] In Lausanne despatch No. 239 of July 7, not printed.
[9] See No. 639.

Turning to concessions, Ismet Pasha said that according to his information nearly all the companies represented at Angora had reached agreements with the Turkish government. If there were any who had not done so their affairs could be settled here in Lausanne. He referred, however, only to companies whose concessions were regularly in force before the war, to the exclusion of companies whose concessions had not been completed at that time. In the case of companies whose concessions were fully completed before the war he would accept (1) confirmation of existing contracts; (2) re-adaptation; (3) settlement of accounts; and (4) arbitration on the settlement of accounts if no agreement were reached otherwise. He said that this would meet the case of all companies which had not already reached agreements. Subject to discussion of minor details he had no objection to the second section of the protocol which dealt with concessions in detached countries. Nothing settled in Lausanne must affect the position of companies whose negotiations at Angora had already resulted in agreements.[10] He would propose to limit the effect of paragraph 8 of the protocol relative to transfers effected under the Constantinople government to territory under the effective authority of that government to the exclusion of territory occupied by the Greeks.

Ismet Pasha then turned to evacuation and criticised our draft protocol in seven distinct respects as follows:

(1) The period of six weeks was unnecessarily long.

(2) In any case the operation should be divided into stages, a period being fixed for the evacuation of each successive area, beginning with Constantinople, which might be evacuated in one week.

(3) He observed that the provisions regarding evacuation had been entirely divorced from the treaty. He must therefore ask for a provision that if the evacuation protocol were not carried out, the Turkish ratification of the treaty would be null and void.

[10] In his telegram No. 115 of July 10, Lord Curzon, referring to this statement, commented: 'It is highly undesirable that such companies should be excluded from the benefits of the treaty guarantees.' Sir H. Rumbold replied, in his telegram No. 272 of July 11: 'You will have seen from record of private meetings with Ismet that we have already agreed that agreements already reached between Turkish government and companies at Angora should not be affected by concessions protocol. We had considered question very carefully and had reached conclusion that it would be neither practicable *vis-à-vis* Turks nor in true interests of companies concerned to ask that latter should be free to re-open negotiations on basis of protocol. To do so would have been contrary to the spirit though perhaps not the letter of allied note of March 27th [see No. 459, n. 4, No. 460 and No. 632, n. 10], and it is most unlikely that any company which after concluding agreement went back thereon in order to negotiate on basis of protocol would do better than it has done already having regard to odium which it would incur with Turks by doing so.

'I trust you will agree with view on which we have acted after considering above arguments in which Board of Trade representative fully concurs.'

In his despatch No. 185 of July 16, Lord Curzon replied: 'I have considered the facts put forward in your telegram No. 272 of 11th instant in justification of your action in agreeing with Ismet Pasha that the agreements already reached between the Turkish Government and concessionary companies at Angora should not be affected by the concessions protocol. On consideration of the arguments in question I endorse your action in this matter.'

(4) The draft protocol made no mention of the restoration of material removed from Turkish stores or from on board ship, e.g. in the recent case of the 'Umid'.[11]

(5) The restoration of ships of war should include all warships interned by the allies.

(6) He had not been able to study in detail the effect of the proposal to bring into force immediately certain articles of the treaty and the annexed conventions. What struck him at first sight, however, was the absence of reciprocity. What, he asked, would happen in the event of an indefinite postponement of ratification by the allied Powers.

(7) He objected to the clause providing for the nine months' negotiations regarding the Iraq frontier to run from the beginning of evacuation, on the ground that this was at variance with what had been already agreed in the relevant article of the treaty. That article had, he said, been adopted at a time when the general conditions of evacuation were already known.

General Pellé stated that he did not consider Ismet Pasha's answer regarding the debt question satisfactory or one which could form a basis for peace. Having offered him his free choice between two alternatives, the allies could not take exception to his rejection of the first. The conditions which Ismet Pasha attached to his acceptance of the second alternative were, however, inadmissible. We were not asking Turkey to enter into any new engagement or to confirm any old one. We were offering her a considerable concession and showing confidence in her, but our governments considered that there must be no room for misunderstanding, as there would be unless we made it clear that the abandonment of a declaration to the bondholders did not imply any renunciation of the views which we had so frequently sustained. The declaration which the allied delegations proposed to make would merely define their point of view. It would not necessarily call for any answer from the Turks. The offer which had been made represented the last word of the French government.

I expressed disappointment at Ismet's statement and said that the Turks could not object to the allies making a declaration on the lines indicated in their offer. As for myself I had definite instructions to make this declaration.

A long discussion ensued. Ismet Pasha persisted for a long time in his contention that, unless the allies were prepared to deal in the treaty settlement with the question of the currency in which interest was to be paid, they should desist from any intervention whatsoever between the Turkish government and the bondholders. General Pellé, supported by myself and M. Montagna, repeated that the declaration which we wished to make was merely an affirmation of an existing juridical position and of rights which the allied governments might have to exercise at some future time. The Turks were not even being asked to *prendre acte* of it. In the end Ismet weakened to the extent of saying that if the allies made a declaration, the Turkish delegation would also have to make a counter-declaration embodying their point of view in order that both statements might stand on record.

[11] See No. 630, n. 2.

Personally I should have liked to acquiesce in this view, but we were debarred from doing so by the fact that the instructions of the French government still require that the allied reservation of rights should take the form of a declaration annexed to the treaty. We therefore passed, after a short separate discussion between my colleagues and myself, to the question of concessions.

After some preliminary discussion, we went through the first portion of the concessions protocol[12] paragraph by paragraph. Ismet Pasha suggested that paragraph 1 should be confined to named companies, viz. those who had sent representatives to Angora and had failed to reach an agreement. My colleagues and I refused to entertain this suggestion.

As I had anticipated Ismet took the strongest exception to the second paragraph relative to non-completed pre-war concessions. He refused absolutely to accept the general principle embodied in the paragraph. We explained that it was meant to cover three specific cases, viz. the concessions definitely promised to the French in 1914,[13] the Vickers Armstrong concession[14] (though I explained that in my view this really came under paragraph 1 and could only be affected by paragraph 2 owing to the attitude taken up by the Turks during the negotiations at Angora), and the Turkish Petroleum Company.[15] We said that we should be prepared to drop the paragraph if Ismet Pasha would give us positive satisfaction regarding these three cases. He professed ignorance of them and thereby drove General Pellé and myself to angry remonstrances.

After a good deal of further discussion, in the course of which Ismet maintained that the declaration attached to the protocol should be limited to Turkish companies in which allied interests had been preponderant in 1914, thus excluding the Anatolian and Bagdad railways, it was agreed that the experts should discuss the various questions which had been raised tomorrow.

It was now very late and I rapidly ran through Ismet's seven objections to the draft evacuation protocol.[16] I had no trouble in demolishing them and I took particular pleasure in showing the Turks up over the incident of the 'Umid'. Ismet Pasha suggested that the evacuation protocol also should be discussed among experts. I said that I was not prepared to discuss the fundamental principles of the very generous offer which we were making, but I had no objection to allowing the draft protocol to be examined by experts in order that any necessary explanations should be given to the Turks and modifications of detail introduced.

It was agreed that the two committees of experts to discuss the concessions protocol and the evacuation protocol should meet tomorrow morning and that the conversation between the delegates should be resumed tomorrow afternoon. I foresee another very difficult interview and can only hope that a night's reflection will make the Turks somewhat more reasonable than they were today. We agreed, pending the resumption of the conversation, that as little as possible should be disclosed to the press. General Pellé said

[12] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 423–4.
[13] See No. 586, n. 9.
[14] See No. 577, n. 4.
[15] See Vol. XIII, No. 286.
[16] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 426–7.

roundly that the offers which he on his side had made were of such a nature that if they were revealed prematurely he would have to withdraw them.

No. 661

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 258 Telegraphic [*E 7079/1/44*]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 8, 1923, 9.35 p.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

I feel that as in practice we mean to make a big concession regarding evacuation on ratification by Turkey the force of the concession will in fact be considerably diminished if we keep present naval forces in Turkish territorial waters and I do not suppose Admiralty are particularly anxious to maintain large units in those waters.

I doubt whether once land forces are evacuated much real advantage would accrue to our interests at Constantinople from the presence of several naval units there in the interval between ratification by Turkey and actual entry into force of treaty and Straits convention. I would, therefore, suggest for your consideration and that of the Admiralty the fixation of maximum number of British light cruisers, e.g. two, with appropriate number of destroyers and auxiliary vessels. In fixing this number, account must be taken of probability that French and Italians whose representatives are being asked to obtain urgent instructions from their governments on the point today, will almost certainly wish to have the right to maintain number equal to ours and Americans will certainly continue to keep some naval forces at Constantinople. Either by separate declaration or insertion in protocol, Allies might then agree to withdrawal of their naval units over and above the number fixed for each.

I shall be very grateful if your instructions can be telegraphed to me if possible by the afternoon of July 9th as it is essential if final negotiations here are to be successful we should now keep them going at a rapid rate and there is a possibility of concluding them tomorrow.

[1] No. 666, n. 8, below.

No. 662

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 9, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 261 Telegraphic [*E 7077/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *July 9, 1923, 2.50 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

Before meeting this afternoon[2] General Pellé told my Italian colleague and

[1] Of July 9, not printed. This telegram summarised the proceedings of the meeting between the Allied and Turkish delegates on the afternoon of July 8 (see No. 666, below).
[2] July 8. See No. 666, below.

myself that his government had instructed him that allied declaration regarding coupons need not be attached to treaty. He added that in conversation on the telephone this afternoon, Monsieur Peretti had suggested personally that in order to avoid counter declaration by Turks if allied declaration were made in a committee and put into procès-verbal, allies might say nothing until after conclusion of peace and then through their High Commissioners make proposed declaration to Turkish government.

Both Signor Montagna and I strongly dislike this proposal as it would look as though we had feared formally to state our view when renouncing Turkish declaration or article in treaty and had then tried to recover our position after conclusion of peace. It will certainly also weaken allied position to make a concession renouncing Turkish declaration if we do not in committee and before conclusion of peace reserve our rights and attitude. We both think it would be much better to make strong declaration in committee and let Turks reply as they like. Neither declaration nor counter declaration will alter juridical position of bondholders. We have let General Pellé know this and I informed him we could not go back on a procedure thereby endorsed by our respective governments regarding making a declaration before conference separates. I telegraph at once in case M. Poincaré tomorrow endorses M. Peretti's suggestion and telegraphs to London and Rome for support.[3]

Repeated to Paris.

[3] In his telegram No. 114 of July 10, Lord Curzon replied: 'I approve your attitude as regards French proposals.'

No. 663

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)
No. 112 Telegraphic [E 7113/1/44]

Immediate FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 9, 1923, 7.45 p.m.*

Your telegrams Nos. 257[1] and 258[2] (of July 8th; withdrawal of naval forces).

I entirely concur in arguments by which you asserted Allied right to free run of Straits pending entry into force of Straits Convention[3] and I cannot consent to derogate from this principle by fixing number or tonnage of ships that may have access to Straits or Sea of Marmara.

Admiralty require maintenance of whole force until evacuation is complete; thereafter they have no immediate interest in keeping any force there. But they insist that it be stipulated that when once total force has been withdrawn rights of access as allowed by Straits Convention be reserved pending coming into force of that instrument.

[1] No. 666, n. 8, below. [2] No. 661.

[3] For the Draft Convention, see Cmd. 1814, pp. 772–85, and for the text finally signed on July 24, 1923, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, pp. 592–600.

It is clear that naval forces have been acting as auxiliary to military forces of occupation and that they will be very considerably reduced on withdrawal of latter. If the Turks insist, you may insert a provision of this indefinite nature in the protocol or give a similar assurance in a letter to Ismet, but in either case or in the event of any other mention of reduction of naval forces the principle of our right of free access must be expressly asserted and it cannot be jeopardized by fixation of a maximum.

No. 664

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 10, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 269 Telegraphic [*E 7134/1/44*]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 10, 1923, 2.40 a.m.*

Your telegram No. 112.[1]

I fear I did not make it sufficiently clear that suggestion regarding delimitation applied only to ships sojourning in Turkish territorial waters. What I would wish to arrange with Turks is (1) unlimited right of passage pending coming into force of Straits convention and (2) right of sojourn in Turkish waters between end of evacuation and coming into force of convention for maximum number of ships of each of the three powers. Turks will resist both and their resistance to (2) may be more strenuous than I anticipated when I drafted my telegrams Nos. 257[2] and 258[3] for at the meeting with Ismet late yesterday[4] afternoon, he was much more insistent on complete naval evacuation of Turkish waters than his expert had been in the morning.

I gathered from telegram under reply that Admiralty, while insisting on unlimited right of passage, are comparatively indifferent to maintenance (once land evacuation is complete) of right to remain in Turkish waters which of course we shall not possess under Straits convention. I would therefore suggest I should be authorised to press strongly for (1) above using argument which I have already invoked but to use discretion as regards (2). If so authorised I would as regards (2) try hard for the right to maintain in Turkish waters during transitional period maximum [number of ships] which I mentioned in my earlier telegrams but would reduce this maximum if necessary subject to getting complete satisfaction as regards (1).

I need hardly point out argument based on destruction by Turks in 1914 of old régime of Straits is very strong as regards right of passage but very weak as regards right of sojourn.

My French colleague has been authorised to undertake to reduce ships in Turkish waters to maximum suggested by me. Italian strength is already below that maximum. If it were necessary to reduce maximum still further

[1] No. 663. [2] No. 666, n. 8, below. [3] No. 661.
[4] July 8. See No. 666, below.

on lines indicated above, I should of course act in agreement with them. Please telephone reply through Paris Embassy.[5]

Matter is most urgent as I believe this to be the only serious question now standing in way of peace.

Repeated to Paris.

[5] In his telegram No. 117 of July 10, Lord Curzon replied: 'I have consulted Admiralty and we are content to leave question of number of vessels sojourning in Turkish waters to your judgement. You may therefore use your discretion as regards (2), provided that as regards (1) you secure formal recognition of unlimited right of passage pending coming into force of the Convention.'

No. 665

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to Sir R. Graham (Rome)[1]

No. 7 Telegraphic [E 7142/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 10, 1923, 1.5 p.m.*

Foreign Office telegram No. 203 to Rome.[2]

Have Italian government replied to representations? Italian delegation here are still without instructions and I shall be grateful if you can press Italian government to send them desired authority to negotiate as soon as possible since time is getting short.

Please let me know position.

[1] Repeated as No. 271 to Foreign Office, where it was received on July 10 at 2.30 p.m.
[2] No. 647, n. 2.

No. 666

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 12, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 268 Telegraphic: by bag [E 7189/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 10, 1923*

My telegrams Nos. 259[1] and 263.[1]

The following is the full report of yesterday's[2] proceedings[3] which I promised by King's Messenger.

The experts sat for three hours in the morning to go through the draft protocol concerning evacuation[4] and to discuss the more or less connected questions of Imbros and Tenedos and the re-establishment of peace between Turkey and Greece. The Turkish expert was told that the allied delegates

[1] Of July 9, not printed. These telegrams gave brief accounts of certain matters reported more fully in the telegram here printed.
[2] i.e. July 8. This telegram was drafted on July 9.
[3] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 428–33, 437–41.
[4] Ibid., pp. 426–7.

were not prepared to alter the draft evacuation protocol in any material particular, but had allowed the meeting to be held in order that any necessary explanations should be given, and minor modifications introduced if required. The Turkish expert was in the main reasonable and conciliatory and he did not revert to some of the objections made by Ismet Pasha the evening before.[5] I am sending home by King's Messenger (see my despatch No. 245 of July 10th)[6] a report[7] prepared for the delegates showing the results arrived at at the meeting.

The principal point made by the Turkish expert—and this was one which had not occurred to Ismet Pasha on July 7th[5]—was that the draft protocol did not provide for naval evacuation. I have reported separately on this important point in my telegram No. 257 of July 8th.[8]

The next really important point raised by the Turkish expert was that relative to the date to be indicated in paragraph 4. The upshot of the discussion is given adequately in the report of the meeting. Nothing else in the report calls for special mention in this portion of the record of yesterday's proceedings.

The allied delegates had intended to resume their discussion with Ismet Pasha early in the afternoon. Owing to the prolonged nature of the discussion between the economic experts, to which I will revert later, the meeting of the delegates was postponed to a later hour. It began with a somewhat unpleasant incident. It will be remembered that, at the close of the private meeting on July 7th,[5] the delegates mutually pledged themselves to give no information to the press regarding what had passed. The only delegate who had demurred to this was Ismet Pasha, who, however, at once withdrew his objection, and agreed to the pledge. It was therefore a painful surprise to find that two Swiss papers yesterday morning published an account of the proceedings, which, though inaccurate in certain particulars, was obviously based on first-hand information. This was all the more unfortunate as the

[5] See No. 660. [6] Not printed. [7] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 434–5.

[8] This ran: 'In discussion of the text of protocol of evacuation by experts this morning Turks enquired whether withdrawal of allied naval forces was included in a phrase in protocol which speaks of delay of six weeks within which operations of evacuation are to be carried out. Allied experts point out: (a) never since armistice had naval units been regarded as part of forces of occupation, (b) Turks themselves in their counter proposals of March 8th had only asked for withdrawal of allied forces "from Turkish territory", (c) nothing could prevent Allies having free run of Straits until convention entered into force since Turks by their own action in August 1914 had destroyed pre-war Straits régime, (d) Ismet and his colleagues had had an hour to study text of protocol yesterday and had raised number of detailed criticisms but had never raised this question.

'Clearly therefore protocol did not and could not cover question of allied naval forces who would have free run of Straits until Straits convention enters into force.

'Turkish expert insisted that presence of large allied naval forces in Turkish territorial waters was certainly regarded by Turks as part of allied occupation. While he said enough to make it clear that Angora will certainly insist on Ismet pressing this point he hinted that Turks would be content with some reduction and not complete withdrawal until entry into force of Straits convention. Ismet appears really to have made an oversight yesterday in not raising point incredible though it may seem.'

published account reproduced a somewhat strong expression which I had used regarding the attitude of the Turkish delegation. There is reason to suppose that the French were in some way responsible for this grave indiscretion, especially as similar information was published yesterday morning in the Paris newspaper 'L'Information', which has a correspondent here. My colleagues and I, who held a short meeting before resuming our discussions with Ismet Pasha, agreed that this must be mentioned at our meeting with him. I therefore opened the proceedings by expressing regret that so serious an indiscretion should have been committed. My French and Italian colleagues expressed similar regret, all of us saying that we could not understand how the information had been given to the press. I went out of my way to make it clear that we regarded the Turkish delegation as entirely free from suspicion, as I had been told that Ismet Pasha, when shown the newspaper report, had most correctly said that, having given his word to make no statement, he would neither confirm nor deny anything, which had been published. Ismet Pasha proceeded to read a previously prepared statement, in which, after expressing astonishment at the violation of the pledge by which all the delegates had bound themselves, he went on to say that I had used an expression which had escaped him at the time owing to his infirmity, but which he would not have allowed to pass had he heard it. I said in reply that while renewing my expression of regret that any indiscretion had occurred, I must object strongly to any criticism of language to which the Turkish delegation had driven me and which had been used at a private meeting. I repudiated indignantly the insinuation that I had taken advantage of Ismet Pasha's infirmity. He responded with a sullen maintenance of his protest, and the incident closed.

We then passed to the question of the interest on the debt. General Pellé summarised the proceedings of the previous day,[5] making it clear that the allies, while abandoning their demand for a Turkish declaration to the bondholders, would make a statement of their own, to which the Turks might reply. After some little discussion, Ismet Pasha asked whether it was clear that the Turks would be free to make a counter-declaration. My French colleague, having told me before the meeting that the French government had agreed that the allied statement should be made at a meeting of his committee in a form drawn up in Paris, to which I had no objection, I thought it was clear especially after what he had said in his preliminary summary, that the Turks could not be prevented from making a counter-declaration in the same way. I told Ismet Pasha that this was my view of the matter, but to my astonishment General Pellé said that he must reserve his formal answer, which he hoped to be able to give on the following day. I can only suppose that he wished to protect himself in case M. Poincaré should adopt the entirely new suggestion made by M. Peretti and reported in my telegram No. 261 of July 9th.[9]

It was then agreed that article 46 bis, which had been in abeyance pending a settlement of the main question of the interest on the debt, should be referred

[9] No. 662.

to the financial experts. As regards article 70, which is the only other outstanding article in the financial clauses, Ismet Pasha said that he still awaited instructions from Angora regarding the allied proposal that this article should be suppressed subject to the Turkish delegation writing a letter which the experts had drafted[10] (see my despatch No. 217 of June 30th).[11] I urged Ismet Pasha to obtain his instructions from Angora as soon as possible.

We now passed to the evacuation protocol[4] and went through the report of the meeting of the experts in the morning. Ismet Pasha was most insistent that the naval forces of the allies should also be evacuated. I repeated the arguments used by my representative in the morning, and insisted that the Turks were making an entirely new demand which was not even covered by their own counter-proposals as formulated in the note of March 8th.[12] I said that I had already consulted my government[13] as to whether a reduction of naval forces, as suggested by the Turkish expert in the morning, could be contemplated, but I pointed out that, in the whole of the correspondence which had led up to the acceptance of the Turkish proposal regarding evacuation, the allied governments had had in mind the evacuation of land forces, as asked for by the Turks themselves.

We then took the three points raised by the Turks on the 4th paragraph of the protocol. As regards the 'Umid',[14] I confirmed what my representatives had said in the morning.[15] Ismet Pasha seemed inclined to press for a declaration in committee that the guns etc. seized in the 'Umid' would be returned, but I think he was relieved when I enabled him to abandon his request by saying I was on the point of telegraphing to Constantinople[16] to say that I had already given an assurance in regard to these guns, etc. I undertook to mention in the same telegram the arms or portions thereof removed from certain Turkish stores in Constantinople about the end of last year and now I believe at Kilia.

The allied delegates agreed to insert after the words 'bâtiments de guerre' the words 'y compris le "Yavouz Sultan Selim"'.

Ismet Pasha abandoned his request for any modification as regards the date indicated in paragraph 4 other than the substitution for the word 'encore' of the words 'à la date de la signature du présent protocole' on my telling him that in the telegram which I was about to send to Constantinople I would say that I had promised that none of the objects covered by the paragraph should be removed from Turkish territory between now and the signature of the treaty, provided it was signed at the end of the present phase of the conference. I fulfilled the promises mentioned in this and the

[10] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 257–8. [11] Not printed. See, however, No. 650.
[12] See No. 431. [13] See Nos. 661 and 664. [14] See No. 630, n. 2.
[15] At the meeting of Allied and Turkish experts. The report of this meeting, transmitted to the Foreign Office in Lausanne despatch No. 245 of July 10, stated: 'L'expert turc demande que le cas des canons etc. saisis à bord de l'Umid soient spécialement visés. A l'avis des experts alliés, une disposition spéciale ne saurait être insérée dans le Protocole. Ils estiment que le cas de ces canons, etc. est déjà couvert, et que, si un doute pouvait exister à ce sujet, il serait écarté par la déclaration faite par Sir Horace Rumbold à la séance privée d'hier.'

preceding paragraph, to which my French and Italian colleagues made themselves parties, by my telegram No. 82 of July 9th to Constantinople, repeated to you under No. 262.[16]

We were unable to dispose of the point raised in paragraph 6 regarding the commercial convention, as the economic experts had not yet had time to go into it. As regards the second portion of paragraph 7, I said that I was prepared to adopt the suggestion made by my representative in the morning that the period of nine months for negotiations regarding the Iraq frontier should run from the end of the evacuation.[17] Ismet Pasha said that he too would accept this, subject to the approval of his government.

Ismet Pasha demurred strongly to any special arrangement being made as regards the application of the provisions of article 14 relative to the Islands of Imbros and Tenedos. He said that that article imposed an obligation on Turkey which she could be trusted to carry out after the Greeks had evacuated the two Islands. He suggested the following formula:

"Le retrait des troupes et autorités helléniques des îles d'Imbros et Tenedos sera effectué dès que le présent traité sera ratifié par les gouvernements turc et grec. Dès ce retrait les dipositions prévues à l'article 14 du traité de paix seront appliquées par le gouvernement turc."

I reserved this question for further consideration before the final meetings of committees.

He agreed to the addition proposed to be made to article 160, providing for the re-establishment of a state of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the articles relative to the Greco-Turkish frontier as soon as the treaty should have been ratified by the two Powers.

By this time the economic experts, who had sat practically the whole day, had produced a new draft of the protocol regarding concessions,[18] a copy of which I am sending home in my despatch No. 246 of July 10th.[19] This had not been copied, and it was close on dinner time. I had learned that the Turkish economic experts had shown the same relative spirit of conciliatoriness as the Turkish delegates themselves had displayed at our meeting. Anxious to take advantage of this spirit, which might be described almost as one of subdued resignation tempered only by intransigence on a few points,

[16] Lausanne telegram No. 82 to Constantinople, repeated to the Foreign Office as No. 262. This ran: 'Protocol relative to evacuation of Constantinople provides for return to Turkey of man-of-war arms ammunition and other war material placed at the disposal of allies in pursuance of 1918 armistice and still in possession of allied authorities on date of signature of protocol, in their actual state and in places where they are.

'Turks asked for special mention of guns etc. captured in "Umid".

'We have refused to mention them in protocol but have undertaken at private meeting that they will be returned in the same way as other arms and ammunition. I threatened to make full statement of facts if Turks wanted this confirmed at official sitting of conference. They have abandoned request for special mention, but we are bound by declaration at private meeting.'

[17] This had been reported by Sir H. Rumbold in his telegram No. 259 (see note 1) and Lord Curzon had replied in his telegram No. 16 of July 10: 'I accept your proposal that date should be end of allied evacuation.'

[18] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 442–4.

[19] Not printed.

I proposed that we should meet again in the evening, in order to clinch matters. Ismet Pasha rather demurred to this, and my French colleague was luke-warm. I nevertheless carried my point with the support of Monsieur Montagna. We agreed to give the Turks a couple of hours to consider the draft produced by the experts, and it was arranged that we should meet again at 11 p.m. When we re-assembled Monsieur Montagna, as President of the Third Committee, went through the new draft protocol article by article.

Article 1 was agreed to.

On *Article 2*, which is now to take the form of separate special provisions for the Vickers Armstrong concession, the Turkish Petroleum Company[20] and the French Railway Concessions of 1914, Ismet Pasha raised several points of detail. As regards Vickers Armstrong and the French Railway Concessions, the most substantial of these was that the paragraph ensuring to the concessionaires for ten years a preferential right in regard to any future concession for the same purpose as their present concessions was so worded as to take effect notwithstanding that the companies might have in the meantime obtained alternative concessions or indemnities. It was agreed that this point must be met, and as there were several others of less consequence, the whole article was referred back to the experts for revision. As regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ismet Pasha assured me that he wished to give satisfaction, but that it must be in a form which could be reconciled with Turkish legislation. With this object he desired to use the words 'droits acquis' instead of the word 'concession'. I objected to this, as it might be said afterwards that *only* acquired rights were upheld, and that the rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company were not in fact 'acquis'. After a vain attempt to find a new formula at the meeting, it was agreed that the experts should make a fresh attempt to arrive at one to-day.

Articles 3 and 4 were agreed to.

Article 5. Ismet Pasha wished it to be made clear that the general provision regarding re-adaptation would not apply to the concessions specially dealt with in article 2. It was agreed that the question was only one of drafting, and should be left to the experts to settle. Subject to this and to a reservation regarding the letter asked for by us to cover the case of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railways etc., he agreed to the principle of article 5. This marked an important advance, inasmuch as, up to July 7th, Ismet Pasha had objected to the principle of arbitration being applied to anything except settlement of accounts.

Article 6. Ismet Pasha wished it to be made clear that this article should

[20] In his telegram No. 265 of July 9, Sir H. Rumbold had stated: 'Americans may still intrigue against Turkish petroleum company settlement exact terms of which are amongst matters referred back to experts. We have, however, met their ostensible objection to clause regarding inchoate pre-war concessions by avoiding inclusion of any general principle in protocol. If they show their hand by objecting to manner in which particular case of Turkish petroleum company is being dealt with we can say we had satisfied ourselves that no rival American interest is involved. We have, I hope, got well to windward of them.' Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1021–34.

not defeat the rights of the government in cases where concessions might lapse or be annulled in the ordinary course of Turkish law, or under the terms of the concessions themselves. We agreed that this was reasonable and that the experts should redraft the article so as to meet the point.

Article 7. Ismet Pasha wished to limit the operation of this to agreements with the Constantinople government regarding concessions and to transfers of concessions in territory under the effective authority of the Constantinople government, i.e. Constantinople and the immediate neighbourhood, to the exclusion of territory which had been occupied by the Greeks. As it was not very clear what he was really driving at, and as there was believed to be at least one case in Smyrna in which the French are interested, it was agreed to refer the article back to the experts.

Ismet Pasha reminded us that it had been agreed that arrangements already arrived at between certain concessionary companies and the Turkish government as a result of the recent negotiations at Angora were not to be affected by the protocol.[21] He wished this to be made clear in the protocol itself. To this we agreed.

Ismet Pasha also said that he would have to submit the whole protocol to his government for approval. The allied delegates expressed apprehension lest this should cause delay. Ismet said he hoped this would not be the case, as he had already telegraphed the main lines. General Pellé took the opportunity of reminding him that the three questions which we had been discussing at our meetings of July 7th and 8th were being settled as a whole, and that any offers which the allies had made regarding the other questions were conditional on all three questions being settled.

Ismet Pasha accepted en bloc section 2 of the protocol. He also accepted the draft declaration[22] attached to it, which indeed had been given the form for which he himself had asked. He reserved his consent to the allied proposal that the Turkish delegation should write us a letter covering the cases of the Oriental Railway, the Anatolian Railway, the Mersina-Adana Railway, the Bagdad Railway and the port of Haidar Pasha.

Before closing the meeting, I reviewed the position of the conference in the manner indicated in the penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 263 of July 9th.[23] It was agreed that the necessary further meetings of the economic and financial experts to dispose of the concessions protocol and

[21] See No. 660, n. 10.

[22] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, p. 444.

[23] This ran: 'I then briefly reviewed position of conference resulting from our prolonged conversations and outlined procedure whereby further discussions amongst experts should be finished as far as possible to-day and ground prepared for final official meetings of committees. I said the only question on which I myself still stood in need of instructions was that of naval forces inside Straits. Ismet on his side had said he would need instructions on three points, viz: article 70, period for Irak frontier negotiations and concessions protocol. I urged him to obtain instructions which he required without further delay. Debt question was not mentioned but if as I hope may be the case French government agree that Turks must be allowed to record reply to declaration which allied delegates propose to make in committee this question should present no further difficulty though article 46 bis relative to re-adjustment of gages still remains to be disposed of by experts.'

the small number of outstanding financial clauses should be held to-day,[24] that the jurists should busy themselves with such drafting amendments as are necessary in the various texts and that the ground should be fully prepared with the least possible delay for a series of meetings of the three committees to be held on the earliest possible day in order to record the final agreements on all points remaining to be settled finally in the conference before the treaty can be printed for signature.

These proceedings closed at 1.30 a.m. this morning.[24] We had been working at high pressure since an early hour on Saturday[25] afternoon, and most of the delegates were reduced to a state of extreme physical exhaustion. This was all the greater as our labours were conducted in an atmosphere of stifling heat. It so happened that the two days also coincided with an annual regatta and fair which were held under the windows of the building in which we meet. To some it appeared that the Near Eastern Peace Conference had assumed the position of one of the gloomier side-shows to the fair. From our own point of view it was extremely trying to have to carry on conversations so laborious and important to the accompaniment in our immediate neighbourhood of mer[r]y-go-rounds, dancing, shooting practice and the clash of varied music.

The economic experts have resumed their labours. I hope to be able to send tomorrow evening in the same bag as this telegram a revised version of the concessions protocol taking account of our discussion last night.

[24] July 9. [25] July 7.

No. 667

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Crewe (Paris) Sir R. Graham (Rome) and Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)

No. 287[1] *Telegraphic* [*E 7195/1/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 11, 1923, 5.40 p.m.*

M. Poincaré has proposed that Lausanne treaty shall be signed on behalf of France, Italy and Great Britain by only the three representatives now at Lausanne.

I have agreed.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 224.

[1] No. 287 to Paris, No. 206 to Rome, and No. 122 to Lausanne.

No. 668

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 12, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 273 Telegraphic [E 7191/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 12, 1923, 3.20 a.m.*

My telegram No. 268.[1]

Things are going more slowly than I expected.

My colleagues and I agreed this morning,[2] after reviewing points still to be settled before final meetings of committees can be held, that further private meeting with Ismet must be held this afternoon.

Before this meeting Ismet came to see me privately and seemed conciliatory. He expressed doubt whether meetings of committees could take place tomorrow as he needed instructions from Angora on various points. He said he was now in a position to agree to my latest proposal regarding Irak frontier negotiations.[3] I showed him formula prepared for meeting of delegates regarding reduction of ships in Turkish waters after evacuation subject to unlimited right of passage. He promised to consider it and spoke principally of difficulties over concessions protocol.[4] His object apparently was to divide me from French over their 1914 concessions and to frighten me with bogey of American opposition. I gave him no encouragement.

At meeting of delegates[5] Turks were evidently playing for delay. Ismet was much more uncompromising about departure of ships than my conversation with him had led me to expect. I am telegraphing separately about this.[6] It was necessary to refer once more to economic experts' point on paragraph 6 of evacuation protocol about commercial convention. Even as regards Irak frontier negotiations he was less precise than in private conversation just before. He admitted that Mudania convention would remain in force during evacuation period subject to arrangements of detail being made between military authorities on the spot. Allied delegates dropped with expression of regret question of any special arrangements applied to Article 14 regarding Imbros and Tenedos. Ismet promised to consider question of allowing Belgium to adhere to concessions protocol.

These were principal matters dealt with in long and inconclusive discussion. We left remainder of outstanding points over for consideration at further private meeting tomorrow morning. These include concessions protocol on which economic experts again worked today. I will report more fully tomorrow evening on proceedings today and tomorrow.

At present it is difficult to see whether Turks are moving back, playing for time in hope that Anglo-French relations may deteriorate owing to

[1] No. 666.
[2] July 11.
[3] See No. 635.
[4] See Nos. 660 and 666.
[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 446–55.
[6] No. 669, below.

Ruhr question, or merely testing allied position in order to see what they can screw out of us before finally coming to terms.[7]

[7] In his telegram No. 275 of July 12, Sir H. Rumbold reported: 'French circles here have got the impression that Turks are delaying matters in the hope that statement which Prime Minister is expected to make tomorrow may produce serious disagreement between Great Britain and France which would react on solidarity of allied front here.'

No. 669

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 12, 9.50 a.m.)
No. 274 Telegraphic [E 7217/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 12, 1923, 3.20 a.m.*

My immediately preceding telegram.[1]

I produced at private meeting of delegates this afternoon[2] formula[3] providing for maintenance of maximum number of allied warships sojourning in Turkish waters inside Straits as laid down by correspondence ending with your telegram No. 117,[4] between the end of evacuation and coming into force of Straits convention, subject to unlimited right of passage during the same period. As my French colleague is still awaiting final instructions from Paris, I had to explain that this was merely provisional British proposal based on categorical instructions from His Majesty's Government.

Ismet said he would report my proposal to his government but went on to express uncompromising views of his own. He said that he could accept no evacuation proposal which did not include complete withdrawal of allied warships from Turkish waters, that Turks had always understood evacuation in this sense and that as regards right of passage only proper course was to bring into force article 2 of Straits convention as soon as Turkey had ratified treaty. I combatted all these contentions strongly using same arguments as in previous discussions and emphasized generosity with which we had tried to give Turkey great measure of satisfaction without sacrificing our own principles.

Discussion was quite inconclusive. Ismet may have been simply trying to see how strongly we held our position but this is just the sort of point on which Turks may prove obstinate to point of refusing to sign unless they secure departure of all allied warships from Turkish waters. I have no intention of giving way easily but I should be glad to learn for my guidance whether in the last resort His Majesty's Government would agree to leave no ships at all stationed in those waters provided I can secure unlimited right of passage. I doubt whether French will take strong line and only desire of my Italian

[1] No. 668.
[2] i.e. July 11. *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 446–55.
[3] Ibid., p. 456.
[4] No. 664, n. 5.

colleague is to stand aside from this question leaving French and us to agree amongst ourselves and then get what we can from Turks.[5]

[5] Lord Curzon, having consulted the Admiralty, replied in his telegram No. 125 of July 16: 'Provided that you secure formal acceptance of unlimited right of access you are authorized to abandon provision for sojourn of warships in Turkish waters. But this concession should only be made in last resort and as part of an absolutely final settlement covering concessions and any other points that Ismet may raise afresh. It would be well that Ismet should realize full significance of unlimited right of passage which we have every intention of exercising.'

No. 670

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Howe[1] *(Belgrade)*
No. 58 Telegraphic [E 7118/1/44]

Urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 12, 1923, 1.50 p.m.*

Lausanne telegram No. 267[2] repeated to you (of July 9th; signature of treaty by Yugoslav government).

Please bring such pressure as you can on government to which you are accredited to abandon their obstructionist attitude and to consent to sign treaty.

You should impress on them that there can be no question of their signature with reservations or of omission of reference to Serbia from article dealing with division of debt.

Repeated to Lausanne No. 123.

[1] Mr. Robert George Howe, second secretary at H.M. Embassy at Belgrade from October 1, 1922, acted as Chargé d'Affaires from July 10 to September 8, 1923.

[2] Of July 9. This ran: 'My allied colleagues and I invited the two Yugoslav representatives to see us this afternoon regarding their government's signature of treaty. In spite of all our arguments, they maintained attitude, which they had adopted before our meeting in June, trying to meet demolition by our jurists of their case regarding validity today of financial stipulation of Treaty of London by opposing contrary opinion of a jurist whom they had consulted. They will either only sign treaty with a reserve, which we explained is juridically impossible, or they demand all reference to Serbia in article dealing with repartition of debt should be omitted. This would involve the reopening of the whole question of method of distributing debt.' (As Sir H. Rumbold explained in his telegram No. 186 of June 12, the Allied delegates had referred the question of the validity of Article 6 of the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913 (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, p. 657), which provided for a settlement of financial matters arising out of the first Balkan War by an international commission, to their legal advisers, who had expressed the opinion that the article had no longer any binding force.)

No. 671

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 12, 9.30 p.m.)
No. 276 Telegraphic [E 7250/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 12, 1923, 7 p.m.*

American observer came last night to speak about formula which has been in discussion between Turks and ourselves to cover case of Turkish Petroleum Company. This formula is given in my immediately following telegram.[1]

Mr. Grew dwelt on importance which his government attached to this matter and said that they would not be able to acquiesce in validation of an agreement which had not at the time fulfilled all the legal requirements. He said that if we maintained our position he would be reluctantly compelled to make a protest in committee. He reminded me that intervention of American army on the western front had enabled Allies to defeat Turkey and that demand made by us to Turks to validate Turkish Petroleum Company's rights amounted to unfair use of our victory. He asked me what was my attitude in this matter and suggested that I should drop case of Company.

I did not discuss with him question whether American intervention in the war had in reality enabled us to defeat Turks. I reminded Mr. Grew that on two occasions on which he had objected on behalf of his government to Article 2 of concessions protocol, he had expressly stated that neither his government nor he himself had any particular allied company in view. The Americans had now obtained satisfaction, in that Article 2 had been dropped, but I told him frankly that I was convinced at the time he had made two above-mentioned démarches his government had certainly had in view Perier loan concession[2] and Turkish Petroleum Company. He demurred to this statement.

I then defined my attitude which was, that as long as I was in charge of this delegation I should continue, in discussions with Turks, to defend British interests to utmost of my ability and that I entirely declined to drop case of Turkish Petroleum Company. If he were obliged to make protest in committee we would stand the racket. I then enquired in what manner he proposed that this case should be settled if it were dropped now.

Mr. Grew replied that as this case had formed subject of correspondence between his and my governments during last three years, it seemed an eminently suitable subject for arbitration. I told him that I would report his démarche to you, whereupon he asked whether I would not delay a settlement of this question so as to enable you to consider matter and, if necessary, give me fresh instructions. I said that I meant to hurry on con-

[1] Of July 12. The formula ran: 'Les droits acquis par la compagnie pétrole de Turquie, en vertu des arrangements intervenus en 1914, aussi que les obligations, découlant pour la dite société anonyme de ces arrangements, sont valables et maintenus.'

[2] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 1007; for the text of the agreement, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (New York, 1956), vol. i, pp. 273–6.

clusion of treaty as much as I could. He then pointed out there might not be time for me to receive fresh instructions. I observed that this assumed that I should receive fresh instructions and I had no reason to anticipate that this would be the case.[3] If Mr. Grew makes protests I shall reply.[4]

[3] In his telegram No. 127 of July 16, Lord Curzon replied: 'As you anticipate I have no fresh instructions to send you and I entirely approve your language to Mr. Grew.'
[4] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1034–5.

No. 672

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 13, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 278 Telegraphic [*E 7258/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *July 13, 1923, 3.35 a.m.*

My telegram No. 273.[1]

Private meeting with Ismet was resumed today.[2] We discussed outstanding questions for nearly four hours in the morning and for about two hours in the afternoon. As regards minor questions, Turks were in better mood and though they were inconceivably tiresome and meticulous over some of these questions, they allowed us slowly to extract satisfaction from them with the result that we were able to settle following points.

Article 46 bis to be replaced by agreed declaration which Ismet will read in committee.

Article 70 to be replaced by letter which Turkish government will address to Debt Council.

Article 78. Turks dropped demand for repartition of pre-war claims amongst succession states.

Navigation including cabotage and port services. Existing state of affairs to be maintained until December 31st, we on our side agreeing in return for declaration to this effect to drop mention of commercial convention in evacuation protocol.

Right of cabotage to be maintained in favour of certain named British, French and Italian lines after January 1st, 1924 on the understanding that Turkish government will consider question of negotiating with them agreements for continuation of cabotage, but that if negotiations are not successful by June 30th, 1924, provisional right of cabotage in present conditions will terminate two years after that date.

Belgium to concede[3] concessions protocol.

Duration of commercial convention to be of same period, i.e. three years for Greece, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

This left nothing to be settled except the form of concessions protocol[4] and question of naval evacuation regarding which General Pellé stated at

[1] No. 668. [2] July 12. *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 459–68 and 472–7.
[3] The words 'accede to' were suggested in the Foreign Office.
[4] See Nos. 660 and 666.

outset of this morning's meeting that he had received instructions and was at one with me. We discussed article 2 (a) and (c) of former (i.e. special arrangement for Messrs. Vickers Armstrong and French railway concession of 1914) in morning with no result except to reduce my French colleague and myself to the verge of desperation. I nevertheless hoped that by the afternoon Turks might be more conciliatory about these clauses, and naval evacuation. In order to promote this, I authorised Mr. Ryan to see Riza Nour in the interval and represent to him how little now separated us but how serious situation would become if Turks persisted in uncompromising attitude [on] questions on which we had gone far more than half way to meet them. Mr. Ryan found Riza Nour and Ismet, who specially asked to see him, apparently very anxious for final settlement but still disinclined to yield regarding either naval evacuation or right of preference in regard to future concessions which we are trying to secure for Messrs. Vickers Armstrong and French 1914 concessionnaires. Ismet also produced entirely new formula about Turkish petroleum company, based on principle that question of what rights were acquired in 1914 should be decided by arbitration.

When delegates re-assembled, we cleared off such minor questions enumerated above as had been left over from morning and once more tackled article 2 (a) and (c) of concessions protocol. Ismet declared that he would not yield on question of right of preference. We had already met his arguments in the morning and finding that his attitude was unchanged, General Pellé and I reminded him for the tenth time that it had been agreed to settle questions of debt concessions and evacuation as a whole. His present attitude we said left us no option but to inform our governments that he had gone back on agreement on these questions reached on July 8th.[5] There was no utility in continuing present discussion.

Ismet replied in uncompromising language. There were, he said, four questions still unsettled, one, naval evacuation, two and three, rights of preference claimed on behalf of Messrs. Vickers Armstrong and French railway concessionnaires, four, Turkish petroleum company. As regards one, he re-affirmed his demand for withdrawal of all men-of-war from Turkish waters and application of article 2 of Straits convention to passing ships. As regards two and three, he said we had accepted principle of compensation and were now asking for something new, viz. right of preference. As regards four, he said he had offered new formula.

We made only such replies as were necessary to define our position before breaking off. We refused to consider his demands regarding one. We pointed out as regards two and three, we had throughout taken validity of concessions in question as our starting point, though we had agreed to seek practical working solution of which right of preference formed part. As regards four, I said that his new formula, obviously due, as I told him outright, to American inspiration[6] was unacceptable and was inconsistent with his promise of July 8th to give us satisfaction.

[5] See No. 666.

[6] See No. 671. Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1034–5.

Meeting then broke up. Ismet's attitude made this refusal on our part to continue discussion absolutely necessary.

I have no doubt that he will now run round trying to patch matter up and I hope that he may realize by tomorrow that he has gone too far. If not we shall have to reconsider our whole position and mise en demeure may be necessary but Turks are uncomfortable and I do not despair of saving situation.

Proceedings today were so protracted that I fear that I cannot send full report by bag as I had intended but present telegram gives everything that is essential.

Repeated to Constantinople No. 87.

No. 673

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 14, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 279 Telegraphic [E 7294/35/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 13, 1923, 8.55 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 118[1] and Constantinople telegram No. 384,[1] my telegram No. 275.[2]

You will have seen by my telegram No. 273[3] that question of maintenance of Mudania convention until the end of evacuation period was raised with Ismet at private meeting of delegates on July 11th, and that he admitted that it should remain in force during that period subject to arrangements of detail between military authorities on the spot. What he meant by this was that case might arise at different stages of departure of allied troops from particular area whereon entry of Turkish troops into such area would be a matter of military arrangement though evacuation as a whole might not have been completed. This seems reasonable especially as wording of article 3 (2) of convention in terms provides only for respect of areas occupied by allied forces until 'decision of peace conference'.

I also mentioned danger of incidents during evacuation period and necessity for restraining population by means of proclamation by Ismet or other high authority. He promised that all necessary measures would be taken.

I shall ask Ismet to confirm these assurances at final meeting of my committee if, as I hope, we find a way out of our present difficulties.

Mr. Ryan asked Riza Nour yesterday when Angora might be expected to ratify treaty. He replied the Grand National Assembly would meet on August 2nd and that ratification might be expected about August 15th.

[1] Of July 11, not printed. These telegrams drew attention to the danger of incidents in Constantinople in the period between the signature of the peace treaty and its ratification by Angora and in the period of the evacuation.

[2] No. 668, n. 7.

[3] No. 668.

This agrees generally with Constantinople telegram No. 387[4] to you. Riza Nour asked similar question about our ratification; Mr. Ryan said that owing to prolongation of proceedings, ratification could hardly be expected before re-opening of Parliament at the end of the autumn.

Repeated to Constantinople.

[4] Of July 12, not printed.

No. 674

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 15, 9 a.m.)
No. 284 Telegraphic [E 7308/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 14, 1923, 8.25 p.m.*

My telegram No. 278.[1]

No movement of any kind having been made by Turks, I considered this afternoon with my allied colleagues some form of summary procedure whereby Turks can be brought to a final private meeting and to a definite decision on the few outstanding issues, tomorrow or Monday.[2] Since none of these issues in themselves separately or collectively provides strong grounds for rupture by the allies, care will be taken should this meeting take place and fail, to leave final decisions to the three governments.

You will have noted that Ismet made complete withdrawal of occupying naval forces and, as regards right of passage, application of article 2 Straits convention one of the few outstanding points of difference between Turkey and the allies on which Tuesday's meeting[3] broke off. In proposing application of article 2, Ismet was of course intending to provide anticipatory application of provisions of convention relating to passage under peace conditions, although for the juridical reason that we remain at war until entry into force of peace treaty, his object could not be achieved in the way which he suggested. As a result of Ismet's stand situation here regarding application of evacuation protocol to allied naval position in the Straits waters has therefore changed somewhat since despatch of my telegram No. 274[4] and Turkish resistance on point may now prove severe.

If, however, we bring Turks to a final meeting, it will be essential for us to be in a position to know beforehand the ultimate limit of concessions to which we may be driven to go, in its course, in our final effort definitely to clinch matters. I have been therefore carefully examining the outstanding points and am fairly satisfied that sufficiently satisfactory solutions can probably be obtained as regards those arising on concessions protocol.

As regards naval evacuation, I am aware that Admiralty are comparatively indifferent as to maintenance of vessels in Turkish waters[5] and I can still

[1] No. 672. [2] July 16.
[3] The reference seems to be to Thursday's meeting (July 12). See No. 672.
[4] No. 669. [5] See No. 663.

reduce in bargaining maximum number of vessels which we proposed to reserve the right to send to sojourn in Straits waters.[6] I am also advised that if protocol merely provided for complete withdrawal of naval units in connection with operations of land evacuation, nothing in the law could prevent our sending vessels in to sojourn in Turkish waters if a grave emergency affecting the safety of British lives in Constantinople arose before treaty entered into force. Possibly Turks would accept a declaration by allies attached to protocol or made by agreement with them in committee expressly safeguarding point.

More serious difficulty arises over *unlimited* right of passage. Clearly an excellent juridical case exists for our insistence on this demand but in view of risk of a break in negotiations mainly on this point, it seems necessary to consider whether its recognition by Turkey is absolutely essential to His Majesty's Government. As explained above, Turks are ready to accept right of passage as limited in numbers by Straits convention. Treaty and therefore Straits convention can probably be brought into force within three months after the end of our evacuation.

There seems no serious risk of any political issue arising during these three months which would require passage of unlimited allied or British forces into the Black Sea and as far as I am aware Admiralty would be very reluctant to send any large force at all as long as both shores of the Straits were in Turkish hands. In the circumstances, it is very difficult to justify refusal by allies during this short interim period of some limited right of passage equivalent in substance to that accepted by them already in Straits convention and to be applied as soon as that convention enters into force.

Neither the French nor Italian support is anything but lukewarm on the point.

If possible of course I will wait for His Majesty's Government's observations on this telegram and in particular on lowest limit with which Admiralty would be content if principle of limitation of right of passage is accepted. If, however, in the course of the next two days, I find that in order to finally clinch matters and secure peace, I must accept a limited right of passage until entry into force of peace treaty, I feel certain that you will support me in taking that responsibility even if I have by then received no answer from you.[7]

[6] See No. 664, n. 5.

[7] As the minutes show, action on this telegram was not taken until July 16. Earlier that day, a reply had been sent to Sir H. Rumbold's telegram No. 274 (see No. 669, n. 5). The following telegram was drafted and approved: 'Your tel[egram] No. 284. We shall be satisfied if you secure right of access equivalent to that provided under terms [Article 2, paragraph 2 (a)] of Straits Convention. But, as stated in my previous telegram No. 125 [No. 669, n. 5], this concession must be dependent on a final settlement on all points.' This telegram, however, was not despatched. Instead, telegram No. 128 of July 16 was sent to Sir H. Rumbold, transmitting information from secret sources concerning Ismet Pasha's instructions from Angora (see No. 680, n. 3, below). It was hoped that Sir H. Rumbold, having this information, would find it unnecessary to make the concession authorized in telegram No. 125.

No. 675

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 16, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 286 Telegraphic [E 7312/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 15, 1923, 7.45 p.m.*

My telegram No. 284.[1]

My French and Italian colleagues and I are sending a note[2] to Ismet this evening recapitulating position as it stood the night of July 8th[3] when agreement in principle on three principal outstanding questions was reached, and developments which led to interruption in private conversations on July 12th.[4] We declare ourselves ready however to instruct our experts and jurists to meet their Turkish colleagues on the morning of July 16th to examine once again outstanding points. We suggest that we should afterwards meet Ismet in order to make a final effort to reach agreement to be submitted next day to committees of conference. In conclusion note emphasises that meeting will be purposeless unless we are sure in advance that Ismet can take definite decisions on outstanding points.

Note is not being published. Text follows by bag.[5]

[1] No. 674. [2] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 498–9. [3] See No. 666.
[4] See No. 672. [5] In Lausanne despatch No. 255 of July 17, not printed.

No. 676

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 16, 5.45 p.m.)
No. 288 Telegraphic [E 7361/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 16, 1923, 12.15 p.m.*

Belgrade telegram No. 92.[1]

I assume British Chargé d'Affaires will be instructed to join his French and Italian colleagues.[2]

Serbian representatives have of course attended every meeting of financial and economic committees and taken active part where it suited them, e.g. as

[1] Of July 15. This ran: 'Minister for Foreign Affairs obstinately maintains attitude adopted by Serbian delegates at Lausanne [see No. 670, n. 2] arguing that article 6 of Treaty of London is still in force and stating he cannot accept opinion of allied jurists. For this reason and in order not to embarrass negotiations they had taken no part in discussions on economic and financial clauses of Treaty of Lausanne and it would be manifestly unfair to ask them to sign treaty parts of which they had not negotiated. They could therefore only sign with reservations already mentioned. I made it quite clear that there could be no question of such a signature and he replied that in that case they would not sign.'

[2] In Foreign Office telegram No. 60 to Belgrade, Lord Curzon had instructed Mr. Howe as follows: 'You should join your French and Italian colleagues in exerting further pressure on government to which you are accredited.' Mr. Howe reported in his telegram No. 94 of July 20 that his French colleague had made his démarche the day before, and that he himself and his Italian colleague had followed suit that morning.

regards duration of commercial convention. It is not accurate therefore to say that they had taken no part in these discussions.

Absence of Serbian representatives from some meetings of financial and economic experts was of course entirely voluntary and it is ridiculous to adduce it as an argument in favour of their case.

So far as this conference is concerned only pressure which can be used is allied intention to refuse to allow them to sign any act or convention of this conference if they will not sign treaty. They would probably like to sign commercial convention on the grounds of economic interests and Straits convention on grounds of prestige.[3]

Repeated to Belgrade.

[3] In his telegram No. 95 of July 20, Mr. Howe reported: 'I see no prospect of this government signing treaty at present moment but I am inclined to think, and French minister is convinced, that Serbs will eventually end by signing although perhaps not for some months . . . '. Referring to this telegram, Sir H. Rumbold, in Lausanne telegram No. 302 of July 21, stated: 'Special protocol, to be executed by parties on day of signature, will enable Yugoslavia to sign at any time up to coming into force of treaty.'

No. 677

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 19, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 292 (and No. 294) Telegraphic: by bag [*E 7478/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *July 17, 1923*

My telegram No. 289.[1]

Meetings of economic experts and experts dealing with evacuation protocol[2] which took place at 10 o'clock yesterday morning ended in no modification of position, except that Turkish experts agreed to an allied proposal that the last paragraphs of sections (a) and (c) of article 2 of the concessions protocol[3] should be modified to substitute rights of equal competition for rights of preference in the case of Vickers Armstrong and the Régie Générale. It was clear that on other points neither side was prepared to show their hand until the delegates' meeting in the afternoon.

This took place at 5 o'clock. About 4 o'clock Mr. Ryan, who was asked by Ismet Pasha to go and see him, had succeeded in extracting with great skill an agreement from Ismet Pasha upon the principles upon which naval evacuation was to be settled. These were given in my above-mentioned telegram.[4] In addition Ismet asked that declaration be made by Turkey

[1] Of July 17. This telegram, which reported that Ismet had replied on July 16 to the Allied Note (see No. 675) agreeing to the proposed meeting, went on to summarise the results of that meeting.

[2] *Recueil (2)*, vol. i, pp. 426–7, 456.

[3] Ibid., pp. 442–4.

[4] This ran: 'After three quarter of an hour's conversation and strong pressure Mr. Ryan extracted agreement from Ismet on point 4 above [Naval evacuation] comprising (a) complete liberty of passage until entry into force of treaty, (b) right of each of the three allies to station one cruiser and two destroyers with suitable coaling and provisioning

who also expressed hope that ratifications by the different Parliaments should take place as soon as possible with a view to the early entry into force of the treaty.

Meeting of allied and Turkish delegates[5] opened by my briefly recapitulating the question of naval evacuation and explaining the agreement which Mr. Ryan and Ismet Pasha had provisionally accepted. As usual emphasising Turkey's sacrifices and the further proof which he was thus giving of her conciliatory spirit, Ismet formally accepted this settlement but my French colleague, while emphasising further concessions offered on this point by the allies, reserved his final agreement until outstanding points, issues on concessions protocol, should be satisfactorily solved. It was agreed that principles should be embodied today by the jurists in a draft declaration for submission to the first committee this afternoon.[6] In the evacuation protocol itself only reference to naval evacuation will be a statement that the withdrawal of military forces comprises allied naval units.

Discussion then passed to the three outstanding points on the concessions protocol. General Pellé explained that he was quite unable to understand why Ismet Pasha should require the suppression of the first paragraph of section (c) of article 2 and the similar phrase regarding maintenance in the first paragraph of section (a) of the same article. Both paragraphs clearly showed that the allies did not demand the application of the old concessions but required this statement regarding maintenance in order to emphasise the basis on which compensation in cash or in kind was to be determined. In particular General Pellé explained how section (c) had been carefully drawn up to leave intact the question of the Chester concession and that he had actually shown the draft to Mr. Grew who raised no objection to it.

As regards Ismet's objections to the last paragraphs of sections (a) and (c) relating to rights of preference, General Pellé emphasised the further great concession which the allied experts had offered the Turkish experts that morning, namely to change the preference rights into one of equal competition with all applicants.

Ismet showed clearly that, as regards maintenance, he was frightened by the attitude of the Angora government and the Angora Assembly who would see in the phrase relating to maintenance an attempt by the allies to challenge their right to give the Chester concession and the possibility of future claims for indemnification by Chester and the American government. He apparently did not fully understand what was being proposed as regards the rights of competition, but gradually took refuge in the one objection that Turkey, even under the article as now drafted, might be prevented from reserving either of these concessions to Turkish as opposed to foreign capitalists.

General Pellé pointed out most emphatically that whatever the Angora

auxiliaries in Straits water up to entry into force of Straits convention or December 31st 1923 whichever comes earliest both (a) and (b) to be provided by unilateral declaration on the part of Turkey to be attached to evacuation protocol. This agreement was formally accepted by Ismet after opening of meeting at five p.m.'

[5] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 480–93.

[6] See No. 678, below.

government might have done in 1923, certain rights were created in 1914 in favour of the Régie Générale. An Iradé had been issued; a legal concession had been given, and for months past Ismet had been aware of the French point of view on this issue and had never challenged their case. General Pellé also pointed out that Hamid Bey when semi-official representative of the Angora government at Constantinople had informed General Pellé that his government regarded the 1914 concession as valid. Finally the minutes of Sunday's meeting[7] were quoted to show that Ismet had accepted the phrase in question, asking only for the suppression of the word 'juridiquement' which had been accorded.

I strongly supported General Pellé and tried to explain to Ismet that no Turkish right was being infringed by the phrase regarding equal competition. Ismet was also challenged to say whether any Turk was really likely to be found with the necessary capital to take up these concessions and whether the Angora Assembly could really be regarded as such strict guardians of the economic rights of Turks after they had handed over practically a complete monopoly for all new railway construction and mineral exploitation to an American capitalist[8] whose financial standing was doubtful. Ismet Pasha only took refuge in the usual phrase regarding sovereign rights and independence, but he did drop one rather significant phrase regarding his apprehension as to putting anything regarding special rights for these companies into an international act.

As regards the Chester concession, Ismet excused his Assembly for their action by saying that they could not wait for allied competition to make itself felt. They were out of contact with the rest of the world and they had therefore been forced to give the concession to the first suitable entrepreneur who came forward.

I took this opportunity of pointing out that, so far as contact with the Turkish government officially was concerned, the United States government had for some time after the armistice maintained relations through the Swedish Legation at Constantinople while taking care to despatch commercial experts and concession hunters to Angora.

The discussion then passed to the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company. I began by reading passages from Ismet's note of July 16th[9] (see my despatch No. 255 of July 16th)[10] to the Presidents of the delegations of the inviting powers in which he more than once lays down that, as regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, the basis of negotiation was the recognition of the acquired rights of the company. I also read the passage from the procès-verbal of the final meeting on the night of July 8th[11] on which agreement in principle was reached. This passage clearly shows that Ismet himself proposed a formula recognising the maintenance of 'droits acquis', that he stated that he was anxious to give us satisfaction and that he had no 'arrière-pensée'.

[7] The reference is presumably to the meeting held on Sunday, July 8 (see No. 666).
[8] Admiral Chester. See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1220–40.
[9] See n. 1.
[10] Not printed.
[11] See No. 666.

I asked Ismet what was now his attitude regarding the company in the light of this explanation. He agreed that the position was generally as I had stated it. He stated quite frankly that he had not fully realised on Thursday[12] the extent to which the maintenance of 'droits acquis' might lead to legal difficulties in connection with the Chester concession. For this reason he had proposed on Thursday last (see my telegram No. 278 of July 13th)[13] the formula providing for arbitration.

In reply it was pointed out that this question was one between the British and Turkish governments and that we were not concerned here with rights given at a later date to an American concessionaire or with the American government's attitude regarding these rights.

Ismet retorted that the Chester concession had been given to a Turkish company not to an American company, and from the point of view of law, differences upon it would be settled in the Turkish courts. He was afraid of the dispute on this point of 'droits acquis' being settled against the Turkish government, if they agreed to any words modifying the present position, and of his government having to pay a large indemnity. He again pressed for arbitration.

At this point I thought it well to suggest that the allied delegates should have a discussion among themselves and the Turkish delegates retired. In the course of the ensuing discussion the French, after some demur, agreed that Ismet's first point regarding the maintenance of rights in paragraph 1 of sections (a) and (c) could really be met by a re-draft which, while suppressing the simple affirmation that the 1914 concessions were maintained, made it clear that concessions had been granted in that year, and that it was now a question of putting the proprietors back into possession of their rights. The French also agreed that it would be possible to accept the incorporation of the paragraph in sections (a) and (c) relating to open competition in a letter from Ismet to the companies. I explained that I was prepared to go a good deal further than I had done on the Turkish Petroleum Company. I suggested that Mr. Ryan who had been in touch with the Turkish experts on all these questions recently should first go to the Turkish delegates in the next room and sound them on the new proposals on which we were agreed, including the new formula regarding the Turkish Petroleum Company, since it seemed essential that we should run no risk of meeting with another failure on the outstanding points. The allied delegates waited for an hour while Mr. Ryan endeavoured to persuade Ismet Pasha to accept the new suggestions and formulas. At 9 o'clock Ismet had come round on the first point, but it was impossible to move him on the other two. The whole meeting was therefore adjourned until 11 p.m. in the hope that Riza Nour and Munir Bey, who understood more clearly the proposals made to them and who were obviously anxious to bring matters to a conclusion, would be able in the mean time to influence Ismet who appeared exhausted and diffident of taking any final responsibility.

[12] July 12 (see No. 672).

[13] No. 672.

When the meeting resumed I explained that I had just received a telegram from my government who insisted upon an immediate and satisfactory solution on the concessions question,[14] and I added that I was astounded at Ismet's apparent refusal to accept the proposals which Mr. Ryan had made to him on behalf of the allied delegates. General Pellé expressed himself equally strongly and said that it was quite useless for the allies to be conciliatory and make concessions as Ismet only went back step by step on what he had agreed upon on Sunday. Signor Montagna, who had for the last two days been singularly silent, now also returned to the charge with an earnest appeal for a display of conciliation and goodwill on Ismet's part.

Ismet began by saying that the points before us were most vital to Turkey and no concession was possible. He dwelt particularly on the prejudice to Turkey's rights of the proposal regarding 10 years' open competition for the Régie Générale. Both my French colleagues and I strongly dissented from this and emphasised the bad faith which the Turkish government were showing as regards the Régie's concession. Eventually, after further discussion, Ismet accepted the allied proposal after the period had been reduced to 5 years and a phrase had been introduced to enable a concession to be given to an undertaking working with Turkish capital alone without inviting any foreign competition. It was agreed that Ismet should write a letter in this sense to the Régie Générale and Vickers Armstrong and should send copies of the letter to the French and British delegations.[15] He will sign them on behalf of the Turkish Minister of Public Works.

Ismet then proceeded to accept the allied suggestions for the re-drafting of the first paragraphs of (a) and (c) to surmount the difficulty regarding the maintenance of the pre-war concessions.

A long controversy ensued on the Turkish Petroleum Company. I tried Ismet with a weak formula which merely provided that the situation in regard to the company's pre-war arrangement should be maintained and that Turkey should declare that it had not been modified by the war. Later I suggested adding to this a sentence providing for further negotiations between the British and Turkish governments on any questions which might arise from that situation. Ismet was adamant on the point. From his rather involved explanations and from what we know from other confidential sources of Angora's attitude it is fairly clear that his difficulty was as follows. The grant of the railway and mineral rights in the Mosul area to the Chester Company reserves the 'droits acquis' by other parties. If Ismet were in any way to appear to confirm directly or indirectly at the conference or in the treaty rights held by the Turkish Petroleum Company before the war, he feared that he would lay himself open to a charge by Chester that the Turkish government had deliberately created 'droits acquis' to conflict with part of the concession which they had granted to Chester a few months before and to deprive him of the greatest attraction in the concession, namely the oil

[14] This was implicit in Foreign Office telegram No. 128 of July 16, not printed (see No. 674, n. 7).

[15] See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp 521–2; Cmd. 1829, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), pp. 236–9.

rights. For this reason he refused to answer my direct question whether or not in the Turkish government's opinion the company's rights were affected by the war. He also rejected a further formula which I proposed as follows: 'Les droits qui existaient au profit de la Turkish Petroleum Company en 1914 existent aujourd'hui nonobstant la guerre qui a éclatée depuis cette date.' Ismet maintained that the question was a juridical one, that he could not intervene politically and that it was for some impartial tribunal to decide whether or not the Turkish Petroleum Company had acquired rights in 1914.

We made it quite clear of course throughout that it was only in so far as the concessions of company concerned might fall within the new Turkey that any question between us and the Turkish government on those rights would arise.

Finally it became quite evident that Ismet would not commit himself. Though General Pellé did his best to support me he was obviously not very interested and Signor Montagna was significantly silent. I therefore felt it useless as well as undesirable to adjourn the discussion and the conclusion of the final settlement over a question so controversial and one on which I would have received little or no support from my allied colleagues. I also felt that Your Lordship would not have wished me to threaten to break or to have adjourned the discussions on account of this one question with all the risks of further points being reopened or other points being raised. I therefore declared that I would content myself with making a strong declaration in the committee next day explaining His Majesty's Government's attitude regarding this company and their rights and holding the Turkish government responsible for any damage to them.

After drafting alterations in two other parts of the Concessions Protocol prepared by the experts had been read and agreed, the meeting closed at 2 a.m. in an atmosphere of relief, but without any display of exhilaration on either side as to the results. While we did not obtain all that I had desired on the Concessions Protocol we secured more than I had expected on the question of evacuation, and the main thing is to have at last brought Ismet to take a final and definite decision.[16]

[16] Cf. *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1035–6.

No. 678

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 19, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 293 (and No. 296) Telegraphic: by bag [*E 7479/1/44*]

LAUSANNE, *July 17, 1923*

My telegram No. 291.[1]

The ground had been carefully prepared for the final meetings of the

[1] Of July 17. This ran: 'At final meetings of three committees held this afternoon agreements on all outstanding questions were officially recorded. It only remains to collate

three committees this afternoon, and while contentious questions were raised they were not of such a kind as to affect the text of the Treaty and the other instruments. The following is a summary record of the proceedings under each head.

First Committee.[2] *Evacuation Protocol.* We adopted the text of the Protocol and the attached declaration,[3] enclosed in my despatch No. 261 of to-day's date.[4] A clause had been added to the Protocol at the last moment providing that the Mudania Convention should remain in force until the end of the evacuation subject to arrangements of detail between the respective military authorities on the spot. The attached declaration records the settlement regarding the right of passage and the retention of a limited number of ships in Constantinople as reported in my telegram No. 289 of to-day's date.[5]

Karagatch Protocol. The text of this[6] has been sent home in my despatch No. 262 of July 17th.[4] It embodies the arrangement made between M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha, with the addition of the Turkish formula regarding Imbros and Tenedos, which is a little better than nothing at all. It was adopted subject to an observation by M. Veniselos that he would like to add a few words, the nature of which he did not indicate, to the clause about Imbros and Tenedos. He said he would like to discuss this addition with Ismet Pasha, with whom he hoped to come to an agreement without difficulty.

Accession of Belgium and Portugal. We adopted the texts[7] enclosed in my despatch No. 260 of July 17th.[4]

Article 160 of the Draft Treaty of January 31st.[8] We formally adopted an addition to this article providing for the re-establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and the bringing into force of the clauses relative to the Greco-Turkish frontier as soon as both Powers had ratified the Treaty.

Amnesty Declaration. The text of this was definitely adopted some time ago[9] and there is no question of altering it. I took the opportunity to-day, however, of reading a prepared statement once more urging upon the Turks the importance of observing this Declaration both in the letter and in the spirit, and urging the allied view that it would become operative as from the date of signature. I laid stress on the recent case of the arrest in Constantinople of certain Greeks who had served in a British Labour Battalion and on the whole attitude of the Turks towards the return of Armenians. General Pellé supported me strongly and made special reference to the case of persons normally resident in Cilicia who, under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement,[10] had been promised an amnesty. The Italian, Japanese and American

texts and prepare treaty and other instruments for signature which has been fixed for July 24th.'

(For the texts of the treaty and other instruments signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, see *Recueil* (*2*), vol. ii; *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, pp. 543–639 and vol. 118, pp. 1045–7; or Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), which contains, besides the French texts, English translations.)

[2] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, pp. 155–62. [3] Ibid., pp. 163–5. [4] Not printed (see n. 1).
[5] No. 677, n. 4. [6] *Recueil* (*2*), vol. i, p. 168. [7] Ibid., pp. 171–3.
[8] See Appendix III. [9] See No. 587.
[10] See Vol. XVII, No. 423, n. 2.

representatives followed. Mr. Grew read a prepared statement[11] echoing what I had said in milder and more flowery language. Ismet Pasha, though he must have been aware that the question of the expatriated Armenians would be raised, was obviously not prepared for this combined attack. After some consultation with his supporters, he delivered himself of a reply in which he stated that Turkey fully desired that the amnesty should be applied sincerely and with rapidity. Turkey, he said, would vie [with] other States in the generosity with which she applied this measure. He claimed that as regards subjects who had borne arms against their country, Turkey had shown greater tolerance than any other State. He nevertheless defended the unwillingness of the Turkish government to allow the return of dangerous Armenian elements and represented the question of the large masses of refugees now outside Turkey as being an economic problem rather than one having any connection with the amnesty.

I asked Ismet Pasha to state more precisely whether the Turkish government would regard the Amnesty Declaration as coming into force on the date of signature. I pointed out that the obligations imposed by it were reciprocal; that it was the intention of the allied governments to satisfy these obligations as soon as they had signed the Declaration; and that, even if legislative action or a decision of the Grand National Assembly were necessary, it nevertheless rested with the Turkish government to suspend proceedings which would eventually be barred by the Declaration if they wished to do so. I pointed out that the Declaration should take precedence of all legislation.

Ismet Pasha briefly replied that Turkey would act, on her side, in the sense which I had indicated.

M. Veniselos said that though the right of the Constantinople Greeks to return to their homes was assured by the Exchange of Populations Convention,[12] he was nevertheless pre-occupied by what he had heard me say, on the authority of the Angora representative in Constantinople, regarding the law applicable to persons who had rendered assistance to enemy armies. He would, however, speak direct to Ismet Pasha on this subject. He added rather pointedly that he hoped that on this, as on other occasions, he would have no difficulty in reaching an agreement with Ismet Pasha in direct conversation. Ismet Pasha concurred in this hope.

I reminded Ismet Pasha that the Turkish delegation was to address to the British, French and Italian delegations a letter embodying the understanding arrived at some weeks ago about schools and other establishments. Ismet promised that the letters would be forthcoming.[13]

It was agreed to issue an invitation to the Russian government to send representatives to Lausanne or, alternatively, to Constantinople within a period of three weeks, to sign the Straits Convention.[14]

[11] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 158–9. See also *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1036–7.
[12] *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–53.
[13] See *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 512–14; Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), pp. 231–3.
[14] Cf. No. 682, n. 3, below.

Having thus disposed of the work of my Committee, I read a closing statement in which, after expressing thanks to the Swiss authorities, the experts (among whom I specially named M. Fromageot and Munir Bey) and the Secretariat General, I advanced some general considerations regarding the dependence of nations on each other, the moral element in the greatness of those Powers who are called great, and the value to a country like Turkey of the example of a country like Switzerland where people of different races, language and religion form, in spite of these distinctions, a solid block animated by a mutual spirit of tolerance and a common spirit of solidarity.

Second Committee.[15]

The letter to the Council of the Public Debt[16] replacing Article 70 of the Draft Treaty of January 31st was agreed to. Ismet Pasha read the agreed statement, subject to which it had been agreed to drop Article 46 bis.

We then came to the first paragraph of Article 56 regarding the maintenance of the Decree of Muharrem, etc. General Pellé announced the decision of the Inviting Powers to drop this paragraph and dispense with any declaration to the bondholders. He read, on behalf of the allied delegations, the statement which had been drawn up in Paris, regarding the sanctity of the obligations imposed on Turkey by her agreements with the bondholders. Ismet Pasha read a counter-declaration in which, after reaffirming the inability of Turkey to pay interest in gold or in pounds sterling, he said that the declaration of the allied delegates was not binding in Turkey. General Pellé pressed him for a definition of what was meant by the latter part of this statement. Did it mean that Turkey repudiated her obligations? Or did it mean that Turkey would treat with her creditors for an alleviation of her burdens by agreement with them? After some little discussion in which Ismet indicated that Turkey contemplated negotiations with the bondholders but strictly on the basis of her incapacity to pay in pounds sterling or gold, General Pellé said he understood Ismet Pasha's statements as in no wise invalidating the juridical value of the contracts between Turkey and the bondholders. Ismet Pasha said that he had sufficiently indicated the attitude of his government and that he had nothing to add. General Pellé, to the relief of everyone, accepted this as sufficient.

M. Veniselos then made a statement to the effect that Greece would consider herself entitled to the benefit of any alleviation of financial liabilities in respect of the Debt which might be agreed upon between the bondholders and the Turkish government.[17] General Pellé made a carefully worded and conciliatory reply, and it was unnecessary for me to intervene. Copies of these statements will be forwarded in due course.[18]

General Pellé then wound up the work of his committee with a statement similar to that which I had already made. He emphasised the bonds which

[15] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 259–64.
[16] Ibid., pp. 257–8. See also Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), pp. 228–31.
[17] Cf. No. 637.
[18] In Lausanne despatch No. 273 of July 21, not printed.

had united France and Turkey in the past and said that France was more interested than any other country in the re-establishment of peaceful relations with Turkey.

Third Committee.[19]

The Turkish delegation withdrew their reservation regarding Article 78 of the Draft Treaty of January 31st, the object of which reservation was to provide for the distribution among the Succession States of pre-war claims.

The allied delegations agreed to drop the paragraphs in Article 9 of the Commercial Convention claiming the maintenance of the right of cabotage for a period of years. M. Montagna mentioned that, so far as the immediate future was concerned, the question of cabotage was disposed of by the declaration attached to the Evacuation Protocol. It had been agreed that no mention should be made of the special arrangement continuing this right in favour of certain British, French and Italian lines for two and a half years after January 1st next, and M. Montagna merely hinted in a passing manner at this arrangement.[20]

Note was taken of the agreement between M. Veniselos and Ismet Pasha regarding the duration of the Commercial Convention, the effect of which is to place Greece on the same footing as Roumania and Serbia and to fix duration of the Convention at two and a half years with a further period of six months as from denunciation by the parties, i.e. a minimum of three years in all three cases.

We next took the Concessions Protocol,[21] a copy of the final version of which is enclosed in my despatch No. 259 of July 17th.[22] The Protocol as a whole was adopted. I then read a statement explaining the circumstances in which all mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company had been omitted from Article 2. I reproached Ismet Pasha with having failed to fulfil his promise to agree upon a formula upholding the acquired rights of the Company. I stated categorically that His Majesty's Government regarded all the obligations undertaken by the Ottoman government in 1914 as binding on the Turkish government in any territory which might remain to Turkey as result of the peace treaty. They did not, I said, recognise any rights, whether within or without such territory, which might be alleged to have been granted by the Turkish government to any third party and which would conflict [with] the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company. I affirmed the strong intention of His Majesty's Government to hold the Turkish government responsible for any failure to fulfil the obligations contracted in 1914.

This elicited a statement from Ismet Pasha to the effect that the question was a juridical one which he was not prepared to prejudice in any way and which, in his view, should be settled by arbitration, as he had already

[19] *Recueil* (2), vol. i, pp. 377–85.

[20] See ibid., pp. 518–20 (or Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series, No. 16 (1923), pp. 233–5).

[21] Ibid., pp. 386–9.

[22] Not printed (see n. 1).

proposed. Mr. Grew, following immediately on Ismet Pasha, made a statement[23] in guarded terms, the substance of which was that he assumed that any settlement regarding Vickers Armstrong and the French Railway Concessionaries would not affect the interests of American citizens. As regards the Turkish Petroleum Company, the views of his government were as stated in the correspondence between them and His Majesty's Government.[24]

I replied briefly to both statements. I reminded Ismet Pasha that if, from the point of view of the Turkish government, there were a conflict between two private interests owing to two conflicting acts of the Turkish government, that government could not escape its responsibility towards the prior claimant, namely the Turkish Petroleum Company, by proposing arbitration. My government, I said, had an undoubted right to protect its own subjects and they intended to exercise this right in case of need. As regards Mr. Grew's declaration, the view of the British government had been stated in the correspondence to which he himself had referred. All I need add was that I had difficulty in understanding by what right a third Power could claim to intervene in a question concerning rights accorded by the Ottoman government, which was the predecessor of the present Turkish government, to a British Company.

This end[ed] the matter.

The Japanese delegate made a speech in which, while saying that Japan had at present no concessionary interests in Turkey and was, for that reason, not a party to the protocol, she stood for the principle of the 'Open Door'. Ismet Pasha, who regards this principle with great suspicion, stated briefly that Turkey was in these matters a sovereign and independent State.

General Pellé raised the question of the prolongation of two years of the contract between the Turkish government and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. He got very little change out of Ismet Pasha, who began by saying that this was outside the competence of the conference, and ended by promising that he would telegraph recommending the matter to the favourable consideration of his government with whom, as a matter fact, the bank was already in direct negotiation.

I then made a statement regarding the position of agents of British companies in Turkey who, under the present Turkish law, might be held responsible for all the operations of their principals in Turkey owing to the mere fact that the companies had not registered under the Turkish law. I pointed out that this law had been promulgated at the end of 1914; that no attempt had been made to enforce it after the Armistice until the Angora government assumed control; that even then its enforcement had been delayed by arrangement between the High Commissioners in Constantinople and the Angora government; and that it was wholly inadmissible in these circumstances that the agents should be visited with responsibility. I reserved the right of His Majesty's Government to protect its subjects by all means customary between governments if any attempt were made so to hold the

[23] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, p. 1038.

[24] See No. 671. See also *F.R.U.S.* 1922, vol. ii, pp. 333–52; 1923, vol. ii, pp. 240–2.

agents of the companies responsible. Ismet Pasha maintained that this was entirely a question of domestic legislation and said that there could be no ground for intervention on such an issue in Turkish internal affairs. General Pellé and Monsieur Montagna supported my statement in a somewhat belated and lukewarm fashion, but the latter usefully pointed out at the end of the discussion that diplomatic intervention in such a case was always possible.

Ismet Pasha made a final speech in which he emphasised fact that peace treaty which was about to be signed was result of an agreement with Turkey reached through discussions to which inviting Powers had had the wisdom to admit Turkey on a footing of equality. He also dwelt on sincere intentions of Turkey to apply all provisions of settlement.

Referring to a passing allusion in my speech to past relations between Great Britain and Turkey, Ismet specially thanked British delegation recalling old friendship between Great Britain and Turkey which had been so strong in the past and he hoped and believed would be strong in future. Ismet then referred to Turkey's special relations with France in history and said that Turkey would continue to entertain friendly sentiments towards that country. Relations between Turkey and Italy had always been most amicable. He expressed special gratitude to Switzerland and to Lausanne as well as to all experts and jurists who had assisted in successful conclusion of common task. Turkish delegation would always remember with feelings of honour and respect collaboration of all delegations present at this conference.

The meeting terminated with a series of formal speeches by the heads of the different delegations most of which can justifiably be described as 'flapdoodle'. The only notable features of this display of oratory were, firstly, that the Roumanian and Serbian delegates professed ignorance of the fact that these were the last real sittings of the conference, and that Monsieur Stancioff leaped in with a statement to the effect that he was most grateful to the President of the Political Commission for the opportunity which had been given to the Bulgarian delegation to state their views and aspirations. This somewhat discomfited Monsieur Montagna who had intended to close the discussion and had already delivered an eloquent, if somewhat lengthy, speech.[25] Both Monsieur Diamandy and Monsieur Yovanovitch said that they would have statements to make at the closing session of the conference. So far as the Serbian delegate was concerned, this created some amusement as it is more than doubtful whether he will be admitted officially to that session, in view of the avowed intention of his government not to allow him to sign the Treaty.[26]

[25] For Signor Montagna's general comments on the Conference of Lausanne see *D.D.I.* (*ii*), No. 140.

[26] See No. 670 and No. 676.

No. 679

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne)

No. 131 Telegraphic [E 7398/1/44]

Very urgent FOREIGN OFFICE, *July 18, 1923, 8.45 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 289 (of 17th July).[1]

I am most uneasy at learning that you jettisoned case of Turkish Petroleum Company whose claims I repeatedly emphasised in discussion when at Lausanne regarding Mosul.

Apart from fact that secret information which you will have received last evening shows that Ismet might have yielded,[2] it appears to me that mere unilateral reservation, however strongly couched by you, cannot but prejudice materially our position in forthcoming negotiations about Mosul, and will also weaken most seriously Company's claims to rights under 1914 concession.

Unless you are convinced that my apprehensions are not fully justified, you should insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum Company into the protocol.

I object very strongly to additional validity given to Chester concession[3] by our surrender.

[1] See No. 677, nn. 1 and 4.

[2] Cf. No. 674, n. 7 and No. 680, nn. 2 and 3, below.

[3] See No. 586, n. 8.

No. 680

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (Received July 20, 8.30 a.m.)

No. 297 Telegraphic [E 7527/1/44]

Very urgent LAUSANNE, *July 19, 1923, 9 p.m.*

Your telegram No. 131.[1]

Your Lordship's telegram has caused me deep concern but does not alter my conviction that only alternative to course which I took would have been rupture of conference.

Ismet's telegram[2] to which you refer, crossed one from Angora instructing him to break rather than yield and to make public reasons for doing so.[3] His

[1] No. 679.

[2] On July 13, Ismet Pasha had advised his Government that, although he would stand firm to the last, a complete rupture in negotiations should be avoided, provided satisfaction were obtained on the evacuation question.

[3] The Angora Government's instructions to Ismet Pasha were summarised in Foreign Office telegram No. 128 to Lausanne (see No. 674, n. 7). These instructions stated that the Angora Government were prepared to allow the question of the rights of the Turkish Petroleum Company to be referred to a neutral arbitrator (thus absolving themselves from responsibility for any possible infraction of the Chester Concession). They went on to say, however, that Ismet Pasha was to stand fast on the principle of the right of the Grand National Assembly to grant concessions to whom they pleased. Sir H. Rumbold evidently attached much importance to this stipulation.

attitude since July 12th has shown that he would have carried out these instructions. I cannot but think in that case allies and considerable section of world opinion would have accused His Majesty's Government of destroying certainty of peace for the sake of British oil interests. We should have incurred odium of having done this after we had ourselves forced French government to treat debt question in manner precisely similar to that in which I myself finally treated that of Turkish Petroleum Company.

I did not consider when I decided on my line of action, nor does it now seem to me possible that failure to obtain affirmation by Turkey of company's rights could in any way prejudice our negotiations regarding frontier. So far as I was influenced at all by consideration connected with latter question, I took view that the more strongly I insisted on such affirmation, the more Turks would have believed His Majesty's Government to be apprehensive lest settlement of frontier question should be unfavourable to them. In any case past experience has shown that in any negotiations . . .[4] by political and military considerations.

For the rest I can only hope that fuller explanations contained in my telegram No. 292[5] and account of my final action given in my telegram No. 293[6] will satisfy you, firstly, that as stated above, course which I took was the only one open to me if rupture was to be avoided, secondly, that I have left question of Turkish Petroleum Company intact as between Turkish government and His Majesty's Government, and thirdly, that my action has in no way enhanced validity of Chester concession.

As regards first consideration, I felt nothing could be further from your wishes than that rupture should take place on an exclusively British question, which, however important, is of secondary importance and which, if we retain Mosul, will, as question between us and Turkey, lose much even of that secondary importance and which relates to oil.

I had in mind your only published statement on latter subject during first phase of conference (see blue book,[7] pages 360 and 361) when you emphatically stated that oil considerations had nothing to do with our attitude regarding Mosul. Moreover, strongly as I felt regarding action of American delegation, I did not think Your Lordship would wish rupture to occur in circumstances which would have committed His Majesty's Government to open and unpleasant dispute with United States government.

As regards second and third considerations, I have not only affirmed in strongest manner, determination of His Majesty's Government to uphold validity of petroleum company's concession but I have denied that any rights alleged to have been given to Chester can over-ride it or that United States government are entitled to intervene in question regarding rights conferred by Turkish government on British company. I have made it very difficult for Turks to invoke hereafter what is perhaps most substantial argument they could use, namely that agreement of 1914 was one between governments and as such abrogated by outbreak of war. Ismet repeatedly said that rights

[4] The text is here uncertain. [5] No. 677. [6] No. 678.
[7] i.e. Cmd. 1814.

claimed by company were of private nature and their value was what it was before the war but that he was not prepared to determine now what their value was.

I do not feel that company's claims are in any way weakened or those of Chester strengthened by what has occurred. Claims of petroleum company remain in exactly the same legal position as before conference. What has happened is that we have failed to secure something which would have put them in a better position and which Turks were determined not to give from fear of exposing themselves to large claim to compensation by Chester which they anticipated, probably with reason, would have the support of United States government.

Before resigning myself to this failure, I sought for ten days by pressure and persuasion to make Turkish representative yield but every day up to the end his attitude had been hardening owing to receipt of increasingly stringent instructions from Angora: he would agree to no formula which did not provide for arbitration, which I refused as I was advised that result of any arbitration might tie our hands to an unfortunate extent in dealing with company claims of rights in the hoped-for event of their falling mainly in Irak.

I propose to await Your Lordship's instructions before taking any action. I deeply regret that after three months' arduous negotiations in the course of which you have more than once been good enough to express appreciation of my proceedings, I should have failed to obtain your approval on the last remaining question which stood in the way of peace. You will doubtless take into account what is much more important than any personal consideration, namely how grave a matter it would be to reopen question after the final meeting of the committee has been held. I could only do so by announcing that His Majesty's Government had practically disavowed my action; even that would not prevent Ismet from accusing both His Majesty's Government and myself of bad faith and I cannot insist too strongly that it will not have the effect of securing more favourable settlement. If His Majesty's Government feels no other course is open to them, they must be prepared to face dangers which I had occasion to indicate when I urged the importance of dissuading French government from, on their side, precipitating rupture.[8]

[8] Mr. Osborne minuted (July 20) as follows: 'Sir H. Rumbold makes out a strong case for his action in an extremely difficult situation. . . . All evidence supports his contention that Ismet would not have dared to give way and it is doubtful if the Allies would have followed us—or would now—in risking a rupture on this point.' In his telegram No. 134 of July 20, Lord Curzon replied to Sir H. Rumbold: 'I accept your explanation and agree that matter must be left as it stands.'

No. 681

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 20, 8.30 a.m.)
No. 299 Telegraphic [E 7529/1/44]

Immediate LAUSANNE, *July 20, 1923, 2.30 a.m.*

Rome telegram unnumbered of July 17th.[1]

Nogara returned today to Lausanne after short visit to Milan.

Italian experts have however discussed text with French and British experts. They raised innumerable points referring everything to Rome and saying that they were waiting instructions. It is clear that they are trying to leave question unsettled here.

From discussions however it is evident that Italians are mainly anxious to secure exclusion of concessionary companies, of course for sole reason that they have none. Unfortunately French expert tells us confidentially that his government's instructions are now to meet Italians by agreeing to such exclusion.

So far he has only shown his hand to Italians by offering to exclude concessionary companies in territories detached from Turkey. In itself this proposal is quite unjustifiable but of course mainly hits French.

In order to make a final attempt to force Italians to a settlement my experts finally agreed to put forward (? final) proposal that convention should include a provision that payments to concessionary companies should in no case exceed one and a half million pounds on strict understanding that this offer would be withdrawn if convention was not signed here. French expert supported this but stated that he considered maximum of one million pounds amply sufficient.

We dislike proposal as to the fixing of any arbitrary sanction but in consultation Italians argued that they wished to secure that the claims of individuals are not entirely swamped by those of concessionaires and it seems better to make some sacrifice of form to secure signature here. Otherwise Italians will continue practice which they occasionally pursue in other matters of keeping this question open for bargaining purposes and our claims will suffer.

Could you telegraph urgently if Treasury agree and if in last resort we could safely accept 1,000,000 sterling as the maximum.[2]

Repeated to Rome.

[1] Of July 17. This telegram, which replied to Lausanne telegram No. 8 to Rome (No. 287 to the Foreign Office) of July 16 requesting Sir R. Graham to expedite the despatch of the Italian delegation's instructions regarding the draft inter-allied agreement on reparations [see No. 647], ran: 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs are expecting M. Nogara shortly in Rome and hope to be able to send definite instructions to Italian delegate after discussion with him.'

[2] Lord Curzon replied, in Foreign Office telegram No. 141 of July 23, as follows: 'Treasury consider that we should accept maximum of one million for payments to concessionary companies.'

No. 682

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 20, 7.30 p.m.)
No. 300 Telegraphic [E 7546/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 20, 1923, 5.30 p.m.*

My despatch No. 264.[1]

Chicherin has replied at length on behalf of the Soviet government's [*sic*] recapitulating their objections to Straits Convention and manner in which it was drafted. To show, however, their peaceful intentions and without withdrawing objections to convention or 'to the so-called League of Nations' they have decided to make attempt to collaborate with the 'Entente Powers'. In view of the impossibility of sending Soviet representative to Switzerland owing to conduct of that country in connection with the murder of Vorovsky[2] in whose person the rights of the three Soviet states were violated by the Conference, they are sending their representative at Rome, M. Jordanski, to Constantinople[3] to sign the Straits Convention there before August 14th.

In one passage note states that Turks having agreed to allied proposals no responsibility attaches to the Soviet republic for violation of rights and interests of Turkish people for observance of which those republics strive and will go on striving.

Copy of Russian reply follows by bag.[4]

[1] Of July 17, not printed. This transmitted the text of the invitation telegraphed by the Lausanne Conference on July 17 to M. Chicherin to sign the Straits Convention. See No. 678.

[2] M. Vorovsky, Soviet Agent in Italy, who had been sent as head of the unofficial Soviet delegation to the resumed Lausanne conference, was shot in his Lausanne hotel on May 10 by a Swiss, M. Conradi, who had formerly been in the Russian army.

[3] As is explained, however, in Mr. Kennard's telegram No. 154 of August 15, Monsieur Jordanski signed the Straits Convention in Rome on August 14, 1923.

[4] Lausanne despatch No. 269 of July 20, not printed. Mr. Osborne minuted (July 24) on this despatch: 'This is the Russian acceptance of the invitation to sign the Straits Convention. It is hard to understand the psychology that requires any communication with other Governments to be expressed in a kind of international Billingsgate. This note, as usual, bristles with denunciations and reservations, I suppose largely for face-saving purposes. And, as usual, they detect in the Convention their customary obsessions—a military plot against Russia, capitalist oppression of Eastern peoples, etc.' Sir E. Crowe added: 'If I had been in the place of the Allied Delegations at Lausanne, I should have instructed M. Massigli to return to M. Chicherin his impertinent note and say the Allied Representatives refused to receive it.' Lord Curzon commented: 'But M. Massigli is unhappily a very different person from the Permanent Under Secretary of State.'

No. 683

Sir H. Rumbold (Lausanne) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
(Received July 24, 8.30 p.m.)
No. 308 Telegraphic [E 7660/1/44]

LAUSANNE, *July 24, 1923, 5.20 p.m.*

Peace Treaty and 17 other instruments including final act[1] were signed this afternoon at plenary session which began at 3 p.m.

Swiss president presided. Yugoslav government having maintained their attitude[2] their delegate did not sign anything. American observer was present but refrained from signing final act although he had been invited to do so.[3]

French withdrew yesterday their proposal to suppress clause in preamble of Greek minorities treaty providing for abolition of guarantee of Greek constitution. Instruments signed to-day consequently include protocol providing for ratification, simultaneously with peace treaty, of both Greek minorities treaty and western Thrace treaty subject only to suppression of Article 7, second paragraph, and Article 15 of former and adjustment of latter necessitated by retrocession of Karagatch to Turkey.[4]

[1] See No. 678, n. 1. As reported by Mr. Henderson in his telegram No. 427 of August 24, the Grand National Assembly voted on August 23 draft laws ratifying the Peace Treaty and other acts signed at Lausanne. The evacuation of the Allied forces began on August 24, and was completed on October 2; Turkish troops entered Constantinople on October 6. A state of peace between Greece and Turkey was restored by the ratification of the Treaty by the Greek Government on August 25. Ratification of the Treaty by Great Britain was delayed by the resignation of the Baldwin government in November 1923, and did not take place until April 15, 1924. The Treaty entered into force on August 6, 1924, with the deposit by Great Britain, Italy, and Japan of their instruments of ratification. The French Government ratified the Treaty on August 27, 1924. As, owing to the delay in ratification, the Straits Convention did not come into force before the end of 1923, the Allies were under the obligation to withdraw their naval forces by December 31. They decided, however, to complete their withdrawal by December 15.

[2] See No. 676.

[3] See *F.R.U.S.* 1923, vol. ii, pp. 1039–40.

[4] In a memorandum of July 26, Mr. Malkin wrote: 'It may be convenient to summarise what has happened about the protocol which was finally signed at Lausanne on the 24th, relating to the bringing into force of the Greek Minorities Treaty and the treaty relating to Western Thrace, which were signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920.

'The original proposal was to have a protocol providing that the ratifications of these two treaties should be deposited at the same time as those of the Lausanne instruments, and further providing for the suppression of article 15 of the Greek Minorities Treaty, which provided a special régime for Adrianople, and for the modification in the transfer of the sovereignty of Western Thrace to Greece, which was necessitated by the retrocession of Karagatch to Turkey. Subsequently, M. Veniselos asked for the suppression of the second paragraph of article 7 of the Minorities Treaty, which provided for a special electoral régime for minorities, on the ground that no such provision had been inserted in the minority clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and this was agreed to.

'At this point, however, the French Government raised a new question by demanding the suppression of the provision in the preamble of the Minorities Treaty under which France and Great Britain renounce their position as protectors of the Greek Constitution [cf. Vol. XVII, No. 5]. This M. Veniselos absolutely refused to accept, and, as the French remained obdurate, it looked as if the matter could not be settled before the signature of the

I leave Lausanne to-night by Simplon Express and shall arrive in London to-morrow afternoon accompanied by Ryan, Payne, Malkin and Cotesworth.[5]

Repeated to Constantinople, Athens, and Sofia.

Lausanne instruments. As, however, it was essential to provide at Lausanne for the bringing into force of the two treaties in question and also for the modifications in them which interested Turkey (*i.e.*, Karagatch and Adrianople), a modified protocol was prepared providing for the above objects, and adding a paragraph under which any further modifications in these two treaties which might be necessitated by existing circumstances were to form the subject of a further agreement to be concluded, before the coming into force of the two treaties, by the Powers concerned. At this stage M. Montagna intervened with the statement that the special full powers which had been given him to sign this protocol would not allow him to sign the new paragraph: a somewhat surprising statement, which, however, may have had its effect in inducing the French to climb down, which they did at the last moment, thus allowing all the questions which it was necessary to regulate to be settled in the protocol.'

[5] Mr. Osborne minuted (July 25) on this telegram: 'On the whole the treaty has by no means a bad press and the skill and patience of our delegation is fully recognized. There is no reason to suppose we could have got better terms, judging by Ismet's telegrams from Angora, for although he describes the omission from the treaty of any mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession as an "unimaginable success", this only means that he got more than he expected but not more than Angora would have insisted on. Once he had, by going back on his word, manoeuvred it into the position of being the only question between peace and war, we were defeated. All through the negotiations we were in the disadvantageous position of not being prepared to fight in order to get our way because the questions at issue were not sufficiently important to us; whereas they were important enough to the Turks to fight for. The Straits would have been another matter as the Turks no doubt realized. On the whole we have more than regained at Constantinople, Mudania and Lausanne the prestige in Turkey that the defeat of the Greeks lost us, whereas, as M. Tardieu laments, French prestige has never been as low.'

APPENDIX I

Memorandum by Mr. H. G. Nicolson respecting the Freedom of the Straits

[*E 13027/27/44*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *November 15, 1922*

I. *Previous History of the Question*

THE problem of the Straits has, during the last 150 years, been subjected to so much confusion of thought, and obscured by so many side issues, that it is to-day difficult to represent the question in its essential features. As an appendix[1] to this paper will be found an historical summary prepared by the Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office,[2] which is of great value in establishing the more permanent elements of the problem and as indicating the aspects from which it has at different times been approached. The following are the main points which emerge from the historical consideration of the Straits question:—

(*a*) The problem of the Straits was from the first regarded, and in its essence remained, an Anglo-Russian rather than an Anglo-Turkish problem. Until 1915 Turkey was considered in this country to be quite subsidiary to the two main protagonists, and Russian ambitions to secure Constantinople (ambitions which were partly imperialistic, partly economic and partly religious) were opposed in this country primarily because their realisation would have implied an outlet for the Russian Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean. It was thus that the term 'the Straits' was invariably taken to cover not only the Dardanelles but also the Bosphorus. In the present paper it is in this sense that the expression 'the Straits' is employed.

(*b*) Up till 1915 the policy of His Majesty's Government was directed towards keeping the Russian Black Sea fleet out of the Mediterranean ('the Closing of the Straits') rather than to enabling the British Mediterranean fleet to enter the Black Sea ('the Freedom of the Straits'). It is important, however, to recollect that these two policies were in their essence little more than two alternative forms of an identic defensive policy against Russia, and that British statesmen, even in the nineteenth century, sometimes hesitated whether their ultimate policy could best be secured by the closing or by the opening of the Straits to ships of war. Lord Palmerston is known to have consulted the Duke of Wellington on the subject, and the latter, after careful consideration, expressed the decided opinion that, as the Straits were nearer to the Russian naval bases than to our own, it would be preferable for them to be closed to the Russian fleet rather than that they should be open to the British fleet.

(*c*) This continual tendency throughout the nineteenth century to press for the closing rather than for the opening of the Straits is explained by a further

[1] Not printed.

[2] Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley. The reference is to a memorandum of November 7, 1922, which is published, with slight changes, in Sir James Headlam-Morley, *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London, 1930), pp. 212–53.

important consideration. So long as Russia coveted the Straits, and Great Britain was opposed to the realisation of this ambition, it was inevitable that Turkey should look to us and France for protection in the event of a Russian attack. Under the Convention of 1841 the Sultan retained the right if Turkey was at war, to allow foreign men-of-war to pass the Straits. It thus became almost an axiom during the nineteenth century that the Sultan would open the Dardanelles, and even the Bosphorus, to the British fleet in the event of any serious Russian menace. Thus, whereas the policy of the 'Closing of the Straits' (as Lord Salisbury indicated in 1878), was inspired by the assumption that in the last resort Turkey, as in the Crimean War, would let us in, 'the Freedom of the Straits' is based on the realisation that now, as in 1915, she very probably will not.

(*d*) The Straits Convention of 1841, the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Treaty of London of 1871, all embodied in different forms the principle that foreign men-of-war should *not* have freedom of transit through the Straits; and His Majesty's Government were always careful to enforce, or rather to maintain, this principle as against Russia. Thus, when during the Russo-Japanese War two vessels belonging to the Russian volunteer fleet passed through the Straits in the guise of merchantmen and proceeded to commit belligerent acts in the Red Sea, His Majesty's Government protested strongly, with the result that the commissions of these two vessels were revoked and reparation for their belligerent action was eventually made.

(*e*) With the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, an entirely new situation was created. Turkey, for her part, realising that she could no longer count upon Great Britain to protect her against Russia, drew towards Germany; while Russia, as early as 1908, opened negotiations with Great Britain in the hope of securing some arrangement as to egress from the Black Sea more in accordance with Russian desires. These conversations led to no definite result at the time although Russia endeavoured during the years that followed to use her influence with her two partners in the Triple *Entente* to obtain an outlet into the Mediterranean. Her attempts to secure this object broke down against our determination that, if the Straits were to be opened, this freedom should be reciprocal, and that Russia should not be allowed into the Mediterranean unless we were also allowed into the Black Sea. By 1912, we find M. Isvolsky, at that time Russian Ambassador in Paris, trying to persuade M. Poincaré that it was in the interest of the two Western partners of the *Entente* to allow the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. M. Poincaré appears to have agreed to this proposal and to have promised M. Isvolsky to 'support him with all his efforts'. It was some one-sided solution of this nature which Russia had in mind in concluding in 1912 a naval agreement with France, and in proposing such an agreement two years later to ourselves.

Although His Majesty's Government had thus adopted a cautious attitude towards Russia so long as she was no more than a co-partner in the *Entente*, yet we showed ourselves prepared generously to meet her wishes so soon as she became our ally in the European War. In March 1915 Notes were exchanged between the British and Russian Governments, under which Russia was promised Constantinople, together with zones of surrounding territory on both sides both of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles corresponding roughly to the zones with which we are now so familiar. This agreement, in its turn, may be said to have lapsed owing to the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and Germany, and Russia and Turkey.

(*f*) The position as regards Turkey was also fundamentally altered by the circumstances of the present war. On the one hand Turkey, in the spirit at least if not in the letter, flagrantly violated the Straits Convention when on the 12th August, 1914, she allowed the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' to pass up the Dardanelles and to take refuge in the Golden Horn. The subsequent closing of the Straits, even to commerce, and the Gallipoli campaign convinced His Majesty's Government that the geographical position of Turkey placed in her hands an immense opportunity for obstruction, and induced them to decide that one of the objects of the war should be to remove this vital corridor from the control of so unreliable a Power.

(*g*) The doctrine of the 'Freedom of the Straits', as thus evolved, became, with the complete defeat of Turkey, a determination on the part of His Majesty's Government to secure that never again should the Sultan be able to bar the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea. The occasion was singularly propitious for the realisation of this determination. Turkey was powerless; Russia was unable to make herself heard or felt; while the Allies were for the moment united. The Treaty of Sèvres, while establishing the principle of free transit for warships both in peace and war, contained provisions which were calculated effectively to guarantee that this freedom of transit could not be interfered with. In the first place, the Dardanelles were, in practice, internationalised by Greece being left on one coast and Turkey on the other; in the second place, Turkey was demilitarised, both generally and locally, and the military control of the Bosphorus rested with the Allies. In the third place, elaborate provisions were enacted both for inspection and control; and in the last place, the Allied Powers, under the second paragraph of Article 36, reserved for themselves the right, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the Treaty, to recede from their promise to leave Constantinople under Ottoman sovereignty.

II. *The Present Position*

Since the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres the circumstances under which that Treaty was drafted have been radically altered. Turkey has recovered; Russia has again become a serious menace; and the Allied Powers have failed, on several important occasions, to maintain a united front. It will thus not only be almost impossible to obtain at the forthcoming Conference an agreement embodying our former solution of the Straits problem, but it would prove physically difficult to maintain or guarantee such a solution even if it could on paper be secured. Our difficulties in this respect are both diplomatic and military.

(A) *Diplomatic Difficulties*

Although Turkey, Russia and France have all pronounced themselves ready to accept in some form the 'Freedom of the Straits', yet the different interpretations given to this elastic formula by the several groups of Powers indicate that considerable divergence exists between our own interpretation and that of the other Powers.

It may be well, at this stage, to outline the interpretations given by the several Governments to the formula of 'The Freedom of the Straits' and to indicate the different reasons of policy which inspire these interpretations:—

1. *British Interpretation*

The interpretation which His Majesty's Government placed on the phrase at the moment when they were drafting the Treaty of Sèvres was undoubtedly that,

whether Turkey was at peace or at war, there should be freedom of passage through the Straits not only for commercial vessels, but also for ships of war; in other words, our purpose was to secure by the terms of the Treaty that in no circumstances should Turkey obstruct the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea.

Our reasons for this were that in the event of a general war, Russia would either be on our side or against us. If she were our ally free communication with her would, as the last war showed, be essential. If, on the other hand, she were our enemy, the closing of the Straits would render her almost invulnerable, and would leave her free to treat the Black Sea as a Russian lake, to isolate Roumania and Bulgaria, and to use the valuable communications between Odessa and Batoum for the transport of troops to the Middle East.

Apart from these primary considerations, the conflict appeared, and still remains, one between the continental, or military system, and the oceanic, or naval system. Put in another way, the issue was whether the Straits were to form a territorial bridge between Europe and Asia, or whether they were to constitute a blue water line separating those two continents. At the present moment, France hopes to construct, on the bases of the elaborate connexus of alliances and combinations which have arisen in Eastern and Central Europe, a dominant position founded, in the final resort, on her own military prestige. If such countries as Bulgaria and Roumania, to say nothing of Turkey, are rendered immune either to pressure or assistance arising from command of the sea by some other Power (*e.g.*, Great Britain), France will be able to exercise her influence with greater facility. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that if we are precluded from sending the British fleet into the Black Sea, if, that is, the mouths of the Danube flow into a permanent Russo-Turkish lake, the whole connexus of Danubian alliances and inter-dependencies which centre round the Little *Entente* will tend all the more to fall within the orbit either of France or Russia. The effect will be felt not only in Turkey, Bulgaria and Roumania, but even in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. If, however, we can obtain the right of sending our fleet to Varna, Constanza and Odessa, whatever France may do for these countries in the way of finance, propaganda and military support, British influence in the last resort will remain equal, if not predominant.

The French realise this perfectly, and for this reason they have at times been tempted to oppose, as far as they can, our interpretation of the Freedom of the Straits.

2. *Other Interpretations of the Formula*

(*a*) *Russia.*—It is notoriously difficult to forecast the attitude which the Soviet Government will in any given circumstances be likely to adopt. Their main object for the present is to keep Turkey dependent as far as possible upon themselves. They will thus oppose any scheme which is calculated to render Turkey susceptible to pressure from the Western Powers and they will wish to keep her in full military possession of the Straits, with power to fortify them. They are unlikely, since their navy will always be weaker than ours, to support free transit of warships: and will probably endeavour to interpret the commercial freedom of the Straits merely as limiting our opportunities of blockade. Finally they will oppose any intervention on the part of the League of Nations.

In any case they may be counted on to put the worst and the most public interpretation upon any formula in which we may try to embody on our desiderata.

(*b*) *Turkey.*—Turkey has seldom found herself in so strong a position, both diplomatic and military, as she enjoys to-day. The Nationalist Government are extremely suspicious of the policy of His Majesty's Government, and are convinced that our intention is to secure some solution under which, in the ultimate resort, the British fleet can bombard Constantinople.

They have committed themselves in vague terms to the commercial freedom of the Straits. They will endeavour to interpret this in such a way as to throw upon Europe the expense of lighting and buoying the two waterways, while retaining for themselves complete military control both of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

They will be found intractable, suspicious and very arrogant. It may be doubted whether they will consent to sign any treaty which does not leave the military control of the Straits entirely within their own hands.

(*c*) *France.*—The French were some time ago not wholly in favour of the free passage of warships. On the one hand, they disliked our command of the sea, and desire therefore to prevent our ingress; on the other hand, they felt that in the event of a future war between France and Russia, it would be very inconvenient for them if the Russian fleet had an analogous right of egress into the Mediterranean. How far the campaign now being conducted by the Turks against all foreign commercial interests will cause the French to reconsider their attitude, and induce them to join us in retaining some physical hold over the new Turkish Government must for the moment remain a matter of conjecture. All that can be said is that the attitude of the French to-day is already very different from the whole-hearted Turcophil policy which was theirs six weeks ago.

(*d*) *Italy.*—The former Italian Government[3] tended generally to support France, to conciliate Turkey and to limit our opportunities of exercising naval power. It is possible that M. Mussolini[4] may be prepared to adopt a more energetic and less subservient policy.

(*e*) *Roumania*, who has a very direct interest in the Freedom of the Straits, will be anxious to agree with our point of view, but is within the orbit of France and at the mercy of Russia.

(*f*) *Jugoslavia* is not wholly to be relied upon for any useful action; but might be willing to support our policy provided France were also in agreement.

(*g*) *Greece*, provided she does not dissolve into anarchy, can be counted on.

(*h*) *Bulgaria* will probably confine her efforts to obtaining an outlet to the Ægean and will not take any very active interest in the transit of war vessels through the Straits.

(B) *Military or Physical Difficulties*

It will be seen from the above that we may be faced at the Conference with serious opposition, of which the nucleus would be formed by Turkey and Russia, on the one hand, and possibly by France and Italy on the other, who may in different ways and for different reasons oppose our desire to secure the free passage of men-of-war. The United States may possibly support our contention, but it is unlikely that, in their capacity of 'observers' at the Conference, they wish to take any very active part in the controversy.

Even, however, if we obtain a general agreement to the effect that the principle of the free passage of warships should be reaffirmed in the new treaty, it will now be difficult to devise and maintain physical guarantees and safeguards for the maintenance of that principle. The free passage of warships both in peace and

[3] That of Signor Luigi Facta. [4] See No. 145, n. 1.

war could be *absolutely* guaranteed only by the presence on the spot of forces able effectively to resist not only the total forces of Turkey, but the total of such forces plus any potential Turkish ally. This could only be secured by clauses similar to those of the Treaty of Sèvres, and it is obvious that we are not to-day in a position, unless we again go to war, to impose such extensive servitudes upon Turkey. On the other hand, anything short of the full scheme of control as embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres might, when put to the test, be found to be illusory. All schemes for the control of the Straits by reduced Allied detachments, or by some military organisation under the League of Nations, would be likely, in practice, to prove irksome, expensive and, in the ultimate resort, ineffective.

Before examining the alternative lines of policy which are now open to us, it is important to indicate that the present disadvantage under which we labour, both diplomatic and military, is not likely to be very permanent. In other words the present moment is for us, of all historical moments, the most inopportune for an international conference on the Straits question; in a few weeks conditions may be more favourable; to-day they are very inauspicious indeed.

Inconvenient as is the present arrogance and power of Turkey, it must be realised that it is largely fortuitous and provisional. It is based on an unnatural alliance with Russia; it has maintained itself owing to the disunity and war-weariness of Europe. Both these phenomena will pass in time and Turkey, galvanised though she now is into unnatural energy, will sooner or later relax again into her hereditary weakness.

It must be remembered also that Turkey knows neither gratitude nor resentment; her only consistent political emotion is fear. For a century she was afraid of Russia and made friends with us and France; when we in our turn made friends with Russia, Turkey sought refuge with Germany; now that she is afraid of us she is espousing France and Russia. It is probable that in a few years she will be afraid again of Russia and will turn again to Great Britain. Thus before long some readjustment of the present unfavourable balance is probable, and as soon as this has taken place Turkey will be easier to deal with.

Moreover, Russia, dangerous as she now is, has become dangerous chiefly from her position of having everything to gain and nothing to lose. This condition in its turn can only be transitory, but while it lasts it renders it in practice impossible to negotiate on a basis of reasonable equality with the Soviet Government.

The Near Eastern question will not be permanently settled by any arrangements which may be made at this Conference. It will only be settled when Russia and Turkey have assumed their natural, and lost their present abnormal, proportions.

It is submitted therefore that our object should be to secure a settlement which, while enabling an early peace to be signed and ratified, will not unduly tie our hands in the future or leave us in regard to the Straits in a position less favourable than that which existed before the war? How can such a settlement be secured?

III. *Alternative Lines of Policy*

We are thus faced by the following proposition:—

1. Our policy at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres was to secure and guarantee the freedom of passage, whether Turkey was at war or peace, not only for commerce but also for ships of war.

2. This freedom of passage can only be absolutely secured by a system of physical guarantees which, to be effective, should not be less than those embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres.
3. Diplomatically it will be difficult to secure the acceptance of the principle of the passage of warships; militarily it will be difficult in present conditions to safeguard the principle even if it were accepted.
4. Some modification of our original policy may therefore be imposed upon us. What form should be given to such modification if found inevitable?

Only six weeks ago it appeared probable that His Majesty's Government would stand practically alone in contending that any real restriction should be imposed upon Turkey's full military control over the Straits.[5] Our two major Allies did not seem disposed to agree to anything beyond vague paper guarantees under the League of Nations; and it was apprehended that, unless we were prepared to act alone against Turkey, we might be forced completely to abandon our maximum programme and to fall back on interpreting the 'Freedom of the Straits' as applying to commerce only.

Since then certain developments have taken place, which indicate that our original pessimism may in some respects be relieved. The Turks have behaved in such a way as to alarm, and even to alienate important sections of French public opinion. The Fascista revolution has placed the Government of Italy in the hands of a man who is certainly more energetic than his predecessors, and may prove more reliable.[6] There are signs to-day that Allied unity again may become a deciding factor.

An important indication of this improvement in the general situation is furnished by the conversations which took place on the 9th November between Marshal Foch and General Burnett-Stuart, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.[7] In these conversations, and in the memorandum which he subsequently prepared, the Marshal made it clear that he, at least, was not of the opinion that the Allies should leave the Turks in unfettered control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and that the 'Freedom of the Straits' was a principle which it was 'absolutely indispensable' that the Allies should maintain 'under penalty of losing one of the principal fruits of the war'.

This statement of Marshal Foch must, it is true, be qualified by certain reservations, namely:—

(*a*) That the Marshal is supposed to be somewhat indifferent to the Near Eastern situation, and that his opinion on this question is likely to carry less weight with the French Government than would his views on the affairs of Central Europe;

(*b*) That, as he himself confessed, he had no clear idea of what was meant by the 'Freedom of the Straits'. We have nothing definite to prove that he considers this phrase necessarily to imply the free passage of ships of war;

(*c*) That the French Government may be unwilling to go so far as to make the acceptance by Turkey of the Freedom of the Straits, in the sense advocated by Marshal Foch, a condition *sine qua non* of signing the Treaty of Peace.

It thus remains uncertain whether the French Government will adopt as their own the proposal which the French Marshal has expounded;[8] whether the Marshal himself agrees with our own view regarding the passage of warships; or whether,

[5] See Nos. 106 ff. [6] See No. 145, n. 1. [7] See No. 178, n. 4.
[8] Cf. No. 204, n. 19 and No. 225, n. 3.

if the Turks reject Marshal Foch's proposal, M. Poincaré will give us any very effective support in imposing the scheme upon them. All we can now say is that the Marshal has decisively expressed his view that the Turks should not be left in a position which will enable them systematically to fortify the Straits.

We may summarise as follows the three main alternatives which are open to us:

1. *Marshal Foch's Proposal*

The outlines of Marshal Foch's scheme are as follows:

(*a*) Demilitarisation of the Straits zones, with destruction of all military and naval works.

(*b*) No Turkish armed forces, with the exception of the Constantinople garrison, to have access to these zones.

(*c*) Inspection (or, in French, 'contrôle') by a Commission, under the auspices of the League, and composed of interested Powers, to secure that this demilitarisation is being observed.

(*d*) No Allied occupation or garrison at any point.

(*e*) Limitation of the armed forces which Turkey may maintain in Eastern Thrace.

Assuming, as we are bound to assume, that we are to-day not in a position to impose such absolute guarantees upon Turkey as were envisaged in the Treaty of Sèvres, this modified proposal of Marshal Foch offers important advantages:—

1. Although it would not in the ultimate resort make it impossible for the Turks to attempt to close the Straits, yet it will render it difficult for them to erect any systematic fortifications.

2. In the event of war there would thus be more likelihood of our being able to rush the Straits than there would be if the Turks, in times of peace, had remained in unfettered and unwatched control.

3. Even, therefore, if we do not obtain specific recognition of the right of free navigation of the Straits by warships, we should, if Marshal Foch's proposal were accepted, place ourselves, under the new Treaty of Peace, in a more advantageous position than we were in 1914.

In the absence, so far, of any assurance that M. Poincaré, even if he agrees to accept the scheme as a joint Allied desideratum, will be willing to impose it upon the Turks, we ought, unless we are prepared to deal with Turkey single-handed, to have ready certain alternatives to which, if need be, we can retreat:—

2. *Interposition of the League of Nations*

If M. Poincaré hesitates to accept Marshal Foch's scheme, or if, as is more likely, he accepts it subject to the reservation that he will not pledge himself to enforce it, we may find it desirable to retire to our second line and invite the co-operation of the League of Nations.

If we contemplate reference to the League of Nations we must prepare to face certain initial difficulties:—

(*a*) In the first place, neither Russia nor Turkey are members [*sic*] of the League, and are therefore unlikely to bind themselves in advance to accept whatever measures the League may prescribe.

(*b*) In the second place, the League itself may object to having imposed upon it any detailed programme such as might be included in a treaty to be adhered to both by Russia and by Turkey.

In other words, if we make the terms of reference too general, they will be objected to by Russia and Turkey; and if we make them too precise, they may not be well received by the League.

It should be possible to conceive some middle course which, while not alienating Russia and Turkey, would render possible the co-operation of the League. Such a course, as regards details, would doubtless base itself upon such established principles as the Danube and Suez Canal Conventions, and would meet the legitimate anxieties of the League by confining the activities and responsibilities of their representative to functions of inspection rather than to functions of control.

The idea would be to elaborate some 'Statute of the Straits' which, while providing for such necessities as lighting, buoyage and sanitary control, would, at the same time, maintain the semblance of Turkish sovereignty.

The Department have prepared, in detailed form, alternative treaty articles[9] by which this supervision of the League could be exercised. These articles are not annexed to this memorandum, but they, as well as several other draft alternatives, are immediately available if desired. Those articles which provide for the intervention of the League are based on the conviction that if the League has to be introduced, it should be represented in the person of an individual High Commissioner rather than in the form of a mixed Commission. If the Allies are unable themselves to establish physical force in the zone of the Straits, they must rely upon some other broad-based moral force working through an individual. The combination of the extremes of moral appeal and personal efficiency can only be achieved through the appointment of a League High Commissioner who should, if possible, be a citizen of the United States.

The powers and functions of such a High Commissioner would not extend very far beyond the inspection of the demilitarised zone envisaged by Marshal Foch. The disadvantage of the interposition of the League would be, however, that in the event of the Turks disregarding the warnings of the High Commissioner, the League would be unable to exert rapid physical pressure. The Turks, who have no regard for anything but physical force, might thus feel that they could continually defy the League with impunity.

If we are unable to secure either some inter-Allied organ of inspection as proposed by Marshal Foch, or the appointment of an American High Commissioner under the League of Nations, we may be obliged to fall back upon our last line of retreat, namely, the commercial freedom of the Straits:—

3. *The Commercial Freedom of the Straits*

To the principle of the commercial freedom of the Straits France, Italy, Russia and Turkey are all committed; the discussion will arise, not on the principle, but on the interpretation to be given to it. Here again a maximum and minimum interpretation can be applied.

(1) *Maximum Interpretation*

(*a*) So long as Turkey was at peace the Straits have always been free to commerce. What is required is some convention such as will secure unimpeded freedom of commercial navigation even when Turkey is at war.

(*b*) During the Tripoli and Balkan wars the passage was blocked by Turkish mines for long periods and free navigation was seriously obstructed; during the

[9] Not printed.

European war the Straits were closed completely. Measures must now be taken to secure that this shall not happen again.

(*c*) Events have shown that Turkey if left in complete physical control of the Straits cannot be trusted.

(*d*) Some international convention must therefore be made such as will provide that in no circumstances shall Turkey be in a position to close the Straits to commerce.

This interpretation would thus imply the imposition upon Turkey of physical guarantees varying from a promise on paper that no military works would be established, to the institution of controls of the nature contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres. The difficulty of this is, not only the old difficulty of maintaining physical guarantees, but also the danger that the Turks will claim that if they are to be deprived of all physical defences they must be guaranteed against attack by the permanent neutralisation, on the Belgian analogy, of the Straits and adjoining territories. This contention would be difficult to counter, and, if accepted, would leave us in a position less favourable than that which existed before the war.

(2) *Minimum Interpretation*

The minimum interpretation would be to regard the Straits merely as an 'international' water-way, and to prescribe measures for the freedom of navigation on the analogy of those embodied in the Danube Convention. Such measures would apply only to conservancy, quarantine, buoyage, and lighting, and, so long as they and the Russians were represented, the Turks would have no objection to the execution and supervision of these functions being entrusted to an international commission. To apply the Danube Convention to the Straits would, it must be admitted, in practice represent but a slight improvement of the pre-war situation, since it would merely regularise the details of navigation during peace. It would not in any effective way solve the problem of free navigation when Turkey is at war. The solution implied in the 'commercial freedom of the Straits' is not therefore a solution at all. It should only be adopted if it is found that no other alternative can be secured.

Conclusions

The following, therefore, are the conclusions arrived at:—

1. That we should in the first instance endeavour to secure the acceptance by France and Italy of Marshal Foch's proposal to be interpreted, if possible, as covering the Freedom of the Straits to navigation by warships.
2. That if allied unity cannot be obtained on this proposal, or if, although agreed in principle, our Allies refuse to exert any real pressure to secure Turkish acceptance, we can fall back upon the interposition of the League of Nations.
3. If defeated on both of the two above propositions we must endeavour to secure the formulation in the eventual Treaty of Peace of the doctrine of the commercial Freedom of the Straits in such a form as, while in no way tying our hands for the future, would impose upon Turkey some measure, if not of international control, at least of international inspection.

HAROLD G. NICOLSON

APPENDIX II

Memorandum by the General Staff on the Proposed New Treaty between the Allies and Turkey

[*E 11359/10102/44*][1]

Secret WAR OFFICE, *October 19, 1922*

IN Foreign Office letter dated the 13th October, 1922,[2] it is stated that 'except on matters where British interests are vitally concerned, there can now be little chance of imposing any conditions upon Turkey, with whom the terms of the new treaty, unlike those of other treaties with the enemy, will probably now have to be negotiated'.

The General Staff agree that the situation in the Near East has been fundamentally changed since the Treaty of Sèvres was drafted. This change is due to the creation of a national spirit in Turkey, and this in turn has resulted in the recent successes of the Turkish army, with the result that we can no longer treat the Turks as a conquered nation to whom it is possible to dictate any terms we wish. The effect of the publication of the Treaty of Sèvres, severe as it was in its terms, at a time when the Allied armies were almost demobilised, was to stir the Turkish nation to resistance, and we should do well at this time, when the Allies are in an even worse situation from a military point of view, to avoid insistence on any terms which are not of vital importance directly or indirectly to the British Empire. Any appearance of an intention to coerce the Turks to-day would probably result in war against a united nation.

It is true that we have it in our power to keep control of the littoral of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora, but, in order to provide the necessary troops, it would be necessary to mobilise, and we should incur a heavy military commitment, since we can never hope in such circumstances to secure a friendly Turkey, or, on the other hand, to crush her power in Asia Minor. It is clear also that we can expect no support from our Allies, and should be obliged to undertake the task single-handed.

If, as appears necessary, we must recognise the re-establishment of Turkish power, it will surely be to our advantage to do everything possible to give the new Turkey the chance of restoring order in her own house and defending her territory. The Turks are numerically a small nation, and, surrounded by potential enemies as they are, could not realise ideas of conquest or territorial aggrandisement on a large scale.

Fate, however, has located them in one of the most coveted areas in the world, and if we are to have peace in the Near East they must be strong enough to defend it. They can attack no vital points in the British Empire (neither Irak nor Palestine can be considered as such), and therefore, from the point of view of the General Staff, so long as our relations with them are friendly, it is to the advantage of His Majesty's Government to strengthen them in a military sense rather than the reverse.

[1] A copy of this memorandum was transmitted by the War Office to the Foreign Office on October 20, 1922.

[2] Not printed.

2. Bearing the above in mind, the General Staff desire to submit the following remarks on some problems which are likely to arise in connection with the settlement between the Allies and Turkey:

(*a*) *The new Turkish Frontier in Thrace.* (See article 27.)[3]

It is understood that the Greeks are likely to resist the Turkish claim to Karagach and other forts on the right bank of the Maritza. Also that they are likely to press for the 1915 frontier, which, northwards from Adrianople, follows the line of the Tundza River.

The General Staff recognise the fact that the possession of the forts at Karagach will provide the Turks with a bridge-head covering the crossing of the Maritza, and thus confer on them at this point of the frontier a considerable strategical advantage over the Greeks. They also realise that it will complicate the question of the control of the railway. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the General Staff are of opinion that Karagach and the other forts on the right bank of the Maritza, which protect the town of Adrianople, should be considered as a part of Adrianople itself and allotted to Turkey, since Adrianople is indefensible from the left bank of the Maritza.

The General Staff also considers that the triangle lying between the Maritza and Tundza Rivers and the Bulgarian frontier forms a salient which could be of no military value to Greece, but rather the reverse. They would even go so far as to suggest that, from a military point of view, it would be to the advantage of Greece if her frontier followed the line of the Kizil Deli Chai to its junction with the Maritza at Demotika, and thence along the Maritza. Such a line would shorten considerably the length of frontier to be defended, and would avoid a dangerous salient.

(*b*) *The Frontier with Irak.* (See article 27.)[3]

Assuming that we are in sight of a satisfactory peace with Turkey, it is hoped that the situation in Irak can be stabilised on its present basis.

Apart from political considerations affecting our relations with King Feisal, the surrender of any portions of Kurdistan and of the Mosul vilayet would react unfavourably upon the position of the Irak local forces and of our Imperial garrison supporting them. So long as Turkey is hostile our position in the Mosul vilayet is insecure, but, provided favourable peace terms can be arrived at with the Turks, the Irak levies and army, as they improve in organisation and efficiency, should be able to maintain sufficiently stable conditions on the northern borders of Irak.

The retention within the Irak frontier of Kurdistan and the Mosul vilayet keeps the Turks at a reasonable distance from Bagdad, and the physical features of the country, as well as the attitude of some of the inhabitants of this area, are an additional safeguard against invasion or interference, should our relations or King Feisal's relations with Turkey at any time become strained.

Were the Turks to be in possession of Kurdistan and Mosul vilayet, our small garrison at Bagdad would be in a most exposed position, and, with the Turks better placed for stirring up rebellion in Irak, a forced withdrawal from Bagdad would become a still more difficult and dangerous operation.

In any rectification of the Irak-Turkish frontier, it is probable that the High

[3] Of the Treaty of Sèvres of August 10, 1920 (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 652–776).

Commissioner would like slightly to extend the Irak frontier so as to include Amadia with its Christian Assyrian population. Such rectification would be of military advantage, as the Assyrians can be relied upon to offer some opposition to any attempted Turkish aggression.

(*c*) *The Control of the Dardanelles.* (See articles 37–61 and 177–180.)[3]

It is understood that His Majesty's Government have it in contemplation:—

(*a*) To place the control of the Straits under the auspices of the League of Nations;

(*b*) To keep a small Allied force in the Gallipoli Peninsula for an indefinite period. (It is not clear whether this force is to come under the orders of the League of Nations or not.)

(*c*) To demilitarise a zone on each side of the Straits.

There is no way of ensuring that the Turks will respect the demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore except by the enforcement of some measure of control, which in turn implies permanent military occupation in some shape or form of the Asiatic shore. This does not mean merely the occupation of a small area at Chanak to cover the Narrows; on the contrary, to be effective the forces employed must be large enough to deny access by the Turks at any point along the whole length of the Dardanelles. To hold Gallipoli alone will never enable the Allies to secure the passage of the Straits, and moreover, although in times of peace we might be content with a force of three or four battalions and some artillery to garrison the Peninsula, we should be faced, directly relations became strained, with the very situation which has recently arisen and be obliged either to withdraw or reinforce hurriedly from the Mediterranean pending the arrival of mobilised divisions.

The situation in European Turkey will not in future be similar to that existing to-day, since the Turkish army will be in full control of Thrace and be free to threaten the small Allied force at Gallipoli. Hence we could spare no detachments from this force to secure a foothold on the Asiatic shore until the arrival of mobilised reinforcements, by which time we should be too late.

It appears therefore to the General Staff that the Allied occupation of the zone of the Dardanelles should either be in sufficient strength to hold both European and Asiatic sides (a commitment to which our army is not strong enough to make more than a very small contribution, say, at most, one infantry brigade and one battery), or should be abandoned.

This does not mean that they would advise that no steps should be taken by diplomatic methods to obtain the demilitarisation of the zone of the Straits, whether it be by making use of the League of Nations or by some other means.

As regards the limits of the demilitarised zones, they suggest that they should be as follows:—

(1) *In Thrace.*—Everything to the southward of a line from Rodosto (exclusive) to Karachal in the Gulf of Xeros (including Gallipoli).

(2) *In Asia.*—The whole of the Sandjak of Chanak.

They are further of opinion that all gendarmerie or police within the demilitarised zones should be controlled by the League of Nations, or such other authority as may be set up in the new treaty.

[3] See note on p. 985.

(*d*) *The Control of the Bosphorus.* (See articles 37–61 and 177–180.)[3]

So long as the Turks occupy Constantinople, which so many other nations covet, the General Staff are of the opinion that they must be allowed to defend it. The ability to close the passage of the Bosphorus to Russian or other ships of war is essential to the defence of Constantinople. The General Staff recommend that no attempt should be made to demilitarise any zone on either side of the Bosphorus.

(*e*) *The Allied Occupation of Constantinople.* (See article 36.)[3]

The General Staff are of opinion that the Allied troops should be withdrawn from Constantinople as soon as the new treaty is ratified by Turkey and Great Britain.

(*f*) *The Strength and Composition of the Turkish Army.* (See articles 152–167.)[3]

The Treaty of Sèvres laid down that the Turkish army should be reduced to:—

(*a*) Gendarmerie, 35,000.
(*b*) Army, 15,000.

The Paris proposals of March 1922,[4] agreed to an increase to 45,000 and 40,000 respectively, though the General Staff, even at that time, were prepared to go further and accept an increase of the gendarmerie to 60,000.

It is idle to deny that to limit the Turkish army in view of the limited man-power of the nation will be to hand her over bound and fettered to one or possibly more of her neighbours which are Russia, Greece and Bulgaria. Turkey's male Moslem population is estimated at perhaps 5,000,000, whilst respectively that of her potential enemies, Russia, Bulgaria and Greece is estimated at 80,000,000, 2,000,000 and 2,000,000. To enable her to resist the pretensions of Russia in the East, Turkey will be compelled to maintain a force sufficient to protect her Transcaucasian frontier. In addition she will require considerable forces to maintain law and order throughout Anatolia. Allowing for these justifiable commitments in Asia, it does not appear to the General Staff that, once we have tided over the present crisis, the Turkish army can ever be large enough to be a dangerous instrument of aggression in Europe unless some new grouping of the nations gives her powerful allies. They recommend accordingly that no attempt should be made to impose limitations on the strength and composition of the Turkish army and gendarmerie in the new treaty.

General Harington in a recent telegram considers that, in reality, the strength of the Turkish army will be governed by what the country can pay for and maintain. He agrees also that it would be very difficult to enforce any limitation.

(*g*) *The System of Recruitment of the Turkish Army and Gendarmerie.* (See articles 165–167.)[3]

The Treaty of Sèvres laid down that the Turkish army must be maintained on a voluntary basis, no conscription being allowed. In March 1922 the Allies stated that they were ready to consider with the Turks in an amicable spirit the determination of the period in which the voluntary system must be established in that country.

The difficulty of enforcing the principle of voluntary service has been exemplified during the last few years in other ex-enemy countries, more particularly in Bulgaria. It involves, if it is to be in any degree successful, rigid control for an indefinite

[4] See Vol. XVII, No. 570.

period. In the case of Turkey, so much of whose territory lies in inaccessible regions, real control will be impossible, and from this point of view alone the General Staff recommend that any attempt should be abandoned. Turkey cannot afford to maintain an army on its present scale as her financial necessities will automatically reduce her peace establishment to moderate limits. No control would be required to watch the Turkish army in this case. On the other hand, as has been shown in paragraph 2 (*f*), if Turkey is threatened by outside aggression, she should be allowed to defend herself to the best of her ability without interference from the Allies. If all Turkey's neighbours had adopted voluntary enlistment, it would be fair to compel Turkey to do the same; but the fact that the Allies are not in a position to compel Russia, Turkey's hereditary enemy, to abandon compulsory service, provides an adequate reason for omitting any mention of this subject in the new treaty.

(*h*) *The Duties of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation.* (See articles 196–205.)[3]

Under the Treaty of Sèvres an Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and Organisation was created—

(*a*) To control the demobilisation and disarmament of the Turks; and

(*b*) To organise in collaboration with Turkey the new forces authorised.

The General Staff recognise that the new treaty should provide for a small commission of control to deal with the demilitarised zone.

In view, however, of what has been said above as to the necessity and right of Turkey to keep an adequate army, they are of opinion that it is unnecessary to attempt to force the Turks to employ Allied officers in the gendarmerie, or to accept Allied control officers with their regular formations. They further consider that any Allied control of the army and gendarmerie would be likely to lead to friction and jealousy between the Allies, and that for this reason also the idea should be abandoned. But, in order to prevent any one Power obtaining a monopoly of the gendarmerie with the consent of the Turks, they recommend that a clause be inserted in the new treaty providing that if Turkey desire the assistance of Allied officers, she must accept them in equal numbers from Great Britain, France and Italy, rank for rank.

(*i*) *The permission granted to the French Government to recruit in Turkey for the Foreign Legion.* (See article 207.)[3]

Article 207 provides that France shall have the right to recruit for her foreign legion in Turkey. The General Staff wish once again to express their opinion that this permission should not be included in the new treaty. They have pointed out that the French in Syria are on interior lines as regards Egypt and Mesopotamia, that practically the whole of the troops used by the French at present are non-Europeans or foreign legionaries. Should the French be given permission to enlist Turks for their foreign legion, we may soon find a large and efficient Turkish army, under a French staff, in a central position, ready to turn us out of Irak or Egypt.

(*j*) *The Admission of Turkey to the League of Nations.*

This is primarily a political question, but the proposal to hand the control of the Straits over to the League of Nations makes it a point of military importance. By

joining the League of Nations, Turkey will presumably acknowledge the League's rights and duties in connection with the Straits, and will be bound to accept its decisions, or leave the League. It is therefore important that Turkey should be admitted to the League, if the latter is to be given control of the Straits.

(*k*) *The Disposal, &c., of Prisoners of War.* (See articles 208–217.)[3]

This question must be considered under two heads:—

(1) Prisoners of war taken prior to the armistice of 1918.
(2) Prisoners of war taken by Greeks and Turks since that date.

As regards (1), it should be insisted that articles 208–217 of the Treaty of Sèvres must be fulfilled in cases where this has not already been done. This is important as uncertainty still exists as to the presence of certain Allied nationals other than Greeks in the hands of the Turks. The suspicion still arises periodically that there are Indians in Asia Minor whose status has never been satisfactorily cleared up. As regards Turks in our hands, we still have one in India whose case is under consideration of the Attorney-General.

As regards (2) above, the General Staff are of opinion that nothing can be done but to use our good offices to enable the Greeks and Turks to come to a mutual agreement. It is hopeless to expect the Turks to give up their Greek prisoners until they are sure of a satisfactory peace.

(*l*) *The Protection of Turkish Nationals who have helped the British during our occupation of Turkey.*

This question has already been the subject of correspondence between the Army Council and the Foreign Office. The General Staff are prepared to leave to the Foreign Office the decision as to how these people can be best protected.

3. In the first paragraph of this paper the General Staff have expressed their opinion that a strong Turkey is not necessarily a danger to the British Empire.

More than this, they are profoundly impressed with the advantages which may reasonably be expected to accrue if we can ensure that Turkey will become friendly instead of hostile. Britain is the greatest Moslem Power in the world; but the allegiance of our Moslem subjects to our rule must to-day be qualified by the extent of their sympathy with the Turks, whom, rightly or wrongly, they are inclining more and more to regard as champions of their faith. There can be no real sympathy between us and our Moslem subjects so long as these two allegiances pull in opposite directions.

The General Staff realise that this question is primarily political, but it affects our Moslem soldiers in India, and in other places in the Near and Middle East. We have altogether some 100,000 soldiers of this faith, and though to date there is little sign of their loyalty being impaired, we cannot expect this to continue in the future if the men are to be recruited from a disaffected population. Further, our military responsibilities are directly affected by our relations with neighbouring Mahommedan States. In short, the General Staff consider that it is probable that a peace with Turkey which will leave our relations with her in an improved condition will go far to diminish our anxieties as to the military situation in India, and in the East generally.

APPENDIX III

Allied Draft Treaty of January 31, 1923,[1] and Turkish Counter-proposals of March 8, 1923[2]

Note: Italic print without underlining denotes articles, paragraphs, phrases, and words rejected in the Turkish Counter-proposals. Additions and emendations proposed by the Angora Government are shown by underlined type in square brackets.

PROJET D'ACTE FINAL

Les gouvernements de l'Empire britannique, de la France et de l'Italie, d'accord avec le gouvernement du Japon, soucieux de rétablir définitivement la paix en Orient, ayant convié d'une part la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène et aussi les États-Unis d'Amérique, et d'autre part la Turquie, à examiner en commun les dispositions propres à atteindre un résultat également souhaité par toutes les Nations;

Ayant estimé, par ailleurs, que parmi les sujets qui se trouveront devoir être traités à cette Conférence la question des Détroits devra être examinée spécialement, en invitant la Bulgarie et la Russie, Puissances riveraines de la Mer Noire, à participer aux négociations et aux décisions qui seraient adoptées;

Et ayant décidé d'admettre les tierces Puissances à faire connaître à la Conférence, soit oralement soit par écrit, mais sans participer aux débats, leurs vues sur les questions mettant directement en cause leurs intérêts, tout en reconnaissant que, parmi ces Puissances, celles qui ont combattu pendant la dernière guerre aux côtés de l'Empire britannique, de la France, de l'Italie, et du Japon, seraient admises à participer aux discussions des questions économiques et financières;

En conséquence, les soussignés se sont assemblés à Lausanne et, à la suite de réunions tenues du 20 novembre 1922 au . . . 1923, les actes ci-après énumérés ont été arrêtés:

I. Traité de paix et Déclaration annexe;
II. Convention concernant le régime des Détroits;
III. Convention concernant les frontières de Thrace;
IV. Convention relative *au régime des Étrangers en Turquie* [*à l'établissement et à la compétence judiciaire entre la Turquie et les Puissances Alliées*], et Déclaration relative à l'administration de la justice en Turquie;
V. Déclaration relative à la participation de l'Albanie au paiement de la Dette publique ottomane;
VI. Convention *relative au régime du commerce avec* [*commerciale entre*] la Turquie [*et les Puissances Alliées*];
VII. Déclaration relative à l'amnistie;

[1] The French text of the Allied Draft Treaty is printed, with an English translation, in Cmd. 1814 (of 1923), pp. 684–817. It is also published in *Recueil* (*1*), vol. i, pp. 347–425.

[2] See No. 431. The text of the Turkish Counter-proposals is printed in *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iv, pp. 33–69.

VIII. Convention concernant l'échange des populations grecques et turques et Protocole annexe;

IX. Accord gréco-turc sur la restitution et l'échange des prisonniers de guerre et des internés civils.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont apposé leurs signatures et leurs cachets au bas du présent Acte.

Fait à Lausanne le . . . mil neuf cent vingt trois en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du gouvernement de la République française et dont les copies certifiées conformes seront délivrées à toutes les Puissances représentées à la Conférence.

.....

.....

(Signatures, sans indication de pays.)

Document No. I of Final Act

PROJET DE TRAITÉ DE PAIX

L'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part;

Animés du même désir de mettre fin définitivement à l'état de guerre qui, depuis 1914, a troublé l'Orient,

Et soucieux de rétablir entre eux les relations d'amitié et de commerce nécessaires au bien-être commun de leurs nations respectives,[3]

Ont décidé de conclure un Traité à cet effet et ont désigné pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir

.....

.....

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes.

PARTIE I

CLAUSES POLITIQUES

Article 1er

A dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, l'état de paix sera définitivement rétabli entre l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène d'une part et la Turquie d'autre part ainsi qu'entre leurs ressortissants respectifs.

De part et d'autre il y aura relations officielles et, sur les territoires respectifs, les agents diplomatiques et consulaires recevront, *à moins de stipulations particulières*,

[3] On February 3, the Allied Powers had offered to insert the following: 'Et considérant que ces relations doivent être basées sur le respect de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté des États'. See *Recueil* (*1*), vol. iv, p. 7, and Cmd. 1814, p. 834.

le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit des gens. [*Dès la ratification du présent Traité par la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie et sans attendre la ratification des autres Puissances contractantes toutes les parties du territoire turc se trouvant sous l'occupation des Puissances Alliées seront immédiatement évacuées.*]

SECTION I

I.—Clauses Territoriales

Article 2

De la Mer Noire à la Mer Égée: la frontière de la Turquie est fixée comme il suit (Voir la Carte No. 1, annexée).[4]

(1) avec la Bulgarie:

De l'embouchure de la Rezvaya jusqu'à *la rive gauche de* la Maritza, point de jonction des trois frontières de la Turquie, de la Bulgarie et de la Grèce :

la frontière Sud de la Bulgarie, telle qu'elle est actuellement délimitée.

(2) avec la Grèce:

—de là, jusqu'au point où la frontière qui avait été fixée par le Traité de So[f]ia du 26 Septembre 1915 traverse la rivière Maritza en amont d'Andrinople :

la rive gauche de la Maritza [*la ligne de thalweg du cours principal de la Maritza*];

—de là, dans la direction du Sud-Est, jusqu'au point où elle traverse la rivière Maritza en aval d'Andrinople;

la frontière qui avait été fixée par le Traité de Sofia du 26 Septembre 1915, laissant à la Turquie la station à laquelle aboutit actuellement l'embranchement du chemin de fer spécialement construit pour desservir la ville d'Andrinople, et laissant à la Grèce la ville et la gare de Karagatch;

—de là, jusqu'à la Mer Égée,

la rive gauche de la Maritza [*la ligne de thalweg du cours principal de la Maritza*].

Article 3

De la Mer Méditerranée à la frontière de Perse, la frontière de la Turquie est fixée comme il suit:

(1) avec la Syrie:

La frontière définie dans l'article 8 de l'Accord franco-turc du 20 Octobre 1921, [*qui reste entièrement en vigueur avec toutes ses annexes*];

(2) avec l'Iraq :

à partir du point où finit sur le Tigre la frontière visée à l'alinéa (1) *du présent article: une ligne à déterminer en conformité de la décision qui sera rendue à ce sujet par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.*

[*La frontière entre la Turquie et l'Iraq sera déterminée à l'amiable entre la Turquie et la Grande-Bretagne dans un délai de 12 mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. A défaut d'accord le litige sera porté devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.*]

[4] Not here reproduced.

Article 4

Les frontières décrites par le présent Traité sont tracées sur les cartes[4] au-1/1,000,000e annexées au présent Traité. En cas de divergence entre le texte et la carte, c'est le texte qui fera foi.

Article 5

Des Commissions de délimitation seront chargées de tracer sur le terrain les frontières décrites dans les articles 2 et 3 et non encore tracées. Ces Commissions seront composées de représentants des Puissances limitrophes intéressées, à raison d'un par chaque Puissance, et d'un Président choisi par eux parmi les ressortissants d'une tierce Puissance.

Elles auront tout pouvoir, non seulement pour la détermination des fractions définies sous le nom de 'ligne à déterminer sur le terrain,' mais encore, si elles le jugent nécessaire, pour la révision, dans le détail, des fractions définies par des limites administratives ou autrement. Elles s'efforceront, dans tous les cas, de suivre au plus près les définitions données dans les Traités, en tenant compte autant que possible des limites administratives et des intérêts économiques locaux.

Les décisions des Commissions seront prises à la majorité des voix et seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées.

Les dépenses des Commissions de délimitation seront supportées également par les Parties intéressées.

Article 6

En ce qui concerne les frontières définies par le cours d'un fleuve ou d'une rivière et non par ses rives, les termes 'cours' ou 'chenal' employés dans les descriptions du présent Traité signifient: d'une part, pour les fleuves non navigables, la ligne médiane du cours d'eau ou de son bras principal, et d'autre part, pour les fleuves navigables, la ligne médiane du chenal de navigation principal. Toutefois, il appartiendra aux Commissions de délimitation, prévues par le présent Traité, de spécifier si la ligne frontière suivra, dans ses déplacements éventuels, le cours ou le chenal ainsi défini, ou si elle sera déterminée d'une manière définitive par la position du cours ou du chenal, au moment de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

A moins de stipulations contraires du présent Traité, les frontières maritimes comprennent les îles et îlots situés à moins de trois milles de la côte.

Article 7

Les divers États intéressés s'engagent à fournir aux Commissions tous documents nécessaires à leurs travaux, notamment des copies authentiques des procès-verbaux de délimitation des frontières actuelles ou anciennes, toutes les cartes à grande échelle existantes, les données géodésiques, les levés exécutés et non publiés, les renseignements sur les divagations des cours d'eau frontières. Les cartes, données géodésiques et levés même non publiés, se trouvant en la possession des autorités turques, devront être remis à Constantinople, dans le plus bref délai possible dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, aux Présidents des Commissions intéressées.

Les États intéressés s'engagent, en outre, à prescrire aux autorités locales de communiquer aux Commissions tous documents, notamment les plans, cadastres

[4] Not here reproduced.

et livres fonciers, et de leur fournir sur leur demande tous renseignements sur la propriété, les courants économiques et autres informations nécessaires.

Article 8

Les divers États intéressés s'engagent à prêter assistance aux Commissions de délimitation, soit directement, soit par l'entremise des autorités locales, pour tout ce qui concerne le transport, le logement, la main-d'œuvre, les matériaux (poteaux, bornes) nécessaires à l'accomplissement de la mission.

En particulier, le Gouvernement turc s'engage à fournir, s'il est nécessaire, le personnel technique propre à assister les Commissions de délimitation dans l'accomplissement de leur tâche.

Article 9

Les divers États intéressés s'engagent à faire respecter les repères trigonométriques, signaux, poteaux ou bornes frontières placés par les Commissions.

Article 10

Les bornes seront placées à distance de vue l'une de l'autre; elles seront numérotées et leur emplacement et leur numéro seront portés sur un document cartographique.

Article 11

Les procès-verbaux définitifs de délimitation, les cartes et documents annexés seront établis en triple original, dont deux seront transmis aux Gouvernements des États limitrophes et le troisième sera transmis au Gouvernement de la République française, qui en délivrera des expéditions authentiques aux Puissances signataires du présent Traité.

Article 12

La décision prise le 13 février 1914 par la Conférence de Londres, en exécution des articles 5 du Traité de Londres du 17/30 mai 1913 et 15 du Traité d'Athènes du 1/14 novembre 1913, ladite décision notifiée au Gouvernement hellénique le 13 février 1914, concernant la souveraineté de la Grèce sur les îles de la Méditerranée orientale, autres que les îles d'Imbros et Tenedos, [*et des îlots de Merkeb dépendant de cette dernière,*] notamment les îles de Lemnos, Samothrace, Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria, est confirmée, sous réserve des stipulations du présent Traité relatives aux îles placées sous la souveraineté de l'Italie et visées à l'article 15. Sauf stipulation contraire du présent Traité, les îles situées à moins de trois milles de la côte asiatique, restent placées sous la souveraineté turque.

Article 13

En vue d'assurer le maintien de la paix, le Gouvernement hellénique s'engage à observer les mesures suivantes dans les îles de Mitylène, Chio, Samos et Nikaria:

(1°) Aucune base navale, ni aucune fortification, ne seront établies dans lesdites îles;

(2°) Il sera interdit à l'aviation militaire grecque de survoler le territoire de la côte d'Anatolie.

Réciproquement, le Gouvernement turc interdira à son aviation militaire de survoler lesdites îles.

(3°) Les forces militaires helléniques dans lesdites îles seront limitées au contingent normal appelé pour le service militaire qui pourra être instruit sur place, ainsi qu'à un effectif de gendarmerie et de police proportionné à l'effectif de la gendarmerie et de la police existant sur l'ensemble du territoire hellénique.

Article 14

Les îles d'Imbros et Tenedos, demeurant sous la souveraineté turque, jouiront d'une organisation administrative spéciale composée d'éléments locaux et donnant toute garantie à la population indigène non musulmane, en ce qui concerne l'administration locale ainsi que la protection des personnes et des biens. Le maintien de l'ordre y sera assuré par une police recrutée parmi la population indigène par les soins et placée sous les ordres de l'administration locale ci-dessus prévue.

Les stipulations conclues ou à conclure entre la Grèce et la Turquie concernant l'échange des populations grecques et turques ne seront pas applicables aux habitants des îles d'Imbros et de Tenedos.

Article 15

La Turquie renonce en faveur de l'Italie à tous ses droits et titres sur les îles ci-après énumérées, savoir: Stampalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lispsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), et Cos (Kos), actuellement occupées par l'Italie, et les îlots qui en dépendent, *ainsi que sur l'île de Castellorizzo* (voir Carte No. 2).[5] [*L'île de Castellorizzo reste sous la souveraineté de la Turquie.*]

Article 16

La Turquie déclare renoncer à tous droits et titres de quelque nature que ce soit, sur ou concernant tous territoires situés au delà des frontières prévues par le présent Traité et sur les îles autres que celles sur lesquelles la souveraineté lui est reconnue par ledit Traité.

Elle reconnaît et agrée les dispositions qui ont été ou seront prises concernant l'attribution, l'indépendance ou tout autre régime de ces territoires ou îles.

[*Les dispositions du présent Article ne portent pas atteinte aux stipulations de l'article 7 de l'Accord d'Angora du 20 octobre 1921 ainsi qu'à celles de la lettre-annexe de même date du Plénipotentiaire français relative à cet article, et aux clauses du procès-verbal de signature de l'Accord susmentionné.*

De même la souveraineté de la Turquie sur l'îlot d'Ada Kala situé sur le Danube est maintenue.]

Article 17

L'effet de la renonciation par la Turquie à tous les droits et titres sur l'Égypte et sur le Soudan prendra date du 5 novembre 1914. [*La Turquie est libérée de tous engagements et obligations à l'égard des emprunts ottomans garantis sur le tribut d'Égypte.*]

Article 18

Des stipulations ultérieures, à intervenir dans des conditions à déterminer entre les Puissances intéressées, régleront les questions naissant de la reconnaissance

[5] Not here reproduced.

de l'État égyptien, auquel ne s'appliquent pas les dispositions du présent Traité relatives aux territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu dudit Traité.

Article 19

La Turquie déclare reconnaître l'annexion de Chypre proclamée par le Gouvernement britannique le 5 novembre 1914. [*La Turquie est libérée de tous engagements et obligations à l'égard des emprunts ottomans garantis sur les revenus de Chypre.*]

Les ressortissants turcs nés *ou* [*et*] domiciliés dans l'île de Chypre acquerront, dans les conditions de la loi locale, la nationalité britannique, à l'exclusion de la nationalité ottomane. [*Les personnes qui en vertu du présent article deviennent sujets britanniques pourront opter pour la nationalité turque conformément aux dispositions générales prévues à la Section II de la présente Partie.*]

Article 20

Les droits et privilèges, qui, en vertu du Traité de Lausanne du 18 Octobre 1912, avaient été réservés en Libye *au Sultan de Turquie* [*à l'Empire Ottoman*], sont et demeurent définitivement abolis.

(2) Dispositions Spéciales

Article 21

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d'accord pour reconnaître et déclarer le principe de la liberté de passage et de navigation, par mer et dans les airs, en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre, dans les Détroits des Dardanelles, la Mer de Marmara et le Bosphore. *La* [*conformément à la*] Convention spéciale, conclue à la date de ce jour, relativement au régime des Détroits [*.Cette Convention*] aura même force et valeur au regard des Hautes Parties ici contractantes que si elle figurait dans le présent Traité.

Article 22

La Convention spéciale, conclue à la date de ce jour, relativement au régime de la frontière décrite dans l'article 2 du présent Traité, aura même force et valeur au regard des Hautes Parties ici contractantes que si elle figurait dans le présent Traité.

Article 23

La Turquie s'engage à reconnaître la pleine valeur des Traités de paix et Conventions additionnelles, conclus par les autres Puissances contractantes avec les Puissances ayant combattu aux côtés de la Turquie, à agréer les dispositions qui ont été ou seront prises concernant les territoires de l'ancien Empire allemand, de l'Autriche, de la Hongrie et de la Bulgarie, et à reconnaître les nouveaux États dans les frontières ainsi fixées.

Article 24

La Turquie déclare dès à présent reconnaître et agréer les frontières de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche, de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce, de la Hongrie, de la Pologne, de la Roumanie, de l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène et de l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, telles que ces frontières ont été ou seront fixées par les Traités visés à l'article 23 ou par toutes conventions complémentaires.

Article 25

Aucun pouvoir, ou juridiction en matière politique, législative, ou administrative ne seront exercés, pour quelque motif que ce soit, par le Gouvernement ou les autorités de la Turquie hors du territoire turc sur les ressortissants d'un territoire placé sous la souveraineté ou le protectorat des autres Puissances signataires du présent Traité, et sur les ressortissants d'un territoire détaché de la Turquie.

Il demeure entendu que le présent Traité ne porte pas atteinte aux prérogatives *spirituelles* [*religieuses exercées en dehors de la Turquie par*] des autorités religieuses des diverses croyances.

Article 26

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes *sont d'accord pour abroger* [*déclarent complètement abrogées*] les capitulations concernant le régime des étrangers en Turquie tant au point de vue des conditions d'accès et de séjour qu'au point de vue fiscal et judiciaire [*ainsi que le système économique et financier résultant des Capitulations*].

La Convention spéciale conclue sur ce sujet en date de ce jour aura même force et valeur au regard des Hautes Parties Contractantes que si les dispositions en figuraient dans le présent Traité.

Article 27

Les ressortissants marocains (zone française) et les ressortissants tunisiens seront à tous égards soumis en Turquie au même régime que les autres ressortissants français.

Les ressortissants libyens seront à tous égards soumis en Turquie au même régime que les autres ressortissants italiens.

[*Les dispositions de cet article ne pourront affecter les personnes qui s'étant, avant la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, établies en Turquie auraient acquis la nationalité Turque.*]

SECTION II

Nationalité

Article 28

Les ressortissants turcs établis sur les territoires qui, en vertu des dispositions du présent Traité, sont détachés de la Turquie, deviendront de plein droit et dans les conditions de la législation locale, ressortissants de l'État auquel le territoire est transféré.

Article 29

Les personnes âgées de plus de 18 ans, perdant leur nationalité turque et acquérant de plein droit une nouvelle nationalité en vertu de l'article 28, auront la faculté, pendant une période de deux ans à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, d'opter pour la nationalité turque.

Article 30

Les personnes, âgées de plus de 18 ans, qui sont établies sur un territoire détaché de la Turquie, en conformité du présent Traité, et qui y diffèrent, par la race, de la majorité de la population dudit territoire, pourront, dans le délai de deux ans

à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, opter pour la nationalité d'un des États où la majorité de la population est de la même race que la personne exerçant le droit d'option, et sous réserve du consentement de cet État.

Article 31

Les personnes ayant exercé le droit d'option, conformément aux dispositions des articles 29 et 30, devront, dans les douze mois qui suivront, transporter leur domicile dans l'État en faveur duquel elles auront opté.

Elles seront libres de conserver les biens immobiliers qu'elles possèdent sur le territoire de l'autre État, où elles auraient eu leur domicile antérieurement à leur option.

Elles pourront emporter leurs biens meubles de toute nature. Il ne leur sera imposé, de ce fait, aucun droit où taxe, soit de sortie, soit d'entrée.

Article 32

Sous réserve des accords qui pourraient être nécessaires entre les Gouvernements exerçant l'autorité dans les pays détachés de la Turquie et les Gouvernements des pays où ils sont établis, les ressortissants turcs, âgés de plus de 18 ans, originaires d'un territoire détaché de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité et qui, au moment de la mise en vigueur de celui-ci, sont établis à l'étranger, pourront opter pour la nationalité en vigueur dans le territoire dont ils sont originaires, s'ils se rattachent par leur race à la majorité de la population de ce territoire, et si le Gouvernement y exerçant l'autorité y consent. Ce droit d'option devra être exercé dans le délai de deux ans à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Article 33

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à n'apporter aucune entrave à l'exercice du droit d'option, prévu par le présent Traité ou par les Traités de paix conclus avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Bulgarie ou la Hongrie, ou par un Traité conclu par les Puissances alliées, ou l'une d'elles, avec la Russie, ou entre les Puissances alliées elles-mêmes, et permettant aux intéressés d'acquérir toute autre nationalité qui leur serait ouverte.

Article 34

Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de 18 ans suivront la condition de leurs parents pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions de la présente Section.

Article 35

Les Juifs de nationalité non ottomane, établis en Palestine à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, auront la faculté d'acquérir la nationalité palestinienne en faisant une déclaration dans telles formes et conditions qui seront prescrites par la loi.

SECTION III

Protection des Minorités

Article 36

La Turquie s'engage à ce que les stipulations contenues dans les articles 37 à 43 soient reconnues comme lois fondamentales, à ce qu'aucune loi, aucun règlement,

ni aucune action officielle ne soient en contradiction ou en opposition avec ces stipulations et à ce qu'aucune loi, aucun règlement ni aucune action officielle ne prévalent contre elles.

Article 37

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder à tous les habitants de la Turquie pleine et entière protection de leur vie et de leur liberté, sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langue, de race ou de religion.

Tous les habitants de la Turquie auront droit au libre exercice, tant public que privé, de toute foi, religion ou croyance dont la pratique ne sera pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.

Les minorités non musulmanes jouiront pleinement de la liberté de circulation et d'émigration sous réserve des mesures s'appliquant, sur la totalité ou sur une partie du territoire, à tous les ressortissants turcs et qui seraient prises par le Gouvernement turc pour la défense nationale ou pour le maintien de l'ordre public.

Article 38

Les ressortissants turcs appartenant aux minorités non musulmanes jouiront des mêmes droits civils et politiques que les musulmans.

Tous les habitants de la Turquie, sans distinction de religion, seront égaux devant la loi.

La différence de religion, de croyance ou de confession ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant turc en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, notamment pour l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries.

Il ne sera édicté aucune restriction contre le libre usage pour tout ressortissant turc d'une langue quelconque, soit dans les relations privées ou de commerce, soit en matière de religion, de presse ou de publications de toute nature, soit dans les réunions publiques.

Nonobstant l'existence de la langue officielle, des facilités appropriées seront données aux ressortissants turcs de langue autre que le turc, pour l'usage oral de leur langue devant les tribunaux.

Article 39

Les ressortissants turcs appartenant à des minorités non musulmanes jouiront du même traitement et des mêmes garanties en droit et en fait que les autres ressortissants turcs. Ils auront notamment un droit égal à créer, diriger et contrôler à leurs frais toutes institutions charitables, religieuses ou sociales, toutes écoles et autres établissements d'enseignement et d'éducation, avec le droit d'y faire librement usage de leur propre langue et d'y exercer librement leur religion.

Article 40

En matière d'enseignement public, le Gouvernement turc accordera dans les villes et districts où réside une proportion considérable de ressortissants non musulmans, des facilités appropriées pour assurer que dans les écoles primaires l'instruction soit donnée dans leur propre langue aux enfants de ces ressortissants turcs. Cette stipulation n'empêchera pas le Gouvernement turc de rendre obligatoire l'enseignement de la langue turque dans lesdites écoles.

Dans les villes ou districts où existe une proportion considérable de ressortissants turcs appartenant à des minorités non musulmanes, ces minorités se verront assurer une part équitable dans le bénéfice et l'affectation des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'État, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de bienfaisance.

Les fonds en question seront versés aux représentants qualifiés des établissements et institutions intéressés.

Article 41

Le Gouvernement turc agrée de prendre à l'égard des minorités non musulmanes, en ce qui concerne leur statut familial ou personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions selon les usages de ces minorités.

Ces dispositions seront élaborées par des commissions spéciales composées en nombre égal de représentants du Gouvernement turc et de représentants de chacune des minorités intéressées. En cas de divergence, le Gouvernement turc et le Conseil de la Société des Nations nommeront d'un commun accord un surarbitre choisi parmi les jurisconsultes européens.

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à accorder toute protection aux églises, synagogues, cimetières et autres établissements religieux des minorités précitées. Toutes facilités et autorisations seront données aux fondations pieuses et aux établissements religieux et charitables des mêmes minorités actuellement existants en Turquie, et le Gouvernement turc ne refusera, pour la création de nouveaux établissements religieux et charitables, aucune des facilités nécessaires qui sont garanties aux autres établissements privés de cette nature.

Article 42

Les ressortissants turcs, appartenant aux minorités non musulmanes, ne seront pas astreints à accomplir un acte quelconque constituant une violation de leur foi ou de leurs pratiques religieuses, ni frappés d'aucune incapacité s'ils refusent de comparaître devant les tribunaux ou d'accomplir quelque acte légal le jour de leur repos hebdomadaire.

Toutefois, cette disposition ne dispensera pas ces ressortissants turcs des obligations imposées à tous autres ressortissants turcs en vue du maintien de l'ordre public.

Article 43

La Turquie convient que, dans la mesure où les articles précédents de la présente section affectent les ressortissants non musulmans de la Turquie, ces stipulations constituent des obligations d'intérêt international et soient placées sous la garantie de la Société des Nations. Elles ne pourront être modifiées sans l'assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations. L'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon, s'engagent, par les présentes, à ne pas refuser leur assentiment à toute modification desdits articles, qui serait consentie en due forme par la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

La Turquie agrée que tout membre du Conseil de la Société des Nations aura le droit de signaler à l'attention du Conseil toute infraction ou danger d'infraction à l'une quelconque de ces obligations, et que le Conseil pourra procéder de telle façon et donner telles instructions qui paraîtront appropriées et efficaces dans la circonstance.

La Turquie agrée, en outre, qu'en cas de divergence d'opinions sur des questions de droit ou de fait concernant ces articles, entre le Gouvernement turc et l'une quelconque des autres Puissances signataires ou toute autre Puissance, membre du Conseil de la Société des Nations, cette divergence sera considérée comme un différend ayant un caractère international selon les termes de l'article 14 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. Le Gouvernement turc agrée que tout différend de ce genre sera, si l'autre partie le demande, déféré à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. La décision de la Cour Permanente sera sans appel et aura la même force et valeur qu'une décision rendue en vertu de l'article 13 du Pacte.

Article 44

Les droits reconnus par les stipulations de la présente Section aux minorités non musulmanes de la Turquie, sont également reconnus par la Grèce à la minorité musulmane se trouvant sur son territoire.

PARTIE II

CLAUSES FINANCIÈRES

SECTION I

Dette Publique Ottomane

Article 45

Les États de la Péninsule balkanique, les îles visées à l'article 15 du présent Traité et les États nouvellement créés en Asie, en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques en 1912–13 soit en vertu du présent Traité, devront participer, dans les conditions indiquées ci-dessous, aux charges annuelles afférentes au service de la Dette Publique Ottomane, telle qu'elle est définie dans le Tableau ci-annexé (*voir Annexe I*), *sous réserve des dispositions contenues dans l'article 50.*

Ces États [*Les États en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie*] devront, dans le délai de trois mois à compter du jour où la notification leur aura été faite, aux termes de l'article 51, de la part qui leur incombe respectivement dans les charges annuelles ci-dessus visées, donner au Conseil de la Dette des gages suffisants pour le paiement de leur part.

Dans le cas où ces gages n'auraient pas été constitués dans le délai indiqué ci-dessus, comme en cas de divergence sur la convenance des gages constitués ou des modalités de paiement, il pourra être fait appel au Conseil de la Société des Nations par tout gouvernement intéressé ou par *le Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane, ce dernier étant* [*tous ceux qui sont*] autorisé à agir, à cet égard, pour le compte de *tous les* [*des*] porteurs de la Dette Publique Ottomane telle qu'elle est définie dans le Tableau ci-annexé.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations pourra confier la perception des revenus donnés en gage aux organisations financières internationales existant dans les pays annexants. Les décisions du Conseil de la Société des Nations seront souveraines.

A compter des dates fixées par l'article 52, la Turquie ne pourra *pas* [*en aucune façon*] être rendue responsable des parts contributives mises à la charge des autres États.

Article 46

Par application du dernier alinéa de l'article 45, le capital nominal de la Dette Publique Ottomane qui est déterminé dans cet article pourra, avec le consentement des porteurs, être réparti entre les États intéressés si un de ces États en fait la demande dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. Cette répartition [*Sous préjudice de la détermination, conformément aux stipulations de l'article 51, par le Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane, du montant des annuités incombant à chacun des États intéressés, on procédera à la répartition entre ces États du capital nominal de la Dette Publique Ottomane dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. Cette répartition devra être achevée dans les neuf mois. Elle*] devra être faite d'après les proportions adoptées pour le partage des annuités et en tenant compte des stipulations des Conventions d'emprunt ou d'avances et des dispositions de la présente Section.

Une Commission sera, *le cas échéant*, réunie à Paris en vue de fixer les modalités de cette répartition. Elle sera composée des délégués du Gouvernement turc, des délégués de chacun des États susmentionnés, des membres du Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane et des représentants de la Dette Publique Ottomane autre que la Dette unifiée et les Lots turcs.

[*Dans le cas où pour une cause quelconque la répartition du capital nominal de la Dette Publique Ottomane ne pourrait pas être effectuée dans le délai ci-dessus prévu la Turquie aura le droit d'émettre de nouveaux titres pour la part dudit capital qui lui reviendrait sur la base du montant des annuités incombant à elle en vertu de l'article 51.*]

Le paiement des *parts contributives* [*annuités incombant à chacun des États intéressés*] ne pourra pas être différé par suite des dispositions ci-dessus [*relatives à la séparation du capital nominal*].

Article 47

La Turquie s'entendra avec le Conseil de la Dette, dans le délai fixé à l'article 45 pour compléter, s'il y a lieu, les gages existants de façon à assurer en totalité le service de la portion d'annuité restant à sa charge.

Article 48

La répartition *des charges annuelles* [*de la Dette Publique Ottomane*] dont il est fait mention à l'article 45 aura lieu de la manière suivante :

1° *Les annuités afférentes aux* [*Les*] emprunts antérieurs au 17 octobre 1912, seront réparties entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie à la suite des guerres balkaniques de 1912–13 et les îles visées *à l'article 15* [*aux articles 12 et 15*] du présent Traité, en tenant compte des changements territoriaux intervenus depuis la mise en vigueur des Traités qui ont mis fin à ces guerres ou des Traités postérieurs.

2° Le solde des *annuités* [*dettes*] restant à la charge de *la Turquie* [*l'Empire Ottoman*] après cette première répartition, augmenté des annuités afférentes aux emprunts contractés par *la Turquie* [*ledit Empire*] entre le 17 octobre 1912 et le 1er

novembre 1914, sera réparti entre la Turquie, *les îles visées à l'article 15, les États balkaniques*, et les États nouvellement créés en Asie, en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché *de la Turquie* [*de l'Empire Ottoman*] en vertu du présent Traité.

Article 49

Le montant de l'annuité à payer par chaque État intéressé devra être, vis-à-vis de la somme totale exigée pour le service de la Dette Publique Ottomane, dans la même proportion que le revenu moyen du territoire transféré vis-à-vis du revenu moyen total de *la Turquie* [*l'Empire Ottoman*] pendant les années financières 1910–1911 et 1911–1912, y compris dans chaque cas le produit des surtaxes douanières établies en 1907.

Article 50

Une divergence de vues s'étant manifestée en ce qui concerne la répartition entre la Turquie et les États de la Péninsule Balkanique, les îles visées à l'article 15 du présent Traité et les États nouvellement créés en Asie en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie, des charges qui incombent ou incombaient à l'Empire Ottoman du chef des garanties kilométriques dont jouissent ou jouissaient certaines lignes de chemins de fer, il a été décidé de soumettre ce différend à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye (voir Annexe II), dont les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à accepter la décision. Jusqu'à ce que cette décision soit rendue, le paiement des parts contributives aura lieu provisoirement en conformité du Tableau annexé à la présente Section (voir Annexe I).

[*Chaque fois que le retrait de la circulation d'une partie du papier-monnaie émis par l'Empire Ottoman sera décidé par la Turquie les États en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de l'Empire Ottoman en vertu du présent Traité devront participer à ce retrait dans la proportion fixée à l'article 49.*]

Article 51

Le Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane devra, dans un délai maximum de trois mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, déterminer sur les bases établies par l'article 49 le montant des annuités incombant à chacun *de ces États* [*des États intéressés*] et leur notifier ce montant.

Les États intéressés auront la faculté d'envoyer à Constantinople des délégués pour suivre les travaux du Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane ayant pour objet la fixation des annuités qui leur incomberont.

Le Conseil de la Dette remplira les fonctions qui sont prévues par l'article 134 du Traité de Paix du 27 novembre 1919 avec la Bulgarie.[6]

Tous différends pouvant surgir entre les Parties intéressés *sur* [*pour*] l'application des principes contenus dans le présent article, devront être déférés au Conseil de la Société des Nations dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la notification prévue à l'alinéa 1er et seront tranchés par un arbitre désigné par ledit Conseil. Ces pourvois ne seront pas suspensifs [*en ce qui concerne le paiement des annuités*].

Article 52

Les annuités dues par les États qui ont annexé des territoires détachés de *la Turquie* [*l'Empire Ottoman*] à la suite des guerres balkaniques, seront exigibles à dater de

[6] The Treaty of Neuilly (see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 781–896).

la mise en vigueur des Traités qui ont consacré l'annexion de ces territoires aux États balkaniques. [*Toutefois les annuités dues par les îles visées à l'article 15 seront exigibles à partir du 17 octobre 1912, et celles dues par les îles visées à l'article 12 à partir du 1–14 novembre 1913.*] Les annuités dues par les États qui ont acquis des territoires détachés de *la Turquie* [*l'Empire Ottoman*] en vertu du présent Traité, seront exigibles à dater du 1er mars 1920.

Sous la réserve prévue à l'article 55, ces annuités continueront à être dues jusqu'à la liquidation définitive de la dette à laquelle elles se rapportent. Toutefois, elles seront proportionnellement réduites au fur et à mesure que les emprunts, qui constituent cette dette, arriveront à extinction conformément aux dates spécifiées par les contrats visés dans la colonne 2 du Tableau ci-annexé (*voir Annexe I*) [(*voir la Tableau de la Dette Publique Ottomane*)].

Les Bons du Trésor de 1911, 1912 et 1913 énumérés audit Tableau, seront stipulés remboursables, avec intérêts, dans le délai de dix ans après les dates inscrites dans la colonne 8.

Article 53

Le Gouvernement turc s'entendra avec le Conseil de la Dette sur les mesures à prendre pour compléter le montant des coupons arriérés de la Dette Publique Ottomane, en tenant compte des arrangements qui devront intervenir entre le Conseil et les États visés à l'article 45 pour le règlement des annuités qui n'auraient pas été payées à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité. Le règlement de ces dernières annuités devra être effectué sans intérêts dans le délai de vingt années à compter de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

[*Les États visés à l'article 45 effectueront, dans le délai de 20 années à compter de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, le payement des annuités afférentes à la part de dette leur revenant et qui, devenues exigibles à partir des dates fixées à l'article 52, sont restées en souffrance. Ce paiement sera effectué sans intérêt.*

Le Gouvernement Turc réglera les annuités arriérées de sa quote-part dans les mêmes conditions.

Les annuités arriérées qui seront payées par les États balkaniques seront affectées au payement des annuités arriérées de la quote-part incombant à la Turquie dans la Dette Publique Ottomane jusqu'à concurrence des sommes payées par la Turquie au compte desdits États.]

Article 54

Le Gouvernement turc se reconnaît débiteur envers le Conseil de la Dette d'une somme équivalente au produit des revenus affectés jusqu'à présent au service de la Dette Publique Ottomane dans les territoires restant turcs et qui auraient dû être versés, mais n'ont pas encore été versés, au Conseil de la Dette, à moins que ces territoires n'aient été occupés par les forces alliées, et excepté dans ce cas, pour la période d'occupation. Le Gouvernement turc s'entendra avec le Conseil de la Dette sur le mode de règlement de cette somme.

Article 55

Chacun des États, qui aux termes du présent Traité doivent supporter annuellement une part du service de la Dette Publique Ottomane, pourra, moyennant un préavis de six mois au Conseil de la Dette, racheter cette obligation en tout ou en partie par le versement d'une somme représentant la valeur de l'annuité en question ou d'une partie de cette annuité capitalisée à un taux d'intérêt qui sera

fixé, ainsi que les conditions de rachat, d'un commun accord par l'État intéressé et par le Conseil de la Dette.

Le Conseil de la Dette n'aura pas le droit d'exiger ce rachat.

Article 56

Le décret de Mouharrem et les décrets annexés du 14 septembre 1903, du 24 mai/4 juin 1911, ainsi que les décrets afférents aux emprunts contractés avant le 1er novembre 1914, sont confirmés.[7]

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à exécuter, en tout ce qui le concerne, les dispositions de l'article 258 du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919 avec l'Allemagne et les dispositions correspondantes des Traités de Paix du 10 septembre 1919 avec l'Autriche et du 4 juin 1920 avec la Hongrie,[8] *aux termes desquelles ces Puissances ont renoncé à toute représentation ou participation dans toutes organisations et commissions de contrôle ou de gestion financière ou économique en Turquie.* [*Aux termes de ces articles la Turquie consent à ce que les délégués des porteurs ressortissant aux Puissances susénumérées ne siègent plus au Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane.*]

[7] In his telegram No. 159 of March 11, Sir H. Rumbold commented: 'It will be recollected that allies at Lausanne agreed to omission in return for Turkish declaration recognising Muharrem decrees. Turkish Government should be requested to furnish such declaration.'

[8] The Treaties of Versailles (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 1–212), Saint Germain-en-Laye (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 112, pp. 317–499), and Trianon (*B.F.S.P.*, vol. 113, pp. 486–646).

ANNEXE I À LA SECTION I

Dette Publique Ottomane Antérieure au novembre 1914

Allied Draft Treaty of January 31, 1923

EMPRUNT.	Date du Contrat.	Intérêt.	Fonds d'amortissement Livres turques or	Capital nominal originaire Livres turques or	Capital existant au 5 novembre 1914 Livres turques or	Annuité exigée (Commission comprise) Livres turques or	Période d'amortissement	BANQUE D'ÉMISSION.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
		Per cent.	Per cent.					
Dette unifiée	14/9/1903–8–21/6/1906 ...	4	0·464	42.275.772	36.799.840	1.887.375	...	
Lots turcs	5/1/1870	...	...	15.632.548	10.666.975	270.000	...	
Osmanié	18–30/4/1890	4	1·	4.999.500	2.952.400	249.975	1931	Banque impériale ottomane.
Priorité Tombac	26/4–8/5/1893	4	1·	1.000.000	664.510	50.250	1954	Banque impériale ottomane.
4.000.000 frs. Chemins de fer orientaux	1–13/5/1894	4	0·35	1.760.000	1.567.192	76.751	1957	Deutsche Bank et son groupe y compris la Banque int. et 2 banques françaises.
5 per cent. 1896	29/2–12/3/1896	5	0·50	3.272.720	2.814.020	180.450	1946	Banque impériale ottomane.
Douanes 1902	17–29/5/1886–28/9–11/10/1902	4	0·50	8.600.020	7.923.234	387.976	1958	Banque impériale ottomane.
4 per cent. 1903, Pêcheries ...	3/10/1888–21/2–6/3/1903 ...	4	0·50	2.640.000	2.439.228	119.097	1958	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad Série I.	20/2–5/3/1903	4	0·087538	2.376.000	2.342.252	97.120	2001	Deutsche Bank.
4 per cent. 1904	4–17/9/1903	4	0·50	2.750.000	2.594.064	124.059	1960	Banque impériale ottomane.
4 per cent. 1901–1905	21/11 – 4/12/1901 – 6/11/1903 – 25/4–8/5/1905.	4	0·50	5.306.664	4.976.422	239.397	1961	Banque impériale ottomane.
Tedjhizat-Askérié	4–17/4/1905	4	0·50	2.640.000	2.441.340	119.097	1961	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, Série II.	20/5–2/6/1908	4	0·087538	4.752.000	4.718.120	200.500	2006	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, Série III.	20/5–2/6/1908	4	0·087538	5.236.000	5.221.700	220.550	2010	Deutsche Bank.
4 per cent. 1908	6–19/9/1908	4	0·50	4.711.124	4.538.908	212.000	1965	Banque impériale ottomane.
4 per cent. 1909	30/9–13/10/1909	4	1·	7.000.004	6.550.698	350.864	1950	Banque impériale ottomane.
Soma-Panderma	20/11–3/12/1910	4	0·16715	1.712.304	1.700.644	71.532	1992	Banque impériale ottomane.
Hodeïde-Sanaa	24/2–9/3/1911	4	0·098738	1.000.010	1.000.010	40.988	2006	Banque française.
Douanes 1911	27/10–9/11/1910	4	1·	7.040.000	6.699.880	352.440	1952	Deutsche Bank et son groupe.
Irrigation de la plaine de Konia	5–18/11/1913	...	...	818.970	818.970	50.006	1932	
Docks, arsenaux et constructions navales	19/11–2/12/1913	5·50	1·50	1.485.000	1.485.000	88.550	1943	
5 per cent. 1914	13–26/4/1914	5	0·50	22.000.000	22.000.000	1.213.055	(1962)	Banque impériale ottomane.
Avance Régie des Tabacs ...	4/8/1913	...	...	1.700.000	890.039	110.000	...	
Bons du Trésor 5 per cent 1911 (achat de vaisseaux de guerre).	13/7/1911	5	variable, moyenne: 20·00	1.779.569	931.040	186.208	1916*	Banque nationale de Turquie.
Bons du Trésor, Banque impériale Ottomane, 1912.	8–21/11/1912	6	33·333	3·000.008	1.063.664	1.000.003	1915*	Banque impériale ottomane.
Bons du Trésor, Périer [et Cie.] 1913.	19/1–1/2/1913	5	20·	4.400.000	3.300.000	1.100.000	1918*	Périer [et Cie.]
Total	... ...	...	...	159.888.213	139.100.150	8.998.213		

Note on the original:— *'Voir Article 52'.

Turkish Counterdraft of Annex I to Section I

EMPRUNTS ET AVANCES.	Date de Contrat.	Intérêts.	Fonds d'Amortissement. Livres turques or.	Capital nominal originaire. Livres turques or.	Capital existant au 5 novembre 1914. Livres turques or.	Annuité exigée (Commission comprise). Livres turques or.	Période d'Amortissement.	BANQUE D'ÉMISSION.
Emprunts.								
		Per cent.	Per cent.					
Dette unifiée	1/14 septembre 1903, 8/21 juin 1906	4	0·464	42.275.772	36.799.840	1.887.375		
Lots turcs	5 janvier 1870	...	...	15.632.548	10.666.975	270.000		
Osmanié	18/30 avril 1890	4	1	4.999.500	2.952.400	250.600	1931	Banque impériale ottomane.
Priorité Tombac	26/8 mai 1893	4	1	1.000.000	664.510	50.250	1934	" " "
4 per cent. 1894 Chemins de fer orientaux	1/13 mars 1894	4	0·35	1.760.000	1.567.192	76.751	1957	Deutsche Bank, &c.
5 per cent. 1896	28/12 mars 1896	5	0·5	3.272.720	2.814.020	180.450	1946	Banque impériale ottomane.
Douanes 1902	28/11 octobre 1902	4	0·5	8.600.020	7.923.234	387.967	1958	" " "
4 per cent. Pêcheries 1903 ...	2/16 mars 1903	4	0·5	2.640.000	2.449.634	119.097	1958	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, Série I.	20/5 mars 1903	4	0·087538	2.376.000	2.342.252	97.363	2001	" " "
4 per cent. 1904	4/17 septembre 1904	4	0·5	2.750.000	2.594.064	124.059	1962	Banque impériale ottomane.
4 per cent. 1901–1905	25/8 mai 1905	4	0·5	5.306.664	4.976.422	239.397	1961	" " "
Tedjhizati-Askérié	4/17 avril 1905	4	0·5	2.640.000	2.441.340	119.097	1961	Deutsche Bank.
Bagdad, Série II.	20/2 juin 1908	4	0·087538	4.752.000	4.718.120	194.725	2006	" "
Bagdad, Série III.	20/2 juin 1908	4	0·087538	5.236.000	5.226.650	214.559	2010	" "
4 per cent. 1908	6/10 septembre 1908	4	0·5	4.711.124	4.538.908	212.530	1965	Banque impériale ottomane.
4 per cent. 1909	8/21 octobre 1909	4	1	7.000.004	6.550.698	350.875	1950	" " "
Soma-Panderma	20/3 décembre 1910	4	0·16715	1.712.304	1.700.644	71.532	1993	Compagnie Smyrne-Cassaba.
Hodeïde-Sanaa	24/9 mars 1911	4	0·098738	1.000.010	1.000.010	41.090	2009	Banque française.
Douanes 1911	27/9 novembre 1910	4	1	7.040.000	6.699.880	352.880	1952	Deutsche Bank et son groupe
Irrigation de la plaine de Konia	5/18 novembre 1913	5	1·1072	818.970	818.970	50.016	1948	
Docks, arsenaux et constructions navales	19/2 décembre 1913	5·5	1·5	1.485.000	1.485.000	88.050	1943	
5 per cent. 1914	2/15 avril 1914	5	0·5	22.000.000	22.000.000	1.213.025	1963	Banque impériale ottomane.
Avance Régie des Tabacs ...	22/4 août 1913	6½	...	1.700.000	891.087	110.000	...	
Bons du Trésor 5 per cent. 1911 (achat de vaisseaux de guerre).	18/5 août 1911	5	20	1.779.586	931.040	196.400	1916	Banque nationale de Turquie.
Bons du Trésor 1912	8/21 novembre 1912	6	33·333	3.000.008	1.070.973	1.107.764	1915	Banque impériale ottomane.
Bons du Trésor, Périer et Cie., 1913	23/6 décembre 1913	5	20	4.400.000	3.520.000	1.102.750	1918	Périer et Compagnie.
Bons du Trésor, Périer et Cie. (1913)	23/6 décembre 1913	5	20	1.100.000	880.000	275.000	1918	
				160.988.240	140.223.863	9.384.402		

Turkish Counterdraft of Annex I to Section I

EMPRUNTS ET AVANCES	Date de Contrat.	Intérêts.	Fonds d'Amortissement. Livres turques or.	Capital nominal originaire. Livres turques or.	Capital existant au 5 novembre 1914. Livres turques or.	Annuité exigée (Commission comprise). Livres turques or.	Période d'Amortissement.	BANQUE D'ÉMISSION.
Avances.								
Société de Bagdad	3/16 juin 1908	7	...	300.000	122.715	...	...	
Administration des Phares ...	5/18 août 1904	8	...	55.000	89.015	...	...	
„ „	5/18 juillet 1907	7	...	300.000	14.970	...	...	
Société de câbles Constantza ...	27/9 octobre 1904	4	...	17.335	12.135	...	...	
Société du tunnel	... ...	...	...	3.000	985	...	...	
Caisse des orphelins	Dates diverses	...	...	153.147	132.000	...	...	
Deutsche Bank	13/26 août 1912	5·5	...	33.000	33.000	...	...	
Administration des Phares ...	3/16 avril 1913	7	...	500.000	555.412	...	...	
Société de Chemin de fer d'Anatolie	23/5 mars 1914	6	...	200.000	150.000	...	...	
Avances sur l'Emprunt, 1911 (2e tranche 55,000,000 M.).	9/22 juin 1911	5·5	...	2.976.000	Avances amorties entre 1912 et 1914 874.692	...	...	
Banque française (pour la construction de routes 15,000,000 fr.).	20/11 octobre 1911	5	...	660.000				
Banque française (pour la construction de routes 10,000,000 fr.).	20/3 octobre 1912	7	...	440.000				
Banque nationale de Turquie et Banque de Salonique (Bons du Trésor pour 1,500,000*l.*).	1/14 février 1912	5·5	...	1.650.000				
Banque impériale ottomane (Bons du Trésor pour 25,000,000 fr. et 400,000*l.*).	19/2 mai 1912	6·5	...	1.540.000				
Banque impériale ottomane (Bons du Trésor pour 22,000,000 fr. et 272,000*l.*).	11/24 juin 1912	7	...	1.267.200				
Banque impériale ottomane (Bons du Trésor pour 28,750,000 fr.).	14/27 août 1912	7	...	1.265.000				
Régie des Tabacs	Juin 1912	6	...	200.000				
Banque impériale ottomane ...	16/29 août 1912	6	...	300.000				
Solde débiteurs du compte-courant à la Banque impériale ottomane.	... ...	5½	...	1.098.623				
Total	... ...	...	...	12.958.305	1.984.924	...		
Total général ...	... ...	...	...	173.946.545	142.208.787	...		

NOTE EXPLICATIVE DE L'ANNEXE I

Les chiffres des colonnes 5, 6 et 7 sont exprimés en livres turques or.

La Turquie possède actuellement une circulation de papier au lieu de sa circulation d'or d'avant-guerre. Aux présents taux de change, la livre turque papier est loin de représenter les taux d'avant-guerre de la livre turque or relativement à la monnaie dans laquelle les emprunts ont été émis et dans laquelle l'intérêt et l'amortissement doivent être payés en Europe conformément aux termes des contrats d'emprunts (voir article 1er du Décret annexe de septembre 1903 et les contrats d'emprunt passim).

La définition de la livre turque or, en ce qui concerne ces colonnes, ne signifie pas que les provisions pour les coupons et les fonds d'amortissement doivent être faites en or, mais que le chiffre en livres turques doit être calculé à un taux de change tel qu'il soit possible aux porteurs de se faire payer dans la monnaie à laquelle ils ont droit, et que les calculs ont été faits en supposant qu'une ou plusieurs des monnaies, dans lesquelles le porteur d'emprunt peut demander le paiement, sont au pair de l'or.

ANNEXE II

Projet de Questions à Soumettre à la cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye

Aux termes de l'article 45 (Clauses financières) du Traité de Paix signé à Lausanne le.....19....

'Les États de la Péninsule balkanique, les îles visées, à l'article 15 du présent Traité, et les États nouvellement créés en Asie, en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques en 1912–13 soit en vertu du présent Traité, devront participer, dans les conditions indiquées ci-dessous, aux charges annuelles afférentes au service de la Dette Publique Ottomane, telle qu'elle est définie dans le Tableau ci-annexé (voir Annexe I), sous réserve des dispositions contenues dans l'article 50.'

Dans ces conditions, il a été décidé de poser à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye les questions suivantes :

Première question :

Doit-on inscrire dans le tableau de la Dette Publique Ottomane à répartir entre la Turquie et les États de la Péninsule Balkanique, les îles visées à l'article 15 du Traité signé à Lausanne, le ..... et les États nouvellement créés en Asie, en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie, les charges qui incombent ou incombaient à l'Empire ottoman du chef de la garantie kilométrique, dont jouissent ou jouissaient certaines lignes de chemins de fer?

Deuxième question :

Dans le cas où les charges relatives aux lignes jouissant d'une garantie kilométrique parmi les dettes à répartir, les charges relatives aux lignes de chemin de fer de Bagdad, de Soma-Panderma et de Hodéide-Sanaa, doivent-elles être éliminées du Tableau de la Dette à répartir?

[*Déclaration de la Délégation Turque.*

La Délégation Turque a l'honneur de faire la déclaration suivante relativement aux quotes-parts des dettes restées impayées jusqu'à ce jour et incombant à certains États balkaniques d'après les Traités de Berlin et de Thessalie.

D'après les articles 33 et 42 du Traité de Berlin du 13 juillet 1878 le Monténégro et la Serbie et, d'après les articles 10 des Traités du 24 mai et du 2 juillet 1881 conclus à Constantinople, la Grèce étaient tenus de prendre à leur charge une part de la dette publique ottomane.

L'Ambassade britannique à Constantinople par sa note du 6 novembre avait communiqué à la Sublime Porte les parts de dettes qui devaient incomber aux États susmentionnés.

Les nombreuses démarches effectuées par le gouvernement ottoman afin d'assurer la participation de ces États à la Dette Publique Ottomane, sont demeurées infructueuses.

L'exclusion des parts contributives en question du tableau des dettes annexé au Traité de paix signé aujourd'hui à Lausanne ne signifie nullement que la Turquie se soit désistée de son droit. Au contraire, la Délégation Turque a l'honneur de déclarer que son gouvernement se réserve le droit d'exiger le paiement de ces parts contributives reconnues définitivement par les traités.]

SECTION II

Réparations

Article 57

Entre la Turquie et les autres Puissances Contractantes (à l'exception de la Grèce), les revendications des ressortissants desdites Puissances [*ainsi que celles des personnes morales appartenant à leurs nationalités*] contre le Gouvernement turc pour les pertes et dommages subis par eux pendant la période comprise entre le 1er août 1914 et la mise en vigueur du présent Traité et les revendications de même nature des ressortissants turcs contre les Gouvernements desdites Puissances seront [*considérés comme*] compensées, *moyennant le paiement d'une soulte de Ltq. 15,000,000 or qui sera versée par le Gouvernement turc auxdits Gouvernements. Les modalités de ce versement sont définies par les dispositions ci-dessous.*

Ledit versement réglera définitivement les réclamations pécuniaires que les Hautes Parties Contractantes ont à formuler les unes contre les autres relativement à des faits survenus entre le 1er août 1914 et la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, y compris les réclamations qui, bien qu'intéressant primitivement les ressortissants respectifs des Parties, impliqueraient ultérieurement un paiement direct ou indirect d'un Gouvernement au profit d'un autre Gouvernement.

[*La Turquie convient de ne pas demander aux Puissances Alliées le payement des sommes en or transférées par l'Allemagne et l'Autriche en vertu de l'article 259-1° du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919 avec l'Allemagne et de l'article 210-1° du Traité de Paix du 10 septembre 1919 avec l'Autriche. Elle convient également à ne pas demander à la Grande-Bretagne la restitution des sommes payées pour les bâtiments de guerre commandés en Angleterre. Aucune réclamation ne pourra être formulée contre la Turquie relativement aux biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants alliés qui, se trouvant sur un territoire placé sous la souveraineté ottomane à la date du 1er août 1914, n'existent plus, ou ont subi des dommages résultant soit des faits de guerre, soit de mesures de réquisition, soit de mesures de séquestre, disposition ou confiscation soit de tout acte ou décision préjudiciable.*

De même les biens qui auraient été saisis ou séquestrés jusqu'à la date du 30 octobre 1918 par les armées et administrations alliées exceptées celles de la Grèce, en territoire turc et ceux saisis ou séquestrés par les armées et administration turques sur les territoires des Puissances alliées ne donneront lieu à aucune réclamation.]

Article 58

La Grèce et la Turquie renoncent réciproquement, l'une à l'égard de l'autre, à tout remboursement de dommages causés à leurs nationaux pendant la période visée à l'article 57.

[La répartition des dommages causés par l'armée et les autoriés helléniques en Turquie sera réglée entre le Gouvernement turc et le Gouvernement hellénique.

En cas de désaccord le montant de la somme à payer par la Grèce sera fixé par voie d'arbitrage.]

Article 59

Pour s'acquitter des obligations qui lui incombent en vertu de l'article 57, le Gouvernement turc versera au Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane 37 annuités de 900,000 livres turques or, représentant chacune l'intérêt calculé à 5% et l'amortissement calculé à 1% de la somme de 15 millions de Ltq. or. La première annuité viendra à échéance le 1er mars 1924.

Article 60

Le Gouvernement Turc devra affecter irrévocablement au Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane des gages suffisants pour garantir le paiement des annuités mises à sa charge. Ces gages seront gérés par le Conseil de la Dette Publique Ottomane. Les revenus donnés en gage devront être agréés par le Conseil de la Dette et avoir produit pendant chacune des deux années précédant leur affectation, une somme supérieure d'au moins 15% au montant des annuités à garantir.

Le Gouvernement Turc s'engage, dans le cas où le produit des revenus visés à l'alinéa précédent deviendrait insuffisant, à combler le déficit en procédant à de nouvelles affectations de recettes.

Les revenus donnés en gage devront comprendre dans tous les cas le produit des concessions existantes ou à créer.

Le Gouvernement turc devra, avant leur promulgation, demander l'avis du Conseil de la Dette sur tous les contrats de nouvelles concessions ou de prorogation de concessions, à accorder à des ressortissants ottomans ou de tous autres.

Afin de permettre au Conseil de la Dette de remplir sa mission en toute connaissance de cause, le Gouvernement turc devra donner au Conseil et à son représentant toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission auprès des administrations intéressées.

Article 61

Le Conseil de la Dette s'entendra avec le Gouvernement Turc pour la création de titres au porteur, représentant un montant nominal de 15 millions de livres turques or, qui porteront la signature du Gouvernement Turc et dont le service sera assuré par les annuités précitées. Ces titres seront appelés 'Bons de Liquidation'; leur forme et leur montant seront arrêtés par le Conseil de la Dette.

Les Bons de Liquidation seront exempts de toutes taxes et de tous impôts établis ou à établir en Turquie.

Article 62

Les Bons de Liquidation seront remis par le Conseil de la Dette aux Gouvernements intéressés ou à telle autorité qui sera désignée par eux pour être distribués aux ayants droit.

Article 63

Le Conseil de la Dette fera le service de l'intérêt et de l'amortissement des Bons de Liquidation. L'amortissement aura lieu par tirage au sort, conformément à un tableau établi par le Conseil de la Dette.

Les dépenses relatives à l'émission et au service des Bons de Liquidation seront supportées par le Gouvernement turc et payées sur le produit des gages affectés à la garantie des bons. Elles auront sur ces gages un privilège de premier rang.

Article 64

Le Gouvernement turc aura à toute époque le droit de rembourser au pair la totalité ou une partie des bons restant en circulation.

Le Gouvernement turc aura également le droit de racheter aux porteurs les bons à telles conditions qui pourront être convenues entre eux et le Gouvernement.

Les bons ainsi rachetés devront être présentés pour annulation au Conseil de la Dette et les annuités à verser par le Gouvernement turc seront réduites en conséquence.

SECTION III

Clauses Diverses

Article 65

Les États en faveur desquels un territoire a été détaché de la Turquie, acquerront gratuitement tous biens et propriétés situés dans ce territoire et enregistrés au nom de l'Empire Ottoman, *et de la Liste Civile.*

[*Les droits de la Liste Civile sur les biens et propriétés situés dans lesdits territoires et inscrits en son nom sont maintenus.*]

Article 66

Les bénéficiaires de pensions civiles et militaires turques devenus, en vertu du présent Traité, ressortissants d'un État autre que la Turquie, ne pourront exercer du chef de leurs pensions aucun recours contre le Gouvernement turc.

Article 67

La Turquie reconnaît le transfert de toutes les créances que l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Bulgarie et la Hongrie possèdent contre elle, conformément à l'article 261 du Traité de Paix conclu à Versailles le 28 juin 1919 avec l'Allemagne et aux articles correspondants des Traités de Paix du 10 septembre 1919 avec l'Autriche, du 27 novembre 1919 avec la Bulgarie et du 4 juin 1920 avec la Hongrie.

Les autres Puissances Contractantes conviennent de [*libérer*] *ne demander aucun paiement à* la Turquie *sur les* [*des*] créances qui leur sont ainsi transférées.

Les créances que la Turquie possède contre l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Bulgarie et la Hongrie sont également transférées auxdites Puissances Contractantes.

Article 68

Le Gouvernement turc, d'accord avec les autres Puissances Contractantes, déclare libérer le Gouvernement allemand des obligations contractées par celui-ci pendant la guerre d'accepter des billets émis par le Gouvernement turc à un taux de change déterminé, en paiement de marchandises à exporter d'Allemagne en Turquie après la guerre.

Article 69

Les sommes en or transférées par l'Allemagne et l'Autriche en vertu de l'article 259–1° du Traité de Paix du 28 juin 1919 avec l'Allemagne et de l'article 210–1° du Traité de Paix du

10 septembre 1919 avec l'Autriche, seront remises à la Turquie, sous la seule réserve de servir de garantie supplémentaire au paiement des cinq premières annuités dues en vertu de la Section II de la présente Partie et aux conditions suivantes:

Si le paiement de ces annuités a lieu à l'échéance, une somme en or équivalente à la somme versée par le Gouvernement turc sera mise immédiatement à la disposition de ce Gouvernement. Après le paiement de la cinquième annuité, le Gouvernement turc recevra le solde des sommes en or visées par l'alinéa précédent.

Si, pour une raison quelconque, les annuités dues par la Turquie aux autres Puissances Contractantes n'étaient pas payées à l'échéance ou n'étaient payées qu'incomplètement, lesdites sommes en or seraient immédiatement employées au règlement de ces annuités.

Sont annulées toutes obligations de paiement mises à la charge du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane tant par la Convention du 20 juin 1331 (3 juillet 1915) relative aux bons de monnaie turcs de la première émission, que par le texte porté au verso de ces bons, *le Gouvernement turc demeurant responsable vis-à-vis des porteurs de ces mêmes bons.*

Article 70

Le Gouvernement turc confirme la validité et assurera l'exécution de tous contrats et règlements intervenus antérieurement au 1er novembre 1922 entre le Gouvernement de l'ancien Empire Ottoman d'une part, et le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane, les ressortissants des autres Puissances Contractantes et les Sociétés ottomanes, où les intérêts de ces derniers sont prépondérants, d'autre part; il en sera ainsi spécialement des contrats et règlements relatifs aux avances consenties au Gouvernement de l'ancien Empire Ottoman, aux répartitions de bénéfices convenues avec ce dernier et au service de la Dette Publique Ottomane.

PARTIE III

CLAUSES ÉCONOMIQUES[9]

Article 71

Dans la présente Partie, l'expression 'Puissances alliées' s'entend des Puissances contractantes autres que la Turquie; les termes 'ressortissants alliés' comprennent les personnes physiques, les sociétés, associations et établissements, ressortissant aux Puissances contractantes autres que la Turquie, ou à un État ou territoire sous le protectorat d'une desdites Puissances.

Les dispositions de la présente Partie relatives auxdits 'ressortissants alliés', s'appliqueront également aux protégés des Puissances ci-dessus visées, dont la patente de protection est antérieure au 1er août 1914, si pendant la guerre ils ont subi des dommages du fait de la protection dont ils jouissaient.

SECTION I

Biens, Droits et Intérêts

Article 72

Les biens, droits et intérêts existant encore ou qui pourront être identifiés sur un territoire qui se trouvait placé sous la souveraineté ottomane à la date du 1er août 1914 et qui demeurera sous la souveraineté turque à la date du présent Traité, appartenant à des ressortissants alliés, lesquels n'étaient pas, pendant la

[9] The Turkish Counter-Draft stated: 'La Partie III (Clauses Économiques) allant de l'article 71 à 117 inclus sera disjointe du Traité de Paix.' (See Nos. 431, 451 and 456.)

guerre, ressortissants ottomans, ou à des sociétés dans lesquelles les intérêts alliés sont prépondérants, seront immédiatement restitués aux ayants droit.

Il en sera de même pour les biens, droits et intérêts turcs existant encore ou qui peuvent être identifiés sur un territoire qui se trouvait placé sous la souveraineté des Puissances alliées à la date du 1er août 1914.

Les Gouvernements des Hautes Parties Contractantes prendront toutes les mesures en leur pouvoir pour remettre, par une prompte procédure administrative, le propriétaire en possession de son bien, libre de toutes charges ou servitudes dont il aurait été grevé sans l'autorisation du propriétaire et indemniser tout tiers lésé par la restitution.

A cet effet, toutes les mesures exceptionnelles de guerre ou mesures de disposition prises par les Hautes Parties Contractantes à l'égard des biens, droits et intérêts ennemis seront immédiatement levées ou arrêtées lorsque la liquidation n'en aura pas été terminée et les réclamations des propriétaires recevront satisfaction par la restitution immédiate de leurs biens dès que ces biens auront été identifiés.

Tous litiges relatifs à l'identité des biens réclamés ou à leur restitution seront soumis au Tribunal arbitral mixte institué par la Section 6 de la présente Partie.

Article 73

La Turquie facilitera, tant par des mesures administratives appropriées que par la livraison de tous documents y afférents, la recherche sur son territoire et la restitution des objets mobiliers de toute sorte, y compris espèces, titres et valeurs, enlevés, saisis ou séquestrés par ses armées et ses administrations, sur des territoires des autres Puissances contractantes, et qui se trouvent à présent sur le territoire de la Turquie et sur celui de ses alliés auxquels, en vertu de traités, de cessions ou d'attributions de quelque nature que ce soit, les objets ci-dessus auraient pu être transférés par la Turquie.

La recherche et la restitution s'effectueront aussi pour les objets susvisés, saisis ou séquestrés par les armées et administrations alliées de la Turquie sur un territoire des autres Puissances contractantes et qui auraient été attribués ou cédés en vertu de traités, ou de toute autre manière, à la Turquie ou à ses ressortissants.

Les requêtes afférentes à ces recherches et restitutions seront introduites auprès du Gouvernement turc par le Gouvernement intéressé dans un délai de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Article 74

Les biens, droits et intérêts qui ont fait l'objet de mesures de disposition ou de mesures exceptionnelles quelconques de la part des autorités des Hautes Parties Contractantes et qui existent encore ou qui peuvent être identifiés sur un territoire placé sous la souveraineté ottomane à la date du 1er août 1914, et détaché de la Turquie par le présent Traité, et qui appartiennent à des ressortissants des Hautes Parties Contractantes, y compris les anciens ressortissants ottomans acquérant de plein droit la nationalité d'une Puissance alliée ou d'un nouvel État, conformément aux dispositions du présent Traité, seront immédiatement restitués aux ayants droit par les Gouvernements intéressés.

Cette obligation de restituer ne s'appliquera pas aux biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants turcs, qui ont fait l'objet de mesures exceptionnelles de guerre ou actes de guerre de la part du Gouvernement ottoman, avant la date du 30 Octobre 1918.

Les Gouvernements des Hautes Parties Contractantes prendront toutes les mesures en leur pouvoir pour remettre, par une prompte procédure administrative, le propriétaire évincé en possession de son bien libre de toutes charges ou servitudes dont il aurait été grevé sans l'autorisation dudit propriétaire.

A cet effet, toutes les mesures exceptionnelles de guerre, ou mesures de disposition prises par les Hautes Parties Contractantes à l'égard des biens, droits et intérêts ennemis, seront immédiatement levées ou arrêtées lorsque la liquidation n'en aura pas été terminée et les réclamations des propriétaires recevront satisfaction par la restitution immédiate de leurs biens dès que ces biens auront été identifiés.

Tous litiges relatifs à l'identité des biens réclamés ou à leur restitution seront soumis au Tribunal arbitral mixte institué par la Section 6 de la présente Partie.

Article 75

Tout impôt ou taxe, ou surtaxe, qui, sans être perçu sur les ressortissants ottomans, leurs biens, droits et intérêts, aurait été perçu sur les personnes des ressortissants alliés, leurs biens, droits et intérêts, ainsi que tout impôt ou taxe de quelque nature ou sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, qui aurait été perçu sur lesdites personnes, leurs biens, droits et intérêts ou leur activité économique contrairement au statut dont ils jouissaient en Turquie, au moment de la déclaration de la guerre, seront ristournés auxdits ressortissants ou à leurs ayants droit pour toute la période où, aux termes du présent article, ils ont été indûment perçus.

Lesdits impôts ou taxes ne pourront être exigés des ressortissants alliés, ainsi que des sociétés alliées, qui ne les auraient pas acquittés au cours de la période de guerre et jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, non plus que tous impôts ou taxes dont lesdits ressortissants ou sociétés alliées auraient été exonérés par le Gouvernement impérial ottoman ou par les autorités occupantes des Puissances alliées sur le territoire turc.

Article 76

Si les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants turcs qui se trouvaient situés, à la date du 1er août 1914, sur le territoire des Puissances alliées ont subi des dommages ou préjudices du fait de mesures exceptionnelles de guerre, ou ont été légalement liquidés, et de ce fait ne sont pas restitués, le propriétaire aura droit à une indemnité équitable fixée à défaut d'accord par le Tribunal arbitral mixte institué par la Section 6 de la présente Partie.

Toutefois, aucune réclamation ne sera recevable, en ce qui concerne les biens restitués, pour les dommages résultant de mesures de gestion, surveillance, ou, en général, toutes mesures conservatoires, prises en conformité des lois et règlements du pays intéressé, et, en ce qui concerne les biens liquidés, pour le fait de la liquidation, si du moins le produit de celle-ci a été équitablement obtenu.

Article 77

Pour l'exécution des articles 72 à 76, les demandes et actions relatives aux restitutions ou indemnités devront être introduites auprès des autorités compétentes dans le délai de six mois et, à défaut d'accord, auprès du Tribunal arbitral mixte dans le délai de 18 mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Article 78

Les dispositions de la présente Section ne porteront point préjudice aux réclamations ou actions introduites auprès du Gouvernement ottoman avant le 1er août

1914 par les Gouvernements des autres Parties contractantes, ou leurs ressortissants au sujet de leurs biens, droits ou intérêts. Ces réclamations ou actions seront poursuivies dans les mêmes conditions auprès du Gouvernement turc.

Article 79

Si les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants alliés (à l'exclusion des ressortissants grecs) qui se trouvaient sur un territoire placé sous la souveraineté ottomane à la date du 1er août 1914 n'existent plus, ou ont subi des dommages résultant soit de faits de guerre, soit de mesures de réquisition, soit de mesures de séquestre, disposition ou confiscation, soit de tout acte ou décision préjudiciable, le propriétaire aura droit à une indemnité que les Puissances alliées lui accorderont sur les sommes prévues à cet effet à l'article 57 (Clauses financières) et conformément à la procédure fixée par elles.

Article 80

Le Gouvernement turc se déclare prêt à indemniser intégralement les Sociétés établies sous une autre loi que celle d'une Puissance alliée, mais où les intérêts alliés sont prépondérants tant pour les dommages résultant de tous actes de guerre, que des mesures de réquisitions, séquestre ou disposition et en général de tout acte ou omission du Gouvernement turc ayant entraîné pour lesdites sociétés une privation de jouissance ou un préjudice matériel.

Le Gouvernement turc pourra offrir auxdites sociétés, en remplacement de tout ou partie des indemnités qui leur sont dues, des avantages ou privilèges économiques de tous ordres.

Si un accord n'intervient pas dans un délai d'un an à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, entre le Gouvernement turc et lesdites sociétés, la question sera soumise à une commission de trois arbitres dont l'un sera désigné par le Gouvernement turc, le second par la société réclamante et le troisième d'accord entre les parties ou, à défaut d'accord, par le Président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Les arbitres évalueront en espèces le montant des indemnités dues par le Gouvernement turc aux sociétés. Ils apprécieront, le cas échéant, si les avantages économiques proposés par le Gouvernement turc à la société et acceptés par elle constituent une réparation équitable de ces dommages. Les arbitres pourront fixer un solde en espèces à la charge du Gouvernement turc.

Les décisions de la Commission arbitrale seront souveraines et immédiatement exécutoires.

Article 81

Le Gouvernement turc et les Gouvernements des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité, procéderont, chacun dans leur territoire et si la demande en est faite dans les conditions fixées à l'alinéa suivant, à la liquidation des biens, droits et intérêts appartenant à l'Allemagne, à l'Autriche, à la Hongrie et à la Bulgarie, ou à leurs ressortissants à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Les biens, droits et intérêts à liquider seront désignés, en Turquie, par la Commission des Réparations établie par les Traités de paix conclus avec l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie. Ils seront désignés dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie par les gouvernements y exerçant l'autorité. Cette désignation devra intervenir dans le délai de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur

du présent Traité et la liquidation devra être effectuée dans le délai d'un an à dater de cette désignation.

Le produit des liquidations, qu'elles aient été déjà ou non effectuées, sera versé à la Commission des Réparations établie par le Traité de paix conclu avec l'État intéressé si les biens liquidés sont la propriété de l'État allemand, autrichien, hongrois ou bulgare. Il sera versé directement aux propriétaires si les biens liquidés sont une propriété privée.

Ne feront pas l'objet de la liquidation prévue au présent article, les biens, droits et intérêts à l'égard desquels il aura été fait usage des dispositions de l'article 260 du Traité de paix avec l'Allemagne et des articles correspondants des Traités de paix avec l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie.

SECTION II

Contrats, Prescriptions et Jugements

Article 82

Restent en vigueur, sous réserve des dispositions qui y sont contenues ainsi que des stipulations du présent Traité, les contrats appartenant aux catégories indiquées ci-après, conclus entre parties devenues ennemies telles qu'elles sont définies à l'article 93 et antérieurement à la date indiquée audit article :

(*a*) Contrats ayant pour objets le transfert ou la livraison de biens immobiliers, lorsque ce transfert ou cette livraison [a] eu lieu en fait avant la date ci-dessus mentionnée;

(*b*) Baux, contrats de location et promesses de location;

(*c*) Contrats relatifs à l'exploitation de mines, de forêts ou de domaines agricoles;

(*d*) Contrats d'hypothèque, de gage et de nantissement;

(*e*) Contrats constitutifs de sociétés, à moins que ces sociétés n'aient été dissoutes en vertu de la loi nationale de la Puissance alliée intéressée;

(*f*) Contrats passés entre les particuliers ou sociétés et l'État, les provinces, municipalités ou autres personnes juridiques administratives analogues;

(*g*) Contrats relatifs au statut familial;

(*h*) Contrats relatifs à des donations ou à des libéralités de quelque nature que ce soit.

Le présent article ne pourra être invoqué pour donner validité à des contrats dont les dispositions ne seraient pas conformes aux lois du pays par lesquelles ils sont régis.

Article 83

Les Contrats d'Assurance sont régis par les dispositions prévues à l'Annexe de la présente Section.

Article 84

Les contrats, autres que ceux énumérés aux articles 82 et 83, passés entre ennemis antérieurement à la date où les parties sont devenues ennemies, seront considérés comme ayant été annulés à partir de la même date.

Toutefois, dans le cas de marchés à livrer, si le fournisseur justifie avoir commencé, avant ladite date, l'exécution du contrat et subit du fait de son annulation un préjudice, il pourra réclamer, dans un délai de six mois à partir de la mise en

vigueur du présent Traité, à l'autre partie une indemnité correspondant au préjudice subi et, à défaut l'accord, demander au Tribunal arbitral mixte prévu à la Section 6 de la présente Partie d'en fixer le montant.

Article 85

Pour tous les contrats autres que ceux énumérés aux articles 82 et 83, chacune des parties au contrat pourra en réclamer l'exécution jusqu'à l'expiration d'un délai de six mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité à la condition de verser à l'autre partie, s'il y a lieu, une indemnité correspondant à la différence entre les conditions du moment où le contrat a été conclu et celles du moment où son maintien est réclamé. Cette indemnité, à défaut d'accord entre les parties, sera fixé par le Tribunal arbitral mixte.

Article 86

Est confirmée la validité de toutes transactions intervenues avant la mise en vigueur du présent Traité entre les parties aux contrats indiqués aux articles 82 à 85, et ayant pour objet notamment la résiliation, le maintien, les modalités d'exécution ou la modification de ces contrats, y compris les accords portant sur la monnaie de paiement ou sur le taux de change.

Article 87

Sont reconnus valables et soumis au droit commun les contrats entre ressortissants alliés et turcs, ainsi que les contrats entre ressortissants alliés et le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman ou les autorités occupantes des Puissances alliées conclus postérieurement au 30 octobre 1918.

Pour l'application du présent article les Sociétés établies sous une loi autre que celle d'une Puissance alliée, mais où les intérêts alliés sont prépondérants, seront considérées comme ressortissants alliés.

Article 88

Tous les différends, quels qu'ils soient, relatifs aux contrats conclus avant la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, entre les ressortissants turcs et les ressortissants alliés, seront réglés par le Tribunal arbitral mixte, à l'exception toutefois des différends qui, par application des lois des Puissances neutres, seraient de la compétence des tribunaux nationaux de ces Puissances. Dans ce cas ces différends seront réglés par ces tribunaux nationaux à l'exclusion du Tribunal arbitral mixte.

Article 89

Sur le territoire des Hautes Parties Contractantes, dans les rapports entre les ennemis, tous délais quelconques de prescription, de péremption ou forclusion de procédure, qu'ils aient commencé à courir avant le début de la guerre ou après, seront considérés comme ayant été suspendus depuis le 29 octobre 1914 jusqu'à l'expiration de trois mois après la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Cette disposition s'applique, notamment, aux délais stipulés dans les lois, règlements et décrets relatifs à toutes concessions et permis de toute nature, ainsi qu'aux délais de présentation de coupons, d'intérêts et de dividendes, et de présentation, en vue de remboursement, des valeurs sorties au tirage ou remboursables à tout autre titre.

En raison des dispositions de la législation du Japon, le présent article, ainsi

que l'article 83, ne s'applique pas aux contrats conclus par des ressortissants japonais avec des ressortissants turcs.

Article 90

Dans les rapports entre ennemis, aucun effet de commerce passé avant la guerre ne sera considéré comme invalidé par le seul fait de n'avoir pas été présenté pour acceptation ou pour paiement dans les délais voulus, ni pour défaut d'avis aux tireurs ou aux endosseurs, de non-acceptation ou de non paiement, ni en raison du défaut de protêt, ni pour défaut d'accomplissement d'une formalité quelconque pendant la guerre.

Si la période pendant laquelle un effet de commerce aurait dû être présenté à l'acceptation ou au paiement, ou pendant laquelle l'avis de non acceptation ou de non paiement aurait dû être donné aux tireurs ou endosseurs, ou pendant laquelle il aurait dû être protesté, est échue pendant la guerre, et si la partie, qui aurait dû présenter ou protester l'effet ou donner avis de la non acceptation ou du non paiement, ne l'a pas fait pendant la guerre, il lui sera accordé au moins trois mois après la mise en vigueur du présent Traité pour présenter l'effet, donner avis de non acceptation ou de non paiement ou dresser protêt.

Article 91

Les jugements rendus ou les mesures d'exécution ordonnées pendant la guerre par une autorité judiciaire ou administrative ottomane quelconque qui, au 1er août 1914, était incompétente pour juger ou décider en ce qui concerne les droits d'une personne qui était alors ressortissante d'une Puissance alliée ou les droits d'une société dans laquelle les intérêts alliés étaient prépondérants seront sujets à revision, à la diligence de ce ressortissant ou de cette société, par le Tribunal arbitral mixte. En pareil cas, les parties seront, s'il est possible et équitable, replacées dans la situation où elles se trouvaient avant le jugement rendu ou la mesure d'exécution ordonnée par l'autorité ottomane; sinon, le ressortissant d'une Puissance alliée, où la société dans laquelle des intérêts alliés étaient prépondérants, qui aura subi un préjudice du fait du jugement ou de la mesure d'exécution, pourra obtenir telle réparation que le Tribunal arbitral mixte jugera équitable, cette réparation étant à la charge du Gouvernement turc.

Article 92

Sera considérée comme valable, en cas de non paiement, la vente d'un immeuble hypothéqué ou d'un gage constitué par contrats conclus avant la guerre, pour garantie d'une dette due par l'ennemi, alors même qu'avis n'a pu être donné au propriétaire, si le créancier a agi de bonne foi et en prenant les soins et précautions raisonnables. Dans ce cas, le propriétaire ne pourra formuler aucune réclamation en raison de la vente de l'immeuble hypothéqué ou du gage.

Si, cependant, le créancier n'a pas agi de bonne foi et n'a pas pris les soins et précautions raisonnables, le Tribunal arbitral mixte pourra, sur recours du débiteur, condamner le créancier à indemniser ce dernier.

Article 93

Au sens de la présente Section les personnes parties à un contrat seront considérées comme ennemies à partir de la date à laquelle le commerce entre elles sera devenu impossible en fait ou aura été interdit ou sera devenu illégal en vertu des lois, décrets ou règlements auxquels une de ces parties était soumise.

Toutefois, les dispositions prévues dans les articles 82 à 85, 89 et 90 ne s'appliquent pas aux contrats passés dans un pays ennemi, avec des ressortissants ennemis, par des ressortissants des Puissances alliées ou de la Turquie, ayant séjourné dans ce pays pendant la guerre et y ayant disposé librement de leur personne et de leurs biens. Ces contrats seront soumis au droit commun.

ANNEXE

I. Assurance sur la Vie

§ 1

Les contrats d'assurances sur la vie, passés entre un assureur et une personne devenue par la suite ennemie, ne seront pas considérés comme annulés par l'ouverture des hostilités ou par le fait que la personne est devenue ennemie.

Toute somme assurée devenue effectivement exigible pendant la guerre, aux termes d'un contrat qui, en vertu du paragraphe précédent, n'est pas considéré comme annulé, sera recouvrable après la guerre. Cette somme sera augmentée des intérêts à 5 p. 100 l'an depuis la date de son exigibilité jusqu'au jour du paiement.

Si le contrat est devenu caduc pendant la guerre par suite du non-paiement des primes, ou s'il est devenu sans effet par suite du non-accomplissement des clauses du contrat, l'assuré ou ses représentants ou ayants droit auront le droit, à tout moment pendant douze mois à dater du jour de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, de réclamer à l'assureur la valeur de rachat de la police au jour de sa caducité ou de son annulation, augmentée des intérêts à 5 p. 100 l'an.

Les ressortissants turcs dont les contrats d'assurance sur la vie, souscrits antérieurement au 29 octobre 1914, ont été annulés ou réduits, antérieurement au Traité, pour non-paiement des primes, conformément aux dispositions desdits contrats, auront la faculté pendant un délai de trois mois à compter de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, et s'ils sont alors vivants, de rétablir leurs polices pour le plein du capital assuré. A cet effet, ils devront, après avoir passé devant le Docteur de la Compagnie une visite médicale jugée satisfaisante par celle-ci, verser les primes arriérées augmentées des intérêts composés à 5 p. 100.

§ 2

Il est entendu que les contrats d'assurances sur la vie, souscrits en monnaie autre que la livre turque, conclus avant le 29 octobre 1914 entre les Sociétés d'une Puissance alliée et les ressortissants turcs pour lesquels des primes ont été payées antérieurement et postérieurement à la date du 30 mars 1915, ou même seulement avant cette date seront réglés : 1° en arrêtant les droits de l'assuré, conformément aux conditions générales de la police, pour la période antérieure au 30 mars 1915 dans la monnaie stipulée au contrat telle qu'elle a cours dans le pays dont cette monnaie émane (par exemple, toute somme stipulée en francs, en francs-or, ou en francs effectifs sera payée en francs français); 2° en livres turques papier—la livre turque étant censée valoir le pair d'avant-guerre—pour la période postérieure au 30 mars 1915.

Si les ressortissants turcs dont les contrats sont conclus dans une monnaie autre que la monnaie turque, justifient avoir continué depuis le 30 mars 1915 à acquitter leurs primes en la monnaie stipulée aux contrats, lesdits contrats seront réglés dans cette même monnaie, telle qu'elle a cours dans le pays dont elle émane, même pour la période postérieure au 30 mars 1915.

Les ressortissants turcs dont les contrats, conclus avant le 29 octobre 1914 dans une monnaie autre que la monnaie turque, avec des sociétés de nationalité d'une Puissance alliée, sont, par suite du paiement des primes, encore en vigueur, auront la faculté pendant un délai de trois mois, à compter de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, de rétablir leurs polices pour le plein du capital dans la monnaie stipulée dans leur contrat telle qu'elle a cours dans le pays dont elle émane. A cet effet, ils devront verser en cette monnaie les primes échues depuis le 30 mars 1915. Par contre, les primes effectivement versées par eux en livres turques papier depuis ladite date leur seront remboursées dans la même monnaie.

§ 3

En ce qui concerne les assurances contractées en livres turques, le règlement sera fait en livres turques papier.

§ 4

Les dispositions des paragraphes 2 et 3 ne seront pas applicables aux assurés qui, par une convention expresse, auront déjà régularisé avec la société d'assurance la valorisation de leurs polices et le mode de paiement de leurs primes, ni à ceux dont les polices seront définitivement réglées à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

§ 5

Pour l'application des paragraphes précédents seront considérés comme contrats d'assurances sur la vie les contrats d'assurances qui se basent sur les probabilités de la vie humaine combinée avec le taux d'intérêt pour le calcul des engagements réciproques des deux parties.

II. Assurances Maritimes

§ 6

Ne sont pas considérés comme annulés, sous réserve des dispositions qui y sont contenues, les contrats d'assurances maritimes au cas où le risque avait commencé à courir avant que les parties fussent devenues ennemies et à la condition qu'il ne s'agisse pas de couvrir des sinistres résultant d'actes de guerre accomplis par la Puissance à laquelle ressortit l'assureur ou par les Alliés de cette Puissance.

III. Assurance Incendie et autres Assurances

§ 7

Ne sont pas considérés comme annulés, sous la réserve énoncée au paragraphe précédent, les contrats d'assurances contre l'incendie ainsi que tous autres contrats d'assurances.

SECTION III

Concessions

Article 94

Les ressortissants alliés, bénéficiaires de concessions accordées avant le 29 octobre 1914 par le Gouvernement ottoman ou toute autorité locale, sur des

territoires restant turcs en vertu du présent Traité, seront rétablis par le Gouvernement turc dans l'intégralité des droits et obligations résultant du contrat de concession primitif et de tous accords subséquents antérieurs au 29 octobre 1914.

Sont de même confirmées, même si la Turquie n'a pas rempli toutes les conditions nécessaires à leur confirmation définitive, toutes conventions ou contrats de concessions, ainsi que les accords et décisions y relatifs, conclus entre la Turquie et les ressortissants alliés avant le 29 octobre 1914, s'ils ont reçu un commencement d'exécution ou ont fait l'objet d'accords entre le gouvernement ottoman et un gouvernement allié.

La durée de toute concession ainsi que l'échéance de tout délai prévu dans une concession seront prorogées d'une période égale du temps écoulé entre le 29 octobre 1914 et la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Il sera, toutefois, tenu compte de cette prorogation dans l'évaluation de l'indemnité qui serait accordée aux concessionnaires en application de l'article 80, ainsi que dans la réadaptation prévue à l'alinéa suivant.

Dans le cas où les concessions, conventions et accords susvisés ne répondraient pas aux nouvelles conditions économiques, le Gouvernement turc et les bénéficiaires s'entendront entre eux en vue d'une revision et d'une réadaptation à ces nouvelles conditions.

Dans le délai d'un an à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité et à défaut d'accord amiable entre les parties sur les conditions de cette réadaptation, la décision sera déférée devant trois arbitres : l'un des arbitres sera désigné par le concessionnaire, le deuxième arbitre sera désigné par le gouvernement turc, et le troisième sera, à défaut d'accord entre les intéressés, désigné par le Président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Les accords intervenus depuis le 30 octobre 1918 entre le gouvernement ottoman et les bénéficiaires des contrats et concessions visés au présent article sont confirmés.

Le gouvernement turc s'engage à maintenir ou à rétablir les ressortissants alliés dans les droits et obligations stipulés par les concessions, permis et contrats y relatifs acquis par eux directement ou par voie à transfert.

Toutes dispositions législatives ou autres, postérieures au 29 octobre 1914 et préjudiciables aux droits visés dans le présent article, sont nulles et non avenues.

Article 95

En vue d'assurer la transformation en un réseau d'État turc des chemins de fer dans lesquels les intérêts turcs ou alliés ne sont pas prépondérants, le gouvernement turc procédera, dans un délai d'un an à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, soit au rachat, soit à la reprise desdits chemins de fer. Au cas où le gouvernement turc procéderait à leur reprise, un arbitre désigné par la Société des Nations fixera le montant de l'indemnité à verser au concessionnaire d'après la valeur réelle et actuelle de l'entreprise, diminuée du montant des travaux effectués depuis le 30 octobre 1918.

Les Gouvernements alliés, dont les ressortissants ont des intérêts prépondérants dans les entreprises de chemins de fer en Turquie faciliteront, en ce qui les concerne, la transformation prévue au paragraphe précédent. Des accords ultérieurs détermineront la nature de ce concours et les modes de cette transformation. Il sera assuré aux capitaux turcs dans l'organisme d'exploitation une participation au moins égale à celle du groupe étranger le plus important.

Article 96

Dans tous les territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques en 1913, soit en vertu du présent Traité, l'État successeur, étant subrogé de plein droit dans les droits et charges de la Turquie vis-à-vis des concessionnaires ou bénéficiaires de contrats, visés à l'article 94, devra conserver à ceux-ci les garanties qui leur avaient été affectées ou leur en attribuer d'équivalentes.

Cette subrogation aura effet pour chaque État successeur à dater de la mise en vigueur du Traité par lequel le transfert du territoire a été stipulé. Ledit État prendra toutes mesures utiles pour que l'exploitation des concessions et l'exécution des contrats puissent être continuées sans aucune interruption.

Toutefois, dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, des négociations pourront être engagées entre les États successeurs et les bénéficiaires des concessions et contrats, à l'effet d'adapter d'un commun accord les dispositions desdites concessions et desdits contrats aux nouvelles conditions économiques.

Il sera tenu compte dans cette réadaptation des charges qu'entraînerait pour le concessionnaire la nécessité de se conformer à la législation desdits États.

A défaut d'accord, dans les six mois, sur les conditions de la réadaptation, l'État ou les bénéficiaires soumettront leurs contestations à l'arbitrage selon la procédure prévue à l'article 94.

Article 97

Dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie, les Puissances alliées ne seront pas tenues de reconnaître la validité des concessions ou transferts de concessions accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman ou par les autorités locales ottomanes postérieurement au 29 octobre 1914.

Article 98

Par application de l'article 155 du Traité de paix avec l'Allemagne et des articles correspondants des Traités de paix avec l'Autriche, avec la Hongrie et avec la Bulgarie, sont déclarés nuls toutes les concessions ou tous droits dans une concession accordée en Turquie depuis le 1er août 1914 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent traité à des ressortissants allemands, autrichiens, hongrois ou bulgares ou à des sociétés dans lesquelles les intérêts desdits ressortissants sont prépondérants.

Article 99

Toute société constituée conformément à la loi ottomane et fonctionnant dans des territoires détachés de la Turquie, soit à la suite des guerres balkaniques, soit en vertu du présent Traité, et où des intérêts alliés sont prépondérants, aura, pendant cinq ans à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, la faculté de transférer ses biens, droits et intérêts à toute autre société constituée en conformité de la loi soit de l'État exerçant l'autorité sur le territoire en question, soit de l'un des États alliés dont les ressortissants contrôlent ladite société. La société à qui les biens, droits et intérêts auront été transférés jouira des mêmes droits et privilèges dont jouissait la société précédente, y compris ceux que lui confèrent les dispositions du présent Traité.

Les dispositions qui précèdent ne s'appliquent pas aux sociétés concessionnaires de services publics dont une partie de l'exploitation demeurerait en territoire turc.

Les sociétés auxquelles seront transférés, en vertu du présent article, des biens, droits et intérêts de sociétés ottomanes, ne seront soumises sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie à aucune taxe spéciale du fait de ce transfert ou de leur constitution en vue de ce transfert s'il n'y est fait obstacle par des conventions internationales en vigueur. Il en sera de même sur le territoire de celle des Puissances contractantes dont ces sociétés prendraient la nationalité, à moins que cette Puissance n'y fasse opposition en vertu de sa législation propre.

Article 100

Les sociétés établies sous une loi autre que celle d'une Puissance alliée dans lesquelles les ressortissants ou groupes alliés ont des intérêts prépondérants bénéficieront des dispositions des articles 94 à 96 dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants alliés.

SECTION IV

Dettes

Article 101

Les dettes, en monnaie ottomane, autres que la Dette Publique Ottomane visée dans la Section 1 de la Partie II (Clauses financières) du présent Traité, du Gouvernement ottoman ou ses ressortissants résidant sur le territoire turc à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, à l'égard des Gouvernements des Puissances Alliées ou leurs ressortissants qui, au 1er août 1914, n'étaient ni ressortissants ottomans ni résidant en Turquie ou y exerçant une activité seront payées ou créditées dans la monnaie des Puissances Alliées intéressées, y compris leurs colonies et protectorats, les Dominions britanniques et l'Inde, sans distinguer selon que les dettes étaient exigibles avant la guerre ou que, résultant de transactions ou contrats dont l'exécution totale ou partielle a été suspendue du fait de la guerre, elles sont devenues exigibles pendant la guerre.

Il en sera de même pour les dettes en monnaie ottomane des Gouvernements des Puissances Alliées et leurs ressortissants non résidant en Turquie ou y exerçant une activité, envers le Gouvernement Ottoman ou ses ressortissants résidant en Turquie.

Le taux de change à appliquer sera celui d'avant guerre. Pour l'application de cette disposition, on considère que le taux de change d'avant guerre est égal à la moyenne des taux des transferts télégraphiques de la Puissance alliée intéressée pendant le mois qui a précédé immédiatement l'ouverture des hostilités entre ladite Puissance et la Turquie.

Les dettes en monnaie ottomane des ressortissants alliés qui, au premier août 1914, résidaient en Turquie ou y exerçaient une activité, envers les ressortissants turcs et réciproquement, seront réglées en monnaie turque.

Si les dettes de part et d'autre sont exprimées dans une autre monnaie que la monnaie ottomane, le règlement aura lieu dans la monnaie convenue au contrat, telle qu'elle a cours dans le pays d'où elle émane.

Les dettes réglées d'un commun accord entre parties avant la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, sans qu'une réserve expresse soit faite quant au taux de change, ne seront pas soumises aux dispositions du présent article.

Les dispositions du présent article, en ce qui concerne le taux de change ne

s'appliqueront pas aux dettes ou créances des personnes résidant dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité.

Les sociétés ottomanes dans lesquelles les intérêts des ressortissants alliés sont prépondérants seront, pour l'application du présent article, considérées comme ressortissants alliés.

SECTION V

Propriété Industrielle, Littéraire ou Artistique

Article 102

Sous réserve des stipulations du présent Traité, les droits de propriété industrielle, littéraire ou artistique tels qu'ils existaient au 1er août 1914 conformément à la législation de chacun des Pays contractants, seront rétablis ou restaurés, à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, dans les territoires des Hautes Parties Contractantes, en faveur des personnes qui en étaient bénéficiaires au moment où l'état de guerre a commencé d'exister, ou de leurs ayants droit. De même, les droits qui, si la guerre n'avait pas eu lieu, auraient pu être acquis pendant la durée de la guerre, à la suite d'une demande légalement faite pour la protection de la propriété industrielle ou de la publication d'une œuvre littéraire ou artistique, seront reconnus et rétablis en faveur des personnes qui y auraient des titres, à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Sans préjudice des droits qui doivent être restaurés en vertu de la disposition ci-dessus, tous actes (y compris l'octroi de licences) faits en vertu des mesures spéciales qui auraient été prises pendant la guerre par une autorité législative, exécutive ou administrative d'une Puissance alliée à l'égard des droits des ressortissants ottomans en matière de propriété industrielle, littéraire ou artistique, demeureront valables et continueront à avoir leurs pleins effets. Cette stipulation s'appliquera *mutatis mutandis* aux mesures correspondantes des autorités turques prises à l'égard des droits des ressortissants d'une Puissance alliée quelconque.

Article 103

Un délai minimum d'une année, à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, sans surtaxe ni pénalité d'aucune sorte, sera accordé aux ressortissants turcs sur le territoire de chacune des autres Puissances contractantes et aux ressortissants de ces Puissances en Turquie pour accomplir tout acte, remplir toute formalité, payer toute taxe et généralement satisfaire à toute obligation prescrite par les lois et les règlements de chaque État pour conserver ou obtenir les droits de propriété industrielle déjà acquis au 1er août 1914 ou qui, si la guerre n'avait pas eu lieu, auraient pu être acquis depuis cette date, à la suite d'une demande faite, avant la guerre ou pendant sa durée, ainsi que pour y former opposition.

Les droits de propriété industrielle qui auraient été frappés de déchéance par suite d'un défaut d'accomplissement d'un acte, d'exécution d'une formalité ou de paiement d'une taxe, seront remis en vigueur, sous la réserve toutefois, en ce qui concerne les brevets et dessins, que chaque Puissance pourra prendre les mesures qu'elle jugerait équitablement nécessaires pour la sauvegarde des droits des tiers qui auraient exploité ou employé des brevets ou des dessins pendant le temps où ils étaient frappés de déchéance.

La période comprise entre le 1er août 1914 et la date de la mise en vigueur du

présent Traité, n'entrera pas en ligne de compte dans le délai prévu pour la mise en exploitation d'un brevet ou pour l'usage de marques de fabrique ou de commerce ou de dessins, et il est convenu en outre qu'aucun brevet, marque de fabrique ou de commerce, ou dessin qui était encore en vigueur au 1er août 1914 ne pourra être frappé de déchéance ou d'annulation, du seul chef de non-exploitation ou de non-usage, avant l'expiration d'un délai de deux ans à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Article 104

Aucune action ne pourra être intentée ni aucune revendication exercée, d'une part, par des ressortissants ou par des personnes résidant ou exerçant leur industrie en Turquie, et d'autre part, par des ressortissants des Puissances alliées ou des personnes résidant ou exerçant leur industrie sur le territoire de ces Puissances, ni par les tiers auxquels ces personnes auraient cédé leurs droits pendant la guerre, à raison de faits qui se seraient produits sur le territoire de l'autre partie, entre la date de l'état de guerre et celle de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité et qui auraient pu être considérés comme portant atteinte à des droits de propriété industrielle ou de propriété littéraire ou artistique ayant existé à un moment quelconque pendant la guerre ou qui seront rétablis conformément à l'article 102.

Parmi les faits ci-dessus visés, sont compris l'utilisation par les Gouvernements des Hautes Parties Contractantes ou par toute personne pour le compte de ces Gouvernements ou avec leur assentiment de droits de propriété industrielle, littéraire ou artistique, aussi bien que la vente, la mise en vente ou l'emploi de produits, appareils, articles ou objets quelconques auxquels s'appliqueraient ces droits.

Article 105

Les contrats de licence, d'exploitation de droits, de propriété industrielle ou de reproduction d'œuvres littéraires ou artistiques, conclus avant l'état de guerre entre les ressortissants des Puissances alliées ou des personnes résidant sur leurs territoires ou y exerçant leur industrie d'une part, et des ressortissants ottomans, d'autre part, seront considérés comme résiliés à dater de l'état de guerre entre la Turquie et la Puissance Alliée. Mais, dans tous les cas, le bénéficiaire primitif d'un contrat de ce genre aura le droit, dans un délai de six mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, d'exiger du titulaire des droits la concession d'une nouvelle licence dont les conditions, à défaut d'entente entre les Parties, seront fixées par le Tribunal Arbitral Mixte prévu à la Section 6 de la présente Partie. Le Tribunal pourra, s'il y a lieu, fixer alors le montant des redevances qui lui paraîtrait justifié en raison de l'utilisation des droits pendant la guerre.

Article 106

Les habitants des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité conserveront, nonobstant cette séparation et le changement de nationalité qui en résultera, la pleine et entière jouissance en Turquie de tous les droits de propriété industrielle et de propriété littéraire et artistique, dont ils étaient titulaires, suivant la législation ottomane, au moment de ce transfert.

Les droits de propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique en vigueur sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité au moment de cette séparation ou qui seront rétablis ou restaurés par l'application de l'article

102, seront reconnus par l'État auquel sera transféré ledit territoire et demeureront en vigueur sur ce territoire pour la durée qui leur sera accordée suivant la législation ottomane.

Article 107

Sont confirmés tout octroi de brevets d'invention ou enregistrement de marques de fabrique aussi bien que tout enregistrement de transfert ou cession de brevets ou de marques de fabrique qui ont été dûment effectués depuis le 30 octobre 1918 par le Gouvernement Impérial Ottoman à Constantinople ou ailleurs.

SECTION VI

Tribunal Arbitral Mixte

Article 108

Un Tribunal arbitral mixte sera constitué entre chacune des Puissances alliées, d'une part, et la Turquie, d'autre part, dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Chacun de ces Tribunaux sera composé de trois membres. Chacun des Gouvernements intéressés désignera un de ces membres. Le Président sera choisi à la suite d'un accord entre les deux Gouvernements intéressés.

Au cas où cet accord ne serait pas réalisé dans le délai de deux mois à compter de la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, ledit Président sera désigné, à la demande d'un des Gouvernements intéressés, parmi les personnes ressortissantes à des Puissances demeurées neutres pendant la guerre, par le Président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye.

De même si, dans ledit délai de deux mois, un des Gouvernements intéressés ne nomme pas le membre devant le représenter au Tribunal, il appartiendra au Conseil de la Société des Nations de procéder à la nomination de ce membre, à la demande de l'autre Gouvernement intéressé.

Article 109

Si le nombre des affaires le justifie, d'autres membres devront être désignés pour que chaque Tribunal arbitral mixte puisse se diviser en plusieurs sections. Chacune de ces sections devra être composée comme il a été dit à l'article 108.

Chaque Gouvernement désignera un ou plusieurs agents pour le représenter devant le Tribunal.

Chaque Gouvernement paiera les honoraires du membre du Tribunal arbitral mixte qu'il nomme et de tout agent qu'il désignera pour le représenter devant le Tribunal. Les honoraires du Président seront fixés par accord spécial entre les Gouvernements intéressés, et ces honoraires, ainsi que les dépenses communes de chaque Tribunal, seront payés par moitié par les deux Gouvernements.

Article 110

Les Tribunaux arbitraux mixtes, créés en vertu des articles 108 et 109, jugeront les différends qui sont de leur compétence en vertu du présent Traité.

La décision de la majorité des membres sera celle du Tribunal.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de considérer les décisions des Tribunaux arbitraux mixtes comme définitives, et de les rendre obligatoires

pour leurs ressortissants et d'en assurer l'exécution sur leurs territoires dès que la notification des sentences leur sera parvenue, sans qu'il soit besoin d'aucune procédure d'exequatur.

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent en outre à ce que leurs Tribunaux et autorités prêtent directement aux Tribunaux arbitraux mixtes toute l'aide qui sera en leur pouvoir, spécialement en ce qui concerne la transmission des notifications et la réunion des preuves.

Article 111

1. Chaque Tribunal arbitral mixte établira lui-même sa procédure. Il décidera de l'ordre et des délais dans lesquels chaque partie devra présenter ses conclusions et réglera les formalités requises pour l'administration des preuves. Il jugera en droit et en équité.

2. Les avocats et conseils des deux parties seront autorisés à présenter oralement et par écrit au Tribunal la défense de leur cause.

3. Le Tribunal décidera de toutes questions et espèces qui lui seront soumises, d'après les preuves, témoignages et informations qui pourront être produits par les parties intéressées.

4. Pour la procédure, la langue employée sera la langue du pays où le Tribunal a son siège et le français, et pour les audiences, sera la langue du pays où se tiennent les audiences et le français.

5. Les sièges, lieux et date des audiences de chaque Tribunal seront déterminés par le Président du Tribunal.

6. Le Tribunal conservera les archives des procès qui lui seront soumis et de la procédure y relative, avec mention des dates.

7. Chacune des Puissances intéressées pourra nommer un secrétaire. Ces secrétaires constitueront le secrétariat mixte du Tribunal et seront sous ses ordres. Le Tribunal pourra désigner en outre tous les fonctionnaires qui lui paraîtront nécessaires.

8. En cas de décès ou de démission d'un membre du Tribunal, ou si un membre du Tribunal se trouve, pour une raison quelconque, dans l'impossibilité de remplir ses fonctions, il sera procédé à son remplacemnt conformément aux principes et modalités indiqués à l'article 108.

Dans ces divers cas, le délai de deux mois, spécifié dans les deux derniers alinéas de l'article 108 commencera à compter du décès ou de la démission, ou de la date à laquelle aura été constatée l'impossibilité ci-dessus mentionnée.

SECTION VII

Traités

Article 112

Dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité et sans préjudice des dispositions qui y sont contenues par ailleurs, les Traités, Conventions et Accords plurilatéraux, de caractère économique ou technique, énumérés ci-après entreront de nouveau en vigueur entre la Turquie et celles des autres Puissances contractantes qui y sont parties :

(1°) Conventions du 14 mars 1884, du 1er décembre 1886 et du 23 mars 1887, et Protocole de clôture du 7 juillet 1887, relatifs à la protection des câbles sous-marins;

(2°) Convention du 5 juillet 1890, relative à la publication des tarifs de douane et à l'organisation d'une Union internationale pour la publication des tarifs douaniers;

(3°) Arrangement du 9 décembre 1907, relatif à la création de l'Office international d'hygiène publique à Paris;

(4°) Convention du 7 juin 1905, relative à la création d'un Institut international agricole à Rome;

(5°) Convention du 27 juin 1855, relative à l'emprunt turc;

(6°) Convention du 16 juillet 1863, relative au rachat des droits de péage sur l'Escaut;

(7°) Convention du 29 octobre 1888, relative à l'établissement d'un régime destiné à garantir le libre usage du Canal de Suez, et sous réserve des stipulations spéciales prévues par l'article 18 du présent Traité;

(8°) Conventions et Arrangements de l'Union postale universelle, y compris les Conventions et Arrangements signés à Madrid le 30 novembre 1920;

(9°) Conventions télégraphiques internationales, signées à Saint-Pétersbourg le 10–22 juillet 1875; Règlements et tarifs arrêtés par la Conférence télégraphique internationale de Lisbonne, le 11 juin 1908.

Article 113

La Turquie s'engage à adhérer aux Conventions ou Accords énumérés ci-après ou à les ratifier:

(1°) Convention du 11 octobre 1909, relative à la circulation internationale des automobiles;

(2°) Accord du 15 mai 1886, relatif au plombage des wagons assujettis à la douane et Protocole du 18 mai 1907;

(3°) Convention du 23 septembre 1910, relative à l'unification de certaines règles en matière d'abordage, d'assistance et de sauvetage maritimes;

(4°) Convention du 21 décembre 1904, relative à l'exemption pour les bâtiments hospitaliers des droits et taxes dans les ports;

(5°) Conventions du 18 mai 1904, du 4 mai 1910, et du 30 septembre 1921, relatives à la répression de la traite des femmes;

(6°) Convention du 4 mai 1910, relative à la suppression des publications pornographiques;

(7°) Convention sanitaire du 17 janvier 1912 sous réserve des articles 54, 88 et 90;

(8°) Conventions du 3 novembre 1881 et du 15 avril 1889 relatives aux mesures à prendre contre le phylloxéra;

(9°) Convention sur l'Opium signée à La Haye le 23 janvier 1912 et Protocole additionnel de 1914;

(10°) Convention radiotélégraphique internationale du 5 juillet 1912;

(11°) Convention sur le régime des spiritueux en Afrique, signée à Saint-Germain-en-Laye le 10 septembre 1919;

(12°) Convention portant revision de l'Acte général de Berlin du 26 février 1885 et de l'Acte général et de la Déclaration de Bruxelles du 2 juillet 1890 signée à Saint-Germain-en-Laye le 10 septembre 1919;

(13°) Convention du 13 octobre 1919 portant réglementation de la navigation aérienne;

(14°) Convention du 26 septembre 1906, signée à Berne, pour interdire l'usage du phosphore blanc dans la fabrication des allumettes.

La Turquie s'engage en outre à participer à l'élaboration de nouvelles Conventions internationales relatives à la télégraphie et à la radiotélégraphie.

Article 114

Il appartiendra à chacune des Puissances alliées de s'entendre avec la Turquie, dans les douze mois qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, sur les Traités, conventions et accords bilatéraux conclus avec elle et qu'il y aurait lieu de remettre en vigueur.

Article 115

Aucune disposition des Traités, Conventions ou Accords conclus par la Turquie avec une Puissance quelconque ne sera opposable au présent Traité. La Turquie s'engage en conséquence à dénoncer toute disposition inconciliable avec le présent Traité.

SECTION VIII

Dispositions Diverses

Article 116

Les Hautes Parties contractantes sont d'accord pour abroger le régime économique résultant des capitulations. Les relations commerciales de la Turquie avec les autres Puissances contractantes seront régies par les dispositions de la Convention spéciale, signée en date de ce jour, qui aura même force et valeur, au regard des Hautes Parties contractantes, que si ces dispositions figuraient dans le présent Traité.

Article 117

Les marchandises et produits originaires ou à destination du Maroc (zone française) ainsi que les marchandises et produits originaires ou à destination de la Tunisie, seront soumis en Turquie au même régime que les marchandises françaises.

Les marchandises et produits originaires ou à destination de la Libye seront soumis en Turquie au même régime que les marchandises italiennes.

PARTIE IV

VOIES DE COMMUNICATIONS ET QUESTIONS SANITAIRES

SECTION I

Voies de Communications

Article 118

La Turquie déclare adhérer à la Convention et au Statut sur la liberté du transit adopté par la Conférence de Barcelone, le 14 avril 1921, ainsi qu'à la Convention et au Statut sur le régime des voies navigables d'intérêt international adoptés par ladite Conférence le 19 avril 1921 et au Protocole additionnel.

En conséquence, la Turquie s'engage à mettre en application les dispositions de ces Conventions, et Statuts et Protocole dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité.

Article 119

La Turquie déclare adhérer à la Déclaration de Barcelone en date du 20 avril 1921 'portant reconnaissance du droit au pavillon des États dépourvus d'un littoral maritime'.

Article 120

La Turquie déclare adhérer aux Recommandations de la Conférence de Barcelone en date du 20 avril 1921 concernant les ports soumis au régime international. La Turquie fera connaître ultérieurement les ports qui seront placés sous ce régime.

Article 121

La Turquie déclare adhérer aux Recommandations de la Conférence de Barcelone en date du 20 avril 1921 concernant les voies ferrées internationales. Ces recommandations seront mises en application par le Gouvernement turc dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité et sous réserve de réciprocité.

Article 122

La Turquie s'engage à souscrire dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, aux Conventions et Arrangements signés à Berne le 14 octobre 1890, le 20 septembre 1893, le 16 juillet 1895, le 16 juin 1898, et le 19 septembre 1906 sur le transport des marchandises par voies ferrées.

Article 123

Lorsque, par suite du tracé des nouvelles frontières, une ligne reliant deux parties d'un même pays traversera un autre pays, ou lorsqu'une ligne d'embranchement partant d'un pays se terminera dans un autre, les conditions d'exploitation, en ce qui concerne le trafic entre les deux pays, seront réglées par un arrangement à conclure entre les administrations de chemins de fer intéressées. Au cas où ces administrations ne parviendraient pas à se mettre d'accord sur les conditions de cet arrangement, ces conditions seraient fixées par voie d'arbitrage.

L'établissement de toutes les nouvelles gares frontières entre la Turquie et les États limitrophes, ainsi que l'exploitation des lignes entre ces gares seront réglés par des arrangements conclus dans les mêmes conditions.

Article 124

Sous réserve de stipulations particulières relatives au transfert des ports et voies ferrées appartenant soit au Gouvernement turc soit à des sociétés privées, et situés dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité, et sous réserve également des dispositions financières du présent Traité relativement aux concessionnaires et au service des pensions de retraite du personnel, le transfert des voies ferrées aura lieu dans les conditions suivantes :

(1°) Les ouvrages et les installations de toutes les voies ferrées seront laissés au complet et en aussi bon état que possible;

(2°) Lorsqu'un réseau ayant un matériel roulant à lui propre sera situé en entier sur un territoire transféré, ce matériel sera laissé au complet, d'après le dernier inventaire au 30 octobre 1918;

(3°) Pour les lignes dont, en vertu du présent Traité, l'administration se trouvera répartie, la répartition du matériel roulant sera fixée par voie d'arrangement

amiable entre les administrations, auxquelles diverses sections sont attribuées. Cet arrangement devra prendre en considération l'importance du matériel immatriculé sur ces lignes d'après le dernier inventaire au 30 octobre 1918, la longueur des voies y compris les voies de service, la nature et l'importance du trafic. En cas de désaccord, les différends seront réglés par voie d'arbitrage. Cet arbitrage désignera également, le cas échéant, les locomotives, voitures et wagons qui devront être laissés sur chaque section, fixera les conditions de leur réception et réglera les arrangements qu'il jugera nécessaires pour assurer, pendant une période limitée, l'entretien du matériel transféré dans les ateliers existants;

(4°) Les approvisionnements, le mobilier et l'outillage seront laissés dans les mêmes conditions que le matériel roulant.

Article 125

A moins de dispositions contraires, lorsque, par suite du tracé d'une nouvelle frontière, le régime des eaux (canalisations, inondations, irrigations, drainage ou questions analogues) dans un État dépend de travaux exécutés sur le territoire d'un autre État, ou lorsqu'il est fait usage sur le territoire d'un État, en vertu d'usages antérieurs à la guerre, des eaux ou de l'énergie hydraulique nées sur le territoire d'un autre État, il doit être établi une entente entre les États intéressés de nature à sauvegarder les intérêts et les droits acquis par chacun d'eux.

A défaut d'accord, il sera statué par voie d'arbitrage.

Article 126

La Roumanie et la Turquie s'entendront pour fixer équitablement les conditions d'exploitation du câble Constanza–Constantinople. A défaut d'entente la question sera réglée par voie d'arbitrage.

Article 127

La Turquie renonce, en son propre nom et au nom de ses ressortissants, à tous droits, titres ou privilèges de quelque nature que ce soit, sur tout ou partie des câbles n'atterrissant plus sur son territoire.

Si les câbles ou portions de câbles, transférés conformément à l'alinéa précédent, constituent des propriétés privées, il appartiendra aux Gouvernements auxquels la propriété est transférée, d'indemniser les propriétaires. En cas de désaccord sur le montant de l'indemnité, celle-ci sera fixée par voie d'arbitrage.

Article 128

La Turquie conservera les droits de propriété qu'elle posséderait déjà sur les câbles dont un atterrissage au moins reste en territoire turc.

L'exercice des droits d'atterrissage desdits câbles en territoire non turc et les conditions de leur exploitation, seront réglés à l'amiable par les États intéressés. En cas de désaccord, le différend sera réglé par voie d'arbitrage.

SECTION II

Questions Sanitaires

Article 129

Le Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople est supprimé. L'administration turque est chargée de l'organisation sanitaire des côtes et frontières de la

Turquie. *Toutefois, il est constitué un Comité sanitaire chargé de diriger le personnel, les lazarets, et les installations nécessaires à la défense sanitaire des Détroits.*

Ce Comité sera composé d'un médecin turc diplômé, Président, et de trois médecins diplômés qui devront toujours appartenir à trois nationalités différentes. Ces derniers seront choisis par le Gouvernement turc sur une liste de six noms, établie de concert par le Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations et par l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique. Toutes les fois qu'il y aura lieu à remplacement, la liste des médecins proposés au choix du Gouvernement turc comprendra au moins deux fois autant de noms qu'il y aura de vacances à pourvoir.

Les indemnités des membres du Comité seront payées sur le produit des taxes sanitaires: le montant en sera fixé par le Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations.

Le Comité Sanitaire des Détroits sera dissous à l'expiration d'un délai de cinq années, à moins que le Gouvernement turc ne juge nécessaire d'en prolonger la durée.

[*Déclaration relative aux Affaires Sanitaires*

La Délégation Turque qui a eu l'honneur d'expliquer que l'organisation sanitaire turque est capable de satisfaire à elle seule les besoins sanitaires du pays et d'appliquer toutes les mesures scientifiques exigées par la situation déclare que le Gouvernement turc désire nommer pour cinq années trois médecins spécialistes européens comme conseillers de l'administration sanitaire des frontières.

Ces médecins seront des fonctionnaires turcs et dépendront du Ministère de la Santé.]

Article 130

Le Comité rédigera ses statuts et le statut du personnel sanitaire des Détroits; il établira son budget annuel et le Gouvernement turc s'engage à couvrir les dépenses telles qu'elles seront fixées par ce budget en prélevant les sommes nécessaires sur le produit des taxes sanitaires perçues dans tous les ports turcs, y compris les Détroits.

Le Comité Sanitaire des Détroits édictera un règlement sanitaire pour les Détroits, en se conformant aux dispositions des Conventions sanitaires internationales, et de la Convention sur le régime des Détroits prévue à l'article 21 du présent Traité.

Un seul et même tarif sanitaire sera appliqué à tous les navires sans distinguer entre le pavillon turc et les pavillons étrangers, et aux ressortissants des Puissances étrangères dans les mêmes conditions qu'aux ressortissants de la Turquie.

Article 131

La Turquie s'engage à respecter entièrement le droit des employés sanitaires licenciés à une indemnité à prélever sur les fonds sanitaires et tous les autres droits acquis des employés et ex-employés sanitaires et de leurs ayants droit. Toutes les questions ayant trait à ces droits, à la destination à donner aux fonds de réserve de l'ex-Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople, à la liquidation financière et administrative de l'ancienne administration sanitaire et aux modalités de la transition de l'ancien au nouveau régime sanitaire en Turquie, ainsi que toute autre question semblable ou connexe seront réglées par une Commission *ad hoc*. Il est entendu que le reliquat des fonds de la réserve générale restant après que satisfaction aura été donnée aux droits ci-dessus mentionnés, sera affecté aux besoins du service sanitaire de la Turquie, soit dans les Détroits, soit en dehors des Détroits.

Cette Commission sera composée d'un Représentant de chacune des Puissances qui faisaient partie du Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople, à l'exception de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche et de la Hongrie.

La Turquie s'engage à accepter toutes les décisions de cette Commission.

Article 132

La Turquie et les Puissances intéressées à la surveillance sanitaire des pèlerinages de Jérusalem, et du Hedjaz et du chemin de fer du Hedjaz, prendront les mesures appropriées, conformément aux dispositions des Conventions sanitaires internationales. A l'effet d'assurer une complète uniformité d'exécution, ces Puissances et la Turquie constitueront une Commission de coordination sanitaire des pèlerinages, dans laquelle les services sanitaires de la Turquie et le Conseil Sanitaire maritime et quarantenaire d'Alexandrie seront représentés.

Cette Commission devra obtenir le consentement préalable de l'État sur le territoire duquel elle se réunira.

Article 133

Des rapports sur les travaux de la Commission de coordination des pèlerinages seront adressés au Comité d'Hygiène de la Société des Nations et à l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique ainsi qu'au Gouvernement de tout pays intéressé aux pèlerinages qui en ferait la demande. La Commission donnera son avis sur toute question qui lui sera posée par la Société des Nations, par l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique ou par les Gouvernements intéressés.

PARTIE V

CLAUSES DIVERSES

1. Prisonniers de Guerre

Article 134

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à rapatrier immédiatement les prisonniers de guerre et internés civils qui seraient restés entre leurs mains.

L'échange des prisonniers de guerre et internés civils détenus respectivement par la Grèce et la Turquie fait l'objet de l'accord particulier entre ces Puissances, signé le.....1923.

Article 135

Les prisonniers de guerre et internés civils qui sont passibles ou frappés de peines pour fautes contre la discipline, seront rapatriés sans qu'il soit tenu compte de l'achèvement de leur peine ou de la procédure engagée contre eux.

Ceux qui sont passibles ou frappés de peines pour des faits autres que des infractions disciplinaires, pourront être maintenus en détention.

Article 136

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à donner sur leurs territoires respectifs toutes facilités pour la recherche des disparus ou l'identification des prisonniers de guerre et internés civils qui ont manifesté le désir de ne pas être rapatriés.

Article 137

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à restituer dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité tous les objets, monnaie, valeurs, documents ou effets personnels de toute nature appartenant ou ayant appartenu aux prisonniers de guerre et internés civils, et qui auraient été retenus.

Article 138

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes déclarent renoncer au remboursement réciproque des sommes dues pour l'entretien des prisonniers de guerre capturés par leurs armées.

2. Sépultures

Article 139

Sans préjudice des dispositions particulières qui font l'objet de l'article 141 ci-après, les Hautes Parties Contractantes feront respecter et entretenir, sur les territoires soumis à leur autorité, les cimetières, sépultures, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs des soldats et marins de chacune d'elles tombés sur le champ de bataille ou morts des suites de leurs blessures, d'accidents ou de maladies, depuis le 29 octobre 1914, ainsi que ceux des prisonniers de guerre et des internés civils décédés en captivité depuis la même date.

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'entendront pour donner toutes facilités de remplir leur mission sur leurs territoires respectifs aux Commissions que chacune d'elles pourra charger d'identifier, d'enregistrer, d'entretenir lesdits cimetières, ossuaires et sépultures, et d'élever des monuments convenables sur leurs emplacements. Ces Commissions ne devront avoir aucun caractère militaire.

Elles conviennent de se donner réciproquement, sous réserve des prescriptions de leur législation nationale et des nécessités de l'hygiène publique, toutes facilités pour satisfaire aux demandes de rapatriement des restes de leurs soldats et marins visés ci-dessus.

Article 140

Les Hautes Parties contractantes s'engagent à se fournir réciproquement:

1° la liste complète des prisonniers de guerre et internés civils décédés en captivité, en y joignant tous renseignements utiles à leur identification;

2° toutes indications sur le nombre et l'emplacement des sépultures des morts enterrés sans avoir été identifiés.

Article 141

L'entretien des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs des soldats, marins et prisonniers de guerre turcs morts sur le territoire roumain depuis le 27 août 1916, ainsi que toute autre obligation résultant des articles 139 et 140 en ce qui concerne les internés civils, feront l'objet d'un arrangement spécial entre le gouvernement roumain et le gouvernement turc.

Article 142

Pour compléter les stipulations d'ordre général des articles 139 et 140, les gouvernements de l'Empire britannique, de la France et de l'Italie d'une part, et les gouvernements turc et hellénique d'autre part, conviennent des dispositions spéciales qui font l'objet des articles 143 à 151.

Article 143

Le gouvernement turc s'engage, vis-à-vis des gouvernements de l'Empire britannique, de la France et de l'Italie, à leur concéder séparément à perpétuité, sur son territoire, les terrains où se trouvent des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs de leurs soldats et marins respectifs tombés sur le champ de bataille ou morts des suites de leurs blessures, d'accidents ou de maladies ainsi que de leurs prisonniers de guerre et internés civils décédés en captivité. Il leur concédera de même les terrains qui seront reconnus nécessaires à l'avenir, pour l'établissement de cimetières de groupement, d'ossuaires ou de monuments commémoratifs par les Commissions prévues à l'article 145.

Il s'engage en outre à donner libre accès à ces sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments et à autoriser, le cas échéant, la construction des routes et chemins nécessaires.

Le gouvernement hellénique prend les mêmes engagements en ce qui concerne son territoire.

Les dispositions qui précèdent ne portent pas atteinte à la souveraineté turque ou suivant le cas à la souveraineté hellénique, sur les territoires concédés.

Article 144

Parmi les terrains à concéder par le gouvernement turc seront compris notamment pour l'Empire britannique ceux de la région d'Anzac (Ari Burnu) qui sont indiqués sur la carte No. 3.[10]

[*La jouissance du terrain susmentionné par l'Empire britannique sera soumise aux conditions suivantes :*

1° *Ce terrain ne pourra pas être détourné de son affectation en vertu du Traité de Paix; en conséquence il ne devra être utilisé dans aucun but militaire ou commercial, ni dans quelques autres buts étrangers à l'affectation ci-dessus visée.*

2° *Le Gouvernement turc aura en tout temps le droit de faire inspecter ce terrain y compris les cimetières.*

3° *Le nombre de gardiens civils destinés à la garde des cimetières ne pourra être supérieur à un gardien par cimetière. Il n'y aura pas de gardiens spéciaux pour le terrain compris en dehors des cimetières.*

4° *Il ne pourra être construit dans ledit terrain tout à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur des cimetières que les bâtiments d'habitation strictement nécessaire aux gardiens.*

5° *Il ne pourra être construit sur le rivage dudit terrain aucun quai, jetée ou appontement pouvant faciliter le débarquement ou l'embarquement des personnes ou des marchandises.*

6° *Toutes formalités nécessaires ne pourront être remplies que sur la côte intérieure des Détroits et l'accès du terrain par la côte de la Mer Égée ne sera permis qu'après l'accomplissement desdites formalités.*

7° *Les personnes désirant visiter le terrain ne devront pas être armées et le gouvernement turc aura le droit de veiller à l'application de cet article, interdiction.*

8° *Le gouvernement turc devra être informé au moins une semaine à l'avance de l'arrivée de tout groupement de visiteurs dépassant 150 personnes.*][11]

[10] Not here reproduced.

[11] As Sir H. Rumbold explained in his telegram No. 160 of March 11, not printed, these proposed regulations had been agreed with the British delegation.

Article 145

Chacun des gouvernements britannique, français et italien désignera une Commission à laquelle les gouvernements turc et hellénique délégueront un représentant et qui sera chargée de régler sur place les questions concernant les sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs. Ces Commissions seront notamment chargées de :

(1°) reconnaître les zones où les inhumations ont été ou ont pu être faites, et constater les sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires ou monuments existants;

(2°) fixer les conditions dans lesquelles il sera procédé, s'il y a lieu, à des regroupements de sépultures; désigner de concert avec le représentant turc en territoire turc, avec le représentant hellénique en territoire hellénique, les emplacements des cimetières de regroupement, des ossuaires et des monuments commémoratifs à établir; et déterminer les limites de ces emplacements en réduisant la surface occupée au minimum indispensable;

(3°) notifier aux gouvernements turc et hellénique, au nom de leurs gouvernements respectifs, le plan définitif des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments établis ou à établir, pour leurs nationaux.

Article 146

Les gouvernements concessionnaires s'engagent à ne pas donner ni laisser donner aux terrains concédés d'autres usages que ceux ci-dessus visés. Si ces terrains sont situés au bord de la mer, le rivage n'en pourra être utilisé pour aucun but militaire, maritime ou commercial quelconque par le gouvernement concessionnaire. Les terrains des sépultures et cimetières qui seraient désaffectés et qui ne seraient pas utilisés pour l'érection de monuments commémoratifs, feront retour au gouvernement turc ou, suivant le cas, au gouvernement hellénique.

Article 147

Les mesures législatives ou administratives nécessaires pour concéder aux gouvernements britannique, français et italien la pleine et entière jouissance à perpétuité des terrains visés aux articles 143 à 145, devront être prises respectivement par le gouvernement turc et le gouvernement hellénique dans les six mois qui suivront la notification prévue à l'article 145, alinéa 3. Si des expropriations sont nécessaires, elles seront effectués par les soins et aux frais des gouvernements turc et hellénique sur leurs territoires respectifs.

Article 148

Les gouvernements britannique, français et italien seront libres de confier à tel organe d'exécution qu'ils jugeront convenable l'établissement, l'aménagement et l'entretien des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments de leurs ressortissants. Ces organes ne devront pas avoir de caractère militaire. Ils auront seuls le droit de faire procéder aux exhumations et transferts de corps jugés nécessaires pour assurer le regroupement des sépultures et l'établissement des cimetières et ossuaires ainsi qu'aux exhumations et transferts des corps dont les gouvernements concessionnaires jugeraient devoir opérer le rapatriement.

Article 149

Les gouvernements britannique, français et italien auront le droit de faire assurer la garde de leurs sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs situés en Turquie, par des gardiens désignés parmi leurs ressortissants.

Ces gardiens devront être reconnus par les autorités turques et devront recevoir le concours de ces dernières pour assurer la sauvegarde des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments. Ils n'auront aucun caractère militaire, mais pourront être armés, pour leur défense personnelle, d'un revolver ou pistolet automatique.

Article 150

Les terrains visés dans les articles 143 à 146 ne seront soumis par la Turquie et les autorités turques, ou selon le cas par la Grèce et les autorités helléniques à aucune espèce de loyer, taxe ou impôt. Leur accès sera libre en tout temps aux représentants des gouvernements britannique, français et italien, ainsi qu'aux personnes désireuses de visiter les sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs. Le gouvernement turc et le gouvernement hellénique, respectivement, prendront à leur charge à perpétuité l'entretien des routes donnant accès auxdits terrains.

Le gouvernement turc et le gouvernement hellénique, respectivement, s'engagent à accorder aux gouvernements britannique, français et italien toutes facilités pour leur permettre de se procurer la quantité d'eau nécessaire aux besoins du personnel affecté à l'entretien ou à la garde desdits cimetières, sépultures, ossuaires, monuments et pour l'irrigation du terrain.

Article 151

Les gouvernements britannique, français et italien s'engagent à accorder au gouvernement turc le bénéfice des dispositions des articles 143 à 150 pour l'établissement des sépultures, cimetières, ossuaires et monuments commémoratifs des soldats et marins turcs reposant sur les territoires dépendant de leur autorité, y compris ceux de ces territoires qui sont détachés de la Turquie.

3. Dispositions Générales

Article 152

Sans préjudice des dispositions de la Partie II (Clauses financières) et de la Partie III (Clauses économiques), est confirmée la validité de tous les ordres donnés, dépenses et affectations financières et en général de toutes les mesures prises en Turquie depuis le 30 octobre 1918 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, par les autorités des Puissances ayant occupé Constantinople, concernant notamment l'administration publique y compris la police, ainsi que les biens, droits et intérêts privés de leurs ressortissants, des étrangers ou des ressortissants turcs et les rapports des uns et des autres avec les autorités de la Turquie.

Il en est de même des ordres donnés et des mesures prises par les autorités desdites Puissances d'accord avec les autorités de la Turquie, ainsi que des ordres donnés et des mesures prises par les autorités de la Turquie d'accord avec les autorités desdites Puissances.

Aucune réclamation du gouvernement turc ou de ses ressortissants ne sera recevable vis-à-vis des Puissances ayant occupé Constantinople ou vis-à-vis de leurs ressortissants ou des étrangers, du chef des ordres ou mesures ci-dessus visés ou en raison d'omissions qui auraient pu être commises par les autorités desdites Puissances ou sur leurs ordres, relativement auxdits biens, droits et intérêts ou aux rapports de leurs ressortissants, des étrangers ou des ressortissants turcs avec les autorités de la Turquie.

[*Déclaration*

Aucune réclamation ne pourra être formulée contre les juges et autorités des Puissances ayant occupé Constantinople, du chef des décisions ou ordres donnés depuis le 30 octobre 1918 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité concernant les biens, droits et intérêts de leurs ressortissants, des étrangers ou des ressortissants turcs et les rapports des uns et des autres avec les autorités de la Turquie.]

Article 153

Toutes décisions judiciaires rendues en Turquie depuis le 30 octobre 1918 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, par un juge ou un tribunal des Puissances ayant occupé Constantinople, ensemble les mesures d'exécution, seront reconnues par le gouvernement turc.

Il en est de même des décisions rendues par la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire constituée le 8 décembre 1921 par les autorités desdites Puissances d'accord avec le gouvernement impérial ottoman.

Article 154

Dès la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, la Turquie remettra sans délai aux gouvernements intéressés les archives, registres, plans, titres et documents de toute nature [*qui*] appartenant aux administrations civile, militaire, financière, judiciaire ou autres des territoires *transférés* [*détachés auraient été transférés en Turquie*]. *Si quelques-uns de ces documents, archives, registres, titres ou plans avaient été déplacés, ils seront restitués par la Turquie, sur la demande du gouvernement intéressé.*

Dans le cas où les archives, registres, plans, titres ou documents visés à l'alinéa 1er et n'ayant pas un caractère militaire concerneraient également les administrations turques et où, en conséquence, leur remise ne pourrait avoir lieu sans préjudice pour ces dernières, la Turquie s'engage, sous condition de réciprocité, à en donner communication aux Gouvernements intéressés.

Le gouvernement turc s'engage spécialement à restituer au gouvernement hellénique les registres fonciers locaux ou tous autres registres publics qui concernent la propriété foncière dans les districts de l'ancien Empire ottoman transférés à la Grèce postérieurement à 1912, et que les autorités turques ont enlevés ou pu enlever au moment de l'évacuation.

Dans le cas où la restitution d'un ou de plusieurs registres serait impossible en raison de leur disparition ou pour toute autre cause, et s'il est nécessaire à la vérification des titres produits devant les autorités helléniques, le gouvernement hellénique aura le droit de prendre toutes copies nécessaires des mentions portées dans le registre foncier central à Constantinople.

[*Outre les archives, registres, plans, etc. visés à l'alinéa 1er du présent article les copies des documents n'ayant pas un caractère militaire et concernant les territoires détachés pourront sur demande et à titre de réciprocité être données aux Gouvernements intéressés.*

Les frais occasionnés par ces opérations seront à la charge de l'État requérant.

Les dispositions précédentes s'appliquent aux registres fonciers concernant la propriété foncière dans des districts de l'ancien Empire Ottoman transférés à la Grèce postérieurement à 1912.]

Article 155

Le gouvernement turc s'engage, à charge de réciprocité, à donner aux gouvernements exerçant l'autorité sur les territoires détachés de la Turquie conformément au présent Traité, ou dont le statut actuel est reconnu par la Turquie en vertu du présent Traité, libres accès aux archives et

documents de toute nature concernant l'administration des vakoufs dans lesdits territoires ou les vakoufs particuliers, en quelque lieu qu'ils soient situés, et dans lesquels sont intéressées des personnes ou des institutions établies sur lesdits territoires.

[*Les dispositions de l'article précédent seront appliquées dans les mêmes conditions aux archives et documents de toute nature concernant l'administration des vakoufs dans les territoires détachés de l'Empire Ottoman ou les vakoufs particuliers en quelque lieu qu'ils soient situés et dans lesquels sont intéressées les personnes ou des institutions établis sur lesdits territoires.*]

Article 156

La Turquie s'engage à reconnaître et agréer les Conventions passées ou à passer par les autres Puissances contractantes ou certaines d'entre elles avec toute autre Puissance, relativement au commerce des armes.

Article 157

La Turquie accepte et reconnaît comme valables et obligatoires toutes décisions et tous ordres concernant les navires turcs et les marchandises turques, ainsi que toutes décisions et ordres relatifs au payement des frais et rendus par l'une quelconque des juridictions de prises des autres Puissances contractantes et s'engage à ne présenter, au nom de ses nationaux, aucune réclamation relativement à ces décisions ou ordres.

[*Toutes décisions et tous ordres concernant les navires et les marchandises de l'une des Parties Contractantes ainsi que toutes décisions et ordres relatifs au payement des frais et rendus par les juridictions de prises de l'autre Partie jusqu'à la date du 30 octobre 1918 seront réciproquement considérés comme valables et obligatoires.*

Les navires sous pavillon turc, ainsi postérieurement à cette date seront restitués à leurs propriétaires.]

Article 158

La Convention particulière, conclue le ..... 192.... entre la Grèce et la Turquie relativement à l'échange des populations grecques et turques aura entre ces deux Hautes Parties Contractantes même force et valeur que si elle figurait dans le présent Traité.

Article 159

La Belgique, la Pologne, le Portugal et l'État Tchéco-Slovaque, dont les nations ont, au cours de la guerre 1914–1918, combattu aux côtés des Puissances concluant aujourd'hui la paix avec la Turquie, seront admises à accéder aux dispositions d'ordre économique et financier du présent Traité.

Cette accession, qui rétablira en tant que de besoin l'état de paix entre la Puissance accédante et la Turquie, sera notifiée au gouvernement de la République française, qui en adressera une copie authentique aux Puissances signataires du présent Traité.

[*L'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène et en ce qui concerne les territoires de la Grèce restés en dehors de l'application de la Convention sur l'échange des populations signée à Lausanne le 30 janvier 1923, le Gouvernement hellénique ainsi que les Gouvernements en faveur desquels des îles ont été détachées de la Turquie, soit en vertu du présent Traité soit à la suite des traités conclus après les guerres balkaniques s'engagent à respecter, conformément aux principes prévus par les divers traités et conventions conclus entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques antérieurement au 30 octobre 1914, les droits des Vakoufs musulmans sur leurs territoires respectifs.*]

[*Article*

Le droit de propriété foncière dans les territoires mentionnés à l'article précédent, tel qu'il résulte de la loi ottomane sur les immeubles urbains et ruraux sera reconnu sans aucune restriction.

Les propriétaires d'immeubles ou de meubles dans lesdits territoires continueront à jouir de tous leurs droits de propriété, même s'ils fixent à titre provisoire ou définitif leur résidence personnelle en dehors de ces territoires. Ils pourront affermer leurs biens ou les administrer par des tiers.

Les droits acquis antérieurement à l'annexion des territoires susdits, ainsi que les actes judiciaires et titres officiels émanant des autorités turques compétentes, seront respectés et inviolables jusqu'à la preuve légale du contraire.]

[*Article*

Les musulmans résidant en dehors de la Grèce, de même que ceux qui ont émigré avant 1912 de la Grèce ou de l'île de Crète et qui y possèdent des propriétés, profiteront en ce qui concerne leurs biens situés sur le territoire hellénique à l'exception de la Thrace Occidentale, des dispositions de l'article 10 de la Convention sur l'échange des populations, signée le 30 janvier 1923 à Lausanne entre la Turquie et la Grèce.]

Article 160

Le présent Traité sera ratifié dans le délai le plus court possible.

Les ratifications seront déposées à Paris.

Le gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au gouvernement de la République française par son représentant diplomatique à Paris que la ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, il devra transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Chacune des Puissances signataires ratifiera par un seul et même instrument le présent Traité, ensemble les autres actes signés par elle et prévus dans l'Acte Final de la Conférence de Lausanne, en tant que ceux-ci requièrent une ratification.

Un premier procès-verbal de dépôt sera dressé dès que la Turquie d'une part et l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon ou trois d'entre eux d'autre part, auront déposé l'instrument de leur ratification.

Dès la date de ce premier procès-verbal, le Traité entrera en vigueur entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes qui l'auront ainsi ratifié. Il entrera ensuite en vigueur pour les autres Puissances à la date du dépôt de leur ratification.

Le gouvernement français remettra à toutes les Puissances signataires une copie authentique des procès-verbaux de dépôt des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent Traité.

Fait à Lausanne le ..... 192.... en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du gouvernement de la République française, lequel en remettra une expédition authentique à chacune des Puissances signataires.

.....

.....

(Signatures et cachets.)

PROJET DE DÉCLARATION

Les gouvernements (britannique, français, italien, ...) reconnaissant l'intérêt de la mesure d'apaisement qui a fait l'objet de l'article 5 de la Convention intervenue entre le gouvernement hellénique et le gouvernement turc pour la restitution des otages civils et l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, se déclarent disposés à adopter, moyennant réciprocité de la part du gouvernement turc, les mêmes dispositions au bénéfice des prisonniers de guerre et internés civils turcs qu'ils pourraient encore détenir à l'exception de ceux qui auraient commis des crimes et délits de droit commun postérieurement à la date du 20 novembre 1922.

Document No. II of Final Act

Projet de convention concernant le Régime des Detroits[12]

Document No. III of Final Act

Projet de Convention concernant les Frontières de Thrace

L'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Bulgarie, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, et la Turquie, soucieux d'assurer le maintien de la paix sur les frontières de Thrace,

Et estimant nécessaire à cette fin que certaines dispositions spéciales réciproques soient prises de part et d'autre de ces frontières, ainsi qu'il est prévu par l'article 22 du Traité de paix signé en date de ce jour,[13]

Ont décidé de conclure une Convention à cet effet et ont désigné pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

.....

.....

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1

Depuis la Mer Égée jusqu'à la Mer Noire, les territoires s'étendant de part et d'autre des frontières séparant la Turquie de la Bulgarie et de la Grèce, seront démilitarisés sur une largeur d'environ trente kilomètres, comprise dans les limites ci-après (voir la carte ci-jointe)[14]:

(1°) en territoire turc, de la Mer Égée à la Mer Noire :

une ligne sensiblement parallèle à la frontière de la Turquie, avec la Grèce et avec la Bulgarie, définie à l'article 2, paragraphes (1°) et (2°) du Traité de Paix

[12] The Allied Draft of this convention, which was accepted in its entirety by the Turks, is not here printed; except for a very few minor drafting alterations, it was identical with the convention finally signed. See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 117, pp. 592–600.

[13] Note on the original:

Projet d'article à insérer dans le Traité de Paix :

La Convention spéciale, conclue à la date de ce jour, relativement au régime de la frontière décrite dans l'article 2 du présent Traité, aura même force et valeur au regard des Hautes Parties ici contractantes que si elle figurait dans le présent Traité.

[14] Not here reproduced.

signé en date de ce jour. Cette ligne sera tracée à une distance minimum de 30 Km. de cette frontière, sauf dans la région de Kirk-Kilisse où elle devra laisser en dehors de la zone démilitarisée la ville elle-même et un périmètre de 5 Km. au minimum compté à partir du centre de cette ville. Elle partira du Cap Ibrije-Burnu, sur la Mer Égée, pour aboutir, sur la Mer Noire, au Cap Serbes-Burnu;

(2°) en territoire grec, de la Mer Égée à la frontière gréco-bulgare:

une ligne partant de la pointe du Cap Makri (le village de Makri exclu) suivant vers le Nord un tracé sensiblement parallèle au cours de la Maritza jusqu'à hauteur de Tahtali, puis gagnant par l'Est de Meherkoz un point à déterminer sur la frontière gréco-bulgare, à 15 Km. environ à l'Ouest de Kuchuk Derbend;

(3°) en territoire bulgare, de la frontière gréco-bulgare à la Mer Noire:

une ligne partant du point ci-dessus défini, coupant la route d'Andrinople à Kossukavak, à 5 Km. à l'Ouest de Papas Keui, puis tracée à 30 Km. au minimum de la frontière gréco-bulgare et de la frontière turco-bulgare, sauf dans la région d'Harmanli où elle devra laisser en dehors de la zone démilitarisée la ville elle-même et un périmètre de 5 Km. au minimum compté à partir du centre de cette ville, pour aboutir sur la Mer Noire au fond de la baie située au Nord-Ouest d'Anberler.

Article 2

Une Commission de délimitation, qui sera constituée dans les 15 jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, sera chargée de déterminer et de tracer sur le terrain les limites définies à l'article 1er. Cette Commission sera composée de représentants désignés par la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce et la Turquie, à raison d'un représentant par Puissance. Les représentants bulgare, grec et turc ne prendront part qu'aux opérations concernant respectivement le territoire de la Bulgarie, de la Grèce et de la Turquie; toutefois, le travail d'ensemble résultant de ces opérations sera arrêté et enregistré en commission plénière.

Article 3

La démilitarisation des zones définies à l'article 1er sera effectuée et maintenue conformément aux dispositions ci-après:

(1°) tous les ouvrages de fortification permanente ou de campagne actuellement existants devront être désarmés et démantelés par les soins de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle ils se trouvent. Il ne sera construit aucun nouvel ouvrage de ce genre, ni organisé aucun dépôt d'armes ou de matériel de guerre non plus qu'aucune autre installation offensive ou défensive d'ordre militaire, naval ou aéronautique.

(2°) Il ne devra stationner ou se mouvoir aucune force armée en dehors des éléments spéciaux, tels que gendarmerie, forces de police, douaniers, garde-frontières, nécessaires pour assurer l'ordre intérieur et la surveillance des frontières.

L'effectif de ces éléments spéciaux, qui ne devront comprendre aucune aviation, ne dépassera pas, savoir:

(*a*) dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire turc 5,000 hommes au total;

(*b*) dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire grec 2,500 hommes au total;

(*c*) dans la zone démilitarisée du territoire bulgare 2,500 hommes au total.

Leur armement ne comportera que le revolver, le sabre, le fusil et 4 fusils mitrailleurs par 100 hommes à l'exclusion de toute artillerie.

Ces dispositions ne porteront pas atteinte aux obligations incombant à la Bulgarie en vertu du Traité de Neuilly du 27 novembre 1919.

(3°) Le survol de la zone démilitarisée par des avions militaires ou navals de quelque pavillon que ce soit, est interdit.

Article 4

Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à limiter les forces armées turques stationnées en temps de paix sur son territoire européen, à un effectif total de 20,000 hommes y compris l'effectif de 12,000 hommes fixé pour la garnison de Constantinople par l'article 8 de la Convention sur le régime des Détroits signée en date de ce jour.

Les effectifs des éléments spéciaux tels que gendarmerie, forces de police, douaniers, garde-frontières, nécessaires pour assurer l'ordre intérieur et la surveillance des frontières ne seront pas compris dans le total de 20,000 hommes ci-dessus stipulé.

Article 5

Au cas où l'une des Puissances limitrophes dont le territoire est visé dans la présente Convention, aurait quelque réclamation à formuler concernant l'observation des présentes dispositions, cette réclamation devrait être portée par elle devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Article 6

La présente Convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Elle entrera en vigueur dès que la Bulgarie, la Grèce et la Turquie l'auront respectivement ratifiée. Un procès-verbal spécial constatera ces ratifications. En ce qui concerne les autres Puissances qui ne l'auraient pas déjà ratifiée à ce moment, elle entrera en vigueur au fur et à mesure du dépôt de leurs ratifications, qui sera notifié aux autres Puissances contractantes par le Gouvernement de la République française.

Le Gouvernement japonais aura la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française par son représentant diplomatique à Paris que la ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, il devra en transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

Fait à Lausanne, le ..... 192.. en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, lequel en remettra une expédition authentique à chacune des Puissances signataires.

.....

.....

(Signatures et cachets.)

[*Article*

Le tronçon des chemins de fer orientaux compris entre Kouléli-Bourgaz et la frontière bulgare sera exploité sous le contrôle et la surveillance des représentants de la Turquie et de la Grèce.

Les voyageurs et les marchandises en provenance ou à destination de la Turquie traverseront ledit tronçon en libre transit sans être assujettis à aucun droit ou taxe ni à aucune formalité de vérification de passeports.

De même les voyageurs et les marchandises turcs allant d'Andrinople à une autre localité de la Turquie ou vice versa ne paieront aucun droit ou taxe ni subiront aucune visite ou contrôle à Kara-Agatch pendant l'arrêt nécessaire pour changement de direction de la voie principale à l'embranchement.

La ligne d'embranchement sera exploitée sur tout son parcours par la Turquie afin d'assurer le trafic de la ville d'Andrinople et les voyageurs et marchandises qui arriveront d'Andrinople par cet embranchement seront, à Kara-Agatch, acheminés sans retard vers leur lieu de destination.]

.....

.....

(Signatures et cachets.)

Document No. IV of the Final Act

PROJET DE CONVENTION RELATIVE *au régime des étrangers en Turquie* [*à l'Établissement et à la Compétence judiciaire entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées*]

L'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, d'une part,

Et la Turquie, d'autre part,

Désireux de *fixer* [*régler*] conformément au droit des gens moderne *le régime des étrangers en Turquie dans des conditions conformes tout à la fois à la souveraineté turque et à la légitime protection de leurs droits* [*les conditions d'établissement des ressortissants de l'une des Parties Contractantes sur les territoires de l'autre ainsi que les questions relatives à la Compétence judiciaire*],

Ont décidé de conclure une Convention à cet effet et ont désigné pour les Plénipotentiaires respectifs, savoir :

.....

.....

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1

A dater de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, les Capitulations concernant le régime des Étrangers en Turquie, tant au point de vue des conditions d'accès et de séjour qu'au point de vue fiscal et judiciaire, sont abrogées entre la Turquie et les autres Puissances contractantes.

CHAPITRE I

CONDITIONS D'*ACCÈS ET DE SÉJOUR* [*ÉTABLISSEMENT*]

[*SECTION I.—ACCÈS ET SÉJOUR*]

Article 2

Sur tout le territoire de la Turquie les ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes seront reçus et traités relativement à leurs personnes et à leurs biens conformément au droit commun international. Ils y jouiront de la plus entière et constante protection [*des lois territoriales*] pour leurs personnes, leurs biens, droits et intérêts. Ils y auront entière liberté d'accès et d'établissement, et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et séjourner en Turquie, en se conformant aux lois et règlements *de police, et sans être soumis de ce chef à aucune restriction quelconque, à laquelle ne seraient pas soumis les ressortissants turcs* [*en vigueur dans le pays y compris les règlements de police. Les dispositions précédentes ne portent pas atteinte au droit de la Turquie d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration en Turquie*].

Article 3

Le Gouvernement turc pourra exiger des ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes la présentation d'un passeport à l'entrée en Turquie. Pour prendre domicile ou former un établissement en Turquie, les ressortissants desdites Puissances devront être munis d'un certificat ou d'un acte d'immatriculation constatant leur nationalité, qui leur seront délivrés par leurs ambassades, légations, consulats ou vice-consulats respectifs institués en Turquie.

Article 4

En Turquie, les ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes auront le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toute sorte de biens mobiliers et immobiliers; ils pourront en disposer notamment par vente, échange, donation, dispositions testamentaires ou de toute autre manière, ainsi qu'entrer en possession par voie de succession en vertu de la loi ou par suite de dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires.

Ils pourront [*en se conformant aux lois et prescriptions en vigueur dans le pays,*] exercer *en Turquie* tous genres de commerce, de profession, d'industrie et d'exploitation permis aux nationaux, *ainsi que tout métier qu'un long usage n'aurait pas réservé aux seuls ressortissants turcs* [*exceptés ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux turcs*]. *En ce qui concerne les professions pour lesquelles des diplômes sont exigés en Turquie, le Gouvernement turc déclare dès à présent reconnaître comme équivalents aux diplômes turcs les diplômes délivrés par les autorités compétentes de l'Empire britannique, de la France, de l'Italie et du Japon et se réserve de conclure sur ce sujet des accords particuliers avec les autres Puissances.*

Ils ne seront soumis, en aucun de ces cas, à des restrictions quelconques, auxquelles ne seraient pas soumis les ressortissants turcs.

Article 5

Les sociétés commerciales, industrielles ou financières, y compris les sociétés de transport ou d'assurance et en général *toutes les personnes morales* régulièrement constituées *hors de la Turquie et* sur le territoire de l'une quelconque des *autres* Puissances *contractantes* [*Alliées*] ou qui y sont légalement reconnues, *jouiront à tous égards en Turquie des mêmes droits que les ressortissants desdites Puissances* [*seront reconnues*

en Turquie et]. *En tout ce qui concerne leur constitution* leur capacité *juridique* et *le* droit d'ester en justice, *elles seront traitées d'après* [*déterminés par*] leur loi nationale, *tout en restant soumises, quant à leurs opérations elles-mêmes en Turquie, aux prescriptions d'ordre public et de police qui y sont en vigueur; elles jouiront, à cet égard, dans tous les cas, des mêmes droits que toute autre société semblable turque ou étrangère.*

[*Quant à leur établissement, leurs opérations et la faculté d'acquérir des biens, immobiliers ou autres, ces sociétés seront soumises aux prescriptions de la loi turque.*]

Article 6

En Turquie, les ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes ne seront pas soumis aux lois [*relatives au service*] militaires. Ils seront exempts de tout service et de toute obligation ou charge remplaçant le service militaire.

Ils ne pourront être expropriés de leurs biens ou privés même temporairement de la jouissance de leurs biens, que pour cause légalement reconnue d'utilité publique et moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité. Aucune expropriation ne pourra avoir lieu sans publicité préalable.

Article 7

La Turquie se réserve le droit d'expulser, par mesures individuelles, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les lois ou règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la mendicité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure ou extérieure de l'État, les ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes, lesquelles s'engagent à les recevoir en tout temps, eux et leur famille.

Le transport des individus expulsés jusqu'au lieu de destination sera effectué par les soins et à la charge du Gouvernement turc, dans des conditions conformes à l'hygiène et à l'humanité.

Article 8

Tout avantage que la Turquie aurait concédé ou pourrait concéder à l'avenir, d'une manière quelconque, à une autre Puissance, en ce qui concerne l'établissement des citoyens et l'exercice des professions, du commerce ou de l'industrie, sera applicable *de la même manière, à la même époque et sans autres* [*dans les mêmes*] conditions aux autres Puissances contractantes, *sans qu'il soit nécessaire de faire une convention spéciale à cet effet.*

Article 9

Réciproquement, les conditions d'accès, de séjour et d'établissement des ressortissants turcs sur le territoire de chacune des autres Puissances contractantes, seront l'objet de conventions particulières que lesdites Puissances se déclarent dès à présent disposées à conclure avec la Turquie.

CHAPITRE II

[*SECTION II*]

Clauses Fiscales

Article 10

Pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire turc, comme pour l'exercice de tout genre de commerce, profession, industrie, exploitation ou activité de quelque nature que ce soit en Turquie, permis aux termes de l'article 4 aux ressortissants

des autres Puissances contractantes, ceux-ci ne seront soumis à aucun impôt, taxe ou charge de quelque nature et sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus onéreux que ceux auxquels sont soumis les ressortissants turcs.

Les ressortissants desdites Puissances, qui seraient établis à l'étranger et qui se livreraient pendant leur passage sur le territoire turc à une activité quelconque, ne seront soumis à aucun impôt, taxe, charge de quelque nature ou sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus onéreux que ceux auxquels seraient soumis les ressortissants turcs ou étrangers établis en Turquie pour une activité de même nature et importance aux termes des dispositions fiscales en vigueur dans le pays.

Les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants desdites Puissances en territoire turc ne seront soumis à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui pourront être imposés aux biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants turcs, tant en ce qui concerne l'acquisition, possession, et jouissance desdits biens, qu'en ce qui concerne leur transfert par cession, mutation ou héritage.

Article 11

Les sociétés *civiles ou* commerciales, industrielles ou financières, y compris les sociétés de transport ou d'assurance, qui sont constituées sous la loi d'un des autres pays contractants et qui [*conformément à l'article 5 de la présente Convention*] s'établissent en Turquie ou y exercent leur activité, n'y seront soumises à aucun impôt, droit ou taxe de quelque nature ou sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, auxquels ne seraient point soumises les sociétés de même nature constituées sous la loi turque.

Les mêmes dispositions s'appliqueront aux filiales, succursales, agences et autres représentations de firmes ou sociétés desdits pays, qui [*en se conformant à l'article 5 de la présente Convention*] sont établies en Turquie ou y exercent leur activité, étant entendu que lesdites filiales, succursales, agences et représentations, ne seront imposées que pour leur capital réellement investi en Turquie ou sur les bénéfices et revenus qu'elles y ont réellement acquis, ceux-ci pouvant servir à la détermination du capital imposable, s'il ne peut être *déclaré ou* vérifié.

Article 12

Si le Gouvernement turc institue, à l'effet de favoriser la production, le commerce ou les transports en Turquie, des exonérations de charges fiscales, de quelque nature ou sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, ou attribue des primes, ristournes ou tout autre mode d'encouragement, ces exonérations ou encouragements seront allouées aussi bien aux ressortissants ou sociétés des autres pays contractants, établis en Turquie, qu'aux ressortissants turcs ou aux sociétés établies sous la loi turque, de manière à éviter toute discrimination au détriment des ressortissants ou sociétés desdits pays.

[*La Turquie conserve la faculté d'accorder aux ressortissants des Puissances Alliées le bénéfice des exonérations fiscales existantes ou à établir en vue de l'encouragement de l'industrie nationale dans le pays.*]

Article 13

Pour toute matière visée aux articles précédents, les impôts, droits, taxes, provinciaux ou locaux, imposables en Turquie aux ressortissants des autres pays contractants ne seront point autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui seraient imposés aux ressortissants turcs.

Article 14

Aucun emprunt forcé ou autre prélèvement exceptionnel sur la fortune, ne seront imposés en Turquie, même en cas de guerre, aux ressortissants des autres pays contractants établis en Turquie ou y exerçant leur activité, à leurs biens, droits et intérêts situés sur le territoire turc, ainsi qu'aux sociétés, filiales, succursales ou agences constituées sous la loi d'un desdits pays et établies en Turquie ou y exerçant leur activité.

Article 15

Au point de vue des charges fiscales de toute nature, les établissements religieux, scolaires ou d'assistance établis en Turquie par des ressortissants, associations, ou sociétés des autres pays contractants, y bénéficieront, sans distinction de religion, de toutes exonérations ou facilités qui sont ou seraient accordées aux établissements religieux, scolaires, ou d'assistance turcs.

Par dérogation exceptionnelle, la franchise douanière est accordée pendant la durée de la présente Convention pour l'importation en Turquie des objets nécessaires au culte ou des matériaux et outillages destinés à l'entretien desdits établissements.

Article 16

Conformément à l'abolition des Capitulations, la Turquie n'accordera pas aux ressortissants des Puissances étrangères un traitement plus favorable qu'à ses propres ressortissants et appliquera à ses ressortissants et aux ressortissants des autres Parties Contractantes le principe de l'égalité de traitement, *tant* en ce qui concerne les matières [*fiscales*] prévues aux dispositions précédentes *qu'en ce qui concerne celles qui n'y seraient point prévues.*

Article 17

Chacune des dispositions contenues dans les articles 10 à 14 ci-dessus demeurera applicable en Turquie pendant une durée de dix années aux ressortissants de chacun des autres pays contractants, à la condition que celui-ci accorde aux ressortissants turcs sur son territoire le bénéfice d'une disposition réciproque.

Sous l'application du présent article, les dominions, colonies, pays de protectorat ou pays à mandat seront individuellement considérés comme des pays contractants.

CHAPITRE *III* [*II*]

CLAUSES JUDICIAIRES [*COMPETÉNCE JUDICIAIRE*]

Article 18

En Turquie, les ressortissants des autres Pays contractants auront libre accès aux tribunaux turcs et pourront ester en justice aux mêmes conditions à tous égards que les ressortissants turcs, sans être astreints à aucune caution ou dépöt, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, en raison de leur extranéité ou de leur défaut de domicile ou de résidence en Turquie [*à condition qu'ils soient domiciliés daus le pays dont ils sont ressortissants ou en Turquie*].

Article 19

Dans les contestations en matière *réelle ou* immobilière s'élevant en Turquie entre ressortissants des autres Pays contractants ou entre ceux-ci et ressortissants turcs,

et concernant des immeubles situées en Turquie, l'action sera portée devant la juridiction turque du lieu de la situation de l'immeuble.

Dans les contestations en matière mobilière, civile ou commerciale, qui viendraient à s'élever en Turquie entre ressortissants des autres Pays contractants ou entre ceux-ci et ressortissants turcs, l'action sera, *à défaut de stipulation contraire entre les parties*, portée devant la juridiction turque *selon les règles ordinaires du droit international.*

Article 20

En matière de statut personnel c'est-à-dire pour toutes les questions concernant le mariage et la communauté conjugale, le divorce, la séparation de corps, la dot, la paternité, la filiation, l'adoption, la capacité des personnes, la majorité, la tutelle, la curatelle, l'interdiction, et en général *pour toutes questions similaires, ainsi qu'en matière de successions mobilières, testamentaires ou ab intestat* [*le droit de famille des ressortissants des autres Puissances Contractantes*], seront seuls compétents les tribunaux nationaux ou autres autorités nationales compétentes se trouvant dans le pays duquel les parties ressortissent.

[*Ces dispositions n'empêchent pas les tribunaux de la Turquie de juger conformément aux lois nationales des parties les questions incidentes qui touchent les matières visées dans cet alinéa. Dans ce cas les décisions relatives au statut personnel n'auront la force de chose jugée que pour les parties en cause et pour la contestation décidée.*

En matière mobilière toutes les questions relatives au titre d'hérédité ou au legs et touchant le droit à la concession ou son partage seront décidées par des tribunaux ou autres autorités compétentes se trouvant sur le territoire du pays dont relevait le défunt et conformément à ses lois nationales.

En matière immobilière les questions relatives au titre d'hérédité ou de legs et touchant le droit à la succession ou son partage seront décidées exclusivement par les tribunaux ou autres autorités compétentes du pays dans lequel les immeubles sont situés et conformément aux lois de ce pays.]

Par dérogation à ce principe pourront également être compétents pour les matières *susindiquées* [*ci-dessus réservées aux juridictions nationales*], vis-à-vis des ressortissants des autres Puissances contractantes, les tribunaux turcs si toutes les parties en cause se soumettent par écrit à la juridiction desdits tribunaux, lesquels statueront d'après la loi nationale desdites parties.

Article 21

En Turquie, les ressortissants des autres pays contractants seront, en matière pénale, justiciables, *conformément aux règles ordinaires du droit international*, de la juridiction turque pour tous les crimes, délits et contraventions commis par eux en Turquie [*ainsi que pour ceux qui étant commis sur le territoire d'un État tiers rentrent en vertu des lois de la Turquie sous la juridiction des tribunaux de cette*], sans préjudice du droit de juridiction que lesdits pays auraient [*également*], d'après leur législation intérieure, sur leurs propres nationaux pour les crimes ou délits commis par ceux-ci à l'étranger.

Article 22

Le Gouvernement turc, animé des intentions formulées dans sa déclaration en date de ce jour relativement à la réorganisation de la justice, déclare que les étrangers en Turquie seront

assurés, quant à leurs personnes et à leurs biens, devant les juridictions turques d'une protection conforme au droit de gens ainsi qu'aux principes et méthodes généralement suivis dans les autres pays.

Article 23

Toutes questions relatives à l'exécution des jugements, à la communication des actes judiciaires et extra-judiciaires aux Commissions rogatoires, aux condamnations aux frais et dépens, à l'assistance *judiciaire* gratuite *et la contrainte par corps* seront, dans les rapports entre la Turquie et les autres Puissances contractantes, l'objet de conventions spéciales à conclure entre les États intéressés.

CHAPITRE IV

ÉCOLES ET ÉTABLISSEMENTS RELIGIEUX OU CHARITABLES

Article 24[15]

Aucune entrave ne sera apportée au libre fonctionnement et aux droits de propriété des établissements religieux, scolaires ou charitables, des hôpitaux, dispensaires et autres établissements analogues existant déjà en Turquie et dirigés par des personnes, communautés ou associations ressortissant aux autres Puissances contractantes.

En ce qui concerne la création de nouveaux établissements similaires, les Puissances intéressées se réservent de conclure des arrangements spéciaux avec le Gouvernement turc.

D'une façon générale, les œuvres religieuses, scolaires, hospitalières ou charitables étrangères en Turquie se conformeront, sans toutefois qu'il soit porté atteinte à leur caractère particulier et à leur libre fonctionnement, aux lois et règlements turcs régissant les œuvres analogues du pays.

Article 25

Les Puissances non signataires seront admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Cette adhésion sera signifiée, par la voie diplomatique, au Gouvernement de la République française et par celui-ci à tous les États signataires ou adhérents. Elle portera effet à dater du jour de la signification au Gouvernement français.

[*CHAPITRE III*

DISPOSITIONS FINALES]

[*Article*

L'application des dispositions de la présente Convention aux ressortissants et sociétés des autres Puissances contractantes en Turquie est subordonnée à la condition expresse de parfaite réciprocité à l'égard des ressortissants et sociétés turcs, dans les territoires desdites Puissances y compris leurs colonies, dominions, protectorats, &c.

Dans le cas où l'une de ces Puissances refuserait en vertu de ses lois ou autrement d'accorder la réciprocité par rapport à l'une quelconque des dispositions en question ses ressortissants et sociétés ne pourront profiter en Turquie de cette même disposition.]

[15] In his telegram No. 177 of March 16, Sir H. Rumbold reported that the Turks offered to substitute for this article a declaration 'which might with some modification be accepted'. See Nos. 488, 523, and 678.

Article 26

La présente Convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Elle entrera en vigueur dans les mêmes conditions que le Traité de paix en date de ce jour [*et aura une durée de 5 années*].

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

Fait à Lausanne le ..... 19.... en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, lequel en remettra une expédition authentique à chacune des Puissances signataires.

.....

.....

(Signatures et cachets.)

[*Déclaration-Annexe à la Convention d'Établissement*

La Délégation Turque déclare que les œuvres scolaires et hospitalières ainsi que les institutions d'assistance reconnues existant en Turquie avant le 30 octobre 1914 et ressortissant à la France, à la Grande-Bretagne et à l'Italie continueront à exister. Toutefois, il est bien entendu qu'elles ne pourront sous aucun prétexte et dans aucun cas se livrer à une propagande ou une action quelconque contraires aux intérêts de la Turquie ou aux lois turques.

Les œuvres et institutions susmentionnées seront au point de vue de charges fiscales de toute nature traitées sur un pied d'égalité avec les œuvres et institutions similaires turques et seront soumises aux lois et règlements régissant ces dernières.]

Projet de Déclaration relative à l'Administration de la Justice en Turquie

Les Plénipotentiaires soussignés, agissant en vertu de leurs pleins pouvoirs, déclarent au nom du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale d'Angora et en conformité de l'article 22 de la Convention en date ce jour, concernant les conditions d'accès et de séjour des étrangers en Turquie :

(1°) *Dès la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix également signé ce même jour et pour la période nécessaire à la réorganisation de l'administration de la justice à la suite des événements qui ont troublé le pays et au moins pour une période de cinq ans, il constituera un corps de conseillers légistes qu'il recrutera comme il suit.*

Le Gouvernement turc constituera une Commission comprenant cinq membres, dont deux fonctionnaires de l'Administration de la justice en Turquie et trois membres qu'il choisira parmi les juges titulaires ou suppléants de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye. Cette Commission sera chargée de présenter au Gouvernement turc les candidats parmi lesquels celui-ci nommera un nombre suffisant, d'après les dispositions ci-après, de conseillers légistes destinés à être attachés au Ministère de la Justice et affectés au service des tribunaux de Constantinople, Smyrne, Samsoun et Adana, ainsi qu'à la Cour d'Appel et à la Cour de Cassation. La Commission joindra à la présentation desdits candidats l'indication des conditions de leur engagement et de leur traitement.

(2°) *Dès la mise en vigueur dudit Traité de Paix, le Gouvernement turc constituera, d'autre part, un Comité consultatif dont feront partie, avec les fonctionnaires des différents services turcs intéressés, ceux desdits conseillers légistes qui seront affectés au Service de la Cour d'Appel et de la Cour de Cassation. Ce Comité aura pour tâche d'élaborer tous projets*

de réforme qui serait jugée nécessaire pour mettre la législation, l'administration de la justice en Turquie et le régime pénitentiaire en conformité des conditions du monde moderne.

(3°) En cas de compétence de la juridiction turque vis-à-vis des étrangers dans les affaires du statut personnel, comme dans les affaires mobilières, civiles ou commerciales, lorsque la demande dépasse 50 livres turques, ainsi que dans les affaires pénales lorsque le prévenu poursuivi en Turquie est un étranger, les tribunaux turcs énumérés au paragraphe 1°, alinéa 2, de la présente Déclaration, auront seuls à connaître en première instance desdites affaires; leurs circonscriptions judiciaires seront fixées en conséquence.

Lorsque les tribunaux et Cours visés au paragraphe (1°), alinéa 2, de la présente Déclaration auront à connaître pour jugement ou pour instruction d'une desdites affaires, leur composition comportera toujours la présence d'au moins un conseiller légiste, choisi parmi ceux prévus audit alinéa. Lorsqu'un Tribunal ou une Cour jugera, en dernier ressort, sa composition comportera toujours un nombre de conseillers légistes assurant à ceux-ci la majorité dans les délibérations.

(4°) Dans les villes de Constantinople, Smyrne, Samsoun et Adana, les mandats d'amener et d'arrêt, ainsi que les mandats ordonnant des visites domiciliaires, ne seront décernés contre des étrangers que sur le visa d'un des Conseillers légistes prévus au paragraphe 1°, alinéa 2, de la présente Déclaration, devant lequel le prévenu sera traduit sans délai.

Les étrangers qui auront été arrêtés sans mandat dans le cas de flagrant délit, ou qui auront été arrêtés ailleurs que dans les villes ci-dessus désignées, pourront toujours réclamer d'être envoyés sans délai et au plus tard dans les 48 heures de l'arrestation devant un des conseillers légistes affectés au service judiciaire dans la plus proche desdites villes. Passé ce délai la mise en liberté sera obligatoire.

[La Délégation turque a déjà eu l'occasion de faire connaître que le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie est en mesure d'assurer aux étrangers devant les tribunaux toutes les garanties d'une bonne justice, qu'il est à même d'y veiller dans le plein exercice de sa souveraineté et sans aucune intervention étrangère. Il n'en est pas moins disposé à faire procéder à des enquêtes et études pour introduire telles réformes que justifierait le progrès des mœurs et de la civilisation.

Dans cet esprit, la Délégation turque tient à faire la Déclaration suivante :

Le Gouvernement turc se propose de prendre incessamment à son service pour la période qu'il jugera nécessaire et qui ne sera pas inférieure à cinq années, des conseillers légistes européens qui seront choisis par lui sur une liste dressée par la Cour permanente internationale de Justice de la Haye parmi les jurisconsultes ressortissants des pays n'ayant pas participé à la guerre de 1914–18, et qui seront des fonctionnaires turcs.

Les conseillers légistes dépendront du Ministère de la Justice où ils participeront aux travaux des commissions de réformes législatives et seront également chargés de suivre, dans les villes de Constantinople et Smyrne, y compris le fonctionnement des juridictions civiles, commerciales et pénales turques et de recevoir toutes plaintes auxquelles pourraient donner lieu soit l'administration de la justice civile, y compris les visites domiciliaires, perquisition ou arrestation, commerciale ou pénale, soit l'exécution des peines, soit l'application des lois avec mission d'en rendre compte au Ministère de la Justice à l'effet d'assurer la stricte observation de la législation turque.

Dans les matières correctionnelles la mise en liberté sous condition devra toujours être prononcée, à moins que la sécurité publique n'en fût compromise ou que la mise en liberté provisoire n'entravât la bonne marche de l'instruction de l'affaire.

Tous compromis et clauses compromissoires en matière civile ou commerciale sont permis,

et les décisions arbitrales ainsi rendues seront exécutées sur le visa du Président du tribunal de première instance, qui ne pourra refuser son visa qu'au cas où la décision serait contraire à l'ordre public.

La présente déclaration sera valable pour une durée de cinq années.]

L'original de la présente Déclaration restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République Française, qui en remettra une expédition authentique à chacune des Puissances signataires du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour.

Fait à Lausanne, le ..... 19 ....
(Signatures et cachets.)

Document No. V of Final Act

Projet de Déclaration relative à la Participation de l'Albanie au Paiement de la Dette Publique Ottomane

L'Albanie déclare accepter de supporter les charges financières et obligations économiques qui lui incombent en tant que territoire détaché de l'ancien empire ottoman, et qui lui seront fixées conformément aux dispositions du Traité de Paix signé à Lausanne le ..... 19....

En foi de quoi le soussigné, après avoir exhibé aux Puissances signataires dudit Traité de Paix ses pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, a signé la présente Déclaration.

L'original de la présente Déclaration restera déposé dans les archives de la République Française, qui en délivrera des expéditions authentiques à chacune desdites Puissances ainsi qu'à l'Albanie et la Bulgarie.

Fait à Lausanne, le ..... 19....

Projet de Convention *relative au Régime du Commerce avec* [*commerciale entre*] la Turquie [*et les Puissances Alliées*]

L'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie, le Japon, la Grèce, la Roumanie, l'État Serbe-Croate-Slovène, d'une part,

Et la Turquie, d'autre part,

Unanimes à considérer le régime commercial résultant des anciennes capitulations comme ne correspondant plus au progrès économique de la Turquie,

Et animés du désir d'établir leurs relations économiques sur la base du droit [*international*] et dans les termes les plus propres à encourager le commerce et à faciliter les échanges,

Ont résolu de conclure une Convention à cette fin et ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir :

.....

.....

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes.

SECTION I

Article 1

A partir de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, le régime commercial résultant des Capitulations, ainsi que de la Convention du 25 avril 1907,[16] *revisée le 23 avril 1911, est abrogé entre la Turquie et les autres Puissances contractantes.*

Article 2

Dès la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention, les tarifs applicables à leur importation en Turquie aux produits naturels ou fabriqués originaires et en provenance des territoires des autres pays contractants, seront ceux du tarif spécifique ottoman mis en vigueur le 1er septembre 1916, *payables en monnaie turque.*

Article 3

Les coefficients de majoration applicables aux droits inscrits au tarif de 1916 perçus en monnaie papier, seront ceux qui étaient en vigueur au *15 décembre 1922* [*1er mars 1923*].

Toutefois, les articles qui, à la même date étaient prohibés ou qui étaient soumis à un coefficient supérieur à 12, seront ramenés audit coefficient. Les articles énumérés au Tableau annexe I seront soumis au coefficient *8* [*9*].

Les coefficients ci-dessus établis [*ainsi que le coefficient 5*] seront maintenus à moins que la différence moyenne entre la livre turque papier et la livre turque or n'ait marqué, *un* [*trois*] mois durant, une augmentation ou une diminution d'au moins 30 pour cent par rapport à la différence qui existait *à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent Traité* [*au mois de février 1923*]. Dans ce cas, et après chaque revalorisation ou dévaluation de même importance de la devise turque, la Turquie devra diminuer ou pourra augmenter les coefficients dans une proportion égale à la revalorisation ou à la dévaluation constatée par la moyenne *mensuelle* [*trimestrielle*] des changes.

Toutefois, en cas de revalorisation de sa devise, la Turquie ne sera tenue à diminuer le coefficient 5, pour les droits qui y sont actuellement soumis, qu'à partir du moment où *ce coefficient dépasserait le coefficient compensatoire de la dévaluation de la devise turque, par rapport à l'or* [*la valeur de la livre turque or tomberait au-dessous de cinq livres turques papier*].

En cas de réforme monétaire, les divers coefficients ci-dessus fixés seraient modifiés en fonction de la différence entre la nouvelle monnaie et l'ancienne, de manière à ne pas altérer l'incidence des droits de douane.

Article 4

La Turquie s'engage à supprimer dès la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention et à ne pas rétablir ensuite pendant la durée de la présente Convention, toutes prohibitions d'importation et d'exportation autres que celles qui pourraient être nécessaires pour :

(*1°*) réserver les ressources indispensables à la vie alimentaire et à l'activité économique de la nation;

[(*2°*) *prévenir les inconvénients graves menaçant son régime économique;*]

(*2°*) [*3°*] assurer la sécurité de l'État;

[16] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 100, pp. 575–8.

(*3°*) [*4°*] préserver les personnes, les animaux et les plantes contre les maladies contagieuses, épizooties et épiphyties;

(*4°*) [*5°*] empêcher l'usage de l'opium et autres toxiques;

(*5°*) [*6°*] interdire l'importation des produits alcooliques dont l'usage est prohibé à l'intérieur;

(*6°*) [*7°*] empêcher l'exportation de la monnaie or ou du métal or:

[(*8°*) *établir ou maintenir des monopoles d'états:*]

A condition qu'une équitable réciprocité lui soit accordée par chacune des autres Puissances contractantes aux termes de sa législation, la Turquie s'engage à appliquer les prohibitions, sans discrimination d'aucune sorte et, au cas où elle accorderait des dérogations ou licences pour des produits prohibés, à ne point favoriser le commerce d'une autre Puissance contractante ou d'une Puissance quelconque au détriment du commerce d'aucune Puissance contractante.

Article 5

Aucun droit *d'accise*, de consommation, *d'octroi et en général aucun droit ou taxe intérieure ou locale* ne sera applicable en Turquie aux marchandises originaires et en provenance des autres pays contractants que dans la mesure où il est perçu sur des articles identiques et similaires *dont une production effective existe* [*produits*] en Turquie.

En outre, la Turquie pourra continuer à percevoir dans les mêmes conditions d'égalité entre ses ressortissants et les ressortissants des autres pays contractants pour les produits énumérés au Tableau de l'annexe II les droits de consommation indiqués audit Tableau.

Article 6

Sous condition d'une équitable réciprocité que chacune des autres Puissances contractantes accordera à la Turquie, conformément à sa législation, tout droit d'exportation que la Turquie aura établi ou pourrait *éventuellement* établir sur un produit quelconque, naturel ou fabriqué, sera également appliqué à tous pays destinataires, sans que par un moyen direct ou indirect ou par des surtaxes ou exonérations de quelque nature et sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, il puisse être institué une discrimination au détriment du commerce de l'une quelconque des autres Puissances contractantes.

Article 7

Le bénéfice des dispositions des articles 2 à 6 [*1er* à *5*] est accordé en Turquie [*à la Grande-Bretagne, à la France, à l'Italie, au Japon*] pour une durée de cinq années, *à dater de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention*, [*et*] à chacune des autres Puissances contractantes [*pour une durée d'une année à dater de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention*], *lesquelles* [*.Les États susmentionnés*] bénéficieront en outre de tout traitement plus favorable que, pour les matières visées auxdits articles, la Turquie pourrait accorder à tout autre pays, *soit en vertu de conventions anciennes, soit* en vertu de mesures et conventions nouvelles, à l'exclusion toutefois des avantages spéciaux qu'en matière de tarifs ou généralement en toute matière commerciale, la Turquie

pourrait accorder à l'un quelconque des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu *du Traité de paix en date de ce jour* [*de la présente Convention ou à un autre État limitrophe pour le commerce de frontière*].

Article 8

Le bénéfice des dispositions *des articles 2 à 7* [*de la présente section*] ne pourra toutefois être réclamé par aucune des Puissances contractantes qui n'accorderait pas à la Turquie, pendant *la même période de cinq ans* [*toute la durée de la convention*], un traitement aussi favorable que celui *qu'aux termes de sa législation respective, elle peut accorder à tous autres pays étrangers* [*qu'elle accorde ou à déjà accordé à tout autre pays étranger*].

[*Article*

Chacune des Hautes Parties contractantes pourra exiger pour établir le pays d'origine des produits importés la présentation par l'importateur d'une déclaration officielle constatant que l'article importé est de production et de fabrication nationale dudit pays, ou qu'il doit être considéré comme tel, étant donnée la transformation qu'il y a subie.

Les certificats d'origine, établis conformément au modèle annexé au présent Traité sous le No. 1, seront délivrés soit par le Ministère du Commerce ou celui de l'Agriculture, soit par les chambres de commerce dont relève l'expéditeur, soit par tout autre organe ou groupement que le pays destinataire aura agréé. Ils seront légalisés par une représentation diplomatique ou consulaire du pays destinataire.

Au cas où l'expéditeur pourra craindre que, malgré le certificat d'origine accompagnant la marchandise, celle-ci demeure sujette à contestation, il pourra faire confirmer le certificat d'origine par un certificat de vérification établi et signé à la fois par l'auteur du certificat d'origine et par un agent technique que désignera le représentant diplomatique ou consulaire du pays destinataire. Cet agent pourra, pour procéder à la vérification, exiger toute preuve ou communication expédiente. Si la marchandise est accompagnée d'un certificat de vérification, elle ne sera assujettie à expertise légale en douane que dans le cas de fraude ou de substitution présumée.

Les colis seront dispensés du certificat d'origine quand le pays destinataire reconnaîtra qu'il ne s'agit pas d'envoi revêtant un caractère commercial.]

Article 9

Les dispositions de la présente Section sont conclues pour une durée de cinq années. La Turquie s'engage à entreprendre à tout moment et à poursuivre activement, sur la demande qui lui en serait faite par une autre Puissance contractante, avant l'expiration de cette période, des négociations en vue de la conclusion de traités de commerce.

Ces Traités seront conclus sans porter atteinte à l'équitable traitement du commerce stipulé à l'article 23 (e) du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Annexe I

Liste des articles soumis au coefficient *8* [9]

65 Pommes de terre.
69 Oranges.
121 Préparations sucrées.
130 Eaux minérales.
178 Peaux vernies.
180 Peaux de porc.
185–187–188 Chaussures.
192 Gants.
200–201 Pelleteries brutes ou ouvrées.
217–218 Meubles.
270 les articles actuellement prohibés.
273–274 et 275 Broderies, dentelles et rubans de coton.
302 Bourre de soie.
305 Gaze, etc.
306 Tulle de soie, etc.
308 Tissus de soie.
311–312 Bonneterie de soie.
314 Passementerie de soie.
324 Châles et ceintures de laine.
339 Vêtements.
348 Ombrelles, parapluies, parasoles, etc.

Annexe II

Taxes de consommation

Thé	40	piastres par kilo.
Café	20	„ „ „
Pétrole	6	„ „ „
Riz	10	„ „ „
Margarine	80	„ „ „
Bougies de stéarine ...	30	„ „ „
Savon ordinaire ...	5	„ „ „
Sacs neufs et usagés ...	5	„ „ „
Épices	30	„ „ „
Allumettes	½	„ „ boîte.
Allumettes bougies ...	1	„ „ „
Papier à cigarettes ...	1	„ „ 50 feuilles.
Briquets	25	„ „ briquet.
Sucre	15	„ „ kilo.
Biscuits	Soumis à une taxe de consommation d'après le pourcentage de sucre contenu.	
Chocolat		
Lait condensé		
Confiseries [*et glucose*] ...		
Boissons non alcooliques (gazeuses et limonades)		
[*Tombac*	*40 piastres par kilo.*]	

SECTION II

Article 10

La Turquie s'engage, à condition qu'un traitement réciproque lui soit accordé en la matière, à accorder aux navires des autres Puissances contractantes un traitement égal à celui qu'elle accorde aux navires nationaux ou un traitement plus favorable qu'elle accorde ou pourrait accorder aux navires de toute autre Puissance.

Le droit est expressément reconnu aux [*Chacune des*] Hautes Parties Contractantes [*conserve le droit*] de réserver *au pavillon national* [*à ses ressortissants et à son pavillon*] la pêche, le cabotage maritime, c'est-à-dire le transport par mer de marchandises [*et voyageurs*] embarquées dans un port *du* [*de son*] territoire *national* vers un autre port du même territoire et les services des ports, c'est-à-dire le remorquage, le pilotage et tous services intérieurs de quelque nature que ce soit.

Si la Turquie réserve au pavillon national le cabotage maritime et la pêche, elle pourra néanmoins accorder à cet égard un traitement spécial au pavillon de l'un quelconque des territoires détachés en vertu du Traité de paix en date de ce jour, sans que le bénéfice de ce traitement puisse être réclamé par d'autres pavillons.

La Turquie permettra à titre transitoire pendant une période de cinq ans le transport de marchandises et voyageurs d'un port turc à un autre port turc aux entreprises qui ressortissent aux autres pays contractants et qui ne seraient point affectées exclusivement à ce trafic.

Article 11

L'égalité de traitement sera accordée [*entre la Turquie et les autres Parties Contractantes*] à titre réciproque en ce qui concerne le droit d'importer ou d'exporter toute espèce de marchandise ou de transporter les voyageurs à destination ou en provenance du pays, et la jouissance de toutes facilités quant au stationnement, au chargement et au déchargement des vaisseaux aux ports, docks, quais et rades.

Il y aura aussi une égalité absolue, sous la même condition de réciprocité en ce qui concerne les droits, charges et paiements de toute espèce prélevés sur les navires, comme les droits sanitaires, les droits de port, de quai, de mouillage, de pilotage, de quarantaine, de phares et autres droits similaires perçus au nom ou au profit du gouvernement, de fonctionnaires, des individus privés, des associations ou des établissements de toute espèce.

La Turquie s'engage de même et moyennant réciprocité à ne grever les marchandises importées ou exportées d'aucun droit différentiel, surtaxe ou majoration de quelque nature ou sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, fondés sur le pavillon du navire importateur ou exportateur, sur les ports d'arrivée ou de départ, sur le voyage du navire ou sur les escales, les droits et taxes imposables aux marchandises importées ou exportées n'étant déterminés que par leur origine et provenance ou leur destination et étant également applicables pour toutes les autres Puissances contractantes, en vertu des dispositions de la Section I.

Article 12

Toute espèce de certificat ou de documents ayant rapport aux navires et bateaux, à leurs cargaisons et à leurs passagers qui étaient reconnus comme valables par la Turquie avant la guerre, ou qui pourront ultérieurement être reconnus comme valables par les principaux États maritimes seront reconnus par la Turquie, vis-à-vis des navires ressortissant aux autres Puissances contractantes, comme

valables et comme équivalents aux certificats correspondants octroyés à des navires et bateaux turcs.

[*Ces stipulations ne seront valables que si les certificats et documents délivrés par la Turquie aux navires et bateaux turcs sont considérés par les autres Parties Contractantes comme équivalents aux certificats et documents délivrés par elles-mêmes.*]

Article 13

Les dispositions de la présente Section seront appliquées par les Hautes Parties Contractantes pendant une période de dix années à compter de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention.

SECTION III

Article 14

La Turquie s'engage [*à condition de réciprocité*] à prendre toutes les mesures législatives ou administratives et à permettre tout recours en justice à l'effet de garantir les produits naturels ou fabriqués originaires de l'une quelconque des autres Puissances contractantes contre toute forme de concurrence déloyale dans les transactions commerciales.

La Turquie s'engage [*de même à condition de réciprocité*] à réprimer et prohiber par des sanctions appropriées l'importation ou l'exportation, ainsi que la fabrication, la circulation, la vente et la mise en vente à l'intérieur, de tous produits ou marchandises qui portent sur eux-mêmes ou sous leur conditionnement immédiat ou sur leur emballage extérieur des marques, noms, inscriptions ou signes quelconques comportant, directement ou indirectement, de fausses indications sur l'origine, l'espèce, la nature ou les qualités spécifiques de ces produits ou marchandises.

Article 15

La Turquie, à la condition qu'un traitement réciproque lui soit accordé en cette matière, s'engage à se conformer aux lois, ainsi qu'aux décisions administratives ou judiciaires prises conformément à ces lois, en vigueur dans un autre pays contractant et régulièrement notifiées à la Turquie par les autorités compétentes, déterminant ou réglementant le droit à une appellation régionale pour les produits qui tirent du sol ou du climat leurs qualités spécifiques ou les conditions dans lesquelles l'emploi d'une appellation régionale peut être autorisée; et l'importation, l'exportation ainsi que la fabrication, la circulation, la vente ou mise en vente des produits ou marchandises portant des appellations régionales, contrairement aux lois ou décisions précitées, seront interdites par la Turquie et réprimées par les mesures prescrites à l'article 14.

Article 16

La Turquie s'engage, avant l'expiration d'un délai de douze mois à partir de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention:

(1°) à adhérer dans les formes prescrites à la Convention Internationale de Paris du 20 mars 1883 pour la protection de la propriété industrielle,[17] revisée à Washington le 2 juin 1911,[18] ainsi qu'à la Convention Internationale de Berne du 9 septembre 1886[19] pour la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques, revisée à

[17] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 74, pp. 44–51.

[18] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 104, pp. 116–28.

[19] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 77, pp. 22–34.

Berlin le 13 novembre 1908[20] et au Protocole Additionnel de Berne du 20 mars 1914[21] relatif à la protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques [*sous réserve des dispositions relatives au droit de traduction*];

(2°) dès avant l'expiration du même délai, à reconnaître et protéger [*avec la réserve précédente*] par législation effective, conformément aux principes desdites Conventions, la propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique des nationaux des autres Puissances contractantes.

Article 17

Des Conventions spéciales entre les pays intéressés régleront toutes questions concernant les archives, registres et plans relatifs au service de la propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique, ainsi que leur transmission ou communication éventuelle par les offices de la Turquie aux offices des États en faveur desquels des territoires sont détachés de la Turquie.

[*SECTION IV*
DISPOSITIONS FINALES]

Article 18

Les Puissances contractantes se réservent le droit de déclarer au moment de la mise en vigueur de la présente Convention que les dispositions de ladite Convention ne s'appliqueront pas à tout ou partie de leurs Dominions jouissant d'un gouvernement autonome, de leurs colonies, pays de protectorat, possessions, ou territoires d'outre-mer soumis à leur souveraineté ou autorité et, dans ce cas, la Turquie serait déliée des obligations qui résultent pour elle de la présente Convention envers lesdits Dominions, colonies, pays de protectorat, possessions et territoires.

Toutefois, lesdites Puissances pourront adhérer ultérieurement, au nom de tout Dominion jouissant d'un gouvernement autonome, colonie, pays de protectorat, possession ou territoire, pour lesquels elles auraient, aux termes de la présente Convention, fait une déclaration qui l'excluait, de même qu'elles pourront dénoncer séparément les stipulations ci-dessus au nom de tout Dominion jouissant d'un gouvernement autonome, colonie, pays de protectorat, possession ou territoire soumis à leur souveraineté ou autorité, après avoir, à cet effet, donné un préavis de six mois.

[*Dans le cas où les colonies, pays de protectorat, etc., susénumérés ne seraient pas exclus du bénéfice de la présente Convention ils devront appliquer à l'égard de la Turquie pour chaque disposition, la réciprocité ou le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée selon que l'un ou l'autre de ces traitements y est stipulé.*]

Article 19

Les Puissances non signataires seront admises à adhérer à la présente Convention.

Cette adhésion sera signifiée par la voie diplomatique, au Gouvernement de la République française et par celui-ci à tous les États signataires ou adhérents. Elle portera effet à dater du jour de la signification au Gouvernement français.

[*La présente Convention est, en ce qui concerne la Section I, conclue entre la Turquie d'une*

[20] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 101, pp. 939–40.

[21] See *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 107, pp. 353–6.

part et la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Italie et le Japon d'autre part pour une durée de 5 années et entre la Turquie et les Puissances autres que celles énumérées ci-dessus pour une durée d'une année.

Les dispositions des Sections II, III et IV auront une durée de cinq années.

Chacune des Parties Contractantes s'engage à entreprendre à tout moment et à poursuivre activement, sur la demande qui lui en serait faite par une autre Puissance Contractante avant l'expiration de ces périodes des négociations en vue de la conclusion de nouveaux traités de commerce.

Pour le cas où, avant l'expiration des délais ci-haut prévus, de nouvelles dispositions n'auraient pas été conclues, chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes acquerra sa liberté d'action.]

Article 20

La présente Convention sera ratifiée.

Les ratifications en seront déposées à Paris aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Elle entrera en vigueur dans les mêmes conditions que le Traité de paix signé à la date de ce jour.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

Fait à Lausanne le ..... 19.... en un seul exemplaire qui sera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, lequel en remettra une expédition authentique à chacune des Puissances signataires.

.....

.....

(Signatures et cachets.)

Projet de Déclaration relative à l'Amnistie

Les Puissances signataires du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour,

Également animées du désir de faire l'oubli sur les événements qui ont troublé la paix en Orient,

Sont tombés d'accord pour déclarer :

I

Aucun des habitants de la Turquie et réciproquement aucun des habitants de la Grèce ne devra être inquiété ou molesté en Turquie et réciproquement en Grèce, sous aucun prétexte, en raison de sa conduite militaire ou politique ou en raison d'une assistance quelconque qu'il aurait donnée à une Puissance étrangère signataire du Traité de Paix en date de ce jour ou à ses ressortissants entre le 1er août 1914 et le 20 novembre 1922.

II

Aucun des habitants des territoires détachés de la Turquie en vertu dudit Traité de Paix ne devra également être inquiété ou molesté soit en raison de son attitude politique [*ou militaire*] contraire à la Turquie ou favorable à celle-ci, pendant la période du 1er août 1914 au 20 novembre 1922, soit en raison du règlement de sa nationalité en vertu dudit Traité.

III

Amnistie pleine et entière sera respectivement accordée par le Gouvernement turc et par le Gouvernement hellénique pour tous crimes et délits commis durant la même période en connexion évidente avec les événements politiques survenus pendant cette période.

[*Article*

Les ressortissants turcs qui auraient été arrêtés ou poursuivis dans les régions occupées de la Turquie par les autorités alliées du chef des infractions politiques militaires ou le droit commun soit encore pour les motifs de sûreté ou de police ou pour toute autre raison emmenés en dehors de la Turquie seront restitués au Gouvernement turc immédiatement après la signature du Traité de paix sans prendre en considération le fait qu'ils auraient été déjà condamnés ou non.]

IV

Toutes condamnations prononcées de ce chef seront annulées et toutes poursuites en cours seront arrêtées.

V

Le Gouvernement turc, partageant le souci de pacification générale dont sont animées toutes les Puissances, déclare son intention de ne pas contester les opérations effectuées sous les auspices des Alliés, pendant la période comprise entre le 20 Octobre 1918 et le 20 Novembre 1922, dans le but de rétablir les familles dispersées en raison de la guerre et de replacer les ayants-droit légitimes en possession de leurs biens.

Toutefois, cette intention n'exclut pas la possibilité d'une revision des opérations susvisées en cas de recours des intéressés. Les réclamations relatives aux personnes et aux biens seront examinées par une Commission composée d'un délégué du Croissant-Rouge et d'un Délégué de la Croix-Rouge. En cas de divergence, ces derniers choisiront un surarbitre; s'ils ne peuvent pas s'entendre sur ce choix, le surarbitre sera désigné par *le Président de* la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de La Haye.

Fait à Lausanne, le ..... 19.... en un seul exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française, et dont une expédition authentique sera remise à chacune des Puissances signataires.

(Signatures.)

[*PROTOCOLE ANNEXÉ À LA DÉCLARATION RELATIVE À L'AMNISTIE*]

Par dérogation à l'article 1er de la Déclaration relative à l'amnistie le Gouvernement turc ayant déclaré qu'il réserve le droit d'interdire le séjour ou l'accès en Turquie de 150 personnes qui rentrent dans la catégorie des individus visés à l'article susmentionné, les Gouvernements alliés ont pris note de cette réserve.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement turc pourra expulser de son territoire ceux des individus en question qui s'y trouveraient actuellement et interdire le retour de ceux qui sont à l'étranger.

Le Gouvernement turc pourra liquider les biens de ces personnes situées en Turquie et tant qu'elles ne l'auraient pas effectué directement ou par leur mandataire dans un délai de six mois à compter de la signature de Traité de Paix.

Fait à Lausanne le ..... 1923 . . . en un seul exemplaire, qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont une copie authentique sera remise à chacune des Puissances signataires.][20]

[20] For the texts of the remaining two documents of the Final Act, *Convention concernant l'Échange des Populations Grecques et Turques* and *Accord entre la Grèce et la Turquie relatif à la Restitution des Otages Civils et à l'Échange des Prisonniers de Guerre*, which were signed at Lausanne on January 30, 1923, see *B.F.S.P.*, vol. 118, pp. 1048–56.